This action might not be possible to undo. Are you sure you want to continue?
IX, AD 1
(Notes on Prima Pars Q. 1, art. 9, ad. 1)
(Unpublished manuscript, Charles De Koninck Papers)
Translated by Michael Augros (1994) With minor revisions by Bart A. Mazzetti (c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti §
although that nature is not found in it: as a stone is said to be the image of a man inasmuch as it has a similar shape.in the species of the thing or in some sign of its species . 1 _______________________________________________________________ To manifest this response one must note that poetry is in the genus of the arts of imitating.Notes on Prima Pars Q.” And the difference of poetry is “in speech.likeness . sculpture. so far does it attain to the notion of indifference: for according as it differs it is not an image: (1) The first is [that] in which is found something similar to another in quality which designates and expresses the nature of the other. Ia. insofar as each attains to the notion of an image. (3) But the most perfect notion of an image is when we find the very same form and nature in number in the one imitating in that which is imitated. the same nature in species. and so the Son is the most perfect image of the Father: because all divine attributes which are signified by way of quality. together with the nature itself are in the Son. q. in which there does not subsist that nature whose image it is. 2 . The terms of this definition must be manifested: Art: right reason about makeable things.” of music “in rhythmical sound. 1. it is required that it proceed from another like to it in species. Thomas distinguishes a threefold grade of imitation. but also according to a unity in number.” etc. whose other species are painting. 2. 1.” Therefore origin and procession expressive of an original is that in which the notion of image is completed. music. likewise in I Sent. or at least in a sign of the species.In these [places] it is to be noted that there are three things that belong to the notion of an image: . not only according to species. as the image of a king on a coin. etc. And in the passage in the Sentences. St. (2) But the notion [of an image] is found more perfectly when there is. (And so the image of God is in creatures. art. 28. 1. Of Imitating: what it is is to be seen in St. d.origin Whence “for something truly to be an image. Thomas. Now the definition of the whole genus is “the art of imitating delightfully. under that quality which designates the similar nature. as the image of a man in the father is found in his son: because he has a likeness in shape. 35. 9. ad. a.) And so this is an imperfect way of being an image. and in the nature which the shape signifies. q. a. -.
For the act of understanding is perfected according as understandable things are in the understanding after the manner of the understanding itself. 86. art. But the act of the will consists in a motion toward things. And this brings with it three things: First that an imitation of such things will be imperfect in the notion of delightful imitation insofar as it is lacking in pure objectivity or insofar as it has something of the subject as distinguished against the object.Delightfully: That there are some imitations naturally delightful to man is shown thus by Aristotle: But the poetic art in general appears to have been begotten by two kinds of causes. not as murder. for the forms of things in the soul. are not contrary. But a sign of this is what happens in works. q. still the original itself is outside the imitation’s notion insofar as it delights. 94. ch. Nor does anything prevent that knowledge of an imitation sometimes presupposes a knowledge of some bad or base original. And this happens when the original is not 3 . because it happens that in considering them then learn and syllogize what each one is. 2) And so. Therefore. [Poetics. and so the understanding is not infected by them. but rather is perfected. For this reason they enjoy looking at images. the forms of the most dishonorable beasts. not only for philosophers. through which [their] contraries are known. 1448b 419] Therefore the art of imitating delightfully is an art of producing works or images or representations whose very consideration or inspection is delightful. since. insofar as it stands in the line of pure objectivity and intelligibility. because [man] is the most imitative [of animals] and makes his first learnings through imitation). Whence murder in a tragedy can be delightful. For we delight in considering the most express images of things which themselves we view with pain. though they communicate in it but slightly. or on account of some other such cause. 4.. and both of them natural. although visible beauty makes for the perfection of vision. yet visible ugliness can be in vision without imperfection. who has most perfect knowledge. For to imitate is connatural to men from childhood. (I-II q. But the delight is due to the imitation or representation. so that the lover joins his soul to the thing loved. but as an imitation of murder. for instance. even an ugly thing can be imitated. that “this is that man”. but on account of the workmanship. and not due to the thing imitated or the original because as Aristotle notes. But the cause of this is that learning is most delightful. for that would be perverse. [III Suppl. sees all beautiful and ugly things. (and in this they differ from other animals. art. 1 ad. and because all men delight in imitations. if one happens not to have seen [the thing imitated] before [the image] would make delight not as an imitation. Whence also God. but similarly for all other men. for example. 1 ad. although it would be necessary for us to know the original of the imitation so that the imitation as imitation is reached. or the coloring. and of the dead. 2] Therefore delight is due to the imitation formally.
And [sometimes1] we are delighted about the work of some art of imitating. 5 ad. Prol. as is manifest in comedies which are imperfect because of a poet or performer.A. And in this respect the universal of the arts of imitating or the imitation has itself midway between the singular and the universal proper. whence it has a notion midway between the universal and the singular. but require as a condition of delight the love of what is imitated.) 3 Many have understood Aristotle to mean by “imitation” making one thing to look in all ways indistinguishable from another. since the original is made more understandable by the imitation.A. And so St. For its images are rather singular things. 1 art. whence it is necessary that. (M.expressed imitatively. And this defect happens for the most part. and because the imitation bespeaks a relation to that which is imitated. as one egg is like another. nor has it properly the notion of origination. that poetic science is about things which. then it would be a likeness of another man not so much as an image of him. or of the one who makes the imitation. neither one is the image of the other. as [leading us] from one thing into another. Whence the goodness of the work is judged from the [resulting] greater understandability of that which is imitated. then it is not a work of the art of imitating delightfully. the two being so alike in every way. (B. reason be seduced by certain likenesses. so that the imitation by itself is not enough but it is necessary for it to be completed by some subject.A. q. cannot be grasped by reason. not knowing it happens more often to delight us because of some subject.) So if some painter makes a portrait of some individual. or insofar as by themselves they are not enough in the line of pure objective imitation. but rather is like a second egg. In this the art has a likeness with the agent intellect. which is a material likeness carrying the illusion of reality. and not because of the object absolutely. One should note the difference between the scientific universal and the quasiuniversal of such an art of imitation. or with matter. For it happens that the representation by a mediocre performer cannot be made delightful unless first the person of the performer is loved. In which danger stands the whole of the art. the art of delightfully imitating has the notion of instrumentality. 3] And in this respect the art of imitating delightfully has the notion of teaching. so that it was outwardly indistinguishable from a true man. as it were. it is necessary that the object as object be more perfect than the original. to the original. namely from the imitation itself the original is elevated and is manifested more.) 4 . and the same happens with poems [which cannot be delightful] unless the original or the poet himself is loved beforehand. Therefore to have poetic knowledge of things is much removed from the 1 2 Reading aliquando for quando. Since neither egg is the origin of the other. but as one egg is like another egg.M. because of a defect of truth. and a certain universality. (And because of this Aristotle says that poetry is more philosophic than is history. [I Sent. Thomas says. (M. (And therefore works of the art of imitating can be morally bad. 2 And in this way many people have quite crudely understood the mind of Aristotle..3 Third that insofar as the imitation of the original is more understandable.. But that to which the imitation or representation conduces in itself lacks the clarity of the representation. The image would then in no way add to the understandability of the original. i. or of the matter in which it is made.) If an artist were to make a sculpture so like a man that it could even move itself etc.) Second that as the understanding can remain in the very representation as in the object by which it is delighted.e. insofar as they are lacking in the notion of the art of imitating. greater in the respect of having understandability.. or by the original.
but of something concomitant [to the end]: “And so it is that the divine understanding. Thomas lays it down as the lowest teaching. has a certain superiority. he lists dialectic first. although it is true that about many things we cannot have [anything] except poetic knowledge. but because of the operations. having a middle place between the singular and the universal and so is more proportioned to most men. for it belongs to reason to lead from one thing into another. For delight in itself does not have the notion of an end. and that the poet has an excellent talent because he teaches us about such things. But this is displeasing to many because of the joy of poetic knowledge and because of its heated impulse. An. which is the institutor of nature. where after having spoken about demonstrative science. namely because of the weakness of most people’s understanding. the first reading. For there are few who attain to the first principles as to the principles of science and attain to true science. the way in which there comes to be disgust in a man for some food if it be represented to him under the likeness of something disgusting. 2]. And reason is said to be seduced by imitations because imitation is naturally delightful to man.perfection of science but also from the imperfection of the singular or of ignorance. These thing having been laid down. So it is true that among natural knowledges the poetic. then rhetoric. Poetry uses metaphors for representations on account of which we take delight. and finally poetics: But sometimes a mere conjecture inclines to some part of a contradiction on account of some representation. And so St. to most men. as when the lion is called the king of animals. But sacred teaching uses metaphors because of their necessity and utility. for it belongs to the poet to lead to something virtuous through some fitting representation. But neither the understanding nor the will. although it is better than some other things. and that which is considered is the imitation of 5 . And so poetic knowledge is laid down by many as if in the highest place of all knowledge. Therefore it is to be noted that Sacred Scripture and theology do not intend representations in themselves delightful to man. 4 art. But such middleness or instrumentality is somehow hidden inasmuch as the imitation seduces reason. Therefore poetic knowledge in itself is a road and it is imperfect. And so many having nothing but a certain appearance of science do not understand the true excellence of science. And to this poetics is ordered. namely the delightfulness of imitation.. but [rather they intend] the things which exceed the grasp of our understanding which without metaphors cannot be signified. as is clear from I Post. Therefore delight has the notion of a mover. from which there follows a representation in which is attributed to the lion more of understandability than he would have. the response of St. But this is by accident. But all these things pertain to rational philosophy. includes delight on account of the operations” [I-II q. Whence in this respect poetic knowledge does not wholly exceed the sensibility according to which operations in animals are sought because of delight. or less fittingly because of the reasons mentioned in the body of the article. 2 ad. seeks knowledge or the good because of delight. Thomas is evident: that the poet uses metaphors on account of representation: for representation is naturally delightful to man. insofar as each is such. Therefore reason is inclined by something in itself extrinsic to cognitive reason. as poetic knowledge is easier. as was said.
and we delight in imitation insofar as it makes us to experience. in our experience of an imitation. and certain species of painting. Now these things follow from the proper definition of the art of imitating about which St.. what we rest in is the likeness of a thing (“that to which the lion is compared”).” as Dr. (B. Second it is unfitting in this.g. Therefore it would be ridiculous to say Scripture or sacred doctrine proceeds poetically. all art is called imitative of nature. namely self-portraits. that they have something of experience.. Thomas says that poetic science is about things which because of a defect of truth cannot be grasped by reason. as when Christ is called a lion. De Koninck says below. which namely. which is “constituted of the two. in which the poet speaks in the first person. For such arts are opposed to knowledge of the universal rather through this. For in comedy as opposed to tragedy.] So the proper reason [or notion] from both sides is wholly opposed. Moreover. but materially. and not as Scripture or theology.the lion. Whence it is said that art is expressive of itself. exceeds the representation. the reality itself. as it were. but for the things themselves. But from this interpretation follow many unfitting things. Third is that in all the arts there is a certain imitation. Thomas speaks in this text. and not the lion itself. First about the very definition of the genus of the arts which here are called arts of imitating delightfully. [I Sent. Whence St. yet as that to which it is an imitation. but we do so as if we were resting in the thing itself. we turn from that which is intended. whence it is necessary that reason be seduced. except materially. 4 E.M) 6 . and not the thing itself. an original and an image. by certain likenesses: but theology is about things which are above reason. Fourth [it is unfittingly said] that poetics is about things which because of a defect in truth cannot be grasped by reason. But in that example we do not rest in that to which he is compared.A. since neither is proportioned to reason. cit. Whence we rest in that to which the lion is compared. is formally the imitation. namely the lion-king. And when it has a poetic appearance. as is clear in the art of making a hammer or a saw. nor in the thing which is constituted from the two.4 But Sacred Scripture uses metaphors not for delightful representations. or about things of which the imitation is better than the original. namely lyric. this is accidental. and so the symbolic mode is common to both. First it is unfitting that the whole is laid down to representation and imitation as if it were that on account of which one is delighted. For against this is one species of poetry. but in the courage of Christ. loc. in which the very person of the artist expresses himself. For insofar as poetic knowledge leads to representations in themselves. his courage is signified by the sensible courage of the lion. man is represented as worse than he is. This object. that imitation as objective is opposed to the subject.
anger. such as this picture. perfectly imperfect. as it were “imperfectly perfect. But the difference of the arts about which we now speak is found in the “delightfully. whence in artificial things we work toward a likeness of natural things. a king. And therefore natural things are imitable by art.” And therefore it must be considered that in these arts there is a twofold exemplar or original: first. so thus the work of nature seems to be the work of intelligence. Whence imitation has the notion of freeing and purging. The first person is not the individual person of the poet. as also [there is] an exemplar and an exemplared. but in the art of imitating delightfully. not yet written out. and already expresses the “what” of the thing to be made. as a lion. And likewise with the image of the painter himself which does not have the notion of an art of imitating delightfully except insofar as it has something of universality. the making idea in the mind of the artist. To the saying “art is expressive of itself” I shall make answer below. in which an individual person has himself wholly materially. or in the conceived poem. The first [experience] is about the very work inasmuch as it has singularity. it is inept. To the second I answer that even lyric poetry is simply objective.] 7 . this is accidental. because by an intellective principle the whole of nature is ordained to its end. when by determinate means it proceeds to certain ends. as is clear in the imitation of sorrow or sadness. as is clear especially in music by which the motions of the passions are imitated. 6. Lectio 4. Yet it can be added that in the works of the arts of imitating delightfully we find a likeness of the spiritual thing which is the universal. But in this singularity as such is not completed the work of an art of imitating delightfully because the work would be as a second egg. inasmuch as many things are imitated before they are to be known by experience. but due to the imitation. But that concept or image has a more radical original the concept or image of which is a likeness in form with the origination.” The second is found on the side of that which is imitated. and all things which can be imitated thus. adding nothing in the line of understandability. n. and if it makes us to know nothing else. but is already an imitation of the first person. But the reason that art imitates nature is that the principle of artificial operation is knowledge. But in that which is thus known by experience is not found that which is proper to art.Responses: To the first I answer that in these arts a twofold experience can be considered. To the third I answer that in any art there is some imitation. or this poem. but all our knowledge is through the senses and taken from sensible and natural things. or only imperfectly. And when from the image the individual person of the painter is better known. or different [from the original] only numerically. a cloud. But this likeness is possible on the side of the work because of its imperfection. Whence because experience is reached indistinctly. imitation is more perfectly expressed. whence the exemplar sometimes is called an original and the exemplared an image. [In II Physic. unless there is understood the very inspection or hearing of a delightful imitation. containing under itself only one individual. which is common to all arts. one ought to mark that the exemplar already is an exemplared or image. which also art imitates in operating. But the delight of which we now speak is not due to that which is known by experience inasmuch as it is of this kind. namely. but in the experience by which it is understandably and delightfully imitated. as is clear in the picture conceived by the painter before execution. But together with that singularity stands a certain universality in which is properly completed the imitation about which we now speak.
as was said above about the first person. as was already said. as is clear in those [works] which are called “daring. Either as that which is had by generation or by nature. but because of that which is imitated.And so the art of imitating delightfully as such and inasmuch as it is of this sort is not said to be imitated. feel pleasure. as happens even in those who seek dialectical knowledge because they themselves are too content with mere likelihood. Plato seems wholly divine (Republic. which one has partly from an innate sensibility for objects under the form of the delightful (indeed. onlooker. But by the moderns it is understood to mean art is expressive of the subject of the artist as subject. The first inasmuch as by nature one is well disposed to conceiving and executing imitations. And about the danger of the arts of imitating. as the onlooker loving an imitation of vile things because he loves vile things. To which last can be added that since in some work of the art of imitating delightfully. as happens in happiness. is an imitation not only of a complete action. Whence the pragmatist proceeds logically when he exalts the eminence of the arts of imitating delightfully. as we hinted above.” Whence one is delighted. But this happens either because the term “subject” is abused. X). 9). and because of this they are more naturally instructed by poetics. however. and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness. most artists are very concupiscible. And with regard to the imitations he reaches. and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way. and because of this someone is called original. two things can be considered. 1925. desiring knowledge on account of the delight. For delightfulness is part of the notion of such imitation not merely as a concomitant. or which is not from any principle. Whence the one who adheres to objects only inasmuch as they have the notion of being delightful. signifying rather some passion or thought which pleases the speaker. or because of an inordinate appetite for delight. and the other the talent of the artist. But this naturally happens in the young who do not yet seek knowledge except under the form of the delightful. III. one of the imitation itself.” this also can be understood in many ways. [Republic. ch. living inordinately). it also happens in many cases on account of excess sensibility that they do not attain to purely understandable things. and he lays down the experience of art as the highest happiness (Art as Experience. but is itself as a first and a root and a simple origin. But in these cases. The second. instrumental knowledge is not exceeded. or for that which is ungenerated. there is also a twofold admiration. 1935). an example of which Aristotle gives from tragedy: Tragedy. II. adheres inordinately. John Dewey speaks rightly about “enjoyed meanings” or delightful significations (Experience and Nature. I think you know that the very best of us. and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast. X. but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. And when art is called “expressive of itself. because imitations of this sort ought to be likely at the same time as unexpected. Now the good poet has these two things. one the very imitation and the other its execution. 605d] But talent can be understood in two ways. or hearer. or because the work is lacking in the notion of delightful imitation. when we hear Homer or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief. as in the saying “a born poet”. Such incidents have the very greatest effect 8 . not because of an imitation. Yet it is to be conceded that delightful imitation carries something of the subject as subject. as is clear from this that [all] artificial things equally can be imitated.
a. Fourth it would follow that even the images of the saints whose very own looks are not delightful. for incidents like that we think to be not without a meaning. we cannot draw the ancient poets or even those who are called “theologizers” wholly to one side or to the other. 1451a 1-10] Therefore the ability of conceiving and of resolving well causes admiration. But from this it does not follow that a comedy’s imitation is not better. but in the face of the image only the exemplar is to be honored. And then those originals or imitated gods. IV. 3 v. and in this consists the humanism of the ancients as man is considered as it were a liberator of gods and creative and an exemplar. Therefore the things which were cited and deduced from St. but of a middle more proportioned to our way of grasping by which higher things are known. therefore. as will be clear from things to be said below about religious art. there is more of the marvellous in them than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance. 9. Still. Responses: 9 . which can happen because of ignorance. “except improperly and abusively. but only a sign or condition by which we are moved to honoring the prototype. as can be seen in Billuart. And the defect itself can happen from many causes. whence the original has itself wholly materially: in which case the imitation comes from the art of imitating delightfully as such. 23. But such are beautiful works of art.” which opinion is commonly rejected by theologians. Even matters of chance seem most marvellous if there is an appearance of design as it were in them. To the fourth I answer that in comedies man is represented as worse and more laughable than he is in reality. But when the imitation falls away from the original. of this sort is necessarily finer than others. by awkward images would be more perfect[ly represented]. many unfitting things follow especially about religious art. with strings and with instruments and in well-sounding cymbals. [Poetics. Or the imitation does not have the notion of a term. so as an image in no way is it the term of worship. For it is more intelligible inasmuch as it has more of the notion of the laughable than the thing itself. are considered imperfect in themselves by the poet: whence related to these imitations are its imperfections. and sometimes his very person becomes as it were the exemplar of the whole life of the admirers. Thomas above are too narrow and must be corrected. in fact. and therefore are made by an art of imitating delightfully. as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the author of Mitys’ death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a public spectacle. T. with drums. And this is impure. Either the very imitation has the notion of a term as that because of which one is delighted. Second. First it is manifest that many works either poetic or musical. and therefore delightful.on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in consequence of one another. And in this last case the imitation is not by the art of imitating delightfully as such. an example of which is given among the ancient writers and sculptors making imitations of the gods. are made by Catholic artists to be beautiful. And in this way one is carried to the subject of the artist. A plot. then there is no art of imitating delightfully as such. Third Sacred Scripture itself incites us to praising God in song. dissert. sculpted or painted. Second it would follow that the images of Christ and of the saints are not to be honored. because their works are a mixture of poetry and dialectic. and in a choir. ch.
but not by delight. and the peculiar assistance he derived in this effort from Greek and Roman literature. yet they do not proceed from an art of imitating as such. But in the art which is defined by delightful imitation. and especially ecclesiastical authority. Therefore the works spoken about in the objection can proceed from the most perfect art and can be beautiful. toward the conquest of this planet as a place of human occupation. This movement was essentially a revolt against intellectual. has itself materially to the imitation. and the original. But the very perfection of its work is a participated perfection. although in a way a principle. Therefore although one has dominion over the form and matter of the work. It indicates the endeavor of man to reconstitute himself as a free being. a word which will often recur in the ensuing paragraphs.. especially divine things.] Humanism. but in a delightful imitation. not as the thrall of theological despotism. Whence if beauty is defined by rest of the appetite or delight in the very aspect of that which is called beautiful. [Encycl. And so arts of imitating delightfully are abusively equated with those which are called “fine arts. Britann. the artist is wholly the master.To the first [I answer] that the property of the art of imitating delightfully is not preserved in a beautiful work of art as such. the definition would be common and dialectical. the “litterae humaniores. And although from this satisfaction follows delight. The term is especially applied to that movement of thought which in western Europe in the 15th century broke through the mediaeval traditions of scholastic theology and philosophy. and is the parent of all modern developments whether intellectual. Yet it is greatly to be noted that religious art is in itself more perfect in the very notion of imitating inasmuch as it expresses better things conducive to better things. yet the matter and the form have themselves materially related to that which is imitated. and devoted itself to the rediscovery and direct study of the ancient classics.” letters leaning rather to the side of man than of divinity. In this article the Renaissance will be considered as implying a comprehensive movement of the European intellect and will toward self-emancipation. scientific. For it is necessary that a work of religious art have the original as its beginning and as its end. And thus the art of imitating delightfully and religious art have themselves in an opposite way. Britann.” It is therefore to be considered that the beautiful is defined as that which pleases when seen. it is not intrinsic to the notion of the beautiful. and so it is defined through the satisfaction following vision. Humanism: in general any system of thought or action which assigns a predominant interest to the affairs of men as compared with the supernatural or abstract. or social. the first and last by which it is measured. toward reassertion of the natural rights of the reason and the senses. whence the notion of delight comes principally from the original and secondarily from the imitation. “Renaissance”] 10 . For religious art is wholly subject to the original and the work refers to the original and its work is perfect inasmuch as it is tending to another. denotes a specific bias which the forces liberated in the Renaissance took from contact with the ancient world —the particular form assumed by human self-esteem at that epoch— the ideal of life and civilization evolved by the modern nations. and toward the formation of regulative theories both for states and individuals differing from those of mediaeval times. and itself is the first measure simply. [Encycl. Therefore humanism in these things is nothing other than the extension of that dominion to originals which are better in themselves.
absolute worship of the exemplar. but not subjecting themselves to the original in the way that was said. Yet in praise there is a special difficulty. and on the other it has many things in common with the art of imitating delightfully. IV. such as admiration. beyond those things which were said above. delight.To the second. but not in itself. but because of contemplation which ends in affection. the image secondary and by reason of the exemplar: whence. by the general and universal providence of God. and the images of the saints by dulia. to be held as thieves. since it is not from something seen perfectly. efficacious operation is transmitted to all other things through submission. Therefore. that praise does not have the notion of delightful imitation except in plays. iii diss xxiii art. of impious and wicked origin.) But if one were to rest in the very image in an absolute way as in “that because of which. T. But the delight which follows admiration is not a delight having itself concomitantly.. to the image because of the exemplar. For praise proceeds from admiration. through those things which are moved more immediately by it.g. relative to the image. so the inspection or hearing of it is not in itself and on its own account delightful. (This is seen with music and instruments in church. a. v (p.” then it would not have the notion of a holy image. because on the one hand it is the most perfect speech of the creature. iii. And though the form be well proportioned and clear as happens in hymns. which is a form of thievery with respect to the divine omnipotence. for he adds: “Therefore he who. because praise itself as a certain work is not the cause of those things [admiration. thus from the image and exemplar is put together one whole object of adoration. purging] but rather the effect. Billuart. Therefore it does not have a term within itself. are. exceeding the power [to grasp] such as is the sublime (as Gregory says about angels who speak to God. will pay penalties: for. the exemplar principal and primary. will have said of himself to have thought out or to have made anything in things which pertain to creation. To the third I answer. 11 . 11). Praise is called purgative of the one praising inasmuch as from praise the soul is freed from an exceeding weight inasmuch as it has curbed the soul. (Ibid. Billuart t. that is. I answer from the same author [e. 142)]: that the same worship is owed to the image and to the exemplar. they rise in the motion of admiration). and purging. so to speak. since because they look to what is above themselves. disser. the images of God and of Christ are adored by latria. 5. the image of the Blessed Virgin by hyperdulia. as if God did not work in a hidden way in all things.) Whence all the more so artists imitating holy things. still it is speech in which what is said is wholly ordained to another. according to this opinion. (ibid. delight. One praising someone would be perverse to rest in his own praise. For praise extols someone as good and virtuous. yet in diverse ways. beyond the things which were said there remains the greatest difference between praise and the delightful imitation. to the exemplar because of itself. which follows upon the grasp of something. Clement of Alexandria condemns as thieves the painters and sculptors who glorify themselves as the inventors and first authors of painted animals and plants.
where the efficacy of the expression is judged from the very beauty of the image. inasmuch as it is compared to some inferior original. But what they have in common is the efficacy of representation and of expression. but if it is compared to more common things. because of the reasons given in the body and in the reply to the third objection of q. 9. And if it be objected that a work of religious art is [therefore] wanting in the perfection of the art of imitating delightfully inasmuch as it does not suffice to proceed from the original. But the same work might happen to have great perfection in the notion of the art of imitating delightfully. since in it the ability of the artist is elevated to eminence. it is a complete abomination. from his ignorance. not formally but eminently. or from a disordered appetite. if the image be compared to the original intended by the artist. Whence it happens that the metaphor of something less noble more efficaciously expresses what is intended than the metaphor of something nobler. it happens to be a delightful imitation. Which often happens in some images of the saints made by painters with great talent. and as an imitation would not be to the prototype as subordinate to the nobler and exceeding. And this can happen either from an artist unable according to the notion of religious art. but it is necessary to revert from the [imitation] back to the original for it to be completed. To which nevertheless it can be added that a good work of religious art has the perfection of an art of imitating delightfully and more besides. and this is better for us than under the figure of the bravest man or of Michael the heavenly soldier. and in his very work is the perfection of delightful imitation. 1. art. whence what is a defect in the art of imitating delightfully would be a perfection in religious art. but with respect to this art would be simply imperfect. but the end of religious art is efficaciously to make us know the original as in itself something more perfect than the mediating representation. it would not be by religious art as such. § 12 . But it happens otherwise when the thing to be expressed is the splendor and beauty of the original. as when the courage of Christ is expressed in the sensible figure of a lion.To the fourth it is to be considered that images are not all ordained to the same thing formally in the original to be expressed. Now the end of the art of imitating delightfully is a delightful imitation in the manner determined above. Whence if an imitation made by religious art does not make us to know the original as the measure of the imitation simply. I answer that the perfection of either is to be judged from the end.
I. a." Origo igitur et processio expressiva originalis est illud in quo ratio imaginis completur.in specie rei vel in aliquo signo specei . d. 1448b 4-19: 13 . etc. vel saltem in signo speciei. (2) Sed perfectior ratio invenitur quando illi qualitati quae designat naturam similem subest eadem natura in specie. sed secundum unitatem in numero. . 35. cujus aliae sunt species pictura. tantum attingit ad rationem indifferentiae: secundum enim quod differt non est imago: (1) Primus est in quo invenitur aliquid simile qualitati alterius. Delectabiliter: Quod quaedam sint imitationes naturaliter homini delectabilites. et in natura quam figura significat. musicae sonus rythmicus. quamvis illa natura in ea non inveniatur: sicut lapis dicitur esse imago hominis in quantum habet similem figuram. requiritur quod ex alio procedat simile ei in specie. 4. musica. quae designat et exprimat naturam alterius. distinguit D. 28. A. 1. simul cum ipsa natura sunt in Filio. ab Aristotele sic ostenditur: Poetica. Imitandi: quid sit videndum est apud D. 2.NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. cui non subsistit natura illa cujus est imago. Declarentur hujus definitionis termini: Ars: recta ratio factibilium.similitudo . et sic est Filius perfectissima imago patris: quia omnia attributa divina quae sunt modum qualitatis significata. 1. (Et sic imago Dei est in creatura.. quatenus unumquodque quantum attingit ad rationem imaginis. Thomas triplicem gradum imitationis. Differentia autem poetica est sermo. q. item I Sent. c. a. Ia. sicut est imago hominis patris in filio suo: quia habet similitudinem in figura. (3) Sed perfectissima ratio imaginis est quando eamdem numero formam et naturam invenimus in imitante cum eo quem imitatur. Et in loco Sent. IX. sicut imago regis in denario). q. sculptura. AD 1 _____________________ Charles De Koninck Ad hanc responsionem declarandum notetur quod poetica est in genere artium imitandi. Thomam. Totius autem generis definitio est ars delectabiliter imitandi.In his notandum quod tria sunt de ratione imaginis: .origo Unde "ad hoc quod vere aliquid sit imago. etc. Et sic est imperfectus modus imaginis. non solum secundum speciem.
(Poetics. sive materia. vel materia in qua fit. et de idem de ipse poemate. et ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur. ita quod amor rei amatae animam conglutinat. seu quatenus sibimetipsis in linea purae imitationis objectivae non sufficiunt." (IIIa. Delectatio vero ista est propter imitationem seu repraesentationem. non ut homicidium. ipsum origniale est tamen extra rationem ejus propter quod delectatur. ut manifestum est in comeodia imperfecta poetae causa vel histrionis. non sunt contrariae. Et hoc tria importat: Primo quod talis imitatio imperfecta erit in ratione imitationis delectabilis quatenus deficit in pura objectiviate seu quatenus habet de subjecto ut contraponitur objecto. et deux causes natuelles. Suppl. de la couleur ou d'une autre cause de ce genre. non autem ust sic propter rem imitatem seu originalem. Sed actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad res. Contingit enim quod repraesentatio ab aliquo mediocri histrione effecta delectabilis esse non possit nisi primo ametur persona histrionis. Unde homicidium in tragoeia delectabile esse potest. res etiam vilis potest delectabiliter imitari. Et aliquando5 de aliquo artis imitandi opere delectamur nobis nescientibus 5 Reading aliquando for quando. par example les formes des animaux les plus vils et des cadavres. quatenus definciunt in ratione artis imitandi. 86. par example que cette figure c'est un tel. Et defectus iste accidit ut in pluribus. seulement ceux-ci n'y ont qu'on apprend en les regardant et on deduit ce que represente chaque chose. a.-. qui perfectissimam cognitionem habet. omnia pulchra et turpia videt.. nisi prius ametur ipsum originale vel ipse poeta. ad 2) Unde "quamvis turpitudo sine visionis imperfectione esse potest. en second lieu. tous les hommes prennent plaisir aux imitations. sive originale. Unde etiam Deus. 4. Et hoc contingit quando originale non est imitative expressum. Imiter est naturel aux hommes et se manifeste des leur enfance (l'homme differe des autres animaux en ce qu'il acquiert ses premieres connaisances) et.Une raison en est encore qu'apprendre est tres agreable non seulement aux philosophes mais paraeillement aussi aux autres hommes. ch. vel ejus qui imitationem facit. 1. a. 1448b 4-19) Ars ergo delectabiliter imitandi est ars producendi opera seu imagines vel repraesentationes quorum ipsa consideratio vel inspectio delectabilis est. hoc enim esset perversum. . 94. species enim rerum in naima. 1. sed magis perficitur. Quamvis igitur oporteat nos imitationis originala cognoscere ut imitatio qua imitatio attingatur. ita ut ipsa imitatio de se non sufficiat sed oportet eam compleri ex aliquo subjecto. Si on n'a pas vu auparavant l'objet represente. ad 2) Delectatio ergo ista est formaliter propter imitationem quatenus haec tenet se in linea purae objectivitatis et intelligibilitatis. per quas contraria cognoscuntur. mais a raison de l'execution. nous aimons a en contempler l'image executee avec la plus grande exactitude. Nec obstat quod cognitio imitationis aliquando supponat cognitionem alicujus mali vel turpis originalis. --Un indice est ce qui se passe dans la realite: des etres dont l'original fait peine a la vue. ce n'est plus comme imitation que l'oeuvre pourra plaire. sed ut homicidii imitatio. quia ut notat Aristoteles. 14 . q.La poesie semble bien devoir en general son origine a deux causas." (Ia IIae. Nam "actio iintellectus perficitur secundum quod res intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus. sed requirunt ut conditio delectationis amorem ejus quod imitatur. (Et ideo opera artis imitandi possunt moraliter malla esse.
nam poetae est inducere ad 15 . sed est potius sicut secundum ovum. Sed ista medieta et instrumentalitas quodammodo occultantur quatenus imitatio rationem seducit. quaerunt cognitionem vel bonum propter delectationem. Et ideo ponit eam Divus Thomas infimam doctrinam ut patet ex I Post. Et secndum hunc respectum universale artis imitandi seu imitatio medio modo se habet inter singulare et universale proprium. prius enumerat dialecticam. Delectatio enim secundum se non habet rationem finis.. Thomas "quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi. Ergo de rebus habere poeticum cognitionem longe distat a perfectione scientiae sed etiam imperfectione singularis vel ignorantiae. deinde rhetoricam. Sed nec intellectus nec voluntas. Res enim singulares sunt potius imagines illius. "Et inde est quod divinus intellectus. Et ad hoc ordinatur Poetica. majorem sub hoc respectu intelligibilitatem habens. sed concomitantis. (I Sent. 5.e. quatenus de uno in aliud. oportet quod illud objectum ut objectum perfectius sit originali. delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Et ideo dicit D. ad 3) Et secundum hance respectum ars delectabiliter imitandi habet rationem doctrinae. Notetur differentia universalis scientifici ab isto artium imitandi quasi univerali. 1. et quia imitatio dicit relationem ad id quod imitatur. imitationis delectabilitate. quantum de se est. In quo ars ista similitudinem habet cum intellectu agente. ad originale. Ergo ratio inclinatur ex aliquo rationi cognitivi secundum se extrinsico. Prol. Et sic multi mente grossiores Aristotelem intellexerunt. sed propter operationes. unde habet rationem medii et ad universale et ad singulare. in quo stat totum artis periculum. Tertio quod in quantum imitatio originale intelligibilior est. ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicujus cibi si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicujus abominabilis. unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducatur".. et ultimo poeticam: Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradicitionis propter aliquam repraesentationem.. Anal lectione prima. Unde si aliquis pictor faciat alicujus individui picturam quae sit materialis similitudo illusionem realitatis conferens. a.frequentius contingit delectari propter aliuod subjectum. et quamdam universalitatem. quatenus originale secundum imitationem intelligibilius fit. 4. ubi postquam locutus sit de scientia demonstrativa. q. ad 2) Ergo poetica cognitio secundum se vialis est et imperfecta." (Ia IIae. tunc nonest opus artis delectabiliter imitandi. ipsa ars delectabiliter imitandi habet rationem instrumentalitatis. qui est institutor naturae. scil. Ergo delectatio habet rationem motivi. Unde sub hoc respectu poetica ognitio non excedit omnino sensibilitatem secundum quam in animalibus quarenetur operationes propter delectationem. Dicitur autem ratio imitationibus seduci. ex imitatione ipsum originale elevatur et magis manifestatur. quia imitatio naturaliter homini delectibilis est. scil. a. Secundo quod ut intellectus possit in ipsa repraesentatione morari ut in objecto propter quod delectatur. nec habet proprie rationem originationis. i. Unde bonitas operis dijudicatur ex majori intelligibilitate ejus quod imitatur. et non propter objectum absolute. Illud autem ad quod conducit imitatio vel repraesentatio secundum sde deficit a claritate repraesentationis. q. 2. (Et propter hoc dicit Aristoteles quod poesis magis philosophica est quam historia). quamvis melior quibusdam aliis.
cit. repraesentationem excedit. quatenus tamen illud cui est imitatio.) Ratio ergo utrique propria omnino opposita est. Hoc autem multis disiplicet propter jucunditatem cognitionis poeticae et ejus impetum ardoris. Et quando habet apparentiam poeticam. Under moramur in eo cui leo comparatur. Unde dicit D. non ipse leo nisi materialiter. 9. hoc est per accidens. Et sic multi non habentes nisi quamdam scientiae apparentiam. et id quod consideratr est imitatio leonis. quamvis verum sit quod de multis non possumus nos habere nisi cognitionem poeticam. ut dictum est. nec in hoc quod ex istis duobus constituitur. propter plurium intellectus imbeccilitatem. AD 1 (Notes on Prima Pars Q.aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem. Sed hoc est per accidens. vel minus convenienter propter rationes in corpore dictas. Et ideo a multis ponitur cognitio poetica quasi in acie totius cognitionis. ad. I. et ideo modus symbolicus utrique communis est. art." (I Sent. IX. Quatenus enim poetica cognitio per se ad repraesentationes attendita verteremur ab eo quod intenditur. loc. Thomae respondio: “quod poeta utitur metaphoris propter repraesentationem: repraesentatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est. Nam pauci sunt qui ad prima principia ut ad principia scientiae et ad veram scientiam attingunt. unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinisbus ratio seducatur: theologia autem est de his quae sunt supra rationem. His positis declaratur D. ex quo sequitur repraesentatio in qua leoni plus attribuitur quam habeat de intelligibilitate. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitatem et utilitatem. 1) 16 . Omnia autem haec ad Rationalem Philosophiam pertinent: inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est.. ut cognitio poetica facilior sit medietatem quamdam habens inter singulare et universale hominibus ut in pluribus magis proportionatam. cum netra rationi proportionetur. et non ut Scriptura vel theologia.” Est igitur notandum quod Sacra Scriptura vel theologia non intendunt repraesentationes homini secundum se delectbiles. scil. Itaque verum est quod inter naturales cognitiones poetica hominibus ut in pluribus quamdam melioritatem habeat. Esset igitur ridiculum dicere Scripturam vel sacram doctrinam poetice procedere. 1. [remainder of the text not yet scanned] NOTULA IN IAE PARTIS Q. non ad repraesentationes delectabiles. A. et quod poetae ingenium excellentium habeat ex hoc quod de istis nos doceat. sed res quae excedunt captum intellectus nostri quae sine mtephoris non possunt significari. Sacra Scriptura vero utitur metaphoris. significatur fortitudo ejus ex sensibili fortitudine leonis. Poetica utitur metaphoris ad repraesentationes propter quas delectamur. quod scil. ut quando leo dicitur animalium res. sed in fortitudine Christi. Thomas: "quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi. Sed in isto exemplo non moramur in eo cui comparatur. scil. leo-rex. non intelligunt verae scientiae excellentiam. sed ad ipsas res. ut quando Christus dicitur leo.
(Unpublished manuscript. 17 . Mazzetti. All rights reserved. Charles De Koninck Papers) (c) 2013 Bart A.
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