Campaign Design #2 Op Art 46-56; Thinking; Logic 17pp; Planner's Ch I-III BG (ret) Huba Wass de Czege, USA ** Thinking,

Fast and Slow Dan Kahneman - biased thinking process developed over time that isn't fittings for current dynamics; we value upside more than downside; Why it helps to be a little crazy to be a good leader; also realists--Sherman, Grant, Churchill, Lincoln, ... Hare Brain, Tortoise Mind If people discount bad things, then you need institutional methods to check thinking; 1980s - traditional approaches to op art and strategic "planning" insufficient to changing technology, Soviet operational styles/maneuver groups/etc, ... issue of how to teach operational judgment? Need to invent something we haven't done previously; disciplined approach? Critical and creative thinking required, not rote memory and regurgitation; We love tactics, hate strategy, and "tacticize" strategy when we can get away with it; Appreciate dynamic and interactive human complexity. The Theory of Theory Building: Profound difference between tactics and strategy Campaigning is a matter of managing shorter Tactical Decision Cycles within longer Strategic Decision Cycles; Old method: leaders do strategy, everyone else does tactics (inside the box built by the leadership); Reality: different levels of organization see things with different granularity than available to the top; Major Propostions 1. Campaign usually applies to theater level of command; however, it is appropriate for any extended mission set in dynamic and interactive human complexity even at much lower levels; requires institutional culture balancing design and planning-design is to strategy what planning is to tactics; 2. Strategy is a conceptual scheme--designed not planned; provide the refined logic planners need to assume in their planning; saying you have an end state is to shortchange yourself; viability inherently expires as situation evolves; operational art is constant mediation of designs and plans (keep them in synch) and continually adapting your thinking while adapting your doing; - military is subordinate to civil leadership that is doing this also, but in an undisciplined way; you can influence your civilian superiors, but you have to know what's going on - time horizons are necessarily closer than the 5-30 year; technology - you can look in the laboratories to see what might be possible, but it's still fuzzy; leave your options open the further put you go; Example: A2AD - helps us determine what capabilities we need to deal with new technologies globally...it does not tell you how to fight a war;

"Wicked problems" - Rittel and Webber 1973 How politicians think - not linear...get a half loaf and move on; Allison's rational actor model; Asking new "meta questions" and seeking new "meta perspectives" - example: post Cold War reductions in force lead to instability because they create room for maneuver; cause rethinking of treaty; Strategy must address them, us and others; thinking behind doing is strategic; what is done is tactical; Study - difference between CEOs who built business vs grew up through business: entrepreneur is more skeptical but also bolder...puts out something to learn about the market as important as producing and selling; cultural problem! If we told Congress we were doing that, we'd be shot. Interactive human complexity cannot be understood without interacting with it; Theory of Theory Building - we're making design too difficult; if you have an illstructured problem, you just haven't done your homework; it's an open system, to a closed system; don't visual an end-state; you still have to have a strategic aim/goal; You can't understand an ill-structured problem...you have to do work/research to apply structure to it and test it out and refine it; Be skeptical about PMESII - some systems are purely perceptions and some physically exist (military forces); need to sort out logic vs facts; Science is not a competition of assertions and beliefs in which compromiser clout decide outcomes; Hypothesis only become viable theory when you've rigorously attempted to falsify it; we do not test our theories...we don't want to--cultural issue; develop the theoretical ground early with 12 good, critical minds to create a better concept; Frame -> develop theory -> formulate tactical solution -> learn It's not thinking outside the box...it's reshaping and rethinking the box. You have to have a box to take action at some point; OODA loop works really well after the problem is framed; Red teaming is useful but not good enough...this is where you bring in your outsiders to gain new perspectives; Theoryof Situation -> Theory for gaining advantage -> Theory for translating strategy into tactics (provisional operational logic)

Issue--currently only producing descriptions but not theories...you have to make choices about what is noise and what is real...about what is important--you may revisit these choices and adjust them during redesign....that's okay. Team composition - diverse thought and expertise; EBO was great for getting the primary desire effect; systemic approach to reach the desired effect; but, only applied to real situations and limited skepticism on second, third...order effects/unintended consequences;