How  the  crisis  was  handled  and  a  comparison  with  the  theoretical  treatment  of   Norman  Agustine.  draw  to  a  close  the  case  study.THE  CRISIS  OF  THE  SOVEREIGN  DEBT     IN  THE  EUROZONE             ABSTRACT     The   sovereign   debt   crisis   that   affected   the   European   Union   in   the   2009.   with   enormous   consequences  for  the  whole  world.  languages  and   cultures.   with   the   conjunction   of   these   three   risk   issues.   The   theoretical   treatment   of   these   risk   factors   is   explained   through   some   example.  only  nine  years  after  its  establishment.   surely   this   crisis   has   made   the   members   better   able   to   work   together.     .   These   factors   have   led   the   European   Union   to   face   the   greatest   crisis   in   its   history.   is   only   a   bureaucratic   superstructure.   for   that   which   now.  From  this  is  derived  the  lesson  for  the  futures  so  that   other  crises  are  averted.  the   European  Union  have  to  change  and  evolve.  More  specifically  is  clear  how  in  order  to  survive.  abandon  their  traditions.   In   the   first   section   is   summarized:   the   historical   context   and   milestones   and   the  main  factors  that  have  led  to  the  emergence  of  these  risks.  Until  now  has  been  an  interesting   political   experiment   but   if   it   doesn’t   want   to   go   down   in   history   as   a   failed   experiment.   is   explained   here   through   the   identification   of   three   risk   issues.   and  in  the  political  and  cultural  topics  in  the  long  term.   but   it   will   be   difficult   for   the   citizens   of   the  country.   specific   and   contagion)   and   is  explained  how  these  are  combined  to  give  rise  to  changes  in  the  spread.   Then   the   three   risk   issues   are   exposed   (aggregate.     The  main  idea  is  that  one  of  these  factors  alone  could  not  lead  to  a  crisis  of  this   magnitude.   which   could  destroy  it.  It  is  a  difficult  challenge   and   it’s   difficult   to   predict   the   outcome.  quoting  several  country  involved  in  the  crisis.   But   the   future   scenario   that   was   proposed.   In  the  conclusion  is  advanced  an  analysis  of  possible  past  scenarios  that  could   have  avoided  the  crisis.   could   bring   Europe   back   in   the   history.   with   few   benefits.  with  a  so  complex  history.  the  members  must  find  a  greater  cohesion  in  economic  terms  first.

 highlighting  the  difficulties  specific  to  each  country   in  southern  Europe.  Thus.       1.  how  it  managed  such   risks.  Therefore.   it   is   important   to   note   that   each   country   has   a   distinct   background   and   therefore   has   their   its   problems   to   deal   with.   individually.   compounding   the   already   difficult   financial  situation  of  the  PIIGS  (Portugal  Ireland  Italy  Greece  and  Spain).   led   to   demanding   markets   with   hysterical  behaviour.  There  was  also  the  fear  that  the  system   and   the   banks   would   not   be   able   to   deal   with   another   crisis.   All   of   these   factors.INTRODUCTION  AND  AIM     The  aim  of  the  report  is  to  assess  the  risk  factors  the  European  Union  had  to  deal   with  during  the  sovereign  debt  crisis  that  erupted  in  2009.     These  risk  issues  combined  have  led  over  time  investors  to  have  less  and  less   confidence  in  the  PIIGS  and  in  the  European  Union  in  general.   but   it   is   necessary   to   use   each   as   an   example  to  deal  with  the  larger  problem  facing  the  EU  as  one  entity.   with   the   addition   of   a   deep   pessimism.   along   with   the   aversion   of   the   markets   to   take   risks   after  the  financial  crisis  of  2007.  and  the  results  of  these  actions.     2. Specific  risk:   particularly   the   risk   of   default.         .   and   that   there   might   have   been   more   hidden   problems. The  aggregate  risk:   The   crisis   arose   out   of   a   lack   of   faith   in   the   current   economic   system.     3.  triggering  a  vicious  cycle  that  has  precipitated  Europe   into  a  downward  spiral.     There  are  three  major  risk  issues  the  EU  and  its  members  have  had  to  deal  with   to  avoid  the  collapse  of  their  system.   meaning   the   likelihood   of   the   probability   that  some  members  in  the  euro  zone  will  fail.   Obviously   the   issue   is   larger   than   for   each   separate   country.  The  lack  of   confidence  was  expressed  in  a  decrease  in  the  demand  for  government  bonds   and  an  increase  in  yield.   was   the   core   of   the   matter. Risk  of  contagion:  concerns  the  whole  of  the  European  Union  as  a  result  of   the  spillover  effect  from  the  initial  problems  in  Greece.   While  the  debt  crisis  of  2009  was  an  all  encompassing  problem  for  the  European   Union.   even   if   a   complete   report   of   the   situation   should   analyse   the   issues   of   each   country.  the  markets   of   Southern   Europe   lose   confidence.  this  report  will  mainly  focus  on  the  risk  factors  pertaining  to  the  EU  as  a   whole.   which   increased   the   spread.

 With  the  introduction  of   the  Euro.   Germany   was   the   first   big   country   to   exceed   the   debt   limit   established  in  the  Maastricht  treaty.   Meanwhile  the  growth  of  the  GDP  (Gross  Domestic  Product)  was  not  following   the  same  trend.  each  country  lost  the  opportunity  to  devalue  the  currency  and  the  only   lender   of   last   resort   became   the   ECB   (European   Central   Bank).  France.  in  the  world   as  a  whole.         To   accumulate   more   votes.   the   ECB  does  not  have  the  jurisdiction  to  buy  sovereign  debt.  the  Maastricht  Treaty  defined  the  limits  of  deficit  spending  and  the  debt   cap  for  the  future.CASE  STUDY     To  analyse  the  ongoing  European  economic  crisis  we  first  need  to  quickly  recall   the  recent  history  of  the  European  Union  and  to  summarize  the  consequences  of   the  financial  crisis  of  2007  in  the  United  States  and.   the   income   was   hit   by   widespread   tax   evasion.                                                          Figure:  Selected  EU  Debt  2007-­‐2010     At   first   the   markets   had   assumed   that   the   Eurozone   debt   was   safe.   for   example.  Greece  and  Italy  were  next  to  follow   suit.   In   addition.   Globally.   The   governments   started   to   make   loans   in   efforts   to   raise   the   funds   to   save   the   system   and   as   a   result   there   was   a   massive   rise   in   global  debt.  subsequently.  For  this  reason.   .   the   public   sector   wages   rose   50%   between   1999   and   2007.   The  debt  increased  in  Italy  and  Greece  due  to  efforts  to  sustain  welfare  service.   In   the   early   2000s.   and   the   financial   system  had  to  face  a  liquidity  crisis.   governments   and   the   central   banks   started   to   save   the   banks   and   the   financial   institutions   to  avoid  the  collapse  of  the  financial   system.   as   it   was   supported  by  all  the  members.   In   Greece.  countries  with  a  high  debt  such   as  Italy  and  Greece  were  thought  to  be  secure.   politicians   financed   public   spending   by   using   debt   to   keep   taxes   from   rising.     CONSEQUENCES  OF  THE  FINANCIAL  CRISIS     After   the   bursting   of   the   bubble   of   the   subprime   mortgage   the   banks   stalled   lending.   In  2000  the  European  Union  became  a  monetary  union.     RECENT  EUROPEAN  HISTORY     In  1992.   However.

  The   regime   switch   may   be   related   to   the   markets   shifting   perceptions   of   a   country’s  fiscal  sustainability.   Greece   was   no   longer   able   to   repay  its  loans  and  was  forced  to  ask  for  aid  from  the  European  Union.  The  real  deficit  was  13%  instead  of  6%  and  the  debit  was  reassessed  at   127%  of  the  GDP.   the   “crisis”   regime.   In   the   second   one.However.   yet   there   has   been   no   rise   in   UK   bond   yields.   Papandreou.   after   the   credit   crunch.   people   started   to   become   more   sceptical   and   risk  averse.  Mr   G.     RISK  MANAGEMENT  ISSUE     The   spread   between   the   yield   of   national   bond   and   the   risk   free   (in   this   case   the   10  years  German  BUND)  was  the  main  indicator  to  monitor  the  development  of   the  crisis.   With   this   debt   level   and   the   rising   interest   rates.  or  to  the  attitude  towards  risk.       .   The  crisis  started  on  October  2009  when  the  new  Prime  Minister  of  Greece.   For   example.   the   “normal”   condition.  especially  in  Europe  where  it  was  unclear  whether  the  central  bank   would   be   able   to   support   its   member   states.   the   spread   reacts   only   by   the   relative   probability   of   a   country’s  default.   One   reasons   investors   are   currently   willing   to   hold   UK   bonds   is   that   they   know  the  Bank  of  England  will  intervene  and  buy  bonds  if  necessary.   much   higher   spreads   can   be   demanded   after  a  relatively  small  deterioration  in  fundamentals.         Figure:  Sovereign  spreads  (10y  Bonds)       Before   analysing   the   risk   issues   that   caused   the   crisis   we   need   to   analyse   how   the  sovereign  yield  spread  can  vary.   UK   debt   has   risen   faster   than   many   Eurozone   economies.   There  are  two  conditions  by  which  the  markets  fix  the  spread:  in  the  first  one.   declared   that   the   old   government   had   lied   about   the   public   finances.

  Finland.  The  risk  of  default  tends  to  increase  with  the  ratio  of  public  debt  to   GDP.   and   a   self-­‐fulfilling   prophecy   where   the   fear   that   higher   yields   would   make   the   country   insolvent.   In  2009  for  all  the  PIIGS  country    the  spread  had  begun  to  grow.  the  German  BUND.  reflecting  the   expectations   of   default   the   markets   had   on   the   countries   of   southern   Europe.     2.  the  rating  did  not  change  at  all.     . Aggregate  Risk   2.   The   other   sources   of   this   kind   of   risk   are   the  unwinding  of  the  financial  imbalances  and  the  occurrence  of  macro  shocks.   also   countries   with   solid   fiscal   financials   like   Austria.   In  fact.   global   uncertainty   and   risk   aversion.   has  increased  the  yield.     Lets   now   examine   the   risk   issue   that   led   investors   to   demand   a   more   high   remuneration  on  the  sovereign  bond  of  the  south  Europe:     1. AGGREGATE  RISK     Aggregate  risk  is  also  known  as  systematic  risk  because  it  affects  the  market  and   because  the  risk  taker  has  no  control.  the  high   value  of  the  debt  markets  led  to  the  notion  that  a  default  was  possible. Country  Specific  Risk   3.   and   the   Netherlands   saw   their   spread   rising.  It  is  driven  by  changes  in  monetary  policy.   The   widespread   aversion   toward   risk   moved   the   investor   to   the   safer   bond   in   the  European  region.   Public   and   private   high   debt   were   indeed   quite   large. Contagion  Risk       Figure:  Determinants  of  Government  Bond  Yields         1.   In  the  case  of  Greece.   The   cause  was  not  the  market  pricing  re-­‐assessment  of  the  government  credit  risk.  whose  government  had  been  buried  in  debt  data. SPECIFIC  RISK     The   country   specific   risk   has   two   components:   the   default   risk   and   the   foreign   exchange  risk.   After   the   breakdown   of   Lehman   Brothers.  decreasing  the  demand  for  the  debt  of   the  other  country  (even  if  they  were  triple-­‐A)  and  as  a  consequence  increasing   the  spread.   The   first   one   relates   to   variations   in   default   probabilities   and   to   the   ability   to   raise  funds.

  However.   The  contagion  starts  a  vicious  circle:  a  lower  demand  of  bond  increases  the  yield   and.   The   country   with   difficulty   had   to   improve   financial   policy   to   rebalance   the   debt   GDP  ratio.   This   increases   the   risk   of   default  and  yield  and  so  on.  such  as  in  Italy.  This  was  because  the  downgrade  and  the   fear  of  a  Greek  default  prompted  a  selling  of  Spanish  and  Italian  bonds.   it   would   be   more   likely   other   countries  would  also  be  in  need  of  aid.   If  the  systemic  risk  has  an  idiosyncratic  origin.   Before  the  introduction  of  the  Euro  the  spread  between  BUND  and  BTP  reached   its   peak.   in   that   period   nobody   worried   about   the   possibilities   of   the   default   of   Italy   because   the   spread   incorporated   not   only   the   risk   of   default.  contagious  occurs  more  likely.   higher   than   any   value   in   this   crisis.   The   development   in   Greece   was   one   of   the   reasons   why   Moody’s   in   July   2011   downgraded   Portugal.   the   component   of   the   spread.  and  don’t  want  to  be  exposed  to  volatility  or  large  losses  later.   Nowadays. RISK  OF  CONTAGION     Contagion   is   the   scenario   in   which   financial   instability   spreads   to   other   economies  that  were  otherwise  healthy.   but   also   the   foreign   exchange   risk.   The   investors   want   to   reduce   their   exposure   while   they   still   have   positive   balances.   related   to   the   foreign   exchange   risk.     3.  for  the  country  with  weak  economic  fundamentals  and  with  a  high  debt  to   GDP   ratio.   it   becomes   unsustainable  to   repay   the   debt.  The  market  worried  not  only  for  the  default  of   the  country  but  also  for  the  stability  of  the  Euro.   .   In  the  same  month  Italian  and  Spanish  bond  yields  had  increased  by  more  than   100  and  80  basis  points  respectively.However.  but  is  the  responsibility  of  the  Central  Bank  to  ensure  the  soundness   of  the  currency.   indicated  the  possibility  of  the  collapse  of  the  Euro  and  a  return  to  the  national   currency.     Figure:  The  spread  between  Italy  and  German       This  explains  why  the  European  Central  Bank  started  to  buy  national  bonds  even   if  the  statute  would  not  allow  it.  this  is  not  enough  to  explain  why  the  spread  occurred  and  became  so   high.   If   Greece   were   to   fail.

  HOW  THE  ISSUES  WERE  DEALT     Two   are   the   main   protagonists   involved   in   solving   the   crisis:   the   European   Central  Bank.   becoming  a  lender  of  last  resort.  Then.   Meanwhile   the   weak   countries   needed   to   re-­‐establish   the   financial   situation   decreasing  the  Debt  to  GDP  ratio  to  reduce  the  default  risk.   the   ECB   started   to   reduce   the   interest   rate   and   loan   money   to   the   financial   system   with   an   unlimited   provision   of   liquidity   through   “fixed   rate   tenders   with   full   allotment”.  with  the  help  of  the  IMF   (International   Monetary   Fund).  The  ECB  had  to  encourage  faith  in   the   European   Union   and   had   to   insure   its   ability   to   act   as   a   central   bank.  in  May  2011  and  in  October  2011.  and   the  single  governments  in  the  weak  countries.   the   ECB   stabilized   the   expectation   of   the   euro.   approved   these   reforms   even   though   there   was   a     consequence  of  falling  into  an  “Austerity  Trap”.   Greece.   making   the   economic   recovery  even  slower.   This   measure   has   ensured   that   the   system   would   not  collapse.         But   otherwise   if   the   countries   don’t   cut   spending   they   risk   a   financial   collapse.     All  the  ECB  actions  required  that  the  single  country   should  embark  on  a  major   austerity  drive  involving  drastic  spending  cuts.  the  European  Stability  Mechanism.     First   of   all.   it   approved   two   tranches   of   bailout   loans   to   Greece.       Figure:  Austerity  trap         .  People   would   therefore   be   more   likely   to   cut   their   spending.   buying   Italian   and   Spanish   government   bonds   to   try   to  reduce  their  borrowing  costs.   Because   of   contagion   resulting   from   the   situation   in   Greece.  one  of  the  most  important  components  of  the  European  Union.   Meaning   even   higher   unemployment   rates   and   lower   wages  that  would  just  make  private  debts  all  the  more  difficult  to  repay.  and  labour  market  and   pension  reforms.   In   February   2011.  worth  about  550bn  euros.   Italy   and   Spain.  where  it  would  almost  definitely   deepen   the   recession.   where   the   market   would   lose   confidence   in   them   and   the   other   European   governments   may   not   have   enough   money  to  bail  them  out.   the   Eurozone   finance   ministers   set   up   a   permanent   bailout   fund.   Furthermore.  tax  rises.  the  governor  of  the  ECB  declared  that  the  central  bank  would  have   lent   money   as   long   as   it   was   indispensable:     this   kind   of   declaration   was   very   important   for   the   faith   in   the   markets   because   it   ensured   the   investor   that   no   bank  or  country  would  be  abandoned  for  failure.

Profiting   from   the   crisis  –  After  the  monetary  union  nothing  was  done  to   improve   the   political   or   fiscal   union   in   Europe.EFFECTIVENESS  WITH  WHICH  THE  CRISIS  WAS  MANAGED     Let’s  know  compare  how  the  European  Union  had  managed  the  crisis  in  relation   with   the   theoretical   view   of   Norman   Agustine     (“Managing  the  Crisis  You  Tried  to   Prevent”)  in  witch  six  stages  of  crisis  management  were  specified.   it   was   really   difficult   to   take   share  policy.   the   European   Union   understood   that   this   could   have   big   consequences  for  the  whole  continent.   and   of   the   crisis   in   particular.  as  we  said  before.   Besides. Preparing  to  manage  the  crisis  –  When  the  crisis  exploded  there  was  no   plan   to   manage   it.   d.   to   avoid   inappropriate   behaviour   that   would   lead   to   lack   of   confidence   in   the   markets  already  wary.  not  enough  control  on  the  balance  sheets  of  the   countries. Resolving   the   crisis   –   The   crisis   is   not   solved   and   just   few   weeks   ago   another  country  (Cyprus)  became  involved  in  the  crisis.           .     c.   the   European   Institutions   had   not   enough   power:   as   young   supranational   Institutions.   was   unexpected.   Furthermore. Recognising  the  crisis  –  As  soon  as  the  Greek  government  declared  the  big   lie. Containing  the  crisis  –  It  took  long  time  to  decide  to  save  Greece  and  to   buy   sovereign   bond.   f.  We  can  say  that   the   actions   taken   were   able   to   save   the   European   Union.  the  only  things  that  it  could  do  was  to  have  a  closer   control   on   the   balance   sheets   of   the   member   states.   the   European   Union   was   not   ready   to   manage   it. Avoiding  the  crisis   –   The   EU   couldn’t   avoid   the   global   financial   crisis   who   was  born  in  the  USA.   in   which   the   member   countries   still   have   personal   interest   in   the   management   of   the   institution.   a   consequence   of   so   many   events.   b.   not   all   directly   controllable   from   the   European   Union.   e.   this   crisis   united   the   countries  and  this  could  be  the  first  step  for  a  European  Federation.   there   was   no   fiscal   union   and.   waiting   too   much   time   make   it   difficult   and   more   expensive  to  handle  the  crisis  later.   but   many   actions  have  to  be  undertaken  to  return  in  a  stable  situation.     a.   Sooner   this   kind   of   action   is   take   better   is   the   reaction   of   the   market.

CONCLUSIONS     SCENARIO  ANALYSIS:  HOW  THE  CRISIS  COULD  HAVE  BEEN  AVOIDED     In   this   section   some   lessons   will   be   extracted   for   the   future   by   analysing   different  scenarios  that  could  have  avoided  the  crisis.     PREVENT  FUTURE  CRISIS     To   prevent   future   crisis.     To   prevent   the   crisis   of   the   insolvency   of   Greece   that   was   expanding   throughout   Europe.   Even  if  it  is  difficult  to  determine  whether  the  crisis  could  have  been  avoided  or   not.   These   measures.   would   have   been   painless   and   productive.  However.   Especially   in   countries   like   Greece   and   Italy.   .   The   aggregate   risk   is   the   most   difficult   to   control.   Most   of   the   Greek   debt   is   currently   held   in   European   banks   (especially   German   and   French   ones).   it   is   important   that   the   EU   and   its   members   closely   monitor  all  three  issues  characterized  in  this  crisis.   in   a   world   so   globalized.   Now   the   countries   of   southern   Europe   cannot   refrain   from   engaging   in   this   way   in   a   short   time.   A   possible   default   of   Greece   would   bring   great   losses   and   the   attendant  risks  of  failure  in  the  major  financial  institutions  of  Europe.   albeit   at   low   cost.     As  previously  stated.   banks   and   private   individuals   to   be   encouraged   to   get   into   debt.  it  will  be  more  difficult  for  a  crisis  to  bring  the  country  to  collapse.   restructuring   the   labour   market.   especially   the   country   balance   sheet.   and   a   promotion  international  competitiveness.   This   happened   after   a   long   period   of   austerity   required   to   comply   with   the   parameters   input   in   the   euro.   These   two   factors   led   countries.   Less   excessive   use   of   debt.   that   would   mean   a   complete   innovation   of   the   national   economy.   it   can   originate   from   anywhere.   The   important   thing   is   that   countries'   policies   are   transparent   and   their   economies   are   in   order.  Derailing  Greece  would   have   been   an   alternative   that   would   not   have   prevented   the   infection.  if  the  institutions  (banks  and  governments)  are  economically  strong   and  clean.  leading   to   suffering   and   impoverished   citizens.   if   they   had   been   enacted   over   the   years.  the  initial  shock  due  to  the  lies  of  Greece  could  have  been   avoided  only  if  there  had  been  strict  centralized  control.   Clearly   the   solution   here   is   that   countries   must   have   a   thriving   economy.   For   the   stability   of   the   system   the  banks  should  stop  speculating  with  financial  innovation.   and   therefore   a   balance   with   equity   (GDP)   would   make   the   countries   now   weaker   and   less   attacked  by  this  series  of  unfortunate  events.   with   the   right   amount   of   risk   aversion   that   characterizes   this   sector.   it   can   lead   to   devastating   consequences   and.  dragging   the  whole  system  to  collapse.  what  is  clear  is  that  after  1999  the  interest  rates  on  the  debt  of  all  euro-­‐zone   countries   have   aligned   themselves   downwards.  and  go  back  to  pure   credit.   in   which  welfare  policies  are  financed  by  taxes.  before  2009   the  European  Union  was  still  much  too  young  and  therefore  lacked  the  political   unity  that  would  allow  such  centralized  control.  the  allocation  of  funds  would  have  to  be  faster.   Moreover.

  the   European   Institutions   must   strongly   declare   to   the   markets   that   they  will  do  everything  necessary  to  save  the  unique  currency.   The   ECB.  This  is  obviously  a     hard  task  because   of  the  uniqueness  of  the  EU.  having  so  many  countries  with  cultural  and  lingual   differences.   especially.   the   member   states   have   to   start   cooperating   to   alleviate   the   competitive  behaviour  between  individual  members.   If   the   Europe   Union   wants   to   survive   through   future   crises.   following   no   model   or   blueprint   from   the   past.   Moreover.It   is   essential   to   ensure   that   institutions   have   strong   credibility   so   as   to   avoid   risk   aversion   in   the   market.     For   those   concerning   the   Default   risk.     The  risk  of  contagion   requires   quickly   realizing   and   executing   a   solution   to   stem   the   crisis.  in  this  crisis  too   many   internal   struggles   have   made   the   expectations   uncertain   about   the   stability  of  the  euro.  is  imperative.   it   would   be   sufficient   that   countries   adhere  to  the  EU  directives.   The   actions   taken   by   the   EU   were   far   too   slow.   but   it   would   have   also   prevented  losing  the  money  required  to  buy  Italian  and  Spanish  bonds.         .   This   would   not   only   be   more   economical   to   save   Greece.   needs   to   reassure   the   market   that  it  won’t  let  any  country  fail.   causing   the   markets   to   worry   and   obsess   over   other   countries   with   weak   economic   situations.   Tighter  control  will  be  necessary  to  prevent  individual  countries  from  abusing  of   the  economic  coverage  of  the  European  Union.   If   the   EU   wants   to   last   a   long   time.   a   stronger   union.   both  politically  and  fiscally.

  International   Studies   Review   (2012)  14.   Banque   de   France  •  Financial  Stability  Review  •  No.  Number  5.   European   Central   Bank   Research   Bulletin   No  14  Autumn  2011   Frederic   S.   Journal   of   Economic   Perspectives—Volume  26.  2010.  Harvard  Business   Review.  Journal  of  Banking  &  Finance  35  (2011)  2945-­‐2955   Miroslav  Prokopijević  (2010).   Monetary   Policy   Strategy:   Lessons   from   the   Crisis.  Sole24Ore  Finanza   e  Mercati  17  Maggio  2010   Tejvan  Pettinger  (2012).  Economic  Blog   .   Euro  Crisis.  369-­‐ 384   Vítor   Constâncio.   Prepared   for   the   ECB   Central   Banking   Conference.   Managing  the  crisis  you  tried  to  prevent.  Economic  Policy  April  2012   Wallace   J.73(6).   Safe   haven.   Thies   (2012).  225-­‐239   Tobias  Knedlik  And  Gregor  Von  Schweinitz  (2012).  I  dieci  perchè  della  crisi  dell’euro.   Contagion   and   the   European   debt   crisis.  PANOECONOMICUS.  3.   Europe    Economic    Forum    conference    on    European    troubles.BIBLIOGRAPHY     Augustine.  16  •  April  2012   Roberto   A.    Asian    worries.    21    January    2013   Ashoka   Mody   and   Damiano   Sandri   (2012).   De   Santis   (2012).  Euro  Debt  Crisis  Explained.  N  (1995).   (2012).   Carluccio  Bianchi  (2012).   JCMS   (Journal   of   Common   Market   Studies)   2012  Volume  50.   The  European  Sovereign  Debt  Crisis.   Tsz-­‐Kin   Chung   (2011).Is   the   EU   Collapsing?.  University  of  Pavia   Fabrizio  Galimbert  (2010).The    three    dimensions    of    the    euro    area    crisis.       Brussels.  La  crisi  dei  debiti  sovrani  in  Europa.   European  Central  Bank  Working  Paper  Series    NO  1419  /  FEBRUARY   2012   Benoît    Cœuré   (2013).  2010.”  Frankfurt.   Crash  risk  of  the  euro  in  the  sovereign  debt   crisis  of  2009–2010.  726–745   Philip   R.  Nov-­‐Dec.  1995.  pp.   “Monetary   Policy   Revisited:   Lessons  from  the  Crisis.   credit   rating   agencies   and   the   spread   of   the   fever   from   Greece.  Vol.   Ireland   and   Portugal.  Number  3—Summer  2012—Pages  49–68   Giovanni   Amisano   and   Oreste   Tristani   (2011)   The   euro   area   sovereign   crisis:   monitoring   spillovers   and   contagion.147(12)  [Peer  Reviewed  Journal]   Cho-­‐Hoi   Hui.   Lane   (2012).  p.Macroeconomic  Imbalances  as   Indicators  for  Debt  Crises  in  Europe.   The   euro   area   sovereign   debt   crisis.   The   eurozone   crisis:   how   banks   and   sovereigns  came  to  be  joined  at  the  hip.   Mishkin   (2011).  pp.  November  18-­‐19.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful