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Reducing security threats from chemical and biological materials
Overview At the international, national and regional levels in 2011 states continued to develop strategies to prevent and remediate the effects of the possible misuse of toxic chemical and biological materials. The Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) agreed to conduct a third intersessional meeting process that will ‘discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action’ on cooperation and assistance, the review of relevant developments in science and technology, and the strengthening of, among other things, national implementation of the convention. Despite the expectations of many states and analysts that the BTWC would somehow be ‘bolstered’ (e.g. by taking additional steps with respect to institutional strengthening and various operational-level or ‘practical’ measures), the political conditions at the conference inhibited taking decisions to establish an intersessional process that is more ‘action-’ and decision-oriented. Thus, the regime is evolving incrementally and is focused on process (see section I in this chapter). The 16th Conference of the States Parties to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) witnessed exchanges between Iran and the United States that partly reﬂected wider international tension regarding the nature and purpose of Iran’s nuclear activities (see section II). Russia and the USA conﬁrmed that they would be unable to complete the destruction of their chemical weapon stockpiles by the ﬁnal CWC-mandated deadline of 29 April 2012 but would nevertheless undertake to complete the destruction expeditiously. In the case of Iraq, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) concluded that progress has been made in razing chemical weapon production facilities. An advisory panel to the OPCW’s Director-General submitted its ﬁnal report after reviewing the implementation of the CWC with a focus on how the convention’s activities should be structured after the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles ends, sometime after 2012. The Director-General, together with the states parties and the OPCW Executive Council, used the process of formulating the report as a means to develop agreed policy guidance for future OPCW priorities and programmes in the lead-up to the Third CWC Review Conference, which will be held in 2013. The report therefore presented options and activities that had been subjected to political and technical review, which the Director-General may use to inform the balance and focus of future activities by the OPCW Technical Secretariat. The report also reﬂects the CWC regime’s continuing transition towards other
392 NON - PROLIFERATION , ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT , 2011
priorities that will become more apparent once chemical weapon stockpiles are eliminated. During the Libyan civil war concern was expressed that the regime of Muammar Gaddaﬁ would employ a stock of residual sulphur mustard against anti-government protestors and armed rebel groups. Similar concerns were expressed regarding the nature and fate of possible chemical and biological weapons in Syria over the course of the country’s civil unrest and tension (see section III). The OPCW sent a special inspection team to Libya in November to investigate reports of undeclared chemical weapons and it was conﬁrmed that the Gaddaﬁ regime had not declared a secret chemical weapon stockpile. The fact that the OPCW did not uncover Libya’s deceptive declarations prior to the 2011 overthrow of Gaddaﬁ raised questions about the organization’s ability to detect violations more generally and prompted calls to review the CWC’s veriﬁcation regime, although little discussion occurred on how to link this problem to the convention’s challenge inspection request provisions. Science and technology and related research can strongly affect chemical and biological warfare prevention, response and remediation efforts (see section IV). Research on avian inﬂuenza in particular has raised a number of policy implications, such as whether it is preferable to describe scientiﬁc research on its merits for peaceful purposes and to avoid characterizing it in terms of potential security threats. The debate also affects research funding, publication policies (e.g. lack of common international standards), agreed principles in research oversight and differences in approach on agreeing and implementing appropriate safety and security standards.
(c) determining the requirements for reporting. and the Seventh Review Conference agreed that another intersessional programme should continue this practice. such as those dealing with the strengthening of national implementation and economic cooperation and development. Kiribati. Micronesia. a coalition of non-governmental organizations. Liberia. South Sudan and Tuvalu. developed a list of 12 topics. Israel. disease and health surveillance. Cameroon. Samoa. Namibia. Guinea. Haiti. Nauru. Marshall Islands. Biological weapon arms control and disarmament JOHN HART The principal activity in 2011 in biological arms control was the Seventh Review Conference of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in December and preparation for it. The review conference nevertheless continued to provide the parties with a framework in which to exchange views and experience on the implementation of the convention. The states that had signed but not ratiﬁed the BTWC were Central African Republic. (d) implementing Article X successfully. the intersessional meeting process. ‘Disarmament: think zone for the Seventh Review Conference’. each introduced by a brieﬁng paper. or speciﬁc consideration of known or suspected bioterrorist activity. Myanmar. Chad. A further 12 states had signed but not ratiﬁed the convention. Mauritania. current or planned activity by states. Two new parties joined the BTWC in 2011: Burundi and Mozambique. science and technology (S&T). Djibouti. <http:// www. Niue.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 393 I. . Egypt.1 Before the Seventh Review Conference the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) collated support documentation and various analyses and proposals concerning biosecurity and biosafety. Guyana.2 The BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP). which included considering and structuring relevant topics and drafting background text. Eritrea. dual-use issues. (b) ascertaining whether veriﬁcation is needed and its nature. and non-state actor threats. (e) studying how countering bioterrorism and the BTWC 1 For a summary and list of parties and signatories of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. Angola. Syria and Tanzania. Comoros. 2 UN Office at Geneva. Lack of consensus continued to affect the parties’ ability to consider possible speciﬁc compliance concerns regarding past. to discuss prior to the review conference: (a) exploring the inﬂuence of technological developments on the BTWC. conﬁdence-building measures (CBMs). Somalia. Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction see annex A in this volume. The states that had neither signed nor ratiﬁed the convention were Andorra.ch/bwc/thinkzone>. Côte d’Ivoire.unog. education and awareness. The parties also remained divided on the question of whether and how to put in place permanent or legally binding mechanisms to encourage a more substantive exchange of views on such concerns. Malawi. Much of this activity was procedural and referred to long-standing implementation principles contained in the various articles of the convention. Nepal.
( j) learning how existing United Nations investigation mechanisms can be used to fortify the convention. on measures to counter the threat of bioterrorism.3 Together with their associated comments. including how to conduct that process and its content. 7 Dec. non-proliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments’. Mr. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . ‘to take on the challenge of encouraging scientiﬁc progress.html>. (i) ensuring global accountability of biodefence activities. and cooperative use of the BWC’s consultative provisions. 6 Gottemoeller. [n. R.8 Some of the 3 BioWeapons Prevention Project. more effective implementation.org/revcon. The common position of the European Union (EU) called for ‘examining annual CBM declarations as the regular national declaration tool on implementation and compliance and developing them further with this objective in mind’. production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction (BTWC).7 Russia criticized the US focus on ‘raising the so-called transparency of bioresearch’ and said it was no ‘substitute for full veriﬁcation’.bwpp. Press Release . US Department of State. 8 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. p. 4 Council Decision 2011/429/CFSP of 18 July 2011 relating to the position of the European Union for the Seventh Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the prohibition of the development. 2011. 2011 relate to each other. but constraining the potential for misuse of science’.d.]. In the lead-up to the review conference many parties signalled their expectations for preferred outcomes. ‘Russian MFA Press and Information Department comment in relation to the publication of the US State Department reports on adherence to and compliance with arms control. (h) determining the place of public health issues in bioweapon control forums.. and (l) assessing the effectiveness of the intersessional process in strengthening the BTWC. <http://www. ‘Remarks by delegation of the United States of America First (Disarmament and International Security) Committee’. and to detect and respond effectively to an attack should one occur. 19 July 2011. moreover. ‘shall not constitute a mechanism for veriﬁcation of compliance’. 2011.PROLIFERATION . 5 Seventh BTWC Review Conference. the BWPP-moderated discussion presents an up-to-date review of the various political and legal nuances associated with the BTWC.5 The United States stated that it viewed the review conference ‘as an opportunity to bolster’ the convention.state. Statement by H. while important. ( f ) establishing how national implementation. affects the strength of the BTWC. 4 Oct.htm>.gov/ t/avc/rls/175000. 7 Gottemoeller (note 6).394 NON . L188. Permanent Representative of Iran. (g) educating life scientists. E. Official Journal of the European Union. <http://www. ‘Civil society preparations for the 7th BWC Review Conference 2011’. Mohammed Reza Sajjadi. 44.6 The US representative went on to say that: We will ask for member states to come together and focus on new ways to enhance conﬁdence in compliance through richer transparency.4 In its opening statement. (k) ascertaining the role that biosecurity plays in preventing bioweapon development. We need to work together. or its absence. Iran cautioned that CBMs. an improved set of conﬁdence building measures.
2 Sep. indicated earlier in the conference. pp.mid. Think Zone for the Seventh BTWC Review Conference. informally). 10 E. Iran. The review conference agreed to conduct an intersessional meeting process. . 2011. 19. Text that allowed for conceptual discussion on veriﬁcation and compliance with the BTWC was dropped from the ﬁnal review conference document because some states had proposed alternative text that diverged from an essentially conceptual exchange of views. India. D.10 Ambassador Paul van den IJssel of the Netherlands chaired the Seventh Review Conference. The parties were generally aware that such a 1292-02-09-2011.nsf/0/f53d23a14bf702b8c32579010047c 468>. such consultation has been largely absent during the past decade. 11 Seventh BTWC Review Conference. including more detailed reporting of disease outbreaks. which considered the legal and political implications associated with efforts to achieve universal membership for the convention and what constitutes ‘full’ and ‘balanced’ implementation of its provisions under the chairman’s theme of ‘ambitious realism’. at the margins (i. interested in learning further details of the fate of the former Soviet offensive biological weapon programme. material and equipment for peaceful purposes. However. Findlay and O. Pakistan and Russia. 93–109. <http://www.mid. were in fact ﬁrm ‘red lines’ not to be crossed.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 395 other parties to the convention remain. Final Document. 9 See Kelly. Veriﬁcation Yearbook 2002 (Veriﬁcation Research. C. The review conference also agreed modiﬁed formats for CBMs. 2011. In the ﬁnal two days it became evident that a number of political markers. Working paper. Meier. ‘The trilateral agreement: lessons for biological weapons proliferation’. p. and strengthening national implementation.11 Annual meetings of the parties and annual meetings of experts will be held in 2012–15 until the Eight Review Conference.g. to be held in 2016.9 Finally. Five delegations notably coordinated their positions during the conference: China. the third such process. the parties broadly supported another intersessional process and the inclusion of S&T in it.. which will explicitly consider cooperation and assistance. ‘Proposal for structured and systematic review of science and technology developments under the convention: submitted by India’. which calls for the convention to be implemented in a manner that avoids hampering economic and technological development while facilitating the exchange of information. The ISU will compile a database of information relevant to economic and technological development to assist in strengthening cooperation and assistance under Article X of the BTWC. <http://www.ln.ru/brp_4. S&T review.ru/brp_4.unog. The existing three-person ISU will support the new process and remain the same size (the non-expansion reﬂects political constraints and ongoing international ﬁnancial uncertainty). eds T. Advance copy.nsf/0/C2356A2C34FC35A6C32578FF00 5CA2E9>. including no decision-making power for the intersessional programme meetings and minimization of further transparency measures via CBMs. Training and Information Centre (VERTIC): London.ln. 2011.ch/bwc/thinkzone>. Available in Russian at <http://www.e. 22 Dec. 2002).
.bwpp. 16. 31 Dec. RevCon Report no. Notably.html>. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . 2011.12 The new intersessional process will consist of an exchange of views and best practice among the parties. the parties will consider S&T developments systematically for the ﬁrst time since the 1992–93 Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Veriﬁcation Measures from a Scientiﬁc and Technical Standpoint (VEREX) meetings on the BTWC.396 NON .PROLIFERATION . ‘The Seventh BWC Review Conference: outcome and assessment’. p. 2. 12 BioWeapons Prevention Project.org/reports. <http://http://www. 2011 shift would risk US rejection.
largely process-oriented. the CSP gave the Director-General. 2 OPCW. Production.4 The inspection component of the budget will decline by a little over 5 percentage points for 2012. OPCW Director-General. the chemical weapon destruction deadline will not be met by 1 For a summary and a list of parties and signatories of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development. (b) executive management (12 per cent). Statement to the United Nations. Israel and Myanmar had signed but not ratiﬁed the CWC. the authority to grant contract extensions or renewals to staff (who may not work longer than 10 years) with expertise applicable to the ‘operational requirements of veriﬁcation and inspection of destruction-related activities’ until 29 April 2016. (e) international cooperation and assistance (10 per cent).2 In a unique. 30 Nov. p. Chemical weapon arms control and disarmament JOHN HART As of 31 December 2011. this represents a 5. a further two states had signed but not ratiﬁed it. Decision C-16/DEC. 188 states had ratiﬁed or acceded to the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). First Committee (Disarmament and International Security). (d) support for the OPCW’s policymaking organs (7 per cent). Egypt.3 The 2012 regular budget consists of (a) administration (21 per cent). A. The activity of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in 2011 was.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 397 II. The 16th Conference of the States Parties (CSP) agreed a 2012 budget of €70 561 800 ($94 million) of which €33 296 600 ($44 million) is allocated for veriﬁcation-related costs and €37 265 200 ($50 million) for administrative and other costs. 3 OPCW. approximately 85 per cent of the inspection resources of the OPCW have been devoted to verifying chemical weapon destruction. Conference of the States Parties. North Korea. 4 OPCW. Ahmet Üzümcü. C-16/DEC. (c) external relations (3 per cent). Decision C-16/DEC. In each of the previous 6 years the OPCW had nominal zero growth budgets. 5 Üzümcü.1 No state joined the convention in 2011. 9. ‘Programme and budget of the OPCW for 2012’. Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction see annex A in this volume. . General Assembly.9. with the notable exception of the Director-General’s advisory panel report. Since the CWC’s entry into force. the principal international legal instrument against chemical warfare. and six states had neither signed nor ratiﬁed the convention. 2 Dec. Reduced inspections reﬂect the April 2012 deadline for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles.. 11. Conference of the States Parties. 2011. 1. Somalia.4 per cent reduction compared to the 2011 budget.12 (note 2).5 Although the overall inspection effort is declining. South Sudan and Syria. 2011. and (g) veriﬁcation (12 per cent). p. 12 Oct. ( f ) inspections (35 per cent). 2011. pp. non-precedent setting measure.12. ‘Future implementation of the tenure policy of the OPCW’. The states that had not signed or ratiﬁed the CWC were Angola. 2.
Broodryk. 25 July 2011. should ‘remain the global repository of knowledge and expertise’ on chemical weapon disarmament as well as on the veriﬁcation of the non-possession and non-use of such weapons. Conference of the States Parties. A. ‘Report of the advisory panel on future priorities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’. Pakistan stated that the report correctly assigns priority to completion of chemical weapon destruction and strikes a proper balance between regulatory aspects (industry. among other functions.–2 Dec. 9 OPCW. Leader of Pakistani Delegation. Technical Secretariat.18. The report emphasized that the OPCW. 3. 21. N. Note by the Director-General. . 28 Nov. Africa’s Policy Imperatives. Opening statement by the Director-General. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . For example. S/951/2011.9 The Director-General stated that effective industry veriﬁcation and data monitoring are the ‘bedrock’ for the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons. 2011. Conference of the States Parties. which presented a menu of options and associated principles that could serve to validate the balance and scope of activity that the Director-General wishes the Technical Secretariat to implement over the coming years. 10 OPCW. no. 2011.PROLIFERATION . ‘The establishment of the international support network for victims of chemical weapons and the establishment of a voluntary trust fund for this purpose’. and Stott. 8 OPCW. 2011. 2 Dec.8 The delegations praised the report. 6 (May 2011). Statement by Ambassador Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry.7 The Director-General established an advisory panel in order to help clarify how the OPCW’s focus on chemical weapon destruction can best be shifted to a broader objective of sustained chemical weapon disarmament. p. among other activities. 35. 28 Nov. The CSP also established an international support network for victims of chemical weapons along with a voluntary trust fund. stating that adjustments should be made to administration practice and asking whether it is ‘appropriate to place the weight of decisions lengthy and intensively negotiated on the discussions of report language during the 6 OPCW. 7 For a summary of universality efforts in Africa see the newsletter of the South African Institute for Security Studies. before increasing somewhat when the ﬁnal two US chemical weapon destruction facilities are commissioned. 2011 Libya. ‘Enhancing the role of the OPCW in building Africa’s capacity to prevent the misuse of toxic chemicals’. C-16/ DG. and coordinate and facilitate the establishment of contacts and appropriate information. Russia and the United States.398 NON . the OPCW Technical Secretariat will administer the fund.. which will drop in 2012. veriﬁcation and national implementation) and international cooperation in chemistry. It is noteworthy that the number of future inspections is determined primarily by the number of active destruction facilities.6 The CSP undertook further efforts to achieve universal membership of the CWC. para. Decision C-16/DEC. Conference of the States Parties. para.13.10 Mexico expressed dissatisfaction with the manner in which the OPCW’s policymaking organs have functioned since the CWC entered into force.
of which 43 had been destroyed and 21 converted to peaceful purposes. 3. . Director General. the UN Monitoring. 16. p. ‘Al Muthanna bunkers decommissioning project’. if any. para. C-16/DG. C-16/DG. peaceful applications. Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate.org/our-work/demilitarisation/>. Conference of the States Parties. Part IV(A). p. Statement by Ambassador Jorge Lomónaco. of 71 195 agent tonnes of declared chemical weapons. 19 Al Sharaa (note 17). 16. 28 Nov. Veriﬁcation Annex. is given in CWC (note 1).18 (note 10). and all declared Category 3 chemical weapons had also been destroyed. 14 The CWC’s Annex on Chemicals comprises 3 ‘schedules’. 15 OPCW.17 Iraq is committed to destroying the contents of bunker 41 and rendering harmless the contents of bunker 13 by encapsulating it in concrete. India. many times reﬂecting occurrences that did not take place or decisions that were not taken during the formal sessions?’11 Destruction of chemical weapons As of 30 November 2011. 52. ‘Demilitarisation’. Chemicals listed in schedules 2 and 3 have wider peaceful. remain sealed and thus largely unavailable to the OPCW Executive Council. Iraq. 13 states had declared 70 former chemical weapon production facilities. para. which is partly based on what schedule a chemical may be listed under.12 As of November 2011. 12 OPCW. Veriﬁcation and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).23.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 399 adoption of the ﬁnal report. 17 Al Sharaa. 18 Al Sharaa (note 17). M. Germany. <http://www.16 Iraqi authorities have deemed physical entry to bunker 41 possible. p. 2011. 5. South Korea. applications. p. 23–26 May 2011.67 million declared items and chemical weapon containers. the USA and the OPCW have been held to discuss base11 OPCW. C-16/NAT. 16 The other bunkers have been ascertained to be either empty or containing only conventional munitions. Libya.95 million had been destroyed. 15.. Schedule 1 chemicals consist of chemicals and their precursors judged to have few.15 Iraq Iraq continued to explore and develop options for the OPCW-veriﬁed destruction of chemical weapons in bunkers 13 and 41 at Al Muthanna in the south of the country. The deﬁnition of chemical weapon categories. Russia and the USA. India and South Korea had destroyed all of their declared chemical weapons. while bunker 13 is still too hazardous to enter. of 8. including commercial.opcw. Interlaken. 50 619 agent tonnes had been veriﬁably destroyed. Permanent Representative of Mexico. Albania.18 The ﬁles of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and those of its successor. the United Kingdom.13 The states that had declared chemical weapon stockpiles to the OPCW are Albania.14 The OPCW estimates that approximately three-quarters of the declared chemical weapon stockpiles were to be destroyed by the extended (and ﬁnal) CWC deadline of 29 April 2012.18 (note 10).19 Technical meetings involving representatives of Iraq. 13 OPCW. para. 16. Slide presentation at the 14th Annual International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (CWD 2011). 2.
(b) 605 one-tonne sulphur mustard containers. (c) incinerator equipment. ‘Chairman Rogers comments regarding recent developments in Libya’.75 tonnes of ‘potassium cyanides’. 4. 48. pp. 21 OPCW. 28 Nov. 22 Aug. Managing Director for Global and Multilateral Issues. Statement on behalf of the European Union by H. p.gov/press-release/chairman-rogers-comments-regarding-recent-developments-libya>. the Ministry of Science and Technology will ‘take the necessary measures to start the Decomissioning project’. C-16/DG. European External Action Service.400 NON . The visual inspection and overhead imagery from these ﬂyovers conﬁrmed that Iraq has made progress in razing chemical weapon production facilities and that the two storage bunkers at Al Muthanna appear to remain undisturbed and intact. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.25 20 Al Sharaa (note 17). 12. E. 2009). using UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) helicopters. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . Mara Marinaki. p.24 Libya During the war in Libya concern was expressed that a stock of residual sulphur mustard might be used by forces loyal to Muammar Gaddaﬁ against anti-government protestors and armed rebel groups. Conference of the States Parties. (d) about 200 one-litre barrels that contain waste material from decontamination. para. 13. 2011. C. 96–97. Press release.23 An Iraqi Experts Technical Committee (established by the head of Iraq’s Ministry of Science and Technology) has issued a report that outlines possible solutions to these problems..21 Iraq has approved $55 million for the decommissioning project. p.e. house.18 (note 10). p. (b) approximately 180 tonnes of sodium cyanide. . remote sampling.25. 22 Al Sharaa (note 17). p.e. . and Duelfer. 2011. <http://intelligence. 23 Al Sharaa (note 17). Simi- .PROLIFERATION . Hide and Seek: The Search for the Truth in Iraq (PublicAffairs: New York. (c) approximately 1. analysis and veriﬁcation) or intrusive (i.–2 Dec. C-16/NAT. 4. (d) 75 kilograms of arsenic trichloride. and OPCW. which originally held residues of polymerized sulphur mustard. After Iraq’s Council of Ministers approves the committee’s recommendations. 8.22 Bunker 13 appears to contain (a) approximately 2500 partially destroyed 122-mm chemical rockets. and (e) 170 one-tonne containers that were previously used to hold tabun. bunker 41 also suffers from ‘serious’ contamination from chemical weapon precursor barrel leakage. too volatile to attempt to destroy’)—characterized by former UNSCOM Deputy Chairman Charles Duelfer as reminding him of the ‘Great Pyramid at Giza’—and the extent to which the veriﬁcation of any destruction of the contents of the bunkers should be non-intrusive (i. Bunker 41 is believed to hold (a) approximately 2000 empty 155-mm artillery shells.20 In May the OPCW also conducted a low-altitude aerial inspection of Iraq’s former chemical weapon production and storage facilities. and (e) ‘heavily contaminated construction material scrap’. 25 US House of Representatives. 2011 line data on the contents of the storage bunker (‘containers and munitions . involving physical entry). 24 Al Sharaa (note 17).
de/EN/Aussenpolitik/Laender/Aktuelle_Artikel/Libyen/111104OVCW-Inspektion-node. 28 Black. The Guardian. para. 39. ‘Libyan rebels discover Gaddaﬁ’s chemical weapons’.18 (note 10). para.33 On 28 November Libya provided a revised declaration to the OPCW that presents information on previously lar concerns have been expressed regarding the nature and fate of possible CBW in Syria over the course of the country’s civil unrest and tension. Press release. . 4 Oct. Press release.26 On 1 September the Executive Council convened an informal meeting to discuss the situation in Libya and the unspeciﬁed ‘delivery of assistance’ that had been provided by the Office of the Director-General.31 The one-day inspection examined the chemical weapons stockpiled at the Ruwagha depot and was meant to verify whether Libya’s chemical weapon stocks remained intact and.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 401 The OPCW had veriﬁed that Libya had destroyed 54.18 (note 10). .17 (note 27). 30 OPCW. Libya. to conﬁrm that they are secure and to prepare for the resumption of destruction operations ‘at the appropriate time’. located 700 kilometres south-east of Tripoli).17. 2011. 22 Sep. ‘OPCW inspectors return from Libya’. I. and OPCW. Executive Council. .auswaertiges-amt. section II. para. on 4 October the Libyan representative to the Executive Council stated that the new government had secured the chemical weapon storage sites at Ruwagha. 32 German Federal Foreign Office (note 31). EC-66/NAT. p. in this volume. 27 OPCW. 2011. 26 OPCW.29 On 2 November an OPCW inspection team visited Libya to verify the status of a temporary chemical weapon holding facility at the Ruwagha Hydrolysis and Neutralisation System to conﬁrm whether sulphur mustard and two chemical weapon precursors had been diverted (the previous inspection had taken place in February when destruction operations were stopped). 31 German Federal Foreign Office. <http://www. that they were properly secured in the aftermath of the country’s civil conﬂict. <http://www. C-16/DG.28 On 3 October the Libyan Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the Director-General ‘conﬁrming . 2.4 per cent of its declared stockpile of Schedule 1 chemical weapons as of 8 February 2011. org/news/article/opcw-inspectors-return-to-libya/>. section I.18 (note 10). 2011. 29 OPCW. 4 Nov. when destruction operations were stopped because of the need to demolish a heating unit at the destruction facility. Germany is also cooperating with Libya to remove small arms and landmines in Libya. and chapter 3. On the conﬂicts in Libya and Syria see chapter 2. 34. Statement by the Libyan delegation. 33 OPCW.html>. C-16/DG.. 2. EC-66/NAT.32 The team conﬁrmed that the facility’s stock of sulphur mustard and chemical weapon precursors had not been diverted.opcw.27 On 22 September. 4 Nov. 2011. ‘Securing Libya’s chemical weapons’. if so. C-16/DG. p. and reiterating’ the importance of sending an OPCW inspection team to Libya to inventory and verify the status of the country’s chemical weapon stockpiles. 13.30 The inspection was ﬁnanced by Germany’s Federal Foreign Office with further support provided by the UN Department of Safety and Security. representatives of the new Libyan Government stated that its forces had captured a sulphur mustard depot in the Al Jufra area (the so-called Ruwagha depot.
2. p. C-16/DG. The remaining stockpile is located at Blue Grass. 87 per cent of the total facility stockpile). C-16/NAT. 39 OPCW. and OPCW. including the CWC. 1800 tonnes. Russia In 2011 chemical weapon destruction operations were carried out at four facilities in Russia: Leonidovka (c. Conference of the States Parties. 5. UN Security Council Resolution 2017.36 The new government reiterated that the country remains committed to ‘all international conventions and treaties it has signed’. Maradykovsky (c. The Hague. Statement by V. 2011. 2011. VX and sulphur mustard). although the time frame to complete operations at these two sites is uncertain. I. A. 6000 tonnes of chemical weapon agent.18 (note 10).12. para. 47 per cent of the facility stockpile). Nov. 38 . and 8. Of the total original chemical weapon stockpile. Kentucky. and Pueblo. 24 per cent of the facility stockpile) and Shchuchye (c. Russia. Russia has now destroyed all of its Category 2 chemical weapons (10 616 tonnes) and its Category 3 chemical weapons. C. p.38 The seventh and ﬁnal chemical weapon destruction facility is scheduled to start operating at Kizner in 2012 (Russia had earlier completed destruction operations at Gorny and Kambarka). US Permanent Representative. 2011 undeclared chemical weapons (known and suspected).7 billion on destroying its chemical weapon stockpiles. 2011. Mikulak. para. close coordination’ with the OPCW to destroy its chemical weapons.402 NON . 40. 41 OPCW. p.41 It completed destruction operations at Anniston. pp. 40 OPCW.7 per cent is located at Blue Grass (consisting of sarin.31. 82 per cent of the facility stockpile).17 (note 27). Kholstov. . 5600 tonnes. and at Tooele. . Umatilla. 1–2.5 per cent is located at Pueblo (consisting of sulphur mustard). 31 Oct. 42 Weber. PowerPoint presentation to the 16th session of the Conference of the States Parties. 2.39 As of 31 October Russia had ‘destroyed and withdrawn’ 57 per cent (22 714 tonnes) of its Category 1 chemical weapons. USA. OPCW. 1. 2011.PROLIFERATION .42 The USA will also continue to 34 35 OPCW..37 The OPCW will undertake a full determination of the status of the previously undeclared chemical weapons (mainly artillery shells) in 2012. Utah (21 January 2012). 1.31 (note 41). 37 OPCW.18 (note 10). 41. OPCW. C-16/NAT. C-16/NAT. para. EC-66/NAT. Oregon (25 October 2011). Libya. 2500 tonnes. 36 OPCW.34 However. Statement by Ambassador Robert P. C-16/NAT. Libya will be unable to complete the destruction of its stockpile by 29 April 2012. Conference of the States Parties. Acting Head of the Russian Delegation. Pochep (c. ‘United States chemical demilitarization program’.35 The UN Security Council has called on Libya to ‘continue . C-16/DG. 29 Nov.12 (note 38). Colorado. C-16/DG. 13. p. Alabama (22 September 2011). A neutralization-based destruction technology will be used at both sites. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . 28 Nov.40 The United States As of November 2011 the USA had spent $23. p. 2.18 (note 10).
Lianhuapao. Hangzhou.48 Japan provided further information on its destruction operations in Nanjing. while France continued to develop a comprehensive OCW destruction programme. ACWs are deﬁned as chemical weapons that were abandoned by a state after 1 Jan. Correspondence with author.44 Destruction operations for ACWs in China continued. Shijiazhuang. p. and 15 had declared that they have possessed old chemical weapons (OCWs) since the convention’s entry-into-force. Poland. EC-66/NAT. geographically distinct projects. and Guangzhou.49 43 The 4 countries that have declared ACWs to the OPCW are China. CWC (note 1). Belgium. Solomon Islands. para. As of October. 23–26 May 2011. OPCW. Germany. 6. Japan. and OPCW. 45 On World War II-era chemical weapons see Tu. (d) ‘activities at other burial sites’ at Jiamusi. Switzerland. 1925 on the territory of another state without the permission of the latter. Germany. 4 Oct. Toxin Reviews. which began on 12 October 2010.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 403 destroy non-stockpiled chemical munitions as they are discovered in coming years (other parties to the CWC will continue to face this problem). EC-66/NAT. 47 OPCW. Italy. 50. May 2012. Wuhan and Xinyang. 2011). PowerPoint presentation at 14th Annual International Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation Conference (CWD 2011). 4 countries had declared that abandoned chemical weapons (ACWs) are present on their territories. para. Japan had shipped one destruction chamber. Bengbu. OCWs are deﬁned as chemical weapons that were produced before 1925 or chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such an extent that they are no longer usable in the manner in which they were designed. E. Slovenia. slide 5. Shouyang.46 As of 30 September 2011. Executive Council. 2011. Japan. and in the northern part of China. Iran.47 Two mobile destruction chambers were scheduled to be used in Haerbaling. Deputy Director-General. ‘Japan’s ACWs in China’. Statement by H. 35 203 ACWs had been destroyed at Nanjing. vol. The 15 countries that have declared OCWs to the OPCW are Austria. Jilin province. 1 (Feb. Italy and Panama. Jiangsu province: this represents 99 per cent of the declared ACWs at that location and 75 per cent of the declared ACWs in China. The Technical Secretariat determined the ACW munitions declared by Iran to be conventional. ‘Chemical weapons abandoned by the Imperial Japanese Army in Japan and China at the end of World War II’. Jilin province. 46 The projects are (a) Mobile Destruction Facility (MDF)-South at Nanjing and Wuhan. Switzerland and the UK. Fujiwara. (b) MDF-North at Shijiazhuang and Haerbin. 44 OPCW. A. Jilin province. slide 4. Permanent Representative of Japan. (c) Haerbaling.. 1.18 (note 10). 51. Hunchun. pp. For information on countries not discussed here see CBW chapters in previous editions of the SIPRI Yearbook. para. Italy.. 48 OPCW.8 (note 47). T. Russia. CWC (note 1). 1–5. Canada. France. 30.43 OCW destruction operations in 2011 were carried out in Belgium. para. 5. Article II.18 (note 10). and (e) identiﬁcation operations at Anqing. Article II. Guangdong province. C-16/DG. Interlaken. Japanese Cabinet Office. Heilongjiang province. H. Ambassador Takashi Koezuka. 49 Fujiwara (note 46). Australia. the UK and the USA. Japan.8. C-16/DG. Abandoned Chemical Weapons Office. Abandoned chemical weapons and old chemical weapons As of December 2011. no.45 ACW sites are clustered in ﬁve. .
p. 2011. Permanent Representative of Iran. F.54 Discussions by the Executive Council and the CSP centred on the language used by the chemical weapon possessor states to reiterate their unequivocal 50 OPCW. Kazem Gharib Abadi.52 At the end of the CSP Iran cast the sole vote against an OPCW decision on the ﬁnal extended deadline for chemical weapon destruction. is not a deliberate attempt to illicitly retain chemical weapons. 651–52. 28 Nov. 2011 Political tension The CSP was marked by political tension between Iran and (mainly) the USA. 28 Nov. Previously.53 It requested the OPCW to sanction the USA (but not Russia. Statement by H. Conference of the States Parties. ‘Final extended deadline of 29 April 2012’. See Hart. Conference of the States Parties.50 The US representative replied that the USA has not deliberately failed to destroy its chemical weapon stockpiles by the April 2012 deadline and has no intention of retaining such stockpiles. Conference of the States Parties. 51 OPCW. for the ﬁrst time. Permanent Representative of Iran. 29 Nov. Conference of the States Parties. He also stated that it is ‘unfortunate’ that the USA ‘has explicitly stated that it cannot meet the [chemical weapon destruction] deadline.PROLIFERATION . ‘Chemical and biological weapon developments and arms control’. and Simon.–2 Dec. J. 1 Dec. E. Kazem Gharib Abadi. Israel attended the CSP as an observer and. E.404 NON . 53 OPCW. Statement by H. CSP decisions had almost always been taken by consensus. with the notable exception of the vote to end the tenure of the second OPCW Director-General in 2002. Although it expressed support for the object and purpose of the CWC. pp. which had been provided to that regime by the United States of America and its western allies’. He stated that ‘A delay in destroying one’s stockpile. 2011.–2 Dec.11. ‘Explanation of vote on the draft decision on the ﬁnal extended deadline of 29 April 2012’. addressed the meeting from the ﬂoor. Supplemental US statement distributed as an official document. Kuhlau. Decision C-16/DEC. The Iranian representative stated that ‘The former regime of Iraq in its aggression against Iran. 2011. The Hague. Iran also called on the persons and companies that supplied Saddam Hussein with chemical weapon-related ‘equipment’ to be sued and stated that Israel possesses ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and therefore poses ‘the most dangerous threat against the regional peace and security’. which will also fail to meet its April 2012 chemical weapon destruction deadline). The delay rather reﬂected exigencies of its destruction programme over previous years. SIPRI Yearbook 2003. USA (note 51). deployed chemical weapons against the innocent people of my country.’51 The US representative also denied that the USA had provided the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein with chemical weapons. J. 1. Israel stated that it was unable to join the regime at present given the current broader geopolitical circumstances in the Middle East—arguing that a broader peaceful accommodation must be reached among the states in the region prior to any accession to the various arms control and disarmament regimes. . 52 OPCW.. The document was circulated at the CSP. even though we are destroying it as rapidly as practicable.. which is a clear-cut case of noncompliance’ that should therefore be referred to the United Nations. 2011. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . 54 OPCW.
. 55 OPCW. C-16/DEC. The OPCW has continued to make special visits to destruction sites in Russia and the USA.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 405 commitment to destroying their stockpiles in the shortest time and to submit further details to the OPCW of their destruction programmes. veriﬁcation and review by the parties that will probably continue for at least ﬁve more years. The CSP decision requires future meetings to undertake an annual review of the progress of chemical weapon destruction by those parties that have not met their April 2012 deadline and sets aside a specially designated meeting at the 2017 CSP to consider this matter.55 Previous discussions on setting a new chemical weapon destruction deadline will thus be superseded by a process of annual information submission. 3(f ). the visits serve to underline the political commitment of both states to destroy their chemical weapon stockpiles as soon as is practical. para.11 (note 53).
2 Kan. 2011). 15 Oct.com/doc/55808872/UN-Panel-of-Experts-NORK-ReportMay-2011>.PROLIFERATION . p. and the American Cover-up. sulphur mustard. A. section III. S. See also chapter 8. including phosgene. The leaked report is available at <http://www. import and export’ of North 1 ‘Report shows Japanese Imperial Army used bioweapons during Sino War’. 3 Panel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009). 74. The report states that the Imperial Japanese Army’s Unit 731 released plague-infected ﬂeas in six operations between 1940 and 1942 in several provinces including Jiangxi. revised edn (Routledge: London. section IV. unspeciﬁed blood agents and other persistent organophosphorus nerve agents.1 North Korea In May 2011 China voted not to allow the UN Security Council to release a report on sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK. Report. 29. 9 Nov.3 It also stated that ‘it is broadly believed’ that North Korea possesses 2500–5000 tonnes of chemical weapons.2 According to the leaked text of the report. smallpox and cholera since the 1980s’. For background see Harris. or North Korea) under Security Council Resolution 1874. 2010 Defense White Paper (MND: Seoul. and chapter 10. 1932–1945. A report written by a doctor for the World War II Japanese military. S. Jilin and Zhejiang. tabun. North Korea is ‘suspected to possess a large stockpile of chemical weapons. 75. 2002). China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues. sarin. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . states that 25 946 people were infected by the Japanese military’s biological weapons during the 1937–45 Second SinoJapanese War. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress RL31555 (US Congress: Washington. para. 2011.406 NON . para. 4 Panel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (note 3). 2011 III. and of maintaining a biological weapons programme to independently cultivate and produce agents such as the bacteria of anthrax. and that North Korea has at least eight chemical weapon production facilities. 2011). . Allegations of chemical and biological weapon programmes JOHN HART Allegations of activity related to chemical and biological weapons (CBW) continued in 2011 with little official or otherwise authoritative reporting to clarify these contentions. in this volume. Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare. which was uncovered in October 2011 in ‘a local office’ of the National Diet Library in Kyoto Prefecture. The report was partly informed by South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND).. including at the Chungsu and the Eunduk chemical plants. DC.4 An unnamed UN member state told the panel that the Second Economic Committee of the National Defence Commission (via its Fifth Machine Industry Bureau and the Second Academy of Natural Sciences) are ‘believed to play leading roles in activities related to the production.scribd. Jiji Press..
8 See Hart.6 Iran and Libya The United States reportedly investigated whether Iran had supplied the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddaﬁ with ‘hundreds of special artillery shells for chemical weapons that Libya kept secret for decades’. 629–48. In Jan. Open Source Center transcript. R. a retired US Army colonel and State Department official who was involved in the discussions in 2003 between Libya. 76. SIPRI Yearbook 2005. ‘Iran may have sent Libya shells for chemical weapons’. Mahley. Washington Post. para. J. 2012 an OPCW official erroneously stated that the shells were not ﬁlled. For Mahley’s remarks see Smith et al.8 The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied that Iran had provided such shells and attributed motivation for the story to a form of ‘soft warfare’..5 Additionally. The OPCW subsequently issued a clariﬁcation to the effect that they were. Korea chemical weapons suits: diplomats’.7 The former Libyan regime had declared air bombs as the only chemical munitions in its stockpile. the United Kingdom and the USA on the modalities for Libya to veriﬁably renounce nuclear and chemical weapons and long-range ballistic missiles and who also served as head of the US delegation that negotiated a draft protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in the 1990s. were empty when (or if ) shipped to Libya. and about more intelligence-sharing. J. The ability of the OPCW to verify locations outside declared facilities is partly dependent on the willingness of the parties to implement the 1993 Chemical Weapons ConPanel of experts established pursuant to Resolution 1874 (note 3). Donald A. ‘Libya’s renunciation of NBC weapons and longer-range missile programmes’. 2011. 2011.. J. (note 7). 9 ‘Iran denies claims of supplying chemical weapon parts to Al-Qadhaﬁ regime’. The suspected shells were ﬁlled with sulphur mustard and were those uncovered by Libyan rebel forces in late 2011 (see section II above). and Lynch. 22 Nov.. whatever their origin. 9:33:05. 21 Nov. The media does not appear to have addressed the question of whether the shells.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 407 Korea’s CBW programme. Agence France-Presse. not just at declared sites’. 2011. in 2011 diplomats were quoted as saying that in 2009 Greece had seized almost 14 000 chemical protection suits from a North Korean ship that was possibly headed for Syria. The panel also stated that the Green Pine Associated Company is ‘deeply engaged in the illicit procurement of chemical material and other specialty items abroad’. and about looking widely. C. S. ‘Greece seizes N. and Kile. stated that ‘we will have to think very seriously about ﬁnding inspectors with a different skill set. 7 Smith. Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television. 17 Nov. Korea Herald.9 The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) did not publicly react on the matter. Warrick. 6 5 . pp. The UN Security Council considered the information on the seizure during its deliberations on ongoing sanctions against North Korea in 2011. N.
Syria US intelligence services reportedly believe that Syria possesses sarin. Damascus. <http://www...S. Article IX. 27 Aug. and we will continue to work closely with likeminded countries to ensure that there is no proliferation of that material. paras 8–25. . Syria has a stockpile of nerve agent and some mustard gas. and that some chemical weapon production facilities are located at military sites that also store Scud missiles. and Veriﬁcation Annex.state.14 10 11 Solomon. ‘Daily press brieﬁng’. 14 See Chemical Weapons Convention. including mustard gas.11 Anonymous current and former US officials have been cited as saying that Syria has ‘at least ﬁve sites where it produces chemicalweapons agents.408 NON . parts X–XI.12 The officials stated that these facilities are located in Aleppo. we do believe that Syria’s chemical stockpile remains under government control and that there is no change in the lockdown status of those weapons. US Department of State. 30 Aug.13 In response to the question of whether Syria possesses such weapons. 2011. . 2011. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . among other places.PROLIFERATION .10 The OPCW nevertheless continues to train to carry out such an inspection should one be requested. VX and sulphur mustard. Sarin and VX’. Solomon (note 11). the US Department of State stated: We have long called on the Syrian Government to give up its chemical weapons arsenal and to join the Chemical Weapons Convention . . Israel monitor suspected Syrian WMD’. ‘U. as well as missile and artillery shells for their delivery. J.gov/r/pa/prs/ dpb/2011/08/171281. 12 13 Solomon (note 11). 2011 vention’s challenge inspection procedures (which have not been used). Hamah and Lattakia.htm>. Wall Street Journal.
and United Nations. p. ‘The anthrax ﬁles’. p.2 The US Congress will continue to consider this matter in 2012. 4. 4 The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and its Plan of Action are contained in UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288. Interagency Coordination in the Event of a Terrorist Attack using Chemical or Biological Weapons or Materials (United Nations: New York. which had taken on some of the activities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force in support of the 2006 UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. the US National Academy of Sciences issued a report that concluded ‘It is not possible to reach a deﬁnitive conclusion about the origins of the Bacillus anthracis in the mailings based on the available scientiﬁc evidence alone’. 152. Office for Disarmament Affairs. a US Army scientist. 2011. while lead international agencies for dealing with nuclear and 1 Guillemin. ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Organization and the United Nations concerning WHO’s support to the Secretary-General’s mechanism for investigation of the alleged use of chemical. 2006. para. national and local levels. However.org/disarmament/ WMD/Secretary-General_Mechanism/>. Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). Frontline. See also US Public Broadcasting Service. 11 Oct. 2011. 20 Sep.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 409 IV. American Anthrax: Fear. <http://www. Chemical and biological warfare prevention and response JOHN HART In 2011 further details regarding the ‘anthrax letter’ investigation in the United States. In 2011 the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Secretary-General concluded a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the World Health Organization (WHO) concerning the the SecretaryGeneral’s authority to investigate alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). biological or toxin weapons’.pbs. . and National Research Council. <http://www. Report of the Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel (Research Strategies Network: Vienna. 2011). 2.4 The report concluded that. was responsible for the letters and acted alone. In August 2011 the Working Group on Preventing and Responding to Weapons of Mass Destruction Attacks.1 Discussions focused on how the Department of Justice had determined that Bruce E. J. and the Investigation of the Nation’s Deadliest Bioterror Attack (Times Books: New York. 3 United Nations. called for enhancing coordination between all relevant international actors and strengthening response capacities at regional. The Department of Justice found that Ivins’s psychiatric history provides ‘considerable additional circumstantial evidence’ that he was guilty.. Review of the Scientiﬁc Approaches Used during the FBI’s Investigation of the 2001 Anthrax Letters (National Academies Press: Washington. 2011). Crime.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/anthrax-ﬁles/>. Aug. which began in October 2001 and was conducted by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).un. VA. 2 Amerithrax Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel. 31 Jan. Ivins.3 Other MOUs with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons were still being negotiated. DC. were released. 2011). 2011).
410 NON . Malta. ‘Cumulative number of conﬁrmed human cases for avian inﬂuenza A(H5N1) reported to WHO. Fourth ESWI Inﬂuenza Conference. World Health Organization (WHO). 7 As of 5 Jan. the animal model that Fouchier was using to study human infections. This research exempliﬁes the growing ability of scientists to manipulate and create pathogens with novel characteristics. while Kawaoka’s group submitted its work to Nature.eswiconference.PROLIFERATION .html>. 2011. organizations with responsibility for CBW threats are more diffuse and characterized by having ‘partial mandates’ in the various activities associated with prevention.who. 6 5 . ‘Da Nang Agent-Orange/dioxin technical documents obtained’. Biosafety and biosecurity concerns led the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to request. <http://www. c. released preliminary results of work to modify the virulence of the A(H5N1) strain of the avian inﬂuenza virus. Fouchier’s group submitted its research to Science. one in the USA and the other in the Netherlands. Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (note 3). 2011 radiological threats are readily identiﬁable. 23 May 2011. 576 cases of A(H5N1) infection had been reported to the WHO since 2003. and 339 of those infected had died. for the ﬁrst time since the body began to meet in 2005. 2003–2011’. preparedness and response.org/>.html>.7 The NSABB’s authority in the matter derives from the fact that both research groups have received funding from the US National Institutes of Health. who leads one of the two research groups. US Trade & Aid Monitor blog.tradeaidmonitor. 11–14 Sep.6 Scientiﬁc research In late 2011 two research groups.8 The second research group is led by Dr Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin and the University of Tokyo. <http://www. The editorial board of Nature indicated that it would consult with the researchers concerning the NSABB’s request. 50%. is perhaps too high because it is possible that some proportion of those infected went unreported.int/inﬂuenza/human_ animal_interface/H5N1_cumulative_table_archives/en/index. 2012. presented ﬁndings that show how a modiﬁed avian inﬂuenza virus strain became readily transmissible among ferrets. <http://www. At the Fourth European Scientiﬁc Working Group on Inﬂuenza (ESWI) in September 2011. Dr Ron Fouchier of the Dutch Erasmus Medical Centre. that the researchers withhold part of their research ﬁndings from publication. The mortality rate. partly because they recovered without being tested. 8 European Scientiﬁc Working Group on Inﬂuenza (ESWI). The NSABB reviewed the draft research and stated that neither manuscript should be published in its United Nations.com/2011/05/da-nang-agent-orangedioxin-technicaldocuments-obtained. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT .5 In 2011 the US Trade & Aid Monitor blog released primary documents and information on planned environmental remediation activity to clean up the after-effects of the US use of defoliants in Viet Nam in the 1960s and early 1970s.
. ‘WHO concerned that new H5N1 inﬂuenza research could undermine the 2011 Pandemic Inﬂuenza Preparedness Framework’. <http://www. The NSABB also stated that the US Government should ‘encourage the authors to submit a special communication/commentary letter’ to the journals ‘regarding the dual use research issue’. respectively).org/news/releases/2012/0120sp_ ﬂu. and throat and shed through mucous and saliva. 30 Dec. 11 In birds. (a) the goals of the research. among other things. Conversely. Birds and humans also share similar cell receptors (alpha 2. 2011.shtml>. (c) the risk assessments carried out prior to the start of the research. the A(H5N1) strain is principally a gut disease that is shed through faeces.9 The WHO stated that it was ‘deeply concerned about the potential negative consequences’ of the research. biosecurity. while in humans the strain is principally found in the lungs.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2011/pip_framework_20111229/en/index. 10 World Health Organization (WHO). and occupational health [that] is part of the responsible conduct of all life sciences research’. or that such work might suggest to states and non-state actors unorthodox avenues for biological weapon attack. the harmonization of such standards internationally is a broader policy objective within. duplicate and sequence minute and ancient DNA samples. 2011.who. However. and ( f ) text ‘addressing biosafety. 21 Nov. for example. mainly due to rapidly improving capabilities to extract. It is less clear how the adherence of facilities to select agent regulation would apply to non-US entities that receive US grants. (b) the potential health beneﬁts. Scientists have found that a change in the PB2 gene facilitated virus reproduction at a temperature 4 degrees Celsius lower than the temperature in the guts of birds.10 In January 2012 it requested a 60-day moratorium to suspend such research during which time the WHO member states were asked to consider what approaches and decisions (if any) should be taken. and that text should be added to describe. (d) the biosafety oversight and related measures. (e) the biosecurity practices and the facilities’ ‘adherence to select agent regulation’. dating 9 US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).3 and alpha 2.html>.11 There were further disagreements regarding whether and how the research proposal could have been modiﬁed to make it less ‘proliferation sensitive’. Nature published a draft genome of Yersinia pestis (the causative agent of plague) that was derived from victims of the Black Death.aaas. ‘National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity Recommendations’. Press statement. observers and analysts have argued that it is important to better understand the mechanisms by which inﬂuenza viruses become readily transmissible among humans.6. Such work yields greater insight into the function of pathogens and the nature of associated virulence factors. <http://www. On 12 October 2011. DNA recovery and sequencing from deteriorated (‘ancient’) and novel specimens are becoming increasingly common. Some observers and analysts have expressed concern that such work unnecessarily risks the accidental release from a laboratory of a modiﬁed virus. the framework of the Australia Group.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 411 entirety ‘with complete data and experimental details’. nose.
SIPRI. J. no. et al. 13 Oct.412 NON . (b) the possible greater susceptibility of the population of 14th century Europe to the bacterium. ‘factors other than microbial genetics. R. 2011). 13 Future implications of science and technology The current and future S&T environment poses several difficult questions for CBW arms control. on their own. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . Nature. Interview of Hendrick Poinar by Ray Suarez. they do not lead to the emergence of new warfare options. E746–E752. 506–10. .unog. <http://www. including its phylogeny. ‘Disarmament: think zone for the Seventh Review Conference’.. pp. The possible reasons include (a) yet to be understood aspects of how the genes are structured in the chromosomes. both of which were more common at the time.. 108. vol. underlined the fast pace of change in science and technology (S&T) by observing that scientists would have been ‘unlikely’ to be able to extract the genome in 2009. K. ‘reveal[s] no unique derived positions’ as compared to those currently found in nature and. One of the principal researchers. 38 (20 Sep. The samples were taken from the teeth of victims. vol. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. and DNA from current Y. See also UN Office at Geneva. wet weather. such as environment. pestis strains was used as a complementary template to the historical strain. 2011 from a strain associated with plague deaths in London in 1348–50.. <http://www. pp. 2011). J. including what is an ‘activity of concern’. 14 Partly based on Hart.org/ newshour/bb/health/july-dec11/blackdeath_10-13. Yet. ‘Science and technology and their impacts on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: a synthesis report on preparing for the Seventh Review Conference and future challenges’. ‘A draft genome of Yersinia pestis from victims of the Black Death’. <http://www. Dec. V. 2011.org/research/disarmament/ bw/publications/btwc111212. 2011. Analysis of the genetic structure of the strain. I. et al. ‘Reconstructing Black Death: why was plague microbe so deadly?’.ch/bwc/thinkzone>. 478 (27 Oct. thus.pbs. and (c) a combination of environmental factors—including extended periods of warmer.pdf>.12 The researchers sought to understand why the strain that caused the Black Death was so virulent.html>. and what is the expected operating environment of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the coming 10–20 years?14 Many S&T advances have increased the knowledge. and Bos.PROLIFERATION . 13 US Public Broadcasting Service. as well as the proximity of humans to rodents and unsanitary living conditions. material and technologies that could be misused if science were to be applied for hostile purposes. and Trapp. vector dynamics and host susceptibility’ should be the focus for analysis of the epidemiology of the bacterium. what is the appropriate policy response with respect to both general S&T trends and developments and possible future speciﬁc activities that may require regulation and other governance responses.sipri. Dr Hendrick Poinar. Newshour. ‘Targeted enrichment of ancient pathogens yielding the pPCP1 plasmid of Yersinia pestis from victims of the Black Death’. What matters is rather the context in which these scientiﬁc activ12 Schuenemann.
it is not the nature of the research itself that should be the focus of clariﬁcation and evaluation by states. on the one hand. This can be done by states (both individually and collectively) in the context of the BTWC and the CWC regime meetings.g. Interaction between governments and regulators. and science and industry.CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS 413 ities are carried out. therefore. private enterprise and the science community. can destabilize the BTWC and the CWC regimes. is also important. Scientists need to have the freedom to carry out research and publish new discoveries and methods. In particular. However. the nature of science calls for a combination of top-down regulation based on the principles and norms of the BTWC and the CWC. Any S&T evaluation mechanisms should be systematic and participatory in nature. traditional distinctions between ‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ of technology transfer will become increasingly irrelevant. Effective chemical and biological arms control calls for a combination of a traditional regulatory approach and the more ﬂuid networking solutions that bring together a wide range of actors. threat assessment and biodefence programmes (depending on how they are structured and implemented) can. The focus of concerned practitioners and policy analysts should be on major trends and ‘drivers’. With regard to policy responses to S&T trends. computing. call for new approaches and responses in CBW arms control. states should understand whether these new scientiﬁc activities and discoveries could lead to paradigm shifts and. if conducted with a lack of sufficient transparency. This. Industry requires a predictable and fair environment in which to conduct science while complying with the BTWC and the CWC norms and the various relevant mechanisms to resolve compliance issues vis-à-vis other parties to these conventions. on the other hand. and more by increasing accessibility to and capacity for work in S&T. The world is already living in a ‘post-proliferation’ environment that is characterized less by the spread of weapons. many or most of which can be readily identiﬁed today. . The entire exercise is both multidisciplinary and driven by the overlapping interests and responsibilities of governments. It is difficult to predict the future operating environment of the two conventions. what is most important is an in-depth evaluation of their implications for the convention regimes. in turn. For example. For example. as the cost of key enabling technologies (e. and a bottom-up approach of selfregulation and voluntary measures to increase transparency and strengthen responsible conduct in research and development activity. synthesis and screening) drops and the international capacity to utilize them increases. raise concerns among other states or actors regarding their legitimacy or intent. While monitoring scientiﬁc activities can assist in the identiﬁcation of new discoveries or research activity.
2008). p. Al-Qaida’s Quest for Weapons of Mass Destruction: The History behind the Hype (VDM Verlag Dr Müller: Saarbrücken. Prioritization implies that decision makers and policymakers (and the public more broadly) can tolerate a degree of ambiguity. A. or rather prioritize the attention and resources devoted to a variety of threats (qualitatively or quantitatively) according to a ‘reasoned and balanced’ hierarchy of risk.15 Broader challenges include the extent to which threat perceptions are driven by actual interest and activity by non-state actors. 2011 Despite the inherently subjective (qualitative) nature of CBW threat assessments. 29.414 NON . 15 Stenersen. understand such threats—provided their national structures are oriented to take such threats into account. whether and how the deliberate spread of disease constitutes a weapon of mass destruction. .PROLIFERATION . and whether states can achieve absolute security. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT . scientists and technical experts working for states. in principle. Another key (‘chicken and egg’) conundrum is whether threat pronouncements—often made by those who are not conducting scientiﬁc research and development—prompt al-Qaeda affiliates (or their equivalent) to consider or to pursue the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons.. Non-state actors—‘terrorists’ and the proverbial garage science operators—lack institutional depth and capacity to achieve similar levels of sophistication or output.