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Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb
Abdelmajid Hannoum Critique of Anthropology 2009 29: 324 DOI: 10.1177/0308275X09336702 The online version of this article can be found at: http://coa.sagepub.com/content/29/3/324
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Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb
University of Kansas, USA
In memory of Clifford Geertz Abstract ■ This article examines the formation of French colonial culture in the Maghreb and the power relations it has generated. Through an analysis of colonial knowledge, the author shows the different and changing discursive strategies put in place to comprehend and control the local population. He also argues that the effects of this colonial knowledge continue in the present and, far from debunking it, national reactions by historians helped make colonial categories and understanding part of the present. Keywords Arabs ■ Berbers ■ French colonialism ■ historical knowledge ■ nationalism ■ racial theories
The notion of ‘culture’ used in this article is a common one with considerable currency among anthropologists and cultural studies scholars, thanks in large part to the work of Clifford Geertz. Human beings, Geertz once notes, are by deﬁnition ‘symbolizing, conceptualizing, meaning-seeking animals’ (1973: 140). However, human beings are not only creators of symbols and meanings, but paradoxically they are caught in, and dependent on that which they create. Geertz contends that: ‘Man is an animal suspended in webs of signiﬁcance that he himself has spun’ (1973: 5). Man’s dependency on culture also means that his behavior is not only regulated by biological needs, but also more so by systems of meanings that Geertz calls ‘programs’ (1973: 44). The main objective of this article consists in showing how colonialism has introduced and imposed its own webs of signiﬁcance into the colonies and especially to show the conditions under which the colonized became caught in webs of signiﬁcance that they themselves had not spun. Needless to say, these colonial webs of signiﬁcance were neither ﬁxed nor homogeneous. On the contrary, they were made of different and at times even conﬂicting elements, the implementation of which was conditioned by colonial politics and subtle and overt power dynamics. Therefore, a discussion of culture, whether colonial or not, needs to take into consideration the constraints, the limits, and the rules that govern relations between various subjects. While the article discusses colonial power relations, its goal is not to examine the dynamics of those relations in postcolonial France, but rather in the Maghreb. In scholarly terms, the ‘metropole’ has always been more
Vol 29(3) 324–344 [DOI:10.1177/0308275X09336702] © The Author(s), 2009. Reprints and permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
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in both the past and the present. Alexis de Tocqueville noted this diversity: a prodigious mélange of races and customs: Arabs. is not to offer another narrative on the Maghreb. Whereas the (post) colonial in France has been examined mainly through the issue of immigration (Silverstein. let us be clear. [each] speaks a language. the Comte de Gobineau in France – and even in the larger Europe – was the most articulate and inﬂuential race theorist whose work had an impact even on the ﬁrst half of the 20th century (Arendt. This judgment seems justiﬁed when one looks at Berbrugger’s work of this period. 5. who are ‘absolutely hideous’ (1967: 107). wears [speciﬁc] clothing. 5. 1966: 171–5). and has different morals. Each of these races that agitates together seems to be in a space much more narrow to contain it. Gobineau judges them to be better than the inhabitants of the New World. but by this expression one concludes that he means ‘Algerian racial types’.325 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb fortunate than the colonies. Ironically. 2007). but rather to engage an anthropological critique of the discourse of both colonialism and nationalism. 1843–5). a more in-depth study by Louis-Adrien Berbrugger gives a fuller description of the inhabitants of Algeria (Berbrugger. Moors. The article is thus a preliminary investigation on how the colonial continues in the contemporary Maghreb. 1951: vol. until 1870. colonial modernity was initially and mostly racial in character. After he notes that the West African race shares what he calls ‘the structure of the monkey’. and French. Silverstein and Chantal Terwault. Around this time. for instance. Tocqueville met Berbrugger during his visit and deemed him ‘not the most catholic mind. Kabyles. Gobineau puts Europeans on the pedestal: Downloaded from coa. the entire population was seen as astonishingly diverse. to wit. especially in Morocco and in Algeria. but the man who lived longer with the Arabs’ (1951: vol.sagepub. except for blacks and what he considers remains of a white European race.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. (Tocqueville. On colonial culture The Maghreb had known Europe mostly. if not exclusively through colonial modernity – that is to say the dominant French culture of the period from 1830 to 1962. Thus. 2013 . 207). It reﬂects a familiarity with Algerian social life. Yet colonial modernity has different faces. comprehending or imagining Algeria (and by extension the Maghreb) through racial categories gave birth to a more complex. Negro. Mahonais2 [sic]. for instance. the (post) colonial relationship within the Maghreb has been relatively neglected despite its enormous importance.1 In the case of Algeria. During his visit to Algeria in 1841. richer view of society. the Vandals. Berbrugger talks about ‘Algerian races’. 191) In 1843. and Islam (Scott. The goal. Nevertheless he labels all of them ‘the Semitic race’. 2004. yet it also betrays a clumsy understanding of the race theory of his time. 2006).
It portrays an astonishingly diverse population. a pestilent congregation of ugliness.. First. the Turks. where beauty and ugliness meet. are not deceitful. However. which is a mixture of whites and blacks. unlike the Jews. (Berbrugger. according to him. the inferior undermines the superior. by the inclination of bodies bent forward. the second alters the ﬁrst. Berbrugger gives a description of each. unlike the Jews who are ‘active. (1967: 107–8) Between the ﬁrst and the second. intermarriage is strongly warned against. It viewed the country as inhabited mostly by a ‘Semite race’. black beard. one quarter of the total population. Moors. Berbrugger describes them as having the ‘nonchalance of the Turks and Downloaded from coa. Berbers and Arabs. he depicts the Jews. on the contrary. by the severe and semicircular features that frame their black eyes and that are particular signs of their race. who constitute. there is the Semite race. Berbrugger maintains that the Turks are a mixture of Albanians. he notes. Not only because they do not have physical characteristics of their own. In his estimation. intriguing’. Berbrugger describes their physical characteristics. white and smooth tint. . They are ‘lazy and accepting of domination’. it is made up of Jews. according to him. by their grace of outline and strength of muscular development. For Gobineau. are politically dominant. but also because. 1843–5: 5) Berbrugger’s representation of the Jews contrasts with his representation of the Turks. and ultimately the good turns bad as a result of this contact. the Moors are ‘nonchalant and apathetic’ (Berbrugger. between the superior and the inferior. As for the Moors. a Farnese Hercules. unlike the Jews. and in this natural aristocracy the Europeans are the most eminent. However. which is I confess. As human races are unequal and exclusive of each other in this view. Coloughli. acting. not only had they the glory of giving the world such admirable types as Venus. Maltese and various renegades from Europe. This ‘Semite race’ is itself diverse. they have: . the Semites are indeed an eloquent demonstration of how mixing creates degeneration. which is fatal to a race and therefore to civilization. the Turks. but also there is a visible hierarchy of beauty established from ancient times even among themselves. they stand in opposition to the Turks and to the Jews. . .sagepub. Berbrugger states that they are ‘excessively honest’. The Coloughlis are descendants of Turkish fathers and Moorish mothers. Indeed. . magniﬁcent eye albeit always false. 1843–5: 7). It is easy to recognize them by their air of deceit (fourberie) and humility. The newly invented concept of Semite is put to use here. Berbrugger applies the racial framework of Gobineau to the population of Algeria. the Moor also has a relative in the form of another group of the Algerian population: the Couloughlis. Turks. Berbrugger also notes that the Moors have two enemies: the Arabs and the Berbers.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4.326 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) Not only are these peoples more beautiful than the rest of mankind. an Apollo. an aquiline noise. even when they are merchants and traders. between the beautiful and the ugly. 2013 . Yet there is something remarkable in this early colonial text.
the Coloughli.327 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb the lymphatic temperament of the Moors’. The postures of the body are not without elegance. by the acts of brigandage they carry without repugnance. from all of the rest of the inhabitants of Algeria. despite relations of enmity between them. say from the Moor. ‘he treats the rest of humanity as his enemy’ (1843–5: 9). The expression of their ﬁgure is rude and savage. the Berber is brave. Their eyes show some type of cruelty. Berbrugger notes disparagingly As for the Arabs.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. in Berbrugger’s text we are far from the representation of the Berber as a primitive European. as shown by their social organization. such as Ernest Mercier (1875) and Emile-Felix Gautier (1927): Downloaded from coa. the Armenians and the Persians. the features of their faces are short. But a group of them are considered Bedouin and nomads: ‘neither civilized nor primitives’. mentioned by Salluste. in total opposition to the Arab that we ﬁnd in the literature of the ofﬁcers of the Arab Bureaux (see Hannoum. Berbrugger observes. Christian indigène. The Arab cultivators. or even from Tyriens. the Berber in his text is opposed to everybody else. The Berbers. but awfully cruel with his enemies. 2008). are ‘much closer to us’. the Salentins and other elements whose remains are lost in time. Berbrugger considers all Arabs a group by themselves and he calls them a nation. Berbrugger depicts them as descendants of the conquerors who ruled Spain and most of Africa. and it is especially this characteristic that distinguishes them from Arabs. the Turk and the Jew? Berbrugger’s description of the Arab may appear positive. Instead. he notes.sagepub. how could one distinguish the Arab. the historian. too much conﬁrmed. any way. He writes: Even though they are divided into societies or independent tribes that are often even enemies. especially compared to later colonial representations both in the work of the Arab Bureaux such as Daumas (1847) and in the work of historians of the civilian regime. (1843–5: 8) Now. But they also have qualities that set them apart from both the Turks and the Moors and. Berbrugger writes: They were formed either from both the Libyans and the Getules or from the emigration of the Medes. (1843–5: 9) Indeed. Those qualities are ‘excessive naughtiness and profound ignorance’ (Berbrugger. we can however consider all of them as one body of a nation. 2001) and in the literature of the civilian regime (Hannoum. ‘They are generally cultivators’. on behalf of the authority of the Punic books of Hiempsa. They live in the desert and wander with their tents from place to place. on the other hand. appear in this text as heterogeneous with profoundly diverse origins. but very nervous and very robust. 1843–5: 8). (1843–5: 9) They have their own moral characteristics that make them distinct from the rest of the population: They are most bellicose and the most indomitable barbarians of this part of Africa. in fact. 2013 . Their body is skinny. The roundness of the head is remarkable. In war and conﬂict.
and is solidly entrenched in its forms of postcolonial culture (Hannoum. by the 1930s. the triumph of the modern ideology of nationhood. the Arabs treat their defeated enemy with mercy. but rather it is the impressive demographic diversity that it reﬂects. a virtue in the view of Berbrugger. Their face is less rounded than the face of the Moor. 2013 . Their hair is generally black. and some type of silk vest and on top a long colored robe to the knees. they seem to constitute the nobility of Algeria. sometimes it is olive skin. but not really opposed to one another. Berbrugger notes.3 the colonial discourse. Indeed. rarely black like the one of the Negro. However. On 11 March 1882. distinguished by their fortune. They are conﬁdent. if anything. had the colonial discourse become more reductionist and presented a population made only of two ‘races’ that are opposed to each other – Berbers and Arabs? The answer may be found in the fact that after 1871.sagepub. while still racialized. and with the disappearance of the Jews as ‘natives’. in fact.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. after 1871 a signiﬁcant shift happened in French colonial modernity: the introduction and. once a major racial theorist. However. These two groups are different from each other in this text. the most authoritative text about the concept of the nation was delivered as a public lecture at the Sorbonne by Ernest Renan. but less agreeable. 2003). 2001. Their gait is less light and their gesture reminds often of the nobility of the antique gesture. Arab women are also depicted in positive light: Arab women. what is most striking about this text again is not only the application of Gobineau’s racial theory to the population of Algeria. He also approvingly notes that they venerate the elderly. The type of their women is more or less the same as the male one. Furthermore. albeit with racialized lenses? Why. and unlike the Berbers. even when they have this characteristic [of blackness]. Their physiognomy is expressive. their skin color is brown. This diversity was soon mysteriously erased in the literature of the Arab Bureaux and was replaced by a literature regulated by the dichotomy Berber versus Arab. The features are much more pronounced. underpants. their eye is sharp and animated. The latter dichotomy served as the main discursive device of the colonial discourse on the Maghreb. dress up very nobly. especially the Berbers. he continues.328 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) The Arabs are of average height and a remarkable force. extremely large sleeved. concentrated around the nation and used the opposition Arab versus Berber to demonstrate the impossibility of nationhood in the Maghreb. the Arabs tend to observe their religion. and more Downloaded from coa. They wear shorts made of very ﬁne fabric. and not just Algeria. it has survived even in today’s Maghreb. (1843–5: 12) Berbrugger also discusses the moral qualities of Arabs and compares them to other groups. Compared to other ‘races’. (1843–5: 15) Clearly the description of the Arab in Berbrugger’s text is hardly negative. it is the only resemblance they have with the Negro race. Arabs are brave and ‘excessively audacious’. Berbrugger’s text prompts us to ask: why in its early phase did colonial discourse account for Algerian demographic and cultural diversity. However.
1927. Renan identiﬁes the principle of this new form of belonging and this novel form of identiﬁcation.329 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb speciﬁcally of anti-Semitism (Renan. Nationhood. Hannoum. especially the Arabs who had always prevented them from forming a viable nation. The Arab is an enemy.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. 1864). that constitute this spiritual principle. which he deﬁnes in the following manner: A nation is a soul. on the other hand. however – and more speciﬁcally the Arab versus Berber dichotomy – became part and parcel of a colonial discourse about the absence of nationhood in northern Africa. a primitive. Tribalism thus became a hallmark of primitiveness and backwardness.5 On the other hand. was the mark of modernity. as a European population. a negation of Europe. ultimately. empirical grounds. one of the most notorious colonial historians. This discourse reordered North Africa and established a new relationship – a tertiary one between Arabs and Berbers on the one hand (antagonistic as conquerors are to the conquered) and between both kinds of North Africans and the French on the other. 2008). Renan. One can clearly see what kind of power relationship is hidden behind and beneath this cultural perception of the colonial state vis-a-vis the population it governs. they are placed in a position of racial and social inferiority. From 1870 onwards. 2013 . Both Berbers and Arabs cannot conceive of existence beyond the tribe. North Africa was seen as a region that had never organized itself nationally mainly because of its purportedly ‘tribal’ nature. 2008.4 However. so that effective colonial policies would be informed and founded on solid. the Berber is a remote parent of Europeans. Racial ideology. 1947. are nomadic by deﬁnition. the will to assert the undivided heritage that we have received. rational progress. Renan’s text on the nation articulates new understandings of the modern polity and speaks about new relations in a way that clearly undermines the concept of race.sagepub. One is in the past. for both lack the cultural concept of nationhood. as well as Arabs. This is also to say that this knowledge was produced in a speciﬁc historical context with the intent to understand and control colonial reality. civility and. the other is in the present. (Renan. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories. the Berbers were cursed by the presence of invaders. live in tribes. The Arabs. If this understanding and Downloaded from coa. On postcolonial power Colonial knowledge functioned as a means by which to order the colonies and to make them understood. it is the nation. but able – and in fact eager – to destroy them (Gautier. the desire to live together. a spiritual principle. see also Hannoum. which in reality are only one. 1947: 903–4) The new understanding soon affected the reality of Algeria. Berbers. Taken together. in the work of Gautier. incapable of founding cities. the other is the actual consent. either in tents or in villages. There are two things.
at the same time. albeit at times invisibly so. such was from the outset our struggle. Yet an important question still cries out for an answer: if the colonial public no longer exists.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. most notoriously a national one. the University of Tunis. his condition of a postcolonial subject. the national elite. colonial culture not only stayed where it was born and developed. as were most of the forms of modern governance and state surveillance. or any form of modern knowledge for that matter – the creation of imaginaries. the University of Algiers. the formerly colonized national elite inherited colonial institutions such as the University of Rabat. most of the intellectual effort was directed against the colonial legacy. or at least is considered no longer accurate and thus no longer relevant? It is most surprising that colonial knowledge became increasingly effective. One might well ask then: how. Tamuda and Revue Tunisienne. remark and state that the educational system was inherited from colonialism. Thus. but also for any would-be politician or ideologue. The colonial signifying objects still constitute a postcolonial public. made him unable and in fact unwilling to think outside of colonial Downloaded from coa. a task to which we have assigned its place and its role. was still in a state of dependency. Hence another crucially important characteristic of colonial knowledge.sagepub. only after the departure of the French. this willingness to cut off from the colonial past. One can even make a general. to bring proofs from the past and the intellectual presence of Africa. given that the journey to French institutions had become a necessity. why and under what conditions colonial objects still participate in the making of a (postcolonial) public? What are the dynamics. the rules and constraints of such making? The postcolonial period brought about a new situation: when the formerly colonial scholars retreated to French institutions. 1995: 87) Boumedienne represented. the inheritor of the colonial state. caused the failure by its myopia or its ‘errors’. but still accurate. which does not amount to the same thing. However. one would expect a dismissal of this same knowledge that either failed to maintain control or. ﬁve years after the independence of the last North African country. albeit with changes and alterations. a rite de passage not only for any would-be intellectual. Yet. Further. but it was also consumed as a commodity to enhance one’s symbolic capital. and even institutional or bureaucratic organs such as Hesperis. of realities that produce subjects who themselves reproduce the same realities.330 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) control failed (as evidenced by the collapse of the colonial system). the University of Oran. 2013 . (Boumedienne. In other words. who consume them in the form of French modernity. then Algerian president Houari Boumedienne declared at the ﬁrst Pan African symposium: To reject the counter truths spread by colonialism. at least in Algeria. one may assume that the colonial knowledge discussed above has also disappeared.
a certain vision of time. This means that the culture of colonialism still governed and imposed attitudes and behaviors. It provides the new masters – the nationalist elite – with the language of power. who visibly enjoyed speaking French in front of an audience of French journalists. not only contain the colonial categories of race and nation. when the formerly colonized have categories of their own to think about themselves. to Indonesia (Anderson. religious or variants thereof). In other words.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. not a vertical. and the profane and sacred. but are often reformulated to ﬁt the postcolonial condition. (Bourdieu. Hassan II. Small wonder. modernity and progress. submission. 2001: 13) Postcolonial power is marked by a horizontal. Nowhere is this relationship more apparent than the domain of language. inevitably. can only be added to the list of those regions that have not overcome the terribly powerful colonial culture in postcolonial contexts across the globe. he never spoke French in public. or. their acts of cognition are. In these contrasting cases. in opposing ways. one could still see the European suit. relationship. no matter the constraints and maneuvers of the so-called native. colonialism has become a focal point of competing Maghrebi national discourses. retains a profound symbolic charge. to contest the colonial Other. as Pierre Bourdieu succinctly puts it: When the dominated apply to what dominates them schemes that are the product of domination. despite the once promising Third World revolutionary experience of Algeria. acts of recognition. nor did he ever visit France. This is different from the attitude of the king of Morocco. Let us discuss three examples: one from Downloaded from coa. especially immediately following independence). colonial categories. and during French ofﬁcial visits he always made recourse to the traditional Algerian burnous – beneath which. The point is seen most evidently in the postcolonial era. Colonial language. from the Paciﬁc (Thomas.sagepub. it is clear how the actions of the former colonized are nothing but reactions. as language is often seen as one of the deﬁning characteristics of a nation. Whether through the political or intellectual elite (often fused in the case of the Maghreb. to put it another way. and who often boasted of speaking French better than a French-born person. It remains limited. but the same categories of colonial modernity linger. giving meaning and in turn allowing for the proprietary monopoly of knowledge and resources both symbolic and material vis-a-vis a mass whose most salient characteristic is precisely the absence of such language. The Maghreb. even on its most fervent detractors. as articulated in various discursive formations (whether nationalist.331 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb parameters: indeed. however. to resist him. 1992). to Amazonia (Taussig. 1994). 2013 . Or. yet at critical junctures it can even be effective in the face of strategies and tactics of postcolonial struggle and human liberation. 1987). in this context French. when their thoughts and perceptions are structured in accordance with the very structures of the relation of domination that is imposed on them.
More importantly. emerged as the father of the Maghrebi francophone literature. especially in literature. Yacine’s act can be clearly seen as an attempt to achieve cultural liberation. In the Maghreb. 2003) Downloaded from coa. This is to say that Yacine stored. ‘French is a booty of war. in his brilliant book L’Idéologie arabe contemporaine.332 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) literature. one of the most notorious francophone Maghrebi writers. After independence. However. an impressive body of literature is written in the language of the colonizer. a virtual system of signs – but rather an actual system of signs. and even more speciﬁcally in the novel. who only a few months before his death asserted that writing in Arabic was shameful: The Algerians who write in Arabic should be ashamed to write in an archaic language which is for the Algerians as Latin or Greek is for the French. despite or because of his speciﬁc writing about the Algerian situation. Yacine once wrote. has come to imprison its taker. Consider Mohamed Dib. Yacine took a more critical stand towards francophonie. (Dib. indeed. writing in French was justiﬁed only by the fact that he wrote ‘to tell to the French [in French] that I am not French’. which he considered more Algerian than either Arabic or French. precisely that which Saussure (1984) calls langage. As the Moroccan writer Abdellatif Laabi once put it. as an abstract. By language I do not mean langue in the sense given by Ferdinand de Saussure – that is. For him. language as practiced in communications. 2013 . Yet there is no doubt that Yacine. But for other francophone writers. in literature. instead of being owned. in practice. or recycled the ‘booty of war’ once the war for independence reached its goal. I believe. In 1969. 1994: 73).com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. and in all types of speaking and writing. he states that ‘I represented to this day an aspect of the alienation of the Algerian culture. the canons of Maghrebi literature are invariably articulated and penned in French.sagepub. I was considered a great writer because France has thus decided’ (Yacine. in the domain of artistic creation. The importance of language as an ideological project vital to the nation-state is better seen.6 in an indirect reference to Dostoevsky’s statement ‘we all came out of The Coat ’ of Nicholas Gogol. ‘we all came out of Nejdma’. the booty of war.’ This expression has been repeated by francophone Maghrebi writers such as Djebar (1985) even though. language-in-use. Laroui makes one exception: Kateb Yacine (1965: 176). Yacine may beg to differ. Yacine actually refused to write in French after independence and chose instead the Algerian ‘dialect’. Abdallah Laroui laments the condition of North African literature in French (which he calls French North African literature) for being expressive not of national values. a stand ignored by those who repeat his phrase about French being a ‘booty of war’. but of a culture of somewhere else. the second from political rhetoric about education and the third drawn from historiography (the textual form of the national discourse).
that determines subjectivity itself and creates an understanding of the social world. where postcolonial French institutions of language. 2002). Language is always linked to power (Barthes.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. it is not booty at all since it is intimately linked to its origin. indiscriminate in France. of distribution. but also analyzes nature. long and difﬁcult in some parts. a cultural system in and of itself.sagepub. French is rather a cultural system. then. Let us quote Benjamin Whorf: Every language is a vast pattern-system. it is. All the more so as writing in French is always at the expense of the national language – be it Arabic. since the Algerian writer needed to express his protest and. ‘Algerians who write in French should be ashamed to write in a foreign language which is for the Algerians as German is for the French’. in the postcolonial period. as Anderson (1992) has reminded us. his refusal to be French. channels his reasoning. It is obvious what type of cultural dependency this creates. to be more speciﬁc. notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena. with speciﬁc categories. to its multiple and contested sites of power. especially in the case of literature – and more so in the case of the novel – is very much associated with the formation of the nationstate. (Whorf. The ‘booty of war’. that while in the colonial period it was understandable that French was a ‘booty of war’. it became selective in northern Africa. the same language ties the Maghrebi writer to a system of domination that continues in the present. a medium that gives one access to modernity. of francophonie are solidly established in the metropole. rather. French was taught to Europeans and was also the privilege of small lucky local elite (Gosnell. then. This process. nor would he or she be given a prestigious page of the Magazine Littéraire to express such a view. But in the case of Europe – or. whereas for obvious reasons the process of Frenchiﬁcation was exclusive. in the case of France – this nation-state was given substance from within its own territory by French writers formulating and articulating French bourgeois values. Cultural creation. is not booty but a Trojan horse. It is not only a means of communication. was deftly called by Weber ‘a White man’s burden of francophonie. Downloaded from coa. whose ﬁrst conquests were to be right at home’ (1976: 73). This is to say. Berber or a Maghrebi ‘dialect’. and builds the house of his consciousness. 1956: 235) French is not. short and easy in others. with colonial categories playing the role of Greek soldiers. in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates. or rather French colonized.333 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb If an Algerian responded. different from others. or an assembling of words that translate things. in the case of Yacine. of publishing. French itself was established in France at the expense of other languages that it eliminated or marginalized. 1978). he or she would not make sense in this context. 2013 . In fact. this claim is rather an expression of its ideology. It was (and it still is) deemed modern. However.
I have always denounced it despite what my detractors say’ (Yacine. This shows the paradox of nationalism in the Maghreb. This is why even Yacine. Be that as it may. arguably the most powerful Maghrebi francophone writer. in the end.9 These authors remain. of the rulers. the myth of clarity and precision was given greater power by the fact that French was the language of importance and prestige. They reach the national elite because of language. Therefore. They are taught neither in French high schools and only marginally in universities. Yacine was indeed well placed to see that French in Algeria was operating a similar transformation of ideologies to those accomplished in France. which claims it is Arab (and/or Berber) but expresses itself in a colonial language. their effect on the French imaginary is less than minimal. unlike their Indian peers for instance. the then president of Al-Akhawayn University and a former minister of education was asked about the state of education in Morocco in front of a small audience of students and faculty. Since colonial times to the present an impressive Maghrebi cultural production has been deﬁned by French post/colonial institutions. Being themselves products of the colonial imaginary. of the masters. he stated: ‘What one calls “francophonie” is a neo-colonial political machine that does nothing but perpetuate our alienation. do not have a place in the French literary establishment.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. or maybe because of its high symbolic capital. after all. 1990) was redeployed in the colonies. writing in French is essentially writing to the French public. despite the fact that the authors advocate are those of francophonie. For despite. His response was: Downloaded from coa. Indeed. making the Maghrebi writer a soldier of the ﬁfth column (légion étrangère.sagepub. writers for a small. during a lecture on the situation in Morocco given by US ambassador Edward Gabriel. 2013 . Yet they are as far from the masses as a foreign language is for a people. In May 2000. authors are looked at with paradoxical suspicion by the national ideologue who accuses them of providing the literature of folklore. as a colonial language. 1994: 132). bluntly alludes to the institutional difﬁculties facing a writer: after he spoke about his disheartening experience publishing in the French press.334 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) clearer and scientiﬁc.10 This takes me to the second issue of political discourse on language and culture. liberal. The Maghrebi writers.8 as Nouvel Observateur surprisingly labeled them).7 The same French myth of clarity and precision that developed in the time of the rise of French as a dominant language (Swiggers. and because they are. an expression of ‘national’ culture after independence. Frenchiﬁed elite. which makes it a desired and a highly competitive commodity. it was the language of power itself. However. and that same expression is decided in Paris by its publishing houses. the masses of the Maghreb do not speak French and they do not even know it well enough to read it. The German or English literary canons do not and could not possibly be deﬁned in France for the Germans or for the English.
mainly because of the ideologies associated with them. namely to maintain these divisions – and therefore with them the differential access to power and social positions – intact. sacred in the view of the masses. but was expressing the cultural situation in Morocco. Language in education has always been the strongest means by which a state assures linguistic hegemony and homogeneity in modern liberal societies. On the contrary. however. Arabic is second. what the Moroccan diplomat suggests as a solution is the same problem.sagepub. In Morocco. languages are endowed with different and unequal symbolic capital.11 He then proposed a solution: What should be done is to educate the people according to the language they speak. and others speak Berber. as stated above. which he describes as a failure. they should be educated in it. he confessed ‘our failure’ in education and. Both Arabic and Berber have come to be deﬁned in relation to French. but useful in the eyes of the state. they needed to be educated accordingly. French remains. in fact. This does not mean those who do not speak it or know it are free from colonial culture. others speak Arabic. one may think. Arabic is not spoken. There is no doubt that French is. shows that the institutional power of education is seen as means by which to assure the continuation of socioeconomic inequalities. Berber. 2013 . surprisingly. French becomes a symbol in and of itself with maybe a greater impact on the minds of those who do not speak it. but what we ﬁnd instead is three languages: Moroccan dialect. Linguistic divisions must be abridged to achieve social justice. In other words. as it used to be. We formulated the educational program as if all Moroccans speak the same language. those who speak French need to be educated in that language. In practical terms.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. which is an ofﬁcial vision. It is mostly the language of those masses located in the periphery of the nation-state – both physically and metaphorically. considered the language of the elite. Berber (or rather the ensemble of dialects referred to as Berber) is a language with minimal symbolic capital.12 The Moroccan diplomat was not. by far. The vision of the Moroccan diplomat. This failure has to do with the fact that we were in charge of educating a multilingual population. It is the language by which state ideology is articulated and communicated. The linguistic divisions are the result of colonial rule.335 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb We admit that we failed in the educational project. It constitutes the currency that can give one access to greater and better material goods. proposes the same failed program as a solution. and French. stating his vision of Moroccan education. Its relative importance stems mostly from the fact that it is seen as the language of Islam. and of savoir faire and savoir vivre. It is the language that allows access to – and the ability to monopolize – important positions in Moroccan (as well as in francophone Maghreb) society mainly because it is deemed to be the language of modernity – of science. Yet. Therefore. The value of a Downloaded from coa. a symbolic good of competition that not many could afford. and even secondary.
Those who do not have it. Its narrative grammar is not the same either. it is not a counterhistory (of the colonial). Further. There is quite a cultural paradox in a national narrative that argues in French that the Maghreb is Arab and Muslim. Instead. L’Histoire des Berbères. 1927).sagepub. stands as the counter history of the precolonial (and thus in this case Muslim) historiography. Indeed. He does so argumentatively against colonial historiography and against what Laroui himself calls ‘Khaldunism’. to a certain degree. the way they were in the old philological tradition. Why Ibn Khaldun? Not only because. no hero. is rather a transformation and an appropriation of the Arabic historiography of Ibn Khaldun. no end. but rather it is a postcolonial history. and indeed one of the major cognitive casualties caused by colonial administration. This discrepancy between the form and the content can be explained only if the national is examined not as a discourse of resistance and challenge. the colonial discourse of the late part of the 19th century was rather a counter-history. By ‘Khaldunism’. and that it has had a unity and a culture of its own. 1997: 60–61). whereas the Khaldunian narrative pertains to a type of a historical discourse that Foucault calls the discourse of the race war (as different from the racist discourse) (Foucault. precisely because of its introduction of the Downloaded from coa. through the act of translation (Hannoum. but also the theses. The most authoritative national historical narrative of the Maghreb – Laroui’s The History of the Maghreb (1977)– was written in French. 2003). like the colonial. Laroui means the framework of analysis. given the form and the content of the national narrative. jealously. Therefore. The Greimasian model of narrative actors does not apply (Greimas. The national historian followed suit most of the time. arguably the most inﬂuential Maghrebi national historian. no villain. plot and end. It then follows that. no opponent. sets as a goal for himself (and for the nation) to articulate its history and thus deﬁne its present. the national. dream of it. what one ﬁnds is a narrative continuation in which there is no beginning. The historical narrative structure of Ibn Khaldun’s work in Arabic is not regulated by modern rules of narration: beginning. and even the narration itself found in the work of Ibn Khaldun. Those who have it keep it. Ibn Khaldun’s historiography was a colonial phenomenon.336 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) commodity may become more appreciated by those who do not possess it. a French colonial text that bears the name of Ibn Khaldun.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. Abdallah Laroui. 2013 . but also because the historiography of Ibn Khaldun itself was one of the ﬁrst. 1983). Semiotics shows that the form of a narrative is as meaningful as its content and that form and content cannot be separated. This will take me to the second question which is the question of national history. constantly. This should come as no surprise as the colonial dismissed Muslim historiography (using solely an argument of authority) as lacking historicity (Gautier. nor helper. but rather as a genealogical narrative that owes its very existence to the colonial.
On the one hand. the time of liberation. by the numerous revolts against it) and continued in the present by France. It is rather the work of Rome in the past (as evidenced. The latter liberation took on more signiﬁcance. the discourse of the national historian is rather ambiguous. colonial France Downloaded from coa. The colonial historical discourse (based on. threatened by an imperialist Other – Rome (whose heritage. especially in colonial historiography from Mercier (1875) and more importantly from Gautier (1927). especially in its Khaldunian form. This is what the national historian inherited – a discursive colonial situation. the colonial discourse makes the suzerain disappear and he is replaced by the people. this ‘glory’ is an unhappy one.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. which is ultimately the glory of the suzerain who has been since the 11th century a Berber. the history of the Maghreb was not a history of struggle between dominating Arabs and dominated Berbers (this is the colonial argument repeated in the national). at the time of the conquest. the settler called for the liberation of the Berber from the Arab. 2008). to use the same colonial language. may be called a discourse of sovereignty. were left in the ‘shadow’. according to counter-colonial narrative. it brings him out of the ‘shadows’. In Laroui’s narrative. and later. is a discourse that speaks about the glory of the Berbers. on the other hand. the Muslim historical discourse) narrates the racial struggle between Arabs and Berbers. but rather a history of class struggle undertaken within a national territory. this colonial discourse is one of both liberation and race struggle.sagepub. itself the result of an entire age of colonial cultural production. The aim of this is to link race to the colonial enterprise and thus for the latter to present itself as the savior of those who had no glory and who were found in the shadows in the time of the conquest. The colonial narrative was undoubtedly one of these counter-histories.337 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb narrative of the race struggle and also because it paid attention to that which was ‘obscure’ and to those supposedly without ‘glory’. in our case the Berbers. But again. even in the Maghreb. not only because it transformed a discourse that. as evidenced by colonial occupation that created a state of ‘retardation’ even after the departure of the French. it was never achieved and thus it is a misery created by those who make it the result of Arab domination. Whereas the Muslim discourse. but also because it pays attention to those who. It also goes on demonstrating the misery. by the race (Hannoum. Initially. at the time of colonization. humiliation and above all domination of the Berbers at the hands of Arabs. yet opposed to. About this. This colonial cultural production is nothing more and nothing less than a narrative called: the Maghreb. the Berbers. for the national historian. 2013 . and even later with Brunschvick (1946). mutatis mutandis. his narrative too celebrates the ‘glory’ of the Berbers. the French army claimed to liberate the Berbers from the Turks. those ‘glory-less’ people. that is the Khaldunian discourse.
where each of the terms is endowed with a socioeconomic meaning. given the ‘Eastern’ origins of Mediterranean countries). which resulted in the end of cultural diversity (itself relative. (1977: 55) One can see how the category Berber. Thus. As seen earlier. this is the colonial myth hiding in the skirts of the national discourse). the problem of origin of both cultures and inhabitants are differently solved. in the south the Sahara had become a refuge for those who chose freedom instead of submission to Rome. To quote Laroui: The Moors were dispossessed peasants who chose freedom. The national historian operated here. the Numidians were free peasants and farm workers who periodically avenged themselves on their exploiters. but also exhaustion of the soil. a narrative of diversity. but only brought urban commerce to an agricultural society. the colonial discourse traces the origins of Berbers to Europe. both are originally diverse and both are originally Oriental. the same transformation created by the European Downloaded from coa. The Phoenicians did not play any role in a civilizing mission. which is part and parcel of the colonial discourse. Laroui continues. The thesis of the European racial origin of the Berbers makes the race struggle not only between Berbers and Arabs. our class struggle. are given the legitimacy to be ‘here’ to liberate. This division. In fact. Roman development of the land brought not only forced sedentarization. deforestation and social debasement. so dear to colonial authors. and as a result of this contact. and the north. The transition from one – the race struggle – to the other – the class struggle – was natural because the narrative of the struggle of classes itself has its origin in the narrative of the struggle of races. instead of the historical narrative of the struggle of races. protest. not a racial one. but also between the latter and Europeans. then. one can ﬁnd the three geographical divisions of North Africa: the Sahara. he notes. Laroui assumes that the purported cultural unity stemmed from the Sahara and contact with the Mediterranean. by it. which in some ways ultimately created a discontinuity between the east and north. It was on the one hand a national. Laroui offers. Thus. already established by the Phoenicians. one ﬁnds at center stage the formation of monarchies in the north. Laroui maintained (and in fact imported) the narrative of the class struggle. became more ﬂagrant during the two centuries of Roman occupation. Nevertheless. 2013 . the category of origin itself is a colonial category. despite or because of this effort to de-legitimize the colonial discourse of the race struggle.338 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) claimed. Laroui could not ignore the very important question of the origins of the ‘races’. on the other a social. who. It is clear to see here how. Marx wrote to Engels saying ‘but. 1997: 69). is replaced in the above quote by other names: Moors and Numedians. Laroui concludes. the east (where a number of colonies developed). While the east was under occupation. Laroui argues. mostly socioeconomic. you know very well where we found it: we found it in the [work of] French historians when they narrated the race struggle’ (quoted in Foucault.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4.sagepub. where local monarchies established themselves. rather. However.
and even high acuteness. It is also clear how this discourse is fraught with colonial categories. What happens in Europe. sooner or later. In colonial narrative. and give it a personality of its own that cuts it off from other colonial entities. The terms ‘foreign’. Laroui himself seems well aware of this. even within the framework of the nation. The name was made most popular by Emile-Felix Gautier. or why else would he write: ‘The idea is to trace the genesis of the concept of the Maghreb and discover how it ultimately took on an objective deﬁnition’ (1977: 14)? Yet he does not show how the name itself is colonial and because it is so the name itself is an appearance of colonial power. However. colonial power displays itself in a postcolonial cognitive act. Regardless of the national historian’s impressive intellectual strength. who argues for a thesis that would rather give credit to the Third World and restore its agency. he accepts colonial naming. eastwards. repeats these names and reiterates colonial categories. as Nietzsche poignantly put it: ‘One should conceive of language itself as an expression of power on the part of the ruler: they say “this is this and this. even when he does so to refute them. was misunderstood by Partha Chatterjee. For. given the absence of the major category of the nation. Whether the population of the region referred to in Muslim historiography as Ifriqiya thought of these ‘events’ in such language at the time they occurred. 1996).” they seal every thing and event with a sound. ‘domination’. the absence of its associated categories must have been also absent in the pre-colonial Maghreb. and behind it there is a whole colonial politics of naming that had to isolate a French zone called the ‘Maghreb’ to make it distinct from what is not French. westward and southward. what territory is ‘occupied’ and what territory is or has to be ‘liberated’. In so doing. happens in the (post)colony. I believe. they were introduced to maintain the thesis of the Arab (race) invading and dominating ‘the Berber’ (race) who were liberated by the French (nation). Equally absent from previous pre-national writings is the name ‘Maghreb’ itself.sagepub.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. 2013 . Categories such as ‘foreign’. This means that. in a complex game then called ‘geopolitics’. While one can understand that Chatterjee’s account. ‘occupation’. ‘liberation’ all denote the national body. which is consistent with the theory of Downloaded from coa. that the Third World did not seem to have even sufﬁcient agency to imagine itself (Chatterjee. as a counter-argument. no one asked. here one can see the pervasive power of the colonial over the national and cannot but accept the argument of Anderson (1992) that nationalism in the Third World is a colonial import and that the nation was also imagined on the colonial model. as it were. epistemological discontinuities are nothing but continuities of the former colonizer.339 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb historians of the 19th century vis-a-vis the discourse of race struggle. Such an argument. ‘occupation’ and ‘domination’ draw their meanings only from within the frame of the national semantics that establishes who is ‘us’ and who is ‘others’. The question now is: ‘Could it be otherwise?’ In any case. some of which may not seem so. He maintains. for the sake of clarity. take possession of it’ (1967: 26).
2013 .340 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) omnipresent power of Foucault. in whose webs the national subject is still caught or rather suspended.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. nor does it even undermine the idea that power is everywhere. but also a colonial critique. nationalism in the Third World was an import and. in so doing. For. with its key categories of unity. is a transformation of available colonial semantics. and did nothing but perpetuate colonial symbolic domination. Nationalism in Europe was transformed out of the semantics (or the content) of what Anderson calls print capitalism. as of today. are all colonial modern categories. Yet such transformation bears within itself the unequal power relationship between what is transformed and what it is transformed from. as we saw. the historian needs to manage either to become epistemologically able to ignore the colonial – which is impossible given the effective postcolonial power axis shaping the imagined national community – or the historian must become a critic and engage in an examination of colonial discursive practices in and of themselves. one should look at the term ‘imagination’ and understand it as a philosophical and more speciﬁcally phenomenological concept. what the nationalists have imagined. it is called by its authors and its readers alike a ‘decolonization of history’. and often against it. To imagine is not to create ex nihilo. Third World nationalism is a restructuring of colonial semantics. writer. Yet the national ideologue (in the form of historian. politician or all of the above) had nothing available to him but those same colonial categories that he oftentimes reversed and. in order to deconstruct them and show how they have participated in the making of a postcolonial culture. It remains. Such national discourse. in reaction to it. created out of the colonial semantics. language. it had to adjust to where it was imported to. Such a project is possible only now. where different conditions gave birth to a postcolonial epistemology. Rather. India or elsewhere. because of this. but rather to restructure ‘semantic ﬁelds’ (Ricoeur. modernity and even will. 1994). not only reproduced but also perpetuated. has been espoused by the nation state. Therefore. 1972). I would like to make it clearer that the above critique does not mean that the national historian missed the point. is not decolonizing. Because it does so. But such a narrative. Even Foucault concedes that an ‘idea is born out of an idea not out of the absence of an idea’ (Foucault. The culture of nationalism the national historian articulated and helped to put in place may be what was Downloaded from coa. It is one idea created out of another. Last. It offers a national narrative.sagepub. On the contrary. because it links itself to other postcolonial histories and anthropologies. despite their restructuring in national narratives. Anderson does not maintain that nationalism in Europe is the same as nationalism in Indonesia. that is created whether in Algeria. progress. the main and maybe the sole legitimate reference on the history of the Maghreb. Anderson’s view does not undermine the agency of the Third World. in order to be so. territory. The concept of the nation. especially in India and Latin America. history. It constitutes the discourse of the nation.
Most are either ‘Arabized’ or ‘Berberized’. the article has privileged the analysis of the culture of the state. through violent events within and outside of the borders of the nation. 1991: 164). consequences. This equation provides insight into the culture of the state and the nationalist projects it has weathered. nationalism offered what one may call an ideology of hope. and has not tackled the issue ethnographically. 2013 . The project of the Islamic nation is not thought of without this relation. sometimes even everlasting. often placed in a higher zone of the ﬂuid structure of Downloaded from coa. are generative of what Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic power’. and France is never far from view. However.341 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb needed in the period following independence. and have lived in ways that defy the elite ﬁgurations. The relationship that Islamist movements envision is not only one of equal adversaries. al-Nahda in Tunisia or Jabhat al-islamiya li a-Inqad. as the marks or signatures of cultural imperialism. Even the Islamist discourse that seems to be viscerally anti-colonial reproduces colonialism and its power relation by making French the focal point of its narratives.sagepub. in Algeria. Symbols of domination. meaning they do not even speak a distinct language. Toward a conclusion A system of domination consists of a set of symbols that are present and hence naturalized in different cultural guises. This is to say nothing of the Islamist movements. the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). and in most cases ‘dialecticized’. but not the other way around. It has effective. France is an adversary whose presence is personiﬁed particularly in what the Algerian masses call hizb fransa. as it survived in its customary forms as well as those that are disguised in what appears to be an anticolonial discourse. Compared to the colonial condition.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. symbolic power is ‘that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or that they themselves exercise it’ (Bourdieu. which usually denotes the nationalist elite. whether that associated with the Adl wa al-Ihasan in Morocco. Yet the masses undoubtedly have a different discourse. permeate all aspects of social life. Here. from the level of the masses. from the bottom up – that is. when nationalism constituted the cultural and political horizon of what was then called the Third World. hence the tremendous power they exert on bodies and ﬁssured or colonized minds. should make one think that nationalism should be subject to a rigorous critique to show its limitations and lay down the necessary conditions to go beyond it. Thus. both symbolic and material. A colonial language is intimidating for a non-French speaker. the culture of nationalism. what a half century of nationalism has indeed revealed. I have interrogated in this article the culture of colonialism and its continuation in the postcolonial era. but one of asymmetrical power. Colonial knowledge. because they are often naturalized.
Histoire de l’établissement des Arabes en Afrique septentrionale (1875). one says: ‘aujourd’hui.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. even of European societies themselves. Notes 1 Actually. that is.sagepub. racial diversity required that the state account for inequalities and antagonisms. he portrays a multi-ethnic. for instance. nor Turkish. In the case of France. 8 This is an interesting use of metaphor by Nouvel Observateur. but also actions that are reactions to the colonial mirror. He explained to us how the latter sentence is more descriptive and thus more clear and precise. 4 See. only 1 out of every 1000. This is not the case. the French government took the more drastic measure in 1871. where racial claims are highly present. not a colonial novel. EmileFelix Gautier. Les siècles obscurs du Maghreb (1927). When France was reduced to a nation. when one describes the weather. the sky is blue). This is neither clear nor precise. 3 In 1871. Muslims. Given the small percentage of those who took on French citizenship. But why would Tocqueville consider them a race? The term race may have been used loosely to mean also ‘type’. racial claims. the French government issued the Decree Cremieux by which all Jews of Algeria were considered French.342 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) power relations. In it. It was as if the nation hid the inequality of races with a unitary national ideology of which the bourgeois are the only real beneﬁciary. our philosophy teacher explained to us in high school how French is a language of clarity and precision by giving us an example. 1864). 5 To mention just the most authoritative colonial texts on the issue. In contrast. despite or because of successive conquests. became stronger and more distinct – neither French. 7 As Moroccans. 2 This may be only a typo for the term Mahomais. see Edward Said. 6 Nedjma (1956) is Kateb Yacine’s most acclaimed novel. see Ernest Mercier. The same sympathizers of the Islamist movements would undoubtedly dream of the hellish heaven of France. Kateb’s novel constituted a break in that it was a national. In Arabic. Even on the level of the masses. and continue to board boats of death to cross the Mediterranean guided by colonial myths. Orientalism (1979). he said. Postcolonial power may be exerted without intent – that is. 2013 . for instance. racial diversity disappeared and. demands and protests. Thus the actions of Islamic movements are always reactions. Unlike the work of previous Maghrebi novelists such as Mouloud Feroun or even Mohamed Dib. For a discussion of Renan and his contribution to the formation of Orientalism. a power that obstructs even its own agentive capacities. nor Arab. a variation of the French term Mahometans. in the United States. the French expression is. Downloaded from coa. France governs not only attitudes. as the légion étrangère was the military regiment with only foreign recruits from the colonies. When one describes the weather. le ciel est bleu’ (today. This occurred after an earlier failed attempt in 1864 to open French citizenship to the Jews of Algeria. he noted. with it. especially De la part des peuples sémitiques dans l’histoire de la civilisation (Renan. multi-confessional Algeria which. one says: ‘al jawwu jamil’ (the weather is nice). without strategy or tactic – and that may be one of its other deﬁning characteristics.
Stanford. Brace and World. Dib. New York: Basic Books. after a forum on education. in Jean Dejeux (ed. CA: Stanford University Press. Adrien (1843–5) Algérie: historique. not a return to the conclusion already reached in 2000. Paris: Publisud. Folklore. References Anderson. 12 The case of Berber he mentions is not clear and is highly problematic. In fact. Berbrugger. Benedict (1992) Imagined Communities. and existence to colonial culture. Gosnell. considered part of local culture unworthy of the nation. which owes its expression. CT: Greenwood Publishers. London: Verso. Post-colonial Memories. Roland (1978) Leçon inaugurale au Collège de France. the Minister of Education of Morocco made a public announcement about ‘the failure of education’ in Morocco.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4.343 Hannoum: Notes on the (post)colonial in the Maghreb 9 The accusation was generalized to all francophone literature by Laroui (1967). Rochester. as there are varieties of ‘Berber dialects’. 2013 . Jonathan (2002) The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria: 1930–1954. Emile-Felix (1927) Les siècles obscurs du Maghreb. Paris: Delahaye. Cambridge. NJ: Princeton University Press. Paris: Maisonneuve. Pierre (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Foucault. who in the name of modernity. Bourdieu. NY: University of Rochester Press. Hannah (1966) ‘Race-thinking Before Racism’. Assia (1985) ‘Du français comme butin’. MA: Harvard University Press. Clifford (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. Eugène and Paul-Dieudonné Fabar (1847) La Grande Kabylie. pittoresque et monumentale. Gautier. pp 158–84. it is more local than national culture. Quanzaine littéraire 436(16–31 March). Arendt. in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Mohamed (2003) Interview. Michel (1972) The Archeology of Knowledge. Arthur (1967) Inequality of Human Races. Magazine Littérature. Djebar. Daumas. Princeton. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Downloaded from coa. Michel (1997) Il faut défender la société. 11 Eight years later. is a culture in its own right. New York: H. Gobineau. Hannoum. and no written tradition. Wesport. New York: Pantheon. 87. In 2008. The term ‘folklore’ is a pejorative one in the language of nationalists. p. Bourdieu. Paris: Seuil. Chatterjee. Paris: Hautes Etudes. Boumedienne. Foucault.) La Culture algérienne dans les textes. Robert (1946) La Berberie orientale sous les Hafsides. Fertig. Algirdas-Julien (1983) Structural Semantics. to say the least. New York: Harcourt. who noted one exception – Kateb Yacine. Abdelmajid (2001) Colonial Histories. Houari (1995) ‘Discours inaugural au Syposium du Premier Festival cultural panafricain’. Greimas. Partha (1996) The Nation and Its Fragments. Pierre (2001) Male Domination.sagepub. 10 This remark by no means applies to the generation of French Maghrebi writings in French in France. Brunschvick. Paris: Hachette. Paris: Payot. literally popular culture. in February 2008. Geertz. one would have expected the failure announced in 2000 to have been addressed. Barthes.
Tocqueville. Eugene (1976) Peasants into Frenchmen. PostColonial Memories (2001). CA: Stanford University Press. Swiggers. Abdelmajid (2003) ‘Faut-il brûler l’Orientalisme?’. Joan (2007) The Politics of the Veil.sagepub. Saussure. Ricoeur. Paris: Seuil. Paris: Maspero.edu] Downloaded from coa. Paris: Levy. 5. Thomas. Paris: Gallimard. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Abdelmajid (2008) ‘The Historiographic State’ History and Anthropology 19 (2): 91–114. Kateb (1994) Le Poète comme un boxeur. Paris: C. Weber. Items and Issues 5(4). culture. Nicholas (1994) Colonialism’s Culture. Ernest (1947) ‘Qu’est-ce que c’est qu’une nation?’. Ferdinand (1984) Cours de linguistique générale. Race. and other essays on colonialism. Princeton. Nietzsche. Renan. Abdallah (1965) L’Idéologie arabe contemporaine. Kateb (1956) Nedjma. Lawrence. New York: Vintage Books.com at Institute of Philosophy RAS on April 4. Princeton. Michael (1987) Colonialism. New York: Routledge. Benjamin (1956) Language. Cultural Dynamics 16(1): 71–91. Silverstein. Laroui. Levy. MA: MIT Press. Whorf. NJ: Princeton University Press. 112–30. Abdelmajid (2001) ‘Colonialism and Knowledge in Algeria’. pp. Yacine. Constantine: Marle. (2004) Algeria in France: Transpolitics. vol. and Chantal Tetreault (2006) ‘Postcolonial Urban Apartheid’. Hannoum. Abdallah (1977) The History of the Maghreb. Silverstein. Laroui. and Reality. and Nation. Princeton. 2013 . in John Joseph and Talbot Taylor (eds) Ideologies and Language. 1. Renan. Ernest (1875) Histoire de l’établissement des Arabes en Afrique septentrionale. Yacine. Paul (1994) ‘Imagination in Discourse and Action’. Mercier. Frederic (1967) On the Genealogy of Morals. 11 June. NJ: Princeton University Press. Hannoum. Paul E. [email: ahannoum@ku. and the epistemology of social science. Cambridge. Scott. History and Anthropology 12(4): 343–79.344 Critique of Anthropology 29(3) Hannoum. and the Wild Man. Ernest (1864) De la part des peuples sémitiques dans l’histoire de la civilization. historical anthropology. Pierre (1990) ‘Ideology and the Clarity of French’. Violent Modernity: France in Algeria (forthcoming). Thoughts. Paul E. Stanford. in Gillian Robinson and John Rundell (eds) Rethinking Imagination. Paris: Seuil. He is the author of Colonial Histories. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. London: Routledge. Shamanism. Alexis (1951) Oeuvres. vol. Paris: Hachette. Taussig. NJ: Princeton University Press. ■ Abdelmajid Hannoum is assistant professor of anthropology and African Studies at the University of Kansas. in Oeuvres.
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