Vastar Resources, Inc.

DeepwaterHorizon TechnicalPositionPaper (Revision5)

!t

lssue: Date: Dlsclpline: Regpon6ible:

EDS/DMS DisconnectPhilosophy September 13,1999 Engineering, Subsea, and Drilling Systems MikeL. Byrd,P.E.

lssue: lniliSlibnof either the EmergencyDisconnectSequence(EDS) or Deadman System (DMS) requires certain functions on the stackto o<ecute rlithin a certainambuntof time. This paperdescribes the'sequ6ncei.timinq.anO overallphilosophy for these events. Basedon this lnformation, the v6nitor shouH be able to desigri the ctntrol systemlo accommodate theserequirements. Declslon: Tffifrillbe three (3) possiblemodesof disconnecting lhe LMRPfrom the lower stack. They are initiatedin the priodties. following d'eirendinq on the natureof eventsdfrvino the needfor disconnect 1. Cotfrbll€dDlcoorinect $quence (CDS)- Thls allowsi manualty controlled disoonnect of the LRMP from the lower stack when adequafewaming ii providedand sufficient iime exists to executethese functions. The functionsare all operat<ir frth do aubrnationft,omthe conbol Bystem. controlled 2. EnlqryencyDiscohnect (EDS)- This is a PLC drivendisoonhect Sequence sequenceinitiatedfrom a PushHold button located on the DrilleCsPanel (located in the drille/s work station), and the Toolpushe/s Panel requiring disconnect has or is rapid&Oeterioratino. 0ocabd in the Bridge).This is to be usedwhenthe situalion I The rigidconduitsysfemwill closethe SBR'sand casingshears,depending on the modeseleited. A manuEl modeselector for runningpipgor casing,which ls set priorto startingthe respectlve operatlons, wilt determine the e:act sequenceof the EDS. 1f t7 3. Deadman (DMS) This is an aulomaticdisconnect Sysbm Disconnect responsein the eventof catastrophic eventsreguiring no manual intervention by rig personnel.The dedicated shearbottlecircuitwill driveSBR's. The riser connectorshouldbe lockedat 1,500 psiwith 500 psi maintained on the lock side during operations. Duringboth. the EDS and DMS seguences, the ionnector shoutdbe unlockedwith 3,000 psi. applief t6 Uottritre unlockclrcdlts. The hydraulic supplyfor the primaryand secondary unlobktunctionin the Pqtlary and secondary EDSrnodewillbe supplM via two SPMvalvesdownstreiiniof the niain su-pply sorrroe. In'the DMSmode.due lo limited quanti$ of acidmulator boftles, therewill be one supply to boththe pririrdry and secondary unlocktunction. goalsfor all disconnect Theprimary sequences are: 1. Provide reliableabilityto disconnect from the stack,hang-offthe LMRP,and allowthe rig to moveoff location. 2. Safetyof all rig personnel. or prwent discharge intothe environment. of hydrocarbons 9 Minimize 4. Minimize or prevent damaqe-to ca6itatequipment 5. Llmlt Limitpipemode mirdedisconnect disconnedt disconneCt to no morethan ttiai thirty hirty (30)seconds. thirtv 6. Limitdasingmodedisconnect to as closeto thirty(30Jseconds as possible. Oiscussion: CLOSING SEQUENCES (forsurnmary 1) seeAttachment Prlmary . CONTROLI€D DTSCOTVwECT SEQUEATCE fCDS) The controlled disconnect is the primarymodeof discoilnecting the LMRPfrom the lowerstack. In this mode.the assumption is that there is adequate warningof deteriorating wbatheror cunentconditions. This wouldallowlime to manually,a!_o.Pposed to PLC or auto-sequence driven,initiateany hang-offand disconnect tunctionsat the cliscretion of RBF/Operato/s representatives. Secondary. EMERGENCyD|SCOTV,VECT (EDS) SEQUENCE
philosophy, fOeepwater Horizon, Tectrnical Position Paper,EDS/DMS (Confd) Disconnect Page1 of7

i{tit
Exhibit No. Worldwide Court Inc.

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026742

RB FalconDeepwater Horiz I TechnicalPositionPaper
) This.isthe secondarymeansof disconnecting the LMRPtrom the lowerstack. This event could be driven bv or cunent conditionsor fault with the dg power managementor Dp systerir 3?.lg,y_qptel9lqting.weather causing the fig to rapidlydrifi off location to the pointof requiring a disconnebt Ine systemshall have a mode selectorbr ddllingand caslng-operations which is selectedprior tc beginning the respec{lve openalion. Properoperatioiral procedures and tower.change will have to be in place to ensure that the conect mode is priorto runningdrill pipeor casing. selected DrillMode(Attachment 2) ;-_Tn Ule'Drll plpe-, will close,shear,and prorride a wellboreseaf. Anythingacrossthe SBR's -qtV ihe-SBR's whl*t b S7n',24.7-wt, $fE6 or smaller, will be cut in'thismode. . Estimated time for thisoperation is approximately 27-30seconds. CasingMode(Attachment 3 -WOAuto-Shear.4 -WAuto-Shear) . Tn-ffisihg mode,the casingshearswill'close ftrst to enable'shearing of the pipe, then the SBR's will close.effecUng to the SeR's from closing on $9 wellboreseal. This will minimizepotentialdamag-e somethingon whi:lr hey can not out . Ihe $8Fs can be efthbr porvered.by.pressure rigid conduitor be adivated by the auto-shear toF th_9 ctruit Utilizing the auto'-shear circirit will minimize the lime needed to execute th'e seouence bv qpprox*nf,l9ly l0 seconds. Hotrever,there is oonoemslnce trls funcdontakes pface after the LtUnp na's Grconnedt€U. In the event of closing the SBR's with lhe rigid conduit supply, the estimatedtirne for executionis 48 seconds. Uqlngthe aulo-shearclrcuil reduoeslhe time to apprbfiinatelv 37 seconOi.--TiG decisfonls to close the. SBR'swith the rigld conduit llne. The prefenedmdttrodof cfbsingthe SBR,s fs throught the rigidconduitsystem. . Thg via push-holdbutlonsand will not be automatcalty initiatedfiom the Dp f:.fts-willbe operatorihitiated orDrlllecfi systema. Teftiary- DEADIItrAN SySfEllt (DMS./(Attachment5 ) The.D€adrnal Deadrnal sysleqr is the firial meansof shuttingih the well and effectingan environmental seal across the wellbore. lt is dntigipated tt anticipatedthat would be that this this would be-an emerg$gy measuri an emergency only,-initiated onii,-iniiiateJ'bt'&;nti by events iuirriJnre-oi such as fre or -and {9L9919t Jnqasqq exPlosion, explosion, pprling

O

a a

--. The DMSwill activateuponloss of ALL of the following: v pods 1. Communication between 2. Powerand siqnalfromthe MUXcables 3. Hydraulic pre6sure from the rigidconduit

of theriset riser, p-ower, iig;ailourcJs'i;tnl powLr,'ano or qnyca.taskophic catastrophic event w_hich frhictf shuts off fryadfufic, hydrirulic, P.arling signal sources to the !f-r{s.otf subsea pods. Theoverall control philosophy reliability of the DMSis to brovide rdliabilitv throuqh simolicitv. This means me,ans that thatthe thefeurer ferrver decisions decisions thesystem the system make reliable hasto niake has themore the it witlbe in executing morereliable executino it! pre-progiammed its ore-6rooiarnmed ) logic.

The DMSwill cfoeeonly the SBR'susingthe dedicatedshear botUe circuit. The casing sheans will not be closed dueto acqlmulatorvoldmetic constraint5. This shouldcoverapproximately 95-97% of ait Oritting activities. RISER CONNECTOR (Attachment 6) TheCameron Type'HC' 18-314" 10Mconnector is usedto connec{ and disconnect the LMRPfrom the lower stack. TheHC connec[dr: . Has one fock circuit only. ' lhc a prirnaryand secondaryunlockcircuit. . Unfock circuitprovidesapprciximatety 1.24timesnpre unlocking force thanlockingforceat a given pressure.

. are€r was suppliedby Cameron

The piston

F"H:lnryqg"_14_9g"_q ]9. psi duringilrillingoperations. .300:500 Hydrauliicircuitry circuitniis ratedftir for 3,000 3.000psl o and is testedto 4,500psi.

pressure psi.andmaintaining have a locking of 1,500 pressure a locking of

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026743

,RBFalcon Deepwater Horii ,l Technical Position Paper
'
l U

Secondary.unlock.clrcuit provides no additional.untocking forge.ab.ove the primary unlock circuitat a given pressure.lt doeshowever, provide redundancy to ttreprimary lockcircuitin sbme c6noiiions.
pressire is applied To lock,. to the lockport,drivingthe lockingpistondown,whichdrawsthe colletsaroundthe qlandrelhub,pre{oading qnndrelfiub, pre-badingthe the connectoi connector to the the maidref. mandref.Theo-rdticatty, Theorelically. the dctuaior the actuator dno is heH dns held in place olacewin with tiie the

r

Thefundamental operatlon of theconnector is as follows:

.
. . o

collefts from the mandielhub. ln lhe eventof fiailure of the seals used in Sreprimaryunlockbetweenthe actuatorrinq and the outer bodv. pressurecan be applledto the secondaryunlock port-whicfiwill nrove the piston umnt tt will then comJiri contact with the actuatorring drivlng the acfuator ringupward,unlocking the connecfor. -seal As seenin the drawing, primaryand se.-condary the diameters between-the unlockchambers are the sarne. This is why there is no additionalunlockforce generated wh'enboth the pninaryand iemnO-ary clrcuiis a?i pressured. lt can also be seen that if the sourceof the primaryand secondarypressureis the same, failure of the primary uplocfseals,will causethe pressure to bleedtherebyneverallowinf pressure to buitdin'thesecondaryuntoCfr chamber.

theactuator dngandcolletts. Thishowever, is highly dependent on thecoeftient --r-orver of ftiction 3" Fper between Delweql between m.e th-e two.parls. two.parts. much muEh fiictioqr requlres hlgher locking-and biring Sntt uritocxins udocking forces. Lorer friabn torces. fridloniin can -_Too _Too fpqol caqs-e nqQ.Plgcl( wlthout pr€ssurc. ofu4r.foq! maintaintng mairntainlng conebnl cbnebnt Usins (POCV) a pilot operated opErated (PQCV) check Cnec[ valve vitve tg dng lolack off iressurc.,Using iFoCVt;; or $_q9.e_PF maintaining psi on$.9 to"f 9lpryb9r 30G500P9i normally controls ttrgplob-leq bctuator ringback-off.ror ihts l9:lt?iryry_ryt?9.9 9f qeslgn, pt€ssure pocV. pr€ssure cleslgn, wlll be used to mafntain fockontherbnnector instsid of a To unloi:k, is applied port. Normally, to.the primary. unlock pistonremains lhe secondary untock I9-tnld,.pryssure. lhe outer body, whichcauses theactuatoi ringto be driven upwani, reteasing the Tfl?q pginft thestgp.gn

Thereare severalchoices for plumbing the supplypres$treto the connector.Theyare: 1. Slnglehydraulic supplles tb elttrer-prlmary'cir-s.dcondary unhck oort 2. Sin0lehydrautic subidyto boththe primaiyand secondarv untoik Dort (DMS) 3. Separate hydraulic-s'uilplies to eachof thi primary andsticondary'unbikporG(eOS) The benefits and risksare shownin the tablebelow: unlocKsupply Method Dng|esupPty ro secondary or primary unlockport. pnmary and secondary unlock ports. (DMSMode) urscrere supptEs to primary and secondary unlock ports (EDSMode)
Dtngle suPPty ro DoIn

t'enelfis
O

KISKS
t

a

r pped, this will minimizethe possibilig . of a leakin thesuppfy. Feweraccumulator bottlesrequired.
rr lne nyqrauilcs are Pnmaflty naro

rrPrngrs srmPre Primary has held 500 psi prior to operating so confidence is high as to seal inteoritv

a

. lr upper seals Detweenactuator nng o and outer body fail, the unlock piston ' will move upward until it is in full contactwith actuatorring, driving the actuator ringupvardto unlock Failure to open the connectorwould require failure of both sets of seals between lhe actuator ring and outer bodyor failureof bothsupplycircuitsto the primary andsecondary unlockports Secondary unlock port is truly redundant Would requirefailure of entire supply circuitdownstream of SMPvalves.

Failure or upperseatsDetween aduator ring and outer body may prevent connector from ooenino. Sinqlepointfailuremedhanism vrPm9 ts morecomplex lf upper seals between actuator ring and outerbody leak, secondaryunlock chamberwifl not build up pressureto drivesecondarv unlockpistonuoward. lf piping systi:m leakS upstrbam of unfock ports, both pnmary and portsare madeineffective secondary Ptpingis morecomplex Additional shear seal valves are reqiured

AIOIE: The abovetable, whendesaibing a seatfailure,assu/res a catastrophic failurein which altftuid pumped in ip_lkcnapea thrcugh the seal intertace.tn actuatity, that prcbabitity is very iow. rne mostiiieiyiaiturc fiediianisii tv a sealwouldbe localizeddamagedue to saring or trcshbuild-upon tie seating surfaces-,h thrscase the leak .t would tend to De slow. Tnehyctrailic nuidiupu! wbuldliketyexree:i ine-huia-di;ch;ry;{htor;i th; A;;;g;;;""i '4nd just causethe connectorio workmoreslitwty ratherthah notwork at itlpage3 of 7 Technicat Position leePwater Horizon, Paper, EDS4MS DisconnectPh/osophv, (Cont'gl -

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026744

Ktt Fafcon ueepwater Horii I Technical Position Paper
It can therefore be concluded that maxirnum redundancy to ensureunlockinq of the con,,rector can be achieyedbv usingboththe primaryand second?ry unlockcircuits,elch beingsupplied sources. In addition, fiom independent to accountfor connector wear, hydraulicfrictional losses, actuaibrring creep, etc. the unlockpressureshould b6 greaterlhan the lock pressure. The recommendation is 1,500-psilocli pressureand 3.000-psiirnlockpressurefor boththe EDSand DMSsequences.Thiswill sive approximateli 2-1lZtimesadditionalunlockforce thariforce used to locktheconnector.This higherunlockpressurehis two priniarybenefits; 1. lt should allowthe connedtor to openmoreouicklv 2. lt accounts for mechanical lossesas describ'ed above. ln^add.ition, 300-500psishould be maintained on the lock circuitduringoperations after lockingthe connector. A POCVwill not be used. lt is felt that this createsa singlepoint fiiluie mechanism, whicli could preventthe connector fromopening. Both.the lock,and prirylary q!d. secondary unlockcircuitsshouldbe testedas a regularpart of the stack tests while the stackis on the surface. This shouldensurethe integrity of the pipingsystemsSuppllingpressureas well as the internal sealson the connector.

1

U

j

v

U

DeePwater Horizon, Technical Paper,EDSDMS Drsconnecf Position (Cont'd) Philosoph%

page 4 of 7

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026745

Horiz I RB FafconDeepwater Position Paper Technical
(Attachment REGULATORY ISSUES 7 -ABS, I -MMS) 1 v I The trable and disconnect belcw summarizesthe basic regulatoryrequirementsrelative to BOP, accumulator, requirements.
Ceilllicatlon of DrillingSystems 1990 (CDS+N rcfersto DNVlegg issuedin 1981and hasdisclalmer 8.1. para.3)

30cFR 250.406 1,1998 June

2 - Piperamsw/locks CDS+N
nwutrruEll YlJtutttE-

2 -Pipe ramsw/locks

(frcr Surtsce subsea stack)

1,5x volumerequired to close ram and annularpreventers and close chokelines 8.12) CDS+N (Appendy o Refers to NPDsections 2.6.3.3 and 2.6.4

.

O

NOTE: Although ,48S, CDS (+N) ls not required for Vastar Resources, ceftlficatlon for approval in ! Nonileglan waters may lnclude signlficant additions andlor changes to the above requirements. This ls due to the fact that more recent NPD regulatlons exlst than are mentloned ln ABS Ceftlflcatlon of Drilling Sysfems, 19W. RB Falcon should coisultwith ABSfor specifying the exact requirements, (Attachment SUBSEAACCUMULATOR 1) QUANITIIES Sizingfor subseaaccumulators of nitrogenat ambientvs. seabed shouldtdke into accountadiabaticexpansion temperatures in addition to any regulatory requirements.

OD""p-"t"r x"rir"",L*

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026746

RB FalconDeepwater Horii -n TechnicalPositionPaper
Attachments: ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I Description of EDSand DMSsystem FlowChart, EDS - DrillMode FlowChart,EDS- CasingMode,SBR'scloseW rigidconduitsupply FlowChart.EDS- Gasin! Mode,SBR'scloseMA-uto-Shear Circuif FlowChart,DMS Cameron Type'HC' Connector - ABS,Certification Regulatory iiequirements of Drilling Systems,1990 - MMS,30 CFR250 Regulatory Requirements

o

.l

v

DisconnecfPhilosopfiv.(Contd) OeePwater Horizon,TechnicatPositbn Papgr,EDSzDMS

page 6 of 7

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026747

RB Falcon DeepwaterHorii ,l TechnicalPositionP l
PreparedBy: Name M. Byrd ReviewedBy: Name KevinWink DonWeisinger Discipline Deepwater Horizon, Rig Manager Vastar,Project Manager Discipline Vastar, Subsea Consultant

-.
\t

qElg.

i
Technical Position Paper,EDSzDMS Drsconnecf (Contd) Pfirlosophy, Oeepwater Horizon, page Z of 7

Confidential Treatment Requested by Transocean Holdings LLC

TRN-HCJ-00026748