This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2229263
1
I ndexing and Stock Price Efficiency
Nan Qin and Vijay Singal
1
March 5, 2013
Abstract
Indexing has experienced substantial growth over the past two decades because it is an effective
way of holding a diversified portfolio while minimizing trading and taxes. In this paper, we
focus on one negative externality of indexing: the effect on efficiency of stock prices. Based on a
sample of S&P 500 index constituents over 1993 to 2011, we find that greater indexing leads to
less efficient stock prices. We attribute our findings to uninformed passive trading and to
reduced incentives for information acquisition and arbitrage induced by the passive nature of
indexing. The relationship cannot be explained by persistence in price efficiency, size,
idiosyncratic volatility, or potential reverse causality, and only partially by liquidity.
1
Qin (nanqin@vt.edu; 5403576774) and Singal (singal@vt.edu; 5402317750) are from the Department of
Finance, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, 1016 Pamplin Hall, Blacksburg, VA 240610221.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2229263
2
I ndexing and Stock Price Efficiency
This version: March 5, 2013
Abstract
Indexing has experienced substantial growth over the past two decades because it is an effective
way of holding a diversified portfolio while minimizing trading and taxes. In this paper, we
focus on one negative externality of indexing: the effect on efficiency of stock prices. Based on a
sample of S&P 500 index constituents over 1993 to 2011, we find that greater indexing leads to
less efficient stock prices. We attribute our findings to uninformed passive trading and to
reduced incentives for information acquisition and arbitrage induced by the passive nature of
indexing. The relationship cannot be explained by persistence in price efficiency, size,
idiosyncratic volatility, or potential reverse causality, and only partially by liquidity.
JEL classification: G14, G23
Keywords: indexing, index funds, ETFs, passive institutional investors, stock price efficiency,
passive trading
3
1. I ntroduction
The indexed investment sector, including index mutual funds, enhanced index funds, exchange
traded funds (ETFs), and closet indexers
2
, has experienced rapid growth over the past two
decades. As of May 2011, the market share of broadly diversified index funds had reached 22.3%
of the mutual fund sector.
3
The potential impact of this sector on the efficiency of equity markets,
however, is an important but unexplored topic. Previous studies have found that institutional
investors generally enhance informational efficiency of stock prices by facilitating the
transmission of information into prices (Boehmer and Kelley, 2009, BK hereafter). Compared to
their active peers, however, passive institutional investors have two unique characteristics. First,
they generally hold a basket of stocks in certain indices passively, without active information
acquisition and price discovery. Second, trading of passive funds is mostly driven by investor
flows or index changes instead of private information. Both features raise concerns regarding
their potential negative impact on price efficiency. As suggested by Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), price discovery relies on informed traders who actively acquire information and
incorporate that information into stock prices by trading. An increase in passive (uninformed)
investors and the consequent reduction in active traders can result in a proportionate increase in
information costs and has the potential to move equilibrium to a less efficient level. Moreover,
inefficient asset prices may result in resource misallocation and impair the quality of the real
economy.
Several studies have examined the impact of institutional investors, either active or passive,
on stock price.
4
Using a comprehensive sample of NYSElisted stocks between 1983 and 2004,
BK find that trading and ownership by institutional investors increase price efficiency.
Specifically, institutional investors incorporate information into stock prices through their
trading whereas their ownership facilitates informed arbitrage. On the other hand, Harris and
Gurel (1986) document that stock prices increase immediately after announcements of additions
to the S&P 500 index but reverse substantially after two weeks without a reversal in trading
volume. They explain these findings by the temporary pricepressure caused by index fund
2
Closet indexers are ‘active’ mutual funds who actually track an index.
3
At the end of June, 2011, there were about 290 equity and fixed income index mutual funds and 990 passive ETFs
with nearly $2.3 trillion in assets in the United States. Data source: Morningstar, “A Brief History of Indexing.”
4
Shu (2007) finds that price anomalies, including return momentum, post earningsannouncement drift, and value
premium are much stronger in stocks with relatively low institutional trading volume.
4
purchases of stocks newly added to the index. Goetzmann and Massa (2003) examine daily flows
for three major S&P 500 index funds and find a strong contemporaneous correlation between
inflows and returns. Similarly, Keim and Madhavan (1997) and Jones and Lipson (1999, 2001)
find that index funds generate a larger price impact relative to active funds during the short
period following their trading. Despite such an extensive literature, there has been no systematic
study about the impact of passive investors on informational efficiency of stock prices. Most of
the previous studies focus only on the price effect after trades or around index changes, but do
not establish a crosssectional relation between passive ownership, trading, and price efficiency.
In this paper, we empirically investigate the relation between indexed holdings and trading
and price efficiency. Based on a sample of S&P 500 constituents over the period 1993 to 2011,
we find that prices become less efficient as indexed ownership grows, where price efficiency is
measured by deviations from the random walk. This relation is not explained by persistence in
price efficiency, size effect, idiosyncratic volatility, or potential reverse causality, and is only
partially explained by a liquidity effect. It is robust to several intraday and daily price efficiency
measures, subsample periods, and alternative liquidity measures. We also examine the impact of
indexed ownership and passive trading separately, showing that indexed investments affect price
efficiency through both channels. We attribute the effect of passive trading to their uninformed
nature and their negative impact on liquidity, while we attribute the effect of indexed ownership
to reduced incentives for information acquisition and price discovery.
Our sample of passive institutional investors consists of 663 index funds, enhanced index
funds, ETFs, and closet indexers. The index and indexlike funds are identified in several ways:
keywords in fund names; ‘activeness’ of funds based on deviations from index compositions;
and fit from regressions of fund returns on index returns. For subsequent analysis, we measure
each stock’s passive ownership as the percentage of shares held by any fund in our sample at the
end of each quarter, and we measure passive trading volume as the sum of absolute holding
changes over that quarter.
Following Hasbrouck (1993), we assume that an efficient intraday transaction price
follows a random walk and use the volatility of the deviation from random walk and its
normalized variant (scaled by price volatility) as absolute and relative measures of price
inefficiency. We believe that these intraday measures, compared to daily or even longerhorizon
proxies, better capture deviation from efficient prices due to relatively quick adjustments of stock
5
prices of S&P 500 firms.
5
However, to ensure that potential price inefficiency in longer horizons
is simply not omitted, we also adopt two daily price inefficiency measures for robustness: the
absolute value of firstorder autocorrelation in daily stock returns and the weeklytodaily
variance ratio.
We prefer a crosssectional approach to a timeseries approach to investigate the relation
between passive investments and price efficiency for two reasons. First, since passive funds are
indexed to an index and index constitution changes slowly over time, timeseries variation in
passive ownership of an index stock is fairly small. A timeseries analysis, therefore, may lack
sufficient testing power. This problem, however, is mitigated in a crosssectional analysis since
crosssectional dispersion in passive ownership and trading is likely to be relatively large.
6
Second, overall efficiency of U.S. equity markets has been improving over the past two decades,
7
probably due to better technology and higher analyst coverage resulting in better information
production and quicker dissemination. This time effect of price efficiency could induce false
inferences from a timeseries analysis, but is unlikely to affect a crosssectional analysis.
Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), each quarter, we regress measures of price
efficiency on passive and nonpassive institutional ownership and control variables. Consistent
with our hypothesis, the deviation of both intraday and daily stock prices from a random walk is
positively correlated with passive ownership. We also reconfirm the inference of BK that (non
passive) institutional investors generally enhance price efficiency. We preclude the possibility of
reverse causality for our finding and confirm its robustness to many alternative specifications.
We consider three explanations for our results. First, higher indexed ownership possibly
implies a low incentive of investors to acquire information. Consequently, it may reduce the
production of information and the incidence of informed arbitrage. Second, indexed ownership
may serve as a proxy for passive trading, which is mostly uninformed. Such uninformed trading
may contribute to greater price inefficiency (Kyle, 1985). Finally, indexed ownership could
reduce liquidity, which in turn raises the cost of informed arbitrage.
5
Chordia, et al. (2005) find that sophisticated investors react to order imbalances within sixty minutes. Thus, they
believe that serial dependence over daily or longer horizon is likely to be small.
6
The timeseries average of the quarterly crosssectional standard deviation of passive ownership in our stock
sample is 1.10%, while the average standard deviation of change in passive ownership across the stock sample is
only 0.39%.
7
BK find that the average relative pricing error of stocks listed on the NYSE has declined from approximately 5%
in 1990 to approximately 1% in 2004. Table 2 shows that the relative pricing error of S&P constituents has declined
from an average of 3% over 19931998 to an average of 0.4% over 20062011.
6
Further analysis reveals that passive trading has a negative impact on price efficiency.
Therefore, at least part of the passive ownership effect on price efficiency comes from passive
trading. However, even after controlling for passive trading, passive ownership continues to be
negatively associated with price efficiency, indicating the indexed investments impair price
efficiency through both channels: passive trading and passive ownership. We also investigate the
relation between liquidity and passive ownership and find that passive trading has a significantly
negative impact on liquidity, though the negative relation between passive holding and liquidity
is not statistically significant. Therefore, it seems that the degradation of price efficiency arises
from three sources: the uninformed nature of passive trading, reduction in liquidity due to
passive trading, and a reduced incentive for price discovery and informed arbitrage induced by
passive ownership.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that establishes a negative cross
sectional relation between indexed ownership, trading, and price efficiency. Given that previous
studies have found a positive relation between institutional investors and price efficiency, this
paper highlights the distinction between passive and nonpassive institutional investors on price
efficiency. While indexing is beneficial for the individual investor, it imposes costs on market
efficiency. Taken to the extreme, no one has an incentive to make prices informationally efficient
with 100% indexing. Even at current levels of indexing, we find that price efficiency is
compromised for stocks with greater indexing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data sources, sample
selection, measures of price efficiency, liquidity, and other control variables. Section 3 presents
our main results from crosssectional regressions and the corresponding robustness tests. Section
4 explores potential underlying mechanisms to explain our findings. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and Methodology
2.1 Sample of Stocks
Our sample includes all stocks that were part of the S&P 500 index at any time from 1993
to 2011, but only from the time of their entry into the index to avoid a lookahead bias. Stocks
that are deleted from the index continue to be in our sample until their delisting. The
consideration here is that the informational environment of a stock will change substantially after
7
being added to the S&P 500 index, due to higher investor recognition, greater transparency, and
more analyst and media coverage, but will not change much after being deleted from the index
(Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004). Furthermore, we require a minimum stock price of $2 for a
stock to remain in the sample. Any stock that trades below $2 at the beginning of a quarter is
deleted from the sample for that quarter. The sample includes a total of 1014 stocks, with an
average of 555 stocks in a quarter. Daily stock price, return, trading volume and shares
outstanding are obtained from CRSP stock files. Intraday trade and quote data are obtained from
NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.
8
We choose 1993 as the start of the sample period
since it is the first year when stock trade and quote data are available in TAQ. We obtain
constituents of the S&P indices from Compustat and of the Russell indices from Russell
Investments. Total returns for the indexes are obtained from Bloomberg.
We choose the S&P 500 as our sample for several reasons. First, informational efficiency
of stock prices is largely influenced by the information environment of the firm. Restricting our
sample to only S&P 500 constituents generates a setting of similar informational environment
across stocks, thus any inference about the association between indexed ownership and price
efficiency will be more robust to potentially unobservable factors that may affect the
informational environment of a firm. Second, nonS&P 500 stocks generally have lower levels of
passive ownership compared with S&P 500 constituents. For example, the average passive
ownership of S&P 500 constituents at the end of 2011 was 7.70%, while that of nonS&P 500
stocks was only 3.30%. Excluding nonS&P 500 stocks, therefore, improves power of the tests
due to potentially greater impact on price efficiency. Third, restricting the sample to S&P 500
constituents, which are high market capitalization stocks, helps reduce the potential impact of
infrequent trading. Finally, the S&P 500 index represents the U.S. equity market and any effect
found among its components is likely to be important for the entire market.
2.2 Sample of Passive Funds
Data about institutional investors are obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund database and
Thomson Reuters U.S. institutional investor holdings database (13f). CRSP provides index fund
and ETF indicators that are used to create the passive fund sample. Fund names provided by both
8
Following Hasbrouck (1988) and Lee and Ready (1991), we assume that trades are recorded five seconds late
during 1993 to 1998 and adjust the time stamps accordingly. For the post1998 period, we assume that the time
stamps are recorded correctly and make no adjustment.
8
CRSP and Thomson Reuters serve as an important complementary source to identify index funds
and ETFs that are not identified by indicators from CRSP. Further, monthly mutual fund returns
provided by CRSP help us identify closet indexers. Thomson Reuters’ 13f database, which
provides quarterly holding data of mutual funds and other institutional investors, is used to
estimate passive and nonpassive institutional ownership and trading of each stock by quarter.
The passive fund sample includes four types of passive institutional investors: 1) a total of
350 openend equity index funds that aim to replicate the performance of a specific equity index
by holding the index constituents in the same proportions as the index, 2) a total of 40 enhanced
index funds that reserve certain flexibility on position size and investment strategies, 3) a total of
236 ETFs that track an index and are traded on stock exchanges,
9
and 4) a total of 37 closet
indexers. We do not restrict our sample to pure index funds and ETFs, but also include enhanced
index funds and closet indexers in order to construct a more complete measure of passive
ownership. Although these funds may strategically adjust weights of some holdings based on
their predictions about future price movements, they track indices passively and closely. Thus,
their impact on price efficiency is closer to index funds than to their active peers.
We create the passive fund sample in four steps. First, we merge the CRSP mutual fund
database, which provides indicators for index funds and ETFs, with the 13f database. We
identify mutual funds from the 13f database that are tagged by CRSP as an index fund or ETF.
Second, we screen remaining funds in both CRSP mutual fund and 13f databases to using
keywords in their names. A fund is classified to be passive if it calls itself as an index fund,
enhanced index fund, or an exchange traded fund (ETF).
10
Third, we identify closet indexers in
two ways. First, following Cremers and Petajisto (2009), we estimate the “Active Share” (AS
hereafter) of each mutual fund from the 13f database. As suggested by Cremers and Petajisto
(2009), any portfolio could be decomposed into a benchmark index portfolio plus a zeronet
value longshort portfolio. Thus, AS is a measure of the overall deviation of the weights of a
fund’s holdings from the benchmark index and defined as
9
This number is smaller than the actual number of U.S. equity ETFs for several reasons. First, we exclude ETFs that
hold substantially international equities. Second, ETFs that are reported jointly with index mutual funds are
identified as index funds instead of ETFs in the sample. An example is Vanguard 500 Index Funds which has both
investor shares and ETF shares. Third, the 13f database does not provide an ETF indicator, while the ETF indicators
from CRSP are not able to identify all ETFs in the 13f database since the MFLINKS dataset does not provide a
complete linkage between the CRSP mutual fund database and the 13f database.
10
See the Appendix for details.
9
AS =
1
2
w
]und,ì
w
ìndcx,ì

N
ì=1
, (1)
where w
]und,ì
and w
ìndcx,ì
are the weights of asset i in the fund and in the index, respectively.
Lower AS indicates higher level of passiveness. For a pure index fund, AS will be close to zero,
since the weight of each asset in the fund portfolio equals the asset weight in the benchmark
index.
11
Second, we estimate a regression of monthly fund returns over its entire life on
corresponding benchmark index returns to obtain Rsquare. A fund with Rsquare close to one is
more likely to follow passive strategies.
12
Since the benchmark indices for closet indexers are not
explicitly stated, we tested ten indices for each fund and selected the lowest AS and the highest
Rsquare for each fund. The indices are: S&P 500 index, S&P 500 Growth index, S&P 500
Value index, S&P 400 MidCap index, S&P 600 SmallCap index, S&P 100 index, Russell 1000
index, Russell 2000 index, NASDAQ 100 index, and the whole market portfolio obtained from
CRSP stock files. To be included in the passive fund sample, closet indexers must have an AS
less than 30% or an Rsquare above 0.99.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Finally, we exclude balanced funds, international funds, and bond funds from the sample.
13
The above procedure generates a total of 663 passive funds. As presented in Table 1, there is a
steady and noticeable increase in the number and (relative) market value of passive funds over
the past two decades. We are only able to identify 54 passive funds with aggregate market value
of $22.11 billion and market share of 0.44% in 1993, but the sample increases to 420 funds with
an aggregate market value of $1.03 trillion and market share of 5.75% in 2011.
14
As of
11
Theoretically, AS for a pure index fund with very low tracking error should be close to zero. However, as 13f
reports generally ignore small holdings, the estimated AS will be higher than the actual value. The average estimate
of AS over the life of an index fund in our sample could be as large as approximately 20%.
12
We do not require the beta to be close to 1 because a passive fund may intentionally maintain a beta different from
1.00 by using leverage or by holding cash.
13
Balanced funds, international funds, and bond funds are identified mainly by their names and country code
provided in the 13f database. We also manually screen the sample to remove any of these funds. See the Appendix
for details.We check the fund prospectus for fund objective and strategies. Typically, a fund is removed from the
sample when its investment strategy states that the manager actively chooses undervalued stocks.
14
The increase in indexing is much steeper and greater than documented in earlier studies (see Wurgler and
Zhuravskaya, 2002). However, our results are largely unaffected because our analysis is crosssectional, not time
series.
10
December 2011, there were 182 index funds with a total market capitalization of $733 billion
and 211 ETFs with a total market capitalization of $290 billion. By comparison, the market share
of institutional investors has experienced a smaller increase from 50.69% in 1993 to 67.24% in
2011.
15
2.3 Measure of relative informational efficiency of prices
Following prior work, we assume that efficient stock prices follow a random walk and,
therefore, price efficiency should be measured by how closely prices follow a random walk. We
adopt three efficiency measures that are widely used in the literature: the pricing errors of
Hasbrouck (1993) and its normalized variant, the daily firstorder autocorrelation in stock returns,
and variance ratios of weekly returns to daily returns. We use the pricing error as the principal
measure, while the other two measures serve as robustness tests.
The pricing error proposed by Hasbrouck (1993) measures the deviation between
transaction prices and implicit efficient prices. Specifically, the log transaction price, p
t
, is
defined as the efficient price, m
t
, plus a transitory deviation, s
t
:
p
t
= m
t
+s
t
. (2)
t indexes either transactions or natural time; m
t
is defined as the expectation of the stock value
given all available public information and is assumed to follow a random walk; s
t
measures the
deviation of transaction price from the efficient price. It is assumed to be a zeromean
covariancestationary stochastic process with standard deviation, o
s
. Clearly, o
s
measures how
closely the transaction price follows the efficient price, thus is used as an inverse measure of
price efficiency.
Intraday trade and quote data obtained from the NYSE TAQ database are used for
estimation of o
s
16
. We ignore the natural times but view transactions as untimed sequences. This
approach is preferable since it gives more weights to periods with heavier price discovery
15
Note that we consider the holdings of S&P 500 components among all passive funds, whether indexed to the S&P
500 or not,
16
Following BK, we use quotes and trades that are within the regular trading hours (9:30AM4:00PM) and ignore
overnight price changes. A quote is removed if the ask price is lower than the bid price, if the bid price is lower than
$0.10, or if the bidask spread is higher than 25% of the quote midpoint. To be eligible for estimation, a trade is
required to have a value of zero in TAQ’s CORR field, marked as ‘*’, ‘@’, ‘@F’, ‘F’, ‘B’, ‘E’, ‘J’, ‘K’, or blank in
TAQ’s COND field, and have a positive trade size and price. A trade is removed if its price differs by more than 30%
from the previous trade.
11
activities, represented by more transactions, and uses information delivered from every single
transaction. Following Hasbrouck (1993), we estimate the lower bound for o
s
using a vector
autoregression (VAR) model with five lags over the fourvariable set X
t
= {r
t
, x
t
]
i
, where
r
t
= p
t
p
t1
and x
t
is a S × 1 vector of the following trade variables: 1) sign of trading
direction that takes value of 1 if the transaction is buyerinitiated value of 1 if it is seller
initiated, and value of 0 for a quote midpoint transaction, 2) signed trading volume, and 3) the
signed square root of trading volume. Following Harris (1989) and Lee and Ready (1991), we
classify a trade as buyerinitiated (sellerinitiated) if the transaction price is above (below) the
prevailing quote midpoint. The inclusion of square root of trading volume aims to allow for
concave dependencies in both m
t
and s
t
. In each quarter, we estimate V(s) for stocks that have at
least 500 trades over that quarter.
17
Specifically, the joint process of X
t
is described by a fivelag
VAR model:
X
t
= B
1
X
t1
+B
2
X
t2
+B
3
X
t3
+B
4
X
t4
+B
5
X
t5
+u
t
, (S)
where B
k
is the 4 × 4 coefficient matrix for lag k; u
t
is a 1 × 4 vector of zeromean error terms
with E(u
ì,t
, u
],t
) = u. The VAR model is then transformed into a fivelag approximation of
vector moving average (VMA) representation:
18
X
t
= u
t
+A
1
u
t1
+A
2
u
t2
+A
3
u
t3
+A
4
u
t4
+A
5
u
t5
, (4)
where A
k
is 4 × 4 coefficient matrix for lag k and is estimated by the approach of Galbraith,
Ullah, and ZindeWalsh (2002):
A
q
= B
1
A
q1
+B
2
A
q2
+⋯+B
q1
A
1
+B
q
. (S)
Variance of pricing error is expressed by:
o
s
2
= y
1,]
y
2,]
y
3,]
y
4,]
]
4
]=0
Co:(u)y
1,]
y
2,]
y
3,]
y
4,]
]
i
, (6)
where
17
Requiring a higher or lower (at least 200) number of transactions does not change the results.
18
VMA lags beyond five are assumed to have little impact and are ignored to simplify the estimation process.
12
y
ì,]
=  A
k,1,ì
5
k=]+1
, (7)
and Co:(u) is the residual covariance matrix from the VAR model. We denote o
s
by V(s) and
use its natural logarithm, Ln[V(s)], as an inverse measure of informational efficiency. As V(s) is
associated with price volatility, we follow BK to normalize V(s) by the standard deviation of log
transaction prices, V(p), to form a measure of relative price efficiency, V(s)/V(p). Both Ln[V(s)]
and V(s)/V(p) are used as principal metrics in the crosssectional analysis.
Though the price adjustment process generally takes less than sixty minutes (Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam, 2005) and should be well described by the V(s), we would like to capture
potential price adjustment processes in longer horizons to enhance the robustness of our findings.
The existence of longhorizon return anomalies, such as momentum, daily and weekly return
autocorrelations, or post earningannouncement drift, indicate the existence of inefficient stock
prices beyond each trading day. Hence we adopt two efficiency measures based on daily and
weekly returns. The first one is absolute value of firstorder daily return autocorrelation, AC(1),
and the second one is a variant of weeklytodaily return variance ratio, 1–VR(1,5). Both are
associated with the magnitude of deviation of stock price from a random walk. Specifically,
AC(1) is estimated for each stock over each quarter by regressing daily returns on 1day lagged
returns:
r
ì,t
= o
ì
+p
ì
r
ì,t1
+e
ì,t
. (8)
Following Lo and MacKinlay (1988), 1–VR(1,5) is estimated for each stock over each quarter as
the absolute deviation of the ratio of weekly return variance to (five times) daily return variance,
where the weekly returns are calculated from a Wednesday to the next Tuesday to eliminate the
weekend effect.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the four efficiency measures, including two
variations of Hasbrouck (1993) over the period 1993 to 2011. The average V(s) across the S&P
500 constituents is 0.082%, but has experienced a notable decrease from 0.156% in the mid
1990s to 0.028% in the late 2000s. The relative efficiency measure, V(s)/V(p), has also
13
experienced a notable decrease from 3% in mid1990s to 0.48% in the late 2010s. AC(1) and 1–
VR(1,5), however, are relatively stable over time with average values of 12.9% and 0.30,
respectively.
2.4 Measures of institutional ownership and trading
We construct passive and nonpassive institutional ownership and trading measures for the
crosssectional analysis. We define passive institutional ownership (PO) of a stock at the end of a
quarter as the total shares held by any fund in the passive fund sample, scaled by total shares
outstanding at the quarter end. Similarly, nonpassive institutional ownership (NPO) is defined as
the total shares held by any institutional investor (who files the 13f form) that does not belong to
the passive fund sample.
19
Therefore, PO represents the fraction of shares held passively by
institutional investors, while NPO represents the fraction of shares that are held by active
institutional investors.
Since the 13f database contains only positions held, we are not able to precisely estimate
trading volumes of either passive or nonpassive institutional investors. Instead, we use changes
in institutional holdings as a lower bound of institutional trading volume. Passive trading (PT)
for each stockquarter is estimated as the sum of absolute changes in passive holdings
standardized by total shares outstanding, while nonpassive trading (NPT) is estimated as the
sum of absolute changes in nonpassive holdings:
PI
k,t
=
∑ ∆EolJings
ì,k,t

N
pcssi¡c
ì=1
Sborc0ut
k,t
, (9)
NPI
k,t
=
∑ ∆EolJings
],k,t

N
ncnpcssi¡c
]=1
Sborc0ut
k,t
. (1u)
Table 2 reports timeseries average of quarterly crosssectional means and standard
deviations of ownership and trading variables. The average quarterly passive trading is 0.45% of
total shares outstanding, which is equivalent to an annual turnover of 1.80%. In contrast, the
19
Institutional holdings are obtained from the 13f database, while data on total shares outstanding is obtained from
the CRSP stock files. For stockquarters which report more institutional holdings than total shares outstanding, we
set institutional ownership to 100% and calculate PO and NPO accordingly provided the institutional ownership in
the previous or the following quarter is above 80%. Otherwise, we consider it to be an invalid observation.
14
average quarterly nonpassive trading is 19.44%, or an annual turnover of 77.76%. As expected,
passive funds trade much less than nonpassive institutional investors after considering the
difference in their ownership. The average NPO (65%) is about 19 times the average PO (3.37%),
whereas average nonpassive trading (19.44%) is about 43 times average passive trading (0.45%).
2.5 Control variables
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) find that liquidity stimulates arbitrage activities
and enhances market efficiency. Three measures for liquidity (ILLIQ) are used in the cross
sectional analysis: 1) equallyweighted relative effective spread (RES), estimated as two times
the absolute distance between actual transaction price and corresponding quote midpoint, scaled
by the quote midpoint; 2) equallyweighted relative quote spread (RQS), estimated as the
absolute distance between bid and ask price, scaled by the quote midpoint, and 3) Amihud (2002)
price impact measure of illiquidity (Amihud) estimated by the approach of Acharya and Pedersen
(2005). RES is preferred since it measures the actual (relative) transaction costs for traders.
However, we recognize that RES may underestimate illiquidity, since transactions are relatively
infrequent during periods of low liquidity.
Previous studies find either a positive or a negative relation between price informativeness
and idiosyncratic volatility. For example, idiosyncratic volatility could be associated with the
quality of information environment (Kelly, 2007; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999) or
strong property rights (Morck et al., 2000), which are difficult to quantify but could facilitate
informed arbitrage. We estimate idiosyncratic volatility (IVol) by the approach of Ang, Hodrick,
Xing, and Zhang (2006). Specifically, for each quarter, we regress daily stock returns on the
three FamaFrench factors and use residual standard deviation, o(e
ì
), times number of trading
days in that quarter as the estimates for IVol.
r
ìt
= o
ìt
+b
ìt
r
mt
+s
ìt
SHB
t
+b
ìt
EHI
t
+e
ìt
, (11)
Additional control variables include log of stock market capitalization (LnMV), log of daily
closing price (LnPrice), and standard deviation of daily returns (Vol). Table 2 reports timeseries
averages of quarterly crosssectional means and standard deviations of all control variables.
15
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Conditional triple sort
Stocks in our sample are first sorted into two groups in each quarter by their market
capitalizations, and then sorted into terciles based on their nonpassive institutional ownerships
(NPO) at the beginning of the quarter. Within each NPO tercile, stocks are sorted into three
groups based on their passive institutional ownership (PO) at the beginning of the quarter. The
average quarterly crosssectional means of price efficiency and illiquidity measures over the
sample period are reported in Table 3. Consistent with BK, each of the four efficiency measures
generally decreases with NPO, which represents a major component of institutional holdings of a
stock. More importantly, after controlling for NPO, each of the four efficiency measures
generally increases with PO. In other words, price efficiency of individual stocks tends to be
negatively associated with their passive ownerships. This relation is more pronounced in
relatively small stocks with low NPO, but almost disappears for large stocks with the highest
NPO. It is reasonable to expect such a relation, however, since large stocks with more non
passive institutional investors tend to have a better information environment, higher liquidity,
and more effective price discovery than smaller stocks, and thus, would be more robust to a
potentially negative impact of passive investors. Another noticeable feature is that higher
indexed ownership is generally associated with lower liquidity, or higher RES. This highlights
the importance of carefully controlling for liquidity in the following regression analysis.
[Insert Table 3 here]
3.2 Crosssectional relation between indexed ownership and price efficiency
To formally examine the relation between indexed ownership and price efficiency, we
estimate a multivariate crosssectional regression following Fama and MacBeth (1973):
PE
ìt
= o
t
+[
P0,t
P0
ì,t1
+[
NP0,t
NP0
ì,t1
+o
t
PE
ì,t1
+y
1,t
RES
ì,t1
+y
2,t
IIol
ì,t1
+y
3,t
InHI
ì,t1
+y
4,t
InPricc
ì,t1
+e
ì,t
. (12)
Specifically, one of the four price efficiency measures, PE
ìt
, in each quarter is regressed on PO,
NPO, and a lagged efficiency measure from the previous quarter, while controlling for illiquidity
16
(RES), idiosyncratic volatility (IVol), natural logarithm of market value of the stock (LnMV), and
natural logarithm of stock price (LnPrice) as at the end of the previous quarter. All independent
variables are lagged by one quarter to prevent potential reverse causality and to reduce potential
impact of passive ownership on contemporaneous explanatory variables. For example, if passive
ownership has effect on both price efficiency and liquidity, using contemporaneous illiquidity
( RES
ì,t
) as a control variable could lead to a downwardly biased coefficient on passive
ownership ([
P0,t
).
20
The lagged pricing efficiency measure is included to control for persistence
in pricing efficiency over time and to control for contemporaneous effect of PE
ì,t1
on P0
ì,t1
and NP0
ì,t1
, if any. The crosssectional regression is estimated in each quarter of our sample
period, and the timeseries mean of the quarterly coefficient estimates is used for inference. The
standard errors are adjusted for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity by the Newey and
West (1987) approach.
Several dependent and independent variables, however, suffer from heteroskedasticity over
the sample period of 19932011. As presented in Table 2, there are large increases in the cross
sectional standard deviations of PO and PT and large decreases in the standard deviations of the
(normalized) pricing error volatility, V(s) and V(s)/V(p), and illiquidity measures, RES and RQS.
For example, standard deviation of PO for our sample stocks is 0.67% over 19931998, but
increases to 2.31% over 20062011. Standard deviation of V(s), on the other hand, drops from an
average of 0.177% over 19931998 to 0.031% over 20062011. Since the crosssectional
volatility of the dependent variables (i.e. V(s) and V(s)/V(p)) are moving in the opposite direction
compared to the volatility of the independent variables (i.e. PO and PT), coefficient estimates of
PO and PT tend to have much larger magnitudes in early years than in recent years, leading to
the FamaMacBeth regression results being largely influenced by results from early years. To
control for timevarying weighting and following Kumar (2009), we standardize all dependent
and independent variables to have zeromean and unit standard deviation on a quarterly basis.
This also makes the coefficient estimates to be comparable across the entire sample period.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Table 4 reports the main results from the crosssectional analysis. Controlling for non
passive institutional ownership and other stock characteristics, each of the four inefficiency
20
Using contemporaneous variables leads to qualitatively and quantitatively similar regression results.
17
measures is positively and significantly related to passive fund ownership, indicating that
indexed holdings are associated with larger deviation from random walk implying lower price
efficiency. In contrast, nonpassive institutional ownership is negatively and significantly related
to all four inefficiency measures, indicating their role in enhancing market efficiency. The results
are consistent with BK that active institutional investors contribute to efficient stock prices.
Moreover, consistent with the Chordia, et al. (2008) argument that liquidity facilitates informed
arbitrage, inefficiency measures are always positively and significantly associated with stock
illiquidity.
3.3 Robustness test: Reverse causality
A positive association between inefficiency measures and indexed fund ownership,
however, may come from a selfselection bias rather than causality. If passive funds prefer to
hold stocks with lower price efficiency, a crosssectional negative relation between indexed
holding and price efficiency is expected even if passive holdings generate no impact on price
efficiency. Though this problem could be significant in studies of active institutional investors, it
is likely to be less serious when studying indexed institutional investors whose trading is mostly
driven by investor flows or index changes rather than preference to stocks with certain
characteristics. Selfselection bias could also exist if fund investors prefer low efficiency stocks
and provide flows to passive funds when overall market efficiency is decreasing. To preclude
any possible selfselection bias, we use timeseries regression as a causality test. Specifically, for
each stock with at least thirty quarterly observations, we estimate the following timeseries
regressions over its entire life in the stock sample:
∆P0
ì,t
= [
1
∆PE
ì,t1
+[
2
∆P0
ì,t1
+[
3
∆NP0
ì,t1
+[
4
∆RES
ì,t1
+[
5
∆IIol
ì,t1
+[
6
∆HI
ì,t1
+e
ìt
. (1S)
∆PE
ì,t1
is the lagged change in one of the four price inefficiency measures, measured as the
difference between PE
ì,t1
and PE
ì,t2
. Similarly, ∆P0
ì,t1
, ∆NP0
ì,t1
, ∆RES
ì,t1
, ∆IIol
ì,t1
,
and ∆HI
ì,t1
are lagged changes in passive ownership, nonpassive ownership, illiquidity,
idiosyncratic volatility, and market value, respectively. Existence of selfselection bias implies a
positive and significant coefficient, [
1
. However, as presented by Table 5, none of the coefficient
18
estimates on ∆PE
ì,t1
is significantly positive, indicating that a decrease in price efficiency does
not cause a significant increase in passive ownership.
[Insert Table 5 here]
3.4 Robustness test using alternative liquidity measures
As suggested by Chordia, et al. (2008), liquidity stimulates arbitrage, which enhances
market efficiency. Controlling for liquidity in our crosssectional regression is important for two
reasons. First, institutional investors, especially nonpassive institutional investors, may have
preference towards liquid stocks due to their lower transaction costs. Thus, institutional holdings
may be relatively efficiently priced simply because they are more liquid. Fortunately, this is not
likely to be an important concern for indexed institutional investors who aim to track a specific
stock index instead of actively looking for liquid stocks. However, a second reason could be that
institutional trading and holdings may have an impact on liquidity, which in turn affects price
efficiency. We estimate regressions similar to Table 4 but use alternative liquidity measures:
relative quote spread (RQS) and the Amihud (2002) price impact measure (Amihud) based on
daily price movements and trading volume. Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates for PO,
NPO, and the illiquidity measure in both specifications. Consistent with Table 4, PO is positively
and significantly associated with all the four price inefficiency measures under both liquidity
specifications, while NPO always has negative coefficients. Moreover, both alternative
illiquidity measures are positively and significantly related to inefficiency measures as expected.
Therefore, our conclusion is robust to the use of alternative liquidity measures.
[Insert Table 6 here]
3.5 Other robustness tests
We use several alternative price inefficiency measures for robustness tests: 1) V(s) without
logarithm transformation, 2) natural logarithm of the normalized pricing error volatility,
Ln[V(s)/V(p)], 3) natural logarithm of AC(1), and 4) natural logarithm of 1VR(1,5). We also
drop the lagged dependent variable in the crosssectional regression, drop early years’
observations in order to improve our testing power (19931995 or 19931998, when we are only
able to identify less than 1% or 2% average passive ownership in S&P 500 constituents), and
19
drop stockquarters where the stock price at the beginning of a quarter is below $5. Moreover,
we use the effective spread in dollars, the quoted spread in dollars and the Liu (2006) non
tradingday measure as alternative illiquidity measures. Finally, we estimate crosssectional
regressions using contemporaneous, instead of lagged, independent variables. All of these
changes generate qualitatively the same and quantitatively similar results for the crosssectional
analysis.
4. Potential explanations
After confirming a negative relation between indexing and price efficiency, we explore
several possible explanations for our results.
4.1 I ndexing and price discovery
First, indexed ownership could be negatively associated with information acquisition and
price discovery. Passive ownership represents shareholders who have no desire to acquire
information or to incorporate that information in the stock price. While active traders are
interested in generating abnormal returns, investors in index funds are only interested in
passively tracking an index with no desire to generate abnormal returns. As a result, stocks held
by indexed investors will probably exhibit larger deviation from the efficient price. In addition,
holding a basket of securities could reduce the incentive, or say necessity, of informed arbitrage
because random mispricing in index stocks is likely to cancel out: lower returns from overpriced
stocks are set off against higher returns from underpriced stocks. With a focus among passive
investors on reducing costs of acquiring information and the absence of motivation to arbitrage
could reduce the aggregate demand for new information, which in turn discourages production of
information. Arbitrage activity thus becomes more costly for active investors, leading to further
price inefficiency.
4.2 Effect of passive trading on price efficiency
Index fund managers trade based on fund flows or index changes with little regard to
mispricing. Furthermore, trading by index funds around index changes is likely to cause herding
among passive investors and temporarily move prices away from fundamentals (Harris and Gurel,
1986; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Chen, Noronha, and Singal, 2004). Research on market
20
microstructure suggests that price efficiency will decline in the presence of such uninformed
trading (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985).
To evaluate the effect of passive trading on price efficiency, we analyze whether the
negative association between indexed ownership and price efficiency is caused by passive
trading. It is well documented that institutional trading could generate temporary price pressure
to move stock prices in the direction of the trade (Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Griffin, Harris,
and Topaloglu, 2003; Chiyachantana et al. 2004). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that greater
indexed ownership may negatively impact price efficiency as a result of passive trading.
We follow a crosssectional regression approach to analyze the role of passive trading by
adding lagged passive trading and nonpassive trading variables as below:
PE
ìt
= o
t
+[
P1,t
PI
ì,t1
+[
NP1,t
NPI
ì,t1
+[
P0,t
P0
ì,t1
+[
NP0,t
NP0
ì,t1
+o
t
PE
ì,t1
+y
1,t
RES
ì,t1
+y
2,t
IIol
ì,t1
+y
3,t
InHI
ì,t1
+y
4,t
InPricc
ì,t
+e
ì,t
. (14)
If the negative relationship between passive ownership and price efficiency is caused by passive
trading, then coefficient on PI
ì,t1
should be significantly positive while the coefficient on
P0
ì,t1
should be insignificant. As mentioned earlier, we use lagged trading instead of
contemporaneous trading to eliminate the potential selfselection bias.
21
Table 7 reports the
regression results.
[Insert Table 7 here]
We find that coefficient estimates for PT are positive and statistically significant for both
Hasbrouck (1993) price inefficiency measures, which is consistent with the notion that passive
trading reduces price efficiency. More importantly, PO is always positively related to all four
price inefficiency measures even after controlling for PT and three of the coefficients are
statistically significant. Therefore, passive trading is a mechanism through which passive
institutional investors negatively affect price efficiency, but it is not the only channel.
4.3 I ndexed ownership and liquidity
21
Similar to passive and nonpassive ownerships, passive and nonpassive trading also shows strong persistence
over time.
21
Finally, negative impact of passive ownership on stock liquidity could raise the cost of
informed arbitrage, which in turn impairs price efficiency. Market makers compensate their loss
from trading with informed traders by the profits from trading with liquidity traders (Kyle, 1985).
As more uninformed traders are attracted to index funds with less trading, a higher proportion of
traders will be informed traders. Realizing the increase in informed traders, market makers will
widen spreads thereby increasing the cost of trading. Price efficiency will decrease as lowered
liquidity suppresses arbitrage activity (Chordia et al., 2008).
Here, we examine whether passive institutional investors indeed negatively affect price
efficiency through stock liquidity. As reported in Table 4, liquidity is significantly negatively
related to price efficiency. If indexed ownership or trading decreases liquidity, it will eventually
weaken price efficiency, as lower liquidity raises transaction costs and discourages informed
arbitrage (Chordia et al., 2008). We estimate two FamaMacBeth crosssectional regressions of
stock illiquidity:
IIIIµ
ìt
= o
t
+[
P0,t
P0
ì,t1
+[
NP0,t
NP0
ì,t1
+y
1,t
IIIIµ
ì,t1
+y
2,t
Iol
ì,t1
+y
3,t
InHI
ì,t1
+y
4,t
InPricc
ì,t
+e
ì,t
, (1S)
IIIIµ
ìt
= o
t
+[
P1,t
PI
ì,t1
+[
NP1,t
NPI
ì,t1
+[
P0,t
P0
ì,t1
+[
NP0,t
NP0
ì,t1
+y
1,t
IIIIµ
ì,t1
+y
2,t
Iol
ì,t1
+y
3,t
InHI
ì,t1
+y
4,t
InPricc
ì,t
+e
ì,t
. (16)
IIIIµ
ìt
refers to one of the three illiquidity measures: RES, RQS, and Amihud; Iol
ì,t1
is lagged
stock price volatility, estimated as standard deviation of daily stock return for each stockquarter.
We standardize all dependent and independent variables to have zeromean and unit standard
deviation in each quarter. The crosssectional regression is estimated in each quarter of the
sample period, and the timeseries mean of the quarterly coefficient estimates is used for
inference. The standard errors are adjusted for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity
using the Newey and West (1987) correction.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Table 8 shows mixed evidence of the impact of passive institutional investors on stock
liquidity. Panel A reports coefficient estimates for Equation (15). Though PO is positively
associated with illiquidity measures, none of the coefficient estimates is statistically significant.
22
Therefore, the evidence is not strong to support a negative relation between passive ownership
and liquidity. Panel B contains regression results for Equation (16). PT is positively related to all
three illiquidity measures, and two of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant.
Therefore, it suggests that passive trading reduces liquidity, which makes prices less efficient.
5. Conclusion
Index funds and indexed investing have been promoted by academics and practitioners
over the last 50 years as an inexpensive and effective way to hold a diversified portfolio. As a
result, the indexed investment sector has grown and today accounts for more than 10% of the
total equity market. While advantages of index investing are significant, there are negative
externalities that passive investors impose on other market participants and the economy by
making the prices less efficient. In a sense, index investors are free riders on rest of the market:
active traders produce information and trade to earn abnormal returns. In the process, they
contribute to market efficiency. Index investors, on the other hand, use these efficient prices to
invest but without directly contributing to making those prices efficient. Their trades are
primarily liquidity, informationless trades motivated either by index changes or by investor
flows.
Consistent with the above notion and based on a sample of S&P 500 stocks over the period
1993 to 2011, we find that indexing reduces informational efficiency of stock prices, and stocks
with a higher level of indexing, as measured by passive ownership, have less informative prices.
On average, the volatility of Hasbrouck (1993)’s pricing error increases by, on average, 1.4% for
every percent increase in indexed ownership. Given that the current level of passive ownership is
7.77%, the degradation in pricing efficiency is a highly significant 11%.
We examine explanations for the decrease in price efficiency. We find that the relation is
not explained by persistence in price efficiency, size, idiosyncratic volatility, or reverse causality,
and only partially explained by a decrease in liquidity. The relationship is robust to several
intraday and daily price efficiency measures and alternate liquidity measures. We distinguish
between the effects of indexed ownership and passive trading on price efficiency, and find that
indexing affects price efficiency through both channels. The main reason for decrease in price
efficiency is the passive owners’ objective of index tracking and the consequent absence of
23
incentive to generate information or arbitrage profits. In addition, the uninformed nature of
passive trading by indexed investors causes prices to be less efficient.
24
Appendix: Selection of I ndex Funds and ETFs
In the first step, we pick up all funds that are classified as either an index fund or an ETF by the CRSP
index fund and ETF indicators.
To identify potential index funds and ETFs that are not marked by the indicators, we then screen
fund names in the 13f database by keywords. For index funds, we look for the following keywords:
‘INDEX’, ‘IND’, ‘IDX’, INDE’, ‘S&P 500 I’, ‘S&P 500I’, ‘S&P 400 I’, ‘S&P 400I’, ‘S&P 600 I’, ‘S&P
600I’, ‘S&P500IND’, ‘S&P400IND’, ‘S&P600IND’, ‘RUSSELL 1000’, ‘RUSSELL 2000’, ‘RUSSELL
3000’, and ‘VANGUARD’. For ETFs, we look for the following keywords: ‘EXCHANGE TRADED’,
‘EXCHANGETRADED’, ‘ETF’, ‘ISHARES’, ‘POWERSHARES’, ‘PROFUNDS’, ‘SPDR S&P’,
‘SPDR DOW’, ‘SPDR DJ, ‘RYDEX’, ‘SPA MG’, ‘MARKET GRADER’, and ‘QQQ’.
To exclude bond funds, balanced funds, and funds that hold substantially derivatives from our
sample, we remove funds with the following keywords in their names: ‘BOND’, ‘INFLATION’,
‘TREASURY’, ‘ BD ’, ‘LEHMAN’, ‘BARCLAY’, ‘OPTION’, ‘HEDGE’, ‘BALANCE’, ‘ALLOC’,
‘ASSET AL’, ‘MULTI ASSET’, and ‘PRINCIPAL PROTECTION’.
To exclude international funds, we require that the country code in 13f is either blank or ‘UNITED
STATES’. Further, we remove funds with the following keywords in their names: 'EURO', 'FRANCE',
'GERMAN', 'CANADA', 'CANADIAN', ' HK ', 'JAPAN', ' SING', ‘INDA’, ‘INDU’, ‘INDI’, ‘INDO’,
'NETH', 'SWITZ', 'ITALY', 'SPAIN', 'ASIA', ' GLOBAL', ' NIKKEI', 'FTSE', 'FTSE', ' EM ', ' EMER ', '
BRIC', ' EUR', ' UK ', ' INT', 'AUSTRLA', ' JAP', 'CNDN', ' CDN', 'PACIF', ' TRU ', 'LATIN', ' EMER', '
EMG', 'EMRG', 'LAT AME', 'KINDOM', 'CHILE', ' JPN', 'TURKEY', 'DEVELOPE', 'ENERGY',
'BRAZIL', 'KOREA', 'BELG', 'MALAYSIA', 'SWEDEN', 'AUSTRIA', ' EMU', 'SOUTH AFR',
'TAIWAN', 'INDONESIA', 'STOXX', 'THAI', 'EX US', 'INDEKS', 'NIKKO', 'TOKYO', 'HANG SENG',
'JPA', 'SIMCAV', 'TOPIX', 'EAFE', 'SPHINX', 'WARBURG', 'FOND', 'TSX', 'AMER EXEMPT', 'TSE',
'GOLDEN DRAGO', 'AVENIR ALIZES', 'FINORD INDEX AMERIQUE', and 'ASX'.
Finally, we manually check the investment objective and strategies of each fund from its
prospectus and remove funds that are not passive equity funds. Typically a fund is removed when its
investment strategy states that the fund is actively managed or that the manager generally pick up stocks
that they believe to be undervalued. We remove funds with the following ID number in the 13f database:
526, 583, 697, 787, 792, 1366, 1469, 1588, 1884, 2231, 2373, 2468, 2518, 2637, 2676, 2875, 2882, 2887,
2965, 3300, 3300, 5040, 7679, 12065, 12065, 12096, 12707, 12760, 12877, 13000, 13143, 13235, 13256,
14266, 14499, 16561, 16570, 16598, 18009, 18252, 20075, 21002, 21888, 22461, 22616, 23300, 23645,
26775, 28900, 28908, 29093, 34560, 36077, 36578, 36593, 45638, 47191, 47224, 47959, 48003, 48160,
49335, 51143, 51527, 51652, 51894, 53700, 53705, 53800, 53900, 53933, 54440, 55633, 56500, 58099,
58852, 60100, 61423, 63079, 64362, 64635, 64635, 64803, 64804, 64805, 64816, 64960, 66970, 67996,
68391, 68392, 70032, 71917, 72523, 72986, 73268, 73290, 73424, 73695, 73695, 74147, 74285, 75703,
75704, 75708, 76021, 76021, 76734, 77497, 77498, 77889, 77941, 78219, 78580, 79882, 80729, 80730,
80811, 80857, 80859, 81110, 81200, 83285, and 83380.
25
References
Acharya, Viral V., and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of Financial
Economics 77, 375410.
Amihud, Yahov, 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: Crosssection and timeseries effects. Journal of
Financial Markets 5, 3156.
Ang, Andrew, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2006. The crosssection of volatility
and expected returns. The Journal of Finance Vol. 61, Issue 1, 259299.
Boehmer, Ekkehart, and Eric K. Kelley, 2009. Institutional investors and the informational efficiency of
prices. Review of Financial Studies 22 n 9, 35633594.
Chan, Louis K. C., and Josef Lakonishok, 1993. Institutional trades and intraday stock price behavior.
Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 33, Issue 2, 173199.
Chen, Honghui, Gregory Noronha, and Vijay Singal, 2004. The price response to S&P 500 index
additions and deletions: Evidence of asymmetry and a new explanation. The Journal of Finance 59, 4,
19011930.
Chiyachantana, Chiraphol N., Pankaj K. Jain, Christine X. Jiang, Robert Wood, 2004. International
evidence on institutional trading behavior and price impact. The Journal of Finance Vol. 59, Issue 2, 869
898.
Chordia, Tarun, Richard Roll, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2005. Evidence on the speed of
convergence to market efficiency. Journal of Financial Economics 76 271–292.
Chordia, Tarun, Richard Roll, and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, 2008. Liquidity and market efficiency.
Journal of Financial Economics 87, 249268.
Cremers, Martijn, and Antti Petajisto, 2009. How active is your fund manager? A new measure that
predicts performance. Review of Financial Studies 22 n 9, 33293365.
Galbraith, John W., Aman Ullah, and Victoria ZindeWalsh, 2002. Estimation of the vector moving
average model by vector autoregression. Working paper.
Glosten, Lawrence R., and Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market
with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 14, Issue 1, 71100.
Goetzmann, William N., and Massimo Massa, 2003. Index funds and stock market growth. The Journal of
Business Vol. 76, No. 1, 128.
Griffin, John M., Jeffrey H. Harris, Selim Topaloglu, 2003. The dynamics of institutional and individual
trading. The Journal of Finance Vol. 58, Issue 6, 22852320.
Grossman, Sanford J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1980. On the impossibility of informationally efficient
markets. The American Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, 393408.
26
Harris, Lawrence, 1989. A dayend transaction price anomaly. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 24, 2945.
Harris, Lawrence, and Eitan Gurel, 1986. Price and volume effects associated with changes in the S&P
500 list: New evidence for the existence of price pressures. Journal of Finance Vol. 41 No. 4, 815829.
Hasbrouck, Joel, 1988. Trades, quotes, inventories and information. Journal of Financial Economics 22,
229252.
Hasbrouck, Joel, 1993. Assessing the quality of a security market: A new approach to transactioncost
measurement. The Review of Financial Studies Vol. 6, No. 1, 191212.
Jones, Charles M., and Marc L. Lipson, 1999. Execution costs of institutional equity orders. Journal of
Financial Intermediation Vol. 8, Issue 3, 123–140.
Jones, Charles M., and Marc L. Lipson, 2001. Sixteenths: direct evidence on institutional execution costs.
Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 59, Issue 2, 253–278.
Keim, Donald B., and Ananth Madhavan, 1997. Transactions costs and investment style: an inter
exchange analysis of institutional equity trades. Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 46, Issue 3, 265–292.
Kelly, Patrick J., 2007. Information efficiency and firmspecific return variation. Working Paper, New
Economic School, Moscow.
Kumar, Alok, 2009. Who gambles in the stock market? The Journal of Finance Vol. 64 No.4, 18891933.
Kyle, Albert S., 1985. Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica Vol. 53, No. 6, 13151335.
Lee, Charles M. C., and Mark J. Read, 1991. Inferring trade direction from intraday data. The Journal of
Finance Vol. 46, Issue 2, 733746.
Lo, Andrew W., and A. Craig MacKinlay, 1988. Stock market prices do not follow random walks:
evidence from a simple specification test. Review of Financial Studies Vol. 1, Issue 1, 4166.
Lynch, Anthony W., and Richard R. Mendenhall, 1997. New evidence on stock price effects associated
with changes in the S&P 500 index. Journal of Business 70, 351–383.
Newey, Whitney K., and Kenneth D. West, 1987. A simple, positive semidefinite, heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix. Econometrica Vol. 55, No. 3, 703708.
Shu, Tao, 2007. Institutional trading and stock price efficiency. Ph.D. dissertation. The University of
Texas at Austin.
Wurgler, Jeffrey, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2002. Does arbitrage flatten demand curves for stocks? The
Journal of Business, Vol. 75, No. 4, 583608.
27
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Passive Fund Sample
The sample of passive funds includes a total of 663 U.S. equity index funds, enhanced index funds, ETFs, and
‘closet indexers’ over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. Values of passive funds and institutional investors are
estimated from their reported (in 13f files) holdings and the corresponding stock price. Institutional investors
include all institutions that file quarterly 13f reports. Column 2 reports the total number of funds in the sample in
each year. Column 3 reports the total value of passive fund holdings. Column 4 reports the total value of holdings of
U.S. institutional investors who file the 13f form. Column 5 reports the market share of the passive fund sample,
measured as total passive fund holdings divided by total U.S. equity market capitalization. Column 6 reports the
average passive ownership of S&P 500 constituents. Column 7 presents the market share of U.S. institutional
investors, measured as total institutional investor holdings divided by total U.S. equity market capitalization.
Year
No. of
Passive
Funds
Total Passive
Fund Holdings
($ billions)
Total Inst. Investor
Holdings
($ billions)
% Market Cap
of Passive
Funds
Average PO
of S&P 500
Stocks
% Market Cap
of Inst.
Investors
1993 54 22.11 2,562.83 0.44% 0.50% 50.69%
1994 77 26.91 2,553.53 0.54% 0.61% 51.07%
1995 85 49.15 3,529.96 0.72% 0.84% 52.02%
1996 101 85.77 4,526.87 1.03% 1.13% 54.55%
1997 104 144.38 5,984.36 1.34% 1.50% 55.49%
1998 130 211.05 7,523.81 1.59% 1.68% 56.62%
1999 174 341.31 9,269.08 2.01% 2.17% 54.52%
2000 278 342.66 9,016.50 2.20% 2.46% 57.90%
2001 300 353.07 8,298.70 2.55% 2.80% 60.02%
2002 309 325.61 6,682.16 2.95% 3.38% 60.60%
2003 312 465.97 9,190.98 3.20% 3.87% 63.05%
2004 338 640.70 10,603.06 3.89% 4.74% 64.46%
2005 335 642.11 11,838.86 3.70% 4.62% 68.16%
2006 325 768.19 13,810.55 3.92% 5.00% 70.46%
2007 453 854.88 14,867.53 4.23% 5.64% 73.64%
2008 474 636.10 8,496.12 5.24% 6.94% 70.05%
2009 444 831.48 10,939.38 5.26% 7.13% 69.22%
2010 431 1,010.43 12,770.74 5.47% 7.46% 69.07%
2011 420 1,028.93 12,031.24 5.75% 7.77% 67.24%
Total 663
28
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Price Efficiency Measures and Control Variables
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. Statistics on the
time series of the crosssectional means and standard deviations of each quarter are reported. PO is the fraction of a
stock owned by passive funds. NPO is the fraction of a stock owned by nonpassive institutional investors. PT is the
sum of absolute passive holding changes of a stock during a quarter scaled by the total share outstanding. NPT is the
sum of absolute nonpassive institutional holding changes of a stock during a quarter scaled by the total share
outstanding. V(s) is the pricing error of Hasbrouck (1993) estimated over a quarter and V(s)/V(p) is the relative
pricing error (scaled by standard deviation of stock (log) price, V(p), over that quarter). AC(1) is the absolute value
of firstorder autocorrelation of daily stock return. VR(1,5) is the variance ratio of weekly stock return variance to
five times daily stock return variance. RES is equallyweighted relative effective spread, estimated as two times the
absolute distance between actual transaction cost and corresponding quote midpoint then scaled by the quote
midpoint. RQS is equallyweighted relative quote spread, estimated as the absolute distance between bid and ask
price and then scaled by the quote midpoint. Amihud is the Amihud (2002) price impact measure of illiquidity
estimated by the approach proposed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). IVol is the idiosyncratic volatility estimated
by the approach of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). Vol is the standard deviation of daily stock returns
estimated over a quarter. MV is the market value of stock at the end of each quarter, recorded in $ billions. Price is
the share price at quarter end.
19932011 19931998 19992005 20062011
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of Stocks 1014 881 856 721
Measures of Efficiency
V(s) (×10
3
) 0.820 1.280 1.555 1.770 0.568 0.838 0.283 0.313
V(s)/V(p) (×10
2
)
1.451 2.250 3.000 3.165 0.798 1.015 0.483 0.449
AR(1) 0.129 0.100 0.130 0.099 0.130 0.102 0.127 0.098
1VR(1,5) 0.301 0.222 0.310 0.227 0.300 0.225 0.293 0.211
Ownership & Trading
PO 3.33% 2.66% 0.93% 0.67% 3.26% 1.62% 6.29% 2.31%
NPO 65.03% 18.05% 58.34% 17.99% 65.34% 17.97% 72.57% 14.92%
Quarterly PT 0.44% 0.70% 0.14% 0.22% 0.47% 0.64% 0.74% 0.96%
Quarterly NPT 19.51% 13.04% 17.21% 11.27% 19.28% 14.12% 22.55% 12.88%
Control Variables
Illiquidity
RES 0.33% 0.40% 0.51% 0.48% 0.31% 0.36% 0.15% 0.19%
ES ($) 0.103 0.129 0.149 0.090 0.091 0.126 0.065 0.153
RQS 0.84% 0.86% 1.13% 0.88% 0.98% 0.92% 0.30% 0.38%
QS ($) 0.266 0.285 0.349 0.182 0.293 0.318 0.131 0.291
Amihud 0.296 0.343 0.301 0.242 0.306 0.415 0.278 0.337
IVol 0.150 0.091 0.143 0.071 0.166 0.099 0.138 0.095
Vol 0.185 0.113 0.162 0.079 0.198 0.115 0.194 0.137
MV ($ billion) 13.764 30.474 7.672 16.071 15.543 35.434 18.633 34.886
Price ($) 41.390 36.720 41.676 29.398 39.210 35.615 43.966 44.926
29
Table 3: Conditional Triple Sort by PO, NPO, and MV
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. A stock is added to
the sample after index addition, but stays in the sample even after index deletion. Stocks are first sorted into two
groups in each quarter by their market values (MV), and then are sorted into tertiles based on their nonpassive
institutional ownerships (NPO) at the beginning of the quarter. Within each NPO tertile, stocks are then sorted into
three groups based on their passive institutional ownership (PO) at the quarter beginning. The average quarterly
crosssectional means over the sample period are reported.
MV at Quarter Beginning ≤50 Percentile >50 Percentile
PO at Quarter Beginning
≤ 33
Percentile
3367
Percentile
> 67
Percentile
≤ 33
Percentile
3367
Percentile
> 67
Percentile
NPO Tercile 1 (lowest)
V(s)/V(p) (×10
2
) 1.537 1.705 2.046 1.154 1.258 1.450
V(s) (×10
3
) 0.741 0.888 1.200 0.513 0.509 0.589
AR(1) 0.131 0.132 0.136 0.129 0.126 0.127
1VR(1,5) 0.295 0.308 0.313 0.295 0.291 0.297
RES 0.30% 0.34% 0.42% 0.20% 0.19% 0.20%
PO 3.00% 3.67% 4.94% 2.73% 3.18% 3.64%
NPO 49.77% 52.19% 50.73% 45.94% 49.21% 48.85%
MV ($ billions) 5.340 4.256 3.040 43.160 51.492 37.320
NPO Tercile 2
V(s)/V(p) (×10
2
) 1.104 1.301 1.505 0.959 0.976 0.999
V(s) (×10
3
) 0.585 0.669 0.850 0.452 0.433 0.471
AR(1) 0.125 0.131 0.131 0.126 0.124 0.132
1VR(1,5) 0.288 0.296 0.295 0.293 0.298 0.295
RES 0.26% 0.29% 0.34% 0.18% 0.18% 0.19%
PO 3.23% 3.72% 4.68% 2.95% 3.21% 3.75%
NPO 69.61% 69.94% 69.99% 64.62% 64.58% 64.75%
MV ($ billions) 5.157 4.126 3.285 30.418 31.576 23.994
NPO Tercile 3 (highest)
V(s)/V(p) (×10
2
) 0.936 0.925 1.231 0.812 0.805 0.851
V(s) (×10
3
) 0.518 0.502 0.713 0.437 0.383 0.432
AR(1) 0.123 0.128 0.126 0.123 0.126 0.126
1VR(1,5) 0.295 0.293 0.294 0.291 0.291 0.290
RES 0.26% 0.25% 0.32% 0.20% 0.19% 0.19%
PO 3.21% 3.72% 4.62% 2.90% 3.24% 4.04%
NPO 82.81% 82.73% 82.50% 78.61% 77.97% 78.46%
MV ($ billions) 4.964 4.046 3.253 19.645 16.680 13.874
30
Table 4: CrossSectional Relation between Passive Ownership and Price Efficiency
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. A stock is added to
the sample after index addition, but stays in the sample even after index deletion. Measure of price efficiency is
regressed on lagged passive ownership (PO) and control variables. Following the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
approach, crosssectional regressions are estimated in each quarter over the sample period from 1993 to 2011 and
the mean coefficients are reported. Ln[V(s)] is the natural logarithm of pricing error volatility proposed by
Hasbrouck (1993) and V(s)/V(p) is the relative pricing error volatility (normalized by standard deviation of stock
(log) price, V(p)). AC(1) is the absolute value of firstorder autocorrelation of daily stock return. VR(1,5) is the
variance ratio of weekly stock return variance to five times daily stock return variance. PO
t1
is the percentage of
shares outstanding held by our passive fund sample at the end of the previous quarter. NPO
t1
is the percentage of
shares outstanding held by nonpassive institutional investors at the end of the previous quarter. DV
t1
is the lagged
dependent variable. RES
t1
is the relative effective spread estimated from the previous quarter. IVOL
t1
the
idiosyncratic volatility estimated by the approach of Ang et al. (2006). LnMV
t1
and LnPrice
t1
are the (log) market
value and (log) price of stock at the end of the previous quarter. All variables are standardized to have zeromean
and unit standard deviation in each quarter. Panel A reports the results when stock characteristics are not controlled.
Panel B reports the results when controlling for stock characteristics. The significance level is based on the time
series variation in the quarterly regression coefficients over the sample period. The standard errors are adjusted for
residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity based on Newey and West (1987). The asterisks indicate significance
at the 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗) levels.
Dependent Variable V(s)/V(p) Ln[V(s)] AR(1) 1VR(1,5)
Panel A: Without Controlling for Stock Characteristics
Intercept 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
PO
t1
0.053 *** 0.015 *** 0.035 *** 0.028 ***
NPO
t1
0.142 *** 0.011 *** 0.031 *** 0.026 ***
DV
t1
0.489 *** 0.906 *** 0.029 *** 0.015 ***
Average N 555 555 555 555
Adj R
2
0.326 0.839 0.013 0.010
Panel B: Controlling for Stock Characteristics
Intercept
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
PO
t1
0.020 *** 0.008 ** 0.025 *** 0.023 **
NPO
t1
0.082 *** 0.008 * 0.020 *** 0.017 **
DV
t1
0.347 *** 0.736 *** 0.029 *** 0.013 **
RES
t1
0.253 *** 0.044 *** 0.042 *** 0.038 ***
IVol
t1
0.044 *** 0.031 *** 0.029 *** 0.007
LnMV
t1
0.055 *** 0.014 * 0.022 ** 0.006
LnPrice
t1
0.231 *** 0.170 *** 0.006 0.011
Average N 555 555 555 555
Adj R
2
0.499 0.865 0.029 0.023
31
Table 5: Robustness test: Reverse Causality
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. A stock is added to
the sample after index addition, but stays in the sample even after index deletion. A stockquarter is required to have
at least five hundred trades to be included in the sample. Dependent is the change (firstdifference) in PO. Ln[V(s)]
is the natural logarithm of pricing error volatility proposed by Hasbrouck (1993) and V(s)/V(p) is the relative pricing
error volatility (normalized by standard deviation of stock (log) price, V(p)). AC(1) is the absolute value of first
order autocorrelation of daily stock return. VR(1,5) is the variance ratio of weekly stock return variance to five times
daily stock return variance. ∆PE
t1
is the change in efficiency measure over the previous quarter. ∆PO
t1
is the
change in percentage of shares outstanding held by passive funds over the previous quarter. ∆NPO
t1
is the lagged
change in percentage of shares outstanding held by nonpassive institutional investors. ∆DV
t1
is the lagged change
in dependent variable. ∆RES
t1
is the lagged change in equallyweighted relative effective spread. ∆IVol
t1
is the
lagged change in idiosyncratic volatility. ∆LnMV
t1
and ∆LnPrice
t1
are the lagged changes in (log) market value and
(log) price of stock. Timeseries regressions are estimated for each stock that has at least thirty quarterly
observations and the mean coefficients across stocks are reported. The significance level is based on the cross
sectional variation in the regression coefficients across all the stocks in the sample. The asterisks indicate
significance at the 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗) levels.
Dependent Variable V(s)/V(p) Ln[V(s)] AR(1) 1VR(1,5)
Intercept 0.118 *** 0.118 *** 0.117 *** 0.117 ***
∆DV
t1
0.422 0.010 0.021 0.005
∆PO
t1
1.167 1.318 * 1.613 ** 1.592 **
∆NPO
t1
0.253 *** 0.247 *** 0.227 *** 0.235 ***
∆RES
t1
0.082 ** 0.060 0.074 ** 0.082 **
∆IVol
t1
0.000 0.023 0.019 0.007
∆LnMV
t1
0.002 0.005 0.001 0.004
N 580 580 580 580
Adj R
2
0.136 0.142 0.141 0.140
32
Table 6: Robustness Test: Alternative Liquidity Measures
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. A stock is added to
the sample after index addition, but stays in the sample even after index deletion. A stockquarter is required to have
at least five hundred trades to be included in the sample. The same FamaMacBeth regressions as in Table 4 are
estimated, but alternative illiquidity measures are adopted. Ln[V(s)] is the natural logarithm of pricing error
volatility proposed by Hasbrouck (1993) and V(s)/V(p) is the relative pricing error volatility (normalized by standard
deviation of stock (log) price, V(p)). AC(1) is the absolute value of firstorder autocorrelation of daily stock return.
VR(1,5) is the variance ratio of weekly stock return variance to five times daily stock return variance. RQS is
equallyweighted relative quote spread, estimated as the absolute distance between bid and ask price and then scaled
by the quote midpoint. Amihud is the Amihud (2002) price impact measure of illiquidity estimated by the approach
proposed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Only coefficients for PO, NPO, and illiquidity measures are presented.
All variables are standardized to have zeromean and unit standard deviation in each quarter. The significance level
is based on the timeseries variation in the quarterly regression coefficients over the sample period. Regressions in
this table include the same control variables as those in Table 4, but coefficients of control variables are omitted for
brevity. The standard errors are adjusted for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity based on Newey and
West (1987). The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗) levels.
Dependent Variable V(s)/V(p) Ln[V(s)] AR(1) 1VR(1,5)
PO
t1
0.020 *** 0.008 ** 0.026 *** 0.024 **
NPO
t1
0.090 *** 0.010 ** 0.023 *** 0.018 **
RQS
t
0.114 *** 0.013 0.042 *** 0.041 ***
PO
t1
0.021 *** 0.007 ** 0.024 *** 0.024 **
NPO
t1
0.079 *** 0.008 * 0.020 *** 0.016 *
Amihud
t
0.145 *** 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 ***
33
Table 7: Effect of Passive Trading on Price Efficiency
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. A stock is added to
the sample after index addition, but stays in the sample even after index deletion. A stockquarter is required to have
at least five hundred trades to be included in the sample. Measure of price efficiency is regressed on lagged passive
trading (PT), passive ownership (PO), and other control variables. Following the Fama and MacBeth (1973)
approach, crosssectional regressions are conducted in each quarter over the sample period from 1993 to 2011 and
the mean coefficients are reported. Ln[V(s)] is the natural logarithm of pricing error volatility proposed by
Hasbrouck (1993) and V(s)/V(p) is the relative pricing error volatility (normalized by standard deviation of stock
(log) price, V(p)). AC(1) is the absolute value of firstorder autocorrelation of daily stock return. VR(1,5) is the
variance ratio of weekly stock return variance to five times daily stock return variance. PT
t1
is the sum of absolute
passive holding changes of a stock during the previous quarter scaled by the total share outstanding. NPT
t1
is the
sum of absolute nonpassive institutional holding changes of a stock during the previous quarter scaled by the total
share outstanding. PO
t1
is the percentage of shares outstanding held by the passive fund sample at the end of the
previous quarter. NPO
t1
is the percentage of shares outstanding held by nonpassive institutional investors at the end
of the previous quarter. DV
t1
is the lagged dependent variable. RES
t1
is the relative effective spread estimated from
the previous quarter. IVOL
t1
the idiosyncratic volatility estimated by the approach of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and
Zhang (2006). LnMV
t1
and LnPrice
t1
are the (log) market value and (log) price of stock at the end of the previous
quarter. All variables are standardized to have zeromean and unit standard deviation in each quarter. The
significance level is based on the timeseries variation in the quarterly regression coefficients over the sample period.
The standard errors are adjusted for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity based on Newey and West
(1987). The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗) levels.
Dependent Variable V(s)/V(p) Ln[V(s)] AR(1) 1VR(1,5)
Intercept 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
PT
t1
0.010 ** 0.022 *** 0.006 0.006
NPT
t1
0.008 0.004 0.017 ** 0.017 ***
PO
t1
0.020 *** 0.004 0.028 *** 0.021 **
NPO
t1
0.079 *** 0.007 0.015 *** 0.012
DV
t1
0.347 *** 0.735 *** 0.028 *** 0.012 **
RES
t1
0.253 *** 0.044 *** 0.037 *** 0.033 ***
IVol
t1
0.042 *** 0.031 *** 0.020 ** 0.000
LnMV
t1
0.054 *** 0.012 0.027 ** 0.002
LnPrice
t1
0.231 *** 0.170 *** 0.005 0.011
Average N 555 555 555 555
Adj R
2
0.502 0.867 0.034 0.026
34
Table 8: Effects of Passive Ownership and Trading on Liquidity
The quarterly sample includes all S&P 500 constituents over the sample period of 1993 to 2011. A stock is added to
the sample after index addition, but stays in the sample even after index deletion. A stockquarter is required to have
at least five hundred trades to be included in the sample. Dependent variable is one of the five illiquidity measures.
RES is equallyweighted relative effective spread, estimated as two times the absolute distance between actual
transaction cost and corresponding quote midpoint then scaled by the quote midpoint. RQS is equallyweighted
relative quote spread, estimated as the absolute distance between bid and ask price and then scaled by the quote
midpoint. Amihud is the Amihud (2002) price impact measure of illiquidity estimated by the approach proposed by
Acharya and Pedersen (2005). ILLIQ
t1
is the lagged illiquidity measure. IVOL
t1
the idiosyncratic volatility
estimated by the approach of Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006). LnMV
t1
and LnPrice
t1
are the (log) market
value and (log) price of stock at the end of the previous quarter. All variables are standardized to have zeromean
and unit standard deviation in each quarter. Panel A reports the results when independent variables are passive
ownership only. Panel B reports the results when independent variables include both passive ownership and trading.
The significance level is based on the timeseries variation in the quarterly regression coefficients over the sample
period. The standard errors are adjusted for residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity based on Newey and
West (1987). The asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (∗∗∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗) levels.
Illiquidity Measure RES RQS Amihud
Panel A: Effect of Ownership
Intercept 0.252 *** 0.546 *** 0.244 ***
PO
t1
0.732 1.910 0.827
NPO
t1
0.052 *** 0.043 *** 0.056 ***
ILLIQ
t1
0.767 *** 0.808 *** 0.680 ***
Vol
t1
0.306 *** 0.305 *** 0.048 ***
LnMV
t1
0.014 *** 0.030 *** 0.013 ***
LnPrice
t1
0.026 ** 0.049 *** 0.005 ***
Average N 555 555 555
Adj R
2
0.835 0.873 0.815
Panel B: Effect of Ownership and Trading
Intercept 0.268 *** 0.572 *** 0.255 ***
PT
t1
1.968 *** 3.112 *** 0.423 ***
NPT
t1
0.105 *** 0.161 *** 0.081 ***
PO
t1
0.390 1.220 0.667
NPO
t1
0.025 *** 0.000 0.034 ***
ILLIQ
t1
0.761 *** 0.804 *** 0.677 ***
Vol
t1
0.338 *** 0.351 *** 0.070 ***
LnMV
t1
0.016 *** 0.034 *** 0.014 ***
LnPrice
t1
0.026 ** 0.049 ** 0.005 ***
Average N 555 555 555
Adj R
2
0.838 0.875 0.818