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Whitehead, Alfred North (1861-1947

Whitehead made fundamental contributions to modern logic and created one of the most controversial metaphysical systems of the twentieth century. He drew out what he took to be the revolutionary consequences for philosophy of the new discoveries in mathematics, logic and physics, developing these consequences first in logic and then in the philosophy of science and speculative metaphysics. His work constantly returns to the question: what is the place of the constructions of mathematics, science and philosophy in the nature of things? Whitehead collaborated with Bertrand Russell on Principia Mathematica (1910-13), which argues that all pure mathematics is derivable from a small number of logical principles. He went on in his philosophy of science to describe nature in terms of overlapping series of events and to argue that scientific explanations are constructed on that basis. He finally expanded and redefined his work by developing a new kind of speculative metaphysics. Stated chiefly in Process and Reality (1929), his metaphysics is both an extended reflection on the character of philosophical inquiry and an account of the nature of all things as a self-constructing ‘process’. On this view, reality is incomplete, a matter of the becoming of ‘occasions’ which are centres of activity in a multiplicity of serial processes whereby the antecedent occasions are taken up in the activities of successor occasions.

1 Life
Alfred North Whitehead studied mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1884 he became a Fellow of Trinity, where he taught mathematics, Bertrand Russell and J.M. Keynes being among his pupils. He was a liberal in politics and an advocate of women’s rights. He wrotePrincipia Mathematica (1910-13) with Russell, moving to London in 1910, where he taught mathematics at University College and was active in educational reform. He became Professor of Applied Mathematics at the Imperial College of Science and Technology in 1914, thereafter writing on the philosophy of science. In 1924 he took up a chair in philosophy at Harvard, where he produced a series of works in speculative metaphysics. Whitehead’s work falls into three periods: the early period of mathematics and logic, the middle period concerned with the philosophy of science; and the late period of speculative metaphysics. Although a matter of debate, his philosophical development is best seen as a shifting, ever-widening analysis of the concept of construction (see Constructivism §1; Constructivism in mathematics §6).

2 Mathematics and logic
Whitehead’s three main early works indicate the central role played by mathematics, logic and science in shaping the themes and models which inform his philosophical thought. His first book, A Treatise on Universal Algebra: With Applications (1898), develops Grassmann’s work in what was then the new field of abstract algebra. Although it had little influence on the subsequent development of mathematics, the Treatise has at least three philosophically significant features. First, it is concerned with the ‘universalization’ or ‘generalization’ of variables beyond their traditional restriction as symbols for numbers. Generalization takes the form of ‘substitutive schemes’, which at this stage in Whitehead’s career are non-axiomatized algebraic formulae having the status of a calculus which symbolizes the operations of addition and multiplication. He holds that the construction of substitutive schemes involves some (here unspecified) relation to the empirical world and that, to be significant, such schemes must have applications or substitutions in some field. In turn, application assists in the investigation of the schemes themselves, which have heuristic value even if they are only partially interpretable at a given stage of knowledge. Second, alongside the emphasis on empirical connection and a realist concern with the significant application of schematized structures, a strong formalist tendency is evident in the Treatise: while consistency is repudiated as the sole ground for existence-theorems, mathematical schemes are defined as conventional idealizations independent of perceptual content (see Realism in the philosophy of mathematics §2). Third, however, Whitehead also emphasizes the synthetic processes of intellectual construction involved in mathematical inference. Like the mathematical intuitionists later on, he regards ‘ 2 + 3’ and ‘ 3 + 2’ as nonidentical (see Intuitionism §1); he holds that the difference of order directs different processes of thought and that equivalence is a matter of identity-in-difference.
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998)

as ‘ingredients’ in events. Version 1. events are unrepeatable. However. (see Russell. the event which is the situation of the object.evident in the treatment of construction in his mathematical writings is a central concern of Whitehead’s subsequent thought. His preferred scheme is constructed on the model of electromagnetic theory in terms of the flux of energy. in particular Russell’s phenomenalist view of theoretical entities as constructions out of atomic sense-data. Thus a ‘sense-object’ . The new theories of physics.for example. speculative account of reality as ‘creativity’ (see Events). Whitehead employs the axiomatic method in constructing a scheme and defines a scheme as a hypothesis to be assessed on the principle of Ockham’s razor (see William of Ockham §2): the preferred scheme in the memoir is that which posits only one class of ultimate entities. classical §§1.realist. of occurrences or events with spatiotemporal spread. ‘Events’ are one of the two basic constituents of nature that Whitehead holds to be disclosed in issue which occupied Whitehead for the rest of his career. are like Aristotelian universalia in rebus (see Aristotle §15. Objects take the place of universals: they are repeatable characters or properties which are neither Platonic forms nor nominalist resemblances but. B. He anticipates his later thought by criticizing the Newtonian account of nature as composed of externally related atoms each occupying a position in absolute space at an absolute time (see Mechanics. §3) is best seen as an account of the logic of relations and an attempt to develop as far as possible the hypothesis of ‘logicism’ . Newton. The effect of the difficulties which subsequently emerged in the logicist project was to strengthen the mathematical-intuitionist tendencies in Whitehead’s thought: he later treats Gödel’s incompleteness theorem as indicating that mathematical logic is an instance of the finite character of all constructions (see Gödel’s theorems §§3-5). Their nature as spatiotemporal regions. a colour which is perceived as situated in an event . relational entities which overlap or extend over one another (see Substance §3). Logical constructions and perceived qualities are to be analysed as features of ‘one system’ of multiple relations by means of a redefinition of sense-experience as the disclosure of the ‘passage of nature’. Whitehead’s Royal Society memoir On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World (1906) offers different logical schemes or models for different theories of the structure of the physical world. Scepticism is never an issue for Whitehead. ‘Objects’ are the second basic constituent of nature disclosed in sense-experience. 4-5. expresses only some of the features of this fundamental relation of extension. written in collaboration with Russell.The development of a philosophy which would coherently relate the different orientations . objects do not act and do not stand to events in an invariable two-termed relation of predication. Taking the place of traditional concepts of substance. As later in Process and Reality (1929). as scepticism assumes that duality has fundamental metaphysical status (see Scepticism §1). I. formalist and intuitionist . London and New York: Routledge (1998) . He abandons the Newtonian concept of ‘nature at an instant’ and rejects the ‘bifurcation’ of nature into perceived qualities and the theoretical entities of science (such as electrons). His complex account of different types of objects is replaced in his later work by an account of the relation of what he calls ‘eternal objects’ to the becoming of Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. As this multiple relation is a facet of nature. however. the perspective relative to the percipient event is not ‘outside’ the world but belongs to the world in that relation. and the conditioning events relating the percipient event to the situation. for Whitehead also terms it ‘process’ and ‘creative advance’. they are terms in a multiple relation of ‘ingression’. The ultimate entities are complexes of relations: points are classes of linear relations which can be given an empirical interpretation in terms of vectors or lines of force. Universals §1). the new logic of relations and Bergson’s account of the fluidity of nature are seen as making possible an empiricism which is neither representationalist nor phenomenalist. that is.0.the claim that all pure mathematics can be derived from an axiomatic scheme of logical concepts taken as primitive (see Logicism §4). thereby dissolving the duality of ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’. Principia Mathematica (1910-13). §§3-4).involves multiple relations between the percipient event (the relevant bodily state of the observer). Events thus imply a special kind of activity pointing towards the later. 3 Philosophy of science Whitehead’s philosophy of science analyses the ontological status of scientific and mathematical concepts in terms of their derivation from the elements and relations of nature as disclosed in sense-experience. The emphasis is on a logic of relations as a way of uniting permanent structure and change in one schematized serial order .

4 Speculative metaphysics Whitehead’s speculative thought challenges the critique of metaphysics characteristic of twentieth-century Anglo-American and European philosophy. Version 1. so C is to D). independent of any metaphysically complete cause or ground. incongruent counterparts and the application of geometries lead him to give the passage of events its own internal. There is no longer any foundationalist appeal to sense-experience in Whitehead’s metaphysics (see Foundationalism §1). Further. Whitehead terms the scheme ‘the philosophy of organism’ to indicate that it embraces biology as much as physics and constitutes a theory of the ‘experience’ of all things as self-constructing centres of activity (see Processes §4). What Whitehead called his ‘Method of Extensive Abstraction’ is primarily an application of a constructivist logic of classes to the question of the status of such theoretical entities as instants of time and points in space. However. Whitehead’s attempt to unify space. which are arranged in a continuum of whole and part like a nest of Chinese boxes. Existence §2). infinitely proceeding multiplicity of sequences. As we descend in the series we progressively reach durations and volumes of ever smaller extension. actualizing] entities’. However. for occasions are relational or serially constituted entities in two senses. Like Bergson and the later Heidegger (see Heidegger. Instants and points are sets or classes of the whole . He agrees with Einstein that space and time are abstractions from spacetime events and that there is an infinite plurality of different ‘time-series’. §2). the completion of an occasion in a series of occasions is its ‘objectification’ by successor occasions. ‘feeling’ and the vectorial transfer of energy. As a ‘generalized mathematics’. the durations of events and spatial volumes. Whitehead defines the act of being in terms of finite self-actualization. uniform (homoloidal) spatial structure. the problems of rotation.0. philosophical significance of §2). a successor occasion has its own internal serial structure as a self-constructing synthesis or ‘concrescence’.‘occasions’. The self-actualization of all things is interpreted as a finite series of acts of self-construction which are asymmetrical. Whitehead’s analysis of the perceptual relations between events allows him to maintain the objectivity both of the distinction between space and time for the observer and of the relative position of the observer. The relation of freedom and determination simply depends on an occasion’s complexity of response. independent of any relation to the objects of which they are the situations. Whitehead’s speculative scheme of categories can be epitomized as universalizing the mathematical concept of series and as closely akin to the mathematical intuitionists’ theory of number construction. M. Instants and points are routes of approximation across. The subject matter of his ‘speculative scheme’ is the ‘empirical side’ of the analysis. In contrast to Russell and his successors who interpret modern mathematical and logical developments in the context of a weak theory of being or existence as quantification. Whitehead’s complex analysis of the serial process of the becoming of occasions employs a variety of analogies with ‘mentality’. transitive and irreflexive. First. Whitehead sees these developments as reopening the possibility of a strong theory of being or existence as ‘act’ (see Being §4. Whitehead’s theory of eternal objects or ‘pure potentials’ is modelled on that of the propositional function. or ‘actual occasions’ which constitute the ‘one genus’ by which the scheme aspires to describe everything. In the state of ‘general potentiality’ eternal objects do not form an Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. defined as everything of which we are conscious as historically situated beings. London and New York: Routledge (1998) . and he treats that structure as actual. This brings him into conflict with the general theory of relativity in which spacetime varies with its (material) contents (see Relativity theory. there are no ‘single’ occasions. This is the ‘process’ of ‘actual [that is. he regards self-actualization as rationally analysable. Categories and applications stand in a relation of proportional analogy (as A is to B. The cogency of the categories depends upon the range of their ‘substitutions’ or ‘applications’ on the ‘empirical side’. respectively. allowing it to modify the extent to which it is determined by its predecessors and environment. constituting an iterative. the theory does not grant the propositional function any metaphysically primitive status but explains what makes the propositional function possible. The construction of an axiomatized scheme of categories is a matter of ‘imaginative generalization’: significant features of the historical world are employed as analogues for the analysis of the nature of all things. Although they do not overlap. Second. time and matter in a single system of relations led him to address Einstein’s theory of relativity critically.part relations of the durations and volumes which enclose them. but unlike them.

The two are combined in an adverbial theory of sensation. but a ‘matrix’ of the ‘multiplicity’ of the endlessly nested possibilities which finite actualizations afford. By serializing occasions.H. This ‘dipolar’ nature expresses the way in which the scheme has a place for the concept of God as both first cause and redeemer (see Process theoism). and ideal or hypothetical inasmuch as it is finite and revisable and consequently does not exclude alternative analyses. there is nothing to prevent the redefinition of the concept of God in that context. Potentiality and actuality are defined as relations of seriality. Whitehead’s general strategy is to define ideality and reality. is the direct experience of the ‘causal efficacy’ of the antecedent world. formulating the ultimate generalities which constitute the nature of things. potential and actual: that is to say. London and New York: Routledge (1998) . which stand in a strictly functional relation of satisfaction and not in any of the traditional relations of agency. constitute the ‘extensive continuum’ or abstract system of part and whole relations. Mathematical relations can thus be intuitionistically defined as equivalently ideal and real. but as states or stages of the serial process of self-construction. Eternal objects of a special kind. Similarly. ‘real potentiality’ can be said to be derived from God because the experience of potentiality from an occasion’s standpoint is nothing other than the ultimacy of ‘appetition’ for actualization. which is the presented locus or spacetime region of the percipient occasion. Internal and external relations are thus states or stages of seriality.0. these aspects are termed his ‘primordial nature’ and revise the concept of God as creator: he does not create occasions but provides them with potentiality. that is. Epistemological Realism. Interpreted as God. not an occasion. the metaphysical scheme is an instance of finite or serial intellectual construction which as such is not subject to the law of the excluded middle (see Intuitionistic logic and antirealism §1). While most readers of Whitehead interpret his speculative realism to mean that his categories are accounts of the metaphysical contents of the world. §§4-5): a successor occasion is internally related to its antecedent occasions. Version 1. as transcendental categories of a new kind which are neither real in the medieval sense nor ideal in the Kantian sense. As a nontemporal being. the concept of God is their nearest conceptual correlate. contrary to the views of many theorists of finite self-actualization. his metaphysics is also self-referentially inclusive.infinite class of possibilities. resemblance or imitation. God is an ‘actual entity’. Speculative Analysis. Whitehead would reconcile the claim that knowledge is perspectival or ‘situated’ with the claim that knowledge is to be defined in terms of objects distinct from and independent of the subject or concrescent occasion. historically situated constructions. but fallible. JAMES BRADLEY List of works Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The primary mode of perception is not a matter of distinct impressions or sense-data but. ‘the objective species’. and is actualized by the becoming of occasions. While his universalization of the concept of finite or serial construction makes him a speculative realist. that is. but its antecedent occasions (as completed or ‘perished’) are not internally related to it. one can also regard them as conditions of the contents of the world. states or stages of actualization. Whitehead’s scheme of categories has a number of significant applications. Thus eternal objects in their state of ‘general potentiality’ are ‘termed’ God because of the ultimate. not actual. The key philosophical difference with Whitehead’s middle-period extension is that the extensive continuum is potential. Relations. Perception.H. F. eternal objects have the status of ‘real potentiality’. not as fundamental metaphysical opposites. Whitehead would dissolve the opposition between F. Whitehead does not attempt to prove God’s existence but to show that. under the principle of serial connection. God. underivable character of possibilities of structure: as the final principle of determination. In his ‘consequent nature’ God objectifies and transforms occasions in the eternal harmony of his nature. The other mode of perception is ‘presentational immediacy’. but his primordial and consequent natures define him as a component of serial process. some of which can be summarized here. The scheme can thus be regarded as real inasmuch as it is constructed or applied. Bradley and Russell on relations by interpreting the doctrines of internal and external relations in the context of his serial pluralism (see Bradley. As components of predecessor occasions which are objectifiable by successor occasions. they are definable as states or stages of serial actualization.

N. A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A. New York: Meridan. OH: Philosophy Documentation Center. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.N. Boston. A. Gross. critical analysis Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.(A clear. (1947) Essays in Science and Philosophy. notably ‘Uniformity and Contingency’. A.S.(A pioneer work in the field of abstract algebra. NJ: Princeton University Press. New York: Macmillan. and Russell.N. ‘Process and Reality’ and ‘Mathematics and the Good’. in Whitehead (1906). References are usually to this or the Cambridge edition.N. and Philadelphia.(The second edition of 1925. New York: The Free Press.N.) Whitehead. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Putnam’s Sons. A. (1929) The Function of Reason.N. Sherburne.) Whitehead. presented in axiomatized form with extensive applications. (1919.(A critical history of the development of modern science. New York: Macmillan.N.N. London: Williams & Norgate. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1920) The Concept of Nature. PA: J. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. 1969.A. Its Meaning and Effect. New York: Macmillan. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London.) Whitehead. 1927. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A.N.(A complete bibliography of Whitehead’s works and the secondary literature up to 1977.) Whitehead. Northrop and Mason W.0.A. (A nontechnical analysis of the philosophy of science and nature which Whitehead sees as required by physics. 1959. notably ‘Uniformity and Contingency’ (1922). and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. should be consulted. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.W. (1926) Review of Science and the Modern World. (1922) The Principle of Relativity. Johnson (ed.(This book contains extensive extracts from Whitehead’s main works. New York: The Philosophical Library.N.) Whitehead. 3 vols.) Whitehead.(One of the central works in modern logic and the philosophy of mathematics. New York: Macmillan. by D. 1929. (1929) Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology. Mind 35: 489-500. (1926) Religion in the Making. (ed. Princeton.) Whitehead. 1925) An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge.(A rich and suggestive restatement of Whitehead’s metaphysics. 1926.C. Griffin and D. 1926. is reprinted in A.N.) Whitehead. A. 1967. Bowling Green.(An analysis of the concepts of civilization and history from the standpoint of Whitehead’s metaphysics.N. New York: Macmillan. in F. with additional notes.N.) Alfred North Whitehead: The Interpretation of Science. MA: Beacon Press.(A clear. (An important collection of papers.) Whitehead. (1910-13) Principia Mathematica.N. 1929.(A historical and critical reflection on the nature of religion in the light of Whitehead’s metaphysics. 1927. concentrating on the concept of organism as the basic principle of modern scientific thought. and London: Ernest Benn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) Woodbridge B. R. totalling 1. later elaborated in Process and Reality. A.) Whitehead. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1974.(This collection of papers. (1925) Science and the Modern World. New York: The Free Press. (1906) On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World.N.) Whitehead.(A critical analysis of the theory of relativity from the point of view of Whitehead’s philosophy of science. 1953. including some of Whitehead’s clearest programmatic and methodological statements. 11-82. A. A. A. A. Bowling Green State University. Lippincott. and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(A prolegomenon to Process and Reality. (1917) The Organization of Thought. (1929) The Aims of Education and Other Essays. Version 1.Whitehead.) References and further reading Braithwaite. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1898) A Treatise on Universal Algebra: With Applications. (Whitehead’s central work in speculative metaphysics. corrected edn. 1961. A. London: G.) Whitehead. this work presents philosophy as a matter of the creation of novel concepts.N.H.) Whitehead. (1926) Symbolism. New York: The Free Press. this work includes a clear statement of his position and a redefinition of the ‘transcendentals’ of medieval philosophy. 1967.B.(This work is essentially a shorter version of The Organization of Thought. with others presented to the Aristotelian Society between 1916 and 1923.N. 1958.(A clear statement of Whitehead’s theory of perception.B. 1978. London: Williams & Norgate. (1911) An Introduction to Mathematics. A. philosophical sections repr.868 entries. New York: The Free Press. B. 1993.) Whitehead. with comparative readings and detailed index.) (1977) Alfred North Whitehead: A Primary-Secondary Bibliography.R. clearly underlining his mathematical intuitionist orientation. repr. ‘Analysis of Meaning’. 1968. New York: Macmillan.W. New York: Macmillan. (1933) Adventures of Ideas. Alfred North Whitehead: An Anthology. 1948. London and New York: Routledge (1998) . A. New York: The Free Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.) Whitehead. 2nd edn.) Whitehead. 1967. A. (1938) Modes of Thought. A. 1958. Series A. elegant account of the basic elements of modern mathematics.P.

2 vols.) Murphy.B. 410-18. W. (ed. Kline. MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. H. relating it to his logical and mathematical work. MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Philosophy of Science 24: 331-5. Proceedings of the First International Whitehead Symposium. (1962) Understanding Whitehead. vol. (A useful account. (1956) Whitehead’s Philosophical Development: A Critical History of the Background of Process and Reality. CA: University of California Press. (eds) (1981) Whitehead and the Idea of Process. CT: Yale University Press.L. Conley. with comparisons to Hegel). (1959) The Philosophy of Whitehead.(A partly technical analysis.(A detailed biography of Whitehead.(A wide-ranging collection of essays by American. L.) Lawrence. J. Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit. Leclerc and Rorty. Hay and M. R. Ford and Rorty. New York: St Martin’s Press. (1959) An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics. and Maassen. and Kline. (1983) Explorations in Whitehead’s Philosophy. 1984. Murphy. E.S.W. Englewood Cliffs.) (1971) Process Studies.F.) Harris.(A valuable collection. 2nd edn. Hartshorne.(A useful collection which includes essays by Buchler. presenting combinatory logic as the basis of the theory of prehensions and eternal objects.) Braithwaite. Philosophical Review 46: 170-7. historical and contemporary. (1954) Nature. Singer (eds) Reason and the Common Good: Selected Essays of A. H. also in Problems of Men. 1990) Alfred North Whitehead: The Man and His Work.(A standard.) Deleuze.(Whitehead’s response is ‘Analysis of Meaning’ in Whitehead (1947): 122-31. London: Allen & Unwin. London: Macmillan. New York: Fordham University Press.(The role of analogy in metaphysical thinking. vol. Die Gifford Lectures und Ihre Deutung: Materialen zu Whitehead’s Prozess und Realität. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. detailed analysis. S (1979) ‘Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics’. (1984) The Development of Whitehead’s Metaphysics. E. (ed. New York: The Macmillan Company. London and New York: Routledge (1998) .) Kline. 1966. 1963.S.B. (The standard introductory text to Whitehead’s entire oeuvre. N. Berkeley. 1966. 1. MN: University of Minnesota Press.(A detailed discussion of the development of Whitehead’s central metaphysical concepts).) (1963) Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy.of Whitehead’s metaphysics in the light of his earlier work. British and Continental philosophers. F.) (1961) The Relevance of Whitehead. (A collection which includes indispensable essays by Leclerc on Aristotle and Whitehead. Philosophical Studies 35: 361-71. New York: Humanities Press and London: Allen & Unwin. A. also in W.) Christian. (ed. I. Mind and Modern Science. (1957) ‘Combinatory Logic and Whitehead’s Theory of Prehensions’.) Ford. (1988) Le Pli: Leibnix et le Baroque. critical analysis of Whitehead’s philosophy of science. 1992.(The importance of Whitehead’s metaphysics in the modern philosophical tradition.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: The Athlone Press. W. with valuable analyses of Whitehead’s theory of perception and use of analogy). The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. New York: Philosophical Library. New York: The Macmillan Company and London: Allen & Unwin. 2nd edn. (1958) Whitehead’s Metaphysics: An Introductory Exposition.E.(A striking analysis of the significance and relation of the philosophies of Dewey and Whitehead.a view strongly challenged by Schmidt (1967). (1985. Christian. Philosophical Review 36: 121-44. nontechnical analysis of Whitehead’s metaphysics. which reads Whitehead’s development in terms of a tension between ‘realism’ and ‘conceptualism’ .) Leclerc.0. Aristotelian Society supplementary vol. G.. (1927) Contribution to ‘Symposium: Is The "Fallacy of Simple Location" A Fallacy?’. repr.(A valuable analysis and critique of Whitehead’s metaphysics from a British Idealist viewpoint. 2.) Haack. 1925-1929. Gefühl und Raum-Zeit: Materialen zu Whitehead’s Prozess und Realität. Minneapolis. Henry. Version 1.A.) Mays. Englewood Cliffs. Ford.G. with analyses of his works. (A useful collection which includes essays by Hall.W. L.) Emmet. trans.(A clear. New Haven. (eds) (1991) Prozess.) Dewey. NJ: Prentice Hall. Fitch. G. 163-77. (1946) The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking. Strawson’s Individuals. Some of the material translated into German has not been published in English. and Wolf-Gazo.) Ford.(An instructive comparison of The Concept of Nature with P. T. Albany: State University of New York Press. (1927) ‘Objective Relativism in Dewey and Whitehead’. 1946.(A journal devoted to Whitehead and ‘process’ philosophies.L. Holz. D. 1965. NJ: Prentice Hall Inc. Baltimore. I. 1993. V. V. G.) Lowe. L.(An indispensable.) Lowe.) Hampe. (1937) ‘Whitehead’s Philosophy’. Baltimore. 7: 224-36.) Leclerc. M. Cobb. and Mays on the Royal Society Memoir of 1906. California: Claremont. (A standard introductory text to Whitehead’s metaphysics. Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber.S.

Mind 57. IL: University of Chicago Press. J. New York: State University of New York Press. NJ: Rutgers University Press.0. London and New York: Routledge (1998) . Freiburg and Munich: Verlag Karl Alber. Version 1.(This work contains very useful analyses and clarifications of Whitehead’s central concepts. and Wiehl R.N.) Palter. (1956) Portraits From Memory.(An historically important and amusing account of the influence on Russell of Whitehead’s early thoughts on ‘construction’. The Library Of Living Philosophers. relating him to Heidegger and others.Nobo. Proceedings of the International Whitehead Symposium. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. (eds) (1983) Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Creativity. (1986) Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity.M. B. W.) The Philosophy of A.V. Treash et al.F. (1960) Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science.A.N.(An indispensable analysis. 5. (1941) ‘Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic’ in P. E. London: Allen & Unwin.(An influential analysis of Whitehead’s place in twentieth-century philosophy.) Wahl. trans. ch. 1986. Whitehead.) Russell. 2nd edn. Schilpp (ed. (The conceptual connections between Whitehead’s thought and twentieth-century literature.) Rapp. 1956. NY: State University of New York Press. J. Proust in particular. G. (1931) Axel’s Castle. (1967) Perception and Cosmology in A. IL: Open Court. 1986. Paris: Vrin. New Brunswick.L. 1967. Chicago. 127-63. (An account of the co-authorship of Principia. (A useful collection of essays mainly by German philosophers and theologians. 1990. partly technical.) Wilson.) Quine. emphasizing Whitehead’s role. R.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.) Schmidt. which presents Whitehead as tending to ‘platonic’ realism. (1948) ‘Whitehead and Principia Mathematica’. 137-8. B. P. La Salle.) Russell. Albany. 1970. F. including an account of his relativity theory. Whitehead’s Philosophy. (A technical and detailed analysis of Whitehead’s theories of extension.(A clear and detailed analysis of Whitehead’s philosophical development. (1932) Vers le concret.