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MILTENBERGER, on behalf of themselves. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROBERT WALKER, Chairman of The Maryland State Board of Elections, et al. Defendants-Appellees, ======================================================== BRIEF OF APPELLANTS TRACY A. FAIR and MARY C. MILTENBERGER On Appeal from the Maryland Circuit Court for Carroll County The Honorable Judge Thomas F. Stansfield Case No. 06-C-12-060692 ======================================================== Tracy A. Fair Jeffrey Darcie 19 W Obrecht Road Assistant Attorneys General Sykesville, MD 21784 Office of the Attorney General 410-552-5907 200 St. Paul Place Mary C. Miltenberger Baltimore, Maryland, 21202 14701 Smouse's Mill Rd. (410) 576-6356 NE Cumberland. Md. 21502 Counsel for Appellees/Defendants 301-724-9110 Appellants on behalf of themselves Robert L. Walker, Chairman of the Maryland State Board of Elections; Linda H. Lamone, State Administrator; Jared DeMarinis, Director of the Candidacy and Campaign Finance Division; Maryland State Board of Elections 151 West Street, Suite 200, Annapolis, MD 21401 John P. McDonough, Maryland Secretary of State, Office of the Secretary of State 16 Francis Street, Annapolis, MD 21401 Appellees/Defendants
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 1. UNFOUNDED DISMISSAL FOR LACHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 2. CITED ANKENY WHICH MISCONSTRUED WONG KIM ARK CASE . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. DEFINITION OF NATURAL BORN CITIZEN a. VATTEL’S LAW OF NATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 b. CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 c. THE CHILD FOLLOWS THE FATHER’S NATIONALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 4. OMITTED LAWS BY STATE OFFICIALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 5. BIRTH CERTIFICATE FORGERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 APPENDIX/RECORD EXTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .SEPARATE VOLUME TABLE OF CITATIONS CASES Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hawarth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461 (1937) Alfafara v. Fross, 26 Cal.2d 358 foreign power Ankeny v. Governor, 916 N.E.2d 678 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) Better Government Ass'n v. Department of State, 780 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1986) Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) Burt v. City of New York, 2 Cir., (1946) 156 F.2d 791 Blyew v. U S, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) Chisholm v. Georgia 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 419 at 2 U. S. 474 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 6 Wheat. 264 264 (1821) Collingwood v. Pace, 1 Vent. 413, 422 County Bridge Commission (1960), 2 Fr Serv 2d 107, 275 F2d 529, 535 Edgar v. Mite Corporation, 457 U.S. 624 (1982)
Elk v. Wilkins 112 U.S. 94 (1884) Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C.Cir.1989 Ex parte Fung Sing, 6 F. (2d) 670. foreign power Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) Ex Parte Reynolds, 5 Dill. 403 Ex parte Yarbrough - 110 U.S. 651 (1884) Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 Grubbs v. Bailes, 445 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2006) Higgins v. Steele, 4 Dak. 72, 23 N. W. 91 In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) In Re Thenault , 47 F. Supp. 952, 1942 Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N. D. 363 Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425 (1876) Liddy v. Lamone 398 Md. 233 ?-? (2007) Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486 Luria v. U S, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) 231 U.S. 9 Lynch vs. Clark, 1 Sandf. Ch. Rep. 583, 675 Vattel? MacLeod v. United States, 229 U. S. 416, 229 U. S. 434 (1913) Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. 2006) McIntire v. Pryor 173 U.S. 38 (1899) Mears v. Sinclair Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) Mollinedo v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 662 S.W.2d 732, 738 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 US 738 (1824) Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Meese , 939 F.2d 1011, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1991) Pirate's Lake Ltd. v. Vestin Realty Mortgage I, Inc., (2008) Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220 Ross v. State Board of Elections 876 A.2d 692 (2005) 387 Md. 649 Ruark v. Solano, 928 F. 2d. Scholl v. Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n, 520 S.W.2d 470, 471 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 60 U. S. 404 Shanks v. DuPont, Pet. 242 Sherman v. United States - 155 U.S. 673 (1895) Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 100 U.S. 306 Suessmann v. Lamone, 383 Md. 697, 862 A.2d 1 (2004) Super Tire Engineers Co. v. McCorkle , 416 U.S. 115, 94 S.Ct. 1694 (1974) Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388 (1815) The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253 (1814) United States v. White United States v. Sanders, Hemp. 486
United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) U. S. v. Tom Mosley and Dan Hogan, 238 U. S. 383 United States v. Ward United States v. Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978). Ware v. Hylton 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 199 at 3 U. S. 281 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391 (1967) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS U.S. Constitution Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment Section 1 Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 3 Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 4 Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 6 Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 9 Maryland Constitution Declaration of Rights, Article 20 Maryland Constitution Article 1, Section 7 Maryland Constitution Article 1 Sec 9 Maryland Constitution Article 1, Section 11 STATUTES 14 Stat. at L, 27; R.S., §1992 Civil Rights Act of 1866 §2172? 8 USC §1448 Oath of renunciation and allegiance 42 USC §1981 Equal rights under the law 42 USC §1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights 42 USC §1986 Action for neglect to prevent 9.3 Declaratory Judgment Act - 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 MD ELECTION LAW §1-101 DEFINITIONS Candidate MD ELECTION LAW §1-201 STATEMENT OF PURPOSE Statement of purpose MD ELECTION LAW §2-102 STATE BOARD Powers and duties MD ELECTION LAW §2-103 STATE BOARD State Administrator MD ELECTION LAW §5-101 CANDIDATES In general MD ELECTION LAW §5-201 CANDIDATES Qualifications MD ELECTION LAW §5-301 CANDIDATES Certificate of Candidacy MD ELECTION LAW §5-302 CANDIDATES Filing MD ELECTION LAW §5-304 CANDIDATES Manner of filing MD ELECTION LAW §5-601 CANDIDATES Candidates qualifying MD ELECTION LAW §5-701 CANDIDATES In general MD ELECTION LAW §5-705 CANDIDATES Certificate of nomination MD ELECTION LAW §5-1203 Qualifying for general election ballot MD ELECTION LAW §8-502
MD ELECTION LAW §9-205 MD ELECTION LAW §9-207 MD ELECTION LAW §9-209 Judicial review MD ELECTION LAW §9-210 Arrangement of ballots MD ELECTION LAW §12-201 Scope of subtitle MD ELECTION LAW §12-202 Judicial challenges MD ELECTION LAW §12-203 Procedure MD ELECTION LAW §12-204 Judgment MD ELECTION LAW §16-301 MD RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §2-613 MD COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS §3-409 Discretionary relief MD COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS §10-501 Judicial notice MD COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS §10-504 Evidence of laws MD CRIMINAL LAW §8-303 ID fraud MD STATE BOARD BYLAWS Article 5 –Roles and Responsibilities §4.5 Level of Effort MD STATE BOARD BYLAWS Article 5 –Roles and Responsibilities §5.1 The Board RULES MD BOARD OF ELECTION’S BY-LAWS-ART 4: RULES OF CONDUCT §4.5 CHARTER & BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION This appeal was filed pursuant to MD Rule §Rule 8-202(a). Circuit Court Case No. 06-C-12-060692. MD Rule §Rule 8-202. Notice of appeal -- Times for filing (a) Generally. Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE This case is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court requesting the appeals court to reverse the final Judgment entered by Judge Stansfield, dismissing the complaint for laches. Appellants filed their original complaint on January 26, 2012, which was later amended on March 19, 2012, after it was made known to Mrs. Fair and Mrs. Miltenberger that several laws had been omitted during the election process, which led to an ineligible candidate gaining access to the 2012 Presidential ballot. Plaintiffs were granted permission by the court to amend their complaint on February 22, 2012, provided they had not yet served the summons on Mr. Obama. The Board members and Secretary of State, on behalf of their attorney, filed a motion to dismiss and Mary and Tracy filed an opposition to their dismissal. A hearing was set for August 17, 2012 and appellants, without counsel, presented the case to the best of their ability, however their efforts resulted in a dismissal of their complaint, on the grounds that it was barred by laches. Mrs. Fair, knowing and making sure that she filed all motions on time, does not agree with the court’s opinion that the complaint was untimely filed, nor d o appellants agree with the misguided definition of natural born citizen, that Judge Stansfield is trying to impose on the citizens of Maryland. On September 6, 2012, Mrs. Fair filed a notice of appeal, in hopes of reversing the dismissal and proceeding to a case on the merits, where she can produce all evidence contained in the record. QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 Whether the Court erred in deciding the time requirements under 9-209 and 12-202 of the Election Law Article, had not been met. 2 Whether the Court was misguided in its definition of natural born citizen, by citing a case, which obtusely admits itself, that it did not correctly interpret Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark. 3 Whether Judge Stansfield erred in his agreement, that EL 8-502 was the only statute appellees were required to follow, on verifying candidate eligibility
4 Whether the misconstruing of the definition of natural born citizen, contributed to the court’s belief that defendants had properly followed the law.. 5 Whether Barack Obama’s birth certificate is a computer generated forgery and if so, is he still eligible for the Presidency. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES 1 UNFOUNDED DISMISSAL FOR LACHES After several years of extensive research and dozen of dismissed cases on the eligibility issue, appellants decided to file their own complaint. But since most cases were dismissed on standing or for untimely filings, we decided to study the process to make sure it was done right, for the 2012 election. We tried for over a year to find an attorney, but could find none that would agree to take our case, thereby we were forced to represent ourselves. Following Obama’s inauguration, it was found out that the Constitutional clause was removed from Obama’s 2008 certificate of nomination (Exhibit 1~ E28) in all states except Hawaii and we wanted to find a copy of that document, along with a copy of his certificate of candidacy, where he signed under oath that he is qualified, so that we could use it as evidence in our case for perjury. Towards the end of 2011, Mrs. Fair started calling the Secretary of State and Board of Elections, trying to figure out the process of the exact time to file their complaint. I explained to all of these officials that Obama was not eligible and tried to get them to look at my evidence, but I was laughed at, ignored and on top of that, had attorneys tell me to check into a hospital. Several weeks later, I found out that the Secretary of State would be certifying the candidates on January 23, 2011, and was reminded that I needed to file my complaint within 3 days after that date, or it would not be accepted. I began calling the Board, Secretary of State on a weekly basis, trying to get copies of the certificates
and the only answer I would get is that they followed 8-502 and that Obama was eligible. When the date came to file my complaint, I was forced to file it without the certificates of nomination and candidacy, but hoped to get them later and amend the complaint as soon as possible. Several weeks passed and no one would answer my questions and started hanging up on me. It was extremely frustrating that they were the ones that had the info I needed, yet they were allowed to keep it from me to try and sabotage my case. I could not amend my complaint without the certificates, but time was running out and I needed to amend soon and serve Obama before it was too late. I decided to go to Annapolis on March 9, 2012, to try and get some answers in person and that is when I find out that there is no certificate of candidacy and that candidates are no longer required to swear under oath that they are qualified. I was shocked to find out that they had done away with something so crucial to the national security of this country. Art.1, §7 of the MD Constitution (E61) clearly states, “The General Assembly shall pass Laws necessary for the preservation of the purity of Elections”. How on earth does removing the sworn oath that you are eligible, make the elections more pure? Having your vote count in an election is one of the most fundamental rights in a Republican form of government and when we lose faith in the election process and you take away the people’s voice, it will be the end of America. Allowing an ineligible candidate on the ballot dilutes the vote of those citizens who are voting for a legitimate candidate, thereby infringing our 1st amendment (E62) rights. The courts warned us! Sherman v. United States - 155 U.S. 673 (1895) PJN The object of the statutes concerning the elective franchise, now embodied in Title XXVI of the Revised Statutes, was, as declared in the title to the Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 140, "to enforce the rights of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this Union, and for other purposes," among which was undoubtedly the preservation of the purity of elections, and the obtaining of an honest expression of opinion from each individual voter.
“The doctrine of laches does not apply in cases of willful infringement.” Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 956-57 The Ku Klux Cases, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) Chancellor KENT, in the opening words of that part of his Commentaries which treats of the government and constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, says: 'The government of the United States was created by the free voice and joint will of the people of America for their common defense and general welfare. 1 Kent, Comm. 201. In a republican government, like ours, where political power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control these elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source of danger. Such has been the history of all republics, and, though ours [110 U.S. 651, 667] has been comparatively free from both these evils in the past, no lover of his country can shut his eyes to the fear of future danger from both sources...If the government of the United States has within its constitutional domain no authority to provide against these evils,-if the very sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage, without legal restraint,-then, indeed, is the country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires, and the love which enshrines it, are at the mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute force on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other. While I was at the board of elections, I asked Jared (appellee) if he could write me a letter explaining that they no longer required sworn oaths by candidates and he refused. He did however type me up a letter (Exhibit 5 E31) claiming once again, they followed 8-502 (E72). The letter was dated March 9, 2012. They did however give me a copy of Obama’s certificate of nomination (Exhibit 1), which had the constitutional clause removed. I went home and started looking over the laws to see if I could find out why a sworn oath is no longer necessary and in the process came across several laws that had been omitted by Mrs. Lamone. Whether or not Linda knows the definition of natural born citizen, is irrelevant. Her required duties clearly state that she must check qualifications, regardless of whether candidates are required to swear under oath. As soon as this was made known to appellants that laws had been omitted
laws, we rushed to amend our complaint, knowing that we only had 10 days to file according to 12-202(b)(1)(E46), once it was made known to us that an act or omission that would change the outcome of an election had occurred. Mary and I rushed as fast as possible to finish our amended complaint just in time. As you can see by the date on the letter which was March 9, appellants filed their amended complaint within 10 days pursuant to 12-202. So either way you look at it, plaintiffs filed timely filings in January and March. We filed within the 3 days of certifying names to the ballots for 9-209 (E68), we were also within the 10 day period then, for filing under 12-202, when they made the act of certifying Obama’s name to the ballot, when he was not eligible under Art. 2, Sec. 1(E61) of the US Constitution. Had an ineligible candidate be removed, it no doubt would have changed the election. I don’t see how appellants could have filed any sooner, than immediately after certification and had the state officials told us sooner that there was no certificate of candidacy we would have amended much sooner. However, according to previous cases in this court, other litigants who filed complaints days before the general election, were told they needed to file before the Primary, which we did, three months before, so the court can’t have it both ways. The case of Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. at 645-46, 770 A.2d at 158-59 explains, “even where such impermissible delay is present under the circumstances presented, if the delay has not prejudiced the party asserting the defense, it will not bar the equitable action.” Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel County, 338 Md. 75, 83, 656 A.2d 751, 755 (1995). Thus, for laches to bar Ross's action there must be both an inexcusable delay and prejudice to Respondents. In the case of Liddy v. Lamone 398 Md. 233, the MD Circuit Court held: “Mr. Gansler cannot be prejudiced because if, in fact, he does not meet the eligibility requirements, he ought not to be on the ballot. The SBE is not prejudiced because it is undisputed that at this late date, there is nothing that can be done to alter the makeup of the ballot for this election. In fact, if this Court were to determine that Mr. Gansler is not
eligible to run for the office of the Attorney General, other remedies are available to preserve the integrity of the election process and to give the voters the choice of qualified candidates that they deserve.”... Moreover, this Court has recognized that in the context of election matters, “any claim against a state electoral procedure must be expressed expeditiously,” Ross, 387 Md. at 671, 876 A.2d a t 705, quoting Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1990) It has been over a year since we filed our amended complaint and it seems that we are the only ones being prejudiced, by our case being dismissed before argument. We were denied our right to “give evidence” pursuant 42 USC Sec. 1981(E63) which states, “All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings ...” Considering this case was regarding the election process, evidence should have been heard and it should have be expressed expeditiously, Art. 20 of the MD Constitution (E10,E61) states: “That the trial of facts, where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People.” The court in Lamone further goes on to say. . . Again, we do not agree. To begin, Gansler relied on the State Board’s initial certification of his candidacy and, later, its certification of the results of the primary election, which confirmed him as the Democratic Party’s nominee for the office o f the Attorney General in the gener al election. For Gansler, the appellant’s dilatory challenge was, indeed, prejudicial, as it could have been brought long before not just the general election but the primary election as well. Appellants case was brought just days after certification, in concert with the Lamone decision, moreover all appellees were well aware of this case, as far back as 2011 from all my phone calls and from my letting them know I needed the certificates as evidence for my case. So there was no surprise or prejudice to them, to the contrary, plaintiffs believe they were prejudiced by the state withholding
evidence, to sabotage their case. They could have easily told me there was no certificate on file, and my case would have been amended 2 months prior to the primary. Again, in the Lamone case they say, “During trial, Appellees argued that Appellant's claims were barred by the doctrine of laches. Appellees argued that the State Board of Elections and Maryland voters would be prejudiced by any ruling on the merits this close to the election. The Circuit Court agreed with Appellant’s argument that constitutional interpretation outweighs any laches defense. The Court correctly cited the Court of Appeals in Ross v. State Board of Elections, holding that laches may be inappropriate in a situation such as this one. 387 Md. 649, 671 (2005). The case of Baltimore County v. Glendale Corp., 219 Md. 465 (E7) (noting that, although it is essential to raise the defense of laches in the pleadings, “equity may decline relief for a stale claim after the facts are fully developed”); In its application, “there is no inflexible rule as to what constitutes, or what does not constitute, laches; hence its existence must be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.” Ross, 387 Md. at 669, 876 A.2d at 704 , quoting Parker, 230 Md. at 130, 1 86 A.2 d at 197 , citing Brashears v. Collision, 207 Md. 339, 352, 115 A.2d 289, 295 (1955); Bowie v. Ford, 269 Md. 111, 122 , 304 A.2d 803, 810 (1973); Day v. Day, 237 Md. 229, 236 , 205 A .2d 798 , 803 (1965). And still more (E8), “It is certainly true, that length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established; and in a case where fraud is imputed and proved, length of time ought not, [Page 19 U.S. 481, 498] upon principles of eternal justice, to be admitted to repel relief. On the contrary, it would seem that the length of time, during which the fraud has been successfully concealed and practised, is rather an aggravation of the offence, and calls more loudly upon a Court of equity to grant ample and decisive relief. Prevost v. Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481 In the 2004 case of ROSS v. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS No. 131, Sept. Term, the court dismissed the case on laches because the case wasn’t filed before the General election and states as follows: “At the hearing, Ross submitted on his memorandum. The judge then heard argument from the State Board and Branch concerning Sections
9-209 and 12-202 of the Election Law Article and the application of laches. The State Board argued that Ross's claim was barred under both Section 9-209 and Section 12-202 of the Election Law Article because he failed to satisfy either of the time periods set forth in those statutes. The Board asserted that Ross should have filed his petition on September 27th, rather than on November 5th, for it to have been timely under Section 9-209. Moreover, the State Board contended that Ross did not file his claim on a timely basis under Section 12-202 of the Election Law Article because he filed twenty-eight days after he first became aware of the alleged wrongdoing on October 13th, which was well beyond the ten-day period stipulated in Section 12-202. Similarly, Branch argued that Ross's action was barred by the doctrine of laches because he failed to pursue his claim prior to the election and caused prejudice to her by waiting until after the election occurred. Moreover, Branch asserted that by failing to seek judicial redress prior to the election, Ross undermined the free election process and that laches properly should bar his claim. On January 19, 2005, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants and against Ross for failing to comply with Section 9-209 of the Election Law Article.” Respondents also argue that Ross's action is untimely under the common law doctrine of laches. They contend that, due to the prejudice inflicted upon the voters of the Thirteenth Councilmanic District by instituting an action after the election, which could have been brought prior to it, election day should be the deadline for filing such an action under Section 12-202 of the Election Law Article. Appellants argue that the constitutional issue, the interpretation of Article V, § 4, outweighed any merit found in the laches defense. In the case os Liddy v. Lamone, Lamone being one of the defendants in this case clearly are changing the gold posts from that case regarding laches as compared to my case where I followed all of their suyggestions. Footnote 10 The court ultimately held that Liddy’s claim was not barred by any applicable statute of limitations because it had “no reason to disbelieve his testimony that he recently came to the conclusion on October 16, 2006, while accessing the internet, that Mr. Gansler had only practiced law in this State for eight years.”
In rejecting the appellees’ arguments, the Circuit Court, citing Ross v. State Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 671, 876 A.2d 692, 705 (2005), held that application of laches was inappropriate in a situation such as the case sub judice. It determined that Liddy was “not responsible for any inexcusable delay in the processing of his complaint [and found] it inappropriate to allow the general election to go forward without examining whether a candidate who may become this State’s next Attorney General is constitutionally eligible to hold that office.” The court further noted, on the issue of prejudice, that “Mr. Gansler cannot be prejudiced because if, in fact, he does not meet the eligibility requirements, he ought not to be on the ballot. The S[tate] B[oard of] E[lections] is not prejudiced because it is undisputed that at this late date, there is nothing that can be done to alter the makeup of the ballot for this election.” On the other hand, the court noted that “Plaintiff [Liddy] and similarly situated voters would b e prejudiced if an ineligible candidate were to remain on the ballot because of a delay in finding out about the lack of eligibility.” As the Supreme Court of the United States stated recently in Purcell v. Gonzalez, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 5, 166 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2006), reversing a lower court’s injunction, in an election case, enjoining operation of voter identification procedures just weeks before an election, “[a] State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its prejelection process.” __ U.S. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 7, 1 66 L. Ed. 2d at 4, quoting Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 1024,103 L. Ed. 2d 271, 287 (1989). The Court articulated further that “[c]onfidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” And finally in the case of Melendez v. O’Connor, 654 N.W.2d 114, proving that states do hear and check qualifications: “We conclude that we need not determine whether or when petitioners were put on notice of Samuels' residency defect because regardless of whether there has been an unreasonable delay by petitioners in filing their petition, there would be no prejudice to Samuels or others in granting the relief requested. The petition alleges that Samuels is not qualified to run for office in district 59B because he moved out of the district on June 1. If this move resulted in a change in Samuels' residence to a place outside district 59B, then he is not eligible to run for state legislative office in district 59B regardless of the timing of the challenge to his eligibility.”
And not to forget: Limitations and Procedures. Maryland law provides that the prosecution of malfeasance, misfeasance, nonfeasance, or a conspiracy to commit such offenses shall be instituted within two years after the offense is committed. If the offense is nonfeasance or if it is continued over time, the statute of limitations would not begin to be calculated until the duty ends or the offender resumes performance of the duty. In the case of McIntire v. Pryor 173 U.S. 38 (1899), it states: “There is no rule in equity which excludes the consideration of circumstances, and, in a case of actual fraud, we believe no case can be found in the books in which a court of equity has refused to give relief within the lifetime of either of the parties upon whom the fraud is proved, or within thirty years after it has been discovered or becomes known to the party whose rights are affected by it”' Before going over the omitted laws by state officials, I would first like to go over natural born citizen, because the state laws make no sense, unless you know the federal to which those laws refer. 2 CITED ANKENY WHICH MISCONSTRUED WONG KIM ARK CASE Judge Stansfield relied on a state case (Ankeny v. Governor of State of Indiana, 916 NE 2d 678)(E77) to determine what the meaning of an Article II “natural born Citizen” is. That definition is an extremely important constitutional issue and one would think that Judge Stansfield would do his own research and analysis of historical evidence and U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the matter. So the soundness of his decision is only as good as the Ankeny case can be. Judge Stansfield said: “The issue of the definition of a ‘natural born citizen’ is thus firmly resolved by the United States Supreme Court in a prior opinion and as this Court sees it, that holding is binding on the ultimate issue in this case.” He then says that because of “stare decisis”, a court can choose not to follow that holding only if a “subsequent holding of the Supreme Court or an amendment to the U.S. Constitution” were to allow it. Judge Stansfield then says: “this Court does not believe that it has the discretion to simply disregard a holding which clearly applies to the definition of ‘natural born citizen’ as it applies to President Obama.” But if
Judge Stansfield were to adhere to what he wrote, his decision would be precluded by Minor v. Happersett (1875)(E76) which “firmly resolved” what the definition of a “natural-born citizen” was. Minor confirmed the American “common-law” definition of a “natural-born citizen” which the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court said was a child born in a country to parents who were “citizens” of that country when the child was born. Minor shows that the Fourteenth Amendment did not repeal or amend this definition. With no subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision or constitutional amendment altering the Minor holding, Minor and its definition of a “natura l-born citizen” is binding upon Judge Stansfield. But he completely ignores this U.S. Supreme Court case. Moreover, in 1877, two year after Minor and 9 years after the passage of the 14th amendment, Congress passed the Revised Statutes and Title XXV, Sec. 1992 (E9) clearly states “Who are Citizens” and has the exact text and cites its source as the 1866 Civil Rights Act, clearly showing that that 14th amendment changed nothing with the character of a citizen. The Civil Rights Act (E9) defines a citizen as “all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;” Judge Stansfield relies on Ankeny which did not correctly interpret the case of U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark and if you look at footnote 14 (E77) in the Ankeny decision, it clearly says, 14 “We note the fact that the Court in Wong Kim Ark did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a "natural born Citizen" using the Constitution’s Article II language is immaterial.” That must be a joke, right? How can a judge claim they are aware that Wong Kim Ark did not pronounce Kim a natural born citizen and then go on to claim Obama a citizen according to Wong Kim Ark? Is this the reason Judge Stansfield stayed away from Wong Kim Ark itself, because it never pronounced Kim natural born.
And if that isn’t the worst of it, Wong Kim Ark even contradicts its own decision when Justice Gray cites English law: By the statute of 7 Anne, (1708) c. 5, § 3, "the children of all natural-born subjects, born out of the ligeance of Her Majesty, her heirs and successors" -explained by the statute of 4 Geo. II, (1731) c. 21, to mean all children born out of the ligeance of the Crown of England: "whose fathers were or shall be natural-born subjects of the Crown of England, or of Great Britain, at the time of the birth of such children respectively . . . . shall be deemed, adjudged and taken to be naturalborn subjects of this kingdom, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever." That statute was limited to foreign-born children of natural-born subjects, and was extended by the statute of 13 Geo. III, (1773) c. 21, to foreign-born grandchildren of natural-born subjects, but not to the issue of such grandchildren; or, as put by Mr. Dicey, "British nationality does not pass by descent or inheritance beyond the second generation." See DeGeer v. Stone, above cited; Dicey, Conflict of Laws 742. Here are the errors committed by Ankeny regarding Wong Kim Ark: a Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 says “natural born Citizen,” not “born Citizen.” It also distinguishes between a “natural born Citizen” and “citizen of the United States.” Wong Kim Ark did not hold that Wong was a “natural born Citizen.” Rather, it held that Wong was a “citizen of the United States” at birth. Even Ankeny confirmed that. Ankeny said that the Court’s language choice was immaterial. But a simple reading of Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 shows that there is a critical difference between a “natural born Citizen” and a “citizen of the United States,” with only the former being eligible to be President today. Hence, when it comes to interpreting and construing the Constitution, word choice is not “immaterial.” b Ankeny erroneously interpreted Wong Kim Ark by erroneously reading the Fourteenth Amendment. It read the amendment to include the clause “natural born” when it only says “born.” c It inserted the “natural born Citizen” clause into the amendment when it does not contain the clause, but only says “citizen of the United States.” d It also erroneously concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment includes a definition of a “natural born Citizen” when it does not and only includes a definition of a “citizen of the United States. Since Judge Stansfield’s decision is only as good as the Ankeny case and having shown the errors contained in the Ankeny case, Judge Stansfield’s decision is
not sound. A significant portion of the lower courts decision is clearly deceptive on its face. When the text in the decision refers to “the plaintiffs”, ninety percent of the time it is the Judge in the Ankeny case, referring to the plaintiffs in that case, not Judge Stansfield referring to us. I have read hundreds of cases over the past 4 years while researching this issue and have never seen a decision where nearly the entire opinion was a full cut and paste, “word for word” from another court opinion, where they leave in vast amounts of irrelevant content, regarding evidence that those plaintiffs based their case on. Judge Stansfield raises the possibility that plaintiff’s claim is barred because Obama was already elected once by the Electoral College and inaugurated. But he simply raises the question without offering any legal authority or argument to support the question he asks. 3 DEFINITION OF NATURAL BORN CITIZEN a. VATTEL’S LAW OF NATIONS (E22) That the framers of the Constitution were influenced by Vattel cannot be disputed. Congressional records prove they ordered Vattel’s, Law of Nations, for use in the Senate1. Charles W.F. Dumas, a secret agent to Congress during the Revolution2 and an ardent supporter of the American cause, printed an edition of The Law of Nations in 1774, and is further corroborated in a letter from Ben Franklin to Charles Dumas, dated Dec.19, 1775, Franklin states: “I am much obliged by the kind present you have made us of your edition of Vattel. It came to us in good season, when the circumstances of a rising state make it necessary frequently to consult the law of nations. Accordingly, that copy which I kept, has been continually in the hands of the members of our congress, now sitting.” Ben Franklin to Charles William Frederic Dumas - December 9, 1775. Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 2 September 1775 - December 1775, page 466. Except for eligibility to the Presidency, naturalized citizens stand on the same footing as do native-born citizens. All alike owe allegiance to the government, and the government owes to them the duty of protection. These are reciprocal
obligations, and each is a consideration for the other. Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9, 231 U. S. 22. Citizenship is membership in a political society, and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of the society. These are reciprocal obligations, one being a compensation for the other. Under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal footing with the native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 88 U. S. 165; Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94, 112 U. S. 101; Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 22 U. S. 827. Turning to the naturalization laws preceding the Act of 1906, being those under which Luria obtained his certificate, we find that they required, first, that the alien, after coming to this country, should declare on oath, before a court or its clerk, that it was bona fide his intention to become a citizen of the United States, and to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign sovereignty; second, that at least two years should elapse between the making of that declaration and his application for admission to citizenship; third, that as a condition to his admission, the court should be satisfied, through the testimony of citizens, that he had resided within the United States five years at least, and that, during that time he had behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same; and, fourth, that at the time of his admission, he should declare on oath that he would support the Constitution of the United States, and that he absolutely and entirely renounced and abjured all allegiance and fidelity to every foreign sovereignty. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 US 738 (1824) A naturalized citizen is indeed made a citizen under an act of Congress, but the act does not proceed to give, to regulate, or to prescribe his capacities. He becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. BLYEW v. U S, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) In this state of things, Congress on the 9th April, 1866, passed an act entitled 'An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and furnish the means of their vindication.' 3 The first section of that act declared all [80 U.S. 581, 582] persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, to be citizens of the United States
Chief Justice Waite said: 'Allegiance and protection are, in this connection (that is, in relation to citizenship) reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection, and protection for allegiance.' 'At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country, of [169 U.S. 649, 680] parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further, and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction, without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient, for everything we have now to consider, that all children, born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction, are themselves citizens.' Minor v. Happersett (1874) 21 Wall. 162, 166-168. Mears v. Sinclair 1 W. Va. 185: Is there any case in either England or America, where the guardian, as a matter of common law, has been permitted to change the domicil of his ward? It is submitted there is none, to the effect of changing succession. It is further sub mitted that there should be none. For in the United Slates domicil is citizenship — that which describes the one describes the other — the rights appurtenant to the one are appurtenant to the other. The test of domicil. 1 Kent 84; Schremshire vs. Schrem- shire, 4 Eccle. Reps., 567. Code, page 73-74. Sto. Con'flt. of laws § § 43 et 44. Philmore on domicil, page 16, chap. 2, including §§ 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. Vattell, page 103. Settlement and domicil are synonymous. Sto. Confl't. laws § 43 (note 7.) 1 Kent, 82. 2 Bouv., 519. Vattell 103, § 210. Test of citizenship. 1 Kent, 82, 83, 86. Vattell, 101, §§ 212, 213, 214. Sto. Confl't. laws, § 48. Gassies vs. Bal lon, 6 Pet. Rep. 751-2 ; Brown vs. Kerne, 8 Pet. 112, 114. Government cannot, in the exercise of a natural attribute, nor in the United States by a vested power, expatriate, banish, or exile a citizen except for crime. A citizen of Virginia being twenty-one years old may leave it. Code, page 74', §3. But government cannot force him to go, except as a pun ishment for crime. It is inherent in all governments to banish or exile as a punishment, but not otherwise. Cooper vs. Telfair, 4 Dallas, 14; 1 Cond. U. S. Rep., 211, 212, 213, and 214. 1 Kent, 599, 600, 604, 606-7 and 612 in exact point. To the same efl'ect is Vattell, page 103, § 218 and 220, and page 107, § 228.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 462 n.12 (1978). The international jurist most widely cited in the first 50 years after the Revolution was Emmerich de Vattel. 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 18 (1826). In 1775, Benjamin Franklin acknowledged receipt of three copies of a new edition, in French, of Vattel's Law of Nations and remarked that the book "has been continually in the hands of the members of our Congress now sitting . . . ." 2 F. Wharton, United States Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence 64 (1889), cited in Weinfeld, supra, at 458. In the case of The Venus, 12 U.S. 8 Cranch 253 (1814) Justice Marshall says: The British doctrine on this subject is well known. ' Once a British subject, always a British subject,' is an established rule in the English law. Great Britain respects the naturalization laws of the United States only for commercial purposes. If one of her subjects be naturalized in this country, and afterwards return to a British territory, she considers him as still, to all intents and purposes, a British subject. She does not even require him to abjure his adopted allegiance. 1. The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country for a special purpose and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel "domicile," which he defines to be, "a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there." Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society, at least as a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens, but is nevertheless united and subject to the society without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicile, he continues, is not established unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. Vattel. 92-93. “The whole system of decisions applicable to this subject, rests on the law of nations as its base. It is, therefore, of some importance to enquire how far the 24 writers on that law consider the subjects of one power residing within the territory of another, as retaining their original character, or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside. “Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says, 'the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.
Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights." Which is confirmed by the case of The Nereide - 13 U.S. 388 (1815) where it states: “It is not for us to depart from the beaten track prescribed for us, and to tread the devious and intricate path of politics. Even in the case of salvage, a case peculiarly within the discretion of courts because no fixed rule is prescribed by the law of nations, Congress has not left it to this department to say whether the rule of foreign nations shall be applied to them, but has by law applied that rule. If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government will manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land.” Which is then validated by the case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino 376 U.S. 398 (1964) which states: As early as 1793, Chief Justice Jay stated in Chisholm v. Georgia that, "Prior. . . to that period [the date of the Constitution], the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of nations." 2 U. S. 2 Dall. 419 at 2 U. S. 474. And, in 1796, Justice Wilson stated in Ware v. Hylton: "When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement." 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 199 at 3 U. S. 281. Chief Justice Marshall was even more explicit in The Nereide when he said: "If it be the will of the Government to apply to Spain any rule respecting captures which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the Government will manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose. Till such an act be passed, the Court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of the land." 13 U. S. 9 Cranch 388 at 13 U. S. 423. As to the effect such an Act of Congress would have on international law, the Court has ruled that an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U. S. 416, 229 U. S. 434 (1913). In the case of Ludlam v. Ludlam, 31 Barb. 486, the court says: "Vattel, in his Law of Nations (page 101), says: ‘As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself
otherwise than by the children of the citizens, these children naturally follow the condition of their fathers and succeed to their rights. * * * The country of the father is, therefore, that of the children, and these become true citizens merely by their tacit consent.’ Again, on page 102, Vattel says: ‘By the law of nature alone, children follow the condition of their fathers and enter into all their rights.’ This law of nature, as far as it has become a part of the common law, in the absence of any positive enactment on the subject, must be the rule in this case.” On the Board of Election’s Website under “Candidacy”, there is a chart labeled “Qualifications for Filing Candidacy” (Exhibit 2~E29), this chart clearly states that the President & VP must be Natural Born Citizens, as opposed to all other candidates. This without a doubt proves that just being born here does not make you a natural born citizen, because they are clearly showing a difference between a citizen and a natural born citizen. In Re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) 'All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.' The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States. The counsel of the plaintiffs in error therefore contend that 'wherever a law of a State, or a law of the United States, makes a discrimination between classes of persons, which deprives the one class of their freedom or their property, or which makes a caste of them to subserve the power, pride, avarice, vanity, or vengeance of others,' there involuntary servitude exists within the meaning of the thirteenth amendment. It is not necessary, in my judgment, for the disposition of the present case in favor of the plaintiffs in error, to accept as entirely correct this conclusion of counsel. It, however, finds support in the act of Congress known as the Civil Rights Act, which was framed and adopted upon a construction of the thirteenth amendment, giving to its language a similar breadth. That amendment was ratified on the
eighteenth of December, 1865,26 and in April of the following year the Civil Rights Act was passed.27 Its first section declares that all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are 'citizens of the United States,' Alfafara v. Fross , 26 Cal.2d 358 Aliens are commonly understood as persons who owe allegiance to a foreign government." De Cano v. State, 110 P.2d 627, 631 and the 1943 Government Code §242 (from Political Code §57). "Alien" is commonly understood and has been judicially defined to be a person who owes allegiance to a foreign government. Ex parte Fung Sing, 6 F. (2d) 670. City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 1893, 56 Fed., 576 A foreign subject who is qualified to become a citizen of the United States, under section 2167 of the Revised Statutes, does not become such by filing his declaration of intention so to do. 'l'hat section requires that he shall renounce allegiance to the sovereignty of which he is a subject, take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and comply with the other conditions prescribed in the second and third paragraphs of section 216'5 of the Revised Statutes, in order to become naturalized; and until he does so he remains a foreign subject. Ex Parte Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894) cites and supports for Minor v. Happersett, as it states: “In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, this court held that the word ‘citizen’ is often used to convey the idea of membership in a nation, and, in that sense, women, if born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction of the United States, have always been considered citizens of the United States, as much so before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment of the constitution as since…” (Emphasis added) and also the City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). FROM Elk v. Wilkins 112 U.S. 94 (1884) Justice Gray cites Chief Justice Taney, proving that he knows exactly what a natural born citizen is: The main object of the opening sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was to settle the question, upon which there had been a difference of opinion throughout the country and in this Court, as to the citizenship of free negroes Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, and to put it beyond doubt that all persons, white or black, and whether formerly slaves or not, born or naturalized in the United States, and owing no allegiance to any alien power, should be citizens of the United States and of the
state in which they reside. Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U.S. 73; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 100 U.S. 306. This section contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two sources only: birth and naturalization. The persons declared citizens are "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof." The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. It is also worthy of remark that the language used about the same time by the very Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, in the first section of the Civil Rights Act of April 9, 1866, declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, is "all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed." 14 Stat. 27; Rev.Stat. § 1992. Gray says "IN HIS OPINION" from Elk v. Wilkins: "An examination of the debates in Congress, pending the consideration of that amendment, will show that there was no purpose, on the part of those who framed it or of those who sustained it by their votes, to abandon the policy inaugurated by the act of 1866, of admitting to national citizenship such Indians as were separated from their tribes, and were residents of one of the States or of one of the Territories, outside of any reservation or territory set apart for the exclusive use and occupancy of Indian tribes. Justice Gray, at that time (Nov. 1884), certainly appeared to have adopted the opinion stated in the Slaughter-House Cases, that children of aliens, born in the country, were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Note that Justice Gray cited to pg. 73 of The Slaughter-House Cases, and the statement bears repeating: "The phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73(1872). Furthermore, Justice Gray, at this point in time, treated the 14th Amendment’s citizenship clause requirement, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof”,
as synonymous with “owing no allegiance to any alien power”. Chester Arthur’s Message makes clear he believed that persons born to aliens in the U.S. required naturalization. And since those who require naturalization are not natural-born, Chester Arthur’s statement appears to be a veiled admission that he was not eligible to be President. Citizen: Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1856 Edition A citizen of the United States, residing in any state of the Union, is a citizen of that state. 6 Pet. 761 Paine, 594;1 Brock. 391; 1 Paige, 183 Metc. & Perk. Dig. h. t.; vide 3 Story's Const. 1687 Bouv. Inst. Index, b. t.; 2 Kent, Com. 258; 4 Johns. Ch. R. 430; Vatt. B. 1, c. Id, 212; Poth. Des Personnes, tit. 2, s. 1. Vide Body Politic; Inhabitant. Article 2, Section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution states: “No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President;” To find the truth, we must start at the beginning. In reading the first line of the Declaration of Independence, it is declared that the they dissolved the political bands with Britain and assumed the Laws of Nature. “When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.”(E22) I am of opinion that no state can make the subject of a foreign prince a citizen of the state in any other mode than that provided by the naturalization laws of congress; that when the constitution (article 1, § 8) says that congress shall have power “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States,” it designed these rules, when established, to be the only rules by which a citizen or subject of a foreign government could become a citizen or subject of one of the states of this Union, and thereby owe allegiance to such state, and to the United States, and cease to owe it to his former government. Lanz v. Randall, 4 Dill. 425 (1876) b. CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume: 3 January 1, 1776 - May 15, 1776 Benjamin Franklin to James Bowdoin
My dear Friend, Philada. Mar. 24. 1776 Inclos'd is an Answer to the Request from the Inhabitants of Dartmouth. I have comply'd with it upon your Recommendation, and ordered a Post accordingly. (1) I have put into Mr Adam's Hands directed for you, the new Edition of Vattel When you have perus'd it, please to place it in your College Library. (2) Yours most affectionately B Franklin Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 8 September 19, 1777 - January 31, 1778 Elbridge Gerry to Thomas Wharton Dear Sir York in Pennsylvania Novr 8. 1777 The following Books are much wanted by some Gentlemen of Congress, & are not to be procured in this Place; if they are to be found in the Pennsylvania Library, which We are informed is removed by Order of your Excellency to Lancaster, I shall be much obliged to You for the Loan thereof being with respect your Excellency's very huml sert,(1) E Gerry Vattell's Law of Nations Grotius Puffendorf (2) Letters of Delegates to Congress: Volume 11 October 1, 1778 - January 31, 1779 Henry Laurens to William Alexander: My Lord. (Private) Philadelphia 29th November, 1778. I had the honor of writing to Your Lordship yesterday; Will you permit me now to ask a very great favor of Your Lordship, design'd more for the public benefit than for my private convenience or amusement, that Your Lordship will endeavor to procure for me as early as may be, one or two Copies of Vatell's Law of Nations. I would rather have two than one; when I learn the cost of it or them, the amount in Gold or Silver shall be immediately remitted. Preface to the 1999 Digital Edition of The Law of Nations Diplomatic Code 185 Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Charles Dumas (Dec. 19, 1775), in 2 The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States 64, 64 (Francis Wharton ed., 1889). Congressional Globe, 1833-1873 : Index to 28th Congress, 2nd Session INDEX TO THE APPENDIX.
28th Cong.Senate and House of Representatives. 2d Sess. Allegiance, natural. (See Webster. See Vattel.) A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774 - 1875 Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, Volume 2 Page 44 Vattel's Laws of Nations to be purchased for the use of the Senate CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION June 18th, 1787 - Alexander Hamilton’s draft for the Constitution suggests in Article IX, Section 1 that: "No person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States unless he be now a Citizen of one of the States, or hereafter be born a Citizen of the United States." (Works of Alexander Hamilton: Miscellanies, 1774-1789, page 407). July 25, 1787 (~5 weeks later) - John Jay writes a letter to General Washington (president of the Constitutional Convention): "Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government; and to declare expressly that the Commander in Chief of the American army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a natural born Citizen." [the word born is underlined in Jay's letter which signifies the importance of allegiance from birth.] (Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 [Farrand's Records, Volume 3] LXVIII, page 61. John Jay to George Washington) September 2nd, 1787 George Washington pens a letter to John Jay. The last line reads: "I thank you for the hints contained in your letter" (Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 [Farrand's Records, Volume 3] page 76.) September 4th, 1787 (~6 weeks after Jay's letter and just 2 days after Washington wrote back to Jay) - The "Natural Born Citizen" requirement is now found in their drafts. (Madison’s notes of the Convention - September 4th, 1787) .The proposal passed unanimously without debate. . Natural Born Citizen in the Congressional Debates The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an act to end slavery in the U.S. and make the freed slaves, citizens. The discussion of these debates actually having been quoted by Justice Gray in United States v. Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649: "During the debates in the senate in January and February, 1866, upon the civil rights bill, Mr. Trumbull, the chairman of the committee which reported
the bill, moved to amend the first sentence thereof so as to read: 'All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States, without distinction of color.' Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, asked 'whether it will not have the effect of naturalizing the children of Chinese and Gypsies, born in this country?' Mr. Trumbull answered, 'Undoubtedly;' (Congressional Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Session p. 498, 573, 57) When the Civil Rights Act went over to the House, Representative John Bingham of Ohio, father of the future 14th amendment, confirms the understanding and construction the framers used in regards to birthright and jurisdiction while speaking on civil rights of citizens in the House on March 9, 1866 and addressing Trumbull’s amendment to the bill: "I find no fault with the introductory clause [S 61 Bill], which is simply declaratory of what is written in the Constitution, that every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen" (1866 Congressional Globe, House of Representatives, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pg 1291) Again, back in 1862, Representative John Bingham: “All from other lands, who by the terms of [congressional] laws and a compliance with their provisions become naturalized, are adopted citizens of the United States; all other persons born within the Republic, of parents owing allegiance to no other sovereignty, are natural born citizens. Gentleman can find no exception to this statement touching natural-born citizens except what is said in the Constitution relating to Indians.” (Congressional Globe, House of Representatives 37th Congress, 2nd Session, pg 1639) The 14th amendment was introduced to render the Civil Rights act constitutional and amend it to the Constitution. It passed in the House, but failed in the Senate until Senator Jacob Howard's amendment to the bill (the citizenship clause) was introduced. In 1866 while introducing bill H.R. 127 (14th Amendment) Jacob M. Howard (Author of the Citizenship clause) states: "This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is by virtue of natural
law and national law a citizen of the United States." (Congressional Globe, Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pg 2890) The law he was referring to, was the Civil Rights Act. "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States;" Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27. Obama’s father was subject to a foreign power and was a British subject (exhibit 6). He was governed under the British Nationality Act of 1948 when Obama was born, which made Obama a British Subject at birth and it is impossible to become a natural born citizen, if you are not born as one. Everyone seems to forget the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof", in the 14th amendment, which is why the law/amendment went astray. The Congressional records of the 14th amendment debates, give us Trumbull’s exact definition of the intent of his Citizenship Clause amendment to the bill. Who would know the intent of the Citizenship Clause better than anyone, than the person who wrote the clause himself? Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, author of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the one who inserted the citizenship clause into the 14th amendment: "The provision is, that 'all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.' That means 'subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.' What do we mean by 'complete jurisdiction thereof?' Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means." (Congressional Globe, Senate, 39th Congress, 1st Session, pg 2893) Trumbull’s words prove without a doubt that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" means the exact same thing as “not owing allegiance to any foreign power. Further supporting my claims is the Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America which states:
"I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic;” 8 USC § 1448 - Oath of renunciation and allegiance. Now why would immigrants not born here and becoming citizens, be required to renounce all allegiance to any foreign sovereignty, but people born here to immigrants are not held to that same allegiance requirement? That just makes no sense. Full allegiance is required for citizenship and the Naturalization Oath and Civil Rights Act prove that the Founders did not recognize dual citizenship and required full allegiance. c. THE CHILD FOLLOWS THE FATHER’S NATIONALITY 4 APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO ELECTION INTEGRITY 1-201. Statement of purpose (E11, E64) 2-102. Powers and duties (E12, E64) Ex parte Yarbrough - 110 U.S. 651 (1884) Chancellor Kent, in the opening words of that part of his Commentaries which treats of the government and constitutional jurisprudence of the United States, says: In a republican government like ours, where political power is reposed in representatives of the entire body of the people, chosen at short intervals by popular elections, the temptations to control these elections by violence and by corruption is a constant source of danger. Such has been the history of all republics, and, though ours has been comparatively free from both these evils in the past, no lover of his country can shut his eyes to the fear of future danger from both sources. If the government of the United States has within its constitutional domain no authority to provide against these evils -- if the very sources of power may be poisoned by corruption or controlled by violence and outrage, without legal restraint -- then indeed is the country in danger, and its best powers, its highest purposes, the hopes which it inspires,
and the love which enshrines it are at the mercy of the combinations of those who respect no right but brute force on the one hand, and unprincipled corruptionists on the other. UNITED STATES v. SAYLOR, 322 U.S. 385 (1944) The conclusion was that 19 protected personal rights of a citizen including the right to cast his ballot, and held that to refuse to count and return the vote as cast was as much an infringement of that personal right as to exclude the voter from the polling place. The case affirms that the elector's right intended to be protected is not only that to cast his ballot but that to have it honestly counted. The case of U. S. v. Tom Mosley and Dan Hogan, 238 U. S. 38 clearly states ”We regard it as equally unquestionable that the right to have one's vote counted is as open to protection by Congress as the right to put a ballot in a box.”, thereby infringing upon our 1st Amendment rights. The court in Johnson v. Grand Forks County, 16 N. D. 363, 125 Am. St. Rep. 662, 113 N. W. 1071. In the case of Burson v. Freeman Justice Blackmun quoting Wesberry v. Sanders: No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily violates this right. Wesberry v. Sanders - 376 U.S. 1 (1964) Accordingly, this Court has concluded that a State has a compelling interest in protecting voters from confusion and undue influence. See Eu, 489 U.S., at 228-229. The Court also has recognized that a State "indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process." Id., at 231. The Court thus has "upheld generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself." Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, n. 9 (1983) (collecting cases). In other words, it has recognized that a State has a compelling interest in ensuring that an individual's right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the election process. In conclusion, we reaffirm that it is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny. This, however, is such a rare case. Here, the State, as recognized administrator of elections, has asserted that the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another
fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from the taint of intimidation and fraud. 42 USC Sec. 1983 creates a federal civil cause of action against state officials for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]he ultimate and indispensable element of such a claim is the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Grubbs v. Bailes, 445 F.3d 1275, 1278 (10th Cir. 2006). And in Kelley v. Boettcher: “It is certainly true that length of time is no bar to a trust clearly established; and, in a case where fraud is imputed and proved, length of time ought not, upon principles of eternal justice, to be admitted to repel relief. On the contrary, it would seem that the length of time during which the fraud has been successfully concealed and practiced is rather an aggravation of the offense, and calls more loudly upon a court of equity to grant ample and decisive relief.' Kelley v. Boettcher, 29 C . A. 22 5 OMITTED LAWS BY STATE OFFICIALS Defendants claim that "9-209 provides only for defects in the ballot", however 9-209 clearly states "a registered voter may seek judicial review of the content and arrangement, or to correct any other error, by filing a sworn petition with the circuit court for the county." Is it not an error if there is an unqualified candidates name illegally placed on the ballot? Under 9-205(4), content includes: (4) the name, as specified in the certificate of candidacy, or as otherwise provided in Title 5 of this article, of each candidate who has been certified by the State Board; Mr. Obama’s grade school papers (exhibit #7), shown on CBS’s Inside Edition, list his name as Barry Soetoro, his nationality as Indonesian and his religion as islam. This confirms that, as a child, Mr. Obama was adopted by his stepfather Lolo Soetoro, as Obama’s step sister, Maya Soetoro has claimed. Barack Obama: School Life in Indonesia Tuesday, 05/06/08:
MARYLAND ELECTION LAW ARTICLE TITLE 1. DEFINITIONS AND GENERAL PROVISIONS SUBTITLE 1. DEFINITIONS 1-101. Definitions (L) Candidate. -(1) "Candidate" means an individual who files a certificate of candidacy for a public or party office. (E62-E70) Subtitle 2. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 1-201. Statement of purpose Subtitle 1. STATE BOARD 2-102. POWERS AND DUTIES 2-103. STATE ADMINISTRATOR 5-201. In general § 5-301. In general. § 5-302. Filing. 5-304. Manner of filing. 5-601. Candidates qualifying. § 5-701. In general. 5-705. Certificate of nomination or election after primary election. 5-1203. Qualifying for general election ballot. 8-502. Candidates for President -- Primary election 9-210. Arrangement of ballots — Candidates and offices. Section 4.5 – LEVEL OF EFFORT 6 BIRTH CERTIFICATE FORGERY Regarding plaintiff’s claim that Obama’s birth certificate is not genuine, Judge Stansfield says that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action because she does not have “verified proof” that the birth certificate produced by Obama is not genuine. What the judge did is completely inappropriate, given that plaintiff should be given an opportunity to present such evidence to the court. The judge did not give plaintiff any opportunity to conduct any discovery, produce any expert testimony, and present her evidence to the court in a plenary hearing. He simply dismissed her claim on motion papers and with no plenary hearing when those papers do not show that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to that birth certificate.
Judge Stansfield dismissed plaintiff’s complaint even though he recognized that plaintiff’s pleading and exhibits could raise an issue of fact as to whether Obama’s birth certificate is genuine, because as he says, birth certificates are not relevant to the question of whether Obama is a “natural born Citizen.” He said that what is relevant is where he was born, not whether he has a birth certificate. He adds that “it is possible, through some error or any number of explanations, why a birth certificate would not reflect precisely the location of a person’s birth.” This is some fantastic reasoning. The only evidence that Obama has presented to the public regarding where he was born is the short form and the long form birth certificates that he posted on the internet. This is the only evidence that we have as to where he was born. If this evidence is not relevant, than what evidence do we have of where Obama was born? There simply is no other evidence. So is Judge Stansfield telling us that Obama has absolutely no constitutional obligation to provide any evidence whatsoever of where he was born in order to show that he is a “natural born Citizen?” With birth certificates not having any relevance, do we even know where Obama was born and who Obama’s parents were? What Judge Stansfield has ruled simply makes no sense when it comes to our need to enforce Article II’s “natural born Citizen” clause. TITLE 8. FRAUD AND RELATED CRIMES SUBTITLE 3. IDENTITY FRAUD § 8-303. Government identification document (E57) TITLE 16 - OFFENSES AND PENALTIES (E15) Subtitle 3 - Conduct of Election Officials Section 16-301 - Neglect of duties; corrupt or fraudulent acts. Opposing counsel told me over and over that all primary candidates qualified pursuant to 8-502(c)(2) with no regard for existing Federal and State laws. Clearly they do not understand their duties, if this is what they believe, because there were several laws that were not entirely followed, including 8-502 itself, because it states:
(c)(2)The Secretary of State shall certify the name of a presidential candidate on the ballot when the Secretary has determined, in the Secretary's sole discretion and consistent with party rules,” If you look at the DNC party rules, it states in the preamble that they are bound by the Constitution and therefore must nominate an Art. 2 Sec. 1, natural born citizen. DNC CHARTER PREAMBLE: What we seek for our Nation, we hope for all people: individual freedom in the framework of a just society, political freedom in the framework of meaningful participation by all citizens. Bound by the United States Constitution, aware that a party must be responsive to be worthy of responsibility, we pledge ourselves to open, honest endeavor and to the conduct of public affairs in a manner worthy of a society of free people. Followed by 5-201(E65) which clearly states that “An individual may become a candidate for a public or party office only if the individual satisfies the qualifications for that office established by law and, in the case of a party office, by party constitution or bylaws and this statute mentions nothing about being exceptions via 8-502, because this deals with qualifying, not certifying, which is the Board’s duty and differs from the Secretary of State’s duty to certify that the content is correct, although that content must conform with federal law. All candidates must satisfy the qualifications for that office established by law, regardless of the method or official. So the Democratic Party has no right nominating Obama and the Board has the responsibility to accept only qualified candidates, pursuant to EL 5-201(E65) and when the constitutional clause has been removed from a candidate’s certificate of nomination, combined with the circumventing of the sworn oath, you are just asking for trouble, not pure elections. This is certainly a red flag to thousands of MD citizens, who I have gotten to sign the petition entitled, “Start immediate investigation of Barack Obama's use of forged IDs and a CT SSN which was never assigned to him according to e-verify”, where people have sent over 50,000 letters to Congress on the issue. The removal of the constitutional clause on a cert of nomination should be reason enough in itself, to warrant an investigation. Why would Nancy Pelosi remove the constitution clause in the first place, there must have been some reason.
Beyond the DNC Bylaws and the SOS’s 8-502 law, the Board has it own duties and rules including EL 2-102(a) that states: (a) In general. — The State Board shall manage and supervise elections in the State and ensure compliance with the requirements of this article and any applicable federal law by all persons involved in the elections process. Furthermore, 9-210(e)(2) states: (e) Names of candidates. (1) A ballot shall contain the name of every candidate who is authorized under the provisions of this article to appear on the ballot. (2) Each candidate shall be listed on the ballot in the contest for which the candidate has qualified. It is apparent that state officials suspended laws to allow an ineligible candidate on the ballot, which is contrary to Art. 9 of the MD Declarations of rights (E10, E60) which states: “That no power of suspending Laws or the execu tion of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature, ought to be exercised, or allowed. Article 6 of the MD Constitution (E10) says: “That all persons invested with the Legislative or Executive powers of Government are the Trustees of the Public, and, as such, accountable for their conduct: Wherefore, whenever the ends of Government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the People may, and of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new Government; the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.” Defendant’s conduct falls below the standards of behavior established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. Defendants acted negligently by departing from required duties assigned to them. They had a duty to the plaintiffs and they breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct. The defendant's negligent conduct was the cause of harm to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs were in fact, harmed or damaged, by an ineligible candidate being allowed on the ballot, thereby diluting our vote and infringing our rights. Defendants were well aware that there was evidence out there, but paid no attention and neglected the trust of the people by ignoring the issue.
42 USC Sec. 1986 Action for neglect to prevent Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; A negligence cause of action has three elements: (1) a legal duty owed by one person to another, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) damages proximately caused by the breach. D. Houston, Inc. v. Love, 92 S.W.3d 450, 454 (Tex. 2002). Defendants are not allowed to pick and choose the laws they wish, in order to change the outcome of elections. In addition, where do you draw the line between being advocated in the “media”, or not? There are scores of articles out there tha t are not advocates of Obama, including the Kenyan Parliament’s minutes, stating Obama is not a native American (exhibit #3) and Sheriff Arpaio’s criminal investigation of Obama ‘s forged birth certificate (exhibit #4). You’ve also got dozens of articles claiming he is Kenyan-born. On top of that you have Michelle Obama and the Kenyan Ambassador both claiming that Obama was born in Kenya. Shortly after Barack Obama was inaugurated, I (Mrs. Fair) heard that he was born in Kenya and started researching to see if it was true. I would research translated foreign pages and started finding article after article, talking about his running for the Senate and claiming that he was “Kenyan-born” (articles pending judicial notice). I then came upon the Kenyan Parliament website and started skimming through their government minutes (Kenyan Hansard) and came across some text that said: “Ms. Odhiambo: The president-elect, Mr. Obama, is a son of the soil of this country. Every other country in this continent is celebrating the
Obama win. It is only proper and fitting that the country which he originates from should show the same excitement, pomp and color. I, therefore, seek leave of the House that we adjourn to discuss the issue'. I continued looking and came across a radio show recording by the “Mike In The Morning Show” on WRIF radio, in Detroit, Michigan from November 6, 2008. They were trying to call the Kenyan Embassy to congratulate them on the Obama win and ended up talking to the Kenyan Ambassador. During the conversation, one of the radio hosts asks Ambassador Ogego, “President elect Obama’s birthplace over in Kenya, is that going to be a national spot to go visit, where he was born?” The Ambassador responded saying, “It’s umm, already an attraction. His paternal grandmother is still alive...”. The radio host then asks, “But his birthplace, they’ll put up a marker there?” and the Ambassador replied saying, “It’s already well known!” I then came across a video of Michelle Obama giving a speech at the LGBT delegate luncheon on August 28, 2008, where she says, “Barack has led by example, when we took our trip to Africa and visited his home country in Kenya, we took a public HIV test.”. After that I another reference from the Kenyan Parliament dated March 25, 2010, where they said, “If America was living in a situation where they feared ethnicity and did not see itself as a multiparty state or nation, how could a young man born here in Kenya, who is not even a native American, become president of America?” There were so many things pointing to Obama being Kenyan-born that I felt I needed to alert the media and my Senator, to try and get them to at least look into it, but I soon found out that the media wanted nothing to do with the issue and neither did Senator Mikulski. On or about April 2011, only after years into his presidency, and under media and political pressure, Defendant Obama published on the internet an electronic version of a purported birth certificate alleging his birth in Honolulu, Hawaii on August 4, 1961 to American citizen mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, and Kenyan British subject father, Barack Obama, Sr.
No physical, paper copy of the actual long form birth certificate has been produced in order to definitively establish Defendant Obama's birth within the United States. Instead, there is credible evidence that the "birth certificate" published on the internet was altered or otherwise fraudulent. (Exhibit ? Arpaio Investigation) Even if this birth certificate is authentic, it would only establish that Defendant Obama was born to a U.S. citizen mother, Stanley Ann Dunham, and a father who was a British subject. In fact, Barack Hussein Obama Sr, Defendant Obama's father, was never a citizen of the United States, and was only in the United States on a student visa, and was later deported from the United States. Appellants contend that the trial court’s decision is clearly erroneous on it face regarding the definition of natural born citizen and believe the court to be misguided in its dismissal for laches, considering no untimely filings. Appellants also believe evidence was overlooked, thereby changing the nature of the case. For the reasons that follow, Appellants respectfully ask this Honorable Court to reverse the Circuit Court’s decision on dismissing for laches and further, to render judgment in appellant’s favor. The Kenyan Parliament is even on record in the Kenyan Hansard minutes, stating that Mr. Obama is a “Son of the soil of that country” and that he is “not even a native American”. Wouldn’t it be extremely easy for our government to contact the Kenyan Parliament and ask them why they are claiming this? Why is it so hard for someone to believe that the Kenyan might just be telling the truth? There’s even a birth certificate from Nairobi that says Obama was born at the King George VI Hospital (exhibit 9), which just so happened to become the World’s Central location for AIDS research and was given millions and millions of dollars, under the Obama administration, I’d like to know how and why this hospital was chosen and can’t believe it was just a coincidence! STANDARD OF REVIEW
Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides that when an action has been tried without a jury, the appellate court will review the case on both the law and the evidence. The trial court’s decision must be reversed if it was not legally correct. Heat & Power Corp. v. Air Products & Chemicals, 320 Md. 584. The clearly erroneous standard for appellate review does not apply to determinations of legal questions or conclusions of law, as in this case there were no hearings or factual findings. By denying the Appellant’s Modification Request without a hearing, the trial court’s decision was not legally correct. COUNT 1: FRAUD COUNT 2: NEGLIGENCE COUNT 3: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY COUNT 4: BREACH OF TRUST COUNT 5: MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE (Nonfeasance) COUNT 6: DERELICTION OF DUTY COUNT 7: FAILING TO UPHOLD SWORN OATH OF OFFICE CONCLUSION 1. Maryland State law provides an elector with the right to prevent election frauds and errors. 2. Appellants have presented substantial evidence that Barack Hussein Obama does not, by his own admission, meet the Constitutional natural born citizenship requirement, found in Article 2 Section 5 Clause 1, in order to be eligible as a candidate for President of the United States of America. 3. Appellants have presented substantial evidence that the purported original, 1961 long form Certificate of Live Birth, for Candidate Barack Obama, posted on the White House Website on April 27, 2011, is a forgery. 4. Appellants have demonstrated that Candidate Obama, with express intent, used this document as an offer of proof, to every elector in the State of Maryland and to our Secretary of State, that he was an eligible Presidential Candidate. By inviting the general public, including Appellants, to view his purported birth certificate on the White House Website and to come to a conclusion about it, Candidate Obama conferred a level of expertise on Appellants concerning said document. 5. Appellants believe that a reasonable, fair minded person would conclude, with sufficient certainty, that Barack Hussein Obama does not meet, by his own admission, the natural born citizenship standard in order to be a presidential candidate. 6. Appellants believe that a reasonable, fair minded person would conclude that the posting of Obama’s alleged original birth document on the White House Website and the ensuing Press Conference, on April 27th, 2011, was fraud, the false representation of a document and the continued concealment of what should have been disclosed—Obama’s original long-form Certificate of Live Birth, if it indeed exists. The related crime of uttering a forged document has also occurred because someone posted an inauthentic identity document with the intent to pawn it off as a genuine scanned photocopy of Obama’s original 1961 Certificate of Live Birth.
7. The presumption of truth the Secretary initially affords candidates, who claim that they are eligible for the office, was legitimately and seriously undermined by a preponderance of evidence concerning Obama and the Secretary was made aware of this evidence. 8. Regardless of Obama’s role in or knowledge of the forgery, the identity document offered by Candidate Obama to substantiate his eligibility and therefore the placement of his name on the Maryland State ballot for the Office of the President, is forged. 9. When fraud is present during the voting process and an ineligible candidate can get his name on the ballot voters are disenfranchised. The voting public has an expectation that the Secretary will protect them from ineligible usurpers gaining access to the ballot. 10. Appellants find no legal authority which would allow the Secretary to place a candidate’s name on the ballot who is Constitutionally ineligible for the office and who is using a forged document in an attempt to prove he is eligible. 11. The placement of the name of Barack Hussein Obama, on the Maryland State ballot for the Office of the President, resulted in the perpetration of election fraud, a wrongful act that harmed electors. 12. A vote for Candidate Obama by electors in Maryland State resulted in legal injury. Prayer for Relief 1. We request that a Special Master be appointed to conduct an evidentiary hearing of the case and determine findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2. We pray the court finds that the alleged acts or omission materially affected the rights of interested parties and the purity of the election process. 3. We ask the court to conclude that the alleged act or omission changed the outcome of the November 2012 general election already held, for the office of the presidency of the United States and to declare void the election for said office. 4. We ask the court to order any other relief that will provide an adequate remedy to Appellants and serve justice. Respectfully submitted, Tracy A. Fair(Pro Se) 19 W Obrecht Rd. Sykesville, MD. 21784 Mary C. Miltenberger(Pro Se) 14701 Smouse's Mill Rd. NE Cumberland. Md. 21502 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _____ day of September, 2012, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Tracy Fair, the Appellant, were mailed, postage pre-paid to: Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey Darsie (attorney for the defendants) Appellee, 200 Saint Paul Place, Baltimore, Maryland 20212 ______________________ Tracy Fair, Appellant (Pro Se)
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