Intervenor King notes that the Court has applied Ohio Law to a situation in which: A) the resident is domiciled in Connecticut and resides in Connecticut. B) the State of Connecticut and Federal Government have already acknowledged the Ohio Power of Attorney. C) Connecticut Courts still have jurisdiction regardless of where the Power of Attorney was signed. See In re Bachand, 2010 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1951 (2010) affirmed by In re Bachand, 306 Conn. 37 (Supreme Court of Connecticut August 2012). As such, and as argued before and below, whatever restrictions Ohio has on Powers of Attorney do not apply when an incapacitated individual takes up residence and domicile in another State. If that were the case then Christopher King, J.D., as Power of Attorney, would have to create a legal fiction and go create a new Power of Attorney in Connecticut, which is a ridiculous proposition and clearly not what the legislature of Connecticut intended. Bachand is proverbially hot off the presses, and as a matter of law this Honorable Court must follow the law of Connecticut and cannot afford any less protection in the Federal scheme than the State affords under the State scheme. And the case is 100% directly on point, involving a Power of Attorney from a different state, and a mother with

Intervenor King asserts that this Motion is valid as either Rule 59E or 60b with respect to her claims.


Alzheimers so an Interlocutory Appeal will follow if this Court does not sua sponte issue a reversal by Monday, 15 April 2013.

[**173] The plaintiff argues, however, that, because Mary was moved to West Hartford for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment for her Alzheimer's condition, her physical presence there was akin to temporary hospitalization, which trial courts have found insufficient to establish residence. See, e.g., Trambarulo v. Whitaker, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-06-4020211-S, 2007 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2575 (September 28, 2007); Robinson v. Probate Appeal, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-03-0827331-S, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2504 (August 22, 2005) [***19] . We disagree. It is undisputed that the facility at which Mary was placed provides long-term care for patients with an incurable condition who require care for the remainder of their lives, rather than acute, transitory care, which patients may seek for temporary, curable conditions, with the intention of returning to their homes once cured. Therefore, Mary was not moved to the West Hartford long-term care facility for a temporary or transitory purpose but, rather, to receive ongoing care in a residential setting for an indefinite period of time. In that regard, the facility in West Hartford was the place where Mary actually lived, which was definite as to purpose, but indefinite as to time.3 See Schutte v. [*49] Douglass, supra, 90 Conn. 538 (Beach, J., concurring). Accordingly, we conclude that Mary resided in West Hartford at the time of the defendant's petition and, therefore, the Probate Court there had jurisdiction to order the accounting from the plaintiff pursuant to § 45a-175 (b).4 Again as specifically argued in prior Memorandum that the Court did not acknowledge in its Decision of 11 April, 2013: 3. The specific laws of Connecticut specifically grant Intervenor the right to file as

she has. It is axiomatic that the specific governs the general, so the Court must not now go reaching beyond the Jurisdiction to try to find some tangential law not squarely on point to truncate the prosecution of this case. Again, Intervenor has relevant information and experiences to share with the Court toward the end of making this system more responsive for everyone involved and therefore this Motion and Memorandum is being filed in that spirit, so that others may benefit. Intervenor presents email #2: I don't know guys but you have not alleged that the POA is valid only in Ohio and you cannot make that argument with a straight face because Connecticut has already recognized it, as has the Federal government.


So then, as you state, CT POA law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-42 et. seq.) provides: Sec. 1-51. Claims and litigation. In a statutory short form power of attorney, the language conferring general authority with respect to claims and litigation shall be construed to mean that the principal authorizes the agent:(1) To assert and prosecute before any court, administrative board, department, commissioner or other tribunal any cause of action, claim, counterclaim, offset or defense, which the principal has, or claims to have, against any individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, government, or other person or instrumentality, including, but not limited to, power to sue for the recovery of land or of any other thing of value, for the recovery of damages sustained by the principal in any manner, for the elimination or modification of tax liability, for an injunction, for specific performance, or for any other relief; (2) to bring an action of interpleader or other action to determine adverse claims; to intervene or interplead in any action or proceeding, and to act in any litigation as amicus curiae; (3) in connection with any action or proceeding or controversy, at law or otherwise, to apply for and, if possible, procure a libel, an attachment, a garnishment, an order of arrest or other preliminary, provisional or intermediate relief and to resort to and utilize in all ways permitted by law any available procedure for the effectuation or satisfaction of the judgment, order or decree obtained; (4) in connection with any action or proceeding, at law or otherwise, to perform any act which the principal might perform, including, but not limited to, acceptance of tender, offer of judgment, admission of any facts, submission of any controversy on an agreed statement of facts, consent to examination before trial, and generally to bind the principal in the conduct of any litigation or controversy as seems desirable to the agent; (5) to submit to arbitration, settle, and propose or accept a compromise with respect to, any claim existing in favor of or against the principal, or any litigation to which the principal is or may become or be designated a party; (6) to waive the issuance and service of a summons, citation or other process upon the principal; to accept service of process; to appear for the principal; to designate persons upon whom process directed to the principal may be served; to execute and file or deliver stipulations on the principal's behalf; to verify pleadings; to appeal to appellate tribunals; to procure and give surety and indemnity bonds at such times and to such extent as the agent deems desirable or necessary; to contract and pay for the preparation and printing of records and briefs; to receive and execute and file or deliver any consent, waiver, release, confession of judgment, satisfaction of judgment, notice, agreement or other instrument which the agent deems desirable or necessary in connection with the prosecution, settlement or defense of any claim by or against the principal or of any litigation to which the principal is or may become or be designated a party; (7) to appear for, represent and act for the principal with respect to bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings, whether voluntary or involuntary, whether of the principal or of some other person, with respect to any reorganization proceeding, or with respect to any receivership or application for the appointment of a receiver or trustee which, in any way, affects any interest of the principal in any land, chattel, bond, share, commodity interest, chose in action or other thing of value; (8) to hire, discharge and compensate any attorney, accountant, expert witness or other assistant or assistants when the agent deems such action to be desirable for the proper execution by him of any of the powers


described in this section; (9) to pay, from funds in his control or for the account of the principal, any judgment against the principal or any settlement which may be made in connection with any transaction enumerated in this section, and to receive and conserve any moneys or other things of value paid in settlement of or as proceeds of one or more of the transactions enumerated in this section, and to receive and endorse checks and to deposit the same; and (10) in general, and in addition to all the specific acts in this section enumerated, to do any other act or acts, which the principal can do through an agent, in connection with any claim by or against the principal or with litigation to which the principal is or may become or be designated a party. All powers described in this section shall be exercisable equally with respect to any claim or litigation existing at the giving of the power of attorney or thereafter arising, and whether arising in the state of Connecticut or elsewhere. ****************** II. The Matter of Sanctions is not Moot. Even if the Intervenor Decision were to stand on Interlocutory Appeal, this Court cannot fail to address the multiple lies set into the record by Defendants, which need not be repeated in this space, as they have been thoroughly identified on prior occasion.

Respectfully submitted, /s/ Christopher King, J.D. _____________________________ Christopher King, J.D. -- Reel News for Real People 617.543.8085


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I the undersigned, solemnly swear that a true copy of this Motion Was delivered via Regular U.S. Mail this 11th day of April, 2013

Defendant Roderick Bremby c/o Hugh Barber, Esq. CT AG 55 Elm Street PO Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141

Plaintiffs Shafer and Harder Sheldon Toubman (ct08533) New Haven Legal Assistance Assoc. 426 State Street New Haven, CT 06510-2018 Phone: 203.946.4811 Fax: 203.498-9271 /s/Christopher King, J.D. __________________________________ By and through Christopher King, J.D. 617.543.8085m