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Supplemental Submission for Testimony of Claudio Manno Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United

States (9-11 Commission) on January 27, 2004 At the request of the 9-11 Commission, the following information is provided to supplement and clarify testimony of Claudio Manno before the 9-11 Commission on January 27, 2004. It responds to the Commission's questions regarding the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) access and use of the TIPOFF database. Q: Did FAA have access to TIPOFF on or before September 11, 2001? A: FAA did not have access to the entire TIPOFF database, known as TIPOFF web. FAA had access to a limited version of the TIPOFF, known as TIPOFF Lite, which was also classified. Agencies within the Intelligence Community (e.g. Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency) had access to the full TIPOFF web database. FAA had access to approximately 61,000 names in the TIPOFF Lite, which did not provide access to all the underlying intelligence that served as the basis for including those names. In the case of the two 9/11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, FAA did not receive the underlying intelligence. The names were entered into TIPOFF Web on August 24, 2001; however, the State Department does not know when the names were entered into TIPOFF Lite. The systems were not concurrently updated, and based on recent discussions with those who managed the TIPOFF Lite system, it is possible the two hijackers' names were not entered until after September 11, 2001. Q: Why didn't FAA provide all the names to which it had access in TIPOFF to the air carriers for inclusion on the No-Fly list? A. FAA, as a consumer of intelligence, had formal written "Reading Requirements" on file with Intelligence Community agencies which specified the information FAA needed to assess and mitigate threats to civil aviation. Among the requirements was the "Identification and capabilities of individuals, groups, and organizations which pose a threat (either actual or potential) to U. S. or foreign civil aviation." In response to the requirements, FAA received several hundred reports each day from those agencies. Analysts in the FAA Office of Intelligence reviewed these reports for real-time and emerging threats. Upon identifying individuals in the reports who could pose a specific threat to commercial aviation, FAA requested approval from the originating agency to identify these individuals to the airlines in order to prohibit boarding on U.S. aircraft or foreign passenger aircraft operating to and from the United States. These requests were not always approved because the originating agency deemed certain name(s) too sensitive to declassify.

Although FAA had access to the approximately 61,000 names in the TIPOFF Lite database, the records to which FAA had access were often not sufficiently detailed or reliable for use in determining whether there was specific and credible information to indicate that a particular listed individual should be put on a No-Fly list as a threat to aviation security. Therefore, FAA relied either on the reporting it received via its Reading Requirements, or on the recommendations of U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, which had access to the intelligence underlying the TIPOFF name list, to add individuals to the No-Fly list provided to air carriers. Q: Why didn't FAA review each name in the TIPOFF data base to determine whether the individual should be put on the No-Fly list? A: FAA did not have access to the TIPOFF Web data base, which included the underlying intelligence that served as the basis for including the names in TIPOFF. Due to the limited content of the TIPOFF Lite list to which FAA had access and the technical difficulty in using the list, the FAA did not have the ability to undertake a review of each name on the list. Technically, TIPOFF Lite was difficult to use for ongoing reviews of the entire list, because it did not highlight new names or entries from the previous day or log-on session. As a result, FAA would have had to reconcile day-to-day changes in the list manually. Much of the information that FAA did have access to was incomplete or unreliable. Many records lacked any biographical data, which is a critical component for the identification of individuals who should be denied transport. Names of dead or arrested terrorists were not purged or separated from TIPOFF Lite. Without the underlying intelligence for names on the list, it was difficult to identify the reporting agency that had the intelligence related to a particular name on the list. Nothing in TIPOFF Lite identified the reporting agency. Therefore, TIPOFF Lite was not a useful tool for FAA.