JCC Internal Backgrounder Iran

Iran-United States Relations Relations between Iran and the United States had remained more or less neutral up until 1953, when Iran was subject to a CIA-backed coup dtat of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Replacing him with the pro-western General Fazlollah Zahedi, the United States garnered resentment from the general Iranian population, building the foundation for the relations between the two countries today. Iran remained pro-western for the next 26 years, with the Iranian government acting as an American proxy state, catering to its every whim. In 1979, however, a completely unforeseen revolution ousted the pro-American shah in favor of antiAmerican Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Anti-American sentiment in Iran grew rapidly, and despite American attempts to mend the ties between the two countries, Iranian anger culminated in 1979 with a hostage crisis, where a group of revolutionary hardliners occupied the American embassy in Tehran and took 52 American diplomats hostage. The hostages were held for 444 days, and after a failed military rescue and the condemnation of actions by the United States, the Algiers Accords were signed and the hostages were released. Though the crisis was mitigated, the ramifications of the event were profound. On April 7, 1980, the United States formally broke diplomatic ties with Iran a severance that persists to this day. Further, the United States imposed complete sanctions on Iran, which were exacerbated later in 1995 and renewed in 2001. The Iran hostage situation in 1979 led to the beginning of the downhill dive of Iran-US relations, and although it destroyed the former economic and military partnership between the two countries, it granted Iran independence and a government free from western influence. The 1980s proved turbulent for relations between the two countries, with numerous events such as the Iran-Iraq War, Hezbollah bombings, and Iran Air Flight 655 incident occurring within a short period of time. These events, along with the United States support of Iraq and the conduction of several aggressive acts such as Operation Praying Mantis, served only to widen the gap between Iran and the United States. Iran-United States relations also took another turn with the events of 9/11 in 2001. Despite President George W. Bush stating that there was no direct connection between Iran and the attacks of September 11th, the United States proceeded to deem Iran one of the members of the Axis of Evil, along with North Korea and Iraq. With the accusation of terrorism, Iran was outraged, and the relationship between the two countries once

again deteriorated. Though the United States was offered a chance to agree to a Grand Bargain, a proposal that would have resolved all the outstanding issues between the United States and Iran, no reply was ever received, and as a result of both this inaction and other acts of belligerence, Iran-United States relations remained volatile. With the continued development of the Iranian nuclear program and the election of the anti-American conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005, Iran-US relations have become even more strained. President Ahmadinejad, largely elected due to his hardline, bellicose nature against the United States, has rigorously denied accusations of Iran attempting to build a nuclear weapon. These accusations, coupled with a history of mistrust and suspicion, have made relations between the two countries in the 21 st century tumultuous at best. The Iranian Mindset In the eyes of much of Irans population, the United States has been an enemy of Iran ever since the coup of Prime Minister Mossadegh. For the decades following the CIA operation, Iran was subjugated as an American proxy state. Eventually, the anger of the people of Iran catalyzed the 1979 Iranian Revolution, freeing Iran from American influence; with this act, Iran severed its ties with the United States permanently, and the relations between the two states became even more distant as time passed. Anti-American sentiment reached its zenith in Iran during the revolution, but it has endured to this day. Beginning with the hostage situation of 1979 and continuing on with the present day disputes over the Iranian nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, among others, the relationship between the two countries is poor. However, several recent polls have suggested that a significant portion of the Iranian population would support an effort at improving relations between the two countries. This apparent disparity between public attitude and the blatantly bellicose actions of President Ahmadinejads government points to worrying inconsistencies between popular opinion and state policy. Thus, Iran is currently of a mixed mindset on the one hand, the country as a whole seems to be firmly opposed to the United States, to the point that diplomatic relations have not yet been reestablished, while on the other, the majority of the Iranian populace wants to see ties restored. Ergo, it will be imperative for this Council to decide on a path to take: would it be wiser to continue the current path of aggressiveness and open pugnacity, or to embark on a new path to try and resolve the differences with the United States? The Nuclear Program

Irans nuclear program first began in the 1950s with the support of the United States and several other European governments as part of Atoms for Peace, a program focused on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Work progressed until the 1979 Iranian Revolution, when the new Supreme Leader Khomeini halted development as he considered nuclear energy religiously evil. However, small-scale research into nuclear energy continued throughout the 1980s and boomed in the period following Khomeinis death. With the assistance of the Iran-Russia joint research organization Persepolis, Iran was able to significantly accelerate its nuclear research and technology from the 1990s onwards. However, though nuclear research did bear fruitful advancements, Iran realized that it only had a limited number of countries supporting the development of its nuclear program. In the early 2000s, Iran signed onto an agreement involving the EU-3 (consisting of France, Germany, and Britain) known as the Tehran Declaration, which validated that in return for the transparency of its nuclear program and full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran would receive recognition of its right to nuclear development. However, IAEA reports soon followed, revealing that Iran had not been able to fully satisfy the requests of the agreement, and the declaration was later reneged upon. By November 2003, no evidence could be found in regard to Iranian nuclear weaponization, but the IAEA was also unable to confirm that the program was fully peaceful, thus bringing the first significant doubts and concerns of the Iranian nuclear program into the international spotlight. In 2004, under the Paris Agreement, Iran suspended its uranium enrichment program to provide an opportunity for negotiations. No solid conclusion was reached, but the agreement did serve to verify Irans determination to become a nuclear power. Coinciding with the election of Ahmadinejad, Irans uranium enrichment program resumed in mid-2005, sparking international outrage. Moreover, in 2006, President Ahmadinejad publicly announced that Iran had been able to successfully enrich uranium, giving rise to even more disapproval amongst the international community. Iran soon became blanketed by further sanctions and asset freezing as a result of its staunch refusal to shut down the nuclear program. Currently, Iran faces a wall of opposition by a large portion of the western world. While Iran has vigorously maintained that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes, the lack of transparency and the refusal of IAEA checks have fed international skepticism. In particular, the United States and its allies are condemning Irans practice of secrecy and have imposed several forms of punishment, including sanctions. With its continuing operations, the Iranian nuclear program remains a pressing issue on the international stage and will no doubt be one of the primary concerns of both cabinets.

Strait of Hormuz The Strait of Hormuz is the only sea route from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean. Lying just at the tip of Oman and to the south of Iran, it is one of the worlds most important trade passages, with 20% of the worlds petroleum, transported by 14 tankers carrying 2.7 million cubic meters of crude oil, passing through each day. At its narrowest point, the strait is merely 21 nautical miles wide, making it an easily defendable location. The Strait of Hormuz holds tremendous strategic importance as it not only controls a vital portion of the worlds traded petroleum, but also partly lies under the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. With significant American interests lying in the oil trade, it is unsurprising that there have been recurrent incidents in the area involving Iranian and American naval forces; noteworthy events include Operation Praying Mantis, which resulted in the destruction of several Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) ships, and the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by an American warship. The strait acts as a deterrent to military action against Iran: with the nearby waters heavily populated by IRIN ships, it would be well within Irans ability to seize the channel by means of mines, airstrikes, or sabotage, effectively choking off a major part of the worlds oil supply and, in turn, sending oil prices soaring. This action would severely impact not just the United States, but much of world; most likely, Iran would also have to suffer the repercussions of any military undertakings in the strait. Threats of sealing the strait originated in a statement made by the commander of the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammed Ali Jafari, in 2008; the United States and international responses to these threats have been hostile, with the commander of the 5th US Naval Fleet, Vice Admiral Kevin Cosgriff, stating that the sealing of the strait by Iran would be considered an act of war. Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz once again resurfaced as of late 2011, when Iranian Vice President Mohammed-Reza Rahimi threatened to cut off oil transport through the strait should Iranian exports be harmed by sanctions. Following his statement, the IRIN carried out a naval exercise, prompting the British Royal Navy to announce that it would send one of its most technologically advanced destroyers, HMS Daring, to patrol the Persian Gulf. Within a month of the original threats, a flotilla comprising ships from Britain, France, and the United States was sent to the Persian Gulf just off the coast of Iran as a precautionary measure against the sealing of the strait. Since January of 2012, Iran has tested new weaponry and has been preparing for possible conflict by conducting combat simulation exercises, with a recent one ending on January 3, 2013.

Despite no actual conflict occurring as of yet, the impact of simple threats have resulted in a momentary increase of 2% in oil prices, illustrating the delicate relationship of oil with the Strait of Hormuz. If war were to break out, Iran would no doubt try to seal the route, while other countries will employ countermeasures to keep it open in order to ensure market stability and a steady source of oil. Projections from current military analysis suggest that Iran should be able to hold the strait for a period of approximately one month. Despite the superior technology of the British, French, and American ships, asymmetric warfare tactics that could potentially be utilized by the Iranian forces should be able to overcome the technological disparity. This prognosis is reinforced by the initial results of Millennium Challenge 2002, an American war-game exercise that some speculate as a simulation of potential conflict in the Strait of Hormuz; in the simulation, the United States fleet was decimated within two days by unconventional warfare strategies. Irans Policy Of pressing concern are Iranian relations with the United States and, also, Israel. Not only are current relations with the United States highly antagonistic, but the ongoing disputes over the nuclear program of Iran are pushing the countries into ever more belligerent positions and threaten to involve more of the international community. In addition, American sympathies towards Israel in the Middle East are also a sizable concern, for Iran still refuses to recognize Israel as an official state. As such, it is important for this Council to develop a strong plan for the future. Should we attempt to conciliate our relations with the western world or continue to bear opposing views? Can we continue forward while under long-term sanctions and international condemnation? These are all integral questions to consider when making decisions in the upcoming meetings of the Supreme National Security Council, as they will no doubt shape the future of our country. The Crisis at Hand On April 1, 2013, members of Irans Kurdish population of 8 million staged a local coup, sealing off military outposts, government buildings, and civilian airports; cutting off communications; and setting up blockades at provincial border lines. The province of Kurdistan was secured first, followed by Kermanshah and Illam in the ensuing days. Armed with automatic weapons, grenades, and Soviet-era half-tracks, the rebels took the government officials of Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces hostage,

demanding secession from the Islamic Republic and the recognition of an independent Kurdistan Republic. The uprising was orchestrated mainly by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the guerilla group, Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). Our government has deemed their demands utterly unacceptable and has ordered immediate military retaliation against the rebel forces. Ground troops, along with Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) fighters and helicopters, have been deployed to bomb, destroy, and eradicate the dug-in Kurdistani rebel fighters and to rescue the hostages located primarily in the Kermanshah mountain regions. Rebel troops are currently armed with Soviet-era equipment as well as light armor, and are proving to be a considerable threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran Army (IRIA) and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is suspected that rebel forces are being armed by organizations in Turkey, where Kurdish nationalist movements are extremely prominent. Preliminary figures suggest that the conflict has resulted in approximately 2000 casualties in under a week, with the conflict currently stuck in a stalemate. Negotiations between our government and the rebel forces have not taken place, and the leaders of this rebellion are not yet known. Both Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have made public statements labelling the uprising as unconstitutional, illegal, and treasonous. Much of the international community including the United States has yet to publicly voice opinions on the conflict; however, Iraq, which actively supports Kurdish autonomy, has stated that it views the rebellion as just and commendable. With the circumstances at hand, it is important for us to quell the rebellion as quickly as possible. Iran stands firmly against the prospect of an independent Kurdistan and even more so against an armed rebellion occurring within its borders. Thus, it is paramount for this Council to decide on an efficient resolution to this conflict. Should we risk more lives to battle out of a stalemate, or should we begin negotiations instead? The burden of this choice rests upon the shoulders of the Supreme National Security Council. Immediate Goals of the Supreme National Security Council 1. Establish a plan as to how Iran will respond to the Kurdistani rebellion. 2. Identify and contact the leaders of the rebel forces. 3. Find all affiliations of the rebel groups, such as the PKK, PJAK, and other potential terrorist groups.