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QUESTIONS FOR 5/22-23 HEARINGS Draft MAY 18, 2003

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Panel on "State of the System: Civil Aviation Security on September 11th" 2 PM, Thursday, May 22, 2003 Primary Questions for Panel: Prior to September 11, 2001, what did the U.S. aviation security system know about terrorist threats to civil aviation? How did the different elements of the system respond to any such information in their possession? What aviation security policies and procedures were in effect as of September 11, 2001? How did these measures comply with relevant laws and regulations? What was known of • /._ the effectiveness of this system, and how was this measured? </ "^ TESTIMONY GOALS FOR PANEL WITNESSES JANE GARVEY (FAA ADMINSTRATOR FROM (1997-2002) ty^i^D^ '. •

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1. Have the witness acknowledge the continuous cycle of warnings from experts about persistent weakness in the aviation security system, and obtain an explanation of how the witness/the system responded to these warnings and eaknesses. Have the witness explain the agency's approach/philosophy to priority setting/management of aviation security vis-a-vis competing FAA missions and priorities. 3. Have the witness explain what intelligence information she had about threats to the aviation security system prior to 9/11 and what actions she took in response. KENNETH MEAD (Then and Current Inspector General of DOT) 1. Have the witness explain the specific weaknesses in the aviation security system leading up to 9/11. 2. Have the witness explain why weakness in the aviation security system was and is such a persistent problem. 3. Receive the witness' critique of management methods and mindset with respect to aviation security.

JAMES MAY (Current Executive Director of the Airlines' lobbying wing: Air Transport Authority—Was not in the job on 9/11/2001) 1. Have the witness describe the airlines' view of the industry's role in aviation security policy setting and implementation. 2. Have the witness explain the airlines' philosophy about aviation security's priority in the industry's mix of missions and by what standards the industry determines what security measures are and are not appropriate (i.e. cost/benefit and bottom line considerations). 3. Have the witness explain what the airlines knew with respect to the performance of their security systems on 9/11? BOGDAN DZAKOVIC (FAA/DHS "Red Team" Member and whistleblower) 1. Obtain the witness' views about the culture of indifference toward security problems in the FAA. 2. Have the witness explain why he felt he had to be a whistleblower rather than go through the customary channels. 3. Have the witness share field personnel's perspective on the quality of the aviation security system and leadership.

Jane Garvey, former FAA Administrator 1. When you came to the FAA as administrator what was your assessment of the Aviation Security System and its effectiveness? By what means and what criteria did the agency measure effectiveness? What did you see as the security system's biggest strengths and weaknesses? 2. When you received audit reports citing weakness in the security system or recommendations for corrective action from the Inspector General, the GAO or other sources, what was the process for responding to the warnings and considering the recommendations? What criteria were used in determining whether to implement specific suggestions? 3. How specifically did the FAA weigh security in relation to competing agendas relative to its mission, including cost containment? What was the organizational attitude in the FAA with respect to security vis-a-vis other priorities when you arrived? What was your philosophy on this point and how was that implemented?

4. What was the process by which you received aviation security threat assessments and alerts? From what agencies and internal personnel did you receive this information and how did you receive it? 5. What exactly did you know about the nature and timing of terrorist threats, both general and specific, prior to September 11, 2001? About threats from al Qaeda? Threats from the individual hijackers? What actions did you take in response to this information? 6. Where were you when the hijacking took place on September 11, when and how were you notified, and what did you do? Were your actions and responses following the incident guided by any prepared protocol, or were your required to respond spontaneously? 7. After September 11, what steps did the FAA take to ascertain the facts about how precisely the aviation security system functioned with respect to the hijackings? What analytical, corrective and disciplinary actions were taken in response? 8. In a hijack situation, please explain your understanding of the division of responsibilities between FAA and NORAD. What protocols or procedures govern FAA's response to hijackings? Were those followed on Septemberl 1, 2001? 9. There are reports that an executive summary exists describing activity in the FAA Command Center on September 11, and containing an indication that a gun was used in one of the hijackings. What can you tell us about these reports, and specifically about the FAA's information about the use of a gun in one or more of the hijackings? 10. Because of time constraints, please supply the Commission with a written response to the following question. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was created in August 1996 in the aftermath of the destruction of TWA Flight 800 and made its report to the President in February 1997. Please comment on the following items contained in the report that would appear to be relevant to the events of September 11, 2001. Please indicate what impact each finding or recommendation had on the civil aviation security system before and after September 11, 2001: a. Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology and potential impacts on operations and passengers. Americans should not have to choose between enhanced securities and efficient and affordable air travel.

b. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening personnel. c. The FAA should require criminal background checks for all screeners and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas. d. The FAA should complement technology with automated passenger profiling. e. The FAA should certify screening companies and improve screener performance. f. The FAA should aggressively test existing security systems.

Kenneth Mead, DOT Inspector Genera 1. Over the past 17 years you have audited aviation security under the auspices of the GAO and as DOT Inspector General. Please elaborate on the impact of economic and other non-security pressures on policy setting and the quality of the security system as of September 11, 2001? Do you believe that the aviation system's governance problems were well known prior to September 11, 2001? If so, why do you believe changes were not made to correct the problems? How would you describe the Department of Transportation and the FAA's responsiveness to security audits, alerts and recommendations? 2. What was the Department's formal process for addressing problems you raised and for considering the corrective actions you recommended? Would they provide you with updates and records of decision records or was it more informal? 3. Prior to September 11, 2001, what performance indicators were employed by the FAA and DOT IG to measure the effectiveness of the passenger screening system, and what did they indicate about the quality of the systems in place at Dulles, Logan and Newark airports, and at American and United airlines? 4. What consequences resulted from any failures to meet performance requirements? In your judgment, were any such penalties effective in improving system performance? 5. What procedures were in place on September 11, 2001 to insure compliance by airports, airlines and contractors with FAA security policies and procedures? How effective were these procedures?

6. In your view, did you make any recommendations as Inspector General that the FAA did not implement or insufficiently implemented, that if adopted, would likely have stopped the hijackings from occurring? 7. What were the biggest weaknesses you identified in the aviation security system prior to September 11, 2001? What were the most serious threats to that system? 8. How can the cost of improving security at our nation's airports through the acquisition of new or additional screening equipment, modifications to airport structures to accommodate new security procedures, and the fortification to airport perimeters and access to secure areas be balanced against tight budget constraints? James May, Air Transport Association (airlines) 1. From the airline perspective, how would you characterize the preSeptember 11, 2001 performance of the aviation security system in general and the baggage and passenger screening system in particular? What methods did you use to evaluate and improve this performance? 2. What did the airlines know about the terrorist threat to civil aviation in the 3-month period leading up to 9/11? What specific steps did you take in response to such threats? 3. How did economic factors affect the civil aviation security prior to September 11, 2001? How did the airlines balance economic and security interests within that system? 4. Very specifically, what was the status of box cutters at each of the airport security checkpoints that the hijackers passed through on September 11, 2001? 5. Published reports indicate that at least nine of the nineteen hijackers were selected for special security scrutiny prior to boarding the hijacked flights: six by the computer-assisted prescreening (CAPPS) system, two because of identification document irregularities, and one because he was traveling with one of the latter two. Are these reports accurate? Specifically, what triggered each selection? In each case, what was done as a result of the selection? 6. Please describe the roles of ATA and the individual airlines, as of September 11, 2001, with respect to aviation security rulemaking, policy development and implementation. 7. Do you believe it is reasonable to conclude that, considering the security systems in place on September 11, 2001, the hijackings on that day should have been prevented? Why, or why not?

Bogdan Dzakovic, FAA/TSA whistleblower 1. For most government employees, the decision to become a whistleblower is a significant one. What made you reach that decision? 2. As an experienced field security inspector, Federal Air Marshal, and member of the "Red Team," you have seen the aviation security system from varying viewpoints. How would you describe the culture within FAA as to the importance of civil aviation security compared to other missions? What are the steps that you would take to make the traveling public safer? 3. Where do you believe the aviation security system broke down to enable the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to succeed? 4. How would you compare the security system we have today to what we had prior to September 11, 2001? Panel on "September 11, 2001: The Attacks and the Response" 9 AM, Friday, May 23, 2003 Primary Question for Panel: What tactics and weapons did the 9/11 hijackers use to defeat the aviation security system and procedures in place on September 11, 2001? What was the cause of the security failure or failures on that date: flaws in the design of the procedures; in the transmittal (including dissemination and training); in the implementation; some combination; or some other factor or factors? TESTIMONY GOALS FOR PANEL WITNESSES

NORM MINETA (Then and current Secretary of Transportation) 1. Have the witness explain his views on the effectiveness of the aviation security system, and his agenda and priorities with respect to aviation security.

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2. Have the witness explain his role and actions in the immediate response to the hijackings. 3. Have the witness explain the way in which the various elements of government are organized and coordinated with respect to budgeting, policymaking, priority setting, management and oversight of aviation security.

MIKE CANAVAN (The FAA's top security official on 9/11/2001) 1. Have the witness describe the quality of the FAA's intelligence collection and response procedures. 2. Have the witness share his assessment of the state of the aviation security system when the witness took the reins and when he left. 3. Have the witness describe his agenda for assessing and improving the aviation security system during his tenure. 4. Have the witness describe the specifics about the performance and response of the aviation security system on 9/11. Norman Mineta, Secretary of Transportation \W | iMLAM)

1. When you became Secretary of Transportation what was your assessment of the Aviation Security System and its effectiveness? By what means and what criteria did the agency measure effectiveness? What did you see as the security system's biggest strengths and weaknesses? 2. What exactly did you know about the nature and timing of terrorist threats, both general and specific, prior to September 11, 2001? About threats from al Qaeda? Threats from the individual hijackers? What actions did you take in response to this information? 3. What weapons do you believe the 9/11 hijackers used, and how do you believe the weapons got on board the aircraft? How did you arrive at these conclusions? 4. What information do we have of any other hijackings which were planned in conjunction with the four 9/11 hijackings but which were not carried out? What steps did you take to screen other flights on that day for potential hijackers? 5. hi responding to the events of September 11, 2001, what policies and procedures were in place to define and facilitate your role and that of your department in relationship to the FAA and to other departments? 6. Where were you when the hijacking took place on September 11, when and how were you notified, and what did you do? Were your actions and responses following the incident guided by any prepared protocol, or were your required to respond spontaneously?

7. In your opinion, was the introduction of weapons onto the four hijacked flights a result of flaws in FAA regulations, air carrier security plans, screener performance, some combination of these, or some other factor? 8. Published accounts indicate that Boston flight controllers determined that American Airlines Flight 11 had been hijacked as early as 8:13 a.m., and that two flight attendants telephoned American Airlines personnel with confirmation that a hijacking occurred at 8:21 a.m. Yet according to the FAA official timeline, NORAD was not notified until 8:40 a.m. Are these reports accurate? If so, what was the cause of the delay in notification? These accounts also indicate that American Airlines Flight 77 turned off course at 8:55 a.m. By that time the fate of AA11 was known and UA flight 175 had been declared to be hijacked. Why was Flight AA77 not immediately declared to be hijacked? Why did it take until 9:24 a.m. to notify NORAD? 9. Published reports indicate that at least nine of the nineteen hijackers were selected for special security scrutiny prior to boarding the hijacked flights: six by the computer-assisted prescreening (CAPPS) system, two because of identification document irregularities, and one because he was traveling with one of the latter two. Are these reports accurate? Specifically, what triggered each selection? In each case, what was done as a result of the selection? 10. What is the residual security role of the Department of Transportation now that TSA has been created and moved over to the Department of Homeland Security? How are the individual transportation modal agencies coordinating with TSA? 11. Because of time constraints, please supply the Commission with a written response to the following question. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was created in August 1996 in the aftermath of the destruction of TWA Flight 800 and made its report to the President in February 1997. Please comment on the following items contained in the report that would appear to be relevant to the events of September 11, 2001. Please indicate what impact each finding or recommendation had on the civil aviation security system before and after September 11, 2001: a. Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because government and industry often found themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology and potential impacts on operations and passengers. Americans should not have to choose between enhanced security and efficient and affordable air travel. b. The FAA should work with industry to develop a national program to increase the professionalism of the aviation security workforce, including screening personnel. c. The FAA should require criminal background checks for all screeners and all airport and airline employees with access to secure areas.

d. The FAA should complement technology with automated passenger profiling. e. The FAA should certify screening companies and improve screener performance. f. The FAA should aggressively test existing security systems. MG Craig McKinley, NORAD 1. Officials from NORAD have repeatedly expressed that ~ prior to 9/11 NORAD's mission was to protect the U.S. from EXTERNAL threats. ["Until the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, NORAD's focus was almost exclusively fixed on threats coming toward the Canadian and American borders, not terrorism in our domestic airspace." (NORAD website, 5/13/03)] Why was NORAD exclusively focused on external threats? Prior to 9/11 was any consideration given to the possibility that America could be attacked by a domestic aircraft? 2. What was NORAD's written policy on 9/11 with respect to hijacked airliners? What policies and procedures were in place to respond to such incidents? Please explain NORAD's role vis-a-vis the FAA in responding to hijackings. 3. In terms of response on the morning of 9111, why were NORAD's assets limited to 14 planes at 7 locations? Why couldn't NORAD task ANY military aircraft to respond to the hijackings? For example, as I understand it General McKinley, you wear two hats; you're both the Commander of NORAD's continental region (CONAR) and you're the Commander of the First Air Force. Why couldn't your predecessor on 9/11 — General Arnold — order any military plane under the command of the First Air Force to respond to the hijackings? 4. When and how did NORAD first learn of the hijackings on 9/11 ? What specifically was NORAD told? Please describe the chain of events and decisions that took place after FAA's notification. 5. Published reports indicate that, on the morning of 9/11, the President authorized the military to shoot down commercial flights that were suspected to be controlled by terrorists. What is your understanding of the substance of the order? How was it communicated down the chain of command? Did any of the pilots that were scrambled receive the order? 6. Published reports indicate that there was a conference call that morning involving NORAD, the FAA and other decision makers. When was the Air Threat Conference Call initiated and by whom? Who participated in the call? What decisions were made and what orders were given on the call?

LTG Mike Canavan (ret.), former Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 1. Based on reports from the GAO and DOT Inspector General and the recommendations from the Pam Am 103 and Gore Commissions, the FAA's "reactive" culture and aviation security system had demonstrated weaknesses for many years. After becoming the head of FAA's Civil Aviation Security, what actions did you take to discern the effectiveness of the system prior to September 11, 2001? What were the metrics and methods used to determine the effectiveness? How did you judge the usefulness of those techniques? What actions did you take to strengthen the system? How did the FAA, DOT, industry, and Congress receive those initiatives? 2. Over the summer leading up to September 11th, the "chatter" in the intelligence community resulted in increased security posture throughout the US Government. It is reported that a National Security Council Counterterrorism Security Group meeting in mid-June led to the FAA's issuance of a security directive to the industry. In your view, what were the most significant threats to civil aviation as of September 10, 2001? How did the system of aviation security governance and information (intelligence) sharing with the industry affect the system's response to the threat? 3. On September 10, 2001, how confident were you that the terrorist threat to US civil aviation could be effectively countered? Were the security directives in place on September 11th adequate? 4. Each air carrier can request exceptions/changes to the FAA's Air Carrier Standard Security Program (ACSSP). What was the process to submit and approve/deny a request for a modification? More specifically, as of September 11, 2001, what was the status of "box cutters" as contraband/prohibited items (ACSSP, Appendix I, Dangerous or Deadly Weapons Guidelines)? Was there or could there have been a difference between the FAA's requirements under the ACSSP and a carrier's passenger screening requirements? Could there have been differences between carriers' passenger screening requirements so that "box cutters" were contraband on one carrier and not on another? Would FAA have known or approved the differences? 5. There was a FAA "Executive Summary" dated September 11, 2001, written for the Administrator, FAA. In the second paragraph regarding American Airlines Flight 11, the summary states: ".. .At approximately 9:18 a.m., it was reported that the two crew members in the cockpit were stabbed. The flight then descended with no communication from the flight crewmembers. The American Airlines FAA Principal Security Inspector (PSI) was notified by Suzanne Clark of the American Airlines Corporate Headquarters, that an on board flight attendant contacted the American Airlines Operations Center and informed that a passenger located in seat 10B shot and killed a passenger in seat 9B at 9:20 a.m.

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The passenger killed was Daniel Lewin, shot by passenger Satam Al Suqami. One bullet was reported to have been fired...." FAA subsequently stated that the reference to a gun onboard AAL Flight 11 was erroneous. What is your recollection of the issue? Would it surprise you, given the effectiveness of the aviation security system on September 11th, that in addition to box cutters, a gun could have been brought onboard? 6. In your opinion, was the introduction of weapons onto the four hijacked flights a result of flaws in FAA regulations, air carrier security plans, screener performance, some combination, or other factors? Given your experience in terrorism/counterterrorism operations, would the deterrent factor of the possibility of Federal Air Marshals aboard made a difference in the operational planning decisions to conduct or how to conduct the events of September 11th? 7. Did your organization conduct an after action/lessons learned analysis of what happened on September 11, 2001? What are your recommendations for the improvement of civil aviation? 8. Prior to 9/11, did the FAA consider the possibility that a plane could be used as a weapon? Was there ever a training exercise or publication that addressed that scenario? If not, why not? Panel on "Reforming Civil Aviation Security: Next Steps" 11 AM, Friday, May 23, 2003 Primary Question for Panel: What has changed with respect to civil aviation security policies and procedures since 9/11/01? What further improvements are needed (including consideration of arming commercial aviation and other pilots; "trusted traveler" and "trusted shipper" programs; CAPPS II and other individual profiling systems; background checks on transportation employees; missile defense for civilian aircraft; and regulation of flight schools)? TESTIMONY GOALS FOR PANEL FOR ALL WITNESSES 1. Have the witnesses explain their view of the state of the aviation security system now compared to 9/11 and in terms of the transfer of jurisdiction from DoT to DHS? 2. Have the witnesses provide their view on the greatest threats to aviation security in the future? WITNESSES

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3. Have the witnesses provide their recommendations on what specific steps we should take to improve aviation security. 4. Have the witnesses describe how we should assess risk, and recommend what criteria should be utilized to assess security initiatives. 5. Have each witness describe his/her vision for the future and about how to create a layered, tf&amkss aviation security system that works. dm. JuiHlTLuirTSA Administrator 1. How do we currently measure success in the various components of the aviation security system? How should we measure it? More specifically, what do we currently know about the performance of the passenger and baggage screening system? 2. What is the status, and your evaluation, of the following specific aviation security laws or proposals: a. b. c. d. e. Arming of commercial air pilots Trusted Traveler program CAPPS II Biometric identification of passengers and airport employees Flight school student screening

3. According to the Congressional Research Service, for FY2003 TSA has received total appropriations of $5.18 billion, of which $4.52 billion, or 87 percent, has been allocated for aviation security functions mandated by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATS A). Furthermore, $3 billion, or 58 percent of the total, is being used for airport screening alone. In your view, does this represent an optimal prioritization, both among all transportation modes and within civil aviation security itself? If not, how should these priorities be reordered? 4. What is the status of the Transportation Security Oversight Board established by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)? Specifically, how is it progressing in fulfilling its mandates to facilitate the coordination and sharing of transportation-related intelligence information, and to develop a common database in support of this effort? 5. What do you consider to be the most serious threats to civil aviation security today? How should security, convenience and privacy concerns be

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balanced with respect to these threats? What role do you think research and development efforts will play in responding to these threats? 6. Current law requires TSA to remain intact for two years but allows the agency to be restructured after that time. What, if any, restructuring options are currently being considered, and why? What restructuring options should be considered? 7. In April testimony to this Commission, Gerald Dillingham of the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified five long-term institutional challenges facing TSA and our national transportation security efforts: a. Developing a comprehensive risk management approach b. Ensuring that funding needs are identified and prioritized, and costs are controlled c. Establishing effective coordination among the many responsible public and private entities d. Ensuring adequate workforce competence and staffing levels e. Implementing security standards for transportation facilities, workers and security equipment. What is your evaluation of the GAO analysis? What is TSA currently doing to address each of these challenges? What more remains to be done? 8. TSA's management of the new screening system has been much discussed of late in both the Congress and the news media. Please tell the Commission about the current status of TSA background checks for TSA screeners. News accounts indicate that over 20,000 of your 55,000 screeners have not received completed background checks. Are these reports accurate? If so, why is this the case? When do you intend to complete these background checks? 9. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (or ATSA) prescribed a number of actions to improve the security of the aviation system, which TSA had to implement within tight time frames. In what specific ways is the aviation system more secure today than it was prior to September 11, 2001? What were the positive effects of ATSA? Have there been any negative effects, or unintended consequences from the new law? 10. What is the status of the memoranda of agreement that TSA has been pursuing in order to facilitate cooperation and coordination with the various transportation modal agencies? 11. Because of time constraints, please supply the Commission with written responses to the following series of questions:

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a. Compare and contrast the current system of passenger and baggage screening with the one it replaced in terms of hiring standards, background checks, training, equipment, supervision and performance measurement. b. Provide a summary of the current status of the transportation security recommendations made by the 1990 President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism ("Lockerbie/Pan Am 103 Commission") and the 1997 White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security ("Gore Commission"). c. The 2002 National Research Council report, Making the Nation Safer, declared, "the most critical need in the transportation sector is a systematic approach to security." More specifically, it called for development of "coherent, layered security systems for all transportation modes, particularly shipping containers and vehicles that contain large quantities of toxic or flammable materials." Finally, the NRC recommended that TSA "establish a strategic research and planning office - attuned to but distinct from the agency's operational and enforcement responsibilities." What is your evaluation of these findings and recommendations, and what is TSA currently doing to address them? What more needs to be done? d. The 2002 Hart-Rudman task force report, America - Still Unprepared, Still in Danger, includes among its "key" recommendations a charge to "Recalibrate the agenda for transportation security; the vulnerabilities are greater and the stakes are higher in the sea and land modes than in commercial aviation. Systems such as those used in the aviation sector, which start from the assumption that every passenger and every bag of luggage poses an equal risk, must give way to more intelligence-driven and layered security approaches that emphasize prescreening and monitoring based on risk criteria." What is your evaluation of these comments, and what is TSA currently doing to address them? What more needs to be done? MG O.K. Steele (ret.), former Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security 1. As the first Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, following the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (Pam Am 103 Commission), you were in a key advantage point to develop and execute the implementation plan for civil aviation security issues. The Commission found that the FAA was a "reactive" agency and the civil aviation security system needed major reform. What is your assessment of the progress made during your threeyear tenure? What were the major impediments to more progress?

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2. During 1991, you established the "Red Team" and took steps to strengthen the Federal Air Marshal Program. Why did you take those actions? What were factors that impacted the scope and implementation of those initiatives? Did you consider expanding the FAM program to cover domestic flights? If not, why? What actions did you take to close the gap between "Red Team" findings and FAA's normal testing program? Please share with the Commission your understanding of the current status of the "Red Team" approach and the Air Marshal Program. 3. The Pan Am 103 Commission recommended that the FAA's Intelligence Division should be moved to the Department of Transportation. The Secretary did not concur. What was your assessment of the intelligence sharing process to include provision of information to the industry? What was the relationship with the DOT's Office of Intelligence and Security? What process or risk management system did you use to determine the security levels and measures required by the industry? How were economic and cost factors used to determine requisite industry actions? How would you assess the current state of information-sharing and threat assessment within the civil aviation security system? 4. Many of the Pan Am 103 Commission recommendations appear to have been still relevant on September 11th and may still be today. What are your recommendations to this Commission for the improvement of the civil aviation security system of tomorrow? 5. Because of time constraints, please supply the Commission with a written response to the following question. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was convened in the aftermath of the December 21, 1988 destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, issued its final report to the President in May of 1990. As Associate Administrator of Civil Aviation Security from 1990 to 1992, you had a key vantage point with regard to the reaction to and implementation of the Commission's recommendations. Please comment on the following findings and recommendations of the Commission, which would appear to have been relevant 11 years later on September 11, 2001. For each, please indicate what was done back in the early 1990s, and your assessment of what has been done thereafter, both before and after September 11, 2001: a. The Commission finds that the U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public. The system needs major reform. b. The Commission finds the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency - preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats. c. The FAA should seek the assistance of the FBI in making a thorough assessment of the current and potential threat to the domestic air transportation system.

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d. The Congress should require criminal background checks for all airport facilities. The legislation should identify certain criminal records that indicate a potential security risk and enable airport operators to deny employment on that basis. e. The FAA must begin to develop stronger security measures for controls over checked baggage, controls over persons with access to aircraft, testing of security systems, the use of modern x-ray equipment, and the prescreening of passengers. f. The FAA must take the lead in stressing the role of human factors in the security equation; training must be improved. Mary Schiavo, former DOT Inspector General 1. What do you believe will be the most serious threats to aviation security in the future, and how can we be proactive in identifying and addressing these threats to prevent an incident, rather than responding after one occurs? 2. What changes do you believe must take place in government's approach, mindset and culture with respect to civil aviation security in order to facilitate sustained improvement in the system? 3. Given that there is no such thing as a perfect security system, and a certain amount of risk is always present despite our best efforts, particularly in a free and mobile society, how do we balance the imperative of effective security with the public desire for efficiency, cost-effectiveness and reasonable levels of convenience? 4. What can the public do to play its rightful role in helping keep our aviation system secure? 5. How can the cost of improving security at our nation's airports through the acquisition of new or additional screening equipment, modifications to airport structures to accommodate new security procedures, and the fortification to airport perimeters and access to secure areas be balanced against tight budget constraints? 6. Because of time constraints, please supply the Commission with a written response to the following question. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which was convened in the aftermath of the December 21, 1988 destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, issued its final report to the President in May of 1990. As DOT Inspector General, you had a key vantage point with regard to the reaction to and implementation of the Commission's recommendations. Please comment on the following findings and recommendations of the Commission, which would appear to have been relevant

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11 years later on September 11, 2001. For each, please indicate what was done back in the early 1990s, and your assessment of what has been done thereafter, both before and after September 11, 2001: a. The Commission finds that the U.S. civil aviation security system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level of protection for the traveling public. The system needs major reform. b. The Commission finds the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency - preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats. c. The FAA should seek the assistance of the FBI in making a thorough assessment of the current and potential threat to the domestic air transportation system. d. The Congress should require criminal background checks for all airport facilities. The legislation should identify certain criminal records that indicate a potential security risk and enable airport operators to deny employment on that basis. e. The FAA must begin to develop stronger security measures for controls over checked baggage, controls over persons with access to aircraft, testing of security systems, the use of modern x-ray equipment, and the prescreening of passengers. f. The FAA must take the lead in stressing the role of human factors in the security equation; training must be improved.

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