You are on page 1of 76


Institute Of Information Technology Abbottabad

Assignment # 01

Subject: Topic: Submitted To: Submitted By:

SEMINAR IN BUSINESS POLICIES PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM Dr Mansoor Shahab Anum Raheem (SP12-MBO-010) Hassan Roshan (SP12-MBO-009) Usman Alam (SP12-MBO-005)

Date: April 9th, 2013


4 4 6 7 7 9 10 10 11 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 15 16 18 19 23 24 25 26 26

INFRASTRUCTURE Stockpile Second strike capability MIRV capability Personnel Doctrine Theory of deterrence Nuclear Command and Control U.S. assistance for arsenal security Security concerns of the United States National Security Council Strategic combat commands Weapons development agencies Delivery systems Future delivery systems Proliferation ABDUL QADEER KHAN Proliferation of URENCO technology International Atomic Energy Agency References

27 30 32 33 33 33 35 37 39 39 41 42 42 44 46 46 49 57 64 73


As of 2012, nuclear power in Pakistan is provided by 3 licensed-commercial nuclear power plants. Pakistan is the first Muslim country in the world to construct and operate civil nuclear power plants. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), the scientific and nuclear governmental agency, is solely responsible for operating these power plants. As of 2012, the electricity generated by commercial nuclear power plants constitutes roughly ~3.6% of electricity generated in Pakistan, compared to ~62% from fossil fuel, ~33% from hydroelectric power and ~0.3% from Coal

electricity. Pakistan is one of the four nuclear armed states (along with India, Israel, and North Korea) that is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but is a member in good standing of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Professor (and later Nobel laureate) Abdus Salam, as Science Advisor to the President, persuaded President Ayub Khan, to establish Pakistan's first commercial nuclear power reactor, near Karachi. Known as Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), the commercial power plant is a small 137 MWe CANDU reactor, a Canadian pressurized heavy water reactor. PAEC's Parvez Butt, a nuclear engineer, was project-director. The KANUPP began its operations in 1972, and it was inaugurated by President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Munir Ahmad Khan as PAEC chairman. The KANUPP which is under international

safeguards is operated at reduced power. In 1969, France's Commissariat à l'énergie atomique and United Kingdom's British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) contracted with PAEC to provide plutonium and nuclear reprocessing plants in Pakistan. Per agreement, the PAEC engineers were the lead designers of the power plants and nuclear reprocessing facilities. While the BNFL and CEA provided the funds, technical assistance and nuclear materials. The work on projects did not start until 1972, and as a result

of India's Operation Smiling Buddha — a surprise nuclear test in 1974 — the BNFL cancelled the projects with PAEC. In 1974, PARR-II Reactor were commissioned, and its project directors were Munir Ahmad Khan and Hafeez Qureshi. The PARR-II is an indigenous reactor that was built under the auspices of PAEC's engineers and scientists. In 1977, due to pressure exerted by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the CEA cancelled the projects with PAEC immediately. Without the assistance of United Kingdom and France, the PAEC engineers completed the plutonium nuclear reprocessing plant — New Labs — and the plutonium reactor — Khushab Nuclear Complex. Both power plants are commercial power plants control by PAEC. In 1989, People's Republic of China signed an agreement with Pakistan to provide 300 MWe CHASNUPP-I power plant under the IAEA safeguards. In 1990, both France and Soviet Union considered the Pakistan's request to provide the commercial nuclear power plants under the IAEA safeguards. But, after the American Ambassador to Pakistan's Robert Oakley expressed U.S. displeasure at the agreements between the Soviet Union and France, the contracts were cancelled. By the 2000, China had expanded its contract with PAEC and is currently assisting in construction of III, and IV power plants. II was completed in April 2011. Due to its growing electricity demands, the Pakistan Government ordered PAEC to set up nuclear power plants in the country. According to PAEC, the goal is to produce 8800 MW electricity by the 2030. Prime minister Yousaf Raza Gillani announced the Pakistan national energy policy in 2010 while the feasibility report was submitted in Prime Minister's Secretariat — the official residence of prime minister of Pakistan. The PAEC are currently planning to lead the construction of KANUPP-II nuclear power plant — a 1000 MWe power plant — and the KANUPP-III — 1000 MWe. While the commercial plants will be indigenously built, the preliminary work is put on hold as of 2009. In 2010, the Nuclear Power Fuel Complex (PNPFC) — a nuclear reprocessing power plant — was commissioned. PAEC led the construction, designing, and maintenance of the facility, while China and IAEA provided funds to the facility.


As of today, only 3 three commercial nuclear power plants are currently operating. The list provided the information about current and future commercial nuclear power plants.

Nuclear power reactors Type Location



capacit capacit y y

Constructio Connecte Commercia n start d to grid l operation



Chasma, Punjab Province

300 MWe

325 MWe

1 August 1993

13 June 2000

15 September 2000



Chasma, Punjab Province

300 MWe

325 MWe

28 December 2005

14 March 2011

20 May 2011



Chasma, Punjab Province

340 MWe

330 MWe

28 April 2009 2016




Chasma, Punjab Province

340 MWe

330 MWe






Chasma, Punjab Province

1000 MWe

1000 MWe




Paradise KANUPP-I PHWR Point, Karachi, Sind h Province

125 MWe

137 MWe

1 August 1966

18 October 1971

7 December 1972





Paradise Point, Karachi, Sind h Province

work started 1000 MWe N/A but then the project was put on hold in 2009. N/A N/A

Designing of reactor is Paradise KANUPP-III PHWR

Point, Karachi, Sind h Province

1000 MWe

completed. N/A But the construction has not yet started



The People's Republic of China has been a strong vocal and avid supporter of Pakistan's nuclear power generation programme from the early on. The history of Chinese-Pakistan cooperation dates back to 1970s when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as prime minister, first visited China. The strong academic interaction between Chinese and Pakistan scientists was begun in 1970s. In 1986, the scientists from KRL and military engineers of Pakistan Army Engineering Corps built a HEU enrichment plant in Hanzhong province of PRC, and provided technical assistance to China in weapongrade centrifuge technology for Chinese nuclear weapons. From 1980s to present, China has contracted with Pakistan to use of civil and electricity purpose use of nuclear technology.

As of 1990 contract, the second commercial nuclear power plant is CHASNUPP-I in Punjab—a 325 MWe PWR—supplied by China's CNNC under IAEA safeguards. The main part of the plant was designed by Shanghai Nuclear Engineering Research and Design Institute (SNERDI), based on Qinshan Nuclear Power Plant. The commercial nuclear power plant began its operations May 2000. In 2005, China expanded its contract with Pakistan, and vowed to build more nuclear power plants in Pakistan. Construction of its twin, CHASNUPP-II, started in December 2005. It is reported to cost PkR 51.46 billion (US$ 860 million, with $350 million of this financed by China). In a meeting with IAEA, an IAEA safeguard agreement with PAEC and IAEA was signed in 2006, and the grid connection is expected in spring of 2011. The enriched fuel takes place in Pakistan's PNPFC facility, which is also under IAEA safeguards. In 2005, both Pakistan government and the Chinese government adopted an Energy Security Plan, calling for a huge increase in generating capacity to more than 160,000 MWe by 2030. Pakistan Government plans for lifting nuclear capacity to 8800 MWe, 900 MWe of it by 2015 and a further 1500 MWe by 2020. Plans included four further Chinese reactors of 300 MWe each and seven of 1000 MWe, all PWR. There were tentative plans for China to build two 1000 MWe PWR units at Karachi as KANUPP II and III, but China then in 2007 deferred development of its CNP-1000 type which is the only one able to be exported. However, Last November 2012, China rolled out its new advanced 1000 MW pressurized water nuclear power reactor, ACPR-1000 at the Hi-Tech Fair in Shenzhen. This reactor was "independently" developed by China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation with full IPR and made its debut at the 13th China Hi-Tech Fair, according to the official media. Since this reactor has been developed by China independently without the involvement of foreign suppliers, it is quite likely that China will export this reactor to Pakistan. PAEC is now currently preparing reports and planning to set up small but more commercial nuclear power plants indigenously. In June 2008, the Pakistan Government announced plans to build commercial nuclear power plants III and IV commercial nuclear power plants at Chashma, Punjab Province, each with 320–340 MWe and costing PKR 129 billion, 80 billion of this from international

sources, principally China. A further agreement for China's help with the project was signed in October 2008, and given prominence as a counter to the US –India agreement shortly preceding it. Cost quoted then was US$ 1.7 billion, with a foreign loan component of $1.07 billion. In March 2009, SNERDI announced that it was proceeding with design of CHASNUPPIII and IV, with China Zhongyuan Engineering as the general contractor. The PAEC said Beijing was financing 85% of the US$ 1.6 billion project. Contracts for CHASNUPP-I and II were signed in 1990 and 2000, before 2004 when China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which maintains an embargo on sales of nuclear equipment to Pakistan, but there are questions about China's supply of Chasma-3 and 4. On 24 September 2010, China informed the IAEA that it will implement an agreement with Pakistan on the export of two nuclear reactors for Islamabad's Chashma nuclear complex. Beijing has said that the reactor deal is part of a 2003 agreement between the two countries, a claim many have questioned, though Germany has accepted. These will be the third and fourth reactors at the complex. According to the Chinese communication to the IAEA, the reactors will be placed under international safeguards. Concerns have been expressed over the lack the safety features incorporated into the Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 reactors, which are alleged to use a design which is not considered safe enough to build in China. In March 2013, Pakistan and China agreed to build a 1000 MW CHASNUPP-5 at Chashma Nuclear Power Complex.


In May 2009, France agreed to cooperate with Pakistan on nuclear safety, which Pakistan's Foreign Minister called a 'significant development' related to the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to Pakistan. But later a spokesman for the French presidency was careful to rein in expectations, saying Mr Sarkozy had "confirmed France was ready, within the framework of its international agreements, to co-operate with Pakistan in the field of nuclear safety."

At U.S.–Pakistan strategic dialogue 24 March, Pakistan pressed for a civil nuclear cooperation deal similar to that with India. One analyst suggested that such a deal was unrealistic at present but might be possible in 10–15 years.

In 2011, Dr. Irfan Yusuf Shami, Director-general (Disarmament) of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and Makyo maya Gawa, director general of Disarmament and Nonproliferation department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan signed an agreement for nuclear non-proliferation in Tokyo. Both countries agreed for stability in South Asia. In 2011, during the state visit of President Asif Zardari, Pakistan seek civil nuclear power cooperation with Japan, a similar deal that Japan and India had signed. According to Jang news group, Japanese Government had denied the nuclear power cooperation with Pakistan. According to the Pakistan Media, the Pakistan officials were highly disappointed with Japanese denial. On the other hand, Japanese officials were left disappointed as Pakistan had denied the Japanese request to support Japan's candidacy for permanent seat for the United Nations Security Council. According to the Jang News, Pakistan offered Japan to provide technical assistance to control nuclear radiation, following the Fukushima reactor nuclear accidents, and Japanese officials have accepted Pakistan's offer. On 20 March 2011, Jang News reported that scientists from PNRA and PAEC were ready to leave for Japan as soon as IAEA gives an approval.

The government has set a target of producing 350 tons (U3O8) per year from 2015 to meet one third of anticipated requirements then. Low grade Ore is known in central Punjab Province at Bannu Basin and Suleman Range.

A small (15,000 SWU/yr) uranium centrifuge enrichment plant at Kahuta has been operated by the KRL since 1984 and does not have any apparent civil use. It was expanded threefold about 1991. A newer plant is reported to be at Gadwal which is operated by PAEC. The plant is not under safeguards of IAEA. In 2006, the PAEC announced that it was preparing to set up separate and purely civil conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication plants as a new US$ 1.2 billion Nuclear Power Fuel Complex which would be under IAEA safeguards and managed separately from existing facilities. At least the enrichment plant would be built at Chak Jhumra, Faisalabad, in the Punjab and have a 150,000 SWU/yr capacity in five years — about 2013, then be expanded in 150,000 SWU increments to be able to supply one third of the enrichment requirements for a planned 8800 MWe generating capacity by 2030.

The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is responsible for the radioactive waste management. From 1972, the PAEC has undertaken to establish the safety objectives, management, and radioactive waste management. In 2004, the PNRA issued guidelines for the management of nuclear and radioactive waste management in nuclear and medical research centers under PAEC. In 2010, the PNRA issued regulatory policy on radioactive waste materials, and Pakistan lawmakers presented the regulatory policy in Pakistan Parliament. The Parliament passed the PNRA regulatory policy unanimously, making it into laws. The PNRA proposed new Waste Management offices to control of the radiation and radioactive materials. The Waste Management Centers are proposed for Karachi, Rawalpindi, Nilore, Lahore and Chashma. Used fuel is currently stored at each reactor in pools. Longer-term dry storage at each site is proposed. The question of future reprocessing remains open. A National Repository for low- and intermediate-level wastes is due to be commissioned by 2015.


The country also has operated one indigenous reprocessing plant, built by PAEC, which was known as the New Labs — outside PINSTECH, Nilore, near Islamabad. The PAEC had contracted with British BNFL for a reprocessing facility which was cancelled in 1974. It was built under the leadership of Mr. Munir Ahmad Khan The plant became functional in the early 1980s, and it is not under IAEA inspection. The second nuclear reprocessing plant was also started by PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan, in 1976, at Chashma, under a contract agreement with France However; France cancelled the agreement for the said plant under US influence in August 1978. In 2006, the PAEC started work another nuclear fuel fabrication plant — Pakistan Nuclear Power Fuel Complex — located 175 kilometers south near Islamabad. An indigenous Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Complex at Kundian, known as Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex (KNFC), already exists which was built by PAEC under Munir Ahmad Khan and completed by 1980. Kundian Nuclear Fuel Complex makes nuclear fuel for KANUPP. However, the 2006 PNPFC project is being financed by the joint Sino-Pak Nuclear Technology Consortium, and the PAEC is leading the designing and construction of the plant. It will be under safeguards but KNFC is not under safeguards. The Pakistan Nuclear Power Fuel Complex is under the IAEA safeguards and inspections as the IAEA also contributed in the mega project financially.

The PAEC's directorate for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control (NSRC) was responsible for the radiation and high radioactive material control in the country. However, in 2001, with the establishment of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), the responsibilities were shifted to PNRA. In 2003, the responsibilities and agency's goals were expanded, as PNRA were given the status of an executive agency. The PNRA oversees reactor safety and security, reactor licensing and renewal, radioactive material safety, security and licensing, and spent fuel management (storage,

security, recycling, and disposal). The PNRA closely work with Chinese CNNC, and is frequently visited by Chinese staff as its technical advisers.

On 18–19 October 2011, the KANUPP Karachi nuclear power plant imposed a sevenhour emergency after heavy water leaked from a feeder pipe to the reactor. The leakage took place during a routine maintenance shut down, and the emergency was lifted seven hours later, after the affected area was isolated.

The Pakistan Nuclear Society (PNS) is a scientific and educational society that has both industry and academic members. The organization publishes large amount of scientific literature on nuclear technology on several journals. The PNS also allied itself with American Nuclear Society (ANS), European Nuclear Society (ENS), Indian Nuclear Society (INS), Korean Nuclear Society (KNS), Chinese Nuclear Society (CNS), Hungarian Nuclear Society (HNS), and the Spanish Nuclear Society (SNS). The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission also published large sums of publication, and published a quarterly magazine — The Nucleus. The PAEC's academic scientists and engineers also publishes the newsletter — The Pak Atom — concerning on nuclear technology and lobbying for the commercial nuclear power plants.

The academic research on nuclear technology began in 1956, with the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. In 1965, United States provided a 10 MW research reactor –Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-I (PARR) – to Pakistan.

The PARR-Reactor consists of three research reactors with a single nuclear particle accelerator. The first reactor was supplied by the U.S. government in 1965 and it is operated by the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). In 1969, the Center for Nuclear Studies was established, and it began its research in a small reactor that was provided by the PAEC. In 1989, the PAEC had built another small research reactor, known as Pakistan Atomic Research Reactor-II reactor. The PARR-II reactor is an indigenously built reactor by the PAEC, and is under IAEA safeguards since IAEA had funded this mega-project. In 1986, another "multipurpose" heavy water reactor, a 50 MWe pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) near Khushab, was built. Known as Khushab-I, it went critical and started its operations in April 1998. The complex is evidently for producing weapons-grade plutonium, isotope production and nuclear reprocessing. A similar or possibly larger heavy water reactor has been under construction at Khushab since about 2002. Khushab is reported to be making demands upon the country's limited uranium resources. Reprocessing of weapon-grade material is reported to take place at Chashma Nuclear Complex, 80 km west.

Pakistan is not a signatory to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it maintains a civil nuclear power general program under IAEA safeguards. Pakistan has repeatedly refused calls for international inspections of its enrichment and reprocessing activities. Munir Ahmad Khan, unlike his rival Abdul Qadeer Khan, developed Pakistan's nuclear weapons and power program ingeniously and quietly. While the weapons were developed in extreme secrecy, the profiles of academic scientists are kept highly classified and completely unknown to the public. Strict nuclear proliferation policies were introduced by Abdus Sattar, Munir Ahmad Khan, and Ishfaq Ahmad in 1972, and since adhered to by the PAEC.


In May 1998, Pakistan, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, carried out tests of 5 atomic devices — codenamed Chagai-I — at Ras Koh region of Chagai Hills. The first five nuclear devices were evidently made from HEU, and the tests were supervised by Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Kahuta Research Laboratories, and the Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers. On May 30, small teams of PAEC scientists performed another test of 1 or 2 nuclear devices — codename Chagai-II — at the Kharan region. The devices were made of weapons-grade plutonium, and had a yield reported to be between 20 and 40 kilotons of TNT equivalent.

Pakistan began focusing on nuclear weapons development in January 1972 under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan. In 1976, Abdul Qadeer Khan also joined the nuclear weapons program, and, with Zahid Ali Akbar, headed the Kahuta Project, while the rest of the program being run in PAEC and comprising over twenty laboratories and projects was headed by Munir Ahmad Khan.[9] This program would reach fruition under President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, then-Chief of Army Staff.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response to neighboring India's development of nuclear weapons. Bhutto called a meeting of senior academic scientists and engineers on 20 January 1972, in Multan, which came to known as "Multan meeting".[citation needed]Bhutto was the main architect of this programme and it was here that Bhutto orchestrated nuclear weapons programme and rallied Pakistan's academic scientists to build the atomic bomb for national survival.[10][dead link] At the Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan, as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who, until then, had been working as Director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division In of the International 1972, Abdus Atomic Energy the

Agency (IAEA),

in Vienna,



Salam led

establishment of Theoretical Physics Group (TPG) as he called scientists working at ICTP to report to Munir Ahmad Khan. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of






surprise nuclear


codenamed Smiling Buddha in 1974, the first confirmed nuclear test by a nation outside the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council, the goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable impetus.[11] Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's second nuclear test ( Operation Shakti), Pakistan detonated five nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in

the Chagai district, Baluchistan. This operation was named Chagai-I by Pakistan, the underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by provincial Martial Law Administrator General Rahimuddin Khan during the 1980s. The last test of Pakistan was conducted at the sandy Kharan Desert under a codename Chagai-II, also in Baluchistan, on May 30, 1998. Pakistan's fissile material production takes place at Nilore, Kahuta, and Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium is made by the scientists. Pakistan thus became the 7th country in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear weapons.[12]

The uneasy relationships with India, Afghanistan, strategy.[13] On the former Soviet Union, and the energy shortage explains its nuclear policy to become a nuclear power as part of its defense 8 December 1953, Pakistan media press welcomed

the U.S. Atoms for Peace initiatives, followed by the establishment of Pakistan in 1956.[14] In 1953, Foreign minister Sir Zafarullah Khan publicly stated that "Pakistan does not have a policy towards the atom bombs".[15] Following the announcement, on 11 August 1955, U.S. and Pakistan reached an understanding concerning the peaceful and industrial use of nuclear energy which also includes a $350,000 worth pool-type reactor.[15] Before 1971, Pakistan's nuclear development was peaceful but an effective deterrent against India, as Benazir Bhutto maintained in 1995.[13] Pakistan followed a strict non-nuclear weapon policy since 1956 until 1971, and major proposals were made

in 1960s by several officials and senior scientists but PAEC under its chairman Ishrat Hussain Usmani made no efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle for the purposes of active nuclear weapons programme.[15] After the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, Foreign minister (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the option of "nuclear weapons programmes" but such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister Muhammad Shoaib and chairman I.H. Usmani.[15] Pakistani scientists and engineers' working at IAEA became aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, On October 1965, Munir Ahmad Khan, director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with Bhutto on emergency basis in Vienna, revealing the facts about the Indian nuclear programme and a weapon production facility in Trombay. At this meeting Munir Khan concluded: "a (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan's security, and for her survival, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent...".[citation needed] Understanding the sensitivity of the issue, Bhutto arranged a meeting with President Ayub Khan December 11, 1965 at Dorchester Hotel in London. Munir Khan pointed out to the President that Pakistan must acquire the necessary facilities that would give the country a nuclear weapon capability, which were available free of safeguards and at an affordable cost, and there were no restrictions on nuclear technology, that it was freely available, and that India was moving forward in deploying it, as Munir Khan maintained.[citation

When asked about the economics of such programme, Munir

Ahmad Khan estimated the cost of nuclear technology at that time. Because things were less expensive, the then costs were not more than $150 million, after hearing the proposal President Ayub Khan swiftly denied the proposal and quoted: "Pakistan was too poor to spend that much money. Moreover, President Ayub Khan mentioned that if Pakistan ever needed the (atom) bomb, Pakistan could somehow acquire it off the shelf..".[citation needed] Although Pakistan began the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, Pakistan responded to India's 1974 nuclear test (see Smiling Buddha) with a number of


to prevent a nuclear

competition in


Asia.[16] On

many different

occasions, India rejected the offer.[16]

Pakistan's nuclear energy programme was established and started in 1956 following the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). Pakistan became a participant in U.S President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace Program." PAEC's first chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmad.[citation needed] In 1961, the PAEC set up a Mineral Center at Lahore and a similar multidisciplinary Center was set up in Dhaka, in the then East Pakistan. With these two centers, the basic research work started.[citation needed] The first thing that was to be undertaken was the search for Uranium. This continued for about 3 years from 1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered in the Dera Ghazi Khan district and the first-ever national award was given to the PAEC. Mining of uranium began in the same year. Dr. Abdus Salam and Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani also sent a large number of scientists to pursue doctorate degrees in the field of Nuclear Technology and Nuclear reactor technology. In December 1965, then-Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited Vienna where he met IAEA nuclear

engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan. At a Vienna meeting on December, Munir A. Khan informed Bhutto about the status of Indian nuclear program.[citation needed] The next landmark under Dr. Abdus Salam was the establishment of PINSTECH – Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, at Nilore near Islamabad. The principal facility there was a 5MWe research reactor, commissioned in 1965 and consisting of the PARR-I, which was upgraded to 10 MWe by Nuclear Engineering Division under Munir Ahmad Khan in 1990.[17] A second Atomic Research Reactor, known as PARR-II, was a Pool-type, light-water, 27-30 kWe, training reactor that went critical in 1989 under Munir Ahmad Khan.[18] The PARR-II reactor was built and provided by PAEC under the IAEA safeguards as IAEA had funded this mega project.[18] The PARR-I reactor was, under the agreement signed by PAEC and ANL,

provided by the United States Government in 1965, and scientists from PAEC and ANL had led the construction.[17] Canada build Pakistan's first civil-purpose nuclear power plant.[citation

The Ayub Khan Military Government made then-Science

Advisors to the Government Abdus Salam as the head of the IAEA delegation. Abdus Salam began lobbying for commercial nuclear power plants, and tirelessly advocated for nuclear power in Pakistan.[19] In 1965, Salam's efforts finally paid off, and a Canadian firm signed a deal to provide 137MWe CANDU reactor in Paradise Point, Karachi. The construction began in 1966 as PAEC its general contractor as GE Canada provided nuclear materials and financial assistance. Its project director was Parvez Butt, a nuclear engineer, and its construction completed in 1972. Known as KANUPP-I, it was inaugurated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as President, and began its operations in November 1972. Currently, Pakistan Government is planning to build another 400MWe commercial nuclear power plant. Having known as KANUPP-II, the PAEC completed its feasibility studies in 2009. However, the work is put on hold since 2009. The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at Dera Ghazi Khan for the concentration of uranium ores. The plant had a capacity of 10,000 pounds a day.[20] In 1989, Munir Ahmad Khan signed a Nuclear cooperation deal and, since 2000, Pakistan is developing two more nuclear power plants with the an agreement signed with China. Both these plants are of 300MW capacity and are being built at Chashma city of Punjab Province called CHASNUPP-I, began producing electricity in 2000, and CHASNUPP-II, began its operation in fall of 2011. In 2011, the Board of Governors of International Atomic Energy Agency gave approval of Sino-Pak Nuclear Deal, allowing Pakistan legally to build 300MWe CHASNUPP-III and CHASNUPP-VI reactors.[21]

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 led to Pakistan losing roughly 56,000 square miles (150,000 km2) of territory as well as losing millions of its citizens to the newly created state of Bangladesh.[22]It was a psychological setback for Pakistanis; Pakistan had lost its geo-political, strategic, and economic influence in South-Asia.[22] Furthermore,

Pakistan had failed to gather any moral support from its key allies, the United States and the People's Republic of China.[23] The 1971 war with India was a crushing defeat for Pakistan, and China failed to provide any significant assistance to Pakistan.[24] Isolated internationally, Pakistan seemed to be in great mortal danger, and quite obviously could rely on no one but itself.[23] At United Nations Security Council meeting, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto drew comparisons with the Treaty of Versailles which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There, Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was "obsessed" with India's nuclear program,[25] that is why Bhutto immediately came up with the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons to prevent Pakistan from signing another 'Treaty of Versailles' as it did in 1971. In 1969, after a long negotiation, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) signed a formal agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant capable of extracting 360g of weapons-grade plutonium annually.[14] The PAEC selected a team five senior scientists, including geophysicist dr. Ahsan Mubarak,[14] were sent to Sell a field to receive technical training.[14] Later, the team under Ahsan Mubarak advised the government to not to acquire the whole reprocessing plant, but key parts important to build the weapons, while the plant would be built indigenously.[14] At the Multan meeting on January 20, 1972, Bhutto stated, "What Raziuddin Siddiqui, a Pakistani, contributed for the United States during the Manhattan Project, could also be done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own people."[26] Raziuddin Siddiqui was a Pakistani theoretical physicist who, in the early 1940s, worked on both the British nuclear program and the US nuclear program.[27]Although a few Pakistanis worked on the Manhattan Project who were also willing to return and do the same for their native Pakistan, Prime Minister Bhutto still needed to recruit and bring in other Pakistani nuclear scientists and engineers who never worked in the United States. This is where Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a German educated metallurgical engineer, came into the picture. Some of the initial funding came from oil-rich Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.

In later years, some funding for the continuation of the nuclear development programme came from the large British Pakistani population. In December 1972, Science Advisor to the President, Dr. Abdus Salam had called theoretical physicists from the ICTP to report of Munir Ahmad Khan, Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. This marked the beginning of the "Theoretical Physics Group" (TPG).[28] Later, Pakistani theoretical physicists at Institute of Theoretical Physics of Quaid-e-Azam University also joined the TPG headed by Salam.[29] The TPG, which directly reported to Abdus Salam in PAEC, was assigned to do research in the development of nuclear weapon devices, and conduct mathematical calculations on complex hydrodynamical phenomenons and the fast neutron calculations.[29] Professor Salam also had done the groundbreaking work of the "Theoretical Physics Group", which was initially headed by Salam until in 1974 when he left the country in protest.[29] The TPG division at PAEC closely collaborated and completed its physics and mathematical calculations on fast-neutron calculations with the Mathematics Group led by Raziuddin Siddiqui and others, a division which contained the pure mathematicians.[29] On other side, Munir Ahmad Khan began to work on indigenous development of nuclear fuel cycle and the weapons programme. Munir Ahmad Khan, with his lifelong friend Abdus Salam, had done a groundbreaking work in the nuclear development, and after Salam's departure from Pakistan, scientists and engineers who were researching under Salam, began to report to directly to Munir Ahmad Khan.[30] In 1974, Munir Ahmad Khan, days after Operation Smiling Buddha, launched the extensive plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment programme, and the research facilities were expanded throughout the country.[31] In 1965,[32] amidst skirmishes that led up to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced: ― If India builds the bomb, we will eat grass and leaves for a thousand years, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. The Christians have the bomb, the Jews have the bomb and now the Hindus have the bomb. Why not the Muslims too have the bomb?[33][34] ‖

In 1983, Khan was convicted in absentia by the Court of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, for stealing the blueprints, though the conviction was overturned on a legal technicality.[35] A.Q. Khan then established a proliferation network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO nuclear technology to Khan Research Laboratories. He then established Pakistan's gas-centrifuge program based on the URENCO's Zippe-type centrifuge.[35][36][37][38][39] Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan was a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.[40] ― It took only two weeks and three days for Pakistan to master the field... and (detonate) the nuclear devices of our own... ‖

—Benazir Bhutto, on first nuclear tests on May 1998, [41] A new directorate, known as Directorate of Technical Development (DTD) under Dr. Zaman Sheikh and Hafeez Qureshi, was established in March 1974 by Munir Ahmad Khan. The DTD was tasked to manufacture chemical explosive lenses, trigger mechanism, and tampers used in atomic weapon. The DTD was later charged with testing Pakistan's first implosion design in 1978, which was later improved and tested on 11 March 1983 when PAEC carried out Pakistan's first successful cold test of a nuclear device, codename Kirana-I. Between 1983 and 1990, PAEC carried out 24 more cold tests of various nuclear weapon designs. DTD had also manufactured a

miniaturized weapon design by 1987 that could be delivered by all Pakistan Air Forcefighter aircraft.[42] Also, Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani’s contribution to the nuclear energy programme, is also fundamental to the development of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he, with efforts led by Salam, established PINSTECH, that subsequently developed into Pakistan’s premier nuclear research institution.[29] In addition to sending hundreds of young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the foundations of the Muslim world’s first nuclear power reactor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad Khan in 1972. Thus, Usmani laid solid groundwork for the civilian nuclear programme. [citation

Scientists and engineers under Munir Ahmad Khan developed the nuclear

capability for Pakistan within early 1980s, and under his leadership the PAEC had carried a cold test of nuclear device at Kirana Hills, evidently made from nonweaponized plutonium. Former chairman of the PAEC, Munir Ahmad Khan was credited as one of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a recent study from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London's dossier on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April 1960. As for its Biological warfare capability, Pakistan is not widely suspected of either producing biological weapons or having an offensive biological programme.[43] However, the country is reported to have well developed bio-technological facilities and laboratories, devoted entirely to the medical research and applied health sciences.[43] In 1972, Pakistan signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1974.[43] Since then Pakistan has been a vocal and staunch supporter for the success of the BTWC. During the various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistan's representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the treaty, and, as part of the non-aligned group of countries, have made the case for guarantees for

states' rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for purposes of scientific research.[43] Pakistan is not known to have an offensive chemical weapons programme, and in 1993 Pakistan signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and has committed itself to refrain from developing, manufacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons.[44] In 1999, Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bihari Vajpayee of India signed the Lahore Declaration, agreeing to a bilateral moratorium on nuclear testing. This initiative was taken after an year past of both countries publicly tested nuclear devices (See Pokhran-II, Chagai-I and II). However, Pakistan is not a party to the NonProliferation Treaty(NPT) and, consequently, not bound by any of its provisions. Since early 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities have not been without controversy. However, since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Government has taken concrete steps to ensure that Nuclear proliferation is not repeated and have assured the IAEA about the transparency of Pakistan's upcoming Chashma Nuclear Power Complex series of Nuclear Power Plants. In November 2006, The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors approved an agreement with the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to apply safeguards to new nuclear power plants to be built in the country with Chinese assistance.

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton informed that Pakistan has dispersed its nuclear weapons throughout the country, increasing the security so that they could not fall into terrorist hands. Her comments came as new satellite images released by the ISIS suggested Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium, a fuel for atomic bombs. The institute has also claimed that Pakistan has built two more nuclear reactors at Khoshab increasing the number of plutonium producing reactors to three.[46]


In May 2009, during the anniversary of Pakistan's first nuclear weapons test, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan’s nuclear security is the strongest in the world.[47] According to Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's nuclear safety program and nuclear security program is the strongest program in the world and there is no such capability in any other country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear weapons.

Modernization and expansion
Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium at its Khushab nuclear facility, a Washington-based science think tank has reported.[49] The sixth nuclear test (codename: Chagai-II) on May 30, 1998, at Kharan was a quiet successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but "powerful plutonium bomb" designed to be carried by aircraft, vessels, and missiles. The Pakistanis are believed to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%." [50] Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is "likely finished and that the roof beams are being placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall".[51] A third and a fourth[52] reactor and ancillary buildings are observed to be under construction at the Khushab site. In an opinion published in The Hindu, former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote that Pakistan's expanding nuclear capability is "no longer driven solely by its oft-cited fears of India" but by the "paranoia about U.S. attacks on its strategic assets.[53][54] Noting recent changes in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, Saran said "the Pakistan military and civilian elite is convinced that the United States has also become a dangerous adversary, which seeks to disable, disarm or take forcible possession of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and its status as nuclear power.


Bilateral arms control proposals and confidence building measures
Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional non-proliferation steps to India, including:[55]       A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in 1978.[56] South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in 1978.[57] Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each other's nuclear facilities, in 1979.[58] Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan, in 1979.[59] A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in 1987.[60] A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.[61]

India rejected all six proposals.[62][63] However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral agreements on nuclear issues. In 1989, they agreed not to attack each other's nuclear facilities.[64] Since then they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on January 1 of each year.[65] Another bilateral agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations would alert the other on ballistic missile tests.[66] In June 2004, the two countries signed an agreement to set up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These were deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely short response time available to them to any perceived attack.

Disarmament policy
Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty as it continues to produce fissile material for weapons.[68][69]

In a recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations:           A commitment by all states to complete verifiable nuclear disarmament; Eliminate the discrimination in the current non-proliferation regime; Normalize the relationship of the three ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with those who are NPT signatories; Address new issues like access to weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors; Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy; Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security

assurances to non-nuclear weapon states; A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of Anti-ballistic missile systems; Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarization of outer space, including development of ASATs; Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional tactical weapons. Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to address international security, disarmament and proliferation challenges.[citation needed]

 Uranium infrastructure
Pakistan's uranium infrastructure is based on the use of gas centrifuges to produce Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta.[4] Responding to India'snuclear test In 1974, Munir Khan launched the

uranium program, codename Project-706 under the aegis of the PAEC. The uranium division at PAEC undertook research on several methods of enrichment,

including gaseous diffusion, jet nozzle and laser enrichment techniques, as well as centrifuges.[71] Abdul Qadeer Khan officially joined this program in 1976, bringing with him centrifuge designs he mastered in URENCO, the Dutch firm where he had worked as a senior scientist. Later, the government separated the program from PAEC and moved the program toEngineering Research Laboratories (ERL), with A.Q. Khan as its senior scientist. To acquire the necessary equipment and material for this program, Khan developed an illicit procurement network, which was later used to provide enrichment technology to Libya, North Korea, and Iran.[72] The Uranium program proved to be a difficult, challenging and most enduring approach. [73]Commenting on the difficulty, one mathematician who worked with A.Q. Khan quoted in the book " Eating grass" that "hydrodynamical problem in centrifuge was simply stated, but extremely difficult to evaluate, not only in order of magnitude but in detailing also."[73] Many of Khan's fellow theorists were unsure about the feasibility of the enriched uranium on time despite A.Q. Khan's strong advocacy.[73] One scientist recalled his memories in Eating Grass: "No one in the world has used the [gas] centrifuge method to produce militarygrade uranium.... This was not going to work. He [A.Q. Khan] was simply wasting time."[73] Despite A.Q. Khan had difficulty getting his peers listening to him, Khan aggressively continued his research and the program was made feasible by Pakistan in shortest time possible.[73] His efforts won him the praise from country's elite politicians and the military science circles, and he was now debuted as the "father of the uranium" bomb.[73] On May 28, 1998, it was the KRL's HEU that ultimately created the nuclear chain reaction which led the successful detonated of boosted fission devices in an scientific experiment codenamed as: Chagai-I.

 Plutonium infrastructure
As opposed to uranium, the parallel plutonium programme is indigenous, locally developed and culminated under watchful eyes of PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.[11] Since 1972, earlier efforts were directed towards plutonium and necessary infrastructure was built by Bhutto as early as 1970s. [11] Contrary to popular perception,

Pakistan did not forego or abandon the plutonium program and pursued it along with the uranium route.[11]Despite many setbacks and international embargo, PAEC swiftly continued its research on plutonium and directed a separated electromagnetic isotope separation program alongside with enrichment program.[11] Towards the end of 1970s, the PAEC began to pursue Plutonium production

capabilities. Consequently Pakistan built the 40-50 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab Reactor Complex at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational. The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by PAEC Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan, who informed the world that the reactor was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani industries contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements made by the U.S. Government officials, this heavy-waterreactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per year with increase in the production by the development of newer facilities,[74] sufficient for at least one nuclear weapon.[75] The reactor could also produce H3 if it were loaded with Li6, although this is unnecessary for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern nuclear weapon designs use 6Li directly. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Khushab'sPlutonium production the ballistic missiles.[citation needed] The Plutonium electromagnetic separation takes place at the New Laboratories, a reprocessing plant, which was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to IAEA inspections and safeguards. In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the creation of as many as "40 to 50 nuclear weapons a year."[76][77][78] The New York Times carried the story with the insight that this would be







lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of

Pakistan's third plutonium reactor,[79] signaling a shift to dual-stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic warheads. On 30 May 1998, Pakistan proved its plutonium capability in a scientific experiment and sixth nuclear test: codename Chagai-II.[73]

Estimates of Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear warheads vary. The most recent analysis, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2010, estimates that Pakistan has 70-90 nuclear warheads.[80] In 2001, the U.S.-based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimated that Pakistanhad built 24–48 HEU-based nuclear warheads with HEU reserves for 30-52 additional warheads.[81][82] In 2003, the U.S. Navy Center for Contemporary Conflict estimated that Pakistan possessed between 35 and 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of 60.[83] In 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimated a stockpile of approximately 50 weapons. By contrast, in 2000, U.S. military and intelligence sources estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may be as large as 100 warheads.[84] The actual size of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is hard for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which surrounds the program in Pakistan. However, in 2007, retired Pakistan Army's Brigadier-General Feroz Khan, previously second in command at the Strategic Arms Division of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper that Pakistan had "about 80 to 120 genuine warheads."[85][86] Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, on 30 May 1998 at Kharan Desert. The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 8–10 kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosion-type weapons, they will typically use between 15–25 kg of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U-235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron reflector/tamper material such as

beryllium metal, which increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic form. However, only 2–4 kg of plutonium is needed for the same device that would need 20 – 25 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of three to four. ―The sixth Pakistan nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, (May 30, 1998) at Kharan Desert was a successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful bomb designed to be carried by missiles. A whole range and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built, both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be a nuclear power with an operational weapon capability, both first and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft), the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the first choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal. As for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been there, from the early 1970s onwards. However, there were only two logistic problems faced by PAEC. One was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state and the PAEC did not divert spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessing at the New Labs. This was enough to build a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons straight away. The PAEC built its own plutonium and tritium production reactor at Khushab, known as Khushab-I reactor, beginning in 1985. The second one was allocation of resources. Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and refining, production of uranium ore or yellow cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide (UO2) (which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion of UO2 into uranium tetrafluoride(UF4) and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF6). The complete mastery of fluorine chemistry and production of highly toxic and corrosive hydrofluoric acid and other fluorine compounds is required. The UF 6 is pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment. The process is then repeated in reverse until UF 4 is

produced, leading to the production of uranium metal, the form in which U-235 is used in a bomb. It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000-20,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2 machines, they would be producing between 75 –100 kg of HEU since 1986, when full production of weapons-grade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, and the five nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 also consumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986 and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced 1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would need 20 kg of HEU; sufficient for 75 bombs as in 2005. Pakistan's first nuclear tests were made in May 1998, when six warheads were tested under codename Chagai-I and Chagai-II. It is reported that the yields from these tests were 12 kt, 30 to 36 kt and four low-yield (below 1 kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25 kt and 150 kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and may have 300 –500 kt[87] large-size warheads.

Second strike capability
According to a US congressional report, Pakistan has addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conflict through second strike capability. Pakistan has been dealing with efforts to develop new weapons and at the same time, have a strategy for surviving a nuclear war. Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a nuclear war.[88] In January 2000, two years past after the atomic tests, the NIE officials stated that the intelligence gathering figures "overstated the capabilities of India's homegrown arsenal and understate those of Pakistan".[89] The US CENTCOM commander, General Anthony Zinni, a friend of Musharraf,[89] told the NBC that longtime assumptions, that "India had an edge in the South Asian strategic balance of power, were questionable at best. Don't assume that the Pakistan's nuclear capability is inferior to the Indians", General Zinni quoted to NBC.[89]

It was confirmed that Pakistan has built Soviet-style road-mobile missiles, state-of-theart air defences around strategic sites, and other concealment measures. In 1998, Pakistan had 'at least six secret locations' and since then it is believed Pakistan may have many more such secret sites. In 2008, the United States admitted that it did not know where all of Pakistan’s nuclear sites are located. Pakistani defence offic ials have continued to rebuff and deflect American requests for more details about the location and security of the country’s nuclear sites.[90]

MIRV capability
Pakistani engineers are also said to be in the advance stages of developing MIRV technology for its missiles. This would allow the military to fit several warheads on the same ballistic missile and then launch them at separate targets.[91]

In 2010, Russian foreign ministry official Yuriy Korolev stated that there are somewhere between 120,000 to 130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, a figure considered extremely large for a developing country. [92]

Foreign assistance
Historically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been repeatedly charged with allegedly transferring missile and related materials to Pakistan. [93] Despite China strongly dismissing the charges and accusations, the United States alleged China to have played a major role in the establishment of Pakistan's atomic bomb development infrastructure.[93] China has consistently maintained that it has not sold any weapon parts or components to Pakistan or anyone else. [93] On August 2001, it was reported that US officials confronted China numerous times over this issue and pointed out "rather bluntly"[93] to Chinese officials that the evidences from intelligence sources was "powerful."[93] But they had been rebuffed by the Chinese, who have retorted by referring to the U.S. support for Taiwan's military build-up which Beijing says is directed against it.[93]

The former U.S. officials have also disclosed that China had allegedly transferred technology to Pakistan and conducting putative test for it in 1980.[94] However, senior scientists and officials strongly dismissed the U.S. disclosure, and in 1998 interview given to Kamran Khan, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained to the fact that, "due to its sensitivity, no country allows another country to use their tests site to explode the devices," although the UK conducted such tests in Australia and the United States.[3] His statement was also traced by Samar Mubarakmand who acknowledged that cold tests were carried out, under codename Kirana-I, in a test site which was built by the Corps of Engineers under the guidance of the PAEC.[3][95] According to a 2001Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided critical technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China is a signatory.[96][97] In 2001 visit to India, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's CongressLi Peng rejected all the accusations against China to Indian media and strongly maintained on the ground that "his country was not giving any nuclear arms to Pakistan nor transferring related-technology to it."[98] Talking to a media correspondents and Indian parliamentarians, Li Peng frankly quoted: "We do not help Pakistan in its atomic bomb projects. Pakistan is a friendly country with whom we have good economic and political relations."[98] In 1986, it was reported that both countries have signed a mutual treaty of peaceful use of civil nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a civilpurpose nuclear power plant. A grand ceremony was held in Beijing where Pakistan's then-Foreign Minister Yakub Khan signed on behalf of Pakistan in the presence of PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan and Chinese Prime Minister. Therefore, in 1989, Pakistan reached agreement with China for the supply of a 300MW

commercial CHASHNUPP-1 nuclear power plant. In February, 1990, President François Mitterrand of France visited Pakistan and

announced that France had agreed to supply a 900 MWe commercial nuclear power plant to Pakistan. However, after the Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in August, 1990, the French nuclear power plant deal went into cold storage and the

agreement could not be implemented due to financial constraints and the Pakistani government's apathy. Also in February 1990, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.P. Yakunin, said that the USSR was considering a request from Pakistan for the supply of a nuclear power plant. The Soviet and French civilian nuclear power plant was on its way during 1990s. However, Bob Oakley, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed U.S. displeasure at the recent agreement made between France and Pakistan for the sale of a nuclear power plant.[99] After the U.S. concerns the civilian-nuclear technology agreements were cancelled by France and Soviet Union. Declassified documents from 1982, released in 2012 under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, said that U.S. intelligence detected that Pakistan was seeking suspicious procurements from Belgium, Finland, Japan, Sweden and Turkey. [100]

Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-first-use" doctrine, indicating that it would strike India with atomic weapons even if India did not use such weapons first. Pakistan’s asymmetric nuclear posture has significant influence on India's decision ability to retaliate, as shown in 2001 and 2008 crises, when Pakistan-based terror organization carried out deadly attacks on Indian soil, only to be met with a relatively subdued response from India. A former Indian Chief of Army Staff, General Shankar Roychowdhury, stated that "Pakistan's threat of nuclear first-use deterred India from seriously considering conventional military strikes." [101] India is Pakistan's primary geographic neighbor and primary strategic competitor, helping drive Pakistan’s conventional warfare capability and nuclear weapons development: The two countries share an 1800 mile border and have suffered a violent history—four wars in less than seven decades. The past three decades have seen India's economy eclipse that of Pakistan's, allowing the former to outpace the latter in defense expenditure at a decreasing share of GDP. In comparison to population, India is more powerful than Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic, and political power—and the gap continues to grow,"[102] a Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs report claims.

Theory of deterrence
The theory of "N-deterrence" has been frequently being interpreted by the various government-in-time of effect of Pakistan. Although the nuclear deterrence theory was officially adopted in 1998 as part of Pakistan's defence theory,[103] on the other hand, the theory has had been interpreted by the government since in 1972. The relative weakness in defense warfare is highlighted in Pakistan's nuclear posture, which Pakistan considers its primary deterrent from Indian conventional offensives or nuclear attack. Nuclear theorist Brigadier-General Feroz Hassan Khan adds: "The cohesive orders and situations of Pakistan unified combatant commands are akin to NATO's position in the Cold War. But, there are geographic gaps and corridors similar to those that existed inEurope that are vulnerable to exploitation by mechanized Indian Army... With its relatively smaller conventional force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more proactive nuclear defense policy."[104] Indian political scientist Vipin Narang, however, argues that Pakistan's asymmetric escalation posture, or the rapid first use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks to deter their outbreak, increases instability in South Asia. Narang supports his arguments by noting to the fact that since India's assured retaliation nuclear posture has not deterred these provocations, Pakistan's passive nuclear posture has neutralized India's conventional options for now; limited retaliation would be militarily futile, and more significant conventional retaliation is simply off the table."[101] The strategists in Pakistan Armed Forces has ceded nuclear assets and a degree of nuclear launch code authority to lower-level officers to ensure weapon usability in a "fog of war" scenario, making credible its deterrence doctrine.[101] On further military perspective, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), has retrospectively contended that "theory of defense is not view to enter into a "nuclear race", but to follow a policy of "peaceful coexistence" in the region, it cannot remain oblivious to the developments in South Asia."[105] The Pakistan Government officials and strategists have consistently


emphasized that nuclear deterrence is intended by maintaining a balance to safeguard its sovereignty and ensure peace in the region.[106] Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion of Pakistan.[107] President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq allegedly told the Indian Prime MinisterRajiv Gandhi in 1987 that, "If your forces cross our borders by an inch, we are going to annihilate your cities."[108] Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the U.S. Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to the report by stating that the United States itself has not ratified the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistanwill do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision." The Congressional Research Service, in a report published on July 23, 2012, said that in addition to expanding its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could broaden the circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear weapons.[109] Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion of Pakistan.[110]

Nuclear Command and Control
The government institutional organization authorized to make critical decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturing is the NCA.[111] The NCA has its genesis since 1970s[111] and has been constitutionally established in February 2000. [111] The NCA is composed of two civic-military committees that advises and console both Prime minister and the President of Pakistan, on the development and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing theKhan Research

Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex. In November 2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali

Zardari announced that he will be replaced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani as the chairman of NCA.[112] The NCA consists of the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), both now chaired by the Prime Minister.[113] The Foreign minister and Economic Minister serves as a deputy chairmen of the ECC, the body which defines nuclear strategy, including the deployment and employment of strategic forces, and would advise the prime minister on nuclear use. The committee includes key senior cabinet ministers as well as the respective military chiefs of staff.[113] The ECC reviews presentations on strategic threat perceptions, monitors the progress of weapons development, and decides on responses to emerging threats.[113] It also establishes guidelines for effective command-and-control practices to safeguard against the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. [113] The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee is the deputy chairman of the Development Control Committee (DCC), the body responsible for weapons

development and oversight which includes the nation's military and scientific, but not its political, leadership.[113] Through DCC, the senior civilian scientists maintains a tight control of scientific and ethical research; the DCC exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and scientific research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.[113] Functioning through the SPD, the DCC oversees the systematic progress of weapon systems to fulfil the force goals set by the committee.[113] Under the Nuclear Command Authority, its secretariat, Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is responsible for the physical protection and to ensure security of all aspects of country's nuclear arsenals.[114] The SPD functions under the joint chiefs of staff committee at the Joint Headquarters (JS HQ) and reports directly to the Prime Minister.[114] The comprehensive nuclear force planning is integrated with conventional war planning at the National Security Council (NSC).[114] According to the officials of Pakistan's military science circles, it is the high-profile civic-military committee

consisting the Cabinet ministers, President, Prime minister and the four services chiefs, all of whom who reserves the right to order the deployment and the operational use of the nuclear weapons.[114] The final and executive political decisions on nuclear arsenals deployments, operational use, and nuclear weapons politics are made during the sessions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which is chaired by the Prime minister.[115] It is this DCC Council where the final political guideles, discussions and the nuclear arsenals operational deployments are approved by the Prime minister. [115] The DCC reaffirmed its policies on development of nuclear energy and arsenals through the country's media.[115]

U.S. assistance for arsenal security
From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specifically the USA has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear detection equipment.[116] Pakistan turned down the offer of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology, a sophisticated "weapon release" program which initiates use via specific checks and balances, possibly because it feared the secret implanting of "dead switches". But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version of PAL and U.S. military officials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to be well secured.[117][118]

Security concerns of the United States
Since 2004 the United States government has reportedly been concerned about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United States has contingency plans to send in special forces to help "secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal".[119][120] Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation giving testimony before the United States House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade concluded that "preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should be a top priority for the

U.S."[121] However Pakistan's government has ridiculed claims that the weapons are not secure.[119] A report published by The Times in early 2010 states that the U.S. is training an elite unit to recover Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organization. This was done in the context of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed Forces, multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former U.S. intelligence official Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. concerns are justified because militants have struck at several Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been denied access to most of them.[122] However, during a visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates denied that the United States had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.[123] A study by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University titled 'Securing the Bomb 2010', found that Pakistan's stockpile "faces a greater threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth".[124] According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US department of energy there is "a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding."[125] Nuclear weapons expert David Albright author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated Pakistan "has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan,"[126] A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service titled 'Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken

several steps to enhance Nuclear security in recent years 'Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question.'[127] In April 2011, IAEA's deputy director general Denis Flory declared Pakistan's nuclear programme safe and secure.[128][129] According to the IAEA, Pakistan is currently contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, making Pakistan as 10th largest contributor.[130] In response to a November 2011 article in The Atlantic written by Jeffrey Goldberg highlighting concerns about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the Pakistani Government announced that it would train an additional 8,000 people to protect the country's nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government also denounced the article. Training will be completed no later than 2013.[131] But on the other hand, Pakistan consistently maintains that it has tightened the security over the several years.[132] In 2010, the Chairman Joint Chiefs GeneralTariq Majid exhorted to the world delegation at the National Defence University that, "World must accept Pakistan as nuclear power."[132] While dismissing all the concerns on the safety of country's nuclear arsenal, General Majid maintains to the fact: "We are shouldering our responsibility with utmost vigilance and confidence. We have put in place a very robust regime that includes "multilayered mechanisms" and processes to secure our strategic assets, and have provided maximum transparency on our practices. We have reassured the international community on this issue over and over again and our track record since the time our atomic bomb programme was made overt has been unblemished".[132]

National Security Council
    Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) National Command Authority (NCA) Ministry of Defence (MoD) Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC)


    

Strategic Plans Division (SPD) - also known as the Strategic Planning Directorate[133] Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) Development Control Committee (DCC) Employment Control Committee (ECC) Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU)

Strategic combat commands
  

Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC) Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC) Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)

Weapons development agencies
National Engineering & Scientific Commission (NESCOM)
   

National Development Complex (NDC), Islamabad Project Management Organization (PMO), Khanpur Air Weapon Complex (AWC), Hasanabdal Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC), Karachi

Ministry of Defense Production
  

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), Wah Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO), Chattar

Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
 

Directorate of Technical Development Directorate of Technical Equipment

                      

Directorate of Technical Procurement Directorate of Science & Engineering Services Institute of Nuclear Power, Islamabad Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology (PINSTECH) New Laboratories, Rawalpindi Pilot Reprocessing Plant PARR-1 and PARR-2 Nuclear Research Reactors Center for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Islamabad Computer Training Center (CTC), Islamabad Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center) Khushab Reactor, Khushab Atomic Energy Minerals Centre, Lahore Hard Rock Division, Peshawar Mineral Sands Program, Karachi Baghalchur Uranium Mine, Baghalchur Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Mine, Dera Ghazi Khan Issa Khel/Kubul Kel Uranium Mines and Mills, Mianwali Multan Heavy Water Production Facility, Multan, Punjab Uranium Conversion Facility, Islamabad Golra Ultracentrifuge Plant, Golra Sihala Ultracentrifuge Plant, Sihala Directorate of Quality Assurance,Islamabad New Labs Nilore,Islamabad

Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)
   

Aerospace Institute, Islamabad. Computer Center, Karachi. Control System Laboratories. Sonmian Satellite Launch Center, Sonmiani Beach.

        

Instrumentation Laboratories, Karachi. Material Research Division. Quality Control and Assurance Unit. Rocket Bodies Manufacturing Unit. Solid Composite Propellant Unit. Liquid Composite Propellant Unit Space and Atmospheric Research Center (space Center), Karachi Static Test Unit, Karachi Tilla Satellite Launch Center, Tilla, Punjab

Ministry of Industries & Production
  

State Engineering Corporation (SEC) Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC) Pakistan Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.

Delivery systems
Land systems
As of 2011, Pakistan possesses a wide variety of nuclear capable medium range ballistic missiles with ranges up to 2500 km.[134] Pakistan also possesses nuclear tipped Babur cruise missileswith ranges up to 700 km. In April 2012, Pakistan launched a Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A, said to be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead designed to evade missile-defense systems.[135] The Babur cruise missile range can also be extended to 1000 km or more. These land-based missiles are controlled by Army Strategic Forces Command of Pakistan Army. Pakistan is also believed to be developing tactical nuclear weapons for use on the battlefield with ranges up to 60 km such as the Nasr missile. According to Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, citing a Pakistani news article,[136] Pakistan is developing its own

equivalent to the Davy Crockett launcher with miniaturized warhead that may be similar to the W54.[137]

Aerial systems
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is believed to have practiced "toss-bombing" in the 1980s and 1990s, a method of launching weapons from fighter-bombers which can also be used to deliver nuclear warheads.[citation

The PAF has two dedicated units (No.

16 Black Panthers and No. 26 Black Spiders) operating 18 aircraft in each squadron (36 aircraft total) of the JF-17 Thunder, believed to be the preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons.[138] These units are major part of the Air Force Strategic Command, a command responsible for nuclear response. The PAF also operates a fleet of F16 fighters, of which 18 were delivered in 2012 and confirmed by General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. With a third squadron being raised, this would bring the total number of dedicated nuclear capable aircraft to a total of 54.[139] The PAF also possesses the Ra'ad air-launched cruise missile which has a range of 350 km and can carry a nuclear warhead with a yield of between 10kt to 35kt.[140] It has also been reported that an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) with a range of 350 km has been developed by Pakistan, designated Hatf 8 and named Ra'ad ALCM, which may theoretically be armed with a nuclear warhead. It was reported to have been test-fired by a Mirage III fighter and, according to one Western official, is believed to be capable of penetrating some air defence/missile defence systems.[141]

Naval systems
The Pakistan's Navy was first publicly reported to be considering deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines in February 2001. Later in 2003 it was stated by Admiral Shahid Karimullah, thenChief of Naval Staff, that there were no plans for deploying nuclear weapons on submarines but if "forced to" they would be. In 2004, Pakistan Navy established the Naval Strategic Forces Command and made it responsible for countering and battling naval-based weapons of mass destruction. It is believed by most experts that Pakistan is developing a sea-based variant of the Hatf VII

Babur, which is a nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise missile.[142] With a stockpile of plutonium, Pakistan would be able to produce a variety of miniature nuclear warheads which would allow it to nuclear-tip the C-802 and C-803 anti-ship missiles as well as being able to develop nuclear torpedoes, nuclear depth bombs and nuclear naval mines.[citation needed]

Future delivery systems
Nuclear submarine
In response to INS Arihant, India's first nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy pushed forward a proposal to build its own nuclear submarine as a direct response to the Indian nuclear submarine program.[143][144][145] Many U.S. military experts believe that Pakistan has the capability of building a nuclear submarine and is ready to build such a fleet, but Pakistan's Navy has cautiously monitored the status of India ’s development of nuclear submarines, and has reserved the right to take appropriate measures in response.[146] Finally in 2012, the Navy announced it would start work on and construction of a nuclear submarine to better meet the Indian Navy's nuclear threat.[147] According to the Navy, the nuclear submarine is an ambitious project, and will be designed and built indigenously. However, the Navy stressed that "the project completion and trials would take anywhere from between 5 to 8 years to build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would join the list of countries that has a nuclear submarine."[147]

A fundamental aspect of nuclear security is ensuring that personnel with sensitive knowledge do not proliferate that expertise, but this aspect of nuclear security in Pakistan was recognized only in the past 10 years and resulted in significant reforms of its personnel security system. Many observers continue to be concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or expertise related to nuclear

weapons from elements in Pakistan.150 This view is only encouraged by recent instability and governance problems. The A. Q. Khan Network Proliferation networks stemming from Pakistan have their roots in the effort to develop a Pakistani nuclear bomb. Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used extensive clandestine procurement networks to obtain technology for its own nuclear weapons program. A report from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence published September 15, 2011, stated that Pakistan, as an under-developed country with no industrial infra-structure, had to buy each and every bit of material and piece of equipment surreptitiously from abroad in the open market and had to establish a network of cover companies within the country and outside to by-pass embargoes and import all the necessary items.151Former Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan directed this procurement and subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea, and Iran with designs and materials related to uranium enrichment for profit.152 153 The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S. reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Then-Director of National Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted in a January 11, 2007, statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that ―Pakistan had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A. Q. Khan network.‖154 When asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007, Se nate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, then-Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say thatSimilarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007 report that ―at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention and could ... resume their black-market business.‖155More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said that the network ―is no longer operating.‖ For its part, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated February 7, 2009, that Pakistan ―has dismantled the nuclear black market network.‖ Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview whether Pakistan was transferring ―nuclear

weapons‖ or related advice to North Korea, Secreta ry of State Hillary Clinton replied that there is ―no evidence‖ that Pakistan is doing so. Furthermore, Acting Assistant Secretary of State Vann Van Diepen described the network as ―basically defunct‖ during a July 22, 2010, congressional hearing, adding that ―we’re on the lookout for sort of the next A.Q. Khan network, so to speak.‖156 Similarly, State Depart ment spokesperson P.J. Crowley told reporters during an August 3, 2010, press briefing that the United States monitors the Khan network ―very closely for signs that others within his realm are still in business.‖ A March 2012 State Department report described the network as ―defunct.‖157Asked during the 2007 hearing about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the United States has not had ―personal, consistent access‖ to Khan, but added that he did not ―have all the details of everything we’ve done.‖ Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, sources report that Islamabad has responded to written questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the agency’s investigation of Iran’s nuclear program.158 Former IA EA official Olli Heinonen, who investigated the Khan network during his time at the agency, stated in an interview published in October 2011 that Khan ―answer[ed] some of my questions in writing through secret channels.‖159 Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation ―closed‖—a position an office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009. The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on 13 individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The sanctions were imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and Executive Orders 12938 and 13382. Pursuant to a requirement in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-73), Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a certification on March 18, 2011, that Pakistan ―i s continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials.‖


Abdul Qadeer Khan[note

(Urdu: also respectfully

; known

b. by


April some

1936); DEngr, NI (twice), HI, FPAS;

in Pakistan asMohsin-e-Pakistan (in Urdu:

; lit: Savior of Pakistan), more

popularly known as Dr. A. Q. Khan, is a Pakistani nuclear scientist and a metallurgical engineer, colloquially regarded as the founder of HEU based Gas-centrifuge uranium enrichment programme for Pakistan's integrated atomic bomb project.[2] Founded and established the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL) in 1976, he was both its senior scientist and the director-general until his retirement in 2001, and was an early and vital figure in other science projects. Apart from participating in atomic bomb project, he made major contributions in molecular morphology, physical martensite, and its integrated applications in condensed and material physics. Abdul Qadeer Khan was a prominent Pakistani scientist,[3] and was involved in the country's various scientific programmes until his dismissal.[3] In January 2004, Khan was officially summoned for a debriefing on his suspicious activities in other countries after the United States provided evidences to the Pakistan Government, and confessed it a month later.[3] Some have alleged that these activities were sanctioned by the authorities, though the Pakistan government sharply dismissed the claims. [4][5] After years of nominal house arrest, the Islamabad High Court (IHC) on 6 February 2009 declared Abdul Qadeer Khan to be a free citizen of Pakistan, allowing him free movement inside the country. The verdict was rendered by Chief Justice Sardar Muhammad Aslam.[6] In September 2009, expressing concerns over the Islamabad High Court's decision to end all security restrictions on Khan, the United States warned that Khan still remains a "serious proliferation risk".[7] Khan was born in Bhopal, India (then British Indian Empire) into a Pashtun, but Urduspeaking family in 1936. His father Dr. Abdul Ghafoor Khan was an academic who served in the Education Ministry of the British Indian Government and after retirement in 1935, settled permanently in Bhopal State.[8] After the partition in 1947, the family emigrated from India to Pakistan, and settled in West-Pakistan.[9] Khan studied in Saint

Anthony's High School of Lahore, and then enrolled at the D.J. Science College of Karachi.[9] There, he took his double BSC degree in Physics and inMathematics under the supervision of physicist Dr. Bashir Syed.[9] In 1956, he attended Karachi

University and obtained a B.S. degree inMetallurgy in 1960 and subsequently got the internship at the Siemens Engineering.[9] After the graduation, he was employed by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and worked as an city inspector of weight and measures inKarachi, Pakistan.[9] In 1961, he went to West Berlin to study Metallurgical engineering at the Technical University Berlin.[9] In 1967, he went to work in The Netherlands. Khan gained fame as a talented scientist at the URENCO nuclear plant he worked in and gained special access to the most restricted areas of the URENCO facility. He could also read the secret documentation on the gas centrifuge technology. Qadeer Khan obtained an engineer's degree in technology from Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands, and a doctorate engineering in Metallurgical engineering under the supervision of Martin Brabers from the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium, in 1972.[9] Qadeer Khan's doctoral dissertations were written in German.[9] His doctoral thesis dealt and contained fundamental work on martensite, and its extended industrial applications to the field of Morphology, a field that studies the shape, size, texture and phase distribution of physical objects.[9][10]

Research in Europe
In 1972, the year he received his doctorate, Abdul Qadeer Khan through a former university classmate, and a recommendation from his old professor and mentor, Martin J. Brabers, joined the senior staff of the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory in Amsterdam.[11] There, he began his studies on the high-strength metals to be used for the development of gas centrifuges.[12] The gas centrifuges were first studied by Jesse Beams during the Manhattan Project in 1940s but research was discontinued in 1944. The Physics Laboratory was a subcontractor for URENCO Group, the uranium enrichment research facility at Almelo, Netherlands, which was established in 1970 by the Netherlands to assure a supply of enriched uranium for nuclear power plants in the

Netherlands.[11] Soon when the URENCO Group offered him to join the senior scientific staff there, Qadeer Khan left the Physics Laboratories.[11] There, he was tasked to perform physics experiments on uranium metallurgy,[11] to produce commercial-grade uranium metals usable for light water reactors.[11] In the meantime, the URENCO Group handed him the drawings of centrifuges for the mathematical solution of the physics problems in the gas centrifuges.[11] Uranium enrichment is a difficult physical process, as 235U exists in natural uranium at a concentration of only 0.7%; URENCO used Zippetype centrifuges for that purpose to separate the isotopes 235U from non-fissile 238U by spinning UF6 gas at up to 100,000RPM.[11] Abdul Qadeer Khan's academic and leadingedge research in metallurgy brought laurels to the URENCO Group.[11] URENCO enjoyed a good academic relationship with him, and had him as one of its most senior scientists at the facility where he researched and studied.[11] At URENCO, Abdul Qadeer Khan pioneering research to improve the efficiency of the centrifuges greatly contributed to the technological advancement of the Zippe centrifuges, a method that was developed by mechanical engineer Gernot Zippe in the Soviet Union during the 1940s.[11] URENCO granted Qadeer Khan access to the most restricted areas of its facility as well as to highly classified documentation on gas centrifuge technology. [11]

1971 War and return to Pakistan
The clandestine and highly secretive atomic bomb project of Pakistan was given a start on 20 January 1972, when President (later Prime minister) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto chaired a secret meeting of academic scientists at Multan.[13] The winter planning seminar known as Multan meeting, the atomic bomb project was launched under the administrative control of Bhutto, and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (or PAEC) under its chairman, Munir Ahmad Khan.[13] Earlier efforts were directed towards the implosiontype bomb with exploration of the Plutonium route.[13] Prior to 1974, Khan had no knowledge of existence of country's integrated atomic development, a controversy that highly doubts Abdul Qadeer Khan's "father-of" claim. It was only on 18 May 1974, when he was alerted after India surprised the world with its first nuclear

test (codename: Smiling Buddha), near Pakistan's eastern border under the secret directives of Indian Premier Indira Gandhi.[13] Conducted by the Indian Army, it was only three years since Pakistan's humiliating defeat in the 1971 Winter war and the outcomes of the war had put Pakistan's strategic position in great danger.[14] The nuclear test greatly alarmed the Government of Pakistan and the people.[13] Prime minister Zulfikar Bhutto squeezed the time limit of the atomic bomb project from five years to three years, in a vision to evolve and derived the country's scientific atomic project as from the "atomic capability to sustainable nuclear power".[13] Sensing the importance of this test, Munir Ahmad Khan secretly launched the Project-706, a codename of a secret uranium enrichment programme under the domain of the atomic project.[13] Following the news about Pakistan, Khan wanted to contribute to the post-war military posture and approached the Pakistan government officials, offering to assist in Pakistan's secret atomic bomb project through his knowledge acquired at URENCO.[15] He insisted in joining the atomic bomb project[16] but was disuated by the military scientists who considered as "hard to find" a job in PAEC as a "metallurgist". [15] Undaunted, he wrote to Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, highlighting his specific experience and encouraged Prime Minister Bhutto to work on an atomic bomb using uranium.[15] According to Kuldip Nayyar, although the letter was received by Prime minister Secretariat, Qadeer Khan was still unknown to the Government, leading Bhutto to ask the ISI to run a complete background check on Khan and prepare an assessment report on him.[17] The ISI declared him as "incompetent" in the field of nuclear technology based on his academic discipline.[17] Unsatisfied with ISI's report, Bhutto was eager to know more about him, and asked Munir Ahmad Khan to dispatch a team of PAEC's scientists to meet him.[18] The PAEC team including Sultan Mahmood travelled to Amsterdam and arrived at his family home at night. Discussions were held until the next day.[18] After the team's return to Pakistan, Bhutto decided to meet with Khan, and directed a confidential letter to him. Soon after, Abdul Qadeer Khan took a leave from URENCO Group, and departed for Pakistan in 1974.[18]


Initiation and atomic bomb project
In December 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan went to Pakistan and took a taxi straight to the Prime minister Secretariat.[19] The session with Bhutto was held at midnight and remained under extreme secrecy.[19] There, Qadeer Khan met with Zulfikar Bhutto, Munir Khan, and Dr. Mübaschir Hassan, government Science Adviser.[19] At this session, he enlightened the importance of uranium as opposed to plutonium, but Bhutto remain unconvinced to adopt uranium instead of plutonium for the development of an atomic bomb.[19] Although Bhutto ended the session quickly he remarked to his friends that: "He seems to make sense."[19] Early morning the next day another session was held where he focussed the discussion on uranium against plutonium, with other PAEC officials presented.[16] Even though he explained to Bhutto why he thought the idea of "plutonium" would not work, Qadeer Khan was fascinated by the possibility of atomic bomb.[16] Many of the theorists at that time, including Munir Khan maintained that "plutonium and the nuclear fuel cycle has its significance",[14] and Munir Khan insisted that with the "French extraction plant in the offing, Pakistan should stick with its original plan."[14] Bhutto did not disagree, but saw the advantage of mounting a parallel effort toward acquiring HEU fuel.[14][20] At the last session with Zulfikar Bhutto, Khan also advocated for the development of a fused design to compress the single fission element in the metalized gun-type atomic device, which many of his fellow theorists said would be unlikely to work.[16][21] Finally in 1976, he joined the atomic bomb project, and became a member of the enrichment division at PAEC.[19] Calculations performed by him were valuable contributions to centrifuges and vital link to nuclear weapon research.[13] He continued to push his ideas for uranium methods even though they had a low priority, with most efforts still aimed to produce military-grade plutonium.[19] Because of his interest in uranium, and his frustration at having been passed over for director of the uranium division (the job was instead given to Bashiruddin Mahmood), Qadeer Khan refused to engage in further research and caused tensions with other researchers.[19] He became highly unsatisfied and bored with the research led by Mahmood; finally, he submitted a

critical report to Bhutto, in which he explained that the "enrichment programme" was nowhere near success.

Kahuta research laboratories
Bhutto sensed great danger as the scientists were split between uranium and plutonium routes.[19] Therefore, he called Khan for a meeting, which was held at the prime minister secretariat. With the backing of Bhutto, Qadeer Khan took over the enrichment programme and




to Engineering


Laboratories (ERL).

Abdul Qadeer Khan insisted to work with theCorps of

Engineers to lead the construction of the suitable operational enrichment site, which was granted. The E-in-C directed Brigadier Zahid Ali Akbar of Corps of Engineers to work with Qadeer Khan in Project-706.[19] The Corps of Engineers and Brigadier Akbar quickly acquired the lands of the village of Kahuta for the project.[22] The military realized the dangers of atomic experiments being performed in populated areas and thus remote Kahuta was considered an ideal location for reearch.[22] Bhutto would subsequently promote Brigadier Zahid Akbar to Major-General and handed over the directorship of the Project-706, with Qadeer Khan being its senior scientist.[23] On the other hand, the PAEC did not forgo the electromagnetic isotope

separation research and a parallel programme was conducted by theoretical physicist Dr. G.D. Allam at Air Research Laboratories (ARL) located at Chaklala PAF base, though G.D. Allam had not seen a centrifuge, but only had a rudimentary knowledge of the Manhattan Project.[24] At first, the ERL suffered many setbacks, and relied heavily on the knowledge from URENCO brought by Qadeer Khan.[24] Meanwhile in April 1976, theorist Ghulam Dastigar Alam accomplished a great feat by successfully rotating the first generation centrifuges to ~30,000 RPM.[24] When the news reached Qadeer Khan, he immediately requested to Bhutto for G.D. Alam's assistance which was granted by the PAEC, dispatching a team of scientists including G.D. Alam to ERL.[24] At ERL, Qadeer Khan

joined the team of theoretical physicists headed by theorist dr. GD Allam, working on the physics problems involving the differential equations in the centripetal forces and angular momentum calculations in the ultra-centrifuges.[24] On 4 June 1978, the enrichment programme became fully functional after Dr. G.D. Alam succeeded in separated the 235U and 238U isotopes in an important experiment in which Dr. A.Q Khan also took part.[24][25] Contrary to his expectation, the military approved to the appointment of Major-General Zahid Ali as the scientific director of entire uranium division.[24] In 1981, when General Akbar was posted back to combat assignments, Khan took over the operations of ERL as its interim director and senior scientist. [22][23] In 1983, his appointment as director of ERL was personally approved by President Zia-ul-Haq who renamed the ERL after him.[26] Despite his role Khan was never in charge of the actual development of atomic bombs, mathematical and physics calculations, and eventual weapons testing. [26] Outgoing General Zahid Ali recommended Munir Khan appointment as the scientific director of atomic bomb project. This appointment came as a shock to Khan and surprised many in the government and the military as Munir Khan was not known to be aligned to conservative military.[24][26][27] The government itself restricted to provide full scientific data of atomic projects and had him required the government security clearance and clarifications of his visits of such secret weapons development sites, which he would be visiting with senior active duty officers.[27] In 1984, the KRL claimed to have carried out its own nuclear cold test of a nuclear weapon, but this was seemed to be unsuccessful while PAEC underMunir Khan had already carried out another test in 1983, codenamed: Kirana-I.[28] PAEC's senior scientists who worked with him and under him remember him as "an egomaniacal lightweight"[26] given to exaggerating his scientific achievements in centrifuges.[26] At one point, Munir Khan said that, "most of the scientists who work on the development of atomic bomb projects were extremely "serious". They were sobered by the weight of what they don't know; Abdul Qadeer Khan is a showman." [26] During the











into rigorous theoretical physics calculations and topics to compete, but yet failed to impress his fellow theorists at PAEC, generally at the physics community. In later years, Abdul Qadeer Khan had became a staunch critic of Munir Ahmad Khan's research in physics, and on many different occasions tried unsuccessfully to belittle Munir Khan's role in the atomic bomb projects. Their scientific rivalry became public and widely popular in the physics community and seminars held in the country over the years.

Uranium tests: Chagai-I
Many of his theorists were unsure that gaseous uranium would be feasible on time without the centrifuges, since Alam had notified to PAEC that the "blueprints were incomplete" and "lacked the scientific information needed even for the basic gascentrifuges."[29] However, calculations by Tasneem Shah, and confirmation by Alam showed methods. civilian the



improvise transformation of



Against popular perception, the URENCO's blueprints were based on the blueprints were filled with serious technical

reactor technology;

errors.[13] ItsSWU rate was extremely low that it would have to be rotated for thousands RPMs on the cost of taxpayer's millions of dollars, Allam maintained.[30] Calculations and innovation came from the team of his fellow theorists, including mathematician Tasnim Shah, and headed by theorist G.D. Alam, who solved the centrifugal problems and developed powerful versions of the centrifuges.[29]Scientists have claimed that Qadeer Khan would have never gotten any closer to success without the assistance of Alam and others. [29][31] The issue is controversial;[24] Qadeer Khan maintained to his biographer that when it came to defending the "centrifuge approach and really putting work into it, both Shah and Alam refused.[24] The rivalry between KRL and PAEC intensified when neighboring India conducted a series of tests of its nuclear bomb, codename Pokhran-II, in 1998 by the Indian Army. This triggered a great alarm and calls for its own tests were made by country's influential politicians. Nawaz Sharif, Prime minister at that time, came under intense

media and public pressure to authorise the nuclear testing programme.[28] After the Indian nuclear weapons tests, Abdul Qadeer Khan repeatedly met with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, asking for permission to test the atomic bomb in Chagai. [28]At the meeting, he even maintained that the tests could be performed at the controlled test site in Kahuta. But this was rebuffed by the government, which instead ordered PAEC, under Dr. Ishfaq Ahmad, to perform tests in Chagai due to the experience of performing the tests in the past.[28] When the news reached him, a furious Qadeer Khan was badly upset and frustrated with the Prime minister.[28] Without wasting a minute, Khan drove to Joint Staff Headquarters where he met with the chairman joint

chiefs General Jehängir Karamat,lodging a strong protest. General Karamat thereupon called the Prime minister, and decided that KRL scientists, including Qadeer Khan, would also be involved in the test preparations and present at the time of testing alongside those of the PAEC.[28] It was the KRL's HEU that ultimately claimed the successful detonation of Pakistan's first nuclear devices on 28 May 1998, under codename Chagai-I.[25] Two days later, on 30 May, a small team of scientists belonging to PAEC, under the leadership of Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, detonated a plutonium nuclear device, codename Chagai-II.[32] The sum of forces and yields produced by devices were around ~40.0kt of nuclear force, with the largest weapon producing around 35–36kn of force. In contrast, the single plutonium device had produced the yield of ~20.0kt ofnuclear force and had a much more bigger impact as compared to uranium devices.[32] Many of Qadeer Khan's colleagues were irritated that he seemed to enjoy taking full credit for something he had only a small part in. [29] He made an attempt to work on the Teller design for the hydrogen bomb, but PAEC had objected the idea as it went against government policy.[16][24][33] Abdul Qadeer Khan was known for taking full credit of something he had only been one of the players, and often got engaged in projects which were theoretically interesting but practically unfeasible

Proliferation of URENCO technology

Abdul Qadeer Khan had established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories.[25][35][36][37] In the 1980s, reports on negotiations between People's Republic of China and Pakistan for the sale of (UF6) and HEU fuel surfaced in the media.[38] The reports alleged that "A.Q. Khan had paid a visit to China to provide technical support in their nuclear program whilst aiding in building the centrifuge facility in Hanzhong province.[38] The Chinese

government offered nuclear material from their side, but Pakistan refused, calling it a "gift of gesture" to China.[38] According to an independent IISS report, Zia had given a "free hand" to Qadeer Khan and given unlimited import and export access to him. The report showed that his acquisition activities were on the whole not supervised by Pakistan governmental authorities; his activities went undetected for several years. [39]

Court controversy and U.S. objections
Pakistan's scientific activities rapidly attracted the attention of the outside world and quickly suspected outside assistance. Suspicions soon fell on Qadeer Khan's knowledge obtained during his years working in the URENCO Group. [40] In 1983, Qadeer Khan was sentenced in absentia to four years in prison by the local court in Amsterdam for attempted espionage.[40] When the news reached to

Pakistan, Barrister SM Zafar immediately traveled to Amsterdam and filed a petition at the Court.[40] Zafar teamed up with Qadeer Khan's old mentor professor Martin Brabers and hisLeuven University to prepare evidence for the case.[40] At the trial, Zafar and Martin argued that the technical informations supplied by Qadeer Khan were commonly found and taught in undergraduate and doctoral physics at the university. [26] The sentence was overturned on appeal on a legal technicality by the Court.[26] Reacting on the suspicion of espionage, Qadeer Khan stated: "I had requested for it as we had no library of our own at KRL, at that time".[26] He strongly rejected any suggestion at Pakistan's proliferation attempts and stressed: "All the research work [at Kahuta] was the result of our innovation and struggle. We did not receive any technical "know-how" from abroad, but we cannot reject the use of books, magazines, and research papers in this connection."[26]

In a local interview given in 1987 he stated that: the U.S. had been well aware of the success of the atomic quest of Pakistan.[41] Allegedly confirming the speculation of export of nuclear technology, the Pakistan Government sharply denied all claims made by Qadeer Khan. Following this, Qadeer Khan was summoned for a quick meeting with President Zia-ul-Haq, who used a "tough tone" and strongly urged Qadeer Khan to cease any information "he'd been providing in statements, promising severe repercussions if he continued to leak harmful information against the Pakistan Government."[41] Subsequently, he made several contacts with foreign newspapers, denying any and all statements he had previously released. [41] After

U.S. terminating major aid to Pakistan, Benazir government reached an understanding with the United States to "freeze" and "capped" the program to LEU which is up to 3– 5%. Later, the program was restored back to 90%HEU in 1990, and on July 1996, he maintained, "at no stage was the program of producing 90% weapons-grade enriched uranium ever stopped".[41]

North Korea, Iran and Libya
The defense treaty between Pakistan and North Korea was signed in 1990 after Benazir Bhutto, Prime minister at that time, paid a state visit to the communist regime. The diplomatic relations with Communist Korea were established during Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's period.[43] In 1990, it was reported that the highly sensitive centrifuge technology was being exported to North Korea in exchange for missile technologies.[43] On multiple occasions, Qadeer Khan had alleged that Benazir Bhutto had "issued clear directions" for that matter. In 1993, downloaded secret information on uranium enrichment was delivered to North Korea in exchange for information on developing ballistic missiles.[39] In 1987, Iran wanted to purchase a fuel-cycle technology from Pakistan, but it was rebuffed.[39] Zia decided that the civil nuclear cooperation with Iran was purely a "civil matter" and part of maintaining good relations with Tehran.[39] Zia did not further approve any nuclear deals, but Qadeer Khan secretly handed over a sensitive report on centrifuges in 1987–89.[39] It was only in 2003 that the nature of such agreements were

made public[43] The Iranian government came under intense pressure from the Western world to fully disclose its nuclear program; the country agreed to accept tougher inspections from the IAEA.[43] The IAEA inspection showed that Iran had established a large uranium enrichment facility using gas centrifuges based on the URENCO designs, which had been obtained "from a foreign intermediary in 1989".[43] The intermediary was not named but diplomats and analysts pointed to Qadeer Khan. [43] The Iranians turned over the names of their suppliers and the international inspectors quickly identified the Iranian gas centrifuges as Pak-1's, the gas centrifuges invented by Qadeer Khan during the atomic bomb projects.[43] In 2003, the IAEA successfully dismantled Libya's nuclear program after persuading Libya to roll back its program in order to have the economic sanctions lifted.[43] The Libyan officials turned over the names of its suppliers which also included Qadeer Khan.[43] The same year, the Bush administration launched its investigation on Qadeer Khan's leak in 2001 and 2002, focusing on Qadeer Khan's personal role.[43] Dismantlement and revelation The Libyan government officials were quoted as saying that "Libya had bought nuclear components from various black market dealers, including Pakistan's". [43] The U.S. officials who visited the Libyan plants reported that the gas centrifuges were very similar to the Pak-1 centrifuges of Iran.[43] By the time the evidence against Qadeer Khan had surfaced, he had become a public icon in the country and was the Science Adviser to the Government.[43] His vigorous advocacy for atom bombs and missiles became an embarrassment to the Pakistan government.[43] On 31 January 2004, Qadeer Khan was suddenly dismissed from his post, and the government launched a full-fledged investigation on Qadeer Khan to ostensibly "allow a fair investigation" of the allegations.[43]The Wall Street Journal quoted unnamed "senior Pakistan government officials" as conceding that Qadeer Khan's dismissal from KRL had been prompted by the U.S. government's suspicions.[43]On 4 February 2004, Qadeer Khan appeared on state-owned media Pakistan Television (PTV) and confessed to running a proliferation ring, and admitted to transferring technology to Iran between 1989 and 1991, to North Korea and Libya between 1991 and 1997.[44][45]

Although not arrested, the national security hearings were launched by the joint law officers from JAG Branch.[43] The debriefings also implicated the role of the former chief of army staff generalMirza Beg.[43] The Wall Street Journal quoted U.S. government officials as saying that Qadeer Khan had told the military lawyers that "General Beg had authorized the transfers to Iran."[46]According to IISS reports, Qadeer Khan had had for several years security clearances over import and export operations which were largely unsupervised and undetected.[39] Since 1970s, Abdul Qadeer Khan's security was tightened, and he never travelled alone, but accompanied by the secret members of the military establishment.[26] Pardon, IAEA calls, and aftermath On 5 February 2004, President Musharraf pardoned him as he feared that the issue would be politicized by his rivals.[47] The constitution of Pakistan allows the President of Pakistan to issue presidential pardons.[47] The hearings of Qadeer Khan badly damaged the political credibility of President Musharraf and the image of the United States. While, the Pakistan media aired sympathizing documentaries, the political parties on other hand used that issue politically to the fall of Musharraf. The U.S. Embassy had pointed out that the successor of Musharraf could be less friendly towards the United States; this refrained United States from applying further direct pressure on Musharraf due to a strategic calculation that may led the loss of Musharraf as an ally. Strong calls were made by many senior IAEA officials, U.S. and European Commission politicians, have Abdul Qadeer Khan interrogated by IAEA investigators, given the lingering scepticism about the disclosures made by Pakistan regarding Qadeer Khan's activities. All such requests were however strongly dismissed by the Prime minister Shaukat Aziz and the government of Pakistan, terming it as "case closed". In December 2006, the WMDC headed by Hans Blix, a former IAEA chief

and UNMOVIC chief; said in a report that Abdul Qadeer Khan could not have acted alone "without the awareness of the Pakistan Government".[48] Blix's statement was also reciprocated by the United States government, with one anonymous American

government intelligence official quoting to independent journalist and author Seymour Hersh: "Suppose if Edward Teller had suddenly decided to spread nuclear

technology around the world. Could he really do that without the American governmentknowing?".[49] In 2007, the hearings were suspended when Musharraf was succeeded by General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani as chief of army staff.[3] Officially, all security hearings were terminated by the ChairmanJoint Chiefs General Tärik Majid on November 2008.[3] Abdul Qadeer Khan was never officially charged with espionage activities nor any criminal charges were pressed against him.[3] The military maintained that the debriefings were the process of questioning Qadeer Khan to learn and dismantle the atomic ring.[3] The details of debriefings were marked as "classified" and were quickly wrapped up quietly following the fall of General Pervez Musharraf.[3] In 2008, in an interview, Qadeer Khan laid the whole blame on President Musharraf, and labelled Musharraf as a "Big Boss" for proliferation deals. In 2012, Qadeer Khan later implicated Benazir Bhutto in proliferation matters, pointing out to the fact as she had issued "clear directions in thi[s] regard." Domestically it is believed by some that Qadeer Khan was made a scapegoat by President Musharraf to prove his uttermost loyalty to the West whose support was urgently and desperately needed for the survival of his presidency.[49] It was done so to protect the names of those high-ranking military officials and civilian politicians, under whom Musharraf served in the past.[49]

Government work and political advocacy
Controversial, Qadeer Khan was shunned by much of the scientific community, but still quite welcome in military science circles. In 2001, Musharraf promoted Abdul Qadeer Khan to 'principalScience Adviser to the President'.[43] Abdul Qadeer Khan remains a populous figure and many saw him as national hero of Pakistan. He often served as Pakistan's extreme national pride, and his long association with nuclear science bought Khan popularity. In the late 1980s, Abdul Qadeer Khan promoted the funding of the Pakistan's integrated space weapons project and vigorously supported, and supervised the Hatf-I andGhauri-I program.[50] In a television speech in

2007, Prime minister Shaukat Aziz paid tribute to Abdul Qadeer Khan and while commenting on last part of his speech, Aziz stressed: "(...)....The services of (nuclear) scientist... Dr. (Abdul) Qadeer Khan are "unforgettable" for the country..(..)....".[51] In 2012, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan announced to form a political party Movement to Protect Pakistan.[52] Khan secured the fellowship and the presidency of Pakistan Academy of Sciences, whose membership is restricted to scientists.[53] Through the Pakistan Academy of Sciences, Khan published two books on metallurgy and material science. [54] Khan began to published his articles from KRL in 1980s, and began to organise conferences on Metallurgy by inviting scientists from all over the world. [54] Gopal S. Upadhyaya, an Indian nuclear scientist and metallurgist as well, attended Khan's conference in 1980s and personally met him along with Kuldip Nayar.[54] In Upadhyaya's words, Khan was a proud Pakistani who wanted to show the world that scientists from Pakistan are inferior to no one in the world.[54] He contributed to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology when he served as the Project-Director of this university.[53] After the construction of institute Khan took the Professorship of Physics while also serving as the Chairman of Department of Metallurgy and Materials Science. [53] Later, Khan helped established the Dr. A. Q. Khan Institute of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering at the Karachi University.[53]

During his time in the atomic bomb project, he pioneered Pakistan research in the thermal quantum field and the condensed physics, while co-authored articles on chemical reactions of the highly unstable isotopic particles in the controlled physical system.[55] He maintains his stance to use of controversial technological solutions to both military and civilian problems, including the use of military technologies for the civilian welfare. Khan also remained a vigorous advocate for a nuclear testing program and defence strength through nuclear weapons. He has justified the Pakistan's nuclear deterrence program as sparing his country the fate of Iraq or Libya. [56] In his recent

interview, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained that he has no regrets for what he did and maintained that: [P]akistan's motivation for nuclear weapons arose from a need to prevent "nuclear blackmail" by India. Had Iraq and Libya been nuclear powers, they wouldn't have been destroyed in the way we have seen recently.... If (Pakistan) had an [atomic] capability before 1971, we [Pakistanis] would not have lost half of our country after a disgraceful defeat. —Abdul Qadeer Khan, statement on 16 May 2011, published the Newsweek,

Abdul Qadeer Khan faced heated and intense criticism from his fellow theorists whom he had worked with in the atomic bomb project, most notably theorist Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy.[58] In addition, Qadeer Khan's false claims that he was the "father" of the atomic bomb project since its inception and his personal attacks on Munir Khan caused even greater animosity by his fellow theorists, and most particularly, within the general physics community towards Qadeer Khan.[2][58] Due to public promotion by the Pakistan media, he remains one of the best known but also most controversial scientists in the country.[3] He has been depicted in the media as Pakistan's own Dr. Strangelove (commonly referred to Edward Teller) in Stanley Kubrick's 1964 satirical film of the same name.[59] He is the recipient of the following honors:
   

Nishan-e-Imtiaz (1999) Nishan-e-Imtiaz (1996) Hilal-e-Imtiaz (1989) Sir Syed University of Engineering and Technology[53]

    

University of Karachi[53] Baqai Medical University[60] Hamdard University[53] Gomal University[53] University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore[53]

60 Gold medal from universities in the country.[53]

International Atomic Energy Agency

In 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Japan and the era of nuclear proliferation began. From 1945 to 1962 four more nations joined the nuclear club and many others were on the threshold. To deal with the growing threat of nuclear annihilation, the countries of the United Nations came together to halt the spread of nuclear weapons technology. To combat the ever increasing use of nuclear technology, the United Nations created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which is based in Vienna. Then in 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed and ratified by member nations and came into force in 1970. The purpose of both is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The NPT placed nuclear facilities under the authority of the previously created IAEA.

The International Atomic Energy Agency came into being in 1957, and by the mid-1960s it had established a program of on-site inspections, audits, and inventory controls, the basic purpose of which is to deter the diversion of peaceful nuclear uses to military purposes by threat of early detection. To achieve its mission, the agency monitors the flow of material into and out of nuclear installations in member countries by auditing plant records and conducting physical inventories. Cameras and seals are used for monitoring when IAEA personnel are not present. Although the IAEA has never conclusively proved that materials were diverted from nuclear installations in any country, they have not been permitted to inspect all facilities. The IAEA has no authority to inspect nuclear programs of nations which are not bound by treaty. In addition, the IAEA can only inspect those facilities that nations will allow it to inspect. According to the SIPRI Yearbook, the IAEA has never conducted a suspect site inspection, but would conduct such an inspection if it received intelligence information from member nations. However, the stand off between Iraqi officials and the IAEA regarding inspection of facilities after the Gulf War is a good example of what happens when the IAEA tries to conduct an inspection on facilities that a nation does not want inspected. Another factor to consider is the inability of the IAEA to inspect

facilities of member nations that the countries have not put under IAEA auspices. For example Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and Pakistan all have installations that the IAEA is not allowed to inspect even though there are other installations that the IAEA does inspect within these nations. The International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors met in June of 1992 and authorized the first budget increase since 1984. Also, at the 1992 meeting the IAEA deferred discussion on the proposal to create a registry of nuclear-related transfers for the second time. A registry of nuclear material would work like the international conventional arms registry, which would enable organizations like the IAEA to keep track of transfers of material that nations could potentially use to create nuclear weapons. A registry would therefore make theft or diversion of nuclear material much less likely because it would be easier to detect. In addition to the IAEA, another very important part of nuclear non-proliferation attempts by the United Nations is the NonProliferation Treaty. Both the NPT and the IAEA form the backbone of the UN efforts to control nuclear technology. The NPT came into force in 1970, creating an internationally binding treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The treaty calls for the existing nuclear powers to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by not assisting any nation in the creation of nuclear weapons. The treaty also calls upon non-nuclear member nations to pledge not to use peaceful nuclear technology to develop nuclear weapons. Of the five existing nuclear weapons nations in 1970 only three signed the NPT, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. China and France agreed to abide by the principles of the treaty but did not sign it. It was not until 1992 that all established nuclear weapons nations acceded to the NPT, China in March and France in August. In the years following the ratification of the NPT, several other nations have achieved what could best be described as ambiguous nuclear status. According to Spector and Smith, India has exploded a "peaceful nuclear device," and Pakistan, South Africa and Israel either possess nuclear weapons or are close to possessing them (6). The

problem with the NPT is that only the five original nuclear weapons nations, China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States are recognized nuclear powers. Even if nations like India detonate a device they cannot be considered nuclear powers under the NPT. This clause of the treaty creates a nuclear hierarchy, which leaves non-nuclear weapons nations at the bottom. Thus, nations perceive that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will strengthen their international status, resulting in an incentive to acquire nuclear weapons rather than as a deterrent. The NPT calls for a conference to review its progress every five years and a conference at the end of twenty-five years to review and extend or dissolve the treaty. In 1995 the twenty-five year conference will be held and the effectiveness of the treaty will be evaluated. It will then be up to the committee to decide whether to extend the treaty as is, amend it, or dissolve it. With the 1993 announcement of North Korea's intent to withdraw from the NPT and the breakdown in negotiations between the United States and North Korea in early 1994 still fresh in the minds of conference delegates, it is likely that efforts will be made to strengthen the treaty and the inspections by the IAEA.

Current Issues
There are several issues that are very important in the current nuclear debate. After the Gulf War, the IAEA, under United Nations mandate, tried to inspect a nuclear facility in Iraq. The result was a stand off between inspectors and the Iraqi officials. In the end, officials did get to inspect the Iraqi nuclear facility, but the international community realized the impotence of the IAEA and the NPT. The United Nations realized how difficult the IAEA and the NPT are to enforce if a member nation refuses to accede to inspection. After the Iraqi incident and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the focus of the international community in regards to non-proliferation has changed. Attention has turned from the previous spotlight on Western Europe, Canada, and Japan towards other nations, and the system must be adjusted to meet the changing needs of verification. At the center of the changing emphasis by the IAEA is the following

question: "Are there possibly other Iraqs, that is, countries successfully hiding nuclear material that they should have declared and placed under international safeguards?" Another current issue in the international non-proliferation debate is the potential nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the time of this writing, the stand-off between the United States and North Korea, regarding the latter's threatened withdrawal from the NPT, is at an end. The nations have signed an accord in Geneva, and North Korea is not leaving the NPT at this time. However, the threatened withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT has exposed one of the treaty's weaknesses. The enforcement of the NPT is almost impossible at this time because all member nations have to do is to withdraw from it. Like most international treaties the NPT has an escape clause which enables nations to withdraw from the treaty by giving member nations and the United Nations Security Council notice of intent to withdraw and an explanation of the extraordinary events that have led to such a decision. The threatened nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, also brings to the forefront the need to provide regional security assurances to help eliminate the need to arm. The Korean Peninsula like the Indian Subcontinent, is characterized by hostile relations between the nations that share borders. The South and North Koreans have an adversarial relationship as do the Pakistanis and the Indians, which offer incentive for those nations to have nuclear weapons as security. Then once one nation acquires weapons the other must have one. Take for example, the hostile relationship that exists between India and Pakistan. Once India made a nuclear device to maintain weapons superiority over enemy state Pakistan, the Pakistanis vowed to have one of their own. As one government official stated "We will eat leaves and grass, even go hungry, but we will have one of our own". The only way to eliminate proliferation in cases like India and Pakistan or North and South Korea is to use the United Nations to work towards creating regional security assurances to eliminate this incentive to nuclearize.

Not only is the current nuclear debate centering on how to strengthen penalties for noncompliance with IAEA safeguards, but it has also been recommended that the number of personnel and financial resources available to the agency be increased. By increasing the resources available to the agency, it will have more money and people to conduct more inspections. Conducting more inspections, will make diversion of materials more risky to proliferators. Also, the inspections need to be modified to increase the quality of inspections, not just the quantity. If the inspections are done less thoroughly, then the increase in number will not matter. In regards to the inspections that the IAEA carries out on facilities, another suggestion that has come out is the use of surprise inspections like those used in Iraq after the Gulf War. The surprise inspection does not allow time for the hiding of illegal activities and the careful cover-up necessary to hide a country's nuclear weapons ambitions. In addition to an increase in human and capital resources, the IAEA needs to have broader access to intelligence data regarding suspect nations. Member nations need to be encouraged to share with the IAEA their intelligence data on suspect facilities, so that it can establish an early warning of such activity. As mentioned above, the IAEA is also considering the creation of a registry of nuclearrelated transfers. This registry would function like the newly created international arms registry and would help the IAEA track shipments of materials that could potentially be used to create nuclear weapons grade material to occur. As the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference approaches, there is new attention being focused on the very real threat that the nuclear nightmare is not over. Now rather than worrying about an East - West conflict, the real nuclear nightmare that has been there all along is getting attention: the threat of a small nation gaining nuclear weapons and having a regional conflict resulting in a nuclear exchange. Imagine the current war in the former Yugoslavia being fought with nuclear warheads.


IAEA terms Pakistan’s nuclear program safe and secure
ISLAMABAD, Apr 25 (APP): International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Monday declared the nuclear program of Pakistan as safe and secure and appreciated the obvious dedication to the safety and security of the regulators as well of operators.Talking exclusively to APP on the sidelines of ―International seminar on nuclear safety and security‖, held here from 21 -23 April, Deputy Director General IAEA Denis Flory said the IAEA emphasizes the importance of national responsibility for security, which Pakistan takes seriously.In fact, Pakistan has had an Action Plan in place to strengthen nuclear security since 2006, he added. Giving details he said this plan covers such items as Management of Radioactive Sources; Nuclear Security Emergency Co-ordination Center (NuSECC);Locating and Securing Orphan Radioactive Sources. Pakistan has worked with the Agency both to implement that Plan and to provide resources for its implementation, he maintained.

For example, he said,Pakistan is the 10th largest contributor to the Nuclear Security Fund, contributing $1.16 million. This is an example of their strong leadership and commitment as well as their serious approach to nuclear security in the course of implementing its action plan.

Additionally, over 200 people from Pakistan have attended IAEA training courses, he went on to add.

DDG IAEA said the Agency has worked with Pakistan to provide detection instruments; staff from Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) receiving ―on the job training‖ with IAEA; security improved at a number of facilities in Pakistan using radioactive sources. The relationship between the IAEA Office of Nuclear Security and PNRA is close and sets a good example for others he said, adding in fact, the Agency has benefitted from lessons learnt, in particular through membership of the Chair of PNRA (past and current) on the DG’s Advisory Group on Nuclear Secur ity (AdSec).

When quizzed about the future of nuclear industry, after the Fukushima incident (Japan) Denis Flory said the future of nuclear industry is not written down.It will depend on the actions taken at national and international levels to strengthen safety, to harmonize the implementation of international safety standards and to build the confidence of society through transparency.

The nuclear community should address now these issues, before confidence is definitely lost, he warned. Denis expressed the IAEA’s support for the people of Japan as they respond to and recover from the tragic events that occurred on March 11th.

The IAEA, World Health Organization (WHO), and officials from other agencies have maintained close contact with Japanese offices and have provided the Japanese government with expertise, advice and technical assistance in a variety of areas, he stated further. ―Upon request, we have sent teams to Japan, who have the skills, expertise,and equipment needed to help assess, survey, monitor, and sample the areas in and around Fukushima Prefecture‖. DDG IAEA said ―We cannot lose focus on the need for clean energy generation, including solar, hydropower, wind and, Yes-nuclear as a way to ease the world’s rapidly growing energy demands and reduce its reliance on polluting fossil fuels‖. Talking about challenges and opportunities in nuclear safety and security Flory said prior to March 11, 2011, more than 60 countries indicated interest in introducing or expanding nuclear power programmes, and the most important challenges were time and resources. ―To prevent another serious nuclear accident or terrorist incident, which,should it occur, will completely erase the development of nuclear power worldwide, we need new thinking and a new approach adapted to our dynamically changing global situations‖. One month ago, he said,the nuclear renaissance looked to be on track. But, it has been dealt a severe blow by Japan’s nuclear safety crisis. The question is whether it could stand the shock of a security incident; it would be particularly damaging to the developing world looking to nuclear for its future energy needs, he added.

He emphasized the need for continued focus on international cooperation, especially providing support for new entrants in building actual capacity and expertise to prevent serious accidents.

DDG IAEA also underscored strong commitment and leadership for safety and security in ensuring robust national safety and security infrastructures with effective and independent regulatory bodies, and strong safety and security management, leadership and culture.



^ a b c d e (PAEC), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (12 May 2011). "Prime Minister inaugurates 340 MW Chashma Nuclear Power Plant Unit-2: Govt to provide full support to PAEC for Nuclear Power Projects Urges International Community to make nuclear technology accessible to Pakistan for power generation". Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's Press Directorate . Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Directorate for Public Press and International News Relations. ^ Nuclear power in Pakistan, Dr. Zia H. Siddiqui and Dr. I.H. Qureshi, pp.31–33. ^ (PAEC), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. "Nuclear Power Generation Programme".Government of Pakistan. PAEC. Retrieved 2011.

 

^ Syed Yousaf, Raza (July 31, 2012). "Current Picture of Electrical Energy In Pakistan".Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (in English). Directorate-General for Nuclear Power Generation. Retrieved 28 November 2012.

^ Zulfikar,





2012). "Pak-China


cooperation". Pakistan Observer. Retrieved 23 April 2012.

^ UN Press Release. "IAEA Publications: Pakistan Overview". IAEA, P.O. Box 100, Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria. IAEA Membership states. Retrieved 17 April 2012.

^ Associate Press of Pakistan (APP) (25 April 2011). "IAEA declares nuclear energy programme safe". Dawn Newspapers, 25th April, 2011. Retrieved 17 April 2012.

^ Dahl, Fredrik (Mon September 27, 2010 12:23pm EDT). "Nuclear-armed Pakistan chairs board of U.N. atom body". Reuters, Vienna. Retrieved 17 April 2012. ""Pakistan is a long-standing and "very law-abiding" member of the IAEA, got no opposition from any side at all"

^ Professor Riazuddin (13 October 2005). "Contribution of Abdus Salam as Member of PAEC". The Nucleus (Nilore, Islamabad: The Nucleus PINSTECH

publication) 42 (1-2): 31–34. ISSN 0029-5698. Retrieved 2011.

^ Siddiqui, Dr. Zia; Dr. Iqbal Hussain Qureshi (13 October 2005). "Nuclear power in Pakistan". The Nucleus (Nilore, Islamabad: The Nucleus PINSTECH publication) 42 (1-2): 63–66. ISSN 0029-5698. Retrieved 2011.

^ "Pakistan Makes Achievements in Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy". Xinhua General Overseas News Service. 27 October 1979.

^ Usman



2004). "PAEC's





reactor". Pakistan Military Consortium. Pakistan Defence Information Center. Retrieved 2011.

^ "Soviet Ambassador Says Soviets Might Sell Pakistan A Nuclear Plant". 26 February 1990. Retrieved 2011.

^ Nizami, Majid; Salim Bukhari (26 February 1990). "Paper Says US To Object To Nuclear Plant Deal". The Nation (in English language) (Islamabad, Islamabad Capital Territory: Nawa-i-Waqt Media Group). pp. 1–2. Retrieved 2011. ^ a b c d e f g h (PAEC), I". PAEC. PAEC.




Commission. "CHASNUPP

^ a b c d e f g (IAEA), International Atomic Energy Agency. "CHASNUPP-II". IAEA. IAEA. Retrieved 2011-04-08. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k (TEX), The Express Tribune. "China firm aims to build big nuclear plant for Pakistan". The Express Tribune. The Express Tribune. ^ a b c d e f (IAEA), database. IAEA.




Agency. "KANUPP-I". IAEA

^ a b c d e f (PAEC), Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. "KANUPP-II". Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. ^ a b c d e Hashim, Asad (31 January 2009, Saturday). "Plan to establish 1,000MW KANUPP-II put on hold". Dawn Newspapers (Karachi, Sindh: Hameed Haroon of Dawn Group of Newspapers). Retrieved 2011.

^ Asad Hashim, Plan to establish 1,000MW Kanupp-II put on hold DAWN Media Group.