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The Opening of Genesis, Part IX.

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness
(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

TEXTS. 26 Then God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness; and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.
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26 et ait: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram: et prsit piscibus maris, et volatilibus cli, et bestiis, universque terr, omnique reptili, quod movetur in terra. 1:26. And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. (Douay-Rheims Challoner Revision) Let us make man to our image. . .This image of God in man, is not in the body, but in the soul; which is a spiritual substance, endued with understanding and free will. God speaketh here in the plural number, to insinuate the plurality of persons in the Deity.

1. Readings. Cf. the following excerpt from the VERITAS Website:


Genesis I. 26-31.

June 25, 2010


And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth. And God created man to his own image: to the image of God he created him: male and female he created them. And God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and all living creatures that move upon the earth. And God said: Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat: and to all the beasts of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to all that move upon the earth, and wherein there is life, that they may have to feed upon. And it was so done. And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good. And the evening and morning were the sixth day. 26-31. The completion of the work of ornation. The sixth day (ii): the creation of man. 26a. Let us make man to our image St. Chrysostom: To whom was it said, Let us make man; and with whom did the Lord make this consultation? It is not as if He had need of counsel and deliberation; far be that thought from us; rather, by the style of these words He wished to declare what excellent honor he was granting to man, whom He had fashioned. What therefore do they say, who still have a veil upon their heart,[1] and do not want to understand any of the things that are contained here? These things were said, so they say, to an Angel or an Archangel. O madness, o vast ignorance! And by what possible reason is it fitting, my good man, that the Angels should enter into consultation with the Lord, and creatures with their Creator? For it is not the Angels place to give counsel, but to assist, and fulfill their ministry Who, therefore, is he, to whom God said, Let us make man? Who other than that Angel of great counsel, that wonderful counsellor, powerful, the prince of peace, the father of the world to come ,[2] the only-begotten Son of God, equal to the Father according to substance, through whom all things were brought forth? (ibid., 2, 3.). St. Basil: To whom does He say: to our image? To whom else, I ask, than to the splendor of His glory,[3] and to the impression of his substance, Him who is the image of the invisible God?[4] (Hexmeron, ix. 6.). St. Augustine: What is said in the other works is not to be received indifferently: God said: Be it made; here, however: God said: Let us make man to our image and likeness : to insinuate, if I may say so, the plurality of persons, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. However, Scripture immediately warns us that the unity of the deity is to be understood, saying: And God created man to His own image; not the Father creating to the image of the Son, or the Son creating to the image of the Father; besides, it would not have been truly said, to our image, if man was made solely to the image of the Father or of the Son This signifies that this plurality of persons does not mean, that we may say, or believe, or think, that there are many gods; no: the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, and it is with regard to this Trinity that it is said to our image; but that we might accept the one God, it is said, to the image of God (De Genesi ad litteram, III. xix. 29.).

St. Ambrose: To whom does He speak? Not to Himself at any rate, because He does not say Let me make, but Let us make. Not to the Angels, because they are His ministers;[5] and it is not possible for servants to have a share with their master, or creatures with their Creator. No, He speaks to the Son: even if the Jews do not wish it, even if the Arians fight against it Would He say to the Angels: Let us make man to our image and likeness ? Hear what Scripture says the image of God is: Who hath delivered us, it says, from the power of darkness, and has translated us into the kingdom of the Son of his love, in whom we have redemption through his blood, the remission of sins; Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature.[6] He is the image of God the Father, He Who always is, and was in the beginning.[7] Indeed He is the image Who says: Philip, he that seeth me seeth the Father also.[8] And how sayest thou, when thou seest the image of the living Father, Shew us the Father? Do you not believe, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? [9] The image of God is power, not weakness: the image of God is wisdom, the image of God is justice: but divine wisdom, and eternal justice (Hexmeron, VI. vii. 40-41.). Cf. S. Beda, In Principium Genesis I. col. 28; In Pentateuchum Comentarii, col. 200; Peter Lombard, Sententiarum I. ii. 4. 26b. The difference between image and likeness. St. Thomas: It is to be said that, as Augustine says,[10] where there is an image, there is necessarily a likeness; but where there is a likeness, there is not necessarily an image. From which it is clear that likeness is of the nature of image, and that image adds something above the nature of likeness, namely that it is expressum, copied and shaped, from something else; for an image is so called because it imitates another. Whence an egg, however much it may be similar and equal to another egg, nevertheless because it is not expressum, copied and shaped, from it, it is not said to be its image (ST. I a q. xciii. a. i.). As a good can be compared to some specific thing as a preamble to it, and as subsequent to it, just as it designates some perfection belonging to it; in the same way also is the comparison of likeness to image. For good is a preamble to man, in that man is a certain particular good; and again good is subsequent to man, in so far as we say a specific man in particular to be good, because of the perfection of his virtue. And likewise, likeness is considered as a preamble to image, in so far as it is more common than an image, as was said above; it is also considered as subsequent to image, in so far as it signifies a certain perfection of the image; for we say that an image of something is similar or dissimilar to that of which it is an image, in as much as it perfectly or imperfectly represents it ( ibid., a. ix.). 28. The nature of mans likeness to God revealed by Gods blessing. St. Augustine: After God had said, to our image, He immediately added, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air , and of the other animals lacking reason: clearly so that we might understand that man is made in the image of God in respect to that, in which he surpasses irrational animals. And this is reason itself: whether it is called mind, or intelligence, or some other more suitable word. Whence the Apostle says: Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man ,[11] who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of him that created him :[12] sufficiently showing where man is created to the image of God: not in the features of the body, but in a certain intelligible form of the illuminated mind (De Genesi ad litteram, III. xx. 30.). St. Chrysostom: God makes clear to us by the words he adds, in what sense He has used the word image. For what does he say? And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth . Therefore

He said image with regard to power and dominion, not with regard to anything else: for indeed God made man ruler[13] over everything that exists on earth; and nothing on earth is greater than man, but all things are under his power (Homili in Genesin, viii. 3.). 30. The blessings given to man. St. Bernard: Let us give thanks, brethren, to our Creator The first thing He granted to us, is that we are ourselves: since He made us, and not we ourselves [14] Lest anyone be content with this gift, granted that it is so great, He who caused you to be when you were not, also pours forth for you things by which you, who already were, can subsist. Nor has He done this less generously, than He did the first wondrously. Let us make, it says, man to our image and likeness. And what afterwards? And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the beasts of the earth, and the fowls of the air . Already it had taught that even the heavenly elements were created for your use. For you remember that they were made for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years . For whom, do you think? No one but yourself. All the other creatures either have no need of all these, or do not understand them. How plentiful He was in this second blessing; how very generous He was! How great are the things He lavished on you for your sustenance; for your instruction; for your consolation; for your correction, and also for your delight! Truly these two blessings are given to you without cost, and He made them doubly without cost. What do I mean, doubly without cost? Without merit on your part, without effort on His. For He spoke, and they were made[15] (Sermones de Tempore, In Psalmum xc., XIV. 1, 2.). 31. They were very good St. Augustine: And you saw, God, all the things you made, and, behold, they were very good. In the different varieties of your works, when you spoke, that they might come into being, and be made, you saw that this and that were good. Seven times I counted it written[16] that you saw that what you made was good; and this is the eighth time, and you saw all things that you made, and behold they were not only good but even very good: just as, as it were, all things together. For separately they were only good; together, though, all things are very good. Every beautiful body also declares this: for the body that consists of all the beautiful members is much more beautiful than the members themselves separately by whose most orderly coming together the whole body is completed however beautiful the members may be on their own (Conf., XIII. xxviii. 43.). [1] 2 Cor. iii. 15. [2] Is. ix. 6, LXX (5): , , , , . Vulgate/DR: And his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace. [3] Hebr. i. 3. [4] Col. i. 15. [5] Ps. xiii. 4. [6] Col. i. 13-15. [7] John i. 1. [8] John xiv. 9. [9] ibid. 9-10. [10] QQ. 83, qu. 74. [11] Eph. iv. 23-24. [12] Col. iii. 10. [13] Gr. . PL translates principem, leader, chief. [14] Ps. ic. 3.

[15] Ps. xxxii. 9. [16] According to the LXX and the corresponding Old Latin.

Cf. The Bible: Genesis 1, Institute for Biblical & Scientific Studies:1
Genesis 1:24-31 DAY 6 <> Man Hebrew Text wnmlxb <da h?un - Let us make man in our image Let us make The Hebrew h?un, let us make is plural. The early Christian church took this phrase as referring to the Trinity. Early Jewish commentators took this phrase as referring to the heavenly court of angels. It used to be taken as a plural of majesty but we is not used with verbs this way (Wenham 1987, 28). Today some call it a plural of self-deliberation (Ibid.). The best interpretation seems to be that God is giving a divine announcement to the heavenly court of angels (See Job 38:7; Wenham, 28). Jewish Literature Man-Adam There are three different ways <da adam is used in Genesis. Adam can just mean the generic term for mankind in general, or male in particular. In Genesis 1:27 the term adam includes both male and female referring to all humanity. In Genesis Two adam refers to a male in contrast to a female. The second use is a historical person named Adam. Hess states that not until chapter 4:25 is a historical person meant (Hess 1997, 31). The third use of adam as a title, is seen in ancient Near Eastern parallels where the lu-sign for ruler means man (Hess 1990, 7). The name adam in Genesis seems to be a word play with the name for ground, adamah from which man was formed (Hess 1997, 31). The root word for adam means red (Hess 1993, 15). The historical Adam may be the same man named Allum the first king in the Sumerian King List who lived before the great flood. He was the first king of Eridu which may be the Biblical Eden. Adam is also equated with Adapa, the first sage (Shea 1977, 27; Fischer 1996, 308). Akkadian Literature An old Babylonian text tells of the creation of man by the mother goddess. It says,

(http://www.bibleandscience.com/bible/books/genesis/genesis1.htm [9/16/08])

Thou art the mother-womb, The one who creates mankind. Create, then, Lullu (savage, first man) and let him bear the yoke! The yoke he shall bear, The work of god man shall bear! Let one god be slain, And let the gods be purified by immersion In his flesh and his blood. Let Nintu mix clay, God and Man, Let them together be smeared with clay (ANET, 99-100). Several other stories tell about man being made from clay. Sometimes the clay is mixed with the blood of a god. The earliest known story dealing with mans creation is Enki and Ninhah which says: And when Enki, the-fashioner-of-the-forms, pondered by himself their nature, He said to his mother, Nammu: My mother, the creature which you named, will verily exist; impose (on him) the burden of the gods! When you have mixed the heart of the clay on top of the Abzu, The two birth-goddesses shall nip off pieces of clay. When you yourself have given (it) form. [Thus] she created mankind ma[le and female...] (COS, 517). Image The other key word is the meaning of image. Is this to be taken physically or spiritually? The preposition b in this phrase means According to, after the pattern of (Wenham 1987, 29). A close parallel is in Exodus 25:40 where Moses is told to build the tabernacle after the pattern seen on the mountain. There are five main views of the meaning of image. (1) The likeness is two aspects of mans nature. This is according to early Christian views like Irenaeus. (2) The image refers to the mental or spiritual side of man. (3) It is the ability to relate to God, to have a relationship with God. (4) The image makes man Gods representative on earth. Man is Gods viceregent on earth. (5) The image is physical. In the ANE kings were considered to be the image of God even the very son of god. This does not mean the king looked like God but describes the kings divine right and function as ruler. It seems that view 4 can be combined with view 5. The king is ruling in Gods place. Man is to rule over all of creation on earth (verse 26). This same word image is used in Genesis 5:3 when Seth is after his (Adams) image. Although man had much in common with animals, it was being in the image of God that made him different (Wenham, 30). It seems the Hebrews have democratized the image of God to refer to all mankind, and not just the king. Egyptian Literature

On a stele of Amenophis II from Amada the pharaoh is called the beloved son in bodily form of Reimage of Horus on the throne of his father (Westermann, 152). Pharaoh is also called the glittering image of the Lord of all and the Pharaoh says, I am his son (that is of Osiris) (Ibid., 153). In another text Amon-Re addresses Amenophis III saying, Thou art my beloved son, come forth from my limbs, my very own image, which I have put upon the earth. I have permitted thee to rule over the earth in peace (Ibid.). From these texts we see that the Pharaoh was the image of god, gods representative on earth. This is similar to Psalm 8. Hebrew Text wbrw wrp - Be fruitful and multiply Man is commanded to be fruitful and multiply. Here is a statement on the divine purpose of marriage which is for the procreation of children. This is also a rejection of the ancient fertility cults which marks unbelief (Genesis 16; 30:14-15). Food Hebrew Text hlkal b?u qry-lk - Every green plant for food Every plant and tree is given to man for food. Note there are only two kinds of vegetation mentioned here. The animals are just given plants to eat, and not fruit from trees. There seems to be an ancient tradition that man and animals were herbivorous. Sumerian Texts There is an interesting text that tells about man before he learned how to make clothes, and learned how to harvest gain. The text Ewe and Wheat says: And there was no cloth to wear The people of those distant days, They knew not bread to eat; They knew not cloth to wear; They went about with naked limbs in the Land, And like sheep they ate grass with their mouth, Drinking water from the ditches (Clifford 1994, 45). This sounds like the description of cave men before civilization developed. In another text How Grain Came to Sumer it begins, At that time, humans ate only grass like sheep; It was then, of old, that An made cereals, barley, and flax descended from heaven (Clifford 1994, 47). Clifford comments that there are two stages of early human development in mythologies; first culture appears, and then instruments of culture. Before this man lived like the animals (Ibid., 46). Akkadian Texts In the ANE man was created by the gods in order to supply the gods with food. In AtraHasis the gods were tried of doing all the work so they decided to create man so he could do the work for them and supply the gods with food (Lambert & Millard 1969, 57-67; lines 191,

339). Later man became so noisy the gods sent a great flood. Atra-Hasis (Noah) is commanded to build a boat to save his life and animals. It rained for seven days and seven nights. Atra-Hasis was saved. In the Gilgamesh Epic Enkidu is described as a primitive man as follows: Aruru washed her hands, Pinched off clay and cast it on the steppe. [On the step]pe she created valiant Enkidu, Offspring of ..., essence of Ninurta. [Sha]ggy with hair is his whole body, He is endowed with head hair like a woman. The locks of his hair sprout like Nisaba. He knows neither people nor land; Garbed is he like Sumuqan. With the gazelles he feeds on grass, With the wild beasts he jostles at the watering-place, With the teeming creatures his heart delights in water. Clifford states, Enkidu leaves his animal-like existence when he enters the city and accepts kingship in the person of King Gilgamesh; he becomes fully human. Egyptian Literature In the Hymn to Amon Re it says, He who made herbage (for) the cattle, And the fruit tree for mankind (ANET, 366; COS, 39). In the Hymn to Aten it says, All beasts browse on their herbs (COs, 45; ANET, 370). Genesis 1:24-31 DAY 7 The Post-Creation Sabbath Hebrew Text wtkalm yuybvh <wyb <yhla lkyw - And God finished his work on day seven The origin of the Sabbath is probably from the 6&7 day cycle of the phases of the moon each month. Six days of the new moon, and on the seventh day there was the quarter moon which was celebrated. Another six days then on the seventh was the full moon which was celebrated. Probably during the captivity there was no one to watch for the phrases of the moon so it became disconnected from the lunar cycle. The new moon and full moon are only mentioned in scripture. Later the sun, moon, and five planets were connected to the week which we still have today. Sunday is the day of the sun. Monday is the day of the moon. Saturday is Saturns day. Tuesday through Friday are Germanic names for the other planets. Tuesday is Tuis day the god of war, Mars. Wednesday is Wodens day, Mercury. Thursday is Thors day, Jupiter. Friday is Friggs day, goddess of love, Venus. The word friend comes from the same root word Fri. Genesis One avoids naming the days of the week after any gods. Gordon comments that the noun sabbath was not used because it may be confused with the meaning of Saturn (1979, 300). Just as sun and moon are not named. It is demythologizing

the seventh day. The Jews were known as Saturns people (Tacitus Histories, 5:2). The Roman Saturns day is similar to the Sabbath. This festival was seven days when all work and business was stopped and slaves were given temporary freedom (Gordon 1979, 300 note 6). Stolz believes that the Sabbath developed out of major festivals that lasted seven days with the final day being a Sabbath (Wenham 35; THWAT 2:863-9). Robinson analyzed the occurrences of the root word for Sabbath and concluded that the primary meaning is not one of rest. The seventh day was a day of completion. He takes both the Hebrew and Akkadian root back to the biliteral root by which means making a turn which implies coming to an end (1980, 41). The moon on the fifteenth day of the month becomes full, it turns from waxing. This may be the different turns or phases of the moon. Old Testament The phraseology of Exodus 40:33 where Moses finishes the tabernacle is similar to finishing the creation of the world. Numbers 28:11-25 tells of offerings on the new moon and the full moon then a festival of seven days. Psalm 81:4 says, Sound the rams horn at the New Moon, and when the moon is full, on the day of our Feast (NIV). This is similar to other ancient cultures. It may be that the Sabbath just started out as a feast on the 15th of the full moon, and then the new moon and then the four quarters of the moons phases. Isaiah 1:13 says, Stop bring meaningless offerings! Your incense is detestable to me. New Moons, Sabbaths and convocations (NIV). Hosea 2:11 says, I will stop all her celebrations: her yearly festivals, her New Moons, her Sabbath days all her appointed feasts (NIV). Sumerian Texts The earliest use of a seven day week is connected with seven days of feasting which can be traced back as far as the 23rd century BC to the time of Gudea (Hildegard and Lewy 1943, 3). Hallo writes, In the celebrated cylinders of Gudea of Lagash, we are introduced to the generalized Sumerian term for lunar festival es-es (Hallo 1977, 5). There are offerings for the new moon, the first crescent (literally chariot of the 7th day) and the full moon (crescent of the 15th day). There is no account of the 3rd crescent. The use of the word chariot may be because of the moon being compared to a chariots wheel. Gudeas dedication of the great temple at Lagesh which lasted seven days is similar to Solomons dedication of the temple at Jerusalem (Hallo 1977, 12). In Summer the moon god Nanna was considered superior to the sun. The moon god was the father of the sun. Their month was based on sighting the lunar crescent. Their year was based on 12 lunar cycles with a 13th sometimes added. One text says, [Nanna], fixing the month and the new moon, [setting] the year in its place (Cohen 1993, 3; A. Sjoberg ZA 73 (1983) 32). Annual festivals tied to the seasons were assigned fixed days in an irrelevant lunar schema so they intercalated the year (Ibid.). The equinoxes were also very important.

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In the OT they are called turn of the year (Exodus 34:22 and 2 Samuel 11:1). At one time there was a six month year marked by the equinoxes called mu-an-na (Ibid., 7). There also may be a connection with the counting system of the Sumerians which is based on the number 60 and multiples, 6, and 3,600 which might be tied to the phases of the moon (six days between phases). Akkadian Texts The Hebrew word tbv is probably from the Akkadian word Sapattu, the day of the full moon, the 15th of the month. In Akkadian the 7th 14th 19th 21st and 28th days of each month were unlucky. The 19th day is exactly 49 days from the last new moon. Neo-Babylonian hitpu offerings were on these same days excluding the 19th. In the Atra-hasis epic Enki says, On the first, seventh, and the fifteenth day of the month I will make a purifying bath (Lambert and Millard 1969, 57, 59). Ugaritic Texts In the Baal Cycle it tells how the palace of Baal was build. First a summary statement is given, then the details. Gibson translates, [Quickly] his mansion was built, [quickly] his palace was raised (1978, 62; KTU 1.4 VI 16-17). Choice cedar trees from Lebanon are brought. A fire is set that burns for 6 days, and on the 7th day it ends. The fire turned the silver into ingots and the gold into gold bricks. Some scholars think the building of Baals palace is the building of the universe (Fisher, 1965, 313-24). Note that it take 6 days then on the 7th day it is finished just like in Genesis. There is another text that tells about Kerets march to Udum that end climactically on the 7th day and he camped 7 more days around the city (KTU 1.14 III 10-15, V 3-7). This is very similar to Joshua taking Jericho. In Aqhat Daniels prayers are not answered until the seventh day. The sacred number 7 is used a number of times in Ugaritic. Egyptian Texts At the completion of Ptahs creation of the world the Memphite Theology states, So has Ptah come to rest after his making everything and every divine speech as well, having given birth to the gods (COS, 23). This parallels Gods rest on the 7th day. Westermann comments, The background to what is said about the rest of God at the end of his creative action is a motif which is widespread in the history of religions, the leisure (otiositas) of the creator GodIt means that the creator god will not intervene any more in the work which he has completed (1994, 167; see also Pettazzoni 1954, 32). In the Hymn to Amon-Re it says, Heliopolitan, Lord of the new moon festival, For whom are performed the six-day and quarter month festivals (COs, 39). Conclusions

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From this study I have learned that Genesis one is a polemic against the surrounding heathen nations, who worshipped many gods. It also seems to be etiological in nature, explaining the Sabbath as a day of rest. Genesis one is not a scientific treatise on how the world was created. According to II Timothy 3:16 the Bible was meant for instruction in righteousness not science. God choose the simple framework of a week to explain the complex story of creation. <> Updated: 4/30/2008 Webmaster: info@bibleandscience.com

Cf. Haydocks Catholic Bible Commentary (1853; original ed. 1811), On Genesis Chapter One; on Gen. 1:1:
Ver. 26. Let us make man to our image. This image of God in man, is not in the body, but in

the soul; which is a spiritual substance, endued with understanding and free-will. God speaketh here in the plural number, to insinuate the plurality of persons in the Deity. (Challoner) Some of the ancient Jews maintained that God here addressed his council, the Angels; but is it probable that he should communicate to them the title of Creator, and a perfect similitude with himself? (Calmet) Man is possessed of many prerogatives above all other creatures of this visible world: his soul gives him a sort of equality with the Angels; and though his body be taken from the earth, like the brutes, yet even here the beautiful construction, the head erect and looking towards heaven, &c. makes St. Augustine observe, an air of majesty in the human body, which raises man above all terrestrial animals, and brings him in some measure near to the Divinity. As Jesus assumed our human nature, we may assert, that we bear a resemblance to God both in soul and body. Tertullian (de Resur. 5.) says, Thus that slime, putting on already the image of Christ, who would come in the flesh, was not only the work of God, but also a pledge. (Haydock) See St. Bernard on Psalm xcix. (Worthington)
Ver. 27. Male and female. Eve was taken from Adams side on this same day, though it be

related in the following chapter. Adam was not an hermaphrodite as some have foolishly asserted. (Calmet) Adam means the likeness, or red earth, that in one word we may behold our nobility and meanness. (Haydock)
Ver. 28. Increase and multiply. This is not a precept, as some protestant controvertists would

have it, but a blessing, rendering them fruitful: for God had said the same words to the fishes and birds, (ver. 22.) who were incapable of receiving a precept. (Challoner) Blessed them, not only with fecundity as he had done to other creatures, but also with dominion over them, and much more with innocence and abundance of both natural and supernatural gifts. Increase. The Hebrews understand this literally as a precept binding every man at twenty years of age (Calmet); and some of the Reformers argued hence, that Priests, &c. were bound to marry: very prudently they have not determined how soon! But the Fathers in general agree that if this were a precept with respect to Adam, for the purpose of filling the earth, it is no longer so, that end being sufficiently accomplished. Does not St. Paul wish all men to be like himself, unmarried? (1 Corinthians vii. 1, 7, 8.) (Haydock)
Ver. 29. Every herb, &c. As God does not here express leave to eat flesh-meat, which he did

after the deluge, it is supposed that the more religious part of mankind, at least, abstained from it, and from wine, till after that event, when they became more necessary to support

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decayed nature. (Haydock) (Menochius) In the golden age, spontaneous fruits were the food of happy mortals. (Calmet)

Cf. Gen. 1:26 (Douay-Rheims):


v. 26: And he said: Let us make man to our image and likeness.v. 27: And God created man to his own image, to the image of God he created him; male and female he created them.

Cf. Gen. 2:7 (Douay-Rheims):


v. 7: And the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth: and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul.

As we have argued elsewhere in this series, Moses represents the coming to be of all things according to a likeness it has with the coming to be of a living thing. Now the only creature one could suppose to furnish the paradigm for this process is man, the microcosmthat is to say, the minor mundus, as St. Thomas calls him. Accordingly, one must look for correspondences between the genesis of the former and that of the latter. Now in the production of man, we observe God to have first formed the proximate matter of his body and then to have imparted to him his soul by means of His breath; understanding the latter to be the same as the spirit of God, which is the Holy Spirit. Hence we must suppose that the unformed state of the earth at the outset of the first day corresponds to the slime of the earth as its material cause (recognizing that both involve earth mixed with water), and the Spirit of God as its moving cause. Note: Not only is the imparting of the soul to the first man to be attributed to Gods Holy Spirit, but also the fashioning of his body, as may be inferred from the following passage of St. Thomas Aquinas: Cf. Summa Theol., IIIa, q., 32, art. 1, obj. ad 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Whether the accomplishment of Christs conception should be attributed to the Holy Ghost? <> Reply to Objection 1: The work of the conception is indeed common to the whole Trinity; yet in some way it is attributed to each of the Persons. For to the Father is attributed authority in regard to the Person of the Son, who by this conception took to Himself (human nature). The taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the Son: but the formation of the body taken by the Son is attributed to the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son, according to Gal. 4:6: God sent the Spirit of His Son. For just as the power of the soul which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other men, so the Power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: Christ, the Power of God, through the Holy Ghost formed the body which He assumed. This is also shown by the words of the angel: The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, as it were, in order to prepare and fashion the matter of Christs body; and the Power of the Most High, i.e. Christ, shall overshadow theethat is to say, the incorporeal Light of the Godhead shall in thee take the corporeal substance of human nature: for a shadow is formed by light and body, as Gregory says (Moral. xviii). The Most High is the Father, whose Power is the Son. (emphasis added)

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Consequently, just as...the Power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: Christ, the Power of God, through the Holy Ghost formed the body which He assumed, doing so just as the power of the soul which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other menso, too, we may presume that the Power of God working through His Spirit formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth;2 it being an article of faith that all Gods works ad extra are to be attributed to the Most Blessed Trinity as one, common principle of creatures (for which, see further below). Now as we have seen, the body of man could only have received the proximate dispositions rendering it suitable to receive the rational soul from God without the intermediary of created causes. But so, too, the earth immersed in water as it existed at the outset of the first day, being the first matter of creation, and so being preceded by nothing, had to have been immediately created by God. By the same exigency, just as the soul of man could only have been produced in being by God, so, too, the worlds first form, namely, the light of the first day, could only have been produced by the divine agency, exclusive of any created cause; the reason for supposing so, as we have argued above, being its possession of the faculty of generation evident from the diurnal rotation of the first heaven. But that very possession demonstrates the heavens reception of its specific nature as the result of the formation of its first principal part. Thus, to our list of verses above we must add verse 2: Now the earth was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep. From the foregoing considerations, then, it follows that these corresponding works, the production of the matter of creation and of man, and that of the substantial form constituting each in its essence, are to be attributed to the divine power exclusively. But if so, it also follows that every other work of the six days may involve created causality, not only with respect to matter presupposed, as is the case with the body of man, but also with respect to the moving cause, as we have argued is the case with the generation of water above the surface of the earth as being due to the causality of a power like that of the sun. But then so, too, with the separation of the waters above from those below by the production of the firmament on the second day, as well as of the gathering together of the waters below at the outset of the third, and the bringing forth of living things, as with the production of plant-life and the end of the same day, and the subsequent productions of living things. N.B. The formation of the body of man from the slime of the earth parallels the state of affairs in the general creation; but slime = mud = a suspension of earth in water therefore these principles are not two names for one subject; rather they have independent existence. That the formation of the body of man from the slime of the earth points to the generation of a new substance by the combining of the elements; mans body being the most temperate such combination.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol. Ia, q. 70, art. 2, ad 1 (tr. English Dominican Fathers): ... at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements... N.B. In the present instance, in the words slime of the earth, we are, perhaps, meant to infer the presence of a seminal virtue rendering it in proximate potency to the form of the human body.

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2. Supplement: Correspondences between the first creation and the special creation of man. The first creation account: On the first three days: In the beginning there is the earth and the waters in a state of imbalance: the waters cover the surface of the earth. When God withdraws the waters from the surface of the earth, the resulting balance makes possible the appearance of life at the end of the third day.

The second creation account: On the return to the sixth day: At this time there is also an imbalance between earth and water, only now it is water that is lacking rather than superabounding. When God sends up a spring, the stream which results waters the face of the earth (= irrigation, not rainfall), the resulting balance making possible the appearance of human life at the end of the sixth day:

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3. The creation of man according to St. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. Ia, qq. 90-93 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
QUESTION 90 Of the First Production of Mans Soul (In Four Articles) After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of mans soul; (2) the production of mans body; (3) the production of the woman. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether mans soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance? (2) Whether, if made, it was created? (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality? (4) Whether it was made before the body? FIRST ARTICLE Whether the Soul Was Made or Was of Gods Substance? We proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not made, but was Gods substance. For it is written (Gen. ii. 7): God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul. But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance. Obj. 2. Further, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of Gods substance. Obj. 3. Further, things that exist and do not differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same. On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Anim iii. 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith, among which the first is the opinion that God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself. I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 77, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence,acquires its knowledge somehow from things,and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act,receives nothing from any other, and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (Q. 3, AA. 1, 7; Q. 9, A. 1). This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagi-nation, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies . And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as

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is stated De Anima i. 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii. 6 [the words as quoted are to be found iv. 31]). So some supposed mans soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. 3, AA. 1, 8; and Q. 75, A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. Reply Obj. 1. The term breathe is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe (spirare), is the same as to make a spirit. Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing. Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. Reply Obj. 3. That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference. (emphasis added) SECOND ARTICLE Whether the Soul Was Produced by Creation? We proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created. Obj. 2. Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. Obj. 3. Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true. On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 27): God created man to His own image. But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.

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I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii (Did. vi. 1) that an accident should be described as of something rather than as something. The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter,whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being,or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. Reply Obj. 1. The souls simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the souls essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. Reply Obj. 2. The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. Reply Obj. 3. As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. THIRD ARTICLE Whether the Rational Soul Is Produced by God Immediately? We proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says ( Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels. Obj. 2. Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But inferior things are forwarded by the higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels. Obj. 3. Further, perfect is that which can produce its like, as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their

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like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7) that God Himself breathed into the face of man the breath of life. I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God. Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior,all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. (emphasis added) FOURTH ARTICLE Whether the Human Soul Was Produced before the Body? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (Q. 66, A. 1; Q. 70, A. 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body. Obj. 2. Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. Obj. 3. Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body. On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body. I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i. 7, 8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodiesare united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. 47, A. 2); and so we need say nothing about it here. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii. 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to

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some causal virtues; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says ( loc. cit. 29): We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created. Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required . Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (Q. 74, A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body . According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. Reply Obj. 1. If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body. Reply Obj. 2. The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. Reply Obj. 3. That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created. (emphasis added)

Hence the soul and the body were created at the same time, notwithstanding the fact that Scripture represents the body of the first man as having been formed first. QUESTION 91
The Production of the First Mans Body (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the production of the first mans body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The matter from which it was produced; (2) The author by whom it was produced; (3) The disposition it received in its production; (4) The mode and order of its production. FIRST ARTICLE Whether the Body of the First Man Was Made of the Slime of the Earth?

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We proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because not being is farther off from actual existence than being in potentiality. But since man is the most honorable of Gods lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of mans body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. Obj. 2. Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. Obj. 3. Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. Obj. 4. Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements. On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7): God made man of the slime of the earth. I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: Gods works are perfect (Deut. xxxii. 4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that all things are pre-contained in Him, not as component parts, but as united in one simple whole, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called a little world, because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him. Reply Obj. 1. The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in mans body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances. Reply Obj. 2. Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they

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say is falsethat light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power. Reply Obj. 3. If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole genus of such contraries, thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense:or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. Reply Obj. 4. In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed. (emphasis added) SECOND ARTICLE Whether the Human Body Was Immediately Produced by God? We proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii. 4), that corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels. But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God. Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. Obj. 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production. Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii. 24) that mans body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xvii. 1): God created man out of the earth.

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I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumenttality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q. 65, A. 4); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii. 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God. Reply Obj. 1. Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust. Reply Obj. 2. Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Physic. ii. 26), man and the sun beget man from matter. For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing. Reply Obj. 3. The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth. Reply Obj. 4. An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body preexisted in the previous work in their causal virtues. (emphasis added) THIRD ARTICLE Whether the Body of Man Was Given an Apt Disposition? We proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and

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quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore mans body was not aptly disposed. Obj. 2. Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. Obj. 3. Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature. On the contrary, It is written (Eccl. vii. 30): God made man right. I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called Gods works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Physic. ii. 7): And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each ones substance. Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. Reply Obj. 1. The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q. 84, A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. Reply Obj. 2. Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abun-dance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle ( De Anima iii. 8), the organ of organs. Moreover this was

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more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments. Reply Obj. 3. An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if mans stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as forefeet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if mans stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reasons proper operation. Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For mans superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus. (emphasis added) FOURTH ARTICLE Whether the Production of the Human Body Is Fittingly Described in Scripture? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, God said; Let it be made, and it was made. Therefore the same should have been said of man. Obj. 2. Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, Let us make man. Obj. 3. Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, God made man of the slime of the earth, he should not have added: And He breathed into him the breath of life. Obj. 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: He breathed into his face the breath of life.

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Obj. 5. Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine ( Gen. ad lit. vii. 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: To His image He made them, he should not have added, male and female He created them. On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture. Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi. 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps. ci. 26), The work of Thy hands is the heaven, and elsewhere (Ps. xciv. 5), His hands laid down the dry land; but in this, that man is made to Gods image. Yet in describing mans production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for mans sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind. Reply Obj. 2. We must not imagine that when God said Let us make man, He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Persons, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man. Reply Obj. 3. Some have thought that mans body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, God made man, must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, and He breathed into his face the breath of life, should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, Receive ye the Holy Ghost (Jo. xx. 22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii. 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, And man was made a living soul; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, He breathed into his face the breath of life, are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body. Reply Obj. 4. Since vital operations are more clearly seen in mans face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into mans face. Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine ( Gen. ad lit. iv. 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him mans soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. QUESTION 92 The Production of the Woman (In Four Articles) We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?

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(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man? (3) Whether of mans rib? (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God? FIRST ARTICLE Whether the Woman Should Have Been Made in the First Production of Things? We proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says ( De Gener. ii. 3), that the female is a misbegotten male. But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. Obj. 2. Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. iii. 16): Thou shalt be under the mans power; and Gregory says that, Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; for the agent is always more honorable than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin. Obj. 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman. On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 18): It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself. I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a helper to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: And they shall be two in one flesh (Gen. ii. 24). Reply Obj. 1. As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind,

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which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv. 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in natures intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female. Reply Obj. 2. Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (Q. 96, A. 3). Reply Obj. 3. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end. SECOND ARTICLE Whether Woman Should Have Been Made from Man? We proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. Obj. 2. Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. Obj. 3. Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev. xviii. 6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man. On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xvii. 5): He created of him, that is, out of man, a helpmate like to himself, that is, woman. I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that God made the whole human race from one (Acts xvii. 26). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gen. ii. 23, 24): She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife. This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii. 12), the human male and female are united, not only for

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generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. v. 32): This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. Reply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing. Reply Obj. 2. Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. Reply Obj. 3. A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove. THIRD ARTICLE Whether the Woman Was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man? We proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the womans body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made onlyeither by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself);or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says ( Gen. ad lit. x): A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction. But the womans body is not more rarefied than mansat least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eves body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam. Obj. 2. Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose. Obj. 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it. On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 22): God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman. I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither use authority over man, and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to mans contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed namely, blood and wateron which the Church was established.

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Reply Obj. 1. Some say that the womans body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says ( Physic. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictoriesviz., the definition with the absence of the thing defined. Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv., in Joan.) that Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib. Reply Obj. 2. The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the mans rib. From this it is clear how to answer the third objection. FOURTH ARTICLE Whether the Woman Was Formed Immediately by God? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii. 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the womans body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God. Obj. 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the womans body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God. On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the mans rib. I answer that, As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human

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semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. Reply Obj. 1. This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species. Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the mans rib. Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (ibid. 18): The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made. Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator. QUESTION 93 The End or Term of the Production of Man (In Nine Articles) We now treat of the end or term of mans production, inasmuch as he is said to be made to the image and likeness of God. There are under this head nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether the image of God is in man? (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures? (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man? (4) Whether the image of God is in every man? (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them? (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only? (7) Whether the image of God is in mans power or in his habits and acts? (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object? (9) Of the difference between image and likeness. FIRST ARTICLE Whether the Image of God Is in Man? We proceed thus to the First Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isa. xl. 18): To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him? Obj. 2. Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. i. 15): Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man. Obj. 3. Further, Hilary says (De Synod. [Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.]) that an image is of the same species as that which it represents; and he also says that an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another. But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.

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On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26): Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness. I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83; qu. 74): Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image. Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likenessnamely, that it is copied from something else. For an image is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says ( ibid.): Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality, as we see in a persons image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made to Gods likeness; for the preposition to signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. Reply Obj. 1. The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: What image will you make for Him? But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man. Reply Obj. 2. The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the Image, and never to the image. But man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness; and to the image by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al. xcvi, De Tempore). Reply Obj. 3. As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says of a thing which adequately represents another, this is to be understood of a perfect image. SECOND ARTICLE Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures? We proceed thus to the Second Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): Effects are contingent images of their causes. But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. Obj. 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness. Therefore it is made to the image of God.

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Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called very good (Gen. i. 31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man. Obj. 4. Further, Bothius (De Consol. iii) says of God: Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image. Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi. 12): mans excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field. Therefore things without intellect are not made to Gods image. I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called mans image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a mans image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that an image is of the same species. Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83; qu. 51) approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him. It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to Gods image. Reply Obj. 1. Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are contingent images of their causes; that is, as much as they happen (contingit) to be so, but not absolutely. Reply Obj. 2. Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image. Reply Obj. 3. The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to Gods image, but that the other parts are excluded. Reply Obj. 4. Bothius here uses the word image to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word image in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.

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THIRD ARTICLE Whether the Angels Are More to the Image of God Than Man Is? We proceed thus to the Third Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God. Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83; qu. 51), man is so much to Gods image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him. But a creature is called Gods image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. Obj. 3. Further, a creature is said to be to Gods image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): The angel is called a seal of resemblance (Ezech. xxviii. 12) because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression. I answer that, We may speak of Gods image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A. 8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to Gods image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God. Reply Obj. 1. Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. Reply Obj. 2. As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer. Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to Gods image. Reply Obj. 3. When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do

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we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. FOURTH ARTICLE Whether the Image of God Is Found in Every Man? We proceed thus to the Fourth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that man is the image of God, but woman is the image (Vulg., glory) of man (1 Cor. xi. 7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God. Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 29): Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. Obj. 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. On the contrary, It is written (Ps. xxxviii. 7): Surely man passeth as an image. I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us (Ps. iv. 7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. Reply Obj. 1. The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, To the image of God He created him, it is added, Male and female He created them (Gen. i. 27). Moreover it is said them in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii. 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man, he adds his reason for saying this: For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man. Reply Objs. 2 and 3. These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory. FIFTH ARTICLE Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?

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We proceed thus to the Fifth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i): One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made. And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity. Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. Obj. 2. Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii. 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement. Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio, xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness. Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. Obj. 3. Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (Q. 32, A. 1). Obj. 4. Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi. 2) that the Son alone is the image of the Father. Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God. I answer that, as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections. Reply Obj. 3. This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says ( De Trin. xv. 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity. Reply Obj. 4. Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii. 5, 6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the

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image of the Son, the Father would not have said, Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness; but to Thy image. When, therefore, it is written, He made him to the image of God, the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God made man to His image, this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition to points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him. Secondly, this preposition to may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, This book is made (like) to that one. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another. SIXTH ARTICLE Whether the Image of God Is in Man As Regards the Mind Only? We proceed thus to the Sixth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not only in mans mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xi. 7) that the man is the imageof God. But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind. Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Gen. i. 27): God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. Obj. 3. Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in mans body also, and not in his mind. Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 7, 24) there is a threefold vision in us, corporeal, spiritual, or imaginary, and intellectual. Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. iv. 23, 24): Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man. Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. iii. 10): Putting on the new man; him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to the image of Him that created him, where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of image as we have explained above (AA. 1, 2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a trace. Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a trace, as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a trace, and the way in which an image, represents anything. An image represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a trace represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by

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the movements of animals are called traces: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the makers love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an image in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a trace. Reply Obj. 1. Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man. Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter. All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the mans offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, to the image of God He created him, it added, male and female He created them, not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. iii. 10), after saying, According to the image of Him that created him, added, Where there is neither male nor female [these words are in reality from Gal. iii. 28] (Vulg., neither Gentile nor Jew). Reply Obj. 3. Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to Gods image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals, as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83; qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in mans body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

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Reply Obj. 4. Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi. 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen. Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented. SEVENTH ARTICLE Whether the Image of God Is to Be Found in the Acts of the Soul? We proceed thus to the Seventh Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi. 26), that man was made to Gods image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge. But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the souls acts. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix. 4) assigns Gods image in the soul to these three thingsmind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul. Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. x. 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to memory, understanding, and will. But these three are natural powers of the soul, as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent., D. iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. Obj. 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts. On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi. 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to Gods image, must be referred to actual vision. I answer that, As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species

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of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word cannot exist without actual thought, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein. Reply Obj. 1. Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions ( De Trin. ix. 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. Reply Obj. 2. Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itselfnamely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently provesDe Trin. x. 3, 4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv. 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [ cf. Q. 79, A. 7, ad 1]. But since, as he says, a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nations tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent. From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences. Reply Obj. 4. Someone might answer by referring to Augustines statement ( De Trin. xiv. 6), that the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things. Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says ( De Trin. xiv. 4): If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence. EIGHTH ARTICLE

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Whether the Image of the Divine Trinity Is in the Soul Only by Comparison with God As Its Object? We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A. 7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says ( De Trin. xii. 4) that when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal. Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. Obj. 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all. Obj. 4. Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor. iii. 18): Weare transformed into the same image from glory to glory. But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 12): The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made. Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. I answer that, As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 8), the the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God. But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

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Reply Obj. 1. For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. Reply Obj. 2. In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, any third thing should be required to make up the trinity, as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there, as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. Reply Obj. 3. The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; whether this image of God be so obsolete, as it were clouded, as almost to amount to nothing, as in those who have not the use of reason; or obscured and disfigured, as in sinners; or clear and beautiful, as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 6). Reply Obj. 4. By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (ibid.), when he says that in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. NINTH ARTICLE Whether Likeness Is Properly Distinguished from Image? We proceed thus to the Ninth Article: Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not properly distinguished from image. For genus is not properly distinguished from species. Now, likeness is to image as genus to species: because, where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely as Augustine says (QQ. 83; qu. 74). Therefore likeness is not properly to be distinguished from image. Obj. 2. Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things (2 Sent., D. xvi). Obj. 3. Further, the image of God in man is threefoldthe image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said ( ibid.) that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness. Obj. 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say ( ibid.) that the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue.

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On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83; qu. 51): Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely image and likeness, since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed. I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v. Did. iv. 15). Now, since one is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between likeness and image. For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83; qu. 51) that the spirit (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. But the other parts of man, belonging to the souls inferior faculties, or even to the body, are in the opinion of some made to Gods likeness. In this sense he says (De Quant. Anim ii) that the likeness of God is found in the souls incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii. 12) that the image implies an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man. In the same sense likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue: for there is no virtue without love of virtue. Reply Obj. 1. Likeness is not distinct from image in the general notion of likeness (for thus it is included in image); but so far as any likeness falls short of image, or again, as it perfects the idea of image. Reply Obj. 2. The souls essence belongs to the image, as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. Reply Obj. 3. Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural likeness exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term image from one point of view and from another the term likeness. Reply Obj. 4. Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of image; but love of virtue belongs to likeness, as virtue itself belongs to likeness.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 91, art. 1 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):
Article 1 Was the first mans body made from the slime of the earth? It seems that the first mans body was not made from the slime of the earth ( de limo terrae):

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Objection 1: It takes more power to make something from nothing ( ex nihilo) than to make it from something, since non-being (non ens) is more distant from actuality than is being-inpotentiality (ens in potentia). But since man is the most dignified of the lower creatures (dignissima creaturarum inferiorum), it was fitting that Gods power should be manifested to the highest degree in the production of mans body. Therefore, it ought to be the case that mans body was made from nothing and not from the slime of the earth. Objection 2: Celestial bodies are more noble than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility, since it is perfected by the most noble form, viz., the rational soul. Therefore, it ought to be the case that it was made from a celestial body rather than from an earthly body. Objection 3: As is clear from their subtlety, fire and air are more noble than earth and water. Therefore, since the human body is the most dignified of all bodies, it ought to be the case that it was made from fire and air rather than from the slime of the earth. Objection 4: The human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore, it was made from all the elements and not from the slime of the earth. But contrary to this: Genesis 2:7 says, God formed man from the slime of the earth. I respond: Since God is perfect, He has given to His works a perfection corresponding to their mode [of being]this according to Deuteronomy 32:4 (Gods works are perfect). Now He Himself is perfect absolutely speaking because He contains all things within Himself antecedently, not in the mode of composition, but in a simple and unified way ( simpliciter et unite), as Dionysius puts itin the manner in which diverse effects preexist in a cause in accord with its unified essence ( secundum unam eius essentiam). Now this perfection flows into the angels insofar as all the things produced by God in nature fall within their cognition through diverse [intelligible] forms. By contrast, perfection of this sort flows into man in a lower-level way. For man does not have within his natural cognition a knowledge of all natural things. Instead, he is in a certain sense composed of all things. For (a) he has within himself a rational soul from the genus of spiritual substances, and (b) he is, by way of likeness to the celestial bodies, far removed from contraries because of the exceptional balance of his constitution (habet elongationem a contrariis per maximam aequalitatem complexionis), whereas (c) he has the elements with respect to his substance. However, he has the elements in such a way that the higher elements, viz., fire and air, dominate in him with respect to their power (since life consists principally in heat, which comes from fire, and in moistness, which comes from air) , whereas the lower elements are abundant in him with respect to their substance. For a balanced mixture would not be possible if the lower elements, which have less power, were not quantitatively more abundant in man; and the reason why mans body is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth is that slime is earth mixed with water. And because all the creatures of the world are in some sense found in him, man is called a miniature world ( minor mundus). Reply to objection 1: Gods creative power is manifested in mans body because its matter was produced through creation. Now the human body had to be made from the matter of the four elements in order that man might share something in common with the lower bodies (haberet convenientiam cum inferioribus corporibus), constituting, as it were, a certain middle ground between spiritual substances and corporeal substances.

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Reply to objection 2: Even though a celestial body is, absolutely speaking, more noble than an earthly body, nonetheless, a celestial body shares less in common with the activity of the rational soul. For in a certain way a rational soul takes its knowledge of truth from the sensory powers, whose organs cannot be formed from a celestial body, because a celestial body cannot be acted upon (cum sit impassibile). Nor is it true that a bit of the fifth essence ( aliquid de quinta essentia) enters materially into the composition of the human body; this claim is made by some who hold that the soul is united to the body by the mediation of a certain sort of light (cf. q. 76, a. 7). First of all, their claim that light is a body is false (cf. q. 67, a. 2). Second, it is impossible for any part of the fifth essence to be divided off from a celestial body or to be mixed in with the elements and this because of the celestial bodys impassibility. Hence, a celestial body can enter into the composition of mixed bodies only through the effect of its power. 3 Reply to objection 3: If fire and air, which are more powerful in their action, also abounded quantitatively in the composition of the human body, then they would completely draw the other elements to themselves, and it would be impossible to fashion the balanced mixture that mans composition needs in order to have a good sense of touch, which is the foundation for the other senses. For the organ associated with each sense must have only in poten-tiality and not in actualitythe contraries which are perceived by that sense. This must be so either in such a way that (a) the organ lacks the whole genus of relevant contraries, in the way that the pupil lacks color, so that it might be in potentiality with respect to all colors something not possible in the case of the organ of touch, since it is composed of the elements, whose qualities the sense of touch perceivesor in such a way that (b) the organ is midway between the contraries, as is necessary in the case of the sense of touch; for the middle is in some sense in potentiality with respect to both extremes. Reply to objection 4: The slime of the earth contains both earth and also water cementing the parts of earth together. Scripture does not make mention of the other [two] elements, both because (a) they are quantitatively less abundant in mans body, as has been explained, and also because (b) in the whole account of the production of things Scripture, which was written for an uneducated people, does not make mention of fire and air, which uneducated people do not perceive with their sensory power. (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 91, art. 4 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):
Article 4 Is the production of the human body appropriately described in Scripture? It seems that the production of the human body is not appropriately described in Scripture: Objection 1: Just as the human body was made by God, so too were the other works of the six days. But in the case of the other works it says, God said, Let such-and-such be made, and it was made. Therefore, something similar should have been said concerning the production of man. Objection 2: As was explained above (a. 2), the human body was made directly by God. Therefore, it is inappropriate to say, Let us make man.

Of course this denial does not prevent the body from possessing an element analogous to the element of the stars (cf. GA, II. 3, 736b 37), as St. Thomas agreed with Aristotle to be the case, and which we argue for in our exegesis of the work of the first day.

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Objection 3: The form of the human body is the soul itself, which is the breath of life. Therefore, after it had said, God formed man from the slime of the earth, it was inappropriate to add, ..... and He breathed into his face the breath of life. Objection 4: The soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body and most especially in the heart. Therefore, it was inappropriate to say, He breathed into his face the breath of life. Objection 5: The male and female sexes have to do with the body, whereas the image of God has to do with the soul. But according to Augustine, the soul was made before the body. Therefore, after it had said, To His image He made him, it was inappropriate to add, ..... male and female He created them. But contrary to this is the authority of Scripture. I respond [by replying to the objections]: Reply to objection 1: As Augustine says in Super Genesim ad Litteram 6, the reason that man is preeminent over other things is not that God Himself made manas if He Himself did not make the other things. For it is written, The heavens are the works of your hand (Psalm 101:26), and in another place, His hands laid down the dry land (Psalm 94:5). Rather, man is preeminent over other things because man was made to the image of God. Nonetheless, in the case of the production of man Scripture uses a special way of speaking in order to indicate that the other things were made for the sake of man. For we normally make with greater thought and greater care those things that we principally intend. Reply to objection 2: This phrase should not be taken to meanas some have perversely taken it to meanthat God was saying to the angels, Let us make man. Instead, this is said in order to signify the plurality of the divine persons, whose image is found explicitly in man. Reply to objection 3: Some have claimed that the [first] mans body was formed antecedently in time, and that later on God infused a soul into the already formed body. But it is contrary to the nature of the perfection of the first institution of things that God would make either the body without the soul or the soul without the body; for each of them is a part of human nature. It is especially inappropriate to make the body without the soul, since the body depends on the soul, but not vice versa. And so to rule this out, some have claimed that (a) when it says, God formed man, this means that the production of the body was simultaneous with the soul, and that (b) when it is added, ..... and He breathed ( inspiravit) into his face the breath of life, this is referring to the Holy Spiritjust as our Lord breathed (insufflavit) on the Apostles, saying, Receive the Holy Spirit (John 20:22). However, as Augustine points out in De Civitate Dei, this reading is ruled out by the words of Scripture. For the following is added to what was just cited: And man was made a living soulbut in 1 Corinthians 15:45 the Apostle relates this phrase to mans animal life and not to his spiritual life. Therefore, the words breath of life refer to the soul, so that when it says, He breathed into his face the breath of life, this serves as an explanation, so to speak, of what had gone before; for the soul is the form of the body. Reply to objection 4: The reason why it says that the breath of life was breathed into the mans face is that the vital operations ( operationes vitae) are more manifest in mans face because of the sensory powers that exist there.

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Reply to objection 5: According to Augustine, all the works of the six days were effected simultaneously. Hence, he does not hold that the first mans soul, which he claims to have been made at the same time as the angels, was made before the sixth day. Instead, he claims that on the sixth day itself (a) the first mans soul was made in actuality and (b) his body was made with respect to its causal principles. By contrast, the other doctors claim that both the mans soul and his body were made in actuality on the sixth day. QUESTION 92 The Production of the Woman The next thing we have to consider is the production of the woman. On this topic there are four questions: (1) Was it fitting for the woman to be produced in this [initial] production of things? (2) Was it fitting for the woman to be made from the man? (3) Was it fitting for the woman to be produced from the mans rib? (4) Was the woman made directly by God? Article 1 Was it fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things? It seems that it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things [in prima rerum productione]: Objection 1: In De Generatione Animalium the Philosopher says, The female is an inadvertently caused male ( femina est mas occasionatus). But it was not fitting for anything inadvertent and deficient to exist in the initial institution of things. Therefore, it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in that initial production of things. Objection 2: Subjection and abasement are the result of sin; for it is after the sin that the woman is told, You shall be under the mans power (Genesis 3:16), and Gregory says, When we do not sin, we are all equal. But the woman has less natural power and dignity than the man, since, as Augustine says in Super Genesim ad Litteram 12, That which acts is always more honorable than that which is acted upon. Therefore, it was not fitting for the woman to be produced in the initial production of things, before the sin. Objection 3: The occasions of sin should be eliminated. But God foreknew that the woman would be an occasion of sin for the man. Therefore, He should not have produced the woman. But contrary to this: Genesis 2:18 says, It is not good for the man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself. I respond: As Scripture says, it was necessary for the woman to be made as a helper to the manmore specifically, as a helper in the work of generation and not as a helper for just any other work, as some have claimed, since for any other work a man can be helped more appropriately by another man than by a woman. This can be made clearer if one considers the modes of generation among living things: For some living things do not have within themselves the active power of generation, but are instead generated by an agent of another species, e.g., those plants and animals that are generated from the appropriate matter without seed ( sine semine) by the active power of celestial bodies.

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On the other hand, other living things have the active and passive powers of generation joined together [within themselves], as in the case of plants that are generated from seeds. For in plants there is no vital work that is more noble than the work of generation, and so it is appropriate in their case for the active power of generation to be joined with the passive power of generation at all times. By contrast, perfect animals have the active power of generation in the male sex and the passive power of generation in the female sex. And because in animals there is a vital work which is more noble than generation and which their life is principally ordered to, the masculine sex is not joined at all times to the female in perfect animals, but is joined only at the time of coitus. So we might imagine that through coitus the male and the female become one in a way similar to that in which the masculine and feminine powers are joined at all times in a planteven though in some plants the one power is more abundant, and in others the other power is more abundant. Now man is ordered toward an even more noble vital work, viz., intellective understanding. And so in the case of man there is an even stronger reason for why there ought to be a distinction between the two powers, with the result that the female is produced separately from the male and yet they are joined together as one carnally ( carnaliter in unum) for the work of generation. And this is why, immediately after the formation of the woman, Genesis 2:24 says, They will be two in one flesh. Reply to objection 1: In relation to a particular nature, the female is something deficient and inadvertent (aliquid deficiens et occasionatum). For the active power that exists in the males seed aims at producing something complete and similar to itself in the masculine sex, and the fact that a female is generated is due either to a weakness in the active power, or to some indisposition on the part of the matter, or even to some transformation from without, e.g., from the southern winds ( a ventis australibus), which are humid, as De Generatione Animalium says. However, in relation to nature as a whole ( per comparationem ad naturam universalem ), the female is not something inadvertent, but is instead ordered by the intention of nature toward the work of generation. Now the intention of nature as a whole depends on God, who is the universal author of nature. And so in instituting the nature, He produced not only the male but also the female. Reply to objection 2: There are two kinds of subjection. The first kind is servile subjection, according to which the one who presides makes use of his subjects for his own advantage. This kind of subjection was introduced after the sin. The second kind is civil or economic subjection, according to which the one who presides makes use of his subjects for their own advantage and good. This kind of subjection existed even before the sin. For the good of order would have been lacking within the human multitude if some had not been governed by others who were wiser. And so it is by this sort of subjection that the woman ( femina) is naturally subject to the man, since the discernment of reason ( discretio rationis) naturally abounds more in the man. Nor, as will be explained below (q. 96, a. 3), is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence. Reply to objection 3: If God had removed from the world everything that man appropriates as an occasion of sin, the universe would have remained incomplete ( imperfectum). Nor should the common good have been destroyed in order that a particular evil might be avoidedespecially in light of the fact that God is powerful enough to order every evil toward the good.

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Article 2 Was it fitting for the woman to be made from the man? It seems that it was not fitting for the woman (mulier) to be made from the man (vir): Objection 1: The sexes are common to both man ( homo) and the other animals. But in the case of the other animals the females ( feminae) were not made from the males ( mares). Therefore, this should not have been the case with man, either. Objection 2: Things that belong to the same species have the same type of matter. But the male (mas) and the female (femina) belong to the same species. Therefore, since the man was made from the slime of the earth, the woman ( femina) should have been made from the same thing, and not from the man (vir). Objection 3: The woman (mulier) was made as a helper in the work of generation. But excessively close kinship renders a person unsuitable for generation, and this is why closely related persons are excluded from matrimony, as is clear from Leviticus 18:6. Therefore, the woman should not have been made from the man. But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 17:5 says, He created from himthat is, from the man a helper like to himselfthat is, the woman. I respond: In the initial institution of things it was fitting for the woman ( mulier) to be formed from the man (vir)more so than in the case of the other animals. It was fitting, first of all, in order that a certain dignity might be preserved for the first man ( homo), viz., that, by way of likeness to God, he himself would be the source of his whole species in the way that God is the source of the whole universe. Hence, in Acts 17:26 Paul says that God made the whole human race from one. It was fitting, second, in order that the man might love the woman more and adhere to her in a more inseparable way, given his realization that she had been produced from him. Hence, Genesis 2:23-24 says, ..... she was taken out of man. Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife. This was especially necessary in the case of the human species, in which the male and the female remain together throughout their whole life something that does not happen with the other animals. Third, it was fitting because, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 8, in the case of human beings, the male and the female are conjoined not only because of the necessity for generation, as with the other animals, but also for the sake of their domestic life, in which the other works of the man and the woman take place and in which the man is the head of the woman. Hence, it was fitting for the woman to be formed from the man as her source. Fourth, there is a reason having to do with the mysteries [of the Faith] ( ratio sacramentalis). For [the womans being made from the man] is a figure ( figuratur) of the Churchs taking her origin from Christ. Hence, in Ephesians 5:32 the Apostle says, This is a great mystery (sacramentum magnum); I mean in Christ and in the Church. Reply to objection 1: The reply to the first objection is clear from what has been said. Reply to objection 2: The matter is that from which something is made. But created nature has a determinate source, and since it is determined to one outcome, it also has a determinate process. Hence, it produces from determinate matter something that belongs to a determinate species. By contrast, since Gods power is infinite, He can make something that is the same

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in species from any kind of matter whatsoever, e.g., the man from the slime of the earth and the woman from the man.4 Reply to objection 3: The sort of close kinship that is an impediment to matrimony comes from natural generation. But the woman was produced from the man solely by Gods power and not through natural generation. This is why Eve is not called Adams daughter. For this reason, the argument is invalid (non sequitur). Article 3 Was it fitting for the woman to be formed from the mans rib? It seems that it was not fitting for the woman to be formed from the mans rib: Objection 1: The mans rib was much smaller than the womans body. But more can be made from less only either (a) through additionbut if this had happened, then the woman would be said to be made from what was added rather than from the ribor (b) through rarefaction, since, as Augustine says in Super Genesim ad Litteram, it is impossible for a body to increase unless it becomes rarified. But a womans body ( corpus mulieris) is not more rarified than a mans, at least not in the proportion that a rib has to Eves body. Therefore, Eve was not formed from Adams rib. Objection 2: There was nothing superfluous in the works that were initially created. Therefore, Adams rib contributed to the perfection of his body. Therefore, when it was taken away, what remained was imperfect. But this seems wrong. Objection 3: A rib cannot be separated from a man without pain. But there was no pain before the sin. Therefore, the rib should not have been separated from the man so that the woman might be formed from it. But contrary to this: Genesis 2:22 says, The Lord God built the rib which He had taken from Adam into a woman. I respond: It was fitting for the woman ( mulier) to be formed from the mans rib ( ex costa viri). It was fitting, first, in order to signify that there should be social union ( socialis coniunctio) between the man and the woman. For instance, the woman should not dominate over the man, and so she was not formed from his head. But neither should she be looked down upon by the man as if she were under servile subjection ( tamquam serviliter subiecta) (cf. a. 1), and so she was not formed from his feet. Second, it was fitting because of a mystery [of the Faith] ( propter sacramentum). For the sacramentsi.e., the blood and water by which the Church was institutedflowed from the side of Christ in dormition on the cross. Reply to objection 1: Some claim that the womans body was formed by the multiplication of the matter without the addition of anything else, in the way in which our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is altogether impossible. For the multiplication of the loaves occurred either through a transformation of the substance of the matter itself or through a transformation of its dimensions. But it did not occur through a transformation of the substance of the matter itself, both because (a) matter, considered in itself, is wholly unable to change as long as it exists in potentiality and has only the character of a subject, and also because (b) multitude and magnitude lie outside of the essence of matter itself. And so the
4

Of course, since the woman is made from the man and the man from the slime of the earth, so, then, is the woman.

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multiplication of matter is not in any way intelligible as long as the same matter remains without additionunless the matter takes on bigger dimensions. But as the Philosopher explains in Physics 4, for the matter to be rarefied is just for it to take on bigger dimensions. Therefore, to claim that the matter is multiplied without rarefaction is to posit contradictories simultaneously, viz., the definition without the thing defined. Hence, since rarefaction does not seem to be present in the multiplications under discussion, it is necessary to posit an addition to the matter, either through creation orwhat is more probablethrough conversion. Hence, in Super Ioannem Augustine says, Christ satisfied the five thousand men with the five loaves in the way that from a few seeds He produces a field full of cornwhich happens through the conversion of nutrients. Yet we still say, He fed the five thousand with five loaves, or He formed the woman from the mans rib, because the addition was made to the preexisting matter of the loaves or the rib. Reply to objection 2: The rib contributed to Adams perfection not insofar as he was a certain individual, but insofar as he was the source of the speciesin the same way that semen, which is released by a natural operation accompanied by pleasure, contributes to the perfection of the one that generates. Hence, a fortiori, by Gods power the womans body was able to be formed from the mans rib without pain. Reply to objection 3: From this the reply to the third objection is clear. Part 1, Question 92 690 Article 4 Was the woman formed directly by God? It seems that the woman was not formed directly (immediate) by God: Objection 1: No individual produced from something similar to it in species is made directly by God. But the woman was made from the man, who was of the same species as she was. Therefore, she was not made directly by God. Objection 2: In De Trinitate 3 Augustine says that corporeal things are managed by the angels. But the womans body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore, it was made by the ministry of the angels and not directly by God. Objection 3: Among creatures the things that preexist through their causal principles are produced by the power of another creature and not directly by God. But as Augustine says in Super Genesim ad Litteram 9, the womans body was produced in its causal principles in the initial works. Therefore, the woman was not produced directly by God. But contrary to this: In the same book Augustine says, Only God, from whom all of nature subsists, was able to form or shape the rib in such a way that it would be a woman. I respond: As was explained above (a. 2), natural generation in any given species is from a determinate matter. But the matter from which man is generated is the human seed of a male or a female. Hence, an individual of the human species cannot be naturally generated from any other type of matter. Rather, only God, who institutes nature, can bring things into being outside of the order of nature. And so only God was able to form the man from the slime of the earth or the woman from the mans rib.

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Reply to objection 1: This argument goes through for a case in which the individual is generated by a natural generation from something similar to it in species. Reply to objection 2: As Augustine says in Super Genesim ad Litteram 9, we do not know whether God made use of the ministry of an angel in forming the woman. However, it is certain that just as the mans body was not formed by angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the womans body formed by angels from the mans rib. Reply to objection 3: As Augustine says in the same book, The initial state of things was not such that the female was going to be formed wholly in this way, but it was only such that she could be formed in this way. And so with respect to its causal principles the womans body preexisted in the initial works not in virtue of an active power, but only in virtue of a passive power ordered to the creators active power.

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4. On the special creation of man on the sixth day. Cf. Fu Youde, Body and Soul: Comparative Studies in Biblical Judaism, Greek Philosophy, and Medieval Christianity:5
The Monism in Judaism Concerning the origin of man, the Hebrew Scripture reads: then the Lord formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being. (Genesis 2:7) Again, When you take away their breath, they die and re-turn to their dust. When you send forth your spirit, they are created . (Psalms 104: 29-30) These descriptions, which look very simple at first glance, are actually considerably significant to our question because they reveal the basic attitude towards the origin and essence of man in the earliest monotheism in the world. We are clearly informed by these two verses of the Bible that (1) man is created by God, therefore is ultimately divine in origin; and (2) man is a mixture of body and soul (spirit), and (3) human body is made of the dust of the ground, which implies that the earth is the mother of human being, and (4) human spirit or soul from God is essential to human life without which man could not live. (emphasis added)

Cf. Ben Zion Bokser, The Wisdom of the Talmud (New York, 1951):
The Theological Elements in the Talmud THE EXISTENCE OF GOD The Talmudists saw a manifestation of God in the dynamism of the world. The universe is not a mass of inert matter. It is an enterprise of tremendous dynamic activity. The universe is filled with the might and power of our God. He formed you and infused into you the breath of life. He stretched forth the heavens and laid the foundations of the earth. His voice blows out flames of fire, rends mountains asunder, and shatters rocks. His bow is fire and His arrows flames. His spear is a torch, His shield the clouds, and His sword the lightning. He fashioned mountains and hills and covered them with grass. He makes the rains and dew to descend, and causes the vegetation to sprout. He also forms the embryo in the mothers womb and enables it to issue forth as a living being.6 6. Exodus Rabbah 5:14. (emphasis added)

Cf. Eccl 11:5:


As thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit, nor how the bones are joined together in the
womb of her that is with child: so thou knowest not the works of God, who is the maker of all.

Cf. The New John Gill Exposition of the Entire Bible, comm. on Eccl 11:5:6
5 6

(http://god-defined.com/body_and_soul_in_religion.html [3/25/10]) Copyright Statement: The New John Gills Exposition of the Entire Bible Modernised and adapted for the computer by Larry Pierce of Online Bible. All Rights Reserved, Larry Pierce, Winterbourne, Ontario. Bibliography Information Gill, John. Commentary on Ecclesiastes 11:5. The New John Gill Exposition of the Entire Bible. <http://www.searchgodsword.org/com/geb/view.cgi?book=ec&chapter=011&verse=005>. 1999.

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Ecclesiastes 11:5 As thou knowest not what [is] the way of the spirit If indeed a man could foresee and be assured of seasonable weather for sowing and reaping, or a proper opportunity for doing good, all circumstances agreeing, it would be right to wait for it, and take it; but as these things are not in our power, nor within the compass of our knowledge, we should take the first opportunity of doing good, and leave the issue to divine Providence: as in many things in nature we are and should be content to be ignorant of them, and leave them with God, who brings them about by his secret power and providence: as, for instance, we know not the way of the spirit, or of the wind, 18 as some render it; from whence it comes and whither it goes, where and when it will subside, or what wind will blow next; or of the spirit or soul of man, how it enters into the body.7 So the Targum, how the spirit of the breath of life goes into the body of an infant: whether it is by traduction, as some, which is not likely; or by transfusion, or by creation out of nothing, or by formation out of something preexistent, and by an immediate infusion of it: or, what is the way of the breath; of the breath of a child in the womb, whether it breathes or not; if it does, how? if not, how does it live? or what is the way of the soul out of the body, how it goes out of it when the body dies; [nor] how the bones [do grow] in the womb of her that is with child ; or is full, pregnant, big with child: or in the womb that is full; 19 full of liquids, and yet bones are separated from them, grow out of them, and in them, and are hardened; all which how it should be is unknown: bones are mentioned because they are the more solid and substantial parts of the body, the basis and strength of it; and because it may seem more difficult how any part of the seed should harden into them, while other parts are converted into skin and flesh; even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all ; the Targum adds, in wisdom; as men are ignorant of many of the works of nature, so of those of Providence, especially which are future; as whether men shall be rich or poor, have days of prosperity or adversity; what their latter end will be, whether they shall not stand in need of the assistance of others, it may be of them or theirs to whom they now give; or what will be the issue of present acts of beneficence and liberality; these, with many other things of the like kind, should be left with God. Some understand this of the work of grace and conversion, which is a secret and difficult work, only wrought by the power and grace of God; and may be begun, or shortly will, in a poor person, judged an unworthy object of charity for supposed want of it, a thing unknown. (xwrh) venti, Pagninus, Montanus, Junius & Tremellius, Piscator, Drusius, Mercerus, Amama, Cocceius, Gejerus, Rambachius; so Broughton, and the Syriac and Arabic versions. 19 (halmh Njbb) in utero pleno, Mercerus, Gejerus, Gussetius, p. 936. in ventre pleno, Cocceius, so Aben Ezra.
18

N.B. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, the soul is created by the Holy Spirit, because God has made all things through Him.8 One is therefore justified in supposing man to have received his soul from God the Father through the Holy Spirit. But we must understand this production to have taken place in conjunction with the causality of the Word, through whom all things were made: Cf. John 1:3-4:
3 All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being. 4 In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men.

7 8

Assuredly, the text of Psalm 104 quoted above demands that we understand spirit in this second way. Cf. Explanation of the Apostles Creed . In The Catechetical Instructions of St. Thomas Aquinas . Translated with a Commentary by Rev. Joseph B. Collins, S.S., D.D., Ph.D. Introduction by Rev. Rudolph G. Bandas, Ph.D., S.T.D. et M. (Baltimore, 1939), The Eighth Article: I Believe in the Holy Ghost, p. 48.

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Since God made all things through the Word, in Him, namely, the Word, was the life God imparted to the first man when he breathed into his face the breath of life. But that life is the Spirit of God, who is breathed out by the Father and the Son: I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Giver of Life, Who proceeds from the Father and the Son (Nicene Creed). Thus, the breath breathed into the face of the first man is life. But the life was the light of men. How, then, can the life received by the first man be understood as light? Every human soul contains a power reducing things knowable in potency to knowable in act: the agent intellect, which Aristotle likens to a light. And man became a living soul (Gen 2:7). Soul here means creature, the whole being named for its principal part: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Rationibus Fidei Contra Saracenos (Reasons for the Faith Against Muslim Objections). Translated by Joseph Kennedy, O.P., Chapter 6: The meaning of God became man:9
We should observe that everything seems most properly identified with what is principal in it, while other aspects seem to adhere to what is principal and are taken up and used by it as it disposes. Thus in civil society the king seems to envelop the whole kingdom and he uses others as he disposes as if they were parts of his own body joined to him naturally. Although man is naturally both soul and body, he seems more principally a soul, since the body ad-heres to it and the soul uses the body to serve its own activity . Likewise, therefore, in the union of God with a creature, the divinity is not dragged down to human nature, but the human nature is assumed by God, not to be converted into God, but to adhere to God. The body and soul thus assumed are somehow the body and soul of God himself, just as the parts of a body assumed by a soul are somehow members of the soul itself.

Now in the soul itself there is something principal, which is a kind of light. Hence the life that was light of men names that power of the soul by which man is intelligent: It is that power by which he shall see God as He is.

(http://www.diafrica.org/nigeriaop/kenny/Rationes.htm [4/21/04])

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5. Creation in relation to second causes. As we have seen, the work of creation is the bringing into being of the entire substance, not presupposing any pre-existing subject or matterthat is, the production of the composite of matter and form (which principles are therefore understood to be co- or con-created, the only priority here being one of nature, insofar as first matter is presupposed to substantial form). But the production of the entire substance, that is, of a complete being, may be understood in two ways: (1) as the bringing into being of a thing simply; (2) as the bringing into being of a thing in some way incomplete and therefore needing an additional productive act to bring it to perfection. According to verse 1, that God produced in being the entire substance of the heaven and the earth is stated without qualification; but according to verse 2, the earth and heaven so produced are understood to be imperfect or incomplete, requiring the works of distinction and adornment to bring them to a finished state, which state God will call good (the good, as consisting in species, mode, and order, being understood of perfect being, as we have seen). But the same is true of living things: since they are produced out of the earth or the water or the air, they must be understood as having existed seminally before being produced by the divine fiat. Verse 1 embraces the bringing into being of everything but human souls: heaven will be afterwards specified as including both the aerial and the starry heavens, while the waters above the firmament point to the material existence of an even higher heaven, called the heaven of heavens, the angels and the blessed dwell. But all three creation kingdoms, the earth, the twofold heavens above it, and the invisible heaven beyond, are understood to exist without certain determinations the reception of which perfect them. For the foundations of the foregoing understanding, cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia q. 65, art. 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels? Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 Thou hast made all things in wisdom. But it belongs to wisdom to ordain, as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher. Objection 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God ( De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59). Objection 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.

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I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone. In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Reply to Objection 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures. Reply to Objection 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above (Question [15], Article [2]); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art. Reply to Objection 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia q. 65, art. 4 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels? Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter. But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances. Objection 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances. Objection 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.

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On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus. But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God. I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, participation (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or per se life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist per se in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called intelligences by them, but angels by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species. But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the composite. Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the composite; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a things mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, God said, Let this thing be, or that, to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is all form and fitness and concord of parts. Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made. But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.

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Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act. Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation. (emphasis added)

6. The role of creatures in the creation. According to the replies to the second and third objections of the preceding article, St. Thomas concludes that the role played by the heavenly bodies was to reduce from potency to act the seeds of forms implanted in things by God, whereas it is the implanting of such seeds themselves which constitutes the first production of creatures, which is therefore due to God alone. But it must be understood that the first production even of the non-living things, like the earth and the waters, was the production of seeds, inasmuch as they stand to the Spirit of God as a passive principle in generation stands to the active, as has been earlier explained. Hence, in either case, the form is due solely to God. Let us turn now to the case of man. 7. Whether an agency other than god produced mans body. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 91, art. 2 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):
Was the human body produced directly by God? It seems that the human body was not produced directly (immediate) by God: Objection 1: In De Trinitate 3 Augustine says that God takes care of corporeal things through the angelic creature. But, as has been explained (a. 1), the human body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore, it ought to be the case that it was produced by the mediation of angels and not directly by God. Objection 2: It is unnecessary for anything that can be effected by a created power to be produced directly by God. But the human body can be produced through the power of a celestial body; for instance, certain animals are generated by putrefaction through the active power of a celestial body, and Albumasar says that men are generated only in places with temperate climates (in locis temperatis tantis) and not in places where heat or cold is excessive. Therefore, it was unnecessary for the human body to be formed directly by God. Objection 3: Nothing is made from corporeal matter except through matters being transformed (per aliquam materiae transmutationem ). But every corporeal transformation has as a cause the motion of a celestial body that is the first motion. Therefore, since the human body is produced from corporeal matter, it seems that some celestial body contributed something to the human bodys being formed. Objection 4: In Super Genesim ad Litteram Augustine says that mans body was made during the work of the six days in the sense that God placed certain causal principles within corporeal creation ( secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae corporali), whereas later on mans body was formed in actuality. But that which preexists by means of its causal principles in corporeal creation can be produced

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through a corporeal power. Therefore, the human body was produced by some created power and not directly by God. But contrary to this: Ecclesiasticus 17:1 says, God created man out of the earth. I respond: The first formation of the human body could not have occurred through any created power, but was instead directly from God. To be sure, some have claimed that the forms existing in corporeal matter are derived from certain immaterial forms. But as has already been explained (q. 63, a. 4), the Philosopher fends off this position in Metaphysics 7 by appeal to the fact that it is composite things, and not forms, that are made per se. And since an agent is similar to what it makes, it is not fitting that a pure form, which exists without matter, should produce a form which exists in matter and which is made only in virtue of the fact that the relevant composite is made. And so it has to be the case that the cause of a form that exists in matter is itself a form that exists in matter; for what is composite is generated from what is composite. On the other hand, even though God is altogether immaterial, it is He alone who through His power can produce matter by creating it. Hence, it belongs to Him alone to produce a form in matter without the assistance of a preexisting material form. For this reason, angels cannot transform bodies with respect to any form unless they are aided by certain seeds, as Augustine puts it in De Trinitate 3. Therefore, since the human bodyby the power of which another similar in species might be formedhad never previously been formed, it was necessary for the first human body to be formed directly by God.10 Reply to objection 1: Even if angels provide some sort of ministry to God in what He does with respect to bodies, it is nonetheless the case that God does certain things among corporeal creatures that angels cannot in any way doe.g., bringing back the dead and giving sight to the blind. It was likewise this sort of power by which He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Still, it could have happened that angels provided some ministry in the formation of the body of the first manlike the ministry they will provide at the last resurrection by collecting the dust. Reply to objection 2: Perfect animals, which are generated from semen, cannot be generated solely through the power of a celestial body in the way that Avicenna imaginesthis, despite the fact that the power of a celestial body does cooperate in the natural generation of perfect animals, in keeping with the Philosophers claim in Physics 2 that a man and the sun generate a man from matter . This is why a place with a temperate climate is required for the generation of men and other perfect animals. However, the power of celestial bodies is indeed sufficient for generating certain imperfect animals from properly disposed matter, since it is clear that more is required for the production of a perfect thing than for the production of an imperfect thing. Reply to objection 3: The motion of the heavens is a cause of natural transformations , but not of transformations that are effected outside the order of nature ( praeter naturae ordinem) and by Gods power alone, e.g., raising the dead and giving sight to the blind. It is these transformations that are similar to mans being formed from the slime of the earth. Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which, among creatures, something is said to preexist through its causal principles. In the first way it preexists in virtue of both an active and a passive power; that is, the thing preexists not only in the sense that it can be made out of preexisting matter, but also in the sense that there is some preexisting
10

In other words, the only way an angel could have produced the first man is from a pre-existing body containing human nature in seed; but by hypothesis, none such could have existed prior to the formation of the first man; therefore, etc.

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creature that is able to make it. In the second way it preexists in virtue of a passive power alone, i.e., in the sense that it can be made by God from preexisting matter. It is in this sense that, according to Augustine, the human body preexisted through causal principles in the works that were produced. (emphasis added)

The reason why no created power such as an angel could have produced the first man is well brought out by the analogous case of the origin of the rational soul in the generation of man: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II: Creation. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes by James F. Anderson (Notre Dame, 1975), c. 86, nn. 1-7:
Chapter 86 THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN [1] From points previously established it can be shown that the human soul is not transmitted with the semen, as though it were begotten by coition. [2] For any principles whatever whose operations cannot be without the body cannot without the body begin to be at all; a things way of being and its way of operating are in mutual accord, since everything operates inasmuch as it is a being. Contrariwise, those principles whose operations are performed without the body are not generated through the generation of the body. Now, the nutritive and sensitive soul cannot operate independently of the body, as we have seen before. On the other hand, as we have likewise pointed out, the intellective soul does not operate through any bodily organ. Therefore, the nutritive and sensitive souls are brought into being through the bodys engendering; but not the intellective soul. The transmission of the semen, however, has as its aim the generation of the body. It is, therefore, through the transmission of the semen that the nutritive and sensitive souls begin to be; but this is not true of the intellective soul. [3] Moreover, there are but two ways in which the human soul could conceivably originate through the transmission of the semen. First, it might be thought to exist in the semen actually, as though it were parted by accident from the soul of the generative agent, in the manner in which the semen is separated from the body. A case in point are annulose 11 animals which live after being cut in two and which contain one soul actually and several potentially, since, when the body of such an animal is divided, the soul begins to exist actually in each living part. Second, the semen might be thought to possess a power productive of the intellective soul, and thus the latter would be held to exist virtually in the semen, but not actually. [4] Now, the first of these is impossible for two reasons. One: since the intellective soul is the most perfect of souls and its power the highest, its proper perfectible subject is a body having many different organs through which its multifarious operations can be carried out; and that is why the soul cannot possibly be actually present in the semen separated from the body; for, indeed, not even the souls of perfect brute animals are multiplied by division, as with annulose animals. And the second reason is this. The intellect, which is the proper and principal power of the intellective soul, is not the act of any part of the body, and therefore it cannot be divided accidentally as a result of the bodys being divided. Nor, then, can the intellective soul be so divided.

11

Cf. Collins English Dictionary, s.v. annulose: adj. (of earthworms, crustaceans, and similar animals) having a body formed of a series of rings; segmented. Cf. In II Sent., dist. 28, q. 2, art. 3, c.

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[5] The second is also impossible. For it is by transmuting the body that the active power in the semen contributes to the generation of the animal; indeed, a power present in matter cannot act otherwise. But every form that is initiated through the transmutation of matter is dependent upon matter for its being, since by this means the form is made actual from being potential, and thus the material transmutation issues in the actual being of the matter through its union with the form. Hence, if in this way the form also begins to be simply, then the form will have no being at all except that which accrues to it through being united to a matter; that is to say, the form will be dependent on matter for its being. Hence, from the hypothesis that the human soul is brought into being through the active power in the semen it follows that its being depends upon matter, as with other material forms. But the contrary of this has already been proved. The intellective soul, therefore, is in no way produced through the transmission of the semen. [6] Moreover, every form brought into being through the transmutation of matter is educed from the potentiality of matter, for the transmutation of matter is its reduction from potentiality to act. Now, the intellective soul cannot be educed from the potentiality of matter, since it has already been shown that the intellective soul altogether exceeds the power of matter, through having a materially independent operation, as was likewise proved above. The intellective soul, therefore, is not brought into being through the transmutation of matter; nor, then, is it produced by the action of a power in the semen. [7] Then, too, the operation of no active power exceeds the genus to which that power belongs. But the intellective soul transcends the whole genus of bodies, since it enjoys an operation completely surpassing the range of bodily things, namely, the operation of understanding. Therefore, no corporeal power can produce the intellective soul. But every action of a power present in the semen is exercised through some bodily potency, since the formative power acts by means of a threefold heatthe heat of fire, of the heaven, and of the soul. Therefore, the intellective soul cannot be produced by a power in the semen. (emphasis added)

Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei. On the Power of God by Thomas Aquinas, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (1952):
Q. III: ARTICLE IX Is the Rational Soul Brought into Being by Creation or Is it Transmitted Through the Semen? [Sum. Th. I, Q. cxviii] 6. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 7) the efficient cause produces its own species in its effect. Now man takes his species from his rational soul. Therefore seemingly the rational soul is caused by the begetter in the begotten. Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generator begets his like in species in so far as the begotten is produced by the action of the generator in order that it may share in his species: and this comes to pass by the begotten receiving a form like that of the generator. If, then, that, form be non-subsistent, and its being consist merely in that it is united to its subject, it will be necessary for the generator to be cause of that form; as is the case with all material forms. If on the other hand it be a subsistent form, so that its being is not entirely dependent on its union with matter, as in the case of the rational soul, then it suffices that the generator be the cause of the union of such a form with matter by merely disposing the matter for the form: nor need it be the cause of the form. (emphasis added)

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If, then, it suffices that the generator be the cause of the union of such a form with matter by merely disposing the matter for the form, then, with respect to the production of the first man, the angelic creature may have likewise disposed the slime of the earth to the form of man, but not proximately. Cf. a text already cited above, St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 91, art. 2, obj. 4, ad 4 (tr. Alfred J. Freddoso):
Objection 4: In Super Genesim ad Litteram Augustine says that mans body was made during the work of the six days in the sense that God placed certain causal principles within corporeal creation (secundum causales rationes quas Deus inseruit creaturae coporali ), whereas later on mans body was formed in actuality. But that which preexists by means of its causal principles in corporeal creation can be produced through a corporeal power. Therefore, the human body was produced by some created power and not directly by God. Reply to objection 4: There are two ways in which, among creatures, something is said to preexist through its causal principles. In the first way it preexists in virtue of both an active and a passive power; that is, the thing preexists not only in the sense that it can be made out of preexisting matter, but also in the sense that there is some preexisting creature that is able to make it. In the second way it preexists in virtue of a passive power alone, i.e., in the sense that it can be made by God from preexisting matter. It is in this sense that, according to Augustine, the human body preexisted through causal principles in the works that were produced. (emphasis added)

But if so, then the angels could have played a circumscribed role in predisposing such a subject to the form of man. 8. The works of distinction and adornment in relation to divine power. Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia q. 69, art. 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day? Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of distinction. Objection 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words of Gn. 3:17, Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee, show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with the work of formation. Objection 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day. On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): The earth brought forth the green herb, after which there follows, The evening and the morning were the third day.

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I answer that, On the third day, as said (Article [1]), the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was invisible or void, being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was shapeless or empty, that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared; secondly, when the earth brought forth the green herb. But concerning the production of plants, Augustines opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine ( Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew.12 Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earths surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, He worketh until now. Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only.13 However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, before it sprung up in the earth, and before it grew, that is, before like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, as indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, from which the seed of others should arise.14 Nor does the question where the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument. Reply to Objection 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earths formation. Reply to Objection 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is said: Shall it bring forth TO THEE.

12

As many commentators note, the plants referred to in the latter account are those requiring the husbandry of man, and so are distinct from the plants produced at the end of the third day. See our commentary ad loc. 13 It is inexplicable to me that St. Augustine could have proposed, and that St. Thomas could have approved, an interpretation that so openly contradicts the plain meaning of the text: the account of the appearance of plant life at the end of the Third Day making quite clear that they were created in a state able to reproduce their kindthat is, in a state of perfection, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. IV) (Summa Theol., I, q. 5, art. 4, c.) 14 Unde signanter Scriptura dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem et facientem semen, quia scilicet sunt productae perfectae species plantarum, ex quibus semina aliarum orirentur . And so Scripture pointedly says, Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, meaning that the species of plants were produced perfect, from which the seed of others [i.e. of other plants, which they reproduce] should arise. (tr. B.A.M.) That is to say, the species of plants were produced in perfection, since they are able to reproduce right from the start, just as were Adam and Eve, as I remarked in the preceding footnote.

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Reply to Objection 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (Question [67], Article [4]; Question [68], Article [3]). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them. (emphasis added)

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia q. 70, art. 2, ad 5 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected. (em-phasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Suppl, q. 74, art. 2, obj. 3, ad 3 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the worlds beginning was effected by Gods power alone, for the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire. Reply to Objection 3: By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby. (emphasis added)

Now, with the exception of man, the first constitution of things took place with the creation of light on the first day, and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form.15 For, as Charles De Koninck explains,
...from the moment of the existence of the first composite being (granted that the world had a beginning in time) all the natural forms possible were given in the potency of Prime Matter. From then on no special creative act is necessary to draw them from potency into [41-42] actuality, provided there exists a sufficient created cause, whatever it be. And, if this sufficient, and created cause exists, the generative causality must be attributed to it in virtue of the principle of divine government through second causes . The principle of sufficient causality demands that the cause in question be on the same level at least as the effect produced. (Le Cosmos, Laval [1936] [typescript], n. 6, pp. 41-42) (emphasis added)

For, as St. Thomas tells us,


15

Cf. Ia, q. 67, art. 4, c. (tr. English Dominican Fathers).

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...in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately from God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. 16

We therefore conclude that by the work of the first day what God first produced in being was the first composite being within which is understood to exist in potency every grade in the hierarchy of being which He was subsequently to produce; the passive principles of things being understood to exist in their proper matters, but their exemplary cause in the first principle of generation in the way in which the forms of things pre-exist in the mind of the artisan; the causality of equivocal agents being limited to the drawing of the higher forms out of the potency of prime matter; such forms being given in the beginning by Gods original fiat whereby He produced things in being, no other special creative act being necessary; an outcome in perfect agreement with the interpretation we are proposing in this monograph. It remains, then, to consider the relation each work has to the causality of the First Cause and to that of nature, once it has been instituted on the First Day, a subject to which we now turn. Cf. A Theologians Brief On the Place of the Human Embryo Within the Christian Tradition.17
The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics Reproduced with Permission (Submitted to the House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research by an ad hoc group of Christian theologians from the Anglican, Catholic, Orthodox and Reformed traditions) Prepared by Rev David Jones MA MA MSt, The Linacre Centre for Healthcare Ethics, London. <> Some theological principles 16. For a Christian, the question of the status of the human embryo is directly related to the mystery of creation. In the context of the creation of things seen and unseen 30 the human being appears as the microcosm, reflecting in the unity of a single creature both spiritual and corporeal realities.31 The beginning of each human being is therefore a reflection of the coming to be of the world as a whole. It reveals the creative act of God bringing about the reality of this person (of me), in an analogous way to the creation of the entire cosmos. There is a mystery involved in the existence of each person. 17. Often in the Scriptures the forming of the child in the womb is described in ways that echo the formation of Adam from the dust of the earth. 32 This is why Psalm 139 describes the child in the womb as being formed in the depths of the earth. 33 The formation of the human embryo is archetypal of the mysterious works of God. 34 A passage that is significant for uncovering the connections between Genesis and embryogenesis is found in the deuterocanonical book of Maccabees, in a mothers speech to her son:

16 17

Cf. idem. (http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/mis/mis_02christiantradition1.html [11/18/08])

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I do not know how you came into being in my womb. It was not I who gave you life and breath, nor I who set in order the elements within each of you. Therefore the Creator of the world, who shaped the beginning of man and devised the origin of all things, will in his mercy give life and breath back to you again. 35 18. The book of Genesis marks out human beings from other creatures. Only human beings male and female are described as being made in the image and likeness of God; only they are given dominion over creation; only Adam is portrayed as receiving life from Gods breath and as naming the animals. 36 However, at the same time, it is clear that human beings are earthly creatures, made on the same day as other land animals, made from the dust of the earth, not descending out of heaven. Because they are earthly, human beings are mortal: Dust you are and to dust you will return.37 There is no sign in these stories of the dualism of body and soul that is found in Pythagoras or in the ancient mystery religions. The soul is not a splinter of God that is trapped in a body. The soul is the natural life of the body, given by the life-giving God. References 30 Creed of Nicaea, N. Tanner Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils London: Sheed & Ward, 1990, I. p. 5. 31 Gregory of Nyssa On the Making of Man; John Damascene Exposition of the Orthodox Faith II.12; Creed of Lateran IV, Tanner p. 230. 32 Job 10.8-12, Ecclesiastes 11.5, Ezekiel 37.7-10 (cf. Wisdom 7.1, 15.10-11). 33 Psalm 139.15. 34 Psalm 139.15, Ecclesiastes 11.5. 35 II Maccabees 7.22-23. 36 Genesis 1.26-28; 2.7; 2.19-20. 37 Genesis 3.19. (emphasis added)

Cf. Teaching Evolution in Yeshivah High Schools by Joel B. Wolowelsky:18 This article originally appeared in Ten Daat, vol. 10, 1, 1997. Appears here with permission.
The second is the obverse side of the coin, the belief that man is not qualitatively different from the animals because he too is but another branch on the evolutionary tree. Here we do have a contradiction between the biblical and scientific texts. Some people find it repulsive to think that man descended from the apes. After all, the Bible tells us that God formed man from the dust of the earth and breathed into him the breath of life. But God forbid (so to speak) that we should have a mental image of God physically molding earth into the form of a person! We have here a simple statement that God formed (yatsar rather than bara) man from existing insignificant matter (afar min ha-adama) and infused in him an aspect of Godliness. The Torah is not making a physical statement, insisting that the insignificant base was dirt rather than pre-human sapiens. It is rather making a metaphysical statement, insisting on humans uniqueness and their spiritual position above the animals . It is only humans into whom God has breathed the breath of life. Better stated, animals became human only when God breathed in them His divine breath. That is why we can perform medical experiments on animals, for example, but not on people. For us, humans and animals differ fundamentally on the metaphysical level, not the physical plane. This is a theological rather than
18

(http://www.lookstein.org/articles/teaching_evolution.htm [3/28/11])

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scientific statement, one that has nothing to do with, say, the exclusivity of humans ability to communicate. Evolutionary biologists have nothing to say on it one way or another. We have no trouble saying that humans came from dust and will return to dust. So too should we feel comfortable in saying that the shell that houses the human soul came from some animal form and, if we do not pay attention to their souls and the Torah which guides them, we can be left only with the animal shell. Anyone familiar with the history of the second half of the twentieth century should easily acknowledge this. (emphasis added)

Cf. Evangelium Vitae: On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life (1995). Encyclical Letter Addressed by the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II to the Bishops, Priests and Deacons, Men and Women Religious, Lay Faithful, and All People of Good Will (1995.03.25), nn. 34-35:
34. Life is always a good. This is an instinctive perception and a fact of experience, and man is called to grasp the profound reason why this is so. Why is life a good? This question is found everywhere in the Bible, and from the very first pages it receives a powerful and amazing answer. The life which God gives man is quite different from the life of all other living creatures, inasmuch as man, although formed from the dust of the earth (cf. Gen 2:7, 3:19; Job 34:15; Ps 103:14; 104:29), is a manifestation of God in the world, a sign of his presence, a trace of his glory (cf. Gen 1:26-27; Ps 8:6). This is what Saint Irenaeus of Lyons wanted to emphasize in his celebrated definition: Man, living man, is the glory of God. 23 Man has been given a sublime dignity, based on the intimate bond which unites him to his Creator: in man there shines forth a reflection of God himself. The Book of Genesis affirms this when, in the first account of creation, it places man at the summit of Gods creative activity, as its crown, at the culmination of a process which leads from indistinct chaos to the most perfect of creatures. Everything in creation is ordered to man and everything is made subject to him: Fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over ... every living thing (1:28); this is Gods command to the man and the woman. A similar message is found also in the other account of creation: The Lord God took the man and put him in the garden of Eden to till it and keep it (Gen 2:15). We see here a clear affirmation of the primacy of man over things; these are made subject to him and entrusted to his responsible care, whereas for no reason can he be made subject to other men and almost reduced to the level of a thing. In the biblical narrative, the difference between man and other creatures is shown above all by the fact that only the creation of man is presented as the result of a special decision on the part of God, a deliberation to establish a particular and specific bond with the Creator: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness (Gen 1:26). The life which God offers to man is a gift by which God shares something of himself with his creature. Israel would ponder at length the meaning of this particular bond between man and God. The Book of Sirach too recognizes that God, in creating human beings, endowed them with strength like his own, and made them in his own image (17:3). The biblical author sees as part of this image not only mans dominion over the world but also those spiritual faculties

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which are distinctively human, such as reason, discernment between good and evil, and free will: He filled them with knowledge and understanding, and showed them good and evil (Sir 17:7). The ability to attain truth and freedom are human prerogatives inasmuch as man is created in the image of his Creator, God who is true and just (cf. Dt 32:4). Man alone, among all visible creatures, is capable of knowing and loving his Creator. 24 The life which God bestows upon man is much more than mere existence in time. It is a drive towards fullness of life; it is the seed of an existence which transcends the very limits of time: For God created man for incorruption, and made him in the image of his own eternity (Wis 2:23). 35. The Yahwist account of creation expresses the same conviction. This ancient narrative speaks of a divine breath which is breathed into man so that he may come to life: The Lord God formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living being (Gen 2:7). The divine origin of this spirit of life explains the perennial dissatisfaction which man feels throughout his days on earth. Because he is made by God and bears within himself an indelible imprint of God, man is naturally drawn to God. When he heeds the deepest yearnings of the heart, every man must make his own the words of truth expressed by Saint Augustine: You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you.25 How very significant is the dissatisfaction which marks mans life in Eden as long as his sole point of reference is the world of plants and animals (cf. Gen 2:20). Only the appearance of the woman, a being who is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones (cf. Gen 2:23), and in whom the spirit of God the Creator is also alive, can satisfy the need for interpersonal dialogue, so vital for human existence. In the other, whether man or woman, there is a reflection of God himself, the definitive goal and fulfilment of every person. What is man that you are mindful of him, and the son of man that you care for him?, the Psalmist wonders (Ps 8:4). Compared to the immensity of the universe, man is very small, and yet this very contrast reveals his greatness: You have made him little less than a god, and crown him with glory and honour (Ps 8:5). The glory of God shines on the face of man. In man the Creator finds his rest, as Saint Ambrose comments with a sense of awe: The sixth day is finished and the creation of the world ends with the formation of that masterpiece which is man, who exercises dominion over all living creatures and is as it were the crown of the universe and the supreme beauty of every created being. Truly we should maintain a reverential silence, since the Lord rested from every work he had undertaken in the world. He rested then in the depths of man, he rested in mans mind and in his thought; after all, he had created man endowed with reason, capable of imitating him, of emulating his virtue, of hungering for heavenly graces. In these his gifts God reposes, who has said: Upon whom shall I rest, if not upon the one who is humble, contrite in spirit and trembles at my word? (Is 66:1-2). I thank the Lord our God who has created so wonderful a work in which to take his rest.26 23 Gloria Dei vivens homo: Adversus Haereses, IV, 20, 7: SCh 100/2, 648-649. 24 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes, 12. 25 Confessions, I, 1: CCL 27, 1. 26 Exameron, VI, 75-76: CSEL 32, 260-261.

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The Opening of Genesis, Part IX. And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness
(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti, All rights reserved.

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