G.R. No. 122256. October 30, 1996.

* REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ACIL CORPORATION, respondents. Courts; Jurisdiction; Agrarian Reform; Eminent Domain; Administrative Law; Statutory Construction; The provision of §50 of R.A. 6657 must be construed in harmony with §57 by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violation of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR.—Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) “all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners” and (2) “the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].” The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases.—Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty‟s Department Store v. Micaller we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies.—Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies — rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, §11 of the new rules provides: §11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.—The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and

preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts. Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; It would subvert the “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.—Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent‟s case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of §57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.” It would subvert this “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the question.— Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine
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in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. The Solicitor General for petitioners. Dominguez, Paderna & Tan Law Offices, Co. for private respondent. MENDOZA, J.:

violation of the DARAB‟s rules of procedure the petition had been filed more than fifteen (15) days after notice of the decision of the PARAD. Private respondent moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied on October 13, 1994. Private respondent there-fore filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, contending that a petition for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 §§5657 falls under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. His contention was sustained by the Court of Appeals which, in its decision1 of October 4, 1995, set aside the order of dismissal of the RTC. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. In turn the government, represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform, filed this petition for review on certiorari, raising as the issue whether in cases involving claims for just compensation under R.A. No. 6657 an appeal from the decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB must first be made before a landowner can resort to the RTC under §57. Petitioners sustain the affirmative proposition. They cite §50 of R.A. No. 6657 which in pertinent part provides: §50. Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) . . . . and argue that the fixing of just compensation for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a “[matter] involving the implementation of agrarian reform” within the contemplation of this provision. They invoke §16(f) of R.A. No. 6657, which provides that “any party who disagrees to the decision [of the DAR] may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation,” as confirming their construction of §50. The contention has no merit. It is true that §50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive original jurisdiction over “all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,” except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. It is also true, however, that §57 provides:
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Private respondent Acil Corporation owned several hectares of land in Linoan, Montevista, Davao del Norte, which the government took pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Private respondent‟s certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. The lands were valued by the Land Bank of the Philippines at P19,312.24 per hectare for the riceland and P4,267.68 per hectare for brushland, or for a total of P439,105.39. It appears, however, that in the Statement of Agricultural Landholdings (“LISTASAKA”) which private respondent had earlier filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), a lower “Fair Value Acceptable to Landowner” was stated and that based on this statement, the Land Bank of the Philippines valued private respondent‟s lands uniformly at P15,311.79 per hectare and fixed the amount of P390,557.84 as the total compensation to be paid for the lands. Private respondent rejected the government‟s offer, pointing out that nearby lands planted to the same crops were valued at the higher price of P24,717.40 per hectare. The matter was brought before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) who, on October 8, 1992, sustained the initial valuation made by the LBP. On December 12, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Just Compensation in the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao del Norte, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent prayed that DAR be ordered to pay P24,717.40 per hectare. However, the RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that private respondent should have appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), pursuant to the latter‟s Revised Rules of Procedure, before recourse to it (the RTC) could be had. In addition the RTC found that, in

§57. Special Jurisdiction.—The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) “all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners” and (2) “the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657].”2 The provision of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases. Thus in EPZA v. Dulay3 and Sumulong v. Guerrero4 we held that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty‟s Department Store v. Micaller5 we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act. Petitioners also cite Rule II, §5 and Rule XIII, §1 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure in support of their contention that decisions of agrarian reform adjudicators may only be appealed to the DARAB. These rules provide: Rule II, §5. Appellate Jurisdiction.—The Board shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, reverse, modify, alter or affirm resolutions, orders, decisions, and other dispositions of its [regional and provincial agrarian reform adjudicators]. Rule XIII, §1. Appeal to the Board.—a) An appeal may be taken from an order or decision of the Regional or Provincial Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both, by giving or stating a written or oral appeal within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the resolution, order or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the opposite or adverse party, if the appeal is in writing. b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by

the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the opposite or adverse party within ten (10) days from the taking of oral appeal. Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies — rules of procedure cannot — it is noteworthy that the New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court. Thus Rule XIII, §11 of the new rules provides: §11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation.—The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) This is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the decision of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is a power vested in the courts. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking.6 Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held7 and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court.8 This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent‟s case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of §57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has “original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.”9 It would subvert this “original and exclusive” jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.
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Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

*************************************************************************** *************************************************************************** People vs. Bandula G.R. No. 89223. May 27, 1994. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AURELIO BANDULA y LOPEZ, accused-appellant. Constitutional Law; Right to Counsel; Criminal Procedure; Custodial Investigation; When accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present; These are blatant violations of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.—From the records, it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna,

the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. 12, Art. III, that—(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused.—We further said in Gamboa v. Judge Cruz that “[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense.” Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation, any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.—Custodial investigation is the stage where the
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police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Same; Same; Same; Same; Admissions obtained without benefit of counsel are flawed under the Constitution.—Indeed, the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De Jesus where we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitution requires that counsel be independent. He cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.—The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic

services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. Remedial Law; Evidence; Confessions; Where there is doubt as to the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the same must be rejected in toto.—This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or maltreated. In fine, we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto. Same; Same; The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished.—With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused-appellant Bandula beyond reasonable doubt, acquittal should follow as a matter of course. We have oftentimes said that while the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated, this claim assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. In this, the state has utterly failed. Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused, a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners and a statute which penalizes
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it is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. Tabilon. the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Aurelio Bandula guilty of the crime charged. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they take fancy on. J. BELLOSILLO.38 cal. the six (6) armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty. disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back. Garay. After succeeding in untying themselves. Negros Oriental. at around ten o‟clock in the evening. AURELIO BANDULA. 42. From there. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while accused Bandula and the two masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of Atty. Erames for accused-appellant.—Indeed.: After he and his wife were individually hog-tied and their house ransacked. wristwatch and . However.the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights. Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation. On 5 May 1989.2 on 27 January 1986. Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of the compound. Teofilo Dionanao. TEOFILO DIONANAO and VICTORIANO EJAN were haled to court for robbery with homicide. snubnose revolver. APPEAL from a judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. Manager of the Polo Coconut Plantation. The armed men were identified by Security Guard Antonio Salva of the plantation as Aurelio Bandula. Accused Dionanao. hog-tied him. For his death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof. after hearing twelve (12) prosecution and nine (9) defense witnesses. rough him up and put words into his mouth. A few minutes later. six (6) armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut Plantation in Tanjay. JUANITO GARAY. the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. a lawyer. Br. the hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. After forcing their way into the house. the two (2) masked men held Salva who was manning his post. Juanito Garay. goggles.” At gunpoint. his three (3) co-accused were acquitted “for insufficiency of evidence. and divested him of his driver‟s license. a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners and a statute which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights. was found dead with three (3) gunshot wounds. . Thereafter. They then went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano. Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others who wore masks were simply referred to as “Boy Tall” and “Boy Short. J. Pastrano and 6|P a g e The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. PANTALEON SEDIGO.”1 As found by the court a quo. Garay locked Pastrano inside his house together with Salva. Saleto J. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused.

” “These extrajudicial confessions made by accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula extracted during custodial investigation. and his two (2) other co-accused Sedigo and Ejan only the following day when they were locked up together with him 7|P a g e . he did not know his three (3) co-accused as he met them for the first time only when they were detained together in the Municipal Jail of Tanjay.from whom three handguns were recovered by the police.Salva went to report the matter to the police. prior to his detention. at that time. was fully covered with herbs. Tomas Borromeo and Pat. a tape recorder. that the following morning. a . Admitted also in evidence were the alleged extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in the commission of the crime by “Boy Tall” and “Boy Short. the following morning. he was made to sign a blank paper purportedly for his release.38 cal. revolver for safekeeping to Jovito Marimat. and a revolver with M16 bullets. On their way.”3 Thus the trial court disregarded the following defenses of the four (4) accused: (a) Teofilo Dionanao—that he was arrested without a warrant and brought to the Tanjay Police Station on 28 January 1986 for no apparent reason. The court also noted that a sum of money suspected to be part of the loot was recovered from accused Pantaleon Sedigo.e. Ruben Zerna). In arriving at its conclusions. after which. that he saw accused Dionanao for the first time only on 28 January 1986 in the Municipal Hall. that he was then put behind bars. that because of the mauling. It likewise took into account the supposed admission of accused Victoriano Ejan that he kept a 12-gauge Winchester shotgun. i. Jr.. Pat. took turns in beating him up until he became unconscious. that he was bedridden as he was undergoing treatment for an inflamed stomach which. that. that his repeated requests to see a doctor were ignored. that. including Antonio Salva. El Moso arrived and took turns in mauling him until he spat blood. revolver with four (4) live ammunitions and one (1) empty shell. after which. he was awakened and dragged by Cpl. later that afternoon. he was locked up in the municipal jail. the trial court considered the alleged confession of accused Bandula that after the incident he gave his . he felt extreme pain on his left rib. Melvin Baldejera.. “have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession.” the trial court ruled. a quack doctor. he was taken out of his cell and again mauled. “paltik” revolver. they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. at around six o‟clock. he was forced to sign a piece of paper without a counsel and the contents of which he did not know. it appearing from the confession itself that accused were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by counsel (Atty. Sr. a bayonet and a pair of binoculars in the house of his relative Emilio Rendora who was found to have the goods in his possession. Garay.38 cal. that. Borromeo and Pat. a . that there he was made to sit on a bench for about an hour when Cpl.. Kagawasan Borromeo.22 cal. he was brought to a room where four (4) persons. that that evening.4 (b) Aurelio Bandula—that in the evening of 27 January 1986 he was in the house of Jovito Marimat. Moso from his sickbed into a waiting motorcycle and brought to the Municipal Hall where he was interrogated by Pat.

It was there where accused Bandula asked to see a doctor. that he was brought to the Municipal Hall and there mauled until he lost consciousness. Ephraim Valles inside the Police Station in Tanjay where he implicated accused Sedigo.”9 that when prosecution witness Pat. neither did he know the deceased Atty. they were merely bystanders and did not participate in one way or another in the commission thereof x x x x The mere knowledge. searched his belongings and arrested him without a warrant.5 (c) Victoriano Ejan—that the first met his three (3) co-accused only on 29 January 1986 when he was confined in the Municipal Hall. the instant appeal by the lone convict. without the extrajudicial confessions. Consequently. that his relatives were barred from seeing him. that he was not aware of the incident that transpired that night until he was arrested at gunpoint by Pat. The prosecution witnesses themselves disclosed that on 28 January 1986 accused Dionanao was “picked-up for investigation” and interrogated by Cpl. he admitted that he noticed accused Sedigo with a “black eye.in his cell. Pat. acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. Ejan and Sedigo on the ground that while “these three accused were present at the scene of the crime x x x from the inception of the crime to its final termination. and were merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney who. that his relatives were not allowed to see him. and. at around sixthirty in the morning. that he had never met any of his co-accused prior to his detention. Borromeo. the trial court nevertheless acquitted Dionanao. Garay. Gaste and Pat. Moso. Esparicia and Cpl. that during his four-month detention in Tanjay. Appellant Bandula argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao executed suffer from constitutional infirmities. Ruben Zerna. that he did not know anything about the charges against him. with their guns drawn. Esparicia at around five o‟clock the following afternoon. Pat. the four (4) accused were transferred from the Municipal Jail of Tanjay to the Negros Oriental Provincial Rehabilitation Center in Dumaguete City. that after taking supper on 27 January 1986.6 (d) Pantaleon Sedigo—that on 29 January 1986. that he did not know nor ever met Atty. he was never investigated. that he has no relative by the name of Emilio Rendora. the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict him of the crime charged.”11 Hence. just barged into his house. inadmissible in evidence considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation. that. by the nature of his position. and. left. he was brought to the provincial hospital where he was examined8 and diagnosed to have an “[o]ld healed fracture with callous formation at the 6th and 7th rib along the mid-auxiliary line. Baldejera was asked on 15 September 1987 in open court if he saw any contusions or bruises on any of the four (4) accused after their arrest. he slept with his wife and four (4) children. he was hit on the chest and eye.12 The following 8|P a g e .”10 Although the respective alibis of all four (4) accused were disregarded considering their positive identification by Salva as the ones who raided Polo Coconut Plantation. as a result of his request. was not entirely an independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. hence. that when he refused to go with them.7 On 6 June 1986.

. again in the presence of Atty. together with “Boy Short” and “Boy Tall. If at all. Jr. Cpl. he implicated three (3) more persons but they were not thereafter included in the Information. Garay with a .24 all promulgated even before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. Cpl. counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna. Zerna. he must be provided with one. Atty. Jr. it can be gleaned that when accused-appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest.21 From the records. Bandula allegedly admitted that he together with two (2) others shot Atty. incommunicado. Pat. (2) No torture. 9|P a g e . brought to the Tanjay Police Station and there interrogated. violence. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. on 29 January 1986. Garay. upon the suggestion of another investigator. v. On top of this. counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to accused Dionanao.14 In his Sworn Statement. Garay. Baldejera.23 and the subsequent case of People v. And. Esparicia. Cpl. Enrile 22 and Moncupa. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. Bandula narrated that after “Boy Short” and “Boy Tall” shot Atty. threat. Art.13 On 4 February 1986. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.” shot Atty.”20 Two weeks after his arrest. Dionanao supposedly admitted that he was with Bandula when the latter. Moso and Pat. revolver. he (Bandula) was ordered likewise to shoot the latter which he did. where he supposedly executed his extrajudicial confession in the presence of the latter. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. v.day. they had no counsel present.18 In that investigation. and their families. III. Bandula allegedly gave a sworn statement in the presence of Atty.17 He was investigated by Cpl. Certainly. there was no counsel present “because that (investigation) was not yet in writing. these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Sec. He also said that Sedigo and Ejan were with them that evening. Borromeo. that— (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Valles took the Supplementary Sworn Statement of Dionanao. Ruben Zerna. Ebarso. Secret detention places.38 cal. at around six o‟clock in the morning. In the twin cases of Morales. solitary. In that statement. Garay. He added that he was going to be killed if he did not join the group. in his Supplementary Sworn Statement. force. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. Galit. and two weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. Enrile.19 At that time. Zerna admitting his participation in the killing of Atty. 12.15 Then. he was brought to the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.16 The prosecution likewise asseverated that accused Bandula was arrested on 28 January 1986. there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused.

It is when questions are initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. i. he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people. Granting that Atty. Judge Cruz 25 that “[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation. public or private prosecutor. by any person on his behalf. the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense. including the maintenance of peace and order. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. It is thus seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running 10 | P a g e . The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means—by telephone if possible—or by letter or messenger. still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence considering that Atty. or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.26 Indeed. he cannot be a special counsel. At such point or stage. Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. shall be inadmissible in evidence. Custodial investigation is the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements. De Jesus 27 where we said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the Constitution.we laid down the procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and conducting a custodial investigation— x x x At the time a person is arrested.. counsel of the police. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. in whole or in part. Obviously. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. any statement elicited from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. a relative. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. As a legal officer of the municipality. the instant case is analogous to the more recent case of People v.e. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. We further said in Gamboa v.” Hence. if there is no counsel at the start of the custodial investigation. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. if any.

preferably of their own choice. the alleged positive identification by Salva crumbles. We have oftentimes said that while the alibi of the accused is easily fabricated.31 Contraposed with the testimonies of Garay and Pastrano. In this. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. She could only see their eyes.into conflict of interests. why did the investigators not inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. although according to Salva only two (2) were hooded.32 The prosecution must rely not on the weakness of the defense evidence but rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. For. recounted that except for Pastrano and Salva whose hands were tied behind their backs. In fine. Where there is doubt as to their voluntariness.29 Consequently.28 What is most upsetting however is the allegation of the four (4) accused that they were mauled into owning the crime. we are strongly drawn to the belief that violence indeed attended the extraction of statements from the accused. even Pastrano who witnessed the crime together with Salva was not able to recognize any of the armed men as they were hooded. In fact. Indeed. this claim assumes importance when faced with the inconsistencies and the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. We cannot give credence to the lone identification by witness Salva of all four (4) accused who were supposedly bold enough to bare their faces. the same must be rejected in toto. Maria Paz Garay. even before attempting to elicit statements that would incriminate them? Why did the investigators not advise the accused that if they could not afford the services of counsel they could be provided with counsel free of charge before conducting any investigation? Why did the investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for medical assistance? How did accused Sedigo get his “black eye” which even Pat. the prosecution is left with nothing but the alleged positive identification of appellant Bandula by witness Salva. Based on the records. the state has utterly failed. Baldejera admitted? How and why did accusedappellant Bandula suffer a fractured rib? We cannot close our eyes to these unanswered questions. Men in uniform do not have blanket authority to arrest anybody they take fancy on. acquittal should follow as a matter of course. we cannot accept the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and use the same against them or any of them. rough him up and put words 11 | P a g e . But this by itself does not measure up to the required standard of moral certainty. For. it is unfortunate that the investigators who are sworn to do justice to all appear to have toyed with the fundamental rights of the accused. she could not recognize any of the men as all their faces were fully covered. With the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accusedappellant Bandula beyond reasonable doubt. he said he would not be able to recognize the malefactors. widow of the victim. This Court is greatly disturbed with the way the accused were treated or maltreated. even if there was light.30 Thus.

Accused acquitted.—Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. Criminal Law. The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession.—No in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it is in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. force. Same.. which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12.33 a penal law which punishes maltreatment of prisoners34 and a statute which penalizes the failure to inform and accord the accused his constitutional rights. such confession will be sustained. accused-appellant. May 17. 2000. ——o0o—— CORLA. 122142. On leave. Vasquez. Costs de oficio. Davide. Note. Extrajudicial Confessions. and Quiason. For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times. MAY 17.35 WHEREFORE. plaintiff-appellee. intimidation. violence. and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings. on reasonable doubt.R. he could also have been forced to sign the booking and information sheet. 12 | P a g e . by any person is his behalf or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone is his behalf (People vs. the conviction of accusedappellant AURELIO BANDULA Y LOPEZ by the court a quo is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. Cruz (Chairman) and Kapunan. JIMMY OBRERO y wise. 332. Same. threat. in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant‟s consent in executing the same has been vitiated. —There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture. §12 of the Constitution. Conviction of accused-appellant reversed and set aside. 191 VOL. in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant‟s consent in executing the same has been vitiated. JJ. vs.. Same. No. 196 SCRA 564). 2000 191 People vs. there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. Two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in Art III. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary. and. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary. Custodial Investigations. such confession will be sustained. concur. and. Obrero G. JJ. other_______________ * SECOND DIVISION. There is a living Constitution which safeguards the rights of an accused. Jr. which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same §12.* THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.into his mouth. SO ORDERED.

—Under the first paragraph of this provision. who. where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed. has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. Right to Counsel. accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation. reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. De los Reyes. III. III. the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused. though presumably competent. Same. Same. care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Under the Constitution. Same. where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed. Same. Same. Same. Same. cannot be considered an “independent counsel” as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on which violence and torture have been applied. that he committed the crime together with his townmate. Same. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta). an uncounseled statement. It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused. if so. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession. Where there is only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and. details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. Same. the confession is admissible against the declarant. Rights of Suspects. such as it is called in the United States from which Art.—The confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent. Miranda Warnings. Here. is merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. is presumed to be psychologically coerced. §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. §12(1) was derived. Especially in this case. Same. in several decisions of this Court. whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. if so. Same. (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him.—There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated. A lawyer who is also a station commander of the WPD cannot be considered as an “independent counsel. whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. Same. 193 13 | P a g e 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED . and that if he is indigent. a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Same. Ronnie Liwanag.”—Art. an uncounseled statement is presumed to be psychologically coerced. This kind of giving of warnings. When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated.Same. Obrero inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. Same. Under the Constitution.—But what renders the confession of accused-appellant 192 People vs. and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel. and that he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega). the confession is admissible against the defendant.

or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. It does not matter that accused failed to object to the introduction of the constitutionally proscribed evidence—the lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. 1989. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled. III.00 cash belonging to Antonio Cabrera against his will. whose true name.: 194 This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court. . but we are committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person. Branch 12. De los Reyes. with intent to kill. the said accused willfully.000. finding accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. rob and carry away the amount of P4. The information alleged— That on or about August 11. Contrary to law.000. public or private prosecutor. Atty. there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. 14 | P a g e The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Same. identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another. MAY 17. Philippines. and to indemnify the heirs of the victims Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta in the amount of P50. Br. municipal attorney. that on the occasion thereof and by reason of the aforesaid robbery. Manila. J. Same.00 representing the amount of money stolen.000. as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD. his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. 2000 193 People vs.—And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti.00 each and to pay the sum of P4. §12(1) cannot be a special counsel. in the City of Manila. Obrero Same.Public Attorney‟s Office for accused-appellant. Evidence. to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid amount of P4. 332. did then and there willfully. unlawfully and feloniously. as already stated. To allow such a happenstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation. APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. violence and intimidation. was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation. assaulted and used personal violence upon the person of NENA BERJUEGA and REMEDIOS HITTA. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. 12. Bandula.00 Philippine Currency. attacked. VOL. unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of force. Same. In this case. the said accused conspiring and confederating with one.000.—As observed in People v. the independent counsel required by Art. Same. A lawyer who is part of the police force could not be expected to effectively and scrupulously assist a suspect in the custodial investigation. O) of accused-appellant which. Same. Obrero MENDOZA. by stabbing them to death. thereby inflicting upon the said victims mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of their death thereafter. to wit: the said accused take. is inadmissible. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case.

Recto Avenue. Martial G. that accused-appellant had gone to La Union. 1989. one of which. Anita C. Pat. Pangasinan. accused-appellant gave a confession (Exh. At about 10:20 a. Pat. Pat. accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Ines of the Western Police District investi_____________ but failed to find accused-appellant. 1344 CM. Sta. they were able to apprehend accused-appellant whom they brought to Manila. he and his group received information from Pat: Alfredo Que of the Urdaneta Police Station that accused-appellant was in Cataban. Bienvenido De los Reyes. in which he admitted participation in the killing of Nena Berjuega and 15 | P a g e . a househelp of Emma Cabrera. Ines testified that on March 3. MAY 17.2 Pat. and Atty. De los Reyes stated that on August 11. 332. Cruz. Cabosas‟s business was located in Blumentritt Street. Recto Avenue. Villamor Valdez. 1989. Recto Avenue in Sta. Moral. 2000 195 People vs. Edmundo Cabal and Pat. and the other by Angie C. Ines identified two sworn statements. O) in writing with the assistance of counsel. 1990. Obrero gated the robbery with homicide. When arraigned. accused-appellant was asked to deliver dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera. she had seen accused-appellant and Ronnie Liwanag. Manila with blood in his hands. Renato Gutierrez went to Rosales. accused-appellant came back and turned over to his employer the amount of P2. accused-appellant confided to his sister that he had allegedly done something wrong in Manila.. 1990. They were told by the sister of accusedappellant. The gist of his testimony is to the following effect: Accused-appellant was a delivery boy employed by Angie Cabosas whose business was selling chickens to customers. in her sworn statement given on August 14. Carandang. Obrero blood. Manila. Sibal. Carlos Emerson. a regular customer at Room 4-D Gatlin Building.m. On the other hand. Ines. she and her employer‟s nephew. Benjamin Ines. Cruz. Pat. The prosecution presented three witnesses. Urdaneta. March 4. Cruz. their hands covered with 196 1 Per Judge Rosmari D. Ines testified that after receiving report of the killing. Ines testified that on that same day. Pat. had been executed by Helen N. Pat. Atty. Ines that accused-appellant used to deliver pork and dressed chicken to their place. Moral said that upon arriving in the house at about 12:20 p. Merly Asuncion. They were told that accused-appellant had gone to Pangasinan allegedly to attend the burial of his grandfather. 1989 and marked as Exhibit L. Bienvenido De los Reyes. Pangasinan 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. According to Pat. She told Pat. Cenido. Pfc. found the bodies of the victims sprawled on the floor. namely. 1989. Accordingly. In the morning of August 11. Sta. His co-accused Ronnie Liwanag has been at large. Manila. In her statement marked Exhibit I. Pfc. both executed on August 11. whereupon. he said. March 4. Cruz.m. Dr. Ines said accused-appellant was positively identified by Anita De los Reyes as one of those whom she saw running down the stairs of the Gatlin Building on CM. 195 VOL.Only accused-appellant had been apprehended. Ines said he and P/Lt. trial ensued.000.00. he and Pfc. 1990. that day. De los Reyes.3 Pat. Ricardo Sibal went to see Angie Cabosas from which they learned that the latter has received a call from Emma Cabrera informing Angie that her house had been robbed and her two maids killed. Sta. Manila. they went to the place indicated and the next day. coming out of the Gatlin Building on CM.

1989. specifically the right and left lungs and the heart. A) that Nena Berjuega suffered 16 stab wounds from which she died. Cenido. as she tried to run away. Dr. De los Reyes. causing her death.4 Accused-appellant‟s extrajudicial confession was presented in evidence as Exhibit O. representing a client accused of illegal recruitment. 197 VOL. De los Reyes. Ronnie then gave the knife to accused-appellant who stabbed the younger maid Remedios Hitta from which she 6 TSN (Atty. Manila three or four months before the incident. MAY 17. 332. Bienvenido De los Reyes). pp. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 16 stab wounds which affected her vital organs. He said that on March 4. Pat. 26. Ronnie covered the mouth of one Nena Berjuega to prevent her from shouting but. his fellow employee. He said accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet. 198 198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 16 | P a g e . medico-legal officer who conducted autopsies on August 11. Emma Cabrera was a regular customer to whom he made deliveries in the morning. pp. confessing to the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide. Antonio Cabrera. According to Atty. Pangasinan. Thereafter. The extrajudicial confession is in Tagalog and signed by accused-appellant in the presence of Atty. After proper identification (Exh. Six of these wounds were fatal so that she could not survive despite immediate medical attention. Ronnie Liwanag. 179-181. 1991. Bienvenido De los Reyes. 1989. 2-4. Accused-appellant‟s work was to deliver dressed chicken. Ronnie went to La Union. Feb. Benjamin Ines). 3 Id. but accusedappellant said he was willing to give a statement as in fact he did.5 In it.Remedios Hitta. the two proceeded to Blumentritt Street and divided the money Ronnie had taken from the house of Emma Cabrera. Feb. Dr. after learning that only two helpers were then at the residence of _______________ died. while accused-appellant proceeded to Pangasinan. He was asked by Lt. 1989 on the victims. U. 2000 197 People vs.. Generoso Javier of the WPD Homicide Section to assist accused-executing an extrajudicial confession.. D) by the victim‟s employer. 1991. Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta. 5-6. He concluded that the assailant _______________ 2 TSN (Pat. 1-4. pp. 2-10. 5 RTC Records. Feb. 26. The prosecution next presented Atty. On August 11. Marcial G. Ronnie stabbed and killed her. On August 10. he happened to be at Station 7 of the WPD. 7-10. 1990. From Blumentritt Street. accused-appellant and Ronnie decided to pull the heist. 6. Cenido prepared a postmortem report (Exh. Manila. a PC Captain of the WPD Headquarters. he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional rights. pp. Avenue. Cabosas and accused-appellant‟s sister Merly Asuncion. proposed that they rob Emma in order to be able to go to La Union to visit his family. March 5. explaining to him that any statement made by him could be used against him in court. had been neighbors in Rosales. pp.N. Obrero Emma Cabrera. P) stating the circumstances of accused-appellant‟s arrest. 1991. pp.6 The other prosecution witness was Dr. 1991. Ines himself executed an affidavit (Exh. 4 Id. accused-appellant said he started working for Angie Cabosas in the latter‟s business on Blumentritt Street.

Recto Avenue. He stated that the weapon used on both victims could have been the same and that both victims sustained multiple stab wounds. the trial court rendered its decision. Cenido likewise prepared a postmortem report (Exh. accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla. he delivered dressed chickens to Emma Cabrera‟s residence on CM. 17 | P a g e 7 TSN.7 Dr. B-1. as well as the sworn statements of Helen Moral (Exh. Aug. and Dr. De los Reyes before and stated that he did not understand the contents of the extrajudicial confession which he signed because he does not know how to read. 2 and 3 (Exhs. The fatal wounds damaged her left and right lungs and the heart that she would not survive despite immediate medical attention. in Pangasinan. Remedios Hitta and Nena Berjuega the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50. Muntinlupa is hereby ordered. 7-9. and G-7. His immediate transfer to the National Bilibid Prisons. Accused-appellant said that at about 9:00 a. 16 (Exh. on August 11.People vs. G-2.000.9 With the testimonies of Pat. 8 (Exh. respectively) were inflicted and that the assailant may have been on the left lateral side of the victim when he inflicted wound no. Cenido and the extrajudicial confession (Exh. 1995. pp. the assailant could have been at the back of the victim. Nena Berjuega and Remedios Hitta (Exhs.00) PESOS each as civil indemnity for their death and the additional sum of P4. Cenido testified that the victim sustained 12 stab wounds with seven fatal ones that caused her death. De los Reyes. 9 and 11 (Exhs. while in wounds Nos. defined and punishable under Article 294(a) of the Revised Penal Code. 8 Id.. the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE. as its sole witness. 3 and 5 (Exhs. Angie was a neighbor of his sister. 29.m. with all the accessory penalties provided by law. C and H). and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. pp. He is further condemned to pay the heirs of the victims. SO ORDERED. without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 1990. respectively). pp. 10-12. and B-4. this Court finds accused JIMMY OBRERO Y CORLA. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide. 1. B-6). and remitted the amount of P2. B-5) and at the victim‟s back when assailant inflicted wound no. G-l. He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds by using a single bladed weapon.8 Dr. Dr. he was beaten up and detained for a week and made to execute an extrajudicial confession. He said that there could be one or more assailant who inflicted these wounds using a single bladed weapon. 332. Obrero and the victim could be facing each other when wounds nos. The defense presented. 199 VOL. G-6. Accused-appellant testified that he had worked for Angie Cabosas in Blumentritt Street _______________ 9 Id. 4. . He observed that in wounds nos. the prosecution rested its case. He denied participation in the commission of the crime and claimed that he was arrested without a warrant in Pangasinan. after being informed of the charges against him.00 as the amount of money taken. 2000 199 People vs. MAY 17. F) that Remedios Hitta suffered 12 stab wounds from which she died. Cenido prepared the certificates of death of the victims. L).000.10 On August 31. Ines. He claimed that. He came back from his errand at around 10:20 a. G-4. Obrero for four (4) months before the incident in this case.00 which had been paid to him. the assailant and the victim could be facing each other. 1989. and G-3. 1. respectively). Atty. I) and Anita De los Reyes (Exh. O). Angie‟s business was selling dressed chickens. B-2. Merly Asuncion.m. He denied having known or seen Atty.000.. 2-6.

The inference rather was that no force was used to make accused-appellant execute the confession. 1994. There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) those which are the product of third degree methods VOL. He did not seek medical treatment nor even a physical examination. otherwise. (2) No torture. 2000 201 People vs. Secret detention places. He claims that Atty. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. was not the counsel of his own choice. To begin with. pp. which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same §12. preferably of his own choice. incommunicado. He signed his name on page 1 to acknowledge that he had been given the Miranda warnings. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. he must be provided with one. O) We discern no sign that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that it was signed by accused-appellant five times. March 2. he signed his name again on the third page in which the jurat appears. 2-5. he has shown no proof of the use of force and violence on him. violence. this instant appeal. which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of §12. 200 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. MAY 17. 1993. 332. Art. Obrero his confession. Dec. (Exh. O) but different parts thereof. Accused-appellant assails the validity of this extrajudicial confession which forms the basis of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide. [p. violence. That was the reason. and (2) those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. O-10) Fifth. force. O-7) Fourth. intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. 0-6) Next. solitary. For if he were simply forced to execute the extrajudicial confession and sign it for five times. (unmarked. threat. he said. who assisted him in executing _______________ such as torture. what accused-appellant claims he was made to sign five times is not the same confession (Exh.Hence. intimidation. (Exh. §12 of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. Accused-appellant claims that his confession was obtained by force and threat. His allegation that the fact that he was made to sign the confession five times is proof that he refused to sign it. there is no reason the police was not able to make him sign the said sheet as well. threat. force. Obrero given the Miranda warnings he agreed to give a statement. he signed the third page at the end of his confession. he refused to sign the booking and information sheet. Aside from this bare assertion. De los Reyes. he signed again his name at the end of page 2 to authenticate that page as part of his confession. He said he signed the extrajudicial confession five times as a sign that it was involuntarily executed by him. he signed again as proof that after being 201 10 TSN. 3-22. O-3) Then. pp. he could also have been forced to sign the booking and 18 | P a g e . (Exh. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (Exh. III. 3] of Exh. 8. Nor can it be inferred that the confession was involuntarily executed from the fact that accused-appellant refused to sign the booking and information sheet.

III. and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel. such confession will be sustained. Ines and Atty. 2000 203 People vs. 1991. (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him. the confession contains details that only the perpetrator of the crime could have given. People v. and. De los Reyes to establish that the above-enumerated requisites were fully satisfied when accusedappellant executed his extrajudicial confession. Elizaga. Obrero which violence and torture have been applied.13 In the case at bar. an uncounseled statement. 23 SCRA 449 (1968). It has been held that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused. the suspect really needs the guiding hand of counsel. Benjamin Ines testified:14 _______________ 11 People v. Pat. where the claim of maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed. §12(1) was derived. 203 VOL. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession. 14 TSN. Duero. a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. the prosecution presented Pat. Cf. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary. Swept into an unfamiliar environment and surrounded by intimidating figures typical of the atmosphere of police interrogation. No one except accused-appellant could have stated that it was he who killed the younger maid of Emma Cabrera (Remedios Hitta). and that he used the same weapon given to him by Ronnie after the latter had stabbed and killed the other helper (Nena Berjuega). 26. 266 SCRA 356 (1997). Moreover. is presumed to be psychologically coerced. it is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he must be informed of his right to remain silent. 6-7. Feb. Obrero Q What happened during the investigation of the accused? 19 | P a g e . reflecting spontaneity and coherence which cannot be said of a mind on 202 which Art. Nicandro. in the absence of conclusive evidence showing the declarant‟s consent in executing the same has been vitiated. Caguioa. under the first paragraph of this provision.11 When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated. 95 SCRA 2 (1980). Ronnie Liwanag. such as it is called in the United States from 13 People v. People v.information sheet. Now. 12 People v. details which are consistent with the medico-legal findings that the wounds sustained by the two victims were possibly caused by one and the same bladed weapon. Under the Constitution. 141 SCRA 289 (1986). 104 SCRA 379 (1981). that he committed the crime together with his townmate. Villanueva.12 But what renders the confession of accused-appellant inadmissible is the fact that accused-appellant was not given the Miranda warnings effectively. MAY 17. the confession is admissible against the declarant. pp. 202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. and that if he is indigent. 332.

was he assisted by counsel? A Yes. to have an attorney. Q Do you know what was the gist of that statement that was given to you. Q Before having taken down the admission of Jimmy Obrero. patrolman? A I informed Jimmy Obrero of his constitutional right to remain silent.A He consented to give a written statement to me. 20 | P a g e . For his part. we provided him with a lawyer. sir. Q Now. 1991. He.. what investigative steps did you undertake relative to his constitutional right. what was it all about? A It‟s all about the admission of Jimmy Obrero. that everything that he will say will be used for or against him. sir. Atty. the consent which he gave after having pointed out to him his constitutional right? A This portion sir. March 5. consented to proceed with the written statement.. the gruesome slaying of two househelps. 3-4. sir. Patrolman. Q And will you please tell us which part of the statement of Jimmy Obrero is it indicated. did you indicate his constitutional rights that you stated in this written statement of Jimmy Obrero? A Yes. however. Q Now. Bienvenido De los Reyes. this “sagot-opo” and then it was further affirmed by his signature over his typewritten name. De los Reyes testified:15 _______________ 15 TSN.. Q And who personally took down the statement of the accused? A I was the one who personally took the statement of accused Obrero. sir. sir. 204 . Patrolman. pp. when accused Jimmy Obrero consented to give statement. I put it on the statement which he voluntarily gave. Q And who was that lawyer that was provided by you? A Atty.

the right not to give statement. 332. Indeed.. the waiver signed by accused-appellant reads: MGA KARAPATAN AYON SA ATING BINAGONG SALIGANG BATAS: . JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA. sir. identification procedure in a police line up. sir. 2000 21 | P a g e . the right to secure lawyer. Q Was that statement taken down into writing? A In a question and answer form. Q: What was the reply of Jimmy Obrero. Obrero Q: Were you able to confront the suspect at that time. Q Was he able to give statement to the police? A Yes. what happened next? A I told him the rights under the Constitution. the accused. Atty. and I told him that all the evidences he might give will be utilized against him in the court with respect to the case—and despite of that. nais kong ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan ayon sa ating Binagong Saligang Batas: 1. I was there inside the room with the client and observing fairly [when he] gave statement voluntarily. in this case at that time you confronted Jimmy Obrero? A: He is willing at that time and [voluntarily] gave his affirmation that he wanted to secure my services. 205 VOL. herein accused? 1A: Yes. I told him for the purpose of investigation—custodial investigation I can render my services to him and afterwards avail the services of another lawyer and I told him his rights under the law.204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. Q After having manifested that he will retain your services as counsel for the investigation. ay aking isasailalim sa pagsisiyasat sa salang Pagnanakaw na may kasamang Pagpatay. De los Reyes. he said he wanted to give his statement to the police in my presence. the right to remain silent... sir. sir. Karapatan mo ang manahimik at huwag-sagutin ang mga itatanong ko sa iyo. MAY 17. sir. the right not to be placed in any Ikaw.

) JIMMY OBRERO y CORLA There was thus only a perfunctory reading of the Miranda rights to accused-appellant without any effort to find out from him whether he wanted to have counsel and. 277 SCRA 232 (1997). 219 SCRA 404 (1993). People v. as stated in People v. cannot be considered an “independent counsel” as contemplated by the law for the reason that he was station commander of the WPD at the time he assisted accused-appellant. upon proper petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to _______________ 16 People v. Obrero file such petition. whether he had his own counsel or he wanted the police to appoint one for him. Ngayon na naipaalam ko na sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan. Indeed. This kind of giving of warnings. 22 | P a g e . are generally suspect. Januario:17 Ideally. People v. Karapatan mo ang kumuha ng isang abogado na iyong sariling pili na maaaring makatulong sa iyo sa imbistigasyon na ito at kung hindi ka makakakuha ng iyong abogado ay bibigyan ka namin ng isa na walang bayad para makatulong sa iyo. Karapatan mo rin na malaman na ang lahat ng iyong sasabihin dito sa iyong Salaysay ay maaaring gamiting katibayan o ebidensya laban o pabor sa iyo o sa kanino mang tao sa alinmang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.18 Moreover. nais mo pa bang magbigay ng iyong malaya at kusang loob na Salaysay? SAGOT: (ni Jimmy Obrero y Corla) Opo. TANONG: Kung ganoon ay sabihin mo ulit ang iyong pangalan at lagdaan mo ito sa ibabaw ng iyong pangalan na ipipirma o imamakinilya ko? (Sgd. Binamira. Art. accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. I can divulge it even to my fellow officer. III. therefore. 17 267 SCRA 608. will you keep it to yourself or you must have to divulge that to your co-policeman because you know that? A If I am the lawyer. in several decisions16 of this Court. he testified as follows: Q Now. has been found to be merely ceremonial and inadequate to transmit meaningful information to the suspect. if so. 206 206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence. care should have been scrupulously observed by the police investigator that accused-appellant was specifically asked these questions considering that he only finished the fourth grade of the elementary school. Especially in this case. or by the latter‟s relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court. then all the testimonies and declaration is my preferential right. a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter could not afford one) should be engaged by the accused (himself). Santos.205 People vs. who. Lawyers engaged by the police. 632 (1997). Obrero 2. what would you do. though presumably competent. Basay. the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic. §12(1) requires that counsel assisting suspects in custodial interrogations be competent and independent. On this point. 3. as in many areas. 283 SCRA 443 (1997). whenever there is a crime committed wherein the member of police to which you belong or working but could not solve the crime and then you were designated as counsel to extend legal assistance to a suspect who is under a custodial investigation and in that conference with the suspect you may have inquired confidential inf ormation. Here. De los Reyes.

as PC Captain and Station Commander of the WPD. was part of the police force who could not be expected to have effectively and scrupulously assisted accused-appellant in the investigation. §12(1) cannot be a special counsel.Q Now. 21. De los Reyes was equal to his duties as a lawyer than a member of the police force. ALISUAG: That is all. did you get approval or permit from the civil— A Previously. we are authorized verbally [as long as] it will not hamper our time. Atty. 2000 207 People vs. do you have authority to practice the law profession.21 the independent counsel required by Art. III. the crime then I will back out. p.. Clearly shown was the fact that Atty. when he lend his assistance to the accused during his in-custody interrogation. MAY 17. municipal attorney. though a station commander but of another police station. Bandula. 20 Rollo. ruled: As shown in Exhibit “O. that he informed the accused of his Miranda rights and despite the warning. 1991. 4). or counsel of the police whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused. p. do you not consider that conflict of duty because no less than your organization was the one investigating that? A I am extending my legal assistance to the client I am handling the case because if it is true that he committed _______________ ATTY.20 This is error. In fact. that he was at all time present when the accused was being interrogated with the accused giving his answers voluntarily (Ibid. March 5. To allow such a hap______________ 18 Citing People v. he testified that he first asked the accused if he is accepting his legal services (TSN. 638 (1995). was remiss in his duty as a lawyer. 4).. Obrero 19 TSN (Atty. he decided to give his confession just the same. if I found suspicion and there is no proof at all. you were extending legal assistance to your client who was charged of illegal recruitment. As observed in People v. 9. p.” accused consented to giving his extrajudicial confession after he was informed of rights under custodial investigation. I go to the litigation. ma‟am. we will not work our time during the police duty. 1991 (emphasis added). And absent any showing that the assisting lawyer. by the way. March 5. De los Reyes. 207 VOL. 332. 251 SCRA 626. when I was at the JAGO. agreeing with him. Bienvenido delos Reyes). p.19 The trial court. 23 | P a g e . 8). his claim to the contrary notwithstanding. that he read to the accused the questions and answers before he signed his extrajudicial confession (Ibid. this Court holds that the proceedings were regularly conducted. Your Honor. 21 232 SCRA 566 (1994). In this case. public or private prosecutor. by affixing his signature thereto (Exhibit “0-3”). Deniega. p. Q According to you.

as already stated. J.22 For these reasons. Bellosillo (Chairman). 2000 209 People vs. 307 SCRA 1 [1999]) Confessions extracted without the assistance of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law. Domantay. (People vs. concur. De Leon. 309 SCRA 148 [1999]) 24 | P a g e . 189 SCRA 403 (1990). O) of accused-appellant which. 90-82187 of the Regional Trial Court. Branch 12. Judgment reversed. JJ. Obrero The Director of Prisons is hereby directed to forthwith cause the release of accusedappellant unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause and to inform the Court accordingly within ten (10) days from notice. Matos-Viduya.. Notes. SO ORDERED.. We cannot thus affirm the conviction of accused-appellant because of the procedural irregularities committed during custodial investigation and the trial of the case. 209 VOL. (People vs. Muleta. inadmissible as evidence. The prosecution tried to introduce circumstantial evidence of accusedappellant‟s guilt consisting of the sworn statements (Exhs. is inadmissible. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of proof which rested on the prosecution. accused-appellant acquitted. I and L) of Helen Moral.—The signatures of the accused on the boxes and on the plastic bags are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights and are. Wong Chuen Ming. Quisumbing and Buena. It does not matter that accused-appellant failed to object to the introduction of these constitutionally proscribed evidence. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited” for questioning. the househelp who said accused-appellant used to deliver dressed chickens to the Cabrera residence. Consequently. 256 SCRA 182 [1996]) Republic Act No.. the conviction of accused-appellant cannot stand. WHEREFORE. Jr. On leave. the decision in Criminal Case No. It may be that by this decision a guilty person is set free because the prosecution stumbled. 1989 she was passing in front of the Gatlin Building where the killing took place when she saw accused-appellant running down the stairs with blood in his hands. we hold that accused-appellant‟s extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence. there is no evidence of the robbery except the confession (Exh. and Anita de los Reyes who said that on March 11. convicting accused-appellant Jimmy Obrero y Corla of the crime of robbery with homicide is REVERSED and accused-appellant is hereby 22 People v. _______________ 208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. but we are committed to the principle that it is far better to acquit several guilty persons than to convict one single innocent person. (People vs. Obrero penstance would render illusory the protection given to the suspect during custodial investigation.208 ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. MAY 17. And while there is evidence of homicide consisting of the corpus delicti. Manila. therefore. there is no identification of accused-appellant. 332. Without the extrajudicial confession. These statements are likewise inadmissible for being hearsay.

it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report 25 | P a g e * EN BANC. GEN. that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination. June 5. Hernandez doctrine prohibits complexing of rebellion with any other offense. AURELIO C. AND EU_______________ 210 210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED People vs. June 5. JAIME N. Toledano [People vs. 1990. NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM. PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON. No. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE. Branch 103. TRAMPE. 103]. FERDINAND R. petitioners. PANLILIO. and HON. vs.* IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. Obrero. ABESAMIS. Quezon City.—It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner‟s arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. Salazar LOGIO C. in violation of Art. JUAN PONCE ENRILE. respondents. JR. 1990.——o0o—— G. sufficient to determine probable cause. ABESAMIS. PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. respondents.* SPS. Salazar G. SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE. 2. Constitutional Law. Complex Crime. however.R. which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. Same. Rebellion. petitioner. 218 Enrile vs. SALAZAR.. No.—The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court. . either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Same. 92164. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. PANLILIO ANDERLINDA E. Personal evaluation of report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 92163. AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL. of the Constitution. This Court has already ruled. III. Regional Trial Court. BRIG. MANANQUIL. REBECCO E. 332 SCRA 190(2000)] 218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. sec. vs.R. in his capacity as Presiding Judge.

220 VOL. 1990 219 Enrile vs. Court has no power to change. to whom no bail is recommended. Salazar ing to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. Same. except this Court. Incumbent on the accused.—The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner‟s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. not without first apply219 orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Same. Bail. claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. in short that would justify bypassing established judicial processes designed to 220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail and. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail. Same.—It is enough to give anyone pause— and the Court is no exception—that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. JUNE 5. Respondent Court has jurisdiction to deny or grant bail to petitioner. but only to interpret the law as it stands at any given time. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor‟s recommendation regarding bail. Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge. Same. none. Congress will perceive the need for promptly the initiative in this matter. and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty. Dissenting and Concurring: Rebellion. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion.. none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court. Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all 26 | P a g e . which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Same. Same. if it erred in that matter.J. 186. Parenthetically. to claim the right to bail hearing to prove the reason or weakness of evidence against him. for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time. nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.—There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge—indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts. Same. and even then. in any event. either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby. Same. Same. so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. C. from deciding them. Complex Crime. though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu propio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. which is properly within its province. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. so complied. incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him. The Court has no power to effect such change. Courts. It is. gives no reason to assume that he had not. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked.and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. denied an opportunity to correct its error. Salazar FERNAN. or could not have. Same. Same. Hopefully. Same. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.

42 Phil. Caltex v. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. 65 SCRA 270 [1975]. But. while in legal theory. the massacre of innocent people. FELICIANO. Concurring Opinion: Rebellion.—The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. Complex Crime. in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here. any procedural flaw notwithstanding. Director of Bureau of Prisons. Case at bar. 378 US 347. or in furtherance of.embracing authority.. 2d 894 [1964]. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms. 186. 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Ed. Marks v.—To my mind. as a rule. JUNE 5. should. Expost facto law. JR. the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion. 55 SCRA 607 [19741. judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally Rebellion. 866 F. City of Columbia. Palomar. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense. The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention— its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. People v.—The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. 18 SCRA 247 [1966]). 12 L. Non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. Complex Crime. Separate Opinion: 221 VOL. Statutes.. Reasons.. Licera. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Jabinal. In time. Habeas Corpus. Devine v. 1990 221 Enrile vs. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians. or in connection with. U. Gumabon v. Moreover. To that extent. J. Concurring Opinion: Rebellion. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. GUTIERREZ. Quilen. Director of Prisons. 43 US 188.S.—While litigants. ascend the steps of the judicial ladder. J. 805).. Salazar enacted. nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues. 51 L. I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that “Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. Ed. Rebellion consists of many acts. I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. the blowing up 27 | P a g e .” MELENCIO-HERRERA. 2d 339 [1989]). 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours].. J. Complex Crime. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed. Thus. 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Statutes. the laying waste of civilian economies. if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. New Mexico Department of Corrections. rebellion are absorbed by the latter. is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms. 2d 260 [1977].

J. Concurring and Dissenting: Rebellion. Case at bar. devolves upon us. Same. robbery.breaking” on 222 222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Separate Opinion: void as the information on which they are anchored. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-be-enacted legislation.—I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion. it has given rise to nothing. Same. notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights—absent when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine—the prosecution has insisted in filing. Rules of Court). J. Crime of Rebellion complexed with murder. however. 13. BIDIN.—And yet. Case at bar. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion. arson. PADILLA. 28 | P a g e . In view thereof. Complex yCrime. a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of the petitioner‟s constitutional right to bail. since the entire question of the information‟s validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases. and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion.—Furthermore. And. Rule 110.. Habeas Corpus. I venture to say that the information is fatally defective. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder. Salazar freedom. In the present cases. Bail. the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed. etc. 187 of President Corazon C. an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder. the prosecution and the lower court. if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings. because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. I take it that when we. and multiple frustrated murder does not exist. Same. it charges nothing. even under procedural law. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. J.—I dissent. Concurring in part and dissenting in part: Rebellion.. 186. and the lower court has persisted in hearing. JUNE 5. was “ground. Consequently. not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law). and multiple frustrated murder does not exist. the Supreme Court.. Salazar the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and Rebellion. habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had been charged with simple rebellion. As a nullity in substantive law. No useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when the Supreme Court has been satisfied that petitioner is entitled to temporary 223 VOL. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. Bail. Its head should not be allowed to surface. insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. Complex Crime. in our Resolution of March 6. on the other hand. The reformation is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. but Executive Order No. an offense which is bailable.of passenger airplanes. Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy to petitioner as an accused. SARMIENTO. Complex Crime. 1990 223 Enrile vs. in the Hernandez case.

People vs. Rodriguez. The facts are not in dispute. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom. through counsel. of no moment. 1990). 28 SCRA 72 (1956). Gen. 20 (1958). none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio. certainly. 515 (1956). Lava.: Enrile vs. People vs. and Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence.4 29 | P a g e . Manila. if not the validity of its doctrine. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue. 2 People vs. 107 Phil. Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103. Jr.00. 659 (1960). Salazar Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. 90-10941. People vs. and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10.000. the limits of its applicability. (b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted. 224 224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.1990. filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2. February 28. we granted him bail. even among laymen. and People vs. it would seem. or having been: (a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books. In the afternoon of February 27. (d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause. State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of _______________ 1 99 Phil. 1990. Romagosa. NARVASA. The following morning. he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District. charging Senator Enrile. alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being. 103 Phil. PETITION for Habeas Corpus. Geronimo. 1990. granted the petitioner “provisional liberty” upon the filing of a bond of P100. 1990. 100 Phil. Brig.. Trampe. The fact that we gave him “provisional liberty” is in my view.3 On the same date of February 28. in Criminal Case No. where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate. because bail means provisional liberty. 90 (1956). the intervening period saw a number of similar cases2 that took issue with the ruling—all with a marked lack of success—but none. without bail. J. Hernandez1 once more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would reexamine. 1990. which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question. To be sure. Edgardo Dula Torres. (c) denied his right to bail. Senator Enrile. none. hence was denied due process.

pp. it should not apply. 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6. Cortés and Griño-Aquino. 407-411. 4 Rollo. 6 Rollo. and Narvasa. Salazar 30 | P a g e . G.R. pp. 186. resolved to treat as a petition 225 VOL. Said return urged that the petitioners‟ case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because— and this is putting it very simply—the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion. 92164. Salazar contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile‟s co-accused. No.5 On March 5. as scheduled. 1990 for habeas corpus. Stated otherwise.J. 1990.7 which had been _______________ and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling. 305-359. The parties‟ oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options: _______________ 3 Rollo. No. and two10 against granting bail to the Panlilios. 92163. Enrile vs. 92164.000.00 (for the Panlilios).The Court issued the writ prayed for. on March 6. G. but not in furtherance.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200. p. whereas the information against Sen. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion. 92163. which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48. J. No.R. pp. C. 1990. 9 Fernan. The Resolution stated that it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. G.J. after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing. of rebellion. The parties were heard in oral argument.R. pp. No. 10 Fernan. No. pp. G. 128-129. 7 Originally a petition for certiorari and prohibition which the Court. C. 92163. 92163.R. upon motion of the petitioners.R.R. cash or surety bonds of P100. Revised Penal Code. G. within 24 hours from notice. G. 226 226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. and the compound crime (“delito compuesto”) arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph. No. returnable March 5. 1990. 92163. the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime (“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another. JUNE 5. The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile‟s petition. JJ. 5 Rollo. the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio. Enrile et al. 92163.. No. 32-34. respectively. 225 8 Rollo. therefore. G. 26. No. the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return6 for the respondents in this case and in G. and raised similar questions.R. Four Members of the Court9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile. 34 et seq. and Narvasa. with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which.R.000. Rollo.

or on the occasion. whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof. Thus. the ruling remains good law. 186. a fine not exceeding P20. this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in Ms written pleadings. would be unfavorable to the movant. On the second option. 227 VOL. JUNE 5. acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed. the incumbent President.10-a In the view of the majority. namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion. On the first option. reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition.000 and prision mayor. depending upon the modifying circumstances present. the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. saw fit to repeal. limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion. or should be. so-called. In other words. if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution. but not in furtherance. exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution. in the absence of aggravating circumstances. This view is reinforced by the fact that not too long ago. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine should be re-exainined. Salazar the theory that Hernandez is. under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him. the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender. and (2) for the crime of murder.”11 In thus acting. of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3. of rebellion. 11 Executive Order No. in the corresponding period. as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that case: “There is one other reason—and a fundamental one at that—why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. said provision. 1990 227 Enrile vs. If murder were not complexed with rebellion. but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor. (b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance. (c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course. and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done). 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that “(w)hen by reason. the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law. 1987. among others. 187 issued June 5. thereof While four Members of the Court felt that the proponents‟ arguments were not entirely devoid of merit. the consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48. Presidential Decree No. the following penalties would be imposable upon the movant. even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes. and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses. depending upon the modifying circumstances present. the Court unanimously voted to reject ________________ 10-a Two Members are on leave. eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the 31 | P a g e . its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing. which includes rebellion). but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute “common” crimes of grave or less grave character. “Upon the other hand. or as a necessary means for the commission. However. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision (Art.

culprit. on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. „En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo. Indeed. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not. not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts performed toy Mm were punished separately. se sancionaran los delitos por séparado. penando separadamente los delitos. does not write finis to the case. however. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be. there can be no reason to inflict a 12 People vs. 2163) and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment. 229 VOL. o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.) “We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article 48).‟ (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana. reading: 228 punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. esta basado franeamente en el principio pro reo. JUNE 5. 186. The Court‟s ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of ________________ 228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. 2168. Salazar other questions relevant to the petitioner‟s complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken. in such case. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act. imposed in its maximum period. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. to our mind. Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for each offense. as amended in 1908 and then in 1932. p. if one act constitutes two or more offenses. This. restricting the imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.‟ (Rodriguez Navarro. II. much less adjudged. 1990 229 Enrile vs. Hernandez. Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other. hasta el limite que represente la suma de las que pudieran imponerse. Salazar „Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos. 32 | P a g e . the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious one. Vol. if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo. Petitioner‟s guilt or innocence is not here inquired into.”12 The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court. „Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite. which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. affect substantially the spirit of said Article 48. supra at 541-543. p. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro: „La unificacion de penas en los casos de eoncmrso de delitos a que hace referenda este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932).

. that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise. Read in the context of Hernandez. said defendant may be allowed bail. Thus. that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is. simple rebellion. It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner‟s arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. culminating in the filing of the ques_______________ 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. at 551. III. But the question remains: Given the facts from which this case arose. Hernandez. was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial? _______________ 13 Id. as means “necessary” (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion. that must now be accepted as a correct proposition.R.”13 The plaint of petitioner‟s counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books. must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20. in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment.14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint. gives no reason to assume that he had not. therefore. or could not have.000. In the light of the Court‟s reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioner‟s case. that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination. we hold that. arsons and robberies. so complied. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder.17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty. Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. No. the Court said: “In conclusion. of the Constitution. and of the logical an. 92163. if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. which is bailable before conviction. while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof. however. under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V.d necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion. G. 2. which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. sec. that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. 230 14 Rollo. in violation of Art.15 This Court has already ruled. not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder. in Hernandez. the murders. it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. pp. the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion. nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. 33 | P a g e . and that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors. arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants. Salazar tioned information.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge. and that. 78-79 and 73-76.

46-47. not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there. the information charges a non-existent crime or.19 It is. Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present 34 | P a g e . Salazar The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner‟s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. in short that would justify by-passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor‟s recommendation regarding bail. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail. 16 Soliven vs. denied an opportunity to correct its error. were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court. none. 1990 231 Enrile vs. pp. in any event. all apparently taking their cue from it.18 There thus seems to be no question that all the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition. No. 167 SCRA 394. distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation. none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court.R. Even acceptance of petitioner‟s premise that going by the Hernandez ruling. 2. irom deciding them. except this Court. Rule 117. though it may be perceived as the better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. footnote 4. It makes no differ* ence that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. and even then. whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him. There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the respondent Judge—indeed such an 18 Sec. 92163. and if it erred in that matter. the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge. Rules of Court. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. contrarily. Salazar court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail. The proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court. G. Parenthetically.15 Supra. theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense. would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him. 232 232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. JUNE 5. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked. 231 assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts. this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial _______________ VOL. Under either hypothesis. 17 Rollo. Makasiar. 186.

186. for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time. bombings. they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation—they claim—of their constitutional rights. 92164) which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual _______________ It may be that in the light of contemporary events.R. WHEREFORE. Hernandez. 77 Phil. pp. or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of. 1990.R. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings. in a proper case.petition. It is enough to give anyone pause—and the Court is no exception—that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No. but also because to wash the Court‟s hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through. pleas like the present. There is an apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion. Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance. the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law. as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military. which is properly within its province. JUNE 5. 1990 233 Enrile vs. Bernabe. Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this matter. that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1. kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days. but will give short shrift to. the Court now decides the same on the merits. that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. 20 Rollo. G. 55. 90-10941. Hopefully. No. that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing. But in so doing. an ongoing rebellion. and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby. 124-125. the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the _______________ 19 Ocampo vs. 92164. No. by the Court of Appeals on review. 234 234 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 35 | P a g e . the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. but by and large attributable to. is allowed to stand in the way of their ambitions. Salazar milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set forth. 233 VOL. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G. not even the sanctity of human life. The Court has no power to effect such change. the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief applied for was denied by the former and.

before final conviction. albeit impliedly. should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are indispensable in the commission of rebellion. Bidin. No pronouncement as to costs. the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. J.R.J. Paras. Gancayco and Regalado. No. J. J. See concurring opinion. the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision 36 | P a g e I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956 ruling of the Court. Medialdea. Dissenting and Concurring: jurisprudence. J. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners. 186 JUNE 5. 1990 235 Enrile vs.. No part in G.. in the instant case. See concurring and dissenting opinion. the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion. I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the 235 VOL. Jr. Salazar instant case that “Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. To that extent. 92163. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law and . To my mind. I believe that the Court. C. or in furtherance of. on the other. See separate opinion. The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was applied by the Court in 1956 during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. J. Gutierrez. Decision). Hernandez. hence said petitioners are entitled to bail. Cruz. 92164. Concurring in G. C.. With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court. Cortés and Griño-Aquino. SO ORDERED. See concurring and dissenting in part. The majority of the Court is correct in adopting. JJ. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion” (p. Padilla.R.Enrile vs. On leave. No.. See dissent. JJ. rebellion are absorbed by the latter.. but I believe that there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.. The Court‟s earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character... the corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become functus oficio. as a matter of right.. concur. Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano. See separate dissenting and concurring opinion. The changes in our society in the span of 34 years since then have far-reaching effects on the allembracing applicability of the doctrine considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their consequent effects on the lives of our people. the view in Hernandez case that when an offense perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another. 9. or in connection with.. JJ. 99 Phil. and those acts or offenses that are merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion.. which is an element of the latter. I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Padilla.. J. Salazar spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only. Fernan. The doctrine was good law then. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.J. Sarmiento. on the one hand. FERNAN.

. The relevance of the distinction is significant. In extreme cases where murder. common crimes committed against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or elements thereof. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof. Separate Opinion: I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine. brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime provision (Art. but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof. 186. robbery. the Court. remains good law and. more particularly. should remain undisturbed. which has been with us for the past three decades.(Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the rebellion. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. A coup d‟etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of other serious crimes such as murder. As in the case of Hernandez. Theoretically. has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. VOL. should not be absorbed in the crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary. but not indispensable. MELENCIO-HERRERA. 1990 237 Enrile vs. and if and when actually committed. Salazar pensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter. the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion. J. To illustrate. not be considered as elements of the said crime of rebellion. failed in the instant case to distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense. a crime which is indispensable in the commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter. may be necessary but not indispensable in committing the latter. With that distinction. Salazar element of surprise and the precise timing of its execution. it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code. In the latter case. arson. arson. and may. The manner of its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup d‟etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950‟s. and other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d‟etat. thus. however. strictly construed. because of the 237 236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine. of which this Court should take judicial notice. JUNE 5. 37 | P a g e . but. therefore. although done in the furtherance of the rebellion. arson. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos among the people. resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder. Generally. the distinction referred to above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d‟etat should be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners. but a crime that is merely necessary but not indis236 The occurrence of a coup d‟etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers. a coup d‟etat per se is a class by itself. if applied to contemporaneous events happening in our country today. kidnapping. etc. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply. etc. as a mode of seizing the powers of the dulyconstituted government. robbery. robbery. and would be those resulting from the bombing of military camps and installations.

petitioner could have continued to languish in detention. habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one‟s liberty (Celeste vs. must have jurisdiction to issue the process. The proliferation of cases in this Court. The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. under the present state of the law. Habeas corpus is thus available. It may still be invoked though if the process. a crime which does not exist in our statute books. however. Even if it had authority to act at the outset. Court of Appeals. But where the detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or VOL. 805). Salazar 38 | P a g e . The charge was obviously intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. that proposition could have been plausible. however. The scope and flexibility of the writ—its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention— its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes—have always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Under the attendant circumstances. may be availed of (Chavez vs. Director of Bureau of Prisons. judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed. 37 SCRA 420) [italics ours]. Quilen. the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy. 24 SCRA 663). 186. In this case. Besides. as a rule. ironically. It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not lie when a person is under custody by virtue of a process issued by a Court. Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion. 42 Phil. no bail was recommended in the Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court. ascend the steps of the judicial ladder. if shown to exist. 239 238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy. While litigants should. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple Frustrated Murder. People. which followed in the wake of this Petition. 1990 239 Enrile vs. The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. any procedural flaw notwithstanding. is a bailable offense and the crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court. JUNE 5. In such a case. therefore. which is less effective. the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of.despite periodic challenges to it that. Salazar The Court. The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner‟s constitutional right to bail inasmuch as rebellion. to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was seeking. the writ of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. Thus. it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right. have only served to strengthen its pronouncements. nothing should stop this Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues. was brought about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner. would oust it of jurisdiction. I take exception to the view. 31 SCRA 391) [Italics ours]. 238 judge or by virtue of a judgment or sentence. the Court below must be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner‟s liberty.

the overt acts comprising rebellion). The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under the Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion. Cases where other offenses are committed. as far as I can see. this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence. This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. Article 135 (entitled: “Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection. destroying property or committing serious violence. Article 22. or particular modes of participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly. may be characterized as separate or discrete offenses which. it would appear that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which.. Thus.. 187 on 5 June 1987. maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection” commit rebellion.” 240 240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. indeed. EO 187 further explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was “restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees. wholly or partially. 942. 39 | P a g e I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court. the scope of the legal concept of rebellion relates to the distinction between.” fey EO No.If. To reach such a conclusion in the case at bar. 142-A. Civil Code. as an abstract question of law.e.—When by reason or on the occasion of any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter.e. would constitute the offense of rebellion. were repealed. Concurring for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender. could stand reexamination or clarification. the indispensable acts or ingredients of the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and. result in colliding with the fundamental non-retroactivity principle (Article 4. both in relation to Article 8.D« No. “for the purpose of (i.”) sets out a listing of acts or particular measures which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: “engaging in war against the forces of the Government. the remedy lies in legislation. J. along with P.” At the same time. differing optional modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection. But Article 142-A1 of the Revised Penal Code. acts which constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed. the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines _______________ 1 “ART. Revised Penal Code. Civil Code). The Writ of Habeas Corpus has served its purpose. or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature. on the other hand. of their powers or prerogatives. on the one hand. If one examines the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: “Rebellion or Insurrection—How Committed”).” Having been so repealed. The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. a “creature unknown in law”—the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. as a matter of law.” Are these modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those “who promote [ ]. I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that. would. which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2 thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. when put together. under the guise of re-examining a settled doctrine. it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion perpetua). naval or other armed forces. for being “repressive. FELICIANO.. I have in mind in particular matters such as the correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code. exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated. or any body of land. Salazar or any part thereof. can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 134 states that “the crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government—”(i. the penalty .

g. 186. Rodriguez. it appears to me that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48. the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications.. 2d 894 [1964]. GUTIERREZ. 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Salazar 135 of the Revised Penal Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e. open to serious doubt whether Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. Ed. Palomar. 866 F. U. 55 SCRA 607 [1974]. To formulate the question in these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer. 2d 339 [1989]). In time. judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as of the date that the law was originally enacted. statutes do not exist in the abstract but rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions interpreting their norms.. JUNE 5. New Mexico Department of Corrections. 378 US 347. would be more onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of simple rebellion. 51 L. City of Columbia. People v. J. Devine v. Thus. The prevailing rule in the United States is that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the penalty prescribed for an offense. 65 SCRA 270 [1975]. 43 US 188. however. Director of Prisons. It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48. Jabinal. JR. 100 Phil. Concurring Opinion 40 | P a g e . especially in view of the conclusions reached by the Court and its several Members today. 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v. Geronimo. 107 Phil. of the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof. I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously where a new judicial doctrine is announced. second clause.S. Gumabon v. 1990 241 Enrile vs. 90 [1956]. 2d 260 [1977]. 18 SCRA 247 241 could be so characterized. while it is precisely the first clause of Article 48 that the Government here invokes. while in legal theory. Ed. Put in slightly different terms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and content to such norms...The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally.12 L. the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 242 VOL. But. the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf. And assuming the Hernandez 242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. 659 [1960]). People v. It is. there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932. in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine of long standing (here. Licera. second clause. Salazar [1966]). People v. Thus. Caltex v. Moreover. Finally. is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. Marks v.

Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. They had to come to us. I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases. I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to assert the right to bail Under the special circumstances of this case. however. issued Pres. 1990 243 Enrile vs. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule. It has been reiterated in equally sensational cases. under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.I join the Court‟s decision to grant the petition. the dropping of the bomb becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the success of a rebellion and. and that a resort to arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a complex crime but one crime—rebellion pure and simple. Decree 942. Order The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. questions the action of the President in repealing a repressive decree. the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new crime into existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver penalties are imposed by law. 186. is violative of human rights. 99 Phil. However. Thus. Even if we declare that rebellion may be complexed with murder. according to the repeal order. our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself. a decree which. 515 (1956) that there is net such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder. JUNE 5. First. therefore. The prosecution. that murder committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion. Hernandez. And fifth. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a separate crime of rebellion. VOL. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion may not be complexed with murder. Attempts to have the doctrine re-examined have been consistently rejected by this Court Third. the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings charged in the information were committed “on the occasion of. 244 244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated. Second. Fourth. The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by the President. All lawyers and even 243 187. but not a necessary means for. President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers. in effect. the commission of rebellion” result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion. That function is exclusively for Congress. President Aquino using her then legislative powers expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Salazar law students are aware of the doctrine. Salazar 41 | P a g e . the killings are only “on the occasion of but not a “necessary means for” the commission of rebellion. any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the picture. However. the petitioners had no other recourse. Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood. This argument is puerile.

through the highest judicial organ. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly comply with its erroneous manifestations. the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. its duty was to obey. All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-existent crime. the blowing up of passenger airplanes. A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision consistently followed for 34 years. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. at the very least and where possible. 23 SCRA 948. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v.L. v. make it conform to the law. Or. 85 SCRA 226 [1978]. 107. any judgment he renders. JUNE 5. However. 65 Phil. he is free to express his reservations in the body of his decision. 34 SCRA 98) The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision.B. It is as simple as that. a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court. and any processes he issues must 245 VOL. It does so with finality. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. VI). order.L. any order he prescribes. 1970. logically and rightly. In this particular case. they do not belong to the prosecution service. Vera. it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the lower court‟s rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. (L-31589. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: „Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court.‟ ” (Ibid. it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known Supreme Court ruling. I cannot understand why the trial Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not entitled to bail. it has to speak with one voice. L-26364. They have to defer and to submit. May 29.‟ (Ibid. The prosecution also loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians. The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors—punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. See also Albert v. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v.Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses. the massacre of innocent people. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail for a nonexistent crime. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Barrera. 186. this Court. and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the rebellion and is part of the rebellion. if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. We cannot and should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to-beenacted legislation. (Tugade v. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative. 1968. July 31. Inc. The principle bears repeating: “Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. by tradition and in our system of judicial administration. 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services. NLRC. The ensuing paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J. 1990 245 Enrile vs. Court of Appeals. Justice J. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. This Tribunal having spoken. Worse. the laying waste of civilian economies. Salazar follow the Supreme Court precedent. or resolution. Court of First Instance. an executive order. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br. 961. 56 [1937] was cited). has the last word on what the law is.B. 125 SCRA 577 [1983]) 42 | P a g e . To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling. binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. It should have been the SolicitorGeneral provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed from their arrest for a non-existent crime.

any probable cause to commit the non-existent crime of rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of 246 planted the bomb had. to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. In Salonga v. even more inexplicable. I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. from the trouble. not in the records of the case. imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be. expense and anxiety of a public trial.I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. More important. the answer was that the evidence would be submitted in due time to the trial court. Cruz Paño. The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or three of their waiters. (See People v. Manta. and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. The Court in Salonga stressed: 246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Even if the hosts recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away. 1990 247 Enrile vs. The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. et al. in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. 118 SCRA 247 VOL. Under the records of these petitions. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon. a much. 186. such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste. Salazar the prosecutors. 216). eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the vicinity. play basketball with barrio youths. citing Hashimn v. appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United States with the Senator and other guests. Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. 71 Phil. The judge or fiscal. The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant. It is. fiestas. any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-conspirator in the rebellion. and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. it does not necessarily follow that the former are co-conspirators in a rebellion. sometime earlier. attend masses and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. 2S SCRA 277) However. it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food. Salazar 241. I listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. and other parties. malicious and oppressive prosecution. join weddings. to go on a vacation. therefore. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group picture. then Senator Salonga was charged as a conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who „The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty. JUNE 5. Boncan. In fact. much stronger showing of probable cause must be shown. and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime. it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. in answer to my query for any other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Clearly. (Trocio v. 43 | P a g e . v. Here. without reason. therefore.A. In the case of the Panlilios. S. Fernandez. 134 SCRA 438 (1985). 129 SCRA 391). The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that rebels ride in buses and jeepneys. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. Oandasa.

preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to suppress rebellion. robbery. Furthermore.” (id. 461-462) Because of the foregoing. Salazar The Court is not. either as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. So it has been before. In the Hernandez case. pending appeal. Separate Opinion VOL. does not exist.. therefore. Cruz Paño. Salazar 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder. etc. arson and robbery does not exist. arson. where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners have not even pleaded thereto. arson and robbery. under our rulings. in the Hernandez case. Aquino dated 5 June 249 248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. there is a deliberate attempt to charge the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. (supra) has been violated.e. 187 of President Corazon C. however. 248 I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. the remedy is with Congress. J. I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the informations as charging simple rebellion. pp. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which. not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law).R. 1990 249 Enrile vs. PADILLA. the Court is confronted with an original case.” The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material respect. 186. I.. New informations charging the correct offense should be filed. those informations should be treated as null and void.. notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights—absent 44 | P a g e . vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void informations for a nonexistent crime. 92164 an extra effort should be made to see whether or not the principle in Salonga v.e. on the other hand. gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder.” I dissent. from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question. This case did not arise from innocent error. while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. this Court was confronted with an appealed case. i. i. the Judge may rightly read it as charging homicide. however. the prosecution and the lower court. not the courts. 515 “remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof. If an information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide. “is to be read as charging simple rebellion. And in G. JUNE 5. and multiple frustrated murder does not exist And yet. et al. Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder. but Executive Order No. Hernandez. In these cases. In the present cases. 99 Phil. on the other hand. the Supreme Court. It should continue to be so.. No. The prosecution wanted Hernandez to be reversed. in any way.should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder. In the present cases. and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court. was “ground-breaking” on the issue of whether rebellion can be complexed with murder.

Rule 102). Article VIII. 90-10941. it is incumbent upon us in the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus (Section 5 (1). for his provisional release on bail. it has given rise to nothing. Consequently. since the entire question of the information‟s validity is before the Court in these habeas corpus cases. fatally decrepit information by labelling or “baptizing” it differently from what it announces itself to be. it charges nothing. Rule 114). Concurring and Dissenting: SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Enrile vs. Constitution and Section 3. SARMIENTO. Thereafter. As Hernandez put it. Its head should not be allowed to surface. 13. even under procedural law. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits of bail. DISMISSED. And. Consequently. accused before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III. Hernandez1 should abide. QUASH the warrants of arrest. before Us. Accordingly. devolves upon us.. Rule 110. to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable. RTC of Quezon City. admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant.when this Court laid down the Hernandez doctrine—the prosecution has insisted in filing..000. a bailable offense but who had been denied his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner‟s constitutional right to bail. I venture to say that the information is fatally defective. J. Petitioner is. More than three decades after which it was penned. at best. and ORDER the information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case Nos. Rule 102).00 posted by petitioner for his provisional release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. the cash bond in the amount of P100. habeas corpus is the 250 I agree that People v. J. The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information. the rules require that “the proceedings together with the bond” shall forthwith be certified to the respondent trial court (Section 14. I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion. if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings. It is indubitable that before conviction. to grant petitioner his right to bail and having admitted him to bail. it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine. Salazar proper remedy available to petitioner as an accused who had feeen charged with simple rebellion. Section 2. I vote to GRANT the petitions. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they are anchored. Concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioner. conditioned for his (petitioner‟s) appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case. among others. on a petition for habeas corpus praying. the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled. an offense which is bailable. ACCORDINGLY. In view thereof. because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed. I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and. rebellion means “engaging in war against the forces of the 45 | P a g e 250 . and the lower court has persisted in hearing. for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of the courts. BIDIN. an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an multiple frustrated murder. without necessity of a remand for further proceedings. As a nullity in substantive law. 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent judge. Rules of Court}. Constitution.

00. July 25. (Macaga-an vs. mention therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage. 793 (1917). however. the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction. of rebellion. 186 SCRA 217(1990)] Garcia vs. respondents. 521. Domingo No. 186. All rights reserved [Enrile vs. Since the acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information. petitioners. 520. the crime of rebellion is left fully described. damage to property. granted the petitioner “provisional liberty” upon the filing of a bond of P100. 1973. illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. is to play into a contradiction in terms because exactly.”3 whether committed in furtherance. among other possible crimes. in this case murder. 515 (1956). Santiago.”2 which implies “resort to arms. I take it that when we. It will serve no useful purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom. Judge of the City Court of Manila. 4 US v. JUNE 5.—Amnesty granted by former President Marcos covers crimes for violation of subversion laws or those defined under crimes against public order. collection of taxes and contributions. 2 Supra.government. of no _______________ 3 Supra. 41 Phil. EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL. GARCIA. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. HON.4 At any rate. because bail means provisional liberty. restraint of liberty. or in the course.. vs. I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. L-30104. 1 99 Phil. of as a necessary means for the commission. HON. 1990 251 Enrile vs. 46 | P a g e . 251 Note. Proceedings in both cases remanded to respondent judge to fix the amount of bail. and FRANCISCO LORENZANA.. I dissent. People. GREGORIO N. Salazar. rebellion includes murder. in our Resolution of March 6. we granted him bail. and the hunger. 1990. The fact that we gave him “provisional liberty” is in my view. _______________ moment. since an amendment will not alter its substance. because in any case. Salazar requisition of property and services. Inc. 152 SCRA 480. 252 © Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply. insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court.. To say that rebellion may be completed with any other offense.000. FELIX DOMINGO.) ——o0o—— VOL. physical injuries and loss of life.

There is to be no ban on such attendance. statute. no matter with what offense he may be charged. later Justice. that all requires criminal trials be open to the public. Domingo Constitutional law. it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held." Then." It was then noted by him that "there.—What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties. Earlier. terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights. too. as was pointed out by Justice Black. Legal history of right to a public trial.—The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. What public trial means. and of the. without objection on the part of respondent policemen.city court Judge. popularly known as the Jones Law. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. This. x x x It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion. notwithstanding. So it is. x x x There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916.L. effect of.144 regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.—No jurisdictional error was incurred by the city court judge where an assistant fiscal abdicated control over the prosecution. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. in the leading case of In re Oliver: "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in (the) English common law heritage. relatives and counsel present." He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure. Some are smaller than others. As a matter of fact. or judicial decision. The thought lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902."but it likely evolved long before the settlement of (the United States) as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J." Same. JULY 25. Same. Reyes in Cariaga v. Historically. as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly in In re Oliver opinion. it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends. 52. under the present dispensation. much less a debate. Jose P. There is now showing that the public was thereby excluded. as likewise made clear. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment." Same. Domingo The answer must be in the negative.B. 1973 145 Garcia vs. When hearings held inside judge's chambers not violative of right to public trial. that his trial is likely to be conducted with VOL. to gain acceptance.—The trial must be public. likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. He then conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution. Lack of intervention by fiscal in trial of criminal case. the jurisdiction of the court was not affected x x x but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to 47 | P a g e . "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776" Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791. Justo-Guerrero: "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention. Criminal procedure. that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single. Delegate. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? 145 144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. reference may also be made to the undisputed fact that at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge. Moreover. Laurel. mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. No relationship to the parties need be shown.

1 _______________ 1 According to the 1935 Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions. 147 48 | P a g e ." Art. Manuel V. FERNANDO." Sec. F-109192. and shall enjoy the right * * * to have a speedy and public trial. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id. for slight physical injuries. 17. ORIGINAL PETITION in the Supreme Court. et al. the hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part. Narvasa. in its Art. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. * * *. eight (8) criminal actions against respondents Edgardo Calo. and grant the petition.) _______________ The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. and (3) Criminal Case No. IV.: procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents as defendants. and without an iota of evidence offered to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises.1968. 2 The other respondents are Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel of the City of Manila police force. the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the 146 146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by city court Judge in the above manner —we rule that there was no transgression of the right to a public trial. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. as follows: a. Pagkanlungan for petitioners. Andres R. Domingo More specifically. It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I of the City Court of Manila presided over by petitioner Judge.intervene x x x". Sec. speaks of an accused in all criminal prosecutions enjoying the right "to have a speedy. F-109191. J. III. impartial and public trial * * *. par. b.3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit. Rafael S. did respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the other respondents2 inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as petitioner. (2) Criminal Case No. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. 3 The real petitioner is Francisco Lorenzana. and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana. F109193. is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. there were commenced. one which thus far has remained unresolved. although such a contrary is proved. The present Constitution. Consengco for respondent Calo. by appropriate informations all dated January 16. 19. For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the facts ascertained—the unique aspect of this case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly altercation. Respondent Judge in his own behalf. force likewise being employed. Certiorari and prohibition. also for slight physical injuries. 1. Chico and Felipe B. for maltreatment.

"6 Then came these allegations in the petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial. and said respondent crossexamined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. Rafael Consengco. This was postponed to September 28. spanning a period of several months (from March to August. the trial proceeded. 1968 and August 10. (2) Criminal Case No. Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused. and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200. 1968—fell on a Saturday. for maltreatment. April 20. Atty. Rafael S. But at the insistence of Pat. June 22. 1968.1968. Saturday was agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases. paragraph 3. for violation of Sec. Domingo submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration. F-109196. August 3. 1968.1968. 6 Ibid. May 11. Francisco Koh who had. 1968. May 4. and (3) Criminal Case No. and the merits of the cases. Domingo (1) Criminal Case No. 1968. for light threats. (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. this time at the instance of Atty."8 It was stated next in the petition: "The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23. but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance."9 Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1.1968. asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. June 1. 1968. 1973 147 Garcia vs. Consengco. 1968. at the instance of Atty. Consengco."10 Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus 49 | P a g e . F-109201. 1968. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel. thru counsel.1968. was absent. filed with the Court of First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition. This was arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who. 5 Ibid. 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning.1968. 52. March 18."5 Also this: "The trial of the cases in question was held. paragraph 7. 1968. It is worthy of note that up to thin late date. 148 148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in. as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel.1968. with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction * * * [alleging jurisdictional defects]. the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel. F-109197. as police officers under suspension because of the cases. June 29. desired the same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday. ________________ 4 Petition. Carbonnel. with the conformity of the accused and their counsel.VOL. and for the conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. thru counsel. Rafael Consengco. 1968. in the meantime. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings. March 30. paragraph 5. There was only one (1) day when Atty. 1968. JULY 25."4 The above was followed by this recital: "The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4. June 15. This was on April 20. thru their counsel. In any case. no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. 1968). in the chambers of Judge Garcia. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer). for slight physical injuries. Atty. April 17. March 23. and April 17. F-109198. and again to October 1. who acted not only in defense of their clients. Consengco and Atty. also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. Wednesday and Friday). All the fourteen (14) trial dates—except March 4 and 18. 1968. for slander. said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to—or pointed out—any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far. representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel.

Domingo found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902. 1969. the basic issue to be resolved. as set forth at the outset. explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. Laurel. 1969. petitioners on January 28. with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued.' "11 A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing. popularly known as the Jones Law. was there any persuasive showing of a violation of the 150 150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs. to gain acceptance. later Justice. adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open to the public. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition. It was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916. Accordingly. Neither in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed. "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated _______________ constitutional guarantee of a public trial. In its resolution of February 3.1969 and that by the other respondents on March 19. JULY 25. Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention [of 1934-1935] 665-666 (1966). such a right ________________ 8 Ibid. 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that there was a failure to respect the right to a public trial of accused persons. terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights. it is for us to grant the merits prayed for. 1. under the present dispensation. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust manner. As a matter of fact.13 Earlier.causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. So it is. respondents were required to answer. until further orders of this Court. now petitioner. After proceedings duly had. as likewise made clear. elevated the matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. Domingo 11 I d. likewise an organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the United States." and ordering the city court Judge. ed. there was an order from him "declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated. Delegate. that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single. as previously stated.. Rather it was the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R. paragraphs 8-9. paragraph 11. 52. 149 VOL. 10 Ibid. much less a debate. As was to be expected the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11. Laurel.14 50 | P a g e . 9 Ibid. 1973 149 Garcia vs. the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) * * * pending in his Court. 12 III S. paragraph 20. 13 Section 3."12 It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion. Jose P. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper understanding of its implications and ramifications. although the diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident.

There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. 1973 151 Garcia vs. The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. 266. that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. 17 Ibid."23 Then. requires that all criminal trials be open to the public. 380 US 32 (1965) and Estes v. 266-267. too. There was an express mention thereof in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7. no problem arises. "but it likely evolved long before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial. 15 333 US 257 (1948).21 Where a trial takes place. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. The trial must be public. JULY 25. or judicial decision. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran 51 | P a g e 14 Section 5. as was pointed out by Justice Black. reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge. No relationship to the parties need be shown. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application. and of the city court Judge. speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver:15 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage. Some are smaller than others."22 What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties."17 It was then noted by him that there. it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. United States. 1900. 2. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. historical lineage of the right to a public trial. without objection on the part of respondent policemen. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion. it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Moreover. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. There is to be no ban on such attendance. Texas.19 He could conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without exception every state by constitution. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation of the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. 267."16 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further ________________ 19 Ibid. 267-268. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. 52. Cf. "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in 1776. as is quite usual. in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals."20 Such is the venerable. 20 Ibid. 16 Ibid. Domingo protection.Historically. . relatives and counsel present. statute. 381 US 532 (1966). Singer v. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. 18 Ibid. 151 VOL. no matter with what offense he may be charged. The State referred to is Pennsylvania."18 Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution ratified in 1791.

B. 14 of the Rules of Court: "The court may upon its own motion exclude the public from the courtroom if the evidence to be produced during the trial is of such a character as to be offensive to decency or public morals. respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge. Domingo should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded. This. 152 People of the Philippines for whom a fiscal speaks and acts. Mercado. The accused. 1065-1066. assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty. Justo-Guerrero:26 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention. It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held. notwithstanding. JULY 25. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. 153 VOL. 3. There is much to be said of course for the concern _______________ 24 4 Moran Comments on the Rules of Court. Reyes in Cariaga v. 23 SCRA 1061 27 Ibid. the jurisdiction of the court was not affected * * * but the court should have cited the public prosecutor to intervene * * *. Reagan v. to any such objection now raised. Duncan v. invoking his right to a public trial. his right is deemed waived. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. 26 L-24494. 22 According to Rule 119. 1970 ed 207-208 152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Garcia vs.272. 1968. 202 Fed. 488 (1918). such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. If any party could complain at all. mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. 1973 153 Garcia vs. 304. 52. June 22. 23 In re Oliver. 391 US 145 (1968). Louisiana.L. To the extent then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command."27 4. One other objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly disposed of."24 The decision referred to. the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid prison. Thus: "In one case. If it were otherwise. even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J. United States v.________________ 21 Cf. it is the 25 4 Phil. Sec. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order at war with the obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. 333 US 257.25 was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905. Moreover." Cf. more appropriately the lack of weight. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in 52 | P a g e . United States. Domingo displayed by respondent Judge to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. Again here there was a failure to abide by settled law. he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe.

J. the nature of the cases handled. Criminal Procedure Annotated... A. unfair. civil as well as criminal. 4. All rights re [Garcia vs. 1965 Edition. The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted. See also SCRA Quick Index-Digest. ———oOo——— 154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Buendia vs.. Nor does it change matters. the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying. Padilla. 1972 Edition with 1973 Supplement. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence. The Bill of Rights.dispelling such misgivings. commanding respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in Civil Case No. page 1114 on Jurisdiction. Domingo. Antonio and 154 Zaldivar and Barredo. Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.V. as did happen here. Makasiar. volume 1. Comments on the Rules of Court. or arbitrary. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen. Te crowded daily calendar. but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life. Jacinto. Notes. City of Baguio Esguerra.V. to the excesses of the English Court of Star Chamber. and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix Domingo. it was in the airconditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place. G. Makalintal. the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. WHEREFORE. except that of dismissing the same. With costs against respondent policemen. setting aside. The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 26.. JJ. nor is its presence unwelcome. Inc.J... 1970 Edition. 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. concur." LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE See SCRA Quick Index-Digest. are on leave. Castro. M. it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge.. dated November 29. did not take part. it has been said that the "traditional Anglo-American distrust for secret trials has been variously ascribed to the notorious use of this practice by the Spanish Inquisition. Fernando. page 315 on Constitutional Law and page 615 on Criminal Procedure. Criminal Procedure. 257).M. E. and to the French monarchy's abuse of the lettre de cachet. xxx In the hands of despotic groups each of them had become an instrument for the suppression of political and religious heresies in ruthless disregard of the right of an accused to a fair trial. © Copyright 2012 Central Book Supply.S. with the eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings. Writ of certiorari and prohibition granted. Actg.. Moran.—In the cited In re Oliver case (333 U. C. would run the risk of being unjust. JJ. Teehankee. vol. volume 2.. 52 SCRA 143(1973)] 53 | P a g e . 1971 Edition. just because. 1969 against the actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent.