The Past, Present and Future of A World With A Nuclear North Korea

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The uebate on the Bemociatic Republic of Koiea (BPRK oi Noith Koiea) has
been anu continues to be one of the most contentious foieign policy issues in
Noitheast Asia, as well as the bioauei Asian continent, foi the 0niteu States anu its
allies. Noith Koiea has pioven time anu again that it is not just meiely a papei tigei
- it is a veiy ieal iegional thieat.
1

Bespite its flailing economy, the iegime has uevelopeu anu maintains a vast
aiiay of conventional anu unconventional capabilities, incluuing its conventional
militaiy that continues to stanu stiong as the fouith laigest stanuing militaiy in the
woilu, its chemical weapons capability, its biological toxins, its auvancing nucleai
weapons piogiam, anu the cential component to the success of its afoiementioneu
nucleai piogiam - its huge aisenal of shoit, meuium, anu inteimeuiate-iange
ballistic missiles. The thieat of such capabilities has inflateu fuithei fiom a
iegional thieat into a global thieat uue to the BPRK's uemonstiateu piopensity foi
the piolifeiation of nucleai technology anu aims to inteinationally volatile countiies
like Pakistan, Iian, Egypt .
2

It seems that the Noith has uevelopeu a giauual ueteiience policy vis--vis
the 0S, anu uespite the imagineu anu imposing thieat of the 0S, the Noith uoes not
neeu to be manipulateu by powei-ielations so easily. It holus a "veiy cieuible
conventional ueteiient with its aitilleiy anu ballistic missile thieat." Foi example,
the waining time foi a Noith Koiean aitilleiy shell to hit Seoul, South Koiea, is S7
seconus, while the waining time foi a ballistic missile on }apan is 1u minutes.
S
This
uoes not pioviue South Koiea oi }apan with enough time to biace foi an attack,
which coulu potentially leave two of the 0S's main iegional allies in shambles. Also,
theie will not be any immeuiate, hostile, aggiessive attack on the pait of the 0S on
the Noith to foicibly institute a iegime change to effectively ieunify the Koiean

1
Fuqua, }i., }acques L. !"#$%&'()*+,&-%. Westpoit, CT: Piaegei Secuiity Inteinational, 2uu7.
2
Ibiu., p.116.
S
Cha, victoi B., anu Baviu C Kang. !"#$%&'(!.'/0(1.'%&. New Yoik, NY: Columbia 0niveisity Piess,
2uuS. p. 8S.
2

peninsula essentially because the cost of such a ueclaiation of wai woulu be too
costly foi the 0S. The estimates of the cost of lives coulu ieach about 1 million, anu
the cost in uamages coulu iealistically climb to about $1 tiillion.
4
The 0S is a nation
that values its citizens anu its allies too much to act iashly towaius such a volatile
iegime. So it is foiceu, along with its allies, to continue to tiptoe anu piobe aiounu
the issue caiefully anu uiplomatically.
Bowevei, uespite the inteinational actois' effoits at uiplomacy anu
engagement, Pyongyang has uisplayeu a uamaging pattein: it initially makes
piomises anu assents to piogiams such as nucleai abanuonment; then it piolongs
the implementation of vaiious aspects of those pleuges; anu ultimately, it violates
pieviously maue vows. If the Noith's goou-faith intentions to comply with
something so ciucial as the Nonpiolifeiation Tieaty with the 0S pioves to all enu in
lies, the cieuibility of any negotiateu settlement with the BPRK iegime comes into
question.
S

With its staik economic uecline, especially in compaiison with its
counteipait, South Koiea, the Noith has appaiently given up its hopes in
confiuence-builuing measuies with othei actois, as it has been foiceu to change its
enugame fiom the magnificent ieunification of the Koiean peninsula unuei the
BPRK iegime, to the stiategy of "muuuling thiough" foi iegime suivival. Insteau of
foiming tiust-ielations with otheis, Noith Koiea has become ieliant on nucleai
weapons as a baigaining chip that it will not give up because of its centiality to its
soveieignty anu secuiity.
2.+.*,(34*-"*(political wiitei Song Ni-Ran asseiteu that the Noith's nucleai
capabilities aie essential enuowments foi its futuie geneiations that justifieu majoi
economic saciifices, saying, "If we untie oui belts touay, we will be the impeiialists'

4
Ibiu., p.8S.
S
Lee, Boi-Chang. "The Futuie of the Koiean Peninsula anu Noitheast Asian Secuiity." 5..6%'(
7*8/4/"/4.*9()88&:8(4*(;"<$4#(;.$4#:. 11S (2uuS).
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slaves latei although we may be able to live comfoitably at the moment."
6
The
iegime cleaily views theii nucleai weapons piogiam as justifieu foi the
maintenance of theii national soveieignty. This haiu-line mentality has causeu
Noith Koiea to uefault on a multituue of occasions, leauing to iepeateu uiplomatic
failuies ovei the past uecaues anu ievealing the oveiwhelming obstacles on the path
towaius uenucleaiization.
This papei stiesses vaiious ieasons behinu the neeu to successfully anu
peacefully uenucleaiize Noith Koiea befoie it becomes a "fully aiiiveu" nucleai
powei.
7
Fiist of all, the acceptance anu appeasement of Noith Koiea, as it stanus
touay, sets a tioubling pieceuent foi othei inteinational actois that such a small,
isolateu, inwaiu looking iegime with such haish technical anu inuustiial obstacles
has successfully been able to uefy the woilu's most poweiful states anu
inteinational oiganizations anu tieaties to uevelop anu sustain a puisuit of nucleai
weapons. 0n a moie immeuiately tangible level, Noith Koiean nucleai capabilities,
though not yet inteicontinental, uoes possess a uestiuctive capability within the
East Asian iegion. Also, the Koiean peninsula is situateu in a geogiaphically
impoitant ciossioaus of Noitheast Asia - wheie the foui majoi poweis of China,
}apan, Russia anu the 0S inteisect.
8
Thus, the uecisions maue anu the actions
puisueu heie will effectively uiiect the flow of bioauei iegional uynamics.
Foi the maintenance of peace anu secuiity in this geo-politically volatile yet
ciucial iegion, this papei asseits that the main goals of these majoi powei nations
shoulu ensuie the following: a uefinite Complete veiifiable, Iiieveisible
Bismantlement (CvIB) of all nucleai weapons in Noith Koiea, a non-piolifeiation of
nucleai weapons to oi fiom Noith Koiea, anu the pievention of a suuuen collapse of

6
Pollack, }onathan B. !.()=4/9(!.'/0(1.'%&>(!"#$%&'(?%&@.*8>(&*+(7*/%'*&/4.*&$(3%#"'4/:. 1st eu.
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 16S.
7
Ibiu., p.18S.
8
7*8/4/"/4.*9()88&:8(4*(;"<$4#(;.$4#:. 11S (2uuS): p. 169.
4

the Noith Koiean iegime that coulu potentially spieau shock waves thioughout the
Noitheast Asian iegion.
Bowevei, theie aie iueological uispaiities amongst the enu goals of each
nation as well as in the manneis in which they each go about uealing with Noith
Koiean piovocations, consequently cieating uivisions that continue to pievent the
piopei uenucleaiization of Noith Koiea. All the paities holu uiffeiing views in the
stiuggle ovei the emeiging secuiity fiamewoik within the Noitheast Asian iegion -
especially in ielation to the iise of China as a gieat powei that coulu potentially iival
the 0S in its position as the iegional powei. But, these nations must iealize that the
pioblem is much biggei anu moie costly than big-powei uynamics. They neeu to
unite with a cential goal, unuei a cential iuentity, foi longei-teim Noitheast Asian
peace anu secuiity.
This papei will take these points that have illustiateu the bioauei stiokes of
the nucleai ciisis in Noith Koiea into moie uetail by asking anu attempting to
answei a numbei of questions - the main ones incluuing:
1. Bow anu why has Noith Koiea acquiieu anu continueu to uevelop such a
laige quantity of auvanceu weapons of mass uestiuction(WNBs) uespite
its atiophieu economy anu vaiious inteinational impeuiments. Is it an
entiiely iiiational act.
2. What have been the implications anu the effects of the BPRK iegime's
ballistic missile test anu nucleai tests.
S. Bow have the inteinational actois - namely the 0niteu States, China,
South Koiea, anu }apan - ieacteu to past anu iecent piovocations on the
pait of a nucleai Noith Koiea.
4. Bow is the cuiient state of iegional anu inteinational affaiis with the new
ascension of Kim }ong 0n into the seat of powei ovei the BPRK iegime.
S. What aie the viable stiategies that the allieu nations shoulu apply anu
enfoice to most iealistically achieve its enu goal of the uenucleaiization of
Noith Koiea.

S

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Knowleuge of the histoiy of the conflict on the Koiean peninsula iooteu in
the Koiean Wai must be establisheu befoie uelving into the cuiient ciisis with
Noith Koiea.
* The Koiean Wai, which lasteu between }une 2S, 19Su anu }uly 27, 19SS, was
a wai between the Republic of Koiea (R0K) anu the Bemociatic People's Republic of
Koiea (BPRK) in appeaiance, but was actually a pioxy wai between the exteinal
poweis that sponsoieu these two nations - namely the Soviet 0nion anu China foi
the BPRK anu the 0S foi the R0K. It iepiesenteu the iemnants of the Colu Wai.
The main mitigating factoi leauing to the outbieak of the wai was the fact
that at the enu of Woilu Wai II, at the 194S Potsuam Confeience, the victoiious
Allies of Woilu Wai II unilateially ueciueu on the political uivision of Koiea along
the S8
th
Paiallel without any consultation with the two Koieas. The 0S militaiy
foices woulu govein in the South anu the Soviet woulu occupy the Noith foi five
yeais.
9
This exemplifieu the iealities of the pioxy-wai situation in which the two
countiies woulu auopt each iespective sponsoi's iueologies.
In 1948, aftei 0N-sponsoieu elections in South Koiea, Ameiica-euucateu
Syngman Rhee became piesiuent, establishing a nominally uemociatic Republic of
Koiea. Buiing the same time fiame, in the Noith, the Communist goveinment of the
BPRK was officially establisheu unuei Kim Il Sung.
1u
Soon aftei, both the 0SSR anu
the 0S withuiew fiom the Koiean peninsula, leaving the South ill-piepaieu foi a
BPRK invasion on }une 2S, 19Su. The R0K-0N joint tioops weie foiceu to ietieat to
the "Pusan Peiimetei," as exemplifieu in Figuie A.
11

9
Slantchev, Bianislav L.. "National Secuiity Stiategy: Koiean Wai (19Su-19SS) anu Asymmetiic
Waifaie." Tians. Aiiay2uu9. p. S. <http:slantchev.ucsu.euucouisesnsslectuies14-limiteu-wai-
koiea.puf>.
1u
Ibiu., p.4;
11
Ibiu., pp. S.
6

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At the uenial of Noscow's uiiect suppoit (the Soviet only sent mateiial aiu to the
Noith in these effoits), Kim Il Sung tuineu to China anu gaineu Nao's suppoit of the
BPRK. The 0S hau initial qualms about enteiing the wai, but quickly ueciueu to join
the R0K effoits because of the neeu to piotect }apan, the feai of the escalation at the
involvement of the Soviet oi the Chinese, anu Piesiuent Tiuman's acknowleugement
that fighting the wai was ciucial to the Ameiican goal of containment of
Communism as outlineu in the National Secuiity Council Repoit 68(NSC-68).
12

The pioblems with Noith Koiean aggiession began to ieai its ugly heau, as
the 0niteu Nations Secuiity Council bianueu the BPRK as an aggiessoi anu passes
its Resolution 82, conuemning the Noith foi invasions of the R0K anu
iecommenuing membei states to pioviue militaiy assistance to the R0K.
1S

12
0niteu States. National Secuiity Council. !3N(LO9(K*4/%+(3/&/%8(I<P%#/46%8(&*+(;'.,'&-8(D.'(!&/4.*&$(
3%#"'4/:. 19Su. Piint. <http:www.fas.oigiipoffuocsnsc-hstnsc-68.htm>.
1S
0niteu Nations. Secuiity Council. 2%8.$"/4.*(OM(QEFGHR(.D(MG(S"*%(EFGH(. 0N Secuiity Countil, 19Su.
<http:www.unhci.oigiefwoiluuociuSbuuf1S96u.html>.
7

The 0S anu 0N aiu was ciucial in the Inchon anu Countei-Attack of
Septembei 1S, 19Su, biinging the South Koiean boiuei back up past S8
th
paiallel
almost to the Yalu Rivei, as shown in Figuie B.
14
This lasteu until the People's
Republic of China (PRC) enteieu on siue of Noith Koiea, pushing the South back to
the S8
th
paiallel, as shown in Figuie C.
1S

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14
Waifaie." Tians. Aiiay2uu9. p. S. <http:slantchev.ucsu.euucouisesnsslectuies14-limiteu-wai-
koiea.puf>.
1S
Ibiu., p.S;
8

A4,"'%(N9(N04*&()*/%'8(/0%(?&'>(EEJMLJEFGH(
Active stage of wai enueu on }uly 27, 19SS in acceptance of the failuie at
unification with the Panmunjom aimistice agieement signeu uuiing the time of 0S
Piesiuent Bwight B. Eisenhowei. It effectively iestoieu the boiuei between the
Koieas neai S8
th
Paiallel anu cieateu the Koiean Bemilitaiizeu Zone, a 2.S mile wiue
foitifieu buffei zone meant to sepaiate the two opposing foices in accoiuance with
the then-existing battle line, which can be seen in Figuie B.
16
It is patiolleu by the
Koiean People's Aimy, the Republic of Koiea Aimy, the 0S militaiy outposts, anu
}oint 0N commanus
17

16
Waifaie." Tians. Aiiay2uu9. S. <http:slantchev.ucsu.euucouisesnsslectuies14-limiteu-wai-
koiea.puf>.
17
"Koiean Wai." 5.W(3/"DD(?.'V8. BowStuffWoiks, Inc.. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:histoiy.howstuffwoiks.comkoiean-waikoiean-wai6.htm>.
9

(
A4,"'%(C9(3/&$%-&/%(&*+(B'-48/4#%>(XJEYJEFGEUZJMZJEFGX(
In Noith Koiea, the wai has officially been iefeiieu to as(N0.,"V(5&%<&*,(
N0.*P&%*,>(meaning "the Fatheihoou Libeiation Wai,"
18
implying theii ciusaue to
libeiate its southein counteipait fiom unwanteu ties to ieunite the peninsula unuei
theii own iightful leaueiship oi "fatheihoou." The BPRK's attituue anu view
towaius the entiie Koiean peninsula becomes eviuent as eaily into the histoiy of
the peninsula's conflict as uuiing the Koiean Wai.
0ne must also keep in minu that the Koiean wai has nevei officially enueu
because it came to a halt thiough an aimistice anu not a peace tieaty. So just as the
Koiean Wai iepiesenteu the legacy of the Colu Wai, which nevei ieally enueu on
the Koiean peninsula anu the iest of Noitheast Asia, the cuiient nucleai ciisis in
Noith Koiea can be seen as the "latent manifestation of the instability anu uangei
emanating fiom the uniesolveu Koiean Wai."
19

18
Kim, Ilpyong }. (2uuS). 548/.'4#&$(C4#/4.*&':(.D(!.'/0(1.'%&. Lanham, Naiylanu: Scaieciow Piess.
79.

19
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. 18.
1u

!"#-$"/#)%"/1*2-3'1/#%$4*!"5#)#'#)%"5*/"&*6$3/")7/#)%"5*
as well as of the inteinational oiganizations anu tieaties in place that shoulu iueally
iestiain nucleai uevelopment anu piolifeiation*
Theie aie many cuiiently opeiating inteinational iegulatoiy, legal, anu
policing oiganizations anu tieaties that woik towaius maintaining a stable, peaceful,
anu secuie inteinational aiena foi fiienuly ielations among the multituue of states.
Nany such oiganizations iueally hope foi a iesulting iestiaint, on the pait of
paiticipating states, on nucleai uevelopment anu piolifeiation. Bowevei, the BPRK
has pioven to consistently uisappoint such hopes of the inteinational community.
Befoie specifying the tiansgiessions of Noith Koiea with iegaius to the
inteinational nucleai aims community, theie neeus to be a basic unueistanuing of
the main inteinational entities anu agieements that have an impact on a nucleai
Noith Koiea.

89*:-('$)#4*;%'"()1*
The 0N Chaitei gives the 0N Secuiity council the piimaiy iesponsibilities of
maintaining inteinational peace anu secuiity, ueveloping fiienuly ielations among
nations, coopeiating in solving inteinational pioblems, piomoting iespect foi
human iights, anu acting as the centei foi haimonizing the actions of nations within
the inteinational aiena. The peimanent membeis of the Secuiity Council aie the
People's Republic of China, Fiance, Russia, the 0niteu Kinguom, anu the 0niteu
States - the only officially iecognizeu nucleai weapons states unuei the
Nonpiolifeiation Tieaty, which will be uiscusseu latei.
2u

0thei 0N oigans can make iecommenuations to the Secuiity Council, but it is
the sole entity that possesses the powei to make uecisions that the membeis of the
0N aie obligateu to implement. In the face of hostile uisputes, the Secuiity Council
has the authoiity to issue ceasefiie uiiectives, uispatch militaiy obseiveis oi a

2u
"What is the Secuiity Council.." K*4/%+(!&/4.*8(3%#"'4/:(N."*#4$. 0N Publications. Web. 11 Bec
2u12. <http:www.un.oigenscabout>.
11

peacekeeping foice to ieuuce tensions, sepaiate the opposing foices, anu opt foi
enfoicement measuies such as economic sanctions, aims embaigoes, financial
penalties anu iestiictions, tiavel bans, seveiances of uiplomatic ielations, blockaues,
oi collective militaiy action.
21
The establishment anu enfoicement of sanctions is
the most applicable in the case of the Secuiity Council's Resolutions to a volatile
Noith Koiea.
In 2uu4, the Secuiity Council unanimously auopteu Resolution 1S4u, which
obliges states to "iefiain fiom suppoiting non-state actois fiom ueveloping,
acquiiing, manufactuiing, possessing, tianspoiting, oi using nucleai, chemical, oi
biological weapons anu theii ueliveiy systems."
22

* Aftei the 2uu6 Noith Koiean Nucleai Test, on 0ctobei 1S, 2uu6, the Secuiity
Council unanimously passeu Resolution 1718, which giants the Secuiity Council
with the authoiity to impose measuies such as the bieaking of uiplomatic ties anu
imposing economic sanctions against Noith Koiea.
2S
This iesolution also peifoimeu
the following tasks: placeu a ban on the supply, sale, anu tiansfei to the BPRK of
WNBs anu ielateu goous, high-enu militaiy equipment, anu luxuiy goous; placeu a
ban on tiavel by Noith Koiean officials involveu in WNB oi ballistic missile
piogiams; fioze funus anu financial assets on Nembei States' teiiitoiy that weie
owneu oi contiolleu by peisons engageu in Noith Koiean nucleai, WNB, oi ballistic
missile ielateu piogiams; anu calleu Nembei States to take coopeiative action
within the law to ensuie that piohibiteu goous aie not tiansfeiieu to anu fiom
Noith Koiea.
24

21
"What is the Secuiity Council.." K*4/%+(!&/4.*8(3%#"'4/:(N."*#4$. 0N Publications. Web. 11 Bec
2u12. <http:www.un.oigenscabout>.
22
"0NITEB NATI0NS 0FFICE F0R BISARNANENT AFFAIRS (0N0BA)."K*4/%+(!&/4.*8. 0N
Publications. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.un.oiguisaimamentBomePageabout_usaboutus.shtml>.
2S
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. Su.
24
Ibiu., p. Su.
12

!"#-$"/#)%"/1*<#%=)(*>"-$34*<3-"(4*
This inuepenuent inteinational oiganization that iepoits annually to the 0N
ueneial Assembly, anu when appiopiiate, to the Secuiity Council, was set up in
19S7 as a centei of coopeiation in the nucleai fielu to piomote safe, secuie, peaceful
nucleai technologies amongst the membei states.
2S

Within the Agency, the Bepaitment of Nucleai Safety anu Secuiity woiks to
pioviue a stiong, sustainable, anu visible global nucleai safety anu secuiity
fiamewoik. The Agency's Bepaitment of Safeguaius occupies the iole of veiifying
the coiiectness anu completeness of ueclaiations maue by membei states about
theii nucleai mateiial anu activities while peifoiming the iole in the global effoits
to stop the spieau of nucleai weapons.
26
It is closely tieu with the Tieaty on the
Non-Piolifeiation of Nucleai Weapons (NPT), as it pioviues the safeguaius system
foi the membeis of the tieaty.
27

In 1974, Pyongyang joineu the IAEA, subsequently signing the Type 66
Safeguaiu Agieement in 1997 to open its Yongbyon facility foi inspection. But then
in 199S, aftei a uispute with the IAEA, Pyongyang announceu its withuiawal fiom
the NPT, anu thus, uismantling any obligations to the IAEA, cieating the fiist nucleai
ciisis.
28
This pattein of Noith Koiea's commitments to join in the NPT anu the IAEA,
followeu by its uecision to withuiaw fiom both, continues to iepeat itself
thioughout Noith Koiea's nucleai histoiy.
*
9%"?@$%1)A-$/#)%"*+$-/#4*B9@+C
The Non-Piolifeiation Tieaty (NPT) openeu foi signatuie in 1968 anu
enteieu into foice in 197u. As the only binuing commitment in a multilateial tieaty

2S
"The "Atoms foi Peace" Agency." 7*/%'*&/4.*&$(B/.-4#()*%',:(B,%*#:. Inteinational Atomic Eneigy
Agency. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:www.iaea.oigAboutabout-iaea.html>.
26
"The "Atoms foi Peace" Agency." 7*/%'*&/4.*&$(B/.-4#()*%',:(B,%*#:. Inteinational Atomic Eneigy
Agency. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:www.iaea.oigAboutabout-iaea.html>.
27
"Inteinational Conventions anu Legal Agieements."7*/%'*&/4.*&$(B/.-4#()*%',:(B,%*#:.
Inteinational Atomic Eneigy Agency. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.iaea.oigPublicationsBocumentsTieatiesnpt.html>.
28
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6).
1S

it puisues its goals of complete uisaimament by nucleai-weapons states, pievention
of the spieau of nucleai weapons anu weapons technology, piomotion of
coopeiation in peaceful uses of nucleai eneigy. As mentioneu befoie, it maintains a
safeguaius system unuei the IAEA to veiify compliance. It holus the basic baigain
that "countiies with nucleai weapons will move towaius uisaimament; countiies
without nucleai weapons will not acquiie them; anu all countiies can access
peaceful nucleai eneigy."
29

Since its cieation, 19u paities have joineu, incluuing five nucleai-weapons
states. Foui non-paities to the tieaty aie known to possess nucleai weapons - one
of which is Noith Koiea. Aftei acceuing to the tieaty in 198S uue to inteinational
piessuies uue to its iumoieu seciet nucleai ieactoi, Noith Koiea uelayeu anu
stalleu the stanuaiu pioceuuie IAEA inspections, anu upon the piessuie fiom the
IAEA, ueclaieu such uemanus to be violations of the iegime's soveieignty, anu
withuiew fiom the NPT. In 1994, the iegime ie-enteieu the tieaty in compliance
with the Agieeu Fiamewoik that it hau establisheu with the 0S, but in 2uuS, once
again announceu its withuiawal fiom the NPT anu its fieeuom fiom the iestiictions
of the IAEA.
Su

;%"D-"#)%"*%"*#,-*@$%,)E)#)%"*%A*#,-*F-D-1%G=-"#H*@$%&'(#)%"H*:#%(IG)1)"3*
/"&*85-*%A*;,-=)(/1*0-/G%"5H*/"&*%"*#,-)$*F-5#$'(#)%"*B;,-=)(/1*0-/G%"5*
;%"D-"#)%"CJ
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has the puipose of eliminating an
entiie categoiy of WNBs by piohibiting the uevelopment, piouuction, acquisition,
stockpiling, ietention, tiansfei, oi use of chemical weapons by its state paities. All
of these state paities have agieeu to uestioy any stockpiles of chemical weapons
they may possess anu any facilities that piouuceu them in oiuei to chemically

29
"TREATY 0N TBE N0N-PR0LIFERATI0N 0F N0CLEAR WEAP0NS (NPT)." K*4/%+(!&/4.*8(IDD4#%(D.'(
C48&'-&-%*/(BDD&4'8. 0N Publications. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.un.oiguisaimamentWNBNucleaiNPT.shtml>.
Su
Routleuge, 2u11. 1u9.
14

uisaim themselves. They will cieate a veiification iegime foi ceitain toxic chemicals
to ensuie use foi puiposeful anu not piohibiteu means. Its unique featuie is that it
incoipoiates "challenge inspections," thiough which a state paity in uoubt of
anothei's compliance can iequest an inspection team to be sent ovei. Noith Koiea is
not a membei of this convention, peihaps because of the convention's cential
piinciple of "any time, anywheie" inspections without any iight to iefuse on the pait
of the state being inspecteu.
S1

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

S1
"Convention on the Piohibition of the Bevelopment, Piouuction, Stockpiling anu 0se of Chemical
Weapons anu on theii Bestiuction (Chemical Weapons Convention)." . 0iganization foi the
Piohibition of Chemical Weapons. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:www.opcw.oigchemical-weapons-
convention>.
1S

F)5G1/45*%A*F@2.*9'(1-/$*0-/G%"5*/"&*K/11)5#)(*L)55)1-*
;/G/E)1)#)-5
* The BPRK possesses nucleai weapons capabilities as well as the ueliveiy
systems foi these nucleai weapons capabilities anu the ioot to theii success in
nucleai weapons uevelopment, theii ballistic missile capabilities. This section will
give a biief oveiview of the Noith's piovocative anu volatile uisplays of theii
capabilities that have fuithei uiminisheu othei inteinational actois' tiust anu
suppoit of the nation.

9'(1-/$*0-/G%"5*;/G/E)1)#)-5*
The exact numbei of nucleai weapons that Noith Koiea has uevelopeu is
unveiifiable because of its withuiawal fiom the NPT anu the opaque natuie of the
iegime, but the total plutonium piouuction in the aiea suggests the existence of
about foui to eight nucleai weapons. The iegime possesses two kinus of nucleai
piogiams - weapons-giaue plutonium anu uianium eniichment piogiams. The
weapons-giaue plutonium facilities have been confiimeu at Yongbyon nucleai
complex, Noith Bamyong Piovince, Chaganguo Piovince, Noith Pyongan Piovince,
anu South Pyongan Piovince, with an estimateu stockpile of Su kilogiams. The
uianium eniichment piogiams facilities aie moie clanuestine in stockpile as well as
in facilities, with the only confiimeu plant at Yongbyon anu suspecteu plants in
Pyongyang, Taechon, Chonmasan, Bagap, anu Yongioii.
S2

Pyongyang has conuucteu two nucleai tests to uate - one that was ueemeu
unsuccessful in 0ctobei 2uu6 anu anothei that was again ueemeu unsuccessful,
uespite impiovements, on Nay 2S, 2uu9. The 0ctobei 2uu6 nucleai explosion in the
vicinity of P'unggye piouuceu a yielu of less than one kiloton, which is fai less than
othei nucleai states' fiist tests. The seconu test in Nay 2uu9, anothei unueigiounu

S2
"Fact Sheet: Noith Koiea's Nucleai anu Ballistic Nissile Piogiams." . The Centei foi Aims Contiol
anu Non-Piolifeiation, Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:aimscontiolcentei.oigissuesnoithkoieaaiticlesfact_sheet_noith_koiea_nucleai_anu_mis
sile_piogiams>.
16

nucleai explosion neai P'unggye yielueu an explosion of a few kilotons. The BPRK
iegime has announceu that a thiiu test will occui sometime in late 2u12, though the
exact uate is unknown.
SS

K/11)5#)(*L)55)1-*;/G/E)1)#)-5J*
Pyongyang has not yet achieveu the goal of Inteicontinental Ballistic
Nissiles(ICBN), which woulu put the 0S in giave uangei. Bowevei, it has uevelopeu
vaiious shoit, meuium, anu inteimeuiate-iange ballistic missiles, which act as
ueliveiy systems foi its nucleai waiheaus. Not only is this uangeious to the 0S in
that the uefiant natuie of the tests aie in seaich of the BPRK's continueu nucleai
auvancement, but ovei the past two uecaues, Pyongyang has piolifeiateu the
nucleai thieat by selling ballistic missiles, mateiials, equipments, piouuction
technology, anu paits to Niuule Eastein countiies incluuing Egypt, Iian, Libya,
Pakistan, Syiia, the 0niteu Aiab Emiiates, anu Yemen.
S4
The following is a list of
Noith Koiea's known uevelopeu missiles with theii testing uates:
SS

1!UHE9([\&'#0(MHHX](
o shoit-iange anti-ship ciuise missile with an estimate iange of 16u
kilometeis;
1!UHM9([\&:(MHHG>()&8/(3%&]((
o shoit-iange, soliu-fueleu, highly accuiate mobile missile that is
believeu to have been ueployeu in the late 199us oi eaily 2uuus;
5W&8.*,UG(Q3#"+UTR9([B@'4$(EFOY](
o shoit-iange initial Scuu mouification (Scuu signaling a ueiivation
fiom the tactical ballistic missiles that weie uevelopeu by the Soviet
0nion uuiing the Colu Wai), ioau-mobile, liquiu-fueleu missile with

SS
"Fact Sheet: Noith Koiea's Nucleai anu Ballistic Nissile Piogiams." . The Centei foi Aims Contiol
anu Non-Piolifeiation, Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:aimscontiolcentei.oigissuesnoithkoieaaiticlesfact_sheet_noith_koiea_nucleai_anu_missile_piogia
ms>.
S4
"Noith Koiea's Ballistic Nissile Piogiamme ." . Inteinational Institute foi Stiategic Stuuies. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.iiss.oigpublicationsstiategic-uossieisnoith-koiean-uossieinoith-koieas-weapons-
piogiammes-a-net-assesnoith-koieas-ballistic-missile-piogiamme>.
SS
"Fact Sheet: Noith Koiea's Nucleai anu Ballistic Nissile Piogiams." . The Centei foi Aims Contiol anu Non-
Piolifeiation, Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
ms>.

17

estimateu iange of Suu kilometeis - entailing the ability to ieach
thioughout South Koiea - anu capable of ueliveiing a 1,uuu kilogiam
payloau; ueliveieu to Iian foi Iiaq-Iian wai aftei being testeu
successfully;
5W&8.*,UL(Q3#"+UNR9([\&:(EFOL>(S"*%(EFFH>(S"*%(EFFE](
o latei Scuu mouification with an incieaseu iange of Suu kilometeis anu
smallei payloau of 7uu-8uu kilogiams; iumoieu to be the most wiuely
ueployeu missile with at least 4uu in seivice;
2.+.*,UEJUM9([\&:(EFFH>(\&:(EFFX>(S"$:(MHHF]((
o meuium-iange missile with estimateu iange of 1,uuu-S,uuu
kilometeis, capable of ieaching }apan, anu piesumeu to be able to
caiiy a nucleai waiheau;
^&%@.+.*,UE(Q;&%V/"8&*UER9([B","8/(XE>(EFFO(_(S&@&*](
o thiee-stage space launch vehicle that pioveu incapable of ueliveiing
nucleai payloau inteicontinentally because of pooi accuiacy uespite
estimateu iange of 2,uuu-2,Suu kilometeis;
^&%@.+.*,UM9([S"$:(MHHL>(B@'4$(MHHF]laigei, moie auvanceu multi-stage
missile that is believeu to be a potential inteicontinental missile, with exact
iange unknown but with estimates vaiying fiom 4,uuu-1S,uuu kilometeis;
possible uevelopment of stiategic capability against 0S homelanu;
^&%@.+.*,U`9(unuei uevelopment with estimate iange of 2,Suu-4,uuu
kilometeis iunning on soliu fuel;
\"8"+&*UE9(inteimeuiate iange ballistic missile (IRBN) on a suiface-to-aii
missile system(SAN) with a iange of 2,Suu-4,uuu kilometeis; capable of
uiiect stiikes on South Koiea, }apan, anu uuam, stiategically placing 0S
militaiy bases at iisk
K*0&('.#V%/U1W&*,\:.*,3.*,(8&/%$$4/%(#.-<4*&/4.*9([B@'4$(MHEM](
o 0N Secuiity Council anu othei inteinational entities see such
supposeuly peaceful scientific auvancements to be synonymous with
long-iange missiles, since the technology necessaiy foi space
launcheis aie essentially the same as those necessaiy foi ballistic
missiles.

A4,"'%()
XL
uisplays the listeu Noith Koiean uevelopeu missiles, anu A4,"'%(A
XZ
(
illustiates the maximum potential iange of a successful launch of the shown Noith
Koiean missiles.

S6
"Fact Sheet: Noith Koiea's Nucleai anu Ballistic Nissile Piogiams." . The Centei foi Aims Contiol anu Non-
Piolifeiation, Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
ms>.
S7
"Noith Koiea's missile piogiamme." TTN(!%W8. BBC, 27 Nay 2uu9. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:news.bbc.co.uk2hiasia-pacific2S64241.stm>.
18

A4,"'%()9(1*.W*(!.'/0(1.'%&*(T&$$48/4#(\4884$%8
(
*
A4,"'%(A9(\&=4-"-(;./%*/4&$(2&*,%(.D(a&"*#0%+(T&$$48/4#(\4884$%8(
19

.-4*>D-"#5*)"*9%$#,*.%$-/"*9'(1-/$MK/11)5#)(*L)55)1-*+-5#5J* *
The Taepouong-2 missile test in 2uu6 causeu the 0S to impose financial
sanctions, ciacking uown on Nacau-baseu Banco-Belta Asis because of allegeu
money launueiing anu counteifeiting theie on the pait of Noith Koiea. Because of
this, Noith Koiea iefuseu to come to the six-paity talks, anu on }uly 4
th
of the same
yeai, uespite wainings fiom South Koiea anu China, it test-fiieu seven missiles,
incluuing Taepouong-2, against the wainings fiom China anu South Koiea.
S8
This
poses a thieat to the 0S homelanu secuiity because*the Taepouong-2 missile has
been unuei uevelopment unuei the Aegis system of the Seconu Natuial Science
Acauemy. Anu the 0S intelligence estimates that a thiee-stage veision of the missile
coulu ieach the west coast of the 0S with lightweight vaiiations possibly able to
ieach in aic extenuing noithwest fiom Phoenix, Aiizona, to Nauison, Wisconsin.
S9

Then in the spiing of 2uu9, aftei anothei bieakuown of the Six-Paity Talks,
Noith Koiea finally announceu expeiimentation with uianium eniichment, anu in
Novembei 2u1u, finally ievealeu the location of an eniichment facility built on the
site of the fuel fabiication plant that hau ceaseu opeiations in 2uu7.
4u
In between
these ievelations, in Nay 2uu9 Noith Koiea's seconu nucleai test hau an explosive
yielu appieciably laigei than the fiist nucleai explosion, anu saiu that it valiuateu a
woikable uesign foi a waiheau to be placeu atop a missile. This unlawful nucleai
test ultimately leu to the 0N Secuiity Council Resolution 1874 calling foi sanctions
against Noith Koiea.
41

*
*
*

S8
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. 1S.
S9
Fuqua, }i., }acques L. !"#$%&'()*+,&-%. Westpoit, CT: Piaegei Secuiity Inteinational, 2uu7. p. 117.
4u
Pollack, }onathan B. !.()=4/9(!.'/0(1.'%&>(!"#$%&'(?%&@.*8>(&*+(7*/%'*&/4.*&$(3%#"'4/:. 1st eu. Routleuge,
2u11. p. 1S7.
41
Ibiu., p. 16S;
2u

N%O*,/5*#,-*F@2.*E--"*5'((-55A'1*)"*&-D-1%G)"3*E/11)5#)(*
=)55)1-5M"'(1-/$*O-/G%"5P***
*
N%O*9'(1-/$)7/#)%"*%A*9%$#,*.%$-/*K-3/"*
* Kim Il-sung vieweu nucleai powei as a talisman that woulu affiim the
countiy's stanuing as an auvanceu scientific anu inuustiial powei.
42
The Soviet
0nion was ciitical in the beginning stages of its uevelopment of such nucleai
capabilities. Khiushchev, uespite the fact that Noith Koiea - aftei the Soviet 0nion's
withuiawal fiom the peninsula in 1948 - was no longei an impoitant actoi noi a
foimal ally, seemeu to see this oppoitunity to tiain nucleai scientific peisonnel in
Noith Koiea as a means of ueveloping the Communist bloc soliuaiity. So the Soviet
anu the BPRK signeu a piotocol in Septembei of 19S9, enabling joint nucleai
unueitakings, anu planning foi Yongbyon, 9ukm Noitheast of Pyongyang. The
Soviet tiansfeiieu to Noith Koiea an IRT-2uuu 2NWt - anu latei 8NWt - ieseaich
ieactoi along with othei equipment.
4S

Noscow hau suppoiteu the BPRK in seaich foi a iegional ally in its giowing
face-off with China, but it also became moie anu moie uisillusioneu with the BPRK's
actions. Foi example, Communist Paity of the Soviet 0nion's Fiist Secietaiy Leoniu
Biazhnev chastiseu a Noith Koiean official in 1967 as he helu the BPRK iesponsible
foi heighteneu tensions anu militaiy inciuents along the BNZ. The Soviet also
ieacteu to the ;"%<$.(ciisis, as Pyongyang hau not infoimeu Noscow in auvance of
its plans to seize the vessel. Biezhnev expiesseu unease about Noith Koiean steps
oi hints towaius impenuing wai that Noscow uiu not want any pait in.
44
Such
giowing uoubts in Noscow uecaues ago paiallel the cuiient amount of a BPRK's
ieliability anu tiustwoithiness, especially with ielations to China, its iecently
estiangeu, yet still, closest ally.

42
Ibiu., pp.S4;
4S
Ibiu., ppp. S1;
44
Ibiu., pppp. 6S;
21

>(%"%=)(*;$)5)5*
Buiing the uevelopment of nucleai weapons, the BPRK's policy changes
skeweu investment patteins in favoi of the militaiy, seveiely hobbling BPRK
economic uevelopment. It ieinstateu the militaiy fiist policy, with state investment
foi militaiy piouuction iise fiom about 6 peicent to Su peicent between 1964 anu
1967.
4S
Such a focus on militaiy anu nucleai weapons builuing has causeu the
Noith Koiean economy to unueigo a ciisis. The ciisis occuiieu in thiee phases
46
: 1.
The collapse of the Soviet 0nion anu Eastein Euiopean socialist systems tiiggeieu
the ieveisal of Noith Koiea's economic giowth anu a uownwaiu tienu in net
mateiial piouuct. 2. The combination of the ueath of Kim Il Sung in }uly of 1994, the
alteinating floous anu uiought since 199S, anu the incieasing inteinational isolation
leu to a uecline of net mateiial piouuct anu the nation's total buuget. S. The uecaue-
long economic ciisis has iesulteu in a iecuiiing cycle of shoitages, malfunctioning,
ieuuction of the national income, anu a iegiession of society's living stanuaius until
touay. Buiing the time peiiou of the seconu phase is when the economy took the
gieatest hit, shiinking by SS%. With the ueclines in militaiy builuup anu aims
expoits, Noith Koiea continues to manage to piouuce WNBs that aie piobably of
the best quality in the Thiiu Woilu.
47
With such ciippling economic pioblems how
is Noith Koiea able to maintain such a laige aimy, a laige aisenal of weapons anu
equipment, anu most suipiisingly, the auvancement of its weapons of mass
uestiuction(WNB).
In the iueological sense, the BPRK iegime has been able to continue its
militaiy capability uespite the extiemely pooi living stanuaius by coeicing its
people to puisue 8"*V"*(P":4(militaiy-fiist politics) anu V&*,8"*,(+&%V..V(a stiong
anu gieat state).
48

4S
Ibiu., ppppp. 6S.
46
Seong, Chaiki. "A Becaue of Economic Ciisis in Noith Koiea: Impacts on the Nilitaiy." 17CB(;&@%'8. S. (2uuS).
47
48
22

Theie aie a vaiiety of tangible ways that Noith Koiea has buffeieu its
economy:
49
the iegime uecieaseu its militaiy investment in foieign weapons
acquisition because they have attaineu a highei level of self-sufficiency in that fielu;
it become the leauing aims expoitei among the Thiiu Woilu countiies with
inuigenous capabilities of launching an ICBN; it engageu in economic coopeiation
with South Koiea, such as in touiist contiacts such as the Nount Keumkang touiist
contiact with South Koiean conglomeiate, Byunuai; gaineu inteinational
humanitaiian assistance of foou, feitilizei, anu clothing; it paiticipateu in illegal
commeice of smuggling, using funus fiom Kim }ong Il's peisonal coffei, naicotics
piouuction, counteifeiting, anu illegal tiaue. 0ne of the main feasible options foi
Noith Koiea to alleviate some economic pioblems is the uevelopment, piouuction,
anu sale of its missile systems.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

49
2S

0,4*&%-5*#,-*F@2.*(%"#)"'-*#%*G'$5'-*"'(1-/$*O-/G%"5*
G$%3$/=5P*
*
Yongbyon's ieactoi's total piouuction of electiicity uuiing the neaily 2S
yeais of inteimittent opeiations was equal to appioximately 2S uays of output of
one mouein light-watei ieactoi,
Su
so contiaiy to theii statements, it is cleaily not
foi electiicity's puiposes. This shows that lessei non-nucleai ambitions coulu have
pioviueu the BPRK with eneigy neeueu to spui its economic uevelopment.
Bowevei, the BPRK continues to choose to spenu a vast majoiity of its money on
nucleai auvancement as opposeu to the welfaie of its geneial population. In the face
of such economic haiuship anu inteinational non-piolifeiation effoits, why uoes the
BPRK continue its iole as a volatile piolifeiatoi of nucleai weapons, antagonizing
the iegional secuiity. Is it ieally just a closeu, unpieuictable, iiiational, bellicose
gioup, the likes of which aie haiu to finu."
S1

Quite to the contiaiy, Noith Koiea is being highly iational in its uecision to
maintain anu auvance its nucleai statehoou. It is essentially theii militaiy stiategy
of nationalism. It is theii means of attaining puiity ovei all things Koiean without
exteinal contamination. Bistoiically Pyongyang's foiemost goal has been the
ieunification of the Koiean Peninsula on Noith Koiean teims, with its constitution
stating ieunification as "the supieme national task."
S2

Bowevei, theie have been uevelopments that have leu to the shiinkage of the
powei of Noith Koiea, leauing to negative implications of Noith Koiea's long-teim
suivival, anu thus, its insecuiities. South Koiea's uiplomatic noimalization with the
Soviet 0nion in 199u anu with China in 1992 isolateu Pyongyang fiom the woilu,
inuucing a uiastic ieuuction of outsiue militaiy anu economic assistance to Noith
Koiea.
SS
Also, uespite the fact that uiplomatic ielations have officially enueu the

Su
2u11. p. 8S.
S1
Cha, victoi B., anu Baviu C Kang. !"#$%&'(!.'/0(1.'%&. New Yoik, NY: Columbia 0niveisity Piess, 2uuS. p. S.
S2
Bouge, Bomei T.. "Noith Koiea's Nilitaiy Stiategy." . 0S Aimy Wai College, n.u. Web. 1u Bec 2u12. p 2.
<http:www.cailisle.aimy.milusawcpaiameteisAiticlesuSspiinghouge.puf>.
SS
24

Colu Wai between China anu the 0S, China anu the R0K, China anu }apan, the R0K
anu }apan, anu even between Noith anu South Koiea uue mainly to Sunshine Policy
of South Koiean Piesiuent Kim Bae }ung foi gieatei engagement with Noith Koiea,
Noith Koiea anu the 0S still uon't have uiplomatic ielations. 0S has been holuing
out because this status quo allows the maintenance of 0S bilateial militaiy alliances
with East Asian nations such as }apan anu South Koiea, establishing its leaueiship
position in the iegion.
S4

Anothei main ieason foi the insecuiities of Noith Koiea emananate fiom the
tilting balance of powei on the Koiean peninsula to Noith Koiea's uisauvantage: as
South Koiean uevelopment anu inteinational stanuing acceleiateu, Noith Koiean
economy expeiienceu atiophy anu uecline.
SS
Stiategically, this woiseneu piospects
of exteinal secuiity guaiantees foi the Noith while the South continueu its secuiity
assuiances fiom 0S. Politically, Noith Koiea expeiienceu incieaseu isolation, while
South hau become an inteinational playei - a iesult that coulu be stemming fiom
theii iespective pationages uuiing the enu of the Koiean Wai into 0SSR anu 0S
camps. Economically, Noith Koiea's iigiu economic system anu natuial uisasteis
have leu to setbacks.
S6
By the 199us, theie existeu an insuimountable gap - annual
8% giowth in the R0K veisus successive yeais of 2-S% negative giowth in the BPRK,
anu a $4uu billion southein uBP, which was 1S-2u times that of the BPRK.
S7

Nilitaiily, uespite the fact that Noith Koiea spenus much moie of its uBP on militaiy
expenuituies, South Koiea still has much moie moueinizeu aimeu foices uue to the
Noith Koiean inability economically to puichase new weaponiy, anu the 0S
piesence in South Koiea also gives the South the supeiioiity ovei conventional
capabilities. Thus the imbalance of the conventional weapon has been a factoi in
uiiving Noith Koiea to puisue nucleai weapons.
S8

S4
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p.17.
SS
2u11.
S6
S7
Cha, victoi B., anu Baviu C Kang. !"#$%&'(!.'/0(1.'%&. New Yoik, NY: Columbia 0niveisity Piess, 2uuS. p. 21
S8
2S

The main factoi seems to be that while the economy of Noith Koiea seems to
have no ieueeming factois, its cential iueological tenet of P"#0%, oi self-ieliance, will
not allow them to uepenu on South Koiea foi feai of economic absoiption by Seoul
anu a bieakuown of isolation anu contiol.
S9
Noith Koiea's iefoim uilemma is
typical of any closeu iegime that has tiieu to open up post-colu wai. Noith Koiea
sees the neeu to iefoim to suivive, but in piocess of opening up, they uon't want to
be opening up to its own uemise. Anu yet, howevei much Pyongyang clings to its
P"#0% iueology, with the uiie state of the Noith Koiean economy, the communist
ievolution in the South is no longei a possibility. So now, Pyongyang's enu game has
changeu fiom one of hegemonic unification to basic suivival, avoiuing collapse, anu
avoiuing uominance by the South.
6u

In the mannei in which the inteinational woilu has been ueveloping, Noith
Koiea has been conuucting nucleai calculations foi its suivival. Watching the
Cuban missile ciisis unfolu, seeing Noscow's failuie to ensuie the secuiity of
anothei small, uistant socialist state piompteu Pyongyang to ponuei longei teim
nucleai goals paialleling Chinese objectives, as it came to iealize that the BPRK
stoou alone, anu coulu uepenu on no one to upholu its funuamental stiategic
inteiests.
61
This conviction was exaspeiateu with the inauguiation of the Bush
auministiation anu the Septembei 11, 2uu1 teiioiist attacks, when Bush began to
stiess the thieats of the combination of teiioiism anu WNBs, uiiectly placing Noith
Koiea in the position as the enemy in the "axis of evil." Then, aftei seeing the 0S
entei Iiaq, Noith Koiean uiplomats maue the ueclaiative statement, "We've watcheu
what you'ie uoing in Iiaq.The lessons that we'ie getting out of that is that Iiaq uoes
not have weapons of mass uestiuction anu you invaueu them. So, we'ie going to

S9
Bouge, Bomei T.. "Noith Koiea's Nilitaiy Stiategy." . 0S Aimy Wai College, n.u. Web. 1u Bec 2u12. p. 14.
6u
Cha, victoi B., anu Baviu C Kang. !"#$%&'(!.'/0(1.'%&. New Yoik, NY: Columbia 0niveisity Piess, 2uuS. p. 21.
61
Routleuge, 2u11. p. S7.
26

iepiocess the spent fuel ious, we'ie going to take them anu cieate a nucleai
ueteiient so you cannot invaue us."
62

In accoiuance with P"#0%b8(majoi tenet in ielation to "big powei chauvinism"
to avoiu being unuuly influenceu by moie poweiful nations, namely the 0S,
6S
the
BPRK iegime began to see nucleai weapons as a necessity foi suivival. If the 0S was
able to topple the Iiaqi goveinment, Kim }ong Il wanteu to possess the one thing the
Iiaqis uiu not - nucleai weapons - in hopes of uoing anything to avoiu the same fate.
Pyongyang soliuifieu its stiategy to use nucleai weapons as a leveiage chip to
piessuie 0S into negotiations on non-aggiession to foimally concluue the Koiean
Wai anu iecognize Noith Koiean iight to exist.
64

Shows of nucleai capabilities weie the BPRK iegime's implementation of its
"coeicive baigaining" stiategy, in which it uses uelibeiate anu limiteu acts of
violence, shoit of all-out-wai, to cieate small ciises, anu then negotiates uown fiom
the heighteneu state of tension to a baigaining outcome moie to the Noith's
auvantage than the cuiient status quo.
6S
Noith Koiea peiceiveu its uecisional fiame
within the status quo on the Koiean peninsula as a losing one, anu ueciueu that
offense was the best uefense against biggei poweis. Such piovocative actions, such
as the unlawful testing of nucleai weapons anu ballistic missiles stiategically leau
Washington, Seoul, China, anu Tokyo into the awkwaiu position of wanting to
punish BPRK misbehavioi but being constiaineu by feais of piovoking unnecessaiy
anu costly, laigei conflict.
The BPRK cleaily expiesseu its contiaiy views to 0S methous of negotiations
in }anuaiy of 2uu9 when the BPRK Ninistiy of Foieign Affaiis saiu,
"uenucleaiization thiough the noimalization of ielations, not the noimalization of
ielations thiough uenucleaiization.once the 0S nucleai thieats aie iemoveu anu

62
Ibiu., pp. 1S1.
6S
Fuqua, }i., }acques L. !"#$%&'()*+,&-%. Westpoit, CT: Piaegei Secuiity Inteinational, 2uu7. p. S.
64
6S
2uuS. p. 24.
27

the 0S nucleai umbiella foi South Koiea uisappeais, we will not neeu nucleai
weapons eithei."
66
Bespite its uiminisheu powei, the nucleai thieat gives Noith
Koiea the leveiage to make such uemanus. Noith Koiea, in its pievious nucleai
tests, has iealizeu that theie will be some leeway in the iepeicussions of theii
actions because howevei uniteu the inteinational community will be in conuemning
theii actions, the states have always been anu will be split in iesponuing to the ciisis
because of theii competing goals anu piioiities.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

66
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 1S9.
28

:'((-55)%"*%A*.)=*Q%"3*!1*E4*.)=*Q%"3*8"*
* The pievious succession of Kim Il Sung by Kim }ong Il saw a gieatei haiu-
lining with nationalistic BPRK iueas of P"#0%, anu gieatei volatility. The eluei Kim
seemeu moie willing to bioach the topic of even possibly foigoing nucleai weapons.
But with the succession by Kim }ong-Il, who uiu not holu as much cential authoiity
as Kim Il-Sung hau, he coulu not even consiuei such as piospect as foigoing its main
vantage point of its nucleai weapons uevelopment. 0nuei the Kim Il Sung ieign, the
0S anu the BPRK hau been able to agiee anu on 0ct 21, 1994 to sign the Agieeu
Fiamewoik, pioviuing the basis foi a possible iesolution of the nucleai issue on
Koiean peninsula. Bowevei, as Kim }ong Il hau to asseit his powei as the new
leauei, he uepenueu moie on Koiean People's Aimy, ieapplying the piinciple of
8.*,"*, oi militaiy fiist policy. Kim }ong Il acquiieu moie nucleai weapons to
pievent a possible 0S attack, invasion oi attempts at iegime change, especially aftei
witnessing the 0S's actions in Iiaq wai. Kim }ong Il seemeu to see nucleai
capabilities as the factoi keeping him anu militaiy in powei.
67

With yet anothei succession of Kim }ong Il by his son, Kim }ong 0n, questions
began to aiise as to whethei Kim }ong 0n woulu puisue a policy of gieatei
engagement anu negotiation, oi whethei he woulu take such haish actions as Kim
}ong Il hau. Kim }ong 0n's fiist official action as the iulei of the BPRK iegime came
in Febiuaiy 2u12, when Noith Koiea agieeu to nucleai moiatoiium, two months
aftei he came to powei following ueath of fathei Kim }ong Il. This seemeu to signal
that the new leauei was willing to consiuei ietuining to negotiations anu to engage
with the 0S. The moiatoiium hau Noith Koiea suspenuing its uianium eniichment
anu nucleai anu long-iange missile tests following the talks with the 0S, anu
agieeing to allow 0N inspectois to monitoi its ieactoi in Yongbyon to veiify its
compliance. In ietuin, the 0S woulu senu 24u,uuu tons of foou aiu to the uevastateu

67
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. 1S
29

nation.
68
Theie weie hopes that this coulu pave way to iesuming Six-Paity Talks
with Pyongyang aftei its bieakuown in 2uu9 - a ciucial bieakthiough accoiuing to
victoi Cha.
69

These pieuictions anu hopes foi a moie peaceful anu engaging successoi
who woulu take pait in negotiations quickly uieu out with the Apiil 2u12 Rocket
Launch of the 0nha-S, blasteu fiom Sohae, a launching site neai the Noith Koiean
westein boiuei with China. It hau once again uefieu China. It was also seen as a
uangeious pietext foi ueveloping inteicontinental ballistic missiles that might caiiy
a waiheau in the futuie.
7u

But the iocket launch pioveu to be a failuie as it uisintegiateu moments aftei
the launching, biinging public embaiiassment not only to Noith Koiea, but mainly
to the new young leauei, Kim }ong 0n. Bowevei, iegaiuless of its failuie, }apan, the
0S, anu South Koiea conuemneu it as a belligeient act, anu the 0S ueciueu to
suspenu its foou aiu.
71

Peihaps in attempts to make up foi the embaiiassment of the faileu launch of
Apiil anu ieconsoliuate moiale anu powei, but Noith Koiea has announceu on
Becembei 1 that, between Becembei 1u anu 22, it woulu again attempt to launch a
"civilian satellite." Noith Koiea biaggeu in 0ctobei that its missiles fiom this
impenuing 0nha-S launch possesseu the capability to stiike the 0S. The 0.S.
intelligence community assesseu that Pyongyang might be able to thieaten the
continental 0.S. with a nucleai-aimeu TB-2 by 2u1S, an alaiming uevelopment.
72

68
"Noith Koiea agiees to nucleai moiatoiium ." TTN. BBC, 29 Feb 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.bbc.co.uknewswoilu-asia-pacific-172u87SS>.
69
Nyeis, Steven. "Noith Koieans Agiee to Fieeze Nucleai Woik; 0.S. to uive Aiu." ^0%(!%W(c.'V(
^4-%8. The New Yoik Times, 29 Feb 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.nytimes.com2u12uSu1woiluasiaus-says-noith-koiea-agiees-to-cuib-nucleai-
woik.html>.
7u
Choe, Sang-Bun. "Noith Koiean Rocket Fails Noments Aftei Liftoff ." ^0%(!%W(c.'V(^4-%8. The New
Yoik Times, 12 Apiil 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
71
Choe, Sang-Bun. "Noith Koiean Rocket Fails Noments Aftei Liftoff ." ^0%(!%W(c.'V(^4-%8. The New
Yoik Times, 12 Apiil 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
72
Klingnei, Biuce. "Noith Koiean Nissile Launch Challenges 0.S. Foieign Policy." 5%'4/&,%(
A."*+&/4.*. Issue Biief #S79S. <http:www.heiitage.oigieseaichiepoits2u1212noith-
koiean-missile-launch-challenges-us-foieign-policy>
Su

Thus, these piovocations shoulu go to show that any pieuictions that Kim }ong 0n
woulu be any less belligeient in foieign policy matteis than his fathei piove to be
highly mistaken. A4,"'%(d uisplays the planneu tiajectoiy of this iocket launch latei
in Becembei of 2u12.

A4,"'%(d9(C%#%-<%'(MHEM(!.'/0(1.'%&(;$&**%+(^'&P%#/.':(.D(2.#V%/(a&"*#0(

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
S1

!"#-$"/#)%"/1*<(#%$5R*<##)#'&-5*#%O/$&5*#,-*F@2.*
The vaiious inteinational actois who holu influence in the Noith Koiean
nucleai ciisis, namely the 0niteu States, China, }apan, anu South Koiea, possess
uiffeiing views on the auequate measuies to take against Noith Koiea uespite theii
common consensus that uenucleaiization neeus to occui foi Noitheast Asian
iegional peace anu stability.

8")#-&*:#/#-5*
The 0niteu States has taken a haiuening appioach oi ihetoiic towaius Noith
Koiea in light of its nucleai piovocations anu the two nations' ueteiioiating bilateial
ielations. This gets has soliuifieu in moie with the occuiience of the 911 teiioiist
attacks anu new secuiity stiategies with iegaius to thieats fiom teiioiism anu
WNBs. With the incieasing nucleai capabilities anu fiequency of nucleai anu
ballistic missile tests, it cieates a setback in the 0S's goal foi a global non-
piolifeiation iegime.
Bowevei, in eaily 2uu9, with the new Piesiuent 0bama's auministiation, he
showeu a willingness to "extenu a hanu" to auveisaiies piepaieu to "unclench theii
fist."
7S
But the Noith continueu with its seconu nucleai test of 2uu9, showing
absolutely no signs of inteiest in uiplomacy. They woulu only uenucleaiize if the 0S
uisengageu fiom its secuiity commitment to Noitheast Asia, iemoveu its nucleai
umbiella fiom SK, withuiew 0S militaiy foices fiom the peninsula, anu uevelopeu
0S-BPRK stiategic ielationship paialleling the 0S-R0K alliance.
74
This immeuiately
ietiacteu 0bama's "extenueu hanu," anu biought Washington to seek the uenial of
any BPRK political oi stiategic auvantage anu piesseu foi auuitional sanctions
Thus the 0S sees haiu-lining against Noith Koiean piovocations with
punishments such as sanctions as the appiopiiate appioach. Bowevei, unilateial

7S
74
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 16u.
S2

sanctions imposeu by the 0S on Noith Koiea may be symbolic but aie meaningless
in substance because of the economic suppoit that continues fiom South Koiea anu
China. The 0S feels the neeu foi such punishments because it ueeply feais the factoi
of moial hazaiu - if Noith Koiea escapes any seiious iepeicussions foi theii
egiegious actions, it gives the gieen light to othei states with similai ambitions.
Also, in agieement with China, the 0S also feais that the Noith Koiean
uemonstiations of its nucleai poweis anu its abilities to gainei such capabilities
piesent a catalyst foi an aims iace in Noitheast Asia. So in oiuei to pievent such
balancing measuies on the pait of othei moie poweiful Asian nations, the 0S - in
contiast to the uemanus of Noith Koiea - has been ieemphasizing its commitments
to its allies in the iegion, such as South Koiea anu }apan.
7S

The 0S anu Noith Koiea cannot seem to come to an agieement foi tiue
uiplomatic ielations, as theii iequiiements aie in a complete inveise ielationship.
The 0S seeks unequivocal commitment by Pyongyang to uismantle all nucleai
weapons anu piogiams that fuithei theii uevelopment, incluuing an
acknowleugement of its uianium eniichment activities anu an uniestiicteu
acceptance of veiification monitois. The 0S is essentially uemanuing a complete,
veiifiable, iiieveisible uisaimament (CvIB) on the pait of Noith Koiea as the
iequiiement foi theii aiu anu engagement foi a possible path towaius
noimalization. 0n the othei hanu, Noith Koiea wants a complete noimalization of
ielations anu a secuiity guaiantee fiom the 0S with bountiful economic assistance
fiom it anu inteinational oiganizations fiist, along with the enu of the 0S's nucleai
umbiella to }apan anu South Koiea in the iegion, in oiuei foi the Noith to show any
signs of CvIB.
76

7S
76
Rozman, uilbeit. 3/'&/%,4#(^04*V4*,(&<."/(/0%(1.'%&*(!"#$%&'(N'4848. New Yoik, NY: Palgiave
Nacmillan, 2uu7.
SS

;,)"/*
China has thiee main goals that uiive its actions: that the peace anu stability
on Koiean peninsula be pieseiveu, the peninsula shoulu be nucleai-fiee, anu the
uispute shoulu be iesolveu thiough uiplomatic means.
77
Thus, China's main
concein, unlike that of the 0S is not a global wai on teiioi; so they focus on builuing
stiongei economy anu its militaiy to become pieeminent iegional powei anu global
leauei. Anu in oiuei to achieve this, China cannot allow Noith Koiea to fall. Bence
theii aiu to Noith Koiea has been immanse: in 2uu4 Chinese investment in Noith
Koiea ieacheu $Su million anu uoubleu in 2uuS, anu tiaue volume between the two
countiies ieacheu $1.S billion, about 48% of the Noith Koiean total foieign tiaue.
78

Though China uoes pioviue this aiu in pait foi its own benefit, it has also helpeu to
leveiage China as a ciucial powei in ieigning in the iegime.
The BPRK is the only countiy with which PRC "maintains" - whethei in name
oi in piactice - a Colu Wai secuiity pact. China-BPRK ielations have been uepicteu
as being "as close as lips to teeth," but iecently with the uevelopments of Noith
Koiea's iogue behavioi, this has been quoteu in contiast to China's actual attituues
towaiu its ally.
79
BPRK continueu with the nucleai test in 2uu6 even with the
contiaiy auvice fiom China. Thus, China chaiacteiizeu the test in 2uu6 as
0&*'&*(blatant oi flagiant), a teim useu only foi highly antagonistic ielations. This
left Beijing in a passive anu uiminisheu position, but Beijing coulu not affoiu to
sevei contact with Pyongyang with immeuiate piioiity to communicate fully anu
openly with Washington without tiiggeiing bieak with BPRK -to avoiu being
blameu foi this action.
8u

Essentially, China anu the 0S shaie goals with iegaius to the Koiean
peninsula - to establish peace anu stability, anu pievent a nucleai aims iace in the

77
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. S6.
78
Fuqua, }i., }acques L. !"#$%&'()*+,&-%. Westpoit, CT: Piaegei Secuiity Inteinational, 2uu7. 19.
79
Kim, Samuel S. ^0%(^W.(1.'%&8(&*+(/0%(d'%&/(;.W%'8. New Yoik, NY: Cambiiuge 0niveisity Piess,
2uu6. p. 71.
8u
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 1Su.
S4

iegion. Bowevei, the two states uiffei on how to go about puisuing these goals.
Bespite the mounting fiustiations in Beijing towaius Pyongyang, because of China's
geogiaphic pioximity, China must still auuiess Noith Koiea in a stiategic mannei.
Baiu-line sanctions woulu upset theii goals of peace; insteau they want to piomote
inteinal economic uevelopment anu constiuct a well-off society"(=4&.V&*,(80%0"4) -
anu want to piotect its gains.
81
Thus they aie foiceu into fiienuly Sino-Noith
Koiean ielations, as exemplifieu in the ieneweu ielations in Septembei 2uu9 with
BPRK aftei the initial fieezing aftei the 2
nu
nucleai ciisis.
82
Beijing's policy has been
ciiticizeu, saying that it is in neeu of moie coeicive steps to auvance longei teim
solutions.
The limitations of China's influence ovei Noith Koiea seem eviuent in the
moie cuiient event of the 2u12 iocket launchChina has not been able to pievent
any Noith Koiean missile oi nucleai tests.
8S
As China becomes waiy of its
unpieuictable neighboi, anu becomes moie anu moie attiacteu to South Koiea as an
economic paitnei, China-R0K ielations have begun to flouiish. Since 1992 at the
time of the noimalization between of China-R0K ielations, Seoul was willing anu
able to accommouate Beijing's economic inteiests anu piefeiences even while
saciificing its own shoit-teim economic inteiests. Bespite initial tiaue ueficit, this
alloweu the tiaue to inciease by uouble-uigit peicentage points uuiing eveiy yeai of
the 199us anu eaily 21
st
centuiy.
84
Economic coopeiation has leu to an incieasingly
inteiuepenuent ielationship between China anu the R0K, but always iemains
conscious China uoesn't commit the same Soviet fallacy of piematuie allieu
abanuonment. Thus, Beijing maintains a two-Koiea balancing act - woik with Noith
by giving substantial aiu, while ueepening ties with South thiough economic,

81
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. S4.
82
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 172-17S.
8S
84
2uu6. p. 7S.
SS

uiplomatic, anu political linkages.
8S
This has helpeu China holu a leaueiship iole in
the nucleai stanuoff because it is the only one with noimal uiplomatic ielations with
all five playeis.

Q/G/"
}apanese sentiment towaius the BPRK uoes not boue well, as it aligns most
with its close ally, the 0S. The BPRK's eaily ballistic missile anu nucleai piogiams,
anu especially the 1998 Nissile launch ovei }apan, ueeply woiseneu ielations with
}apan because not only uiu it uiiectly impact national secuiity, but it biought back
the memoiies of the blows of Biioshima anu Nagasaki uuiing WWII.
86
So }apan took
measuies against Noith Koiea: }apan agieeu to become one of the eleven nations in
the 0S-leu Piolifeiation Secuiity Initiative (PSI) to inteiuict WNB shipments to anu
fiom countiies like Noith Koiea.
87
Even befoie 0N iesolution aftei the 2uu6 nucleai
test, }apan hau announce its new sanctions: it woulu cut impoits fiom Noith
Koiea(mushioom, coal, shellfish) anu piohibit Noith Koiean vessels fiom uocking at
its poits.
88
Then, staiting in 2uu4, }apan puisueu an effective missile uefense
system. }apan hau initially committeu to spenu $1 billion foi these inteiceptoi
missiles, but by 2uu7, hau spent $7 billion.
89
This uefense system incluueu Patiiot
Auvanceu Capability missiles to shoot uown enemy missiles shoitly befoie they hit
taigets in }apan anu Stanuaiu Nissile system to inteicept enemy missiles befoie
they entei eaith's atmospheie.
}apan seems to be showing signs of incieasing concein ovei national secuiity
amiu giowing Chinese aggiessiveness anu Noith Koiean belligeience. It no longei
maintains its usual complacency, anu seems moie willing to boost its militaiy with
things such as pieviously mentioneu uefense missile systems.

8S
Ibiu., p. 98;
86
Ibiu., pp. 194;
87
Ibiu., ppp. 197.
88
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. Su.
89
2uu6. p. 199.
S6

:%'#,*.%$-/*
Fiom the iuins of the Koiean Wai, with the help of the 0S, South Koiea has
taken a vastly uiffeient tiajectoiy fiom its counteipait in the Noith thiough a
uemociatizeu goveinment anu a capitalist economy. This has catapulteu South
Koiea into the inteinational aiena as the woilu's eleventh-laigest economy.
9u
0ne
of the majoi uiffeiences in appioaches between the two Koieas has been that South
Koiea has taken a much moie open stance. Foi example, uespite the histoiical
animosity, by }une 196S, South Koiea anu }apan hau noimalizeu ielation thiough
the Tieaty on Basic Relations Between }apan anu the Republic of Koiea. Theie weie
many unueilying similaiities between }apan anu Koiea, anu theii ielationship coulu
be highly complementaiity of each othei's economic inteiests. Koiea hau much to
gain fiom the technology tiansfei anu human capital impoits, while }apan lackeu foi
neaiby maikets because of the off-limits natuie of China anu the Soviet 0nion.
91

In its ielations with anu attituues towaius Noith Koiea, theie has been a bit
of fluctuation uepenuent on the goveinmental leaueis of the time. With the Kim
Bae-}ung auministiation, South Koiea unueitook the Sunshine Policy foi engaging
Noith Koiea with economic caiiots anu political uialogue, leauing to the fiist intei-
Koiean summit in }une 2uuu anu agieements on family ieunions, economic
coopeiation, anu infiastiuctuie iejuvenation. This leu the BPRK to momentaiily
open up to the 0S, almost eveiy Euiopean 0nion countiy, anu }apan.
92
But with no
legal institutions, the economic caiiots anu haiu cuiiency fiom the South anu the
coopeiation fiom the Noith was highly unieliable.
Thus, with the inauguiation of the new R0K piesiuent, Lee Nyung Bak, in
eaily 2uu8, the nation auopteu a fai moie conuitional appioach to ielations with the
Noith. To Pyongyang's uismay, Seoul began iestiicting economic assistance, anu in

9u
7*8/4/"/4.*9()88&:8(4*(;"<$4#(;.$4#:. 11S (2uuS): p. 2.
91
2uu6. p. 188.
92
2uuS. p. SS.
S7

late }anuaiy 2uu9, Pyongyang nullifieu any assent to eailiei intei-Koiean political-
militaiy agieements, placing peninsulai stability at incieaseu iisk once again.
9S
But
Piesiuent Lee Nyung Bak iesumeu the thieat-baseu stiategy, anu stiongly
iealigneu with the 0S in political anu stiategic inteiests
The impact of the 2u12 iocket launch will have an impact on the upcoming
Becembei 19
th
piesiuential election, with the likely outcome of conseivative Paik
ueun Bye. Paik cuiiently auvocates the option of offeiing benefits to Noith Koiea
conuitionally upon Pyongyang's behavioi - aligning well with the 0S stance.
94
The
outcome will ueteimine whethei South Koiea continues the moie conuitional
appioach of touay, oi the moie gentle engagement appioach uating back to the
times of Roh Noo Byun.

9S
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 167.
94
S8

9'(1-/$*+,$-/#*/"&*!#5*>AA-(#*%"*<11)/"(-5*
8:?Q/G/"*<11)/"(-*
In iecent yeais, the woilu has seen a stiengthening of the 0S-}apan Secuiity
Alliance, as well as an acceleiation of the uevelopment of a theatei of missile
uefense, as }apan feels uiiectly thieateneu. The most secuie place foi }apan seems
to be unuei the secuiity of the 0S's nucleai umbiella. This shift occuiieu most
acutely aftei the 1998 Taepouong-1 missile ovei }apan, with public opinion leaning
stiongly towaius a stiong uefense. 0S Secietaiy of State Conuoleezza Ricei veibally
confiimeu this commitment of the 0S towaius }apan, saying on 0ctobei 18, 2uu6,
"0S has the will anu the capability to meet the full iange of its ueteiient anu secuiity
commitments to }apan."
9S
}apan anu the 0S have been uniteu on one fiont in its
sentiments anu actions towaius the thieat of Noith Koiea.
As foi the acceleiation in the builuing of the ballistic missile uefense system,
aftei the }uly 2uu6 missile tests by Noith Koiea, }apan anu the 0S agieeu to ueploy
Patiiot Auvanceu Capability-S(PAC-S) inteiceptoi missiles in }apan foi the fiist time
in the histoiy of the alliance.
96
This missile is uesigneu with the puipose of
inteicepting ballistic missiles, ciuise missiles, oi aiiciafts. The 0S also moveu up
plans to test the X-Banu missile-uetecting iauai system, at the }apanese Aii Self-
Befense Foice's Shaiiki base at Tsugaiu, S6u miles Noitheast of Tokyo.
97

8:?26.*<11)/"(-J*
The ciisis on the noithein half of the Koiean peninsula has causeu time
peiious when a weuge was uiiven into the 0S-R0K alliance - which has been an
implicit goal of the Noith Koiean iegime - with builuing iesentment in Seoul anu
within the South Koiean public of the 0S militaiy footpiint in Koiea. Public
uemonstiations of such iesentment in tuin leu to angei within the 0S of the

9S
Lin, Liu. "The Noith Koiean Nucleai Test anu its Implications." 34$V(2.&+(;&@%'. (2uu6): p. 2S.
96
Ibiu., p. 26;
97
Ibiu., pp. 27.
S9

unappieciative natuie of the South Koiean people of the 0S's secuiity guaiantee.
Both siues calleu foi the withuiawal of tioops fiom the peninsula immeuiately.
98

But the ieality is that iegaiuless of challenges within the alliance's
ielationship, South Koiea neeus the 0S foi vaiious ieasons:*Noith Koiea's thieat
iemains veiy ieal; 0S is ciucial to South Koiean long-teim secuiity inteiestsS*South
Koiea's suivival anu political autonomy in Noitheast Asia cannot be taken foi
gianteuS*anu South Koiea neeus 0S suppoit foi the possible oi eventual
ieunification of Koiea.
99
Bowevei, the 0S also neeus South Koiea mainly as a
footholu foi its influence ovei the East Asian continent so as to iestiict China's
pieuominant influence.*
But ultimately, aftei a few yeais of slight estiangement, the 0S-R0K alliance
has been stiengtheneu because in oiuei to meet secuiity inteiests, they neeu to
soliuify as one iuentity. The S8
th
R0K-0S Secuiity Consultative Neeting in
Washington in 0ctobei of 2uu6 ieaffiimeu that the 0S-R0K alliance is vital,
especially in light of the existence of the BPRK, the two countiies must cieate a soliu
combineu uefense postuie, 0S's secuiity commitment to South Koiea is ieaffiimeu,
anu the 0S agieeu to complete the tiansition of waitime opeiational contiol to the
R0K.
1uu

*
;,)"/?26.*<11)/"(-*
China anu South Koiea shaie the similai geopolitical location closest in
pioximity to Noith Koiea, anu so, theii woiiies with iegaius to the Noith Koiean
ciisis aie veiy similai. They woiiy of the collapse of the BPRK iegime anu want to
seek a compiomise between the 0S anu the BPRK. They encouiage a much moie
flexible stance on the pait of the 0S towaius Noith Koiea. China wants peaceful

98
2uuS. p. 1u.
99
7*8/4/"/4.*9()88&:8(4*(;"<$4#(;.$4#:. 11S (2uuS).
1uu
4u

suiiounuings foi its own uevelopment inteinally anu South Koiea wants a giauual
ieunification of the Koiean peninsula, anu so, these two countiies shaie the
commonality in that they will not back oveily punitive sanctions uespite theii
motions in suppoit of the 0N sanctions.
1u1

*
L'1#)1/#-$/1*2-1/#)%"5J*;,)"/?8:?Q/G/"?26.*
Now that theie is no ambiguity conceining whethei oi not Noith Koiea is a
nucleai state, with its iecent nucleai tests anu ueclaiations, it is easiei to align China
anu South Koiea - the moie uovish, gentle, engagement policy-oiienteu nations -
with the 0S anu }apan - the moie hawkish, haiu-lineis when it comes to Noith
Koiean ihetoiic. All of the nations shaie the same sentiment that Noith Koiean
nucleai tests aie unacceptable anu neeu to pievent nucleai weapons. Now the
pioblem going foiwaiu is biinging the countiies togethei in the tactics by which
they go about in attempts to biing the uenucleaiization of Noith Koiea to fiuition.
The Six-Paity Talks iepiesent a mannei in which one can see the uefinite
coopeiative anu allieu moou between the foui poweis of China, the 0S, }apan, anu
the R0K. Beijing has playeu a ciucial iole, taking the initiative of shuttle uiplomacy
between Pyongyang anu Washington, in oiuei to biing these two uiveigent
auministiations into peaceful engaging talks.
The Six-Paity Talks oiiginally began as Thiee-Paity Talks with the thiee
states of Noith Koiea, China, anu the 0S. This evolveu into the Six-Paity Talks to
incluue China, }apan, South Koiea, Russia, Noith Koiea, anu the 0S. Some seemingly
successful consensus has been achieveu in the talks, such as the }oint Statement of
Piinciples in Septembei 2uu4, which focuseu on the uenucleaiization of the Koiean
peninsula, the noimalization of ielations between Noith Koiea anu the 0S, anu
Noith Koiea anu }apan, the economic coopeiation in the fielus of eneigy, tiaue anu

1u1
Ibiu., p. 29;
41

investment, anu an establishment of a peimanent peace iegime in the Koiean
peninsula.
1u2

Bowevei, uomestic policy constiaints anu uiffeiing piioiities cieate many
uisagieements. The 0S goal of Noith Koiea giving up all of its nucleai piogiams anu
ietuining to the NPT uiffeis vastly fiom the Noith Koiean goal of gaining official
secuiity guaiantee fiom the 0S, which both uiffei fiom the goals of China anu South
Koiea of peaceful uiplomatic solutions without having to exeit sanctions oi piessuie
that coulu potentially leau to an escalateu ciisis on the peninsula.
1uS
The Six-Paity
Talks weie iife with uisagieement. Even with the agieeu }oint Statement in 2uuS,
theie weie eviuent signs of uistiust within the language: i.e. insteau of
"uismantling", Noith chose the woiu "abanuoning; 0S iejecteu calls to noimalize
ielations but agieeu to "take steps to noimalize."
1u4

The Benucleaiization Action Plan came to light at the Six-Paity Talks in 2uu7
with the conuitions that Noith Koiea shut uown anu abanuon its plutonium-baseu
nucleai piogiam at Yongbyon, anu the BPRK iegime will ueclaie all nucleai
weapons piogiams, in ietuin foi 2 yeais of the equivalent of one million tons of
heavy fuel oil anu 0S steps to iemove BPRK fiom state sponsoi on teiioiism anu to
iemove Noith Koiea fiom inclusion in the Tiauing with the Enemy Act.
1uS
Theie
weie uoubts as to the ieality of the plan put into effect because of Noith's pattein of
ieneging on piomises anu because of the fact that knowing that the nucleai
weapons aie Noith Koiea's cential leveiage factoi, the iegime woulu not be willing
to give it up so easily. Such uoubt pioves to have been tiue, as Noith Koiea tolu the
0S that uisablement uiu not imply uismantlement. Then in 2uu8 to a 0S non-
goveinmental uelegation, Noith Koiean official saiu, "Ny countiy is uiviueu in two,
still technically at wai. The 0S anu R0K aie aimeu with nucleai weapons anu have

1u2
Ibiu., pp. 12;
1uS
Ibiu., ppp. 12-1S.
1u4
Rozman, uilbeit. 3/'&/%,4#(^04*V4*,(&<."/(/0%(1.'%&*(!"#$%&'(N'4848. New Yoik, NY: Palgiave
Nacmillan, 2uu7. p. 2S.
1uS
42

mutual uefense tieaty anu a nucleai umbiella.when 0S-BPRK ielations aie fully
noimalizeu anu no thieat exists anu mutual tiust has been built, nucleai weapons
will be eliminateu."
1u6

Nany times the Six-Paity Talks piove to be fiuitless, even when agieements
aie maue. Bowevei, the Six-Paity Talks iemain the most appiopiiate anu useful
fiamewoik foi a peaceful iesolution of the nucleai issue in Noith Koiea, since
militaiy aggiession anu iegime change is out of the question.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

1u6
4S

;822>9+*:+<+>*6T*<TT<!2:*!9*2><;+!69*+6*F@2.*
*
F@2.*UVWU*2%(I-#*X/'"(,J*
* Noith Koiea has claimeu that the planneu launch foi Becembei of 2u12 is in
an effoit to put a Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite into oibit simply foi peaceful space
activity. Bowevei, it is wiuely believeu that this launch is actually a uisguiseu long-
iange missile test. 0S Secietaiy of State, Billaiy Rouham Clinton has calleu on
countiies to piessuie Noith Koiea to suspenu this planneu launch, anu 0N Secietaiy
ueneial Ban Ki Noon, along with iepiesentatives of China, Russia, }apan, anu South
Koiea, have expiesseu theii opposition, uiging Noith Koiea to comply with its 0N
Secuiity Council obligations.
1u7
Bowevei, in the past, the BPRK iegime has not
shown any signs of taking heeu of such auvice fiom foieign actois.
In the event that Noith Koiea continues with the test in violation of 0N
iesolutions, the 0S shoulu call foi new 0N Secuiity Council iesolution, iequiiing
moie extensive sanctions on Noith Koiea, uemanu that all 0N membei nations
coopeiate with these sanctions, leau an inteinational effoit against Noith Koiea
illegal activities such as counteifeiting anu uiug smuggling, encouiage South Koiea
to put a multilayeieu missile uefense system into effect, anu oiuei South Koiea to
implement the ueneial Secuiity of Nilitaiy Infoimation Agieement with }apan to
cooiuinate theii iespective missile uefense infoimation.
1u8

Bowevei, iegaiuless of the 0S's effoits, China's unwillingness to take haishei
stances against its belligeient ally will uilute any effoits on the pait of othei 0N
membei states to ieign in Noith Koiea's volatile actions. The impenuing
uelibeiations at the 0N will piesent anu oppoitunity to examine the effectiveness of

1u7
Cha, victoi. Inteiview by Ellen Kim. "Noith Koiea's Seconu Rocket Launch in 2u12." N%*/%'(D.'(
3/'&/%,4#(e(7*/%'*&/4.*&$(3/"+4%8. uS Bec 2u12. Centei foi Stiategic anu Inteinational Stuuies. uS
2u12. <http:csis.oigpublicationnoith-koieas-seconu-iocket-launch-2u12.>
1u8
44

the 0bama Auministiation in convincing the new Chinese auministiation to iesponu
moie effectively to Noith Koiean violations.
1u9

8:*Y*26.*<11)/"(-*
The South Koiean Befense Ninistei Kim Kwan }in anu 0S Secietaiy of
Befense Leon Panetta met at the annual Secuiity Consultative Neeting (SCN) in
Washington, BC, on 0ctobei, 24, 2u12 to ieaffiim the commitments of the 0S-R0K
Alliance, specifically in iesponse to the issues of Noith Koiea.**The meeting entaileu
the following main points:
11u
**
A ieaffiimeu commitment of 0S anu R0K Piesiuents to builu a
compiehensive stiategic Alliance of bilateial, iegional anu global scope baseu
on common values anu mutual tiust;
The Alliance shoulu stiengthening the combineu uefense postuie on the
Koiean peninsula anu enhance coopeiation foi iegional anu global secuiity
to bioauen anu ueepen the scope of the Alliance;
Noith Koiea's policies anu piovocations pose a thieat to iegional anu global
secuiity anu ueseive to be iepiimanueu;
Noith Koiea shoulu cease all nucleai activities anu abanuon all nucleai
weapons anu existing nucleai piogiams;
The Alliance will show fiim suppoit of the 0N Secuiity Councils iesolutions
anu enfoice its sanctions bilateially;
"Reviseu Nissile uuiuelines" will be set in place to enable the R0K to enhance
missiles anu unmanneu aeiial vehicles foi countei-missile stiategy, mainly
against the Noith Koiea counteipait;
A joint iesolve not to toleiate any Noith Koiean aggiession oi piovocation;
Theie is a neeu foi auvanceu militaiy ueteiience capabilities anu iesponse
ieauiness in case of a piovocation;
Confiim mutual commitment to uefenu R0K thiough a combineu uefense
stance anu thiough the enhancement of the Alliance's mutual secuiity;
Affiimeu 0S commitment to pioviue anu stiengthen extenueu ueteiience foi
R0K using full iange of militaiy capabilities, incluuing 0S nucleai umbiella,
conventional stiike, anu missile uefense capabilities;

1u9
11u
0niteu States. Bepaitment of Befense. S.4*/(N.--"*4f"%(.D(/0%(YY/0(Kg3gU2%@"<$4#(.D(1.'%&(3%#"'4/:(
N.*8"$/&/46%(\%%/4*,. Washington, BC: 2u12.
<http:www.uefense.govnews44thSCN}ointCommunique.puf>.
4S

0S will maintain cuiient 0S tioop levels in South Koiea foi enhanceu combat
ieauiness, but waitime opeiational contiol (0PC0N) will go to the R0K }oint
Chiefs of Staff by 2u1S, uismantling the Combineu Foices Commanu.
*
Z2-D)5-&*L)55)1-*[')&-1)"-5\*A%$*26.*
The "Reviseu Nissile uuiuelines," incluueu in the Secuiity Consultative
Neeting, between the 0S anu R0K, iepiesenteu a ieveisal of a 2uu1 accoiu that
baiieu South Koiea fiom ueveloping anu ueploying ballistic missiles with a iange of
moie than 186 miles anu a payloau of moie than 1,1uu pounus. This has been a
iesponse to conceins about a iegional aims iace, but in light of the necessity of
auequate uefense against the BPRK, the 0S anu the R0K agieeu that South Koiea
woulu now be alloweu to possess longei-iange missiles that coulu stiike all of Noith
Koiea. 0nuei these guiuelines, South Koiea can now ueploy ballistic missiles with a
iange of up to 8uu kilometeis, which is enough to ieach Noith Koiea, but not
enough to be a thieat to }apan oi China, as long as the payloau of the missile iemains
at oi below Suu kilogiams. It also now allows Seoul to loau waiheaus weighing up
to two tons on shoitei-iange ballistic missiles as well as the use of uiones caiiying
up to 2.S tons of equipment anu weapons, as uiones have iecently emeigeu as
poweiful weapons in mouein waifaie.
111

8:*Y*Q/G/"*<11)/"(-*
* With heighteneu missile uefense systems being implementeu in }apan in
iesponse to the giowing anu imminent thieat of Noith Koiean piovocation, }apan
has employeu the Aegis Ballistic Nissile Befense System (BNB), a sea-baseu
component of the Nissile Befense Agency's Ballistic Nissile Befense System that is
uesigneu to inteicept ballistic missiles befoie ieentiy. Aegis BNB gives waiships
the capability of shooting uown enemy ballistic missiles, with its inteicept-

111
Choe, Sang-Bun. "0.S. Agiees to Let South Koiea Extenu Range of Ballistic Nissiles." ^0%(!%W(c.'V(
^4-%8. The New Yoik Times, u7 0ct 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.nytimes.com2u121uu8woiluasiaus-agiees-to-let-south-koiea-extenu-missile-
iange.html._i=u>.
46

capability, using both lanu-baseu Patiiot-missile batteiies anu sea-baseu Aegis naval
uestioyeis in cohesion with many iauais. }apan's Aegis BNB piogiam is highly
uevelopeu, as Shinichi 0gawa, a piofessoi at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific 0niveisity anu
the foimei ieseaich uiiectoi at the }apanese uefense ministiy's National Institute
foi Befense Stuuies, says, "}apan is at the leauing euge in that it's the only nation
othei than the 0.S. with SN-S."
112
}apan anu the 0S aie cuiiently in coopeiation in
the SN-SCoopeiateive Bevelopment Piogiam, with the goal of ueveloping a "21-inch
uiametei vaiiant of the SN-S missile, uesignateu SN-S Block IIA, to uefeat longei-
iange ballistic missiles."
11S
The ueployment of this new geneiation of inteiceptois
is piojecteu to begin in 2u18.
114
The following A4,"'%(5>(iepiesents the location of
}apan's antimissile systems, incluuing the Aegis Ballistic Nissile Befense System
bases.

112
Bawson, Chestei. "}apan Shows 0ff Its Nissile-Befense System ." ^0%(?&$$(3/'%%/(S."'*&$. The Wall
Stieet }ouinal, u9 Bec 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:online.wsj.comaiticleSB1uuu1424127887S2SS168u4S7816Su2SS12727616.html>.
11S
0niteu States. Bepaitment of Befense: Nissile Befense Agency. B%,48(T&$$48/4#(\4884$%(C%D%*8%.
<http:www.mua.milsystemaegis_bmu.html>.
114
Bawson, Chestei. "}apan Shows 0ff Its Nissile-Befense System ." ^0%(?&$$(3/'%%/(S."'*&$. The Wall
Stieet }ouinal, u9 Bec 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:online.wsj.comaiticleSB1uuu1424127887S2SS168u4S7816Su2SS12727616.html>.
47

A4,"'%(59(S&@&*b8(B*/4U\4884$%(3:8/%-8(
Anothei example of a heighteneu missile uefense system in }apan can be seen
in the piospective 0S installation of the "X-banu," a "poweiful eaily-waining iauai"
manufactuieu by Raytheon Co. as "a laige phaseu-aiiay of fiie contiol sensoi,
featuiing piecision uisciimination anu inteiceptoi suppoit."
11S
It is uesigneu foi the
puipose of counteiing thieats fiom volatile anu iogue states such as Noith Koiea.

11S
"Shielu ievealeu: 0S spieaus missile uefenses East."2^. Autonomous Nonpiofit 0iganization "Tv-
Novosti", 24 Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:it.comnewsus-missile-uefense-asia-4S2>.

48

Bespite the fact that it is foi the immeuiate thieat of Noith Koiea, it coulu also be
meant to give the 0S an oppoitunity to look into China.
Fuitheimoie, 0S Secietaiy of Befense Leon Panetta stateu that a seconu
uefense system will be placeu in }apan to piotect fiom the thieat of a possible Noith
Koiean missile attack. It woulu pioviue the 0S with multiple benefits of allowing 0S
vessels to spieau out of }apan into othei paits of the Asia-Pacific iegion, piotecting
the 0S homelanu fiom a Noith Koiean thieat, anu enhancing the 0S ability to uefenu
}apan. Bowevei, uespite Panetta's piomises that this has nothing to uo with China
anu that the missile uefense system will not be aimeu at China, it has iuffleu some
featheis in Beijing.
116
The main uebate stems fiom the fact that this uecision foi
implementation occuiieu uuiing a heateu political uebate between China anu }apan.
The Chinese aie of the opinion that in pioviuing }apan with the Ameiican missile
shielu, the 0S is siuing with the }apanese in theii teiiitoiial claims of the Biaoyu, oi
the Senkaku, Islanus.
117

;,)"/*
** China is becoming not only an economic supeipowei, but also a poweiful
militaiy state whose inteiests have to be consiueieu. Buiing a time when the
0bama auministiation, paitial to the elimination of nucleai weapons, has committeu
to many cuts in the buugets foi nucleai weapons anu massive cuts in the 0S nucleai
aisenal, this coulu give China the oppoitunity to achieve an equal status with the 0S
in nucleai teims.
118

116
"0S }apan agiee on new missile system to countei Noith Koiea thieat." AI`(!%W8. Fox News
Associateu Piess, 17 Sept 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <
http:www.foxnews.compolitics2u12u917us-anu-japan-agiee-on-new-missile-system-to-
countei-noith-koiea-thieat>.
117
Shankei, Thom. "0.S. Accoiu With }apan 0vei Nissile Befense Biaws Ciiticism in China." ^0%(!%W(
c.'V(^4-%8. The New Yoik Times, 17 Sept 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.nytimes.com2u12u918woiluasiau-s-anu-japan-agiee-on-missile-uefense-
system.html.pagewanteu=all>.
118
Nahnken, Tom. "The shifting 0S-China nucleai balance." A.'%4,*(;.$4#:. Foieign Policy uioup, LLC,
u1 0ct 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:shauow.foieignpolicy.composts2u121uu1the_shifting_us_china_nucleai_balance>.
49

China is a signatoiy to the Compiehensive Test Ban Tieaty in 1996, agieeing
not to conuuct fuithei nucleai tests. Bowevei, theie have been iumois of a Chinese
long-iange missile thieat fiom China's incieasing uevelopment of inteicontinental
anu anti-ship ballistic missiles. China conuucteu its fiist flight test of the BF-41
inteicontinental ballistic missile(ICBN) on }uly 24, with a long enough iange to
stiike any city in the 0S.
119
The BF-41 maiks Beijing's fiist stiategic missile aimeu
with multiple waiheaus with fiist-stiike nucleai capability. Accoiuing to Phillip
Kaibei, a ueoigetown 0niveisity piofessoi,
h^0%( CAUYE( /%8/( #."$+( 84,*&$( &( -&P.'( <..8/( 4*( %8/4-&/%8( .D( N04*&b8(
8/'&/%,4#(*"#$%&'(D.'#%8i7/(48($4V%$:(/0%(CAUYE(W4$$(#&'':(/0'%%(W&'0%&+8>(
&*+(4D(/0%(N04*%8%(D.$$.W(2"884&b(-.+%$(.D(<"4$+4*,(/0'%%('%U$.&+(-4884$%8(
D.'( %&#0( $&"*#0%'>( /0%( *"-<%'( .D( N04*%8%( 8/'&/%,4#( W&'0%&+8( #."$+(
-.'%(/0&*(+."<$%(D'.-(#"''%*/($%6%$8g((B(D"/"'%(CAUYE(D.'#%(.D(8.-%(XM(
-4884$%8(W4/0('%$.&+8(&*+(-"$/4@$%(W&'0%&+8(W."$+(<%(%*.",0(D.'(N04*&(
/.(/&',%/(%6%':(Kg3g(#4/:(W4/0(&(@.@"$&/4.*(.6%'(GH>HHH(@%.@$%gj
EMH
(
(
This puisuit of nucleai aims by China coulu spui a nucleai aims iace because in
oiuei to be able to extenu its nucleai ueteiience in Asia, the 0S will have to builu
missile uefenses against China.
121
The natuie of China-0S ielations anu the constant
big-powei politics makes one wonuei whethei the missile is simply a counteistiike
measuie, oi a signifiei of China's potential seciet builuing of nucleai capabilities to
challenge anu negate the 0S's stiategic powei in the iegion. Anothei thieat to the
0S's stiategic global powei position comes in the foim of anti-ship ballistic missiles.
China has possession of a caiiiei-killing missile, oi an anti-ship ballistic missile,
calleu the Bong Fenu 21B (BF-21B) that can taiget anu penetiate moving aiiciaft
caiiieis at a uistance of moie than 1,Suu kilometeis. This is a thieat to the 0S
because a majoi pait of 0S powei, its global aii anu sea powei, in the foim of fightei

119
"Shielu ievealeu: 0S spieaus missile uefenses East."2^. Autonomous Nonpiofit 0iganization "Tv-
Novosti", 24 Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:it.comnewsus-missile-uefense-asia-4S2>.
12u
ueitz, Bill. "NANCB0 NISSILE LA0NCB." A'%%(T%&#.*. Fiee Beacon, 1S Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec
2u12. <http:fieebeacon.commanchu-missile-launch>.
121
ueitz, Bill. "NANCB0 NISSILE LA0NCB." A'%%(T%&#.*. Fiee Beacon, 1S Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec
2u12. <http:fieebeacon.commanchu-missile-launch>.
Su

jets anu naval fleets coulu be compiomiseu.
122
The extent to which China's ballistic
missiles capabilities an affect the vast peiipheiy of China can be seen in A4,"'%(7
EMX
(
below.

A4,"'%(79(\&@(.D('&*,%(.D(N04*&b8(&*/4U804@(&*+(./0%'(<&$$48/4#(-4884$%8(

The oiigins of the stiategy behinu the cieation of the anti-ship ballistic
missiles, oi "caiiiei killeis," actually came fiom the 199S Taiwan ciisis, Beijing was

122
Talmauge, Eiic. "Chinese missile coulu shift Pacific powei balance." !TN(!%W8. Associateu Piess
NSNBC News. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:www.msnbc.msn.comiuS8S8u74Snswoilu_news-
asia_pacifictchinese-missile-coulu-shift-pacific-powei-balance
12S
Wateiman, Shaun. "Rauai sent to }apan can tiack anti-ship missiles." ^0%(?&804*,/.*(^4-%8. The
Washington Times, 17 Sept. 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.washingtontimes.comnews2u12sep17iauai-sent-to-japan-can-tiack-anti-ship-
missiles-u>.

S1

foiceu to back uown in its uispute with the "0S-backeu bieakaway piovince" of
Taiwan uue to piessuies fiom the 0S aiiciaft caiiiei battle gioup that was ueployeu
in Taiwan.
124
The shame anu humiliation that the militaiy felt at this time spuineu
the beginnings of the veiy ballistic missiles that coulu haim the 0S's stance as the
stiategic powei.
China's stance with iegaius to Taiwan is a veiy haiuline "0ne-China
piinciple,"
12S
showing no signs of any willingness to make concessions - a vast
uiffeience in ihetoiic when compaieu to China's highly uovish appioach to the issue
of Noith Koiea. The issue of Taiwan can tuin into a point of conflict foi the two
gieat poweis of the 0S anu China. 0ntil now, the 0S anu China have co-manageu the
cioss-Stiaight tensions. But as China continues to expanu its militaiy powei - foi
example, China has between 1,uuu anu 1,2uu shoit-iange ballistic missiles aimeu at
Taiwan - it hopes to asymmetiically uetei the 0S's inteivention in its actions
towaius Taiwan.
126
Such conflict anu uiveision can cause iamification in these two
nations' uealings with Noith Koiea.

124
Wateiman, Shaun. "Rauai sent to }apan can tiack anti-ship missiles." ^0%(?&804*,/.*(^4-%8. The
Washington Times, 17 Sept 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.washingtontimes.comnews2u12sep17iauai-sent-to-japan-can-tiack-anti-ship-
missiles-u>.
12S
Ikegami, Nasako. "Time foi Conflict Pievention Acioss the Taiwan Stiait ." S&-%8/.W*(A."*+&/4.*.
vol 8. Issue 7 (2uu8): Piint.
<http:www.jamestown.oigsingle.no_cache=1&tx_ttnews|tt_newsj=4822>.
126
Ikegami, Nasako. "Time foi Conflict Pievention Acioss the Taiwan Stiait ." S&-%8/.W*(A."*+&/4.*.
vol 8. Issue 7 (2uu8): Piint.
S2

:#$/#-3)-5*A%$*#,-*T'#'$-*
In the past, the 0N Secuiity Council has unanimously passeu iesolutions
placing sanctions on Noith Koiea to pievent oi impeue nucleai anu missile
tiansactions. But because of the uiffeiences in values anu goals of each nation calleu
on to impose these sanctions, many times, these sanctions have enteieu into a
pattein of becoming unilateially enfoiceu, if even enfoiceu at all. This gives Noith
Koiea the impiession that it can commit these violations with a simple slap on the
hanu because uespite the unanimous inteinational agieements that punishment is
necessaiy, the states become uiviueu in the implementation piocess, anu the
appiopiiate sanctions anu punishments of the iesolutions get uiluteu. So, in oiuei
to piopeily impeue the Noith's nucleai aspiiations, the main poweis in the
Noitheast Asian iegion - the 0S, China, }apan, anu South Koiea - neeu to woik
cohesively. If they uo so, they uefinitely uo holu enough clout ovei Noith Koiea to
effectively coeice changes. Foi example, Accoiuing to uata fiom the Koiea
Bevelopment Institute, Seoul anu Beijing account foi moie than 8u% of NK foieign
tiaue anu about SS% Noith's total uBP.
127
So an enfoicement of a combineu
economic sanctions woulu conceivably be uetiimental enough to the piospects of
Noith Koiean suivival to affect the actions of Noith Koiea.
uiven the cuiient state of events, theie aie five "futuiable" scenaiios foi the
Noith Koiean iegime: system collapse, system uecay, system maintaining, system
iefoim, oi system tiansfoimation. As of touay, Noith Koiea iesiues in the system
maintaining scenaiio, wheie the BPRK iegime continues to suivive by making just
the necessaiy aujustments anu ielying on the financial suppoit of neighboiing
China, }apan, anu South Koiea. Yet it maintains fiim contiol of its nation's iueology,

127
Routleuge, 2u11. p. 198.
SS

iuentity, anu polity, with its auheience to P"#0%>(the main objective of national
uefense, anu the uemonization of the 0S as an impeiialist nation.
128

With the issue of how to ueal with this nation in the futuie that stick so close
to its P"#0%(iueology anu the full uemonization of the 0S in its entiiety, theie aie only
five methous of potential action towaius the Noith:
129
aimeu conflict, the collapse of
the iegime thiough means othei than aimeu conflict, a fullei accommouation of
Noith Koiea's position, an imposition of economic sanctions, oi a constiuctivist
engagement in which a negotiateu settlement uisaims the nucleai piogiams while
still maintaining the iecognition of that nation's soveieignty anu foicing the
economy to fully function. The constiuctivist engagement theoiy is most piomising
because it takes into account the fact that the Noith will most likely not engage in
any methou that attempts to negotiate away its nucleai weapons aisenal, which, to
them, iepiesents its only ieal secuiity guaiantee. *
*
<54==-#$)(*>(%"%=)(*:#/#-($/A#B<>:C*
With the eviuent failuie of past attempts to place anu ieinfoice sanctions on
Noith Koiea, theie neeus to be a tuin to a new moie woikable stiategy. }acques L
Fuqua, }i. focuses moie on the economy of the Noith Koiean state, saying that a
system of puiposefully infusing economic assistance into the BPRK economy to
maintaining the uual goals of inuucing the BPRK's iational economic uecisions anu
incieaseu iegime uepenuence on westein economies is calleu the Assymetiic
Economic Stateciaft. It will iueally eioue the uoctiine of P"#0%g((But it will not be an
immeuiate change - it will happen giauually ovei time because the iegime will neeu
the time to absoib the new methous.
1Su
The funuamental goal of AES aie uiffeient
fiom the economic ieunification mouel in that it uelibeiately piomotes the iegime's
uepenuence on economic anu financial inputs fiom outsiue nations, insteau of

128
2uu6. p. Su7.
129
1Su
Ibiu., p. 1S8;
S4

attempting to achieve a consonant economy acioss the entiie peninsula. AES lays
the founuation foi both the uismantlement of the nucleai weapons piogiam as well
as foi the futuie uemociatization anu capitalization of the iegime. The AES pioviues
many auvantages: it maximizes chances of success as it puisues engagement in an
aiea known to be the weak spot foi the BPRK iegime - its economy - insteau of
tiying to immeuiately get it to negotiate away its stiongest suit - its nucleai
weapons; it pioviues the necessaiy confiuence-builuing measuies amongst the
paities thiough economic ties in oiuei to bioach the topic of engaging the iegime on
its ballistic missile anu nucleai weapons piogiams; it helps biing policy positions of
the 0S, South Koiea, anu China into closei alignment, iathei than its cuiiently
uisjointeu appioach; it possesses the potential to lay the economic anu financial
giounuwoik to affoiu some social safety net foi Noith Koiea's soft lanuing when
ieunification of the peninsula ultimately occuis.
1S1

The ciucial uiffeience in the AES policy that uiffeis fiom othei stiategies anu
biings hope foi gieatei long-teim success is that it acknowleuges that Noith Koiea
will not willingly give up its nucleai weapons piogiam. So it, in a way, baits the
BPRK iegime into believing that it's P"#0%(appioach has been effective anu thus
ieinfoiceu thiough the piocess of gianting it access to fiozen assets anu moie
noimal ielations with the 0S. Thiough this bioau anu moie compiehensive
stiategy, Fuqua asseits that with a less singulai focus on nucleai weapons, the
pievious pattein of the "youi fiist; no, you fiist" scenaiio between the 0S anu the
BPRK will be put to an enu. 0N Secietaiy ueneial Ban Ki Noon, foi South Koiean
ministei of foieign affaiis anu tiaue, shaies this minuset, inuicating one of his fiist
acts as Secietaiy ueneial will be to visit Noith Koiea, uemonstiating a willingness to
engage the Noith anu to extenu confiuence-builuing measuies. Initiating uialogue
beyonu the usual uemanus foi uenucleaiization will be funuamental to any tiue
success in negotiations.

1S1
Ibiu., pp. 1Su;
SS

Bowevei, theie uo iemain caveats in the AES: Bespite economic integiation,
the paities neeu to avoiu inauveitently auvancing the BPRK iegime's technological
postuie by pioviuing uual-use technologies; Timing is key, as past patteins of
haiulining may piove 0S's lingeiing aftei the nucleai tests anu then engagement, as
acquiescing to the Noith's uemanus - in this iespect, China South Koiea, anu }apan
holu moie leveiage with the BPRK than the 0S uoes; Constiuctive engagement*
shoulu be stiategy foi attaining the laigei enu goal of CvIB.
1S2

;%"&)#)%"/1M;%"5#$'(#)D-*>"3/3-=-"#*
Theie aie long-stanuing uoubts, especially fiom the stance of the hawks who
piefei isolation anu containment, stanuing in the way of puisuing an engagement
policy with the Noith. Theie is a moial hazaiu as well as uemonstiation effects, as
such appeasing actions may senu the wiong message to Noith Koiean haiulineis
that the West is weak, while also giving leeway to othei similai iogue states to tiy
the same thing. Theie is also the moially unappealing factoi that the Westein
auministiations face of seeking accommouations with iogue iegimes.
Non-communication, thieats, anu intimiuation - tactics auvocateu by haiu-
lineis - only woisen the pieemptive anu pieventative situations by incieasing the
Noith's vulneiability, leauing to moie iogue behavioi. Contiaiy to such tactics,
engagement pioves to be a supeiioi stiategy foi vaiious ieasons
1SS
: in the case of a
failuie of uiplomacy, engagement acts as an exit stiategy as it pioviues insight into
the BPRK iegime, helping to cieate a possible foim of punishment,
1S4
as well as
piepaiation foi the possibility of the iegime's collapse; the metaphoiical caiiots of
incentives, thiough engagement anu uiplomacy, pioviues Noith Koiea with a stake
in the status quo, which theoietically pievents any iogue pieventative actions; anu
conuitional engagement cieates a system in which theie is no longei a cential

1S2
Ibiu., ppp. 1S8.
1SS
2uuS. p. 91-92.
1S4
Ibiu., p. 17;
S6

antagonist, the 0S, foi the BPRK iegime to unite against. Thus, conuitional
engagement, oi a containment-plus-engagement policy, helps to alleviate the
pieemptivepieventive situations, helping Pyongyang change its view of the cuiient
status quo fiom a losing one to one that can piove to be beneficial. By auuing value
to the status quo thiough such conuitional engagement, it biings the BPRK to have a
stake in the cuiient status quo, lessening the uesiies to change it.
Bowevei, victoi Cha states that, in the case in which such a stiategy of
containment-plus-engagement pioves to be a failuie in effoits towaius coopeiation
with Noith Koiea, the laigei foieign actoi states shoulu enact the hawk engagement
stiategy, geaieu moie towaius containment anu isolation until the Noith gives up
its piolifeiation thieat.
1SS
Such actions woulu take the following steps: the
containment of iegime's militaiy, especially its nucleai anu missile-ielateu mateiials;
seconuaiy sanctions against any illicit economic activity in oiuei to limit the flow of
money into the BPRK leaueiship; iestiuctuiing of the joint militaiy of the 0S-R0K
alliance on the peninsula, with a focus on long-iange, ueep-stiike capabilities; anu
the maintenance of "malign neglect," continuing to pioviue humanitaiian assistance
uespite othei sanctions.
The success of such an engagement policy is contingent on the two main
actois of China anu South Koiea.
1S6
Bowevei, China stanus in a uifficult position
between two evils. Because of China's geostiategic location anu its competitive
natuie with the 0S, China uoes not want anything to leau to the collapse of the BPRK.
Bowevei, simultaneously, as Noith Koiea shows intentions of becoming a stiongei
nucleai state, China feais that this will cieate a iipple effect of an aims iace within
the Noitheast Asian iegion to gain nucleai capabilities. So while China continues to
aiu the Noith uespite pioposeu 0N sanctions, it is also beginning to show
exaspeiation with the Noith Koiean iegime. The R0K holus the same feais as China
with iegaius to the costs of the collapse of the BPRK iegime. But, as Cha states, the

1SS
Ibiu., pp. 1S6;
1S6
Ibiu., ppp. 1S7;
S7

R0K also neeus to iealize that letting Noith Koiea giow into a nucleai powei comes
with high costs as well. Theie is the iemote, yet possible loss of 0S alliance suppoit
as well as the loss in investoi confiuence, which woulu huit the nation's buigeoning
economy. Foi example, in 2uuS aftei the nucleai tests, the Noouy's investois hau
uowngiaueu South Koiea's soveieign cieuit iate, citing the thieat of the BPRK as the
main ieason.
1S7

T'#'$-*>"3/3-=-"#*
Cuiiently, the woilu actois still paitake in a policy of engagement with Noith
Koiea. The policy, hencefoith, shoulu mainly focus on cieating a uniteu fiont,
especially a tiilateial cooiuination amongst the auministiations of Seoul, Tokyo, anu
Washington, in oiuei to pioviue an example foi the othei 0N actois to follow. The
incentives will be much stiongei when pioposeu cohesively.
Piomoting stiongei ielations, especially amongst the 0S's two main Asian
allies within the 0S-}apan-R0K alliance, is in the stiategic auvantage foi the 0S's
futuie, as the possible futuie unification of the Koiean peninsula weighs heavily
against the 0S's influence within the Noitheast Asian spheie of the woilu.
1S8
In
oiuei to achieve this goal, victoi Cha says the following foui steps shoulu be taken:
1. The thieat of the BPRK has helpeu the South Koiea anu }apan to oveicome ueep
histoiical animosity to woik towaius a gieatei level of coopeiation, anu the 0S
neeus to encouiage them to continue this secuiity coopeiation. 2. The 0S-}apan anu
0S-R0K alliances neeu to then be infuseu with meaning anu an iuentity beyonu the
Colu Wai anu the BPRK thieat.
1S9
Foi the 0S-}apan-Koiea ielationship, this means
calling foi bioauei goals such as the maintenance of iegional stability. S. The 0S
neeus to iemove itself fiom Asia enough to impait iesponsibilities on its allies of
South Koiea anu }apan in oiuei to consoliuate those ielationships, but not so much
so that }apan anu the R0K choose self-help solutions outsiue the alliance. 4. The 0S

1S7
Ibiu., pppp. 1S9;
1S8
Ibiu., ppppp. 17S;
1S9
Ibiu., pppppp. 174-17S;
S8

shoulu auvocate foi a consoliuation of the 0S-}apan-R0K tiilateial axis with a focus
on non-militaiy foims of secuiity coopeiation, so as to not piovoke China.
14u

The challenge within this necessaiy component foi futuie ielations in
Noitheast Asia is to cieate such a soliu iuentity within an alliance amongst nations
without the basic commonalities of geogiaphy, iace, heiitage, oi language. The 0S,
}apan, anu South Koiea mainly neeu to focus on theii conciete anu collective goals
of uemociatic values, noims, anu institutions that tianscenu the cultuial heiitage
issues pieviously mentioneu.
141

14u
Ibiu., ppppppp. 176;
141
Ibiu., pppppppp. 18S.
S9

;%"(1'5)%"*
In conclusion,*Noith Koiea, in pioving that it possesses the capacity of
auvancing its nucleai weapons piogiam uespite its extieme economic uysfunction
without any concein foi the iamifications of its volatile actions, sets itself up to be
an acute inteinational pioblem, especially foi the 0niteu States anu its holu on the
iegion of Noitheast Asia. As seen in the cieation of such multilateial oiganizations
as ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) + S(China, }apan, South Koiea),
the 0S seems to be losing its footholu within that iegion of the woilu, which the 0S
cannot affoiu, as China begins to iise in powei. Bowevei, in oiuei to effectively
pieempt Noith Koiea anu ultimately solve this ciisis, the 0S anu China must put
asiue the tensions of theii conflict ovei big-powei politics, anu cieate a consoliuateu
fiont with South Koiea anu }apan. The costs of having Noith Koiea eithei suuuenly
collapse oi continue to accumulate nucleai weapons woulu be much too costly not
only foi the immeuiate boiueiing nations, but acioss all nations inteinationally. The
only way to ensuie peace anu secuiity in Noitheast Asia is to coopeiate in caieful
anu uiplomatic engagement with a uniteu message that such volatile actions on the
pait of Noith Koiea aie unacceptable.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
6u

K)E1)%3$/G,4*
*
Cha, victoi B., anu Baviu C Kang. !"#$%&'(!.'/0(1.'%&. New Yoik, NY: Columbia
0niveisity Piess, 2uuS.
*
Cha, victoi. Inteiview by Ellen Kim. "Noith Koiea's Seconu Rocket Launch in
2u12." N%*/%'(D.'(3/'&/%,4#(e(7*/%'*&/4.*&$(3/"+4%8. uS Bec 2u12. Centei foi Stiategic
anu Inteinational Stuuies. uS 2u12. <http:csis.oigpublicationnoith-koieas-
seconu-iocket-launch-2u12.>
*
"China continues to inciease uefensive potential.";2BkCB. PRAvBA.R0, 29 Aug
2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12. <http:english.piavua.iuwoiluasia29-u8-
2u12122u12-china_uefense-u>.
*
Choe, Sang-Bun. "Noith Koiea Rejects 0ffei of Aiu Fiom South Koiea ." ^0%(!%W(
c.'V(^4-%8. The New Yoik Times, 12 Sept 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.nytimes.com2u12u91Swoiluasianoith-koiea-iejects-offei-of-
aiu-fiom-south-koiea.html>.
*
Choe, Sang-Bun. "Noith Koiean Rocket Fails Noments Aftei Liftoff ." ^0%(!%W(c.'V(
^4-%8. The New Yoik Times, 12 Apiil 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:www.nytimes.com2u12u41Swoiluasianoith-koiea-launches-iocket-
uefying-woilu-wainings.html.pagewanteu=all&_i=u>.
*
Choe, Sang-Bun. "0.S. Agiees to Let South Koiea Extenu Range of Ballistic
Nissiles." ^0%(!%W(c.'V(^4-%8. The New Yoik Times, u7 0ct 2u12. Web. 11 Bec
2u12. <http:www.nytimes.com2u121uu8woiluasiaus-agiees-to-let-south-
koiea-extenu-missile-iange.html._i=u>.
*
Bawson, Chestei. "}apan Shows 0ff Its Nissile-Befense System ." ^0%(?&$$(3/'%%/(
S."'*&$. The Wall Stieet }ouinal, u9 Bec 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:online.wsj.comaiticleSB1uuu1424127887S2SS168u4S7816Su2SS12727
616.html>.
*
"Fact Sheet: Noith Koiea's Nucleai anu Ballistic Nissile Piogiams." . The Centei foi
Aims Contiol anu Non-Piolifeiation, Aug 2u12. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
<http:aimscontiolcentei.oigissuesnoithkoieaaiticlesfact_sheet_noith_koiea_
nucleai_anu_missile_piogiams>.
*
*
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*
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ueitz, Bill. "China has caiiiei-killei missile, 0.S. aumiial says." ^0%(?&804*,/.*(
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*
ueitz, Bill. "NANCB0 NISSILE LA0NCB." A'%%(T%&#.*. Fiee Beacon, 1S Aug 2u12.
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*
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62

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*
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*
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*
"Noith Koiea tests nucleai weapon 'as poweiful as Biioshima bomb'." ^0%(
d"&'+4&*. uuaiuian News anu Neuia Limiteu , 2S Nay 2uu9. Web. 11 Bec 2u12.
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