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Emergency Response and Recovery

Non-statutory guidance to complement Emergency Preparedness


Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Introduction Principles of effective response and recovery Responding agencies Management and co-ordination of local operations Care and treatment of people Information and the media The Government Offices for the English regions Regional Civil Contingencies Committees in England Response arrangements in Scotland 3 6 11 20 34 43 51 54 59 63 69

Chapter 10 Response arrangements in Wales Chapter 11 Response arrangements in Northern Ireland Chapter 12 The role of UK central government in response and recovery Chapter 13 Emergency powers Annexes
Annex Annex Annex Annex 1A 1B 3A 13A Overview of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 Recovery management Civil Contingencies Act 2004: list of responders Requesting the making of Emergency Regulations under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

74 79 83
83 84 90 91

Glossary Bibliography

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Chapter 1 Introduction

The United Kingdoms approach to preparing for and responding to emergencies is founded on the six activities of integrated emergency management (paragraphs 1.11.3). This guidance complements Emergency Preparedness, which deals with the pre-emergency phase and describes the requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the Act) and supporting Regulations (paragraph 1.4). Emergency Response and Recovery describes the multi-agency framework for responding to and recovering from civil emergencies in the UK (paragraph 1.5). This chapter explains three key terms which underpin this guidance response, recovery and emergency (paragraphs 1.61.12). This guidance is not intended to be prescriptive, and can be adapted in the light of local circumstances, experience and priorities (paragraphs 1.131.14). This guidance is targeted at all personnel who may become involved in emergencies, particularly those at a senior level. It aims to develop a shared understanding of multi-agency response and recovery arrangements across responding agencies (paragraphs 1.151.17). This chapter outlines the structure of the guidance (paragraphs 1.181.19).


1.1 Civil protection in the UK is based on the concept of integrated emergency management. Under integrated emergency management, both preparation for and response to emergencies focuses on the effects of events rather than their causes. There is, therefore, a generic framework for responding to and recovery from emergencies whatever the scenario. Furthermore, preparation and response should be undertaken as an extension of a local responders normal day-to-day activities. Emergency response and recovery is grounded in what local responders do on a day-to-day basis, albeit delivered on a larger scale and to a faster tempo. The underlying aim of integrated emergency management is to develop flexible and adaptable arrangements that will enable effective joint response to any emergency. 1.2 Civil protection arrangements need to be integrated both within and between organisations. Not only should civil protection be an integral part of organisational planning, but also local responders must work collaboratively as part of a coherent multi-agency effort. 1.3 Integrated emergency management is a holistic approach to civil protection which comprises six related activities: anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. 1.4 Emergency Preparedness which sets out how the duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the Act) should be carried out covers the first four activities. A brief description of the provisions of the Act can be found at Annex 1A. 1.5 Emergency Response and Recovery deals with the last two activities. It describes the generic framework for multi-agency response and recovery, at the local level, in the UK. It also describes response structures at central government, devolved administration and regional level by way of context.

of arrangements for collaboration, co-ordination and communication are, therefore, vital. Response encompasses the effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g. fighting fires, rescuing individuals) but also the indirect effects (e.g. disruption, media interest).

Recovery 1.7 In contrast, recovery may take months or even years to complete, as it seeks to address the enduring human, physical, environmental, social and economic consequences of emergencies. Depending on the nature and severity of the emergency, recovery management can involve a protracted and challenging programme of work. This document addresses the recovery dimension throughout. Additionally, Annex 1B provides an aide-memoire on what recovery comprises and signposts some of the support and guidance government can offer as part of this process. 1.8 Experience has shown that the recovery effort is not just a matter for the statutory agencies. The private sector and the wider community will play a crucial role in their own recovery, and the statutory agencies will take on an enabling role. 1.9 Response and recovery are not, however, two discrete activities and the response and recovery phases do not occur sequentially. Recovery should be an integral part of the combined response from the very beginning, as actions taken at all times can influence the longer-term outcomes for communities.

Emergency 1.10 The term emergency underpins this guidance. An emergency is defined in the Act as: an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK; an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK; or war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. Additionally, to constitute an emergency, an event or situation must also pose a considerable test for an organisations ability to perform its functions. 1.11 The common themes of emergencies are: the scale of the impact of the event or situation; the

Response 1.6 Response encompasses the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. In many scenarios it is likely to be relatively short and to last for a matter of hours or days rapid implementation


demands it is likely to make of local responders; and the exceptional deployment of resources. 1.12 The term emergency is used consistently throughout this guidance to encompass all disruptive challenges that require the use of assets beyond the scope of normal operations and require a special deployment. The term major incident is commonly used by emergency services personnel to describe events or situations which would constitute an emergency as defined in the Act; this is the threshold of event or situation that will initiate a response under their major incident plans. These terms refer to the same threshold and are essentially interchangeable.

stand-alone briefing document that can be used for training purposes in advance of emergencies and for reference purposes during emergencies. 1.17 This guidance is primarily aimed at an English and Welsh audience. While this guidance does describe emergency response and recovery arrangements in Scotland and Northern Ireland, it does so for context-setting purposes only. This guidance is relevant to both England and Wales unless otherwise stated.

Structure and content

1.18 This guidance outlines local response and recovery arrangements and sets them in context. In particular, it describes: the guiding principles that underpin emergency response and recovery (Chapter 2); how the response and recovery effort is managed and the contribution of individual organisations (Chapters 36); the role of central government and the regional tier in dealing with civil emergencies and how they will operate (Chapters 7, 8, 12 and 13); and the differences between the arrangements in England and those in use in the devolved administrations (Chapters 911). 1.19 This guidance is not intended to be exhaustive. More detailed sources of advice and guidance are available and are referenced where appropriate.

1.13 This guidance aims to establish good practice based on lessons learned from responding to and recovering from emergencies, both in the UK and internationally. 1.14 It is not intended to be prescriptive or an operations manual. There is not a single approach that will meet the needs of every area. Similarly there is no single organisational arrangement that will be appropriate to each and every type of emergency. Emergency Response and Recovery establishes a common framework that is flexible enough to be adapted to local circumstances and the problems in hand. 1.15 The objectives of this guidance are to further develop: a shared understanding of the multi-agency framework for emergency response and recovery at the local level, and the roles and responsibilities of individual organisations; a shared understanding of the role of local, regional and national levels in emergency response, and how they will work together; and a common frame of reference (e.g. language, concepts) for those involved in responding to emergencies. 1.16 Whilst Emergency Preparedness is aimed principally at civil protection professionals, this volume of guidance is likely to be useful to all staff of responder agencies, in particular senior officers or managers who may become involved in emergency response and recovery work. It is intended to be a


Chapter 2 Principles of effective response and recovery

Emergency response and recovery arrangements should be flexible and tailored to reflect circumstances, but will follow a common set of underpinning principles (paragraph 2.1). These principles guide the response and recovery effort at all levels local, regional and national (paragraphs 2.22.3). There are eight guiding principles: continuity emergency response and recovery should be grounded in the existing functions of organisations and familiar ways of working, albeit on a larger scale, to a faster tempo and in more testing circumstances (paragraphs 2.42.6); preparedness all organisations and individuals that might have a role to play in emergency response and recovery should be properly prepared and be clear about their roles and responsibilities (paragraphs 2.72.9); subsidiarity decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with co-ordination at the highest necessary level; local agencies are the building blocks of the response to and recovery from an emergency of any scale (paragraphs 2.102.11); direction clarity of purpose comes from a strategic aim and supporting objectives that are agreed, understood and sustained by all involved. This will enable the prioritisation and focus of the response and recovery effort (paragraphs 2.122.15); integration effective co-ordination should be exercised between and within organisations and levels (i.e. local, regional and national) in order to produce a coherent, integrated effort (paragraphs 2.162.19); co-operation flexibility and effectiveness depends on positive engagement and information sharing between all agencies and at all levels (paragraphs 2.202.21); communication good two-way communication is critical to effective response and recovery, and reliable information should pass, without delay, to those who need to know, including the public (paragraphs 2.222.25); and anticipation ongoing risk identification and analysis is essential to the anticipation and management of the direct and indirect consequences of emergencies (paragraphs 2.262.28).


Guiding principles
2.1 The response to and recovery from an emergency needs to be flexible and to reflect the prevailing circumstances. The approach and management arrangements will inevitably differ according to a range of factors: the nature and demands of the emergency (e.g. geographical extent, lead agency); local circumstances, priorities and experience; and whether or not there is regional, national or international involvement in the response and recovery effort. 2.2 However, there are eight guiding principles (see below) that underpin the response to and recovery from every emergency. These principles apply equally to each tier local, regional and national and are consistent with Central Government arrangements for responding to an emergency: concept of operations (see contingencies/conops.pdf). 2.3 These principles are a useful tool in understanding, developing and reviewing emergency response and recovery arrangements at local, regional and national levels.

roles, responsibilities and organisational arrangements are different in emergency mode, these should be embedded through training and exercising.

Preparedness 2.7 All individuals and organisations that might play a part in the response and recovery effort should be appropriately prepared. This requires a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities and how they fit into the wider picture. 2.8 A brief overview of the roles and responsibilities of the major agencies involved in emergency response and recovery can be found in Chapter 3. Further guidance on the multi-agency framework, for managing emergency response and recovery work, can be found in Chapter 4. 2.9 The Act requires those organisations at the core of emergency response to work together to ensure that they are prepared for emergencies, whatever the cause or scale. Statutory guidance under the Act, Emergency Preparedness, explains the requirements of the legislation and offers good practice advice to local responders. A brief outline of the aims, objectives and provisions of the Act can be found at Annex 1A.

Continuity 2.4 Emergency response and recovery arrangements in the United Kingdom are founded on the premise that those organisations fulfilling functions on a dayto-day basis are best placed to exercise them in the demanding circumstances of an emergency. The experience, expertise, resources and relationships they have in place will be crucial, although they may be deployed in a different way and supported by neighbouring areas or even outside agencies. For this reason, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the Act) imposes a duty to plan for emergencies in respect of functions. 2.5 Equally, effective response and recovery will be grounded in tried and tested arrangements built on everyday working practices. In an emergency, familiarity and simplicity are virtues. Wherever possible, response and recovery arrangements should preserve established structures and ways of doing things that people know well. 2.6 By their very nature, emergencies require the special deployment of staff and resources. Wherever Subsidiarity 2.10 The UKs approach to emergency response and recovery is founded on a bottom-up approach in which operations are managed and decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level. In all cases, local agencies are the building blocks of response and recovery operations. Indeed, the local level deals with most emergencies with little or no input from the regional or national levels. 2.11 The role of central government and the regional tier is to support and supplement the efforts of local responders through the provision of resources and co-ordination. The central and regional tiers will only become involved in emergency response and recovery efforts where it is necessary or helpful (Chapters 713).

Direction 2.12 When an emergency occurs, those responsible for managing the response and recovery effort face


an array of competing demands and pressures. These will vary according to the event or situation that caused the emergency, the speed of its onset, the geographical area affected and many other factors. The information available will often be incomplete, and perceptions of the situation may differ within and between organisations. The response and recovery effort may involve many organisations potentially from across the public, private and voluntary sectors and each will have its own responsibilities, capabilities and priorities that require co-ordination. 2.13 Amidst these pressures it is essential to establish a clear, unambiguous strategic aim. This will help establish a shared set of priorities and thereby focus effort and resources where they are most required. The determination of that aim, its communication and its observance, are fundamental to the success of the multi-agency effort. Without this direction and focus there is a risk that pressure from external forces such as the media, interest groups and vocal individuals may divert effort and resources away from priority activities. 2.14 In sudden impact emergencies (e.g. explosions, transport accidents) local responders will immediately strive to save life, alleviate suffering and contain the effects of the emergency. But in most cases the response phase is relatively short perhaps only a matter of hours. The strategic aim should look beyond the immediate demands of the response and embrace the longer-term priorities of restoring essential services and helping to facilitate the recovery of the affected communities. 2.15 In wide-area or slow-onset emergencies (e.g. disruption to the fuel supply, spread of infectious disease) where the emergency services may not necessarily lead the response the strategic aim may be more difficult to identify and formulate. It is, nevertheless, equally important to establish clear aims and objectives to focus activity, given the likely scale, complexity and duration of operations. Government may, in certain limited circumstances, assume the role of setting the strategic direction where only it is in a position to deliver the necessary co-ordination.

Integration 2.16 Responding to and recovering from emergencies is a multi-agency activity that may involve many organisations. Their involvement, role and prominence may change between phases of the emergency. Furthermore, depending on the nature and severity of the event or situation, there may also be involvement from regional and national levels. It is crucial that the contributions of respective organisations are integrated. 2.17 The number and diversity of organisations involved in emergency response and recovery can pose difficulties for the effective management of local operations. Co-ordination and communication between and within organisations and other tiers of response can pose particular challenges that, unless confronted and resolved, may degrade the effectiveness of operations. 2.18 This underlines the importance of putting in place clearly defined structures to ensure that key agencies can: combine and act as a single authoritative focus where necessary; consult, agree and decide on key issues; and issue instructions, policies and guidance to which all agencies will conform. This will only be achieved if structures and processes are formulated through careful planning, and embedded through operations and regular exercising and training. Chapter 4 describes, in greater detail, the generic multi-agency framework for the management and co-ordination of local operations, while Emergency Preparedness covers the work required in the preparatory phases to enable effective integration. 2.19 Emergencies do not respect boundaries. Some emergencies may affect large areas; some may have national or even international implications (e.g. maritime pollution, atmospheric radiological pollution). It is important that mechanisms are in place to manage emergencies which straddle Local Resilience Areas1 and regions or affect more than one part of the UK (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland). Chapters 812 describe some of

Local Resilience Areas the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (Contingency Planning) Regulations 2005 require Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate with other Category 1 and 2 responders in their Local Resilience Area. Each Local Resilience Area (with the exception of London) is based on a police area. The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation is the Local Resilience Forum.


the mechanisms that are in place to deliver this integration in the case of wide-area emergencies.

Co-operation 2.20 Emergency response and recovery is a multiagency activity. The management of emergencies brings together a wide range of organisations which are not bound by hierarchical relationships. Although one agency may take the lead in relation to an emergency or a phase or an aspect of that emergency decision-making processes will always be discursive and consensual. 2.21 Mutual trust and understanding are, therefore, the fundamental building blocks of effective multiagency operations. Organisations must understand each others functions, ways of working, priorities and constraints. This will facilitate the genuine dialogue that is essential to enabling shared aims and objectives to be developed, agreed and implemented. Furthermore, openness between agencies and confidentiality externally are also crucial to effective operations. Unauthorised disclosure of information or unilateral action will not only prejudice cohesion, but also undermine operational effectiveness.

rather than local initiative and invention. Otherwise, there is a risk that parochial usage may interfere with interoperability and co-operation with local partners and neighbouring areas and hinder co-ordination at the regional and national levels. The same applies to concepts of operation, doctrine and structures. The need to develop templates wherever possible, and to embed the skills and drills of information management through training and exercising. 2.24 Any emergency will result in widespread media interest and public concern. It is, therefore, essential that structures and processes exist to manage the demands of the media and to ensure that messages given out are consistent. It is similarly essential that the public receives appropriate advice, warnings and information to provide reassurance and a basis for any necessary action. Further information on arrangements for managing the media and providing information to the public can be found in Chapter 6. 2.25 As described in Chapter 3, the private and voluntary sectors and the general public itself are key participants in the recovery management effort. The flow of authoritative information underpins the resilience of a community to disruptive challenges, supports business continuity management arrangements and facilitates self-help. In return, the flow of information, from and through the private and voluntary sectors, forms a vital part of the operational picture needed by those managing the emergency. Accordingly, information management arrangements must allow not only for transmission, but also receipt.

Communication 2.22 An accurate, timely, two-way flow of information is fundamental to the effective management of the response and recovery effort. This is, however, especially difficult to achieve amidst the pressure and urgency of an emergency. In particular: information management procedures may vary between agencies; perspectives on the event or situation may differ; mistakes and misunderstandings may occur under pressure; and communications can become overloaded. 2.23 There is a balance to be struck between ensuring that decisions are well informed and acting swiftly and decisively. Establishing systematic information management systems and embedding them within multi-agency emergency management arrangements will enable the right balance to be struck. In establishing such processes, responders should bear in mind the following. Terms and definitions should, wherever possible, come from national standards and publications

Anticipation 2.26 Anticipation is crucial in both the pre-emergency and post-emergency phases. Anticipation is commonly used to describe the first phase of the integrated emergency management process, which sees organisations actively horizon-scanning for potential emergencies. But, it is also a principle of effective response and recovery. Without anticipation, managers will not gain and retain the initiative amidst the pressure and urgency of events; leadership and control will remain in crisis mode; and there will be a significant risk of losing public confidence. 2.27 All emergencies have disparate direct and indirect impacts that may not be immediately



apparent amidst the pressure, uncertainties and demanding circumstances of an emergency. Two factors merit particular consideration in planning, training and exercising. In emergencies, risk becomes dynamic new risks emerge, established risks recede and the balance between risks changes continuously. Active risk assessment and management should be an ongoing process. But they should enable, rather than obstruct, effective operations by providing analysis of, and solutions to, anticipated problems before they arise. Emergencies create business continuity challenges demands on staff time, resources and management attention will be significant and maintaining the response and recovery effort alongside an organisations day-to-day functions will pose a major challenge. The risk of senior management discontinuity during prolonged periods of pressure may not be immediately apparent, but can be significant. This can be managed through good organisation, planning and thorough training and preparation of deputies and second teams at every level. 2.28 An important aspect of anticipation is addressing recovery issues at the earliest possible opportunity, ensuring that the response and recovery effort is fully integrated. This will ensure that recovery priorities are factored into the initial response, and will ensure coherence between the two streams of activity. Ideally, the two activities should be taken forward in tandem from the outset, although in some cases, constraints on capacity may necessitate a degree of separation in the early stages as the natural focus will be on life-saving response activity.



Chapter 3 Responding agencies

This chapter outlines the roles and responsibilities of the main agencies and sectors that are likely to become engaged in the response to and recovery from emergencies at the local level. This chapter describes arrangements in both England and Wales unless otherwise stated. It includes information on: police services (paragraphs 3.13.5); fire and rescue services (paragraphs 3.63.8); health bodies (paragraphs 3.93.20); HM Coroner (paragraphs 3.213.24); local authorities (paragraphs 3.253.30); government agencies and other non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs) (paragraphs 3.313.43); the Armed Forces (paragraphs 3.443.49); the private sector (paragraphs 3.503.57); the voluntary sector (paragraphs 3.583.62); and the community (paragraphs 3.633.66). The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the Act) establishes the legal framework for emergency preparedness at the local level in the United Kingdom. Annex 1A describes the nature and scope of the duties it imposes on the majority of the bodies listed in this chapter. The Act establishes the basis for Local Resilience Forums in England and Wales (based on police areas outside London), which help facilitate co-ordination and co-operation between responders at the local level in the preparedness phase (see Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 2).



Police services
3.1 The police will normally co-ordinate the activities of those responding at and around the scene of a land-based sudden impact emergency. The saving and protection of life is the priority, but, as far as possible, the scene must be preserved to safeguard evidence for subsequent enquiries and, possibly, criminal proceedings. Once life-saving is complete, the area will be preserved as a crime scene until it is confirmed otherwise (unless the emergency results from severe weather or other natural phenomena and no element of human culpability is involved). Where practical, the police, in consultation with other emergency services and specialists, establish and maintain cordons at appropriate distances. Cordons are established to facilitate the work of the emergency services and other responding agencies in the saving of life, the protection of the public and property and the care of survivors. 3.2 Where terrorist action is suspected to be the cause of an emergency, the police will take additional measures to protect the scene (which will be treated as the scene of a crime) and will assume overall control of the incident. These measures may include establishing cordons to restrict access to and require evacuation from the scene, and carrying out searches for secondary devices. All agencies with staff working within the inner cordon remain responsible for the health and safety of their staff, but the police will ensure that this is informed by an assessment of the specific risks associated with terrorist incidents. If there is the possibility that an emergency has been caused by terrorist action, then that will be taken as the working assumption until demonstrated otherwise. 3.3 The police oversee any criminal investigation. Where a criminal act is suspected, they must undertake the collection of evidence, with due labelling, sealing, storage and recording. They facilitate enquiries carried out by the responsible accident investigation bodies, such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) or the Air or Marine Accident Investigation Branches. 3.4 The police process casualty information and have responsibility for identifying and arranging for the removal of fatalities. In this task they act on behalf of HM Coroner, who has the legal responsibility for investigating the cause and circumstances of any deaths involved.

3.5 Survivors or casualties may not always be located in the immediate vicinity of a disaster scene. It is, therefore, important to consider the need to search the surrounding area. If this is necessary, the police will normally co-ordinate search activities on land. Where the task may be labour intensive and cover a wide area, assistance should be sought from the other emergency services, the Armed Forces or volunteers.

Fire and rescue services

3.6 The primary role of fire and rescue services in an emergency is the rescue of people trapped by fire, wreckage or debris. They will prevent further escalation of an incident by controlling or extinguishing fires, rescuing people and undertaking other protective measures. They will deal with released chemicals or other contaminants in order to render the incident site safe or recommend exclusion zones. Also, they will assist other agencies in the removal of large quantities of flood water. They will also assist ambulance services with casualty-handling and the police with the recovery of bodies. 3.7 Fire and rescue services are trained and equipped to manage gateways into the inner cordon if requested to do so by the police liaising with the police to establish who should be granted access (particularly where terrorist action is the suspected cause) and recording entry and exit. However, responsibility for the health and safety of personnel working within the inner cordon remains with individual agencies, which should ensure that personnel arriving at the scene have appropriate personal protective equipment and are adequately trained and briefed. Health and safety issues will be addressed collectively at multi-agency meetings on the basis of a risk assessment. 3.8 Although the National Health Service (NHS) is responsible for the decontamination of casualties, fire and rescue services will where required undertake mass decontamination of the general public in circumstances where large numbers of people have been exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances. This is done on behalf of the NHS, in consultation with ambulance services.



Health bodies
Ambulance services 3.9 Ambulance services have responsibility for co-ordinating the on-site NHS response and determining the hospital(s) to which injured people should be taken, which may depend on the types of injuries received. The officer of the ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of the service, at the scene of an emergency, is the Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO). If necessary, the ambulance service will seek the attendance of a Medical Incident Officer (MIO). 3.10 Ambulance services in conjunction with the MIO and medical teams endeavour to sustain life through effective emergency treatment at the scene, to determine the priority for release of trapped casualties and for decontamination in conjunction with fire and rescue services, and to transport the injured, in order of priority, to receiving hospitals. 3.11 Ambulance services may seek support from voluntary aid societies (e.g. British Red Cross and St John Ambulance) in managing and transporting casualties.

physiotherapy, chest clinics, orthopaedic clinics, dressings, drug regimes and the post-traumatic stress caused by the event. Depending on the nature of the emergency, there may then be a requirement for more long-term health monitoring/surveillance. Appropriate NHS organisations ensure that these services are engaged in NHS emergency preparedness activities.

Private health trusts 3.14 It is the responsibility of NHS organisations to ensure that providers of independent healthcare in their area including independent treatment centres are engaged in the process of planning and response to an emergency. In addition, ambulance services have links with their local private ambulance services for the deployment of agreed resources as required in the event of an emergency.

Strategic Health Authorities (SHAs) in England 3.15 SHAs are the local headquarters of the NHS and, as such, are able to mobilise and commit resources across the authority area. They are responsible for co-ordinating the health response across a widespread incident that affects several hospitals. They will liaise with the Department of Health (DH) to support a regional response.

Acute trusts 3.12 Acute trusts manage local hospitals. Each acute trust including foundation trusts maintains arrangements for dealing with emergencies. In the event of an emergency, ambulance services will designate hospitals with major accident and emergency departments as casualty-receiving hospitals. The trust will provide a clinical response to the emergency, including provision of general support and specialist healthcare to all casualties. The trust, when called upon to do so, will provide a mobile medical team (MMT). Local Health Boards in Wales 3.16 Local Health Boards provide local co-ordination of NHS emergency planning and response within their areas and lead health co-ordination over a wider area covered by each Local Resilience Forum. They liaise with the Welsh Assembly Governments Health and Social Care Department to support a pan-Wales response.

Health Protection Agency (HPA) 3.17 Outbreaks of disease and radiological and chemical incidents have the potential to cause disruption, to communities, on a large scale. The HPA is a non-departmental public body which makes public health advice available to government departments, the NHS, the statutory agencies and directly to the public. It provides a central source of authoritative scientific/medical information and other specialist advice on both the planning and operational responses to public health or other emergencies. This includes providing authoritative

Primary and community care services 3.13 The provision of primary and community care services covers a range of health professions, including general practitioners, community nurses, health visitors, mental health services and pharmacists, many of whom would need to be involved, particularly during the recovery phase of an emergency. In the early stages, following an incident, the focus would be on the follow-up to injuries incurred at the incident, i.e. the continuing recovery of patients,



messages about health protection measures in order to reduce public anxiety. In Wales, the HPA works closely with the National Public Health Service for Wales.

spans across more than one district, a lead coroner should be established to deal with all fatalities. 3.22 Following the recovery of the deceased from the emergency (which in most circumstances will be led and co-ordinated by the police and carried out by trained body-recovery teams), it will be for the coroner to decide whether a post mortem is required to establish the cause of death. On the instruction of the coroner, a pathologist carries out the post mortem. If the death does not require an inquest, the death may be registered on receipt of a coroners certificate detailing the cause of death; if an inquest is required, the coroner registers the death when the inquest is concluded. 3.23 Coroners should have an emergency plan for their own mortuaries in dealing with multiple deaths in terms of how this might impact on the normal working arrangements. Additionally, they are instrumental in the development of local and regional emergency plans for extraordinary emergency mortuary arrangements. It is also vital that coroners are familiar with any major incident plans held by the police. 3.24 The role of the coroners and their officers in terms of planning and responding to emergencies is further explained in the Home Office documents Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies (May 2004) and Interim Guidance and Update (June 2005). Both of these documents are available at

Public health 3.18 The Regional Directors of Public Health (RDsPH) represent the Chief Medical Officer in the English regions. In the event of a major public health emergency, the RDsPH working closely with the directors of the HPA provide public health advice, support and leadership to help SHAs and the wider NHS manage the emergency. They ensure co-ordination with regional resilience mechanisms in preparing for and responding to outbreaks of infectious diseases and other public health emergencies. 3.19 Public health advice is available in Wales from the National Public Health Service for Wales. The service will provide management of the public health aspects of emergencies in Wales, working closely with other parts of the NHS and non-NHS agencies as appropriate.

Department of Health 3.20 DH will take control of the NHS resources, in England, in the event of a complex and significant emergency including those on a national and international scale through its Emergency Preparedness Division Co-ordinating Centre. It will provide the co-ordination and focal point for the NHS and will support the Health Ministers and Secretary of State. It will also co-ordinate with the health departments in the devolved administrations.

Local authorities
3.25 Local authorities play a critical role in civil protection. They have a wide range of functions that are likely to be called upon in support of the emergency services during an emergency (e.g. social services and housing) and crucially exercise a community leadership role. Local authorities maintain a small hub of planners who co-ordinate and facilitate emergency planning and response work across the authority. 3.26 In emergencies that exceed existing mortuary provision, the local authority will liaise with the coroners office to provide emergency mortuary capacity. For further details on arrangements for dealing with fatalities in emergencies see Chapter 5.

HM Coroner
3.21 The role of the coroner is defined by statute. In an emergency, the coroner will be responsible for establishing the identity of the fatalities and the cause and circumstances of death. Essentially, they will determine who has died, how, and when and where the death came about. The coroner will be supported by a deputy and an assistant deputy. Current legislation dictates that a body lying in a coroners district (irrespective of where death has occurred) will trigger and determine jurisdiction, provided the deceased has died from violence or sudden death of an unknown cause. If an emergency



3.27 The welfare of emergency response personnel is an important consideration in the case of a protracted emergency. This will include catering facilities, toilets and rest rooms. Depending on the circumstances and available premises, the local authority may provide facilities for use by all agencies, in one place. 3.28 As the emphasis moves from response to recovery, the local authority will take the lead in facilitating the rehabilitation of the community and the restoration of the environment. 3.29 It will play an enabling role in close collaboration with a wide range of bodies who are not routinely involved in emergency response (e.g. Regional Development Agencies, building proprietors and land owners). In particular, the local authority will work with partners to: meet the longer-term welfare needs of survivors (e.g. social services support and financial assistance from appeal funds) and the community (e.g. anniversaries and memorials, helplines and drop-in centres); and facilitate the remediation and reoccupation of sites or areas affected by an emergency.

in England and Wales. As an environmental regulator, with a wide range of roles and responsibilities, it responds to many different types of incident affecting the natural environment, human health or property. 3.32 The Environment Agencys main priorities, at incidents, are to: prevent or minimise the impact of the incident; investigate the cause of the incident and consider enforcement action; and seek remediation, clean-up or restoration of the environment. 3.33 The role of the Environment Agency at an incident depends on the nature of the event. In a flood event, it focuses on operational issues such as issuing flood warnings and operating its flood defence assets to protect communities at risk. In a pollution incident, it will seek to prevent/ control and monitor the input of pollutants to the environment. In other emergencies (such as animal disease outbreaks), its principal role is usually to regulate and provide advice and support on waste disposal issues.

Health and Safety Executive Port health authorities 3.30 These are separately constituted local authorities that carry out a range of functions at seaports and airports. Their primary duties relate to the control of infectious disease, environmental protection, imported food control and hygiene on vessels. In some instances, they are part of a local authority, in others they may be a joint board of local authorities serving a number of ports in a harbour, or a single authority carrying out the function across the districts of a number of local authorities. They work closely with the Health Protection Agency, Food Standards Agency, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the National Public Health Service for Wales. 3.34 HSEs mission is to protect peoples health and safety by ensuring that risks in the workplace are properly controlled. HSE regulates health and safety in nuclear installations, mines, factories, farms, hospitals, schools, offshore gas and oil installations and other workplaces. It also regulates the safety of the gas grid, railway safety, and many other aspects of the protection of both workers and the public. 3.35 HSEs remit encompasses the workplace health and safety of other responding agencies, including the emergency services. In addition, its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) experts can provide relevant specialist or technical advice to support planning for, response to and recovery from emergencies, especially, but not exclusively, those events that involve major hazard industrial sites. HSE is not, itself, an emergency service.

Government agencies and other NDPBs

The Environment Agency 3.31 The Environment Agency is the leading public body for protecting and improving the environment

Highways Agency 3.36 The Highways Agency is responsible for the overall management and maintenance of all motorways and trunk roads within England, otherwise known as the



Strategic Roads Network. It becomes involved with any incident that adversely affects or disrupts the normal operation and availability of the road network. These include incidents involving vehicles and, less frequently, such things as terrorist threats/activity, demonstrations on the roads or severe weather. 3.37 At the time of writing, the Highways Agency is undergoing a major transition towards becoming a full, 24-hours-a-day operational response organisation. Once completed (estimated 2007), the National Traffic Control Centre (NTCC) will be a central hub for the collection and dissemination of traffic and travel information using all familiar forms of media. Seven Regional Control Centres, situated throughout England will further assist with collection and dissemination of information and will also act as control centres for the management of localised incidents. Highways Agency Traffic Officers will liaise with and help road users, assist the police, and assist with the clearance of incidents and with general management of traffic, including diversions. 3.38 In Wales, responsibility for the operation and management of the motorway and trunk road networks rests with the Welsh Assembly Government.

3.42 Co-located with the MCA is the Secretary of States Representative (SOSREP). SOSREP is empowered under merchant shipping legislation to intervene on behalf of the Secretary of State for purposes relating to safety or pollution in respect of ships, given certain conditions. This includes powers to give directions. SOSREP has similar powers regarding pollution from offshore oil and gas installations. 3.43 The MCAs emergency response and recovery roles are further explained in the Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom and the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution. Both documents may be found on the MCAs website at

The Armed Forces

3.44 The Armed Forces national structure, organisation, skills, equipment and training can be of benefit to the civil authorities in managing the response to and recovery from emergencies. This support is governed by the Military Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA) arrangements. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) joint doctrine publication Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience sets out the detailed rules and procedures governing the employment of the Armed Forces for MACA operations. This can be accessed at defencecontrib.pdf. Reserves, including Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces (CCRFs), can be deployed alongside regular service personnel. 3.45 The Armed Forces maintain no standing forces for MACA tasks. There are, by definition, no permanent or standing MACA responses. Assistance is provided on an availability basis and the Armed Forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. Neither the production of contingency plans nor Armed Forces participation in civil exercises guarantees the provision of MACA support. It is therefore essential that responding agencies do not base plans upon assumptions of military assistance: the Armed Forces should be called upon only as a last resort. The provision of Armed Forces support requires approval by a Defence Minister following a request by a government department.1

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) 3.39 The MCA is an executive agency of the Department for Transport. The MCAs Directorate of Operations includes HM Coastguard (responsible for civil maritime search and rescue) and the Counter Pollution and Response Branch. 3.40 The primary responsibility of HM Coastguard is to initiate and co-ordinate civil maritime search and rescue within the UK Search and Rescue Region. This includes mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist people in distress at sea, or in danger on the cliffs or shoreline, or in certain inland areas. The Counter Pollution and Response Branch is responsible for dealing with pollution at sea, and assists local authorities with the shoreline clean-up. 3.41 HM Coastguard may assist other emergency services and local authorities during civil emergencies, such as flooding, at the specific request of the police or local authority.

Unit commanders have prior approval in certain limited circumstances to provide urgent assistance where it is necessary to save life, alleviate distress or protect property in the event of an emergency without specific approval.



3.46 The Army acts as the lead service for MACA on land. The Regional Brigade Headquarters will be able to give advice and should be contacted in the first instance. All such headquarters have 24-hour emergency contact telephone numbers. The MoDs Joint Regional Liaison Officer may act in a liaison capacity within local or regional civil emergency control centres when appropriate, providing a link to the MoDs UK command structure. Liaison involves the provision of advice and exchange of information. It does not guarantee the provision of support. In exceptional circumstances, requests for assistance may be directed to any service unit, station or establishment. 3.47 Any requests for assistance should focus on the capability required: the solution will be determined by the availability of military resources and the commanders judgement. Templates for requesting MACA assistance can be found in Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience. 3.48 Where there is a direct threat to life, the MoD may, at its discretion, choose to waive the recovery of costs. In cases where human life is not deemed to be in danger, civil organisations will be required to meet all or some of the costs of the service response. When the response moves towards the recovery phase, and danger to human life subsides, continued military assistance will be considered as routine and charged for at rates determined by the MoD. Civil authorities should consider the disengagement of military assistance at this point, if very high costs are to be avoided.

The private sector

Essential service providers 3.50 There is a wide range of private sector bodies that while not routinely involved in the core of multi-agency emergency response and recovery work will have an important role in the response to and recovery from incidents affecting their sectors. They include: gas and electricity transmitters and distributors; fixed and mobile telecommunications providers; water and sewerage undertakers; and a range of transport companies. 3.51 They are crucial players in the response and recovery, and will work closely with emergency services and local authorities to deliver timely restoration of essential services and to minimise the wider impact on the community. 3.52 There are established sector-specific emergency planning arrangements in each of these sectors to build resilience and put in place effective response frameworks. For example, emergency management done by water and sewerage undertakers is governed by a Security and Emergency Measures Direction (SEMD) made under Section 208 of the Water Industry Act 1991. 3.53 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 defines these organisations as Category 2 responders, requiring them to co-operate and share information with Category 1 and other Category 2 responders. This multi-agency co-operation will ensure that these industries own arrangements are fully linked with those of the wider emergency management community. 3.54 There are also established multi-agency arrangements for dealing with incidents affecting sites covered by the Control of Major Accident Hazards, Pipelines Safety, and Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations.

Search and rescue (SAR) 3.49 The MoD has responsibility for providing SAR facilities for military operations, exercises and training within the UK and, by agreement, for civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of the Department for Transport. Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR coverage requirements, they will be made available for civil maritime and land-based SAR operations. The MoD establishes and maintains the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) at RAF Kinloss for the operation and co-ordination of civil and military aeronautical SAR, and requests for aeronautical SAR assistance should be placed directly with ARCC.

Other private sector organisations 3.55 A wider community of industrial or commercial organisations may also play a direct role in the response to emergencies, especially if their organisation is the cause of an emergency (e.g. industrial accident at their premises); is affected by an emergency (e.g. staff need to be evacuated); or can provide resources required to mitigate the effects



of an emergency (e.g. food retailers, caterers). Site or service managers may, therefore, become involved in emergency response and recovery work. 3.56 In the recovery phase, the private sector will play a significant part, given the size of the resources, specialist expertise and capabilities (e.g. site clearance, decontamination and engineering) at its disposal. It also has a direct commercial interest in ensuring the remediation of sites and the rapid rehabilitation of the communities they operate within. 3.57 Insurance is a key enabler in the recovery process and the insurance industry is, therefore, an important player. Insurance staff (e.g. loss adjusters) can deploy to the scene rapidly. The Association of British Insurers (ABI) provides insurance information and advice to members of the public who have suffered loss or damage as a result of an emergency. They have the capability to set up an advice service close to the scene, if required. There is a strong case for building the insurance industry into planning arrangements. This will ensure that the need to give insurance industry personnel appropriate access to the scene is given due consideration.

services, whether as individual volunteers or as members of local or national volunteer organisations. Statutory responders should develop and implement agreed processes for activating call-out mechanisms and systems for organising, managing, briefing and debriefing volunteers. The voluntary sector should also be included in post-response review and evaluation activity. 3.60 Mutual aid arrangements do exist within and between many of the voluntary sector organisations, for activation as required, particularly across boundaries. In the event of a major or international emergency, voluntary sector support may be accessed through the head offices of the relevant voluntary organisations or through the Voluntary Sector Civil Protection Forum or the National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee (NVASEC). 3.61 Through local multi-agency liaison arrangements (i.e. Local Resilience Forum (LRF)), the statutory services will maintain an overview of the services that are offered across a range of voluntary organisations and will provide an agreed system for co-ordinating the voluntary sector response, including members of the public who may volunteer their services in response to an incident (convergent volunteers). It is important to avoid double-counting and gaps in service provision by indicating which statutory responder has first call on (or priority need for) any particular voluntary sector contribution. 3.62 Agencies using volunteers may become responsible for the health and safety of volunteers and will need to ensure that they are properly equipped, trained, supervised and supported. Statutory responders may also enter into agreements with voluntary organisations in relation to the payment of costs.

The voluntary sector

3.58 The voluntary sector can provide a wide range of operational and support skills and services to statutory responders. These skills and services include: practical support: first aid, support to ambulance services, supporting hospital personnel, referral to other organisations, rescue, refreshments and emergency feeding, searching for survivors, transportation and medical services (e.g. diagnosis, administration of drugs); psycho-social support: comforting, befriending, listening, helplines, support lines, support networks, advice, counselling, spiritual support and group therapy; equipment: communications (e.g. radios), medical aid equipment (e.g. mobility aids), bedding, clothing and hygiene packs (e.g. washing kits); and information services: public training (e.g. first aid, flood preparation), communications and documentation. 3.59 Statutory responders should be aware of the capabilities and capacity of local voluntary organisations and the means of accessing their

The community
3.63 The community can play a vital role in the response to and recovery from emergencies. It can provide resources, expertise and knowledge in support of the response agencies. Members of the community may need to provide self-help and can also provide support for local vulnerable people who may need physical assistance or reassurance. 3.64 There will also be local networks for the dissemination of information that the response



agencies need to pass on to the local community. The community may also be able to advise on the different cultural or language needs of its members. 3.65 Response agencies should take account of this local resource when responding to emergencies. Some local authorities have recognised its potential by developing community response plans, particularly in relation to specific risks (flooding, major accident hazard sites, nuclear sites, etc.). 3.66 In the recovery phase, members of the community will want to help themselves and support each other, and may establish support groups. They should be consulted at all stages when the response agencies are developing their recovery strategies. It is particularly important to consult the community before establishing plans for any rebuilding or regeneration of the affected area. The community should also be involved in any memorial services or appeal funds.



Chapter 4 Management and co-ordination of local operations

There is a common set of objectives applicable to the multi-agency response to, and recovery from, all emergencies (paragraph 4.1). There is an agreed national framework for managing the local multi-agency response to, and recovery from, emergencies. This chapter describes the three management tiers that comprise the framework (i.e. gold, silver and bronze); their roles and responsibilities; the interaction between the tiers; and the interaction between individual agencies within the tiers (paragraphs 4.24.32). It is a generic framework and the principles and procedures underpinning it are flexible enough to be used to manage a wide range of emergencies. However, further guidance is given on the considerations that may apply in relation to: localised emergencies (paragraphs 4.334.43); wide-area emergencies (paragraphs 4.444.52); terrorist incidents (paragraph 4.53); maritime emergencies (paragraphs 4.544.61); and procedures and considerations for the management of evacuations (paragraphs 4.624.76). The management of recovery operations is also described (paragraphs 4.774.88). It also provides guidance on information management, contingency telecommunications arrangements and debriefs (paragraphs 4.894.111).



Objectives for a combined response

4.1 Agencies that may be involved in emergency response and recovery at the local level all work to the following set of common objectives: saving and protecting life; relieving suffering; containing the emergency limiting its escalation or spread; providing the public with warnings, advice and information; protecting the health and safety of personnel; safeguarding the environment; protecting property; maintaining or restoring critical services; maintaining normal services at an appropriate level; promoting and facilitating self-help in the community; facilitating investigations and inquiries (e.g. by preserving the scene and effective records management); facilitating the physical, social, economic and psychological recovery of the community; and evaluating the response and recovery effort and identifying lessons to be learned.

4.5 Within this framework, the management of the emergency response and recovery effort is undertaken at one or more of three ascending levels, which are defined by their differing functions rather than by specific rank, grade or status: bronze operational level; silver tactical level; and gold strategic level. 4.6 The terms bronze, silver and gold are used consistently throughout this publication to describe these tiers of joint, multi-agency emergency management. Some organisations use the descriptors operational, tactical and strategic as a substitute. While these terms may be more accessible to those personnel not routinely involved in dealing with emergencies, they can cause confusion for two reasons. Firstly, the meaning of the terms operational and tactical differs between the Armed Forces and some civil organisations. Secondly, in some instances the nature or severity of an emergency may necessitate the involvement of the regional tier in England, a devolved administration or UK central government. In some instances, the strategic level will shift upwards from the local level, although the functions of the bronze, silver and gold teams at the local level will remain broadly the same. 4.7 In rapid onset emergencies within a limited geographical area, the emergency management framework is usually constructed from the bottom up and the bronze level will be activated first. Escalation of the event (in severity or geographical extent) or greater awareness of the situation may require the implementation of a silver or even a gold level. There will also be situations in which all three levels may be activated concurrently, and others (e.g. widearea, slow onset emergencies) when the response may be initiated by central government or by the regional tier. Decisions on the activation of management levels should be guided by flexibility, functional requirements and two broad precepts. Firstly, the principle of co-ordination at the highest necessary level should be applied. Secondly, it is better to activate gold on a precautionary basis and then stand it down than be forced to activate it belatedly under the pressure of events. 4.8 In its planning, each agency will need to recognise the three tiers of management and their support requirements, which are described in more detail in the following paragraphs. The tiers of

Management framework
4.2 Emergencies involve a large number of agencies that need to co-operate and support each other. Procedures and capabilities need to be well integrated for response and recovery work to be effective. 4.3 There is a generic national framework for managing emergency response and recovery that is applicable irrespective of the size, nature or cause of an emergency, but remains flexible enough to be adapted to the needs of particular circumstances. Adoption of this nationally agreed management framework will help integrate plans and procedures within and between agencies and across geographical boundaries. It also ensures that all agencies understand their roles and responsibilities in the combined response. 4.4 This framework identifies the various tiers of management in emergency response and recovery, and defines the relationships between them. It provides a common framework within which individual agencies can develop their own response and recovery plans and procedures.



management do not predetermine the rank or status of the individuals involved, but act as simple descriptors of their functions.

Bronze the operational level

4.9 Bronze is the level at which the management of immediate hands-on work is undertaken at the site(s) of the emergency or other affected areas. 4.10 Personnel first on the scene will take immediate steps to assess the nature and extent of the problem. Bronze commanders will concentrate their effort and resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility for example, the police will concentrate on establishing cordons, maintaining security and managing traffic. They will act on delegated responsibility from their parent organisation until higher levels of management are established. 4.11 Agencies retain control of resources and personnel deployed at the scene, but each agency must liaise and co-ordinate with all other agencies involved to ensure a coherent and integrated effort. In most instances, the police will co-ordinate the operational response at an identifiable scene. 4.12 These arrangements will usually be adequate to deal with most events or situations, but, if events demand greater planning, co-ordination or resources, an additional tier of management may be necessary. A key function of a bronze commander will be to consider whether circumstances warrant a silver level of management and to advise his/her superiors accordingly. 4.13 Where the silver level of management is established, bronze commanders become responsible for implementing the silver commanders tactical plan within their geographical area or functional area of responsibility. To discharge this successfully, they need to have a clear understanding of the silver commanders intent and plan, their tasks, and any restrictions on their freedom of action, on which they in turn can brief their staff.

usually comprise the most senior officers of each agency committed within the area of operations, and will assume tactical command of the event or situation. Silver commanders will: determine priorities for allocating available resources; plan and co-ordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken; obtain additional resources if required; assess significant risks and use this to inform tasking of bronze commanders; and ensure the health and safety of the public and personnel. 4.15 Although each of the senior officers at the silver level will have specific service or agency responsibilities, together they must jointly deliver the overall multi-agency management of the incident and ensure that bronze commanders have the means, direction and co-ordination required to deliver successful outcomes. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, silver should not become directly involved in the detailed operational tasks being discharged by bronze. 4.16 In a rapid onset emergency when there is an identifiable scene and the emergency services are in the lead, then silver will usually work from an incident control point located nearby or directly adjacent to the scene. An alternative location should always be identified as a back-up. 4.17 The effectiveness of silver as a joint, multiagency organisation rests on a systematic approach to multi-agency co-ordination. Irrespective of the pressure of operations, the lead commander must create time for regular, structured briefing, consultation and tasking meetings with his counterparts and key liaison officers. Collocation will assist these processes, which should be defined, documented and embedded through training. 4.18 When an emergency occurs without a specific scene (e.g. disruption to the fuel supply or an overseas emergency with domestic effects), a silver headquarters may still be required to deliver effective multi-agency co-ordination. 4.19 In those cases where it becomes clear that resources, expertise or co-ordination are required beyond the capacity of silver (e.g. where there is more than one scene or incident), it may be

Silver the tactical level

4.14 The purpose of the silver level is to ensure that the actions taken by bronze are co-ordinated, coherent and integrated in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. Silver will



necessary to invoke the gold level of management to take overall command and set the strategic direction. Once this occurs, silver commanders will continue to effect multi-agency co-ordination within their area of responsibility, while simultaneously directing tactical operations within the strategic direction and parameters set by gold.

therefore, be appropriate for an agency not involved at strategic level nevertheless to send liaison officers to meetings of the SCG. 4.24 As part of the tasking process, SCGs may commission the formation of a series of supporting groups to address particular issues. For example, given the likely demands of the immediate response from gold, it is good practice, in most emergencies with significant recovery implications, to establish a Recovery Working Group (RWG). 4.25 SCGs must develop a strategy for providing warnings, advice and information to the public and dealing with the media. If a Lead Government Department is engaged in the emergency, then the co-ordination of media lines and information given directly to the public is essential if public confidence is to be maintained. Chapter 6 of this guidance addresses media management and communicating with the public in more detail. 4.26 Further strategic issues that may require the formation of specific sub-groups include: humanitarian assistance for those affected by the emergency (see also Chapter 5); facilitating inquiries and investigations; visits by VIPs; and international and diplomatic dimensions. 4.27 The SCG does not have the collective authority to issue executive orders. Each organisation represented retains its own responsibilities and exercises control of its own operations in the normal way. The SCG, therefore, has to rely on a process of discussion and consensus to reach decisions at gold level, and to ensure that the agreed strategic aims and objectives are implemented at the silver and bronze levels. Effectiveness at gold level therefore rests upon every member having a clear understanding of the roles, responsibilities and constraints of other participants. The required mutual understanding and trust will be cemented through training and exercising. 4.28 SCGs must comprise representatives with the appropriate mix of seniority and authority in order to be effective. Wherever possible, representatives should be empowered to make executive decisions in respect of their organisations resources. In any case, representatives must be able to obtain decisions

Gold the strategic level

4.20 Where an event or situation has an especially significant impact or substantial resource implications, involves a large number of organisations or lasts for an extended duration, then it may be necessary to implement multi-agency management at the gold level. The multi-agency group, which brings together gold commanders from relevant organisations, is called the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), although it is also commonly referred to as gold command or simply gold. 4.21 Emergencies can place considerable demands on the resources of responding agencies and can pose significant challenges in terms of business continuity management. Furthermore, they may have long-term implications for communities, economies and the environment. These require the attention of top-level management. 4.22 The purpose of the SCG is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency and to establish the policy and strategic framework within which silver will work. The SCG will: determine and promulgate a clear strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly; establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation; prioritise the demands of silver and allocate personnel and resources to meet requirements; formulate and implement media-handling and public communication plans; and direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response in order to facilitate the recovery process. 4.23 The requirement for strategic management may not apply to all responding agencies owing to differing levels of engagement. However, emergencies are invariably multi-agency and rarely remain within the ambit of a single agency. It may,



quickly. In a long-running emergency, the need for personnel to hand over to colleagues will undoubtedly arise. This underlines the necessity for each organisation to select, train and warn sufficient senior individuals who are capable of fulfilling this role. 4.29 It will normally be the role of the police to co-ordinate the gold management level and therefore to chair the SCG, particularly where there is an immediate threat to human life, a possibility that the emergency was a result of criminal activity, or significant public order implications. However, depending on the nature of the emergency, this role may be undertaken by another agency (e.g. in some health emergencies). In these circumstances an agency other than the police may initiate and lead the SCG. 4.30 Furthermore, the leadership of the SCG in the recovery phase may pass to another agency if its role and responsibilities leave it better placed to take on the role (e.g. the local authority). The identification of lead agencies in relation to specified emergencies and transitional arrangements in relation to the recovery phase will be agreed and exercised in the preparation phase (see Chapters 5 and 7 of Emergency Preparedness). 4.31 The SCG should be based at an appropriate location away from the scene. This will usually be at the headquarters of the lead service or organisation (e.g. police headquarters). The location of SCG meetings may shift if another agency takes the lead in relation to the recovery phase. In the preparation phase, consideration should be given to the arrangements suitable for a range of scenarios and alternative locations should be identified for business continuity purposes. 4.32 Depending on the nature, extent and severity of the emergency, either the regional tier or central government may become involved. The SCG will then become the primary interface with these other levels of response. Detailed descriptions of when the regional and national levels may become involved, what their likely contribution will be, how they will be organised, and liaison with the local level can be found in Chapters 712.

Using and adapting the management framework in specific circumstances

The response to localised emergencies 4.33 Within the United Kingdom, there is substantial experience of managing emergencies that occur within the bounds of relatively small geographical areas and have localised effects (e.g. explosions or major fires). 4.34 To bring order to the response and reduce the potential for confusion, it is important that the emergency services establish control over the immediate area and also build up arrangements for co-ordinating individual agencies contributions to the response. Each agency needs to establish its own control arrangements, but continuous liaison between them is essential. Effective response depends on good communication and mutual understanding, which is built up through planning, the development of protocols and joint exercises. 4.35 It is generally accepted that the first members of the emergency services to arrive on the scene should make a rapid assessment and report back to the control room. The control room that receives the initial report should, in accordance with established plans, alert the other emergency services and relevant partner agencies. 4.36 In accordance with their own procedures, those agencies will then alert personnel or activate appropriate response and recovery plans to the level they judge necessary. Agreed protocols should be in place to alert any commercial or industrial organisations whose premises, services or personnel could be affected, or required as part of the response and recovery effort. Voluntary organisations that may be required to support the response and recovery effort should be informed at the earliest opportunity, in accordance with established plans. 4.37 For localised incidents, silver commanders will usually operate from an incident control point established in the vicinity of the incident site. 4.38 Arrangements that are necessary in the immediate vicinity of the scene include the following:



assessing control measures with regard to reducing risk; deciding the functions to be controlled by each agency after taking account of: the circumstances; the professional expertise of the emergency services and other agencies; statutory obligations; and overall priorities; reception and engagement of utility companies staff (e.g. gas, electricity and water) on essential safety work, or to effect the restoration of essential services, where appropriate; and setting up an inner cordon to secure the immediate scene and provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area, as illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. All those entering the inner cordon should report to a designated cordon access point. This ensures that they can be safely accounted for should there be any escalation of the incident, and affords an opportunity for briefing about the evacuation signal, hazards, control measures and other issues about which they need to be aware. People entering the inner cordon must have an appropriate level of personal protective equipment, while those leaving must register their departure. 4.39 If practical, an outer cordon may have to be established around the vicinity of the incident to control access to a much wider area around the site,

as shown in Figure 4.2. This will allow the emergency services and other agencies to work unhindered and in privacy. Access through the outer cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel should be by way of a scene access control point. The outer cordon may then be further supplemented by a traffic cordon. 4.40 Other issues that should be addressed at this level include: establishing internal traffic routes for emergency and other vehicles (including a one-way system where appropriate); and deciding on the location of key functions or facilities, for example: casualty clearing station(s) to which the injured can be taken; an ambulance loading point for those who need to be taken to hospital; a collection/assembly point for survivors before they are taken to a Survivor Reception Centre; possible helicopter landing site(s); a rendezvous point or points for all responding personnel, which may be some distance from the scene in the event of a bomb incident or incidents involving hazardous materials; a marshalling area for assembling vehicles and equipment; a body holding area that is under cover and protected from public view; and a media liaison point.

Figure 4.1: Setting up an inner cordon


Inner cordon

Forward control points (FCPs)


Ambulance Cordon access point Local authority




Figure 4.2: Setting up an outer cordon

Incident control points (ICPs) Outer cordon
Rendezvous point Others Police Fire Ambulance Local authority

Inner cordon

Survivor assembly point Casualty clearing station Ambulance loading point Body holding area Vehicle marshalling area Media liaison point


The possible need for evacuation of the public from the immediate vicinity may also have to be considered at a very early stage. Other functions will be carried out outside the immediate scene. Box 4.1 details these. 4.41 For the majority of localised emergencies, there are significant benefits if a liaison officer represents the interests of the relevant local authority or local authorities at the incident control point, if this is established. Arrangements should also be in place for calling in liaison officers from other organisations that may need to contribute to the response (e.g. the Environment Agency, health organisations and utilities). Liaison officers at the scene should be clearly identifiable. They should be equipped with their own communications so that they can remain in contact with their organisations to obtain any further support rapidly. 4.42 Where local authority services might be required at short notice, resources should be

assembled nearby so that they are ready for immediate action if called upon by the emergency services. Some functions will by their very nature be discharged outside cordons and away from the scene but remain essential components of an integrated response. Similarly, it may be appropriate for emergency services and other organisations to be represented within the local authoritys emergency/crisis management centre, which provides the focus for the management and co-ordination of local authority activities. 4.43 If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, it is essential that a site incident officer from the affected organisation establishes liaison with responding organisations. Such a representative can ease access to facilities within the establishment and act as a link between the establishments senior management and the emergency management structure.

Box 4.1: Key off-scene locations and functions

local authority crisis/emergency centre rest centres Family and Friends Reception Centres Survivor Reception Centres casualty bureau emergency mortuary receiving hospitals media liaison points Family Assistance Centres



The response to wide-area emergencies 4.44 Historically, the United Kingdom has been more fortunate than some other countries, suffering at a lesser frequency and scale from wide-area natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes or major storms and flooding. Nevertheless, it is essential that plans and arrangements are in place to deal with emergencies that are not limited to a single, local scene. 4.45 The framework for managing wide-area emergencies will follow the same generic framework that is applicable to all emergencies, and many of the challenges faced will be similar to emergencies where there is an identifiable scene. However, it is probable that inter-agency strategic management will be required in such circumstances, leading to the activation of Strategic Co-ordinating Groups in all or most affected areas. 4.46 In the early stages of the response there is likely to be an excess of often contradictory information. In this scenario, SCGs will have an especially important role in forming a common recognised information picture. 4.47 In a densely populated country like the UK, where wide-area emergencies are likely to affect large numbers of people, self-help will be the first response. Wide-area emergencies can overwhelm local resources, disrupt telecommunications and cut off access or egress routes. Further blockage of routes may occur as people attempt to leave an affected area. 4.48 Business continuity management will also be a particular challenge. Primary office locations and emergency control centres may have been affected or made inaccessible. The likelihood of a protracted response and recovery effort will also place a heavy burden on staff and resources. 4.49 Wide-area emergencies may affect large parts of one or more regions, and therefore pose challenges in terms of communication, co-ordination and integration. Where a number of SCGs are established, they will need to work closely together to ensure the response is integrated and co-ordinated. There may be a role for the regional

tier in supporting or co-ordinating the local response, and a Lead Government Department may become involved. Further details can be found in Chapters 712. 4.50 Not all emergencies occur suddenly. The emergency management framework set out in this chapter is readily adaptable to slow-onset or rising tide emergencies such as animal disease outbreaks or a disruption to the supply of fuel. However, in these circumstances it becomes more likely that the response will be led from the top-down rather than from the bottom-up, with SCGs being convened at the request of and working within a strategic framework set by government. This is because in certain circumstances central government will be: better sighted on an emerging risk (e.g. through intelligence reports, international liaison or access to specialist advice); well positioned to maintain an overview of the situation as it develops (e.g. patterns of disruption or infection); and able to help ensure a coherent, integrated and robust response (ensuring that pre-emptive action is taken where necessary). 4.51 Effective top-down leadership of an emergency presumes robust and timely information flows upward and downward. Regional Resilience Teams and the Devolved Administrations will play a crucial role in ensuring that this happens, activating the crisis management machinery described in Chapter 8 where necessary. 4.52 Emergencies overseas can also have similar implications for the UK and its citizens, and may impose challenging demands on local responders, for example the 2004 Asian tsunami. However, in such cases (e.g. natural disasters or large-scale evacuations) the effects are likely to be distributed geographically across the UK and are therefore unlikely to overwhelm the resources of a large number of responders. In these circumstances central government, working closely with the police and other agencies, will lead the response by liaising with international counterparts to arrange for the identification and repatriation of the dead, injured and survivors, and by communicating with the public.



Terrorist incidents 4.53 The multi-agency approach and management arrangements described in this guidance are flexible and responsive to the nature of the emergency at hand. The management framework for responding to and recovering from the consequences of a terrorist incident will be similar to that adopted in relation to non-malicious incidents. But in relation to terrorism it may be necessary for the police to take executive action in respect of the entire incident. The impact of terrorist events on public confidence, and the possibility of further attacks, will make the provision of warnings, advice and information to the public particularly important.

signatory, and with the provisions of the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual. In general, the handling of maritime emergencies is an international business, and good working relationships have been established with neighbouring states. 4.58 The at-sea response in a marine pollution incident significant enough to require a national level of intervention will be co-ordinated from a Marine Response Centre established by the MCAs Counter Pollution Branch at the time of the incident. The Marine Response Centre will work closely with the Salvage Control Unit established by the Secretary of States Representative (SOSREP) if required to assist him in matters of salvage control. SOSREP may set up a similar Operations Control Unit in cases involving the offshore oil and gas industry. The Marine Response Centre and/or the Salvage Control Unit may be located at the nearest RCC or in a harbour authority or other suitable building, depending on the circumstances of the incident. Prior to their establishment, the Counter Pollution Branch and/or SOSREP may operate from the Marine Emergencies Information Room (MEIR) at MCAs headquarters in Southampton. 4.59 It is important to remember that maritime incidents are likely to have an on-shore dimension. It is essential that land and maritime authorities liaise at the earliest opportunity to address the particular problems caused by such emergencies. Inter-agency liaison needs to recognise the shore-based consequences at an early stage and make appropriate arrangements. In SAR incidents this will include the reception of survivors and the deceased brought ashore, for which the land-based authorities are responsible (e.g. local authorities). In pollution incidents affecting the shoreline, this dimension is co-ordinated from a Shoreline Response Centre, usually established by the local authority most affected. 4.60 There is currently no statutory duty for fire and rescue services to respond to offshore incidents. However the MCA has arrangements with strategically located coastal services enabling them to exercise their power to take action at sea in response to incidents such as fires, chemical hazards and collisions involving vessels.

Maritime emergencies 4.54 The objectives of the combined response and the tiered management framework also apply to maritime emergencies. However, the nature of a maritime emergency raises specific management and co-ordination issues that do not arise on land. 4.55 The response to a maritime emergency in which life is at risk will normally be led by a Search and Rescue (SAR) Mission Co-ordinator (SMC) based at one of the Maritime and Coastguard Agencys (MCAs) Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCC).1 The RCC will also initiate the response to maritime pollution incidents by alerting duty officers of the MCAs Counter Pollution Branch. 4.56 There are 18 RCCs around the coast of the UK, plus London Coastguard, based near the Thames Barrier, which co-ordinates SAR on the River Thames. The RCCs are staffed on a 24-hour basis and have a full communications fit. The lead in maritime emergency response at sea and on the coast will be taken by the RCC best placed to do so. 4.57 As regards the SAR operation, the SMC will initiate and co-ordinate the response of various SAR facilities (e.g. RNLI Lifeboats, military and civilian SAR helicopters, Auxiliary Coastguard teams, and/or shipping in the area) and may appoint an On-Scene Co-ordinator and/or an Aircraft Co-ordinator to assist in implementing the SAR plan at the scene of the incident. These arrangements are in keeping with international conventions to which the UK is

MCAs RCCs are subdivided into Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCC) and Maritime Rescue Sub-Centres (MRSC). The generic term RCC is used here for simplicity



4.61 Local planning and response for maritime emergencies should be consistent with the National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations and the Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom. These documents may be found on the MCAs website,

Evacuation 4.62 In some circumstances it may be necessary to advise the public on whether they should evacuate a given area or remain and shelter indoors. Such circumstances include risks to life or health from: release or threatened release of radioactive materials or other hazardous substances; spread of fire; risk of explosion; damage caused by severe storms; risk from serious flooding; and risk of environmental contamination. 4.63 The possible need and operational guidance for evacuation in the event of the release, or threatened release, of radioactive material is set out in Arrangements for Responding to Nuclear Emergencies. 4.64 In the event of the release, or threatened release, of non-radioactive hazardous materials, additional information on the nature of the risk may be obtained from the Fire and Rescue Service, chemical data systems and other accredited sources. Currently, emergency arrangements exist with the Meteorological Office to forecast the direction and spread of any chemical plume, using information provided from the scene together with remote telemetry. 4.65 The Meteorological Office and/or regional weather centres issue severe weather warnings. In addition, the Meteorological Office issues to the police and to the Environment Agency warnings of abnormally high tides that could possibly lead to flooding. The Environment Agency is responsible for issuing to the public and other organisations flood warnings on specific rivers and coastlines. 4.66 It is normally the police who recommend whether or not to evacuate and define the area to be evacuated. Their recommendation will take account of advice from other agencies. The Fire and Rescue Service will inform them about risks associated with

fire, contamination and other hazards. Ambulance services and local authorities can advise on problems associated with moving people who are frail, disabled or at risk for any other reason. Local authorities will also be able to identify individuals or groups of individuals that may need particular support. Local authorities can also advise on the location of pre-designated rest centres and on other possible places of shelter within the area. 4.67 The police can only recommend evacuation and have no power (except within the inner cordon in response to a terrorist incident) to require responsible adults to leave their homes. Past experience has shown that people with domestic pets may be unwilling to leave their homes unless arrangements include them. Local authorities might make arrangements with the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals or local pet shelters for care of pets advice. 4.68 In deciding whether to evacuate or not, it is necessary to assess whether bringing people outdoors may put them at greater risk than leaving them where they are to shelter indoors. This is particularly important in the case of the release of hazardous substances, where terrorist devices may be present, or where flood water levels are likely to rise quickly. 4.69 When planning for contingencies, building occupiers should seek professional advice on whether there are areas in the building where people can shelter safely. Such areas must be structurally robust and should be equipped with telephones, first-aid facilities, adjacent toilet facilities and a water supply. 4.70 The physical and organisational difficulties of large-scale evacuation should not be underestimated. There are particular problems in evacuating hospitals, prisons and nursing homes, and in evacuating those individuals who are at home, but are frail or vulnerable. Large scale evacuation is a last resort owing to the length of time it takes to complete and the risks the public may be exposed to as a consequence of being evacuated. Local planning should include arrangements to support people sheltering in their own homes where this is the safest option. 4.71 However, when there is a decision to evacuate, evacuation assembly points should be set up near the



affected area. If time permits, these should be signposted. People in the affected area should be advised to go to their nearest evacuation assembly point. People taking prescribed and other medications should be reminded to carry these with them, and particular attention needs to be paid to those with sensory impairment. 4.72 Bearing in mind that evacuation may be at different times of day or night and from locations as different as homes, industrial complexes, shopping malls, venues, ports or airports, various methods can be used for warning and informing the public: loudhailers, tannoys, mobile public address systems, radio or TV announcements, works sirens, display screens, scoreboards and monitors, or various combinations of these methods. 4.73 The police will, as far as is practicable, take steps to ensure the security of property left empty after evacuation. In the event of an extended evacuation, the local authority may have to consider other security arrangements. 4.74 Arrangements for warning, evacuation and securing property must take account of any safety risks to emergency service and local authority personnel that arise from exposure to hazards. 4.75 At the evacuation assembly point, the dispersal of evacuees to survivor reception centres or rest centres must be co-ordinated. Reception and rest centres should maintain a comprehensive index of evacuees and their whereabouts. The police will need this information, initially for casualty bureau purposes. They may also need it later if they have to interview witnesses. 4.76 In order to account for all evacuees from an affected area, it is important to encourage those leaving reception or rest centres to register their intended destination when they leave, whether they are returning home or staying elsewhere (see also Chapter 5).

4.78 SCGs may task a Recovery Working Group with bringing key agencies together to give momentum to the recovery management effort within the overall strategic framework. It will form the focus for integrated initiation and planning on recovery, while ensuring the coherence of response and recovery work. 4.79 The Recovery Working Group (RWG) brings together the key agencies involved and is led by a senior officer of the agency most appropriate to the task. In many cases, the RWG will be led by the local authority, given its functions in relation to the remediation of the physical environment, co-ordination of welfare support and community leadership. The RWG will seek to: ensure that longer-term recovery priorities are reflected in the planning and execution of the response; ensure that relevant organisations in the public, private and voluntary sectors are engaged in the recovery effort from the earliest opportunity; and ensure continuity of the management of the emergency once the response phase has been concluded. 4.80 While the response and recovery phases run in parallel, it is crucial that leadership and co-ordination of the overall multi-agency effort is clearly defined. In the case of most emergencies the police will lead the response phase and will chair the SCG. The recovery effort will be led by the organisation with the most appropriate combination of responsibility, capability and management capacity. In most cases, the multi-agency recovery effort is likely to be led by the local authority, drawing together all relevant agencies. 4.81 Recovery work taking place during the response phase needs to be co-ordinated within the strategic framework established by the SCG. For example, if an RWG is established it should operate as a subgroup of the SCG rather than as an autonomous and unconnected stream of work. 4.82 The decision to move from a phase in which response is the strategic priority to a phase in which recovery is the strategic priority will be determined on a case-by-case basis. But it is likely to occur when the immediate response efforts to save life, property and recover evidence have concluded. This judgement will need to be taken by the SCG, which will need to address the issue of transition from response to

Recovery operations 4.77 Multi-agency recovery operations should start as soon as possible after the onset of an emergency ideally this will be taken forward in tandem with the response itself. This is essential both to gain the initiative and to reinforce public confidence.



recovery early on in the process. The handover of leadership and co-ordination too will need to be agreed by the SCG and communicated clearly to all responders involved in the multi-agency effort. To be effective, the recovery process and in particular the transition from response to recovery should be fully integrated into planning, exercising and training programmes. 4.83 The recovery phase may be very long indeed and the achievement of normality may be difficult to identify and define. Rebuilding can take a matter of years; comprehensive decontamination and restitution of the environment may take decades; and the collective and individual human impacts will last longer. 4.84 An effective recovery operation requires wellestablished project and programme management disciplines. This guidance does not cover those subjects, but more information is available in Office of Government Commerce publications such as Managing successful programmes, which can be accessed via 4.85 Emergencies have a wide range of economic, social, health and environmental impacts. Establishing policy and priorities for the recovery effort requires the leadership from elected representatives and active participation from affected communities. 4.86 Community engagement and ownership is fundamental to most recovery operations, and both will contribute to the recovery of the community itself and its members. Whereas urgency and decisiveness are the key features of the response phase, recovery requires thorough consultation, stakeholder management and related activities effective communication with the public is essential. 4.87 In most cases, the private sector will deliver the largest part of the recovery operation, the assets and resources deployed, and the work undertaken. In addition, if the physical losses caused by the

emergency are insured, then the insurance companies will be heavily engaged with individual policyholders and contractors through loss adjustment and settlement. This was evident following the major floods in Yorkshire in 2000, where the burden of recovery operations on public sector bodies was light in comparison with the costs borne by the insurers. 4.88 Annex 1B describes in greater detail the recovery phase and the activities it comprises, identifies the components of the recovery process and outlines some of the support and guidance available.

4.89 Good communications are at the heart of an effective response. Plans must set out arrangements to supplement usual communications facilities and provide properly trained staff. Reliable information must be passed correctly and without delay so that all responding agencies share a common picture of the situation. Effective emergency communications involve many information management activities (see Box 4.2). Essentially, procedures must aim to provide the right people with the right information at the right time in a form that they can understand, assimilate and act upon. 4.90 Planning for emergency communications must therefore pay close attention to procedures, language use, human factors and skilled use of different communications media. Wherever possible, emergency communications procedures must make maximum use of existing skills and routine practices. Appropriate training must be provided for the extra dimensions to communications that emergencies bring.

Telecommunications resilience 4.91 The challenge to overcome in maintaining the availability of the communications systems used by

Box 4.2: Information management activities

providing receiving summarising checking collating relaying capturing interpreting prioritising logging distributing responding editing filtering recording



Box 4.3: Media available for communicating in an emergency

radio land line mobile phone text messaging pager fax e-mail local responders arises from the many diverse commercial organisations offering services (i.e. mobile, fixed, internet and radio) that rely on the same physical infrastructure or are interrelated. This is often not obvious to the customer of the service. Operators do not generally publish information on how their respective networks are built or interconnect. 4.92 There is no single solution to contingency communications; what is required is a layered approach with a range of measures offering a level of capability across a range of potential network incidents or failures. 4.93 Responding agencies should use suitable good practice guidance for procuring resilient telecommunications systems. The National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC) produces guidance that enables responding agencies to make informed decisions about resilience in their dealings with telecommunications service providers (see 4.94 The Cabinet Office through its Central Sponsor for Information Assurance (CSIA) provides telecommunications resilience to a range of key responding agencies in case of disruption to the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). Contingency Telecommunications Provision (CTP) is currently migrating from the Emergency Communication Network (ECN) towards a more modern system providing both fixed and mobile access. The new system will provide a secure and resilient crisis communications capability separate from the PSTN. Further details about contingency telecommunications systems, and telecommunications in general, is available on the CSIA website at 4.95 Responding agencies should make effective use of any available means of contingency geographical information systems (GIS) CCTV databases video conferencing television networks radio networks internet communication. This should also include a programme for testing telecommunications systems both internally and with other responders, and training for those who may be required to use the systems. More information regarding contingency communications systems and telecommunications resilience is available on the CSIA website. 4.96 By virtue of their size and diversity, public fixed-line networks are resilient to a wide range of conditions. The networks are, however, vulnerable to overload in emergencies. 4.97 The UK Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) consists of a core network to connect various areas together, telephone exchanges to route calls, radio equipment to connect mobile users to the network, and the users telephone equipment. Conceptually, the PSTN and PLMN are very similar and it is only the wireless nature of the local connection and the extra management involved that differentiate them. Thus, the PLMN nationally is dependent upon the same core networks as the PSTN for its operation and therefore is no less vulnerable. Additionally, mobile aerial sites suffer from very limited back-up power capability. The mobile networks should not be relied upon as back-up systems for the fixed networks for business continuity purposes. 4.98 A Telecommunication Industry Emergency Planning Forum (TI-EPF) has been established to provide for exchange of information, discussions of risk and counter measures. It maintains a plan for the telecommunications sector to facilitate co-operation in maintaining the critical national infrastructure in times of emergency. 4.99 The TI-EPF also provides a focus for communication between the telecommunications industry and government. It meets regularly, but may also be convened in response to an emergency.



4.100 The membership of the forum comprises a number of fixed, mobile and internet service providers and network operators. More information on the TI-EPF is also available on the CSIA website.

updated. Key numbers for fixed telephones that will continue to be allowed to make outgoing calls under GTPS may not necessarily belong to those with a response role, and other categories should be considered, for example kidney dialysis patients.

ACCess OverLoad Control (ACCOLC) 4.101 The United Kingdom PLMN is susceptible to overload during the immediate period following the onset of an emergency. If invoked, ACCOLC would provide critical cellphone communication for responders with specific on-the-scene response roles during this period. 4.102 Government departments sponsor ACCOLC registrations for organisations concerned with emergency response and recovery work, and strict criteria are applied. 4.103 Invocation of ACCOLC is requested by the Police Gold Commander if key responders are experiencing difficulties accessing the cellular network. In exceptional circumstances, the Cabinet Office may issue the request. 4.104 ACCOLC would be invoked only across the smallest possible area of the network, on a cell-bycell basis. Other cells would continue to operate normally. Once a call was routed out of the ACCOLC restricted cell, it would be treated as a normal call. Users are advised to keep calls as short as possible, ideally no longer than 30 seconds. 4.105 Applicants must be able to assert, and substantiate on demand, that they have specific emergency response roles at the scene of an incident. For further information on ACCOLC registrations and restrictions, please contact CSIA at

Debriefing, inquiries and lessons to be learned

4.108 In order to facilitate operational debriefing and to provide evidence for inquiries (whether judicial, public, technical, inquest or of some other form), it is essential to keep records. Single-agency and inter-agency debriefing processes should aim to capture information while memories are fresh. 4.109 A comprehensive record should be kept of all events, decisions, reasoning behind key decisions and actions taken. Each organisation should maintain its own records. It is important that a nominated information manager be responsible for overseeing the keeping and storage of the records and files created during the response, and also for assuring the retention of those that existed before the emergency occurred. All document destruction under routine housekeeping arrangements should be suspended. All electronic records should be copied directly to non-volatile media. 4.110 Good record-keeping serves a further purpose, whether or not there is a formal inquiry. It allows lessons to be identified and made more widely available for the benefit of those who might be involved in future emergencies. Additionally, chief officers and chief executives will wish to ensure that there is appropriate follow-up to any lessons that emerge from the debriefing process. Appropriate follow-up will depend on the circumstances but might include revision of plans, procedures and training, strengthening of liaison with other agencies, and the devising of targeted exercises to test alternative approaches. 4.111 Debriefing should be honest and open, and its results disseminated widely. This is particularly important when it comes to disseminating lessons identified, which should be considered at local, regional, devolved administration or central government level as appropriate.

Government Telephone Preference Scheme (GTPS) 4.106 Fixed service telephone numbers of essential users can be registered for GTPS. GTPS is available from British Telecom and Cable & Wireless. 4.107 Those responsible for emergency management arrangements must register key numbers in advance and ensure that they are regularly checked and



Chapter 5 Care and treatment of people

Emergencies affect individuals, families and communities in a wide range of ways. The provision of humanitarian assistance is a multi-agency activity and it is important that this work is co-ordinated (paragraphs 5.15.5). This chapter identifies the key groups of people affected by emergencies, and outlines the structures and processes that are put in place to provide care and assistance to meet their needs: the injured (paragraphs 5.65.7); uninjured survivors, including the provision of Survivor Reception Centres and rest centres (paragraphs 5.85.19); families and friends, including the operation of Family and Friends Reception Centres and Family Assistance Centres (paragraphs 5.205.38); the deceased (paragraphs 5.395.41); and rescuers and response workers (paragraphs 5.425.49). This chapter also addresses the specific needs of children and young people; faith, religious, cultural and minority ethnic communities; elderly people; and people with disabilities in emergencies (paragraphs 5.505.60). It also gives specific guidance about memorials and disaster appeal funds (paragraphs 5.615.65). This chapter is primarily oriented towards emergencies occurring in the United Kingdom. However, in dealing with overseas emergencies involving UK citizens, agencies should draw on this guidance selectively and pragmatically.



5.1 Emergencies can cause death and physical injury; they can also have an impact on the psychological, social and economic welfare of individuals affected, as well as their families, friends and wider communities. This chapter identifies the key groups of people affected by emergencies and outlines ways of meeting their needs. 5.2 It is important to recognise at the outset: The range of assistance required in addition to medical assistance and material welfare, many of those affected by an emergency will have social and psychological needs. The range of agencies involved the care and assistance given to meet the needs of those affected lies at the heart of emergency response and recovery work. This brings together a wide range of agencies including: the National Health Service, which provides assistance to those suffering from injury or trauma; police services, who are responsible for establishing the identity of the injured and fatalities, providing information to family and friends and conducting criminal investigations; local authorities, who co-ordinate welfare support and social care; commercial organisations (e.g. transport companies), who may provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by emergencies occurring in their sectors; voluntary organisations, which have particular expertise in dealing with health and welfare needs; and embassy staff where an emergency affects foreign nationals. The period of time this assistance may need to be provided for humanitarian assistance will be required in the immediate aftermath of the incident, but in many cases this need will extend into the medium and longer term. It is important to look beyond the immediate response effort, and consider the longer-term recovery and rehabilitation issues for individuals, families and communities. 5.3 The diverse needs of those affected by emergencies, the range of agencies involved, and the period of time these demands will persist for, make the effective provision of humanitarian assistance a challenging but essential task.

5.4 It is important that agencies work together to ensure that the needs of those affected are dealt with by the most appropriate agency; that there is no duplication of effort; and that individuals and their families and friends are dealt with in a sensitive and joined-up way. In the preparation phase this should be embedded through multi-agency planning and regular training and exercising. 5.5 The Strategic Co-ordinating Group (see Chapter 4) should also take steps to ensure that humanitarian assistance is co-ordinated and effective in the response phase. This might take the form of establishing a working group to advise on this issue if required.

Individuals and groups affected by emergencies

Injured 5.6 The care and treatment of the injured is a high priority response objective. Injured survivors may be taken to a casualty clearing station, which will usually be sited in a building or temporary shelter close to the ambulance loading point. Medical and paramedical personnel will carry out triage and any appropriate stabilisation measures before ensuring that casualties are evacuated in accordance with priorities for hospital treatment. 5.7 The Ambulance Incident Officer who has overall responsibility for the work of ambulance services at the scene of an emergency is responsible for ensuring: the establishment of medical communications on site; the transport of medical teams; whether a Medical Incident Officer (MIO) who is responsible for the management of medical resources at the scene should be appointed; in consultation with the MIO, conveyance of casualties to appropriate receiving hospitals; transport of casualties to distant specialist hospitals by helicopter where appropriate; the provision of ambulance resources necessary for the ongoing treatment of casualties; and the distribution and replenishment of medical and first-aid supplies.



Uninjured survivors 5.8 Those who have survived an emergency with no apparent physical injuries (or with only minor injuries) may nonetheless be traumatised and suffering from shock, anxiety or grief. They will, therefore, need to be treated with care and sensitivity. 5.9 They are often anxious for information about the incident; any family, friends or colleagues who may have been affected by the emergency; the location of other survivors; and what will happen to them next and when. Their initial needs are likely to include: shelter and warmth; information and assistance with contacting family and friends; support in their distress; food and drink; first aid to treat injuries and meet medicinal and mobility needs; and changing, washing and toilet facilities, and perhaps spare clothing. 5.10 Uninjured survivors may also need welfare support beyond these immediate requirements. This could include transport home, finding temporary accommodation and financial advice and assistance. 5.11 Psychological welfare is also important. Some apparently uninjured survivors may display adverse symptoms, immediately or a considerable time later. Experience has shown that the quality of care and support received by survivors in the immediate aftermath of an incident is crucial in managing the longer-term psychological effects. 5.12 Local authorities, particularly social services and education departments, are responsible for co-ordinating the provision of care and welfare support by both the statutory and voluntary sector in emergencies. Two local authority-managed facilities are likely to be established in the immediate aftermath of an incident to provide assistance to uninjured survivors. These facilities may in some cases be co-located.

police documentation teams and interviews undertaken where necessary. It may be established and run initially by the emergency services who will be first on the scene until the local authority becomes engaged in the response. 5.14 Survivors will often be able to provide crucial information about what happened and may be important witnesses at any subsequent trial or inquiry. There must be a balance between the requirement to gather evidence from survivors and the reluctance of some to remain at the scene of their distress. For example, prioritising information might help, so that only names and addresses are taken from those anxious to leave, with further details being obtained later. 5.15 The Survivor Reception Centre is likely to be activated for only a limited period of time, and then may cease operation or migrate into the rest centre facility. The longer-term welfare requirements of survivors will be met through Family Assistance Centres or by local authority social services outreach teams.

Rest centre 5.16 A rest centre is a building designated or taken over by the local authority for the temporary accommodation of evacuees and homeless survivors, with overnight facilities. 5.17 The longer-term housing needs of those made homeless by an emergency or those who need to be evacuated for long periods of time are the statutory responsibility of the local authority. 5.18 The responsibility for organising, staffing and providing logistical support for Survivor Reception Centres and rest centres sits with the local authority. However, the local authority relies upon the contributions of other services to provide effective assistance to uninjured survivors. In particular: the police may need to ensure the security of these facilities, controlling access in order to prevent uninvited media representatives or onlookers disturbing those inside; Primary Care Trusts may be required to give assistance in treating those requiring non-acute medical care and dealing with the effects of trauma; and

Survivor Reception Centre 5.13 The Survivor Reception Centre is a secure area in which survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter and first aid. Information will usually be gathered by



the voluntary sector can augment the local authoritys capabilities and capacity to provide welfare support. 5.19 The flow of information to survivors from responding agencies is also important if anxiety and disruption to lives is to be kept to a minimum.

Family Assistance Centres 5.25 Agencies also need to put in place mechanisms to meet the needs of family and friends who are not reunited with their loved ones during the initial response to the emergency. Family Assistance Centres may be established to provide comprehensive longer-term humanitarian assistance, in particular during the remainder of the response and any subsequent investigations. The scale and nature of the emergency may also influence the longer-term requirement for a Family Assistance Centre and the organisations required to be present. Having considered the potential scale of an incident, the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (see Chapter 4) will make a decision on the opening of a Family Assistance Centre. This decision will draw heavily on the views of the local authority where the Family Assistance Centre would be sited. 5.26 Its fundamental purpose is to act as a one-stopshop for survivors, families and all those impacted by the disaster, through which they can access support, care and advice. The Family Assistance Centre will: act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved individuals and families; survivors; and impacted communities; enable individuals and families to gain as much information as is currently available about missing family members and friends; enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, which enhances the ability to identify loved ones quickly; offer access to a range of facilities that will allow individuals, families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs; and provide a coherent multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that will minimise duplication. 5.27 Local authorities will lead in identifying and establishing these centres, in consultation with police colleagues and the voluntary sector. The responsibility for identifying and securing the use of suitable premises rests with the local authority, which will co-ordinate welfare support to the community in the event of an emergency. It will also be responsible for meeting the costs of securing the use of premises in the planning phase, and for providing the centre itself in the event of an emergency. However, it is important to adopt a multi-agency approach to this task. During the planning phase local authorities may

Family and friends Family and Friends Reception Centres 5.20 Experience has shown that in the immediate aftermath of an incident many people will travel to the scene or to meeting points such as travel terminals if they believe their family or friends may have been involved in an emergency. 5.21 If necessary, the police, in consultation with the local authority, will establish Family and Friends Reception Centres at suitable locations, to help reunite family and friends with survivors it will provide the capacity to register, interview and provide shelter for family and friends. These may be near the scene, in the area of the community affected or at arrival and departure points. Any commercial, industrial or other organisations concerned may also need to be consulted as they may have a role in providing assistance. 5.22 Family and Friends Reception Centres will be staffed by police, local authority staff and suitably trained voluntary organisations. The authorities should also consult and involve representatives of faith communites whenever appropriate. Interpreters may also be required. 5.23 Those responsible should give the fullest possible information to enquirers seeking news of people who might be affected, while taking care to preserve the privacy of the individual. Friends and relatives who may be feeling intense anxiety, shock or grief, need a sympathetic and understanding approach. Proper liaison and control must be in place to ensure that information is accurate, consistent and non-contradictory. 5.24 Again, access may need to be controlled in order to prevent uninvited media representatives or onlookers from disturbing those inside.



enter into agreements with voluntary agencies, establishing clear expectations in relation to the responsibility for the payment of costs (see Chapter 3). The Association of Chief Police Officers produced, and Cabinet Office sponsored, document Humanitarian Assistance in Emergencies: Guidance on Establishing Family Assistance Centres will provide guidance on how to plan for and set up a Family Assistance Centre in an emergency and the organisations which may be able to assist with this process. 5.28 The Family Assistance Centre will exist for a limited period, and ongoing support to survivors, families and affected communities will be provided through outreach groups established by local authorities.

5.32 A police casualty bureau has three fundamental tasks: to obtain relevant information regarding persons involved or potentially involved; to assess and process that information; and to provide accurate information to relatives and friends, the investigating and identification officers and HM Coroner. 5.33 When a casualty bureau is required, its early establishment is essential. Without such a facility, calls from concerned friends and relatives may swamp control centres, with the potential to severely inhibit the management of the response to the incident. Once the bureau is activated and able to receive calls, the media will publicise a dedicated telephone number. 5.34 The bureau telephone numbers must also be passed as soon as possible to telephone network controllers, control rooms for the other emergency services and the local authority (or authorities), receiving hospital switchboards, and embassies (if appropriate). These measures will reduce delays and confusion caused by embassies and relatives ringing round for information. 5.35 As part of this process the police will send documentation teams to each receiving hospital, the mortuary, Survivor Reception Centres and, possibly, rest centres, as well as to relatives. Good co-ordination of this activity is essential to avoid unnecessary duplication of visits, particularly to next of kin. 5.36 In order to fulfil its role, the casualty bureau will: receive enquiries from the general public and file missing person (MISPER) reports; record details (including their whereabouts) of survivors, evacuees, the injured and deceased through reports from police documentation teams, receiving hospitals, Survivor Reception Centres, rest centres, Family and Friends Reception Centres, etc.; formulate a comprehensive list of missing persons; collate data to support identification of persons involved; liaise with the ante mortem team; and inform enquirers (by the most appropriate means) of the condition and location of these persons.

Police Family Liaison Officers 5.29 Following an emergency that involves loss of life, police Family Liaison Officers (FLOs) have a crucial role to play in investigating those believed to be missing and assisting in the identification process by the collection of ante mortem data from families and others. They will be working to a family liaison strategy for the emergency set by the police Senior Identification Manager (SIM). This individual will have overall responsibility for the identification of the deceased on behalf of HM Coroner. 5.30 FLOs have an important role to play in providing a single point of contact particularly in the aftermath of the emergency keeping families informed of developments in respect of the identification and any investigation that may take place. The FLO will also provide a liaison point for other agencies that may be able to assist with the family needs.

Police casualty bureaux 5.31 In many emergencies, establishing the identity and whereabouts of people will be a critical issue. The purpose of a police casualty bureau is to provide a central contact and information point for gathering and distributing information about individuals who have been, or are believed to have been, involved in an incident. For the purposes of the bureau, a casualty may be defined as any person who is directly involved in, or affected by, the incident. This will include survivors, evacuees and the deceased.



Role of commercial organisations 5.37 A number of commercial organisations (e.g. transport companies) offer family assistance services in the event of an emergency occurring in their sector. For example: The UK passenger train operators provide care and support to victims of rail-related emergencies and their family and friends. In conjunction with its members, the Association of Train Operating Companies has developed a Code of Practice, Joint Industry Provision of Customer Care following a Major Passenger Rail Accident, which sets out the framework through which such care and support is provided. Upon notification of an accident, UK airlines and helicopter operators will activate emergency response plans. This will include the assembly of humanitarian assistance teams. 5.38 It is important that any arrangements for call centres opened by transport operators and other commercial organisations to provide information following an emergency are closely linked into police casualty bureau procedures. This will help minimise the potential for duplication of effort and, more importantly, inconsistencies in the messages given out. It is also important that any responding commercial organisation is integrated into the Family Assistance Centre to ensure there is genuine multiagency co-ordination.

plans should consider the welfare of those working with multiple deaths. 5.41 Practical advice on how to plan on a multiagency basis and deliver a sensitive and effective response is detailed in the Home Office documents Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies (May 2004) and Interim Guidance and Update (June 2005). Both of these documents are available at

Rescuers and response workers 5.42 Emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response and recovery effort. Pressure of work may sometimes be sustained over long periods. Agencies need to ensure they look after the physical, emotional and psychological welfare of staff managers should be trained in what to look out for in both the short and longer term. 5.43 Health and safety at work legislation requires employers and others to ensure so far as reasonably practicable a safe place of work and working practices. The legislation is therefore flexible what is reasonably practicable in the challenging circumstances of an emergency will clearly be different to what is reasonably practicable on a dayto-day basis. Responding agencies should apply their training, knowledge and skills in assessing the circumstances they face and should take appropriate precautions. In most cases, this will be to apply their established systems of work and use their usual equipment, including personal protective equipment. Some circumstances may require more detailed assessment (e.g. before the emergency services can safely enter a badly contaminated or unstable building). 5.44 Similarly, legislation on working time is not a bar to the emergency services or others responding to an emergency effectively. Given the way in which working time is calculated (e.g. the 48-hour limit is calculated by averaging time worked over 17 weeks), relatively long periods of long hours can be accommodated. There is also a number of exceptions which will apply depending on the circumstances. However, given the challenging nature of emergency response work, responding agencies should ensure

The deceased 5.39 It is essential that the handling of issues surrounding fatalities is both efficient and sensitive. What is important is that the response as far as it is possible seeks to satisfy the legal requirements for enquiring into what happened and the needs of families, providing timely and accurate information and appropriate support. 5.40 Challenges faced by responding agencies are likely to be diverse and complex. A whole range of activity is likely to be undertaken from recovering the deceased from the incident site to identifying them, and in turn releasing them to families for funerals. A joined-up multi-agency response should be developed and tested through the development of plans;1 these

Lord Justice Clarkes public inquiry on identification of victims following major transport accidents (2001), highlighted that joint training and exercising would assist in delivering an appropriate and sensitive service to families of the deceased.



that shifts are of a reasonable length and rotas are in place to ensure the continuing health, safety and effectiveness of personnel. 5.45 Other physical requirements include: refreshments at any response scene, especially to provide warmth or prevent dehydration; facilities for taking meals away from the front line; washing and changing facilities; medical and first-aid facilities; and telephone and transport provision so people can keep their families informed and get home as quickly as possible. 5.46 With regard to psychological welfare, management should consider the need for: proper briefing to ensure people know what is happening and what their contribution will be; honest information about what to expect where unpleasant or stressful tasks are involved; quiet space to prepare, unwind or think; someone to discuss experiences with, both at the time and afterwards; providing access to information on sources of help or support; information about what constitutes a normal reaction; similar support and information for family or partners; and debriefing at the end of a days activity and the close of operations. 5.47 For many it will be enough to talk through issues with their colleagues or peers, perhaps guided by a suitably trained or experienced person. Some, however, will require skilled professional help. All services should provide access to this in a way that ensures confidentiality and overcomes any cultural resistance. 5.48 In areas of activity that are particularly harrowing it is important to advise personnel (be they professional or voluntary workers) of the nature of the work involved. Training and selection arrangements should aim to ensure that suitable staff are chosen, appropriate training is given and support is available. 5.49 The welfare of personnel remains the responsibility of individual agencies. However, in

some circumstances the local authority may provide premises for a joint emergency service welfare facility. Voluntary organisations may be asked to augment the efforts of occupational health personnel if required.

Meeting the needs of specific groups 5.50 The care and support needs of a range of groups require special consideration. This section focuses on four such groups children and young people; faith, religious or cultural groups; elderly people and disabled people which can make challenging demands on responding agencies.

Children and young people 5.51 Catering for the needs of children and young people raises particular issues. The emotional effects on children and young people are not always immediately obvious to parents or school staff. At times they find it difficult to confide their distress to adults, often because they know it will upset them. In some children the distress can last for months and may affect academic performance. Families, carers and professionals who deal with children and young people need to be aware of the range of symptoms that they may show after a major trauma. They should note any changes in behaviour and alert others. 5.52 There are a number of key issues to consider: The relaying of accurate information to children and young people as well as adults is vital. The families of children and young people caught up in a tragedy need full and accurate information as quickly as possible. Formal debriefing meetings for children, young people and adults can be an important part of the rehabilitation process. Further information on the special arrangements needed when children and young people are caught up in traumatic events is contained in the booklet Wise Before the Event Coping with Crises in Schools. 5.53 Local authorities have professional educational psychologists available to provide the necessary support and assistance to children who have experienced trauma or other problems following an emergency. Their expertise should be sought at an early stage of the response to any emergency where children and young people are involved or affected.



5.54 Working with children and young people brings its own particular strains arrangements must include the welfare needs of support workers. It is important that staff and volunteers who have a specified role in dealing with children and young people in the event of an emergency have undertaken appropriate checks.

needs which necessitate additional sensitivity, care or support or the deployment of specific resources (e.g. mobility aids). Disabilities are wide ranging and may include: physical or sensory impairment (e.g. hearing or sight); learning difficulties; and mental health problems. 5.59 Local authorities will be aware of residential and nursing homes where elderly people or people with disabilities reside or visit for day care. In the event of an emergency, families and neighbours may also bring to the attention of responding agencies elderly and disabled people who do not receive local authority attention. 5.60 It is important to make provision to meet any special needs and to provide additional sensitivity, care or support that may be required. These needs may relate to: information; communication and understanding; mobility; medication; and reassurance.

Faith, religious, cultural and minority ethnic communities 5.55 Any emergency occurring in the UK is likely to involve members of different faith, religious, cultural and ethnic minority communities. Emergency services, local authorities and other responding agencies should bear their needs in mind. In communities where this can be reasonably anticipated, suitable arrangements should be built into plans. In cases such as transport accidents it is more difficult to predict who will be affected, but planning should at least identify which organisations can provide help and maintain advice on how to engage them. 5.56 Some people may have language difficulties: help from translators and interpreters may therefore be needed. Any interpreters used should be aware of the principles of responding to and recovering from emergencies (and will need appropriate support afterwards). Particular faith, religious, cultural and minority ethnic requirements may relate to medical treatment, gender issues, hygiene, diet, clothing, accommodation and places for prayer. Depending on the faith, religion, culture and ethnicity of the deceased or bereaved, there may also be concern about how the deceased are managed, and the timing of funeral arrangements. 5.57 Various sections of faith communities have wellestablished emergency arrangements. It is therefore important to integrate their requirements into general contingency planning as far as possible. Further advice on the particular needs of faith communities is available in The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies: Some guidelines (Home Office, 2005) and the British Red Cross Refugee Reception Handbook.

Memorials and disaster appeals 5.61 Emergencies can have a significant and long-lasting physical, emotional and psychological impact on the welfare of individuals, families and friends and wider communities affected by emergencies. Experience has demonstrated the effectiveness of two particular mechanisms of enabling the community itself to participate in the longer-term recovery and rehabilitation process.

Memorial services or services of remembrance 5.62 A memorial service provides an opportunity for those affected to share their grief with others. However, it often has an important national as well as local role and is likely to receive extensive media coverage. For these reasons it is important to consider the organisation and structure of such events very carefully, covering such aspects as timing, invitations, representation and conduct. 5.63 Preparations for such occasions should involve all relevant faith communities, representatives of the bereaved, advisers on media coverage and security, the local community, dignitaries and those who provided different aspects of the response.

Elderly people and people with disabilities 5.58 Careful consideration should also be given to the needs of elderly and disabled people involved in or affected by an emergency; they may have



Disaster appeals 5.64 Whenever an emergency occurs, people often wish to contribute in some way. Even before any appeal has been launched, unsolicited donations are likely to be received by, for example, the local authority. Dealing with donations and accompanying letters can be a time-consuming task and it may be preferable to launch an appeal fund. Agencies should make it clear at the earliest opportunity what type of assistance (e.g. financial) they are seeking dealing with unwanted or unneeded donations can be timeconsuming and costly. 5.65 Establishing an appeal fund can be a complex and sensitive task. Appeal fund management involves co-ordinating the handling of donations, weighing the arguments for and against charitable status, appointing independent trustees, deciding how to distribute funds fairly and eventually distributing funds to the appropriate beneficiaries. All of these activities are fraught with potential pitfalls; they require extensive research, planning and monitoring in order to maximise the response of the public. Advice is available from a number of sources, including the British Red Cross Disaster Appeal Scheme (United Kingdom).



Chapter 6 Information and the media

This chapter concerns co-operation with the media at the scene of an emergency. It includes information on: working successfully with the media at the time of an emergency a key part of civil protection (paragraphs 6.56.8); media arrangements at the scene of an emergency (paragraphs 6.96.26); a co-ordinated approach to communications (paragraphs 6.276.33); and ensuring consistency in information provided to the public (paragraphs 6.346.46).



6.1 Good public communication is vital to the successful handling of any emergency and should be incorporated in all contingency planning. When an emergency occurs, the key communications objective will be to deliver accurate, clear and timely information and advice to the public so they feel confident, safe and well informed. 6.2 The news media (broadcasting, print and text services) remain the primary means of communication with the public in these circumstances. Websites are also being used widely to provide a further source of more detailed information and advice for the public, in particular for those at work or who have no immediate access to television or radio during the day. 6.3 The Civil Contingencies Act includes two specific duties for Category 1 responders in relation to communicating with the public. Firstly, there is a duty to inform the public about civil protection matters so that the public are better prepared to deal with emergencies if they occur. Secondly, there is a duty to maintain arrangements to warn the public and provide appropriate advice if an emergency occurs. Chapter 7 of Emergency Preparedness (Communicating with the public) describes the requirements of the legislation and offers good-practice advice on public communications issues. 6.4 In addition, the Government has issued the Preparing for Emergencies booklet (see to help ensure that the public is informed and prepared. The booklet brings together, in one practical guide, information and advice that the Government has already published and aims to help the public play its part in preventing emergencies and helping to deal with their effects. Public safety is the Governments number one concern and the leaflet is the latest phase in the Governments campaign to ensure that the public is informed about emergencies.

connections, plus 24-hour news websites. An incident such as the Morecambe Bay cockle pickers tragedy, for example, can attract worldwide media interest within hours. Advances in technology mean that live interviews, pictures and reports can now be sent, direct from the scene of an incident, via a mobile phone as the event is unfolding. They may come from members of the public making direct contact with media channels even before journalists have arrived. These developments mean there will be a constant requirement from the media for accurate, timely and up-to-date information. Where it is not provided, rumour and misinformation may flourish. 6.6 The Media Emergency Forum (MEF) and, since their establishment in 2003, increasingly the Regional MEFs (RMEFs), have been working with the media to establish what arrangements are required to ensure the delivery of information to the public in an emergency. Initiatives such as the BBCs Connecting in a Crisis guide ( connectinginacrisis/index.shtml) are also designed to ensure that their own local radio station producers have established appropriate contacts with emergency planners, the police and other key organisations in their localities. 6.7 A protocol on the delivery of urgent public safety information has also been agreed with national broadcasters. 6.8 The purpose of this chapter is to identify some of the technical and practical issues that will arise for those working with the media in an emergency.

Providing assistance to the media at the scene of an incident

6.9 In many situations it will be the police as co-ordinators of the response at and around an incident site and with their particular responsibility for criminal investigation with whom the media will need to liaise first. Studies undertaken for MEF have indicated that upwards of 200 media representatives can be expected to turn up at the site of an emergency within an hour of it happening, and this can swell to 1,000 or more from all over the world within 24 hours. They will require space for a range of support services, from feeding to sanitation facilities, and broadcasters in particular have a need for parking space for their satellite trucks.

Working with the media

6.5 There have been considerable changes in the news media in recent years with the development of 24-hour rolling news and the advent of multiple channels provided through cable and satellite



Control of access to the emergency scene 6.10 Controlling access to the incident site itself is a matter for the police, put in place whenever practical. Restricting access aims to allow rescue services to carry out their work unhindered and to preserve evidence at what may be the scene of a crime. Decisions on the extent of the cordon need to be taken quickly and include, where possible, consideration of the medias need to be able to film and report what is happening at the site. 6.11 Helicopters and/or cherry pickers hoistmounted remote cameras may well be quickly deployed by the media seeking overview of the site. Decisions on control of airspace and overflight should, therefore, be an early consideration.

Pooling arrangements 6.15 Access to the incident site for the purpose of filming, television and stills pictures and reporting what has happened may have to be limited either because of the physical limitations or security considerations at the scene or because of the numbers of media representatives wanting access. Such a decision is never going to be popular and should be taken only when absolutely necessary. One way to resolve this is by seeking media co-operation in nominating and agreeing members for a pool. A pool might, for example, comprise one TV crew, one news agency, such as the Press Association, a photographer and a radio reporter. Their pooled coverage is then made available simultaneously to all the other media organisations. Additional thought may also need to be given to meeting the particular needs of foreign media organisations (including providing them with accreditation where necessary).

Establishing a media liaison point 6.12 A media liaison point is a designated point close to an emergency scene, usually (but not always) outside the outer cordon erected by the police around an incident site. This serves as the rendezvous point for media representatives, where their bona fides can be checked and from where they may be able to gain controlled access to the site itself for the purposes of filming, photography and news reporting.

Requirement for an emergency media centre 6.16 A decision will also need to be taken quickly about the requirement for establishing an emergency media centre. Where possible, the media should be consulted on this. (If the site does not work for them, they will not use it.) The requirement will obviously depend on issues such as the potential longevity, scale and seriousness of the incident or possibly multiple incidents. Issues such as the need for accreditation of large numbers of foreign media, the ready availability of suitable locations including power, parking and IT facilities and the opportunities for media access to the site(s) themselves will need to be considered. 6.17 In many cases, a forward briefing point with good views over the incident site and regular briefings may well be sufficient for the medias needs.

Nominating a media liaison officer 6.13 The swift attendance, at the scene, of an experienced Media Liaison Officer (MLO) (likely to be from the police) should ease pressure from the media. It is vital that this person quickly establishes a procedure for dealing with media requests and for regularly briefing them on developments. Rumour and conjecture will flourish in a vacuum, and it is far better that the MLO gains the trust and confidence of the media by providing regular updates on events, even if there is little new to say.

Establishing credibility with the media 6.14 Demonstrating awareness of their need to meet copy deadlines or broadcast live reports will assist the MLO in establishing credibility with the media at the scene. This is important as he/she may need to seek the medias co-operation in, for example, organising pooled access to the incident site for filming or broadcasting urgent appeals for blood donors or details of evacuation arrangements.

Regular briefings from senior personnel involved in the operation 6.18 Arrangements should also be made for the media to receive regular briefings from and interviews with senior police officers, fire and ambulance officers and representatives of other key agencies involved, such as transport companies and local authorities. This can best be facilitated in a large covered space where a raised dais and microphone



facilities are available. This will ensure more control over the proceedings and a less stressful environment. 6.19 While facts may be scarce initially, the media will welcome an honest appraisal of what is known at the time and an account of what is being done, for example, to free trapped people. This should be backed up with a commitment to provide new information as soon as it is available. There should be no speculation on causal factors or half promises that raise expectations. Limitations on the release of information, where this is necessary to avoid prejudicing a possible criminal prosecution, should also be explained. 6.20 Press releases and briefings should be released in electronic form as soon as possible, for distributing to the media, local responders press offices, and for posting on emergency websites like UK Resilience (

confirmed. Names should never be released until next of kin have been informed. In general, this information will be confirmed only by the emergency services involved. It may be necessary to establish a casualty bureau (see also Chapter 5) for the purposes of co-ordinating and sifting this information. In briefing the media about this and providing contact details and so on, it should be made clear that the bureaus role is to receive information to assist in identifying those involved.

Establishing an emergency call centre 6.24 Where it is deemed necessary to establish an emergency call centre for the public to seek further information, that number should be given urgently to the local media to broadcast/publish. The call centres role and the information it can and, more importantly, cannot provide should be made very clear. Its role should be clearly distinguished from that of the casualty bureau.

Interviews with survivors and their families 6.21 The media will be keen to obtain interviews with survivors and their families. While this may be a cathartic experience for individuals in the long run, many will feel too shocked and distressed to give interviews in the immediate aftermath of an incident. The first consideration should always be the well-being of the individual. However, if a survivor, relative or friend is willing and able to speak briefly at a press conference or give an interview, it will certainly relieve pressure on all concerned. They will need support and advice from press officers from involved organisations in preparing what they are going to say and in dealing with any follow-up enquiries from the media. 6.22 Strenuous efforts should also be made to shield survivors and their families from aggressive pursuit by less responsible members of the media. At its worst, this activity may include harassment, invasion of privacy, intrusion into grief and shock, unwanted involvement of relatives and friends, and interviewing or photographing children. Decontamination procedures 6.25 If there is a need to decontaminate victims at the scene, the media will require clear and urgent briefing on the procedures involved. (Apart from anything else, media employers have a duty of care to their own staff.)

Assistance from the Government News Network 6.26 The Government News Network (GNN) should be regarded as a prime resource to send experienced press officers to the scene (at no cost for the first 24 hours) and should be contacted at the earliest opportunity, either direct through the Regional Director or through the 24-hour emergency helpline (020 8938 3560). The GNN has an initial response IT capability in each office and will attend with basic equipment to set up a forward base. Their initial role will be to support local responders. As the incident develops, assistance can range from helping to staff a Lead Government Department (LGD) to handling VIP visits.

Release of casualty figures 6.23 Great care should be taken to ensure that no information about individual casualties, or premature or uncorroborated estimates of the numbers of casualties, is released until details have been

Establishing a co-ordinated approach to communications

6.27 As the emergency develops, there will be a requirement for a more comprehensive media response structure. This should be headed by a public



relations (PR) manager, ideally with previous crisis experience. It is essential that this person has sufficient seniority and personal authority to take decisions and command respect. He/she must be fully involved in the strategic decision-making arrangements for handling the emergency.

Additionally, the NCC could provide a central press office to co-ordinate the overall government message. NCCs may also be set up regionally by using the GNN.

Requirements in an emergency media centre 6.31 MEF has made recommendations on the basic requirements for an emergency media centre. Considerable additional work has also been done through London Resilience, and increasingly through the RMEFs, to identify suitable locations and address issues such as the staff required to run such an operation 24 hours a day. Experienced press officers from all the organisations involved and also support staff will be required. At the request of the LGD, trained staff from the GNN can be engaged to supplement departmental resources. 6.32 There are several benefits to establishing a proper media centre for the duration of the emergency. These include a central focus for locating the media, for accrediting potentially large numbers, including media coming from overseas, and for organising regular briefings and providing facilities for press conferences and interviews. It will also provide a central point for assessing media coverage, co-ordinating information flows from all the organisations involved and, if necessary, establishing a central press office. In the event of a widespread or multi-site disaster, a single media centre may serve as a focus for several media liaison points at different locations.

Role of the emergency PR manager 6.28 The emergency PR manager (and his/her team) should oversee all aspects of the media response. Typically, this would include: activities at the media liaison point; arrangements for the media to visit any scene, including transport arrangements where events have occurred in a remote location; management of a media centre when/if this is established; monitoring of likely media activities related to the emergency but at locations remote from the primary scene; monitoring of media coverage; support for those who choose to be interviewed and protection of the privacy of those who do not wish to be interviewed; participation in/management of any discussions/ negotiations with the media not to broadcast certain details for the time being, or indeed to broadcast specific details (e.g. during hijack situations or kidnap negotiations); liaison with central government communications arrangements (e.g. News Co-ordination Centre (NCC)); and provision of communications policy advice to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group handling the emergency.

Remote handling 6.33 Experience has shown that, in some emergencies, media attention focuses on communities and individuals living many miles from the scene, but who are seen as having a direct link to the emergency perhaps because the victims came from there. Action will be required to ensure that media facilities and requirements in this area are also covered by the PR managers central co-ordination arrangements.

Role of the NCC 6.29 In the event of an emergency, the NCC may be established by the Cabinet Office Communications Group. The NCC supports the Lead Government Department (LGD) in their communications management of the overall incident. 6.30 The nature of the NCCs support will depend on the circumstances, but it could take the form of securing extra staff to work in the LGD or in an operations centre; helping to compile and distribute briefing material; designing and establishing websites; forward planning; collation of requests for ministerial interviews; and preparing media assessments.

Ensuring consistency in information provided to the public

6.34 The demand for information from both the media and the public may, initially at least, threaten to overwhelm the capacity of individual organisations PR teams involved in the emergency.



Each organisation should ensure that its emergency media plans set out clearly the steps required to keep the public informed. This will include maintaining up-to-date lists of key contacts, previously agreed procedures for seeking additional communications and administrative support from other organisations, and a grab-bag containing basic equipment and supplies. If help from the GNN is required, their press officers will arrive with their own IT equipment. 6.35 Under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Category 1 responders are required to make arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency. This is fully covered in Emergency Preparedness, the guidance to Part 1 of the Act, and is outlined in Annex 1A of this publication. 6.36 These arrangements may best be set out in a protocol that has been agreed locally, through the RMEFs, or directly with media organisations such as the BBC through its Connecting in a Crisis initiative. 6.37 Under other existing legislation such as the COMAH Regulations (Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999) and REPPIR (Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001) there is a duty to provide information to the public. Under COMAH, an operator must provide information to members of the public liable to be affected by a major accident at the operators establishment. In preparing this information, the operator must consult the local authority in which they are situated and reach agreement for the local authority to disseminate the information to the public. Similarly, under REPPIR, an operator or carrier must ensure that members of the public, in an area likely to be affected by a radiation emergency as a result of their operations, are supplied with appropriate information. The operator or carrier must consult the local authority or local authorities for the areas concerned and reach agreement with them to disseminate the information. 6.38 In the event of an emergency, the UK Resilience website forms part of the NCC operation and carries

information for local responders. It includes briefing documents, guidance and detailed planning material. Working in parallel with the Preparing for Emergencies website, it can provide evacuation routes, rest centre addresses and supply depot locations, etc. The Preparing for Emergencies website has information for the general public on what to do to prepare for emergencies. In the event of emergencies, it can also carry ministerial statements, background details, and instructions on actions to take. Both sites can be updated within half an hour and kept updated from a variety of locations. 6.39 The web team monitors news sources and feeds for breaking news and additional information, and liaises with other government departments web teams to co-ordinate messages and share information.

Working with the RMEFs/MEF 6.40 The MEF is an ad hoc and voluntary group of senior media editors, government representatives, local emergency responders and private industry set up in the late 1990s to consider media issues arising from civil emergencies. 6.41 RMEFs were established in 2003 and are increasingly forging similar links, based on the establishment of networks and trust, at the local and regional level. These forums are a mechanism that can be used during an emergency to explore communication issues with the media under the Chatham House Rule.1 Where necessary, media briefings on salient issues can be urgently arranged. After an event, debriefs can help to identify where communications could have been handled better. Co-ordination is achieved through the GNN, which acts as the secretariat to the RMEFs. Their links with all regional stakeholders, including the regional and national media, will ensure that the widest possible consultation takes place. Here again, GNN staff can be engaged to assist with the development of the exercise scenarios or help with the arrangements for the exercise itself.

The Chatham House Rule is used to facilitate both free speech and confidentiality at meetings. Meetings may be held on the record or under the Chatham House Rule. In the latter case, it may be agreed with the speaker(s) that it would be conducive to free discussion that a given meeting, or part thereof, should be strictly private. When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information or opinions disclosed to them providing they do not refer to the meeting or the speaker.



6.42 Consideration should be given to regular testing and exercising of crisis communication plans to identify problem areas and ensure lessons are learned.

Co-ordination of information flow among stakeholders 6.43 A key issue during any emergency is to try and ensure consistency in the information provided by the different agencies involved. In the confusion that often follows an incident, it can be a difficult and lengthy process to establish clear, concise and accurate facts and figures about what has happened. However, the media will have an insatiable appetite for these details and will continue to seek information wherever and from whoever they can. 6.44 It will cause unnecessary pain and alarm if the information provided by different agencies is inconsistent, and great care should be taken to avoid this. Inconsistency will also lead to a loss of confidence in the responding agencies handling the incident. 6.45 Establishing cross-agency co-ordination of information at an early stage in an incident is a key step in seeking to avoid unnecessary confusion and inconsistency. This may include production and distribution of a core media brief for distribution among key stakeholders, central co-ordination of interviews, or even a centralised press office. It could also mean provision of additional press officers by one agency to support the efforts of another agency that may be coming under particular pressure. 6.46 The UK Resilience website and other sites can be a central source of information for the press and broadcasters inside and outside the United Kingdom, including press releases, briefings, statistics, response figures, maps, graphics and instructions. It can also be used to distribute emergency plans and transmit alerts and warnings.

visiting the scene may also be accompanied by local MPs. This would be arranged through the Ministers Private Office. It is possible that the scale of the emergency may, in addition, prompt visits by a member of the Royal Family and/or the Prime Minister. Local VIP visitors may include the Lord Lieutenant and/or High Sheriff, religious leaders, local MPs, mayors, local authority leaders and other elected representatives. If foreign nationals have been involved, their countrys Ambassador, High Commissioner or other dignitaries may also want to visit key locations. 6.48 Visits to the scene of an emergency need to take account of the local situation and the immediate effects on the local community. It may be inappropriate for VIP visitors to go to the scene of the emergency while rescue operations are still going on, particularly if casualties are still trapped. VIP visits should not interrupt rescue and life-saving work and the emergency services must be consulted about the timing of visits. 6.49 VIP visits will inevitably cause some disruption and visitors will want this to be kept to a minimum. The additional need for security may also cause a problem. However, there are also dividends to be gained from such visits as they may boost the morale of all those involved, including the injured and the emergency services, and give an opportunity to place on record public gratitude for what has been done. 6.50 The emergency services are experienced at handling VIP visits in normal circumstances and many of the usual considerations will apply to visits to the scene or the emergency. However, it may be necessary to restrict media coverage of such visits, in which case pooling arrangements may be made. 6.51 Visiting Ministers and other VIPs will require comprehensive briefing before visiting the site and will require briefing before any meetings with the media. 6.52 VIPs are likely to want to meet those survivors who are well enough to see them. It will be for the hospitals to decide, on the basis of medical advice and respect for the wishes of individual patients and their relatives, whether it is appropriate for VIPs and/or the media to visit casualties. If the media cannot have access to wards, VIPs can still be interviewed afterwards, at the hospital entrance,

Visits by VIPS
6.47 Visits by VIPs can lift the morale of those affected as well as those who are involved with the response. A government Minister may make an early visit to the scene or areas affected, not only to mark public concern but also to be able to report to Parliament on the response. A government Minister



about how patients and medical staff are coping. Such VIP visits are best managed by the PR team of the host venue in close consultation with the police.

6.53 Emergencies place enormous demands on all involved in the response and recovery effort. Media interest, particularly if it is international, can create pressure 24 hours a day, and careful planning of staggered handovers between shifts is essential. Senior staff within responding agencies will wish to take the sustainability of their level of engagement with the media into account and seek mutual aid accordingly. The pooling of resources in a joint media centre may be helpful in this respect. This relates not only to operational personnel but also to those providing administrative and specialist skills, e.g. in website technology. 6.54 In the much longer term, experience has also shown that media interest will be rekindled on the anniversary of events, and provision may need to be made to consider how such occasions are handled.

took before they could gauge the full extent of the tragedy, not to mention the sheer volume of calls. Responding agencies learned of everything from the medias urgent need for an official presence on site as opposed to a police station some distance away to the problems of trying to cable a press conference at short notice. Carlisle floods: The 2005 floods in Carlisle raised a number of issues for the media and responders. The debrief for this incident led by the RMEF highlighted loss of power, business continuity, and the problems of collating and distributing information to the public and the media when faced with a lack of power and telephones. The debrief highlighted the widespread use of the internet and the advantages there would have been of one dedicated website a project now being taken forward and the importance of flexible, cross-organisation working. (Case studies and examples of good practice may be found in the MEF/RMEFs annual report,

Media debrief
6.55 Where there has been a considerable amount of media attention, there will be inevitable strains between media and local responders interests. Arranging for senior media representatives to meet with senior members of the emergency services and other organisations involved in the incident, some weeks after, can assist both sides in looking at how information was provided and identifying ways in which arrangements can be improved in the future. RMEFs can provide the mechanism for a full and frank exchange of views in a mutually supportive environment. For example: Morecambe Bay cockle pickers tragedy: The RMEFs invitation to the debrief was well received, attracting representatives from television, radio, the print media, fire, police and coastguard plus Lancashire County Council, Government News Network and Government Office for the North West. There was plenty of straight talking under the Chatham House rule but the atmosphere was constructive. The media were able to understand the problems faced by the emergency services (e.g. a scene the size of Morecambe Bay) and the time it



Chapter 7 The Government Offices for the English regions

The Government Offices (GOs) offer an easy way for local responders in the English regions to link into central government (paragraphs 7.17.2). The work of the GOs in this area is co-ordinated by Regional Resilience Teams (RRTs) (paragraphs 7.37.4). GOs are increasingly the first place government departments contact for briefing in a non-terrorist emergency and can help ensure effective communications between national and local levels (paragraphs 7.57.10). GOs have a particular focus on consequence management issues and can provide advice on ministerial and VIP visits and communications issues (paragraphs 7.117.14). GOs may play an important role in cross-regional co-ordination, liaising with other GOs and the Devolved Administrations (DAs) to support the response effort during cross-border emergencies (paragraph 7.15). GOs will provide support for Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs) if established (paragraph 7.16).



Role of the Government Offices in an emergency

7.1 The Government Offices (GOs) in the English regions can provide a useful link to central government during a non-terrorist emergency and they will often be the first place that government departments turn to for a situation report on non-terrorist incidents. The GOs are likely, therefore, to have a role to play in most emergencies that could generate ministerial interest or national/regional press coverage. Government departments may also use GOs to cascade information and guidance to local responders. The GOs also have substantial knowledge and experience of the working of central government and so provide a valuable first port of call for advice and guidance. 7.2 GOs need to become involved only in the response to an event where they can genuinely add value. In most of the emergencies that local responders will face, the involvement of the GOs will be limited to gathering information to brief the centre. However, the greater the significance of the incident, and the ministerial and press interest it generates, the more the GOs will be able to provide support and assistance.

in some areas. This is particularly the case where responding agencies have departmental sponsors for example, the Environment Agency has direct lines of communication with the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) during flooding incidents. However, these lines of communication are generally agency-specific and departments are increasingly turning to GOs to take a multi-agency and cross-departmental view of an event and so complement such arrangements and add value. 7.6 In many smaller-scale, non-terrorist events, particularly where Ministers show an interest, government departments will approach the RRTs for information. The RRTs will, therefore, request situation reports from local responders. Using the GOs as the main point of contact will reduce the risk of duplicated requests from different government departments. Local responders can also use the GOs as a first port of call for requests for advice or assistance from central government. 7.7 In order to ensure effective two-way flow of information between local responders and central government, it may be appropriate for the GO to place a Government Liaison Officer within the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). Local responders should, therefore, consider issuing an invitation to the relevant GO whenever a multiagency SCG is established. In counter-terrorist incidents there are arrangements for a Home Office-led Government Liaison Team to be activated. Where this is the case, the GO officer will normally be co-located with that team to advise on consequence management and recovery issues. 7.8 The mechanisms for alerting, mobilising and information sharing between local responders and the GO will be set out in Regional Response Plans, agreed for each region. The plans will have three main elements: procedures for activating the emergency management facilities in the GO; procedures for activating the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC); and procedures for communicating with the local level, other regions and central government (see Chapter 18 of Emergency Preparedness). 7.9 When the national emergency co-ordination arrangements are activated, GOs will provide situation reports for the Central Situation Cell,

Role of the Regional Resilience Teams

7.3 A Regional Resilience Team (RRT) has been established in each of the GOs to co-ordinate the response of the whole GO. The teams are led by a senior official and supported by four or five staff. (In London the team is larger, with a significant number of secondees from a range of organisations.) The RRTs will be the first point of contact in GOs for any resilience issues in normal working hours. GOs also have arrangements in place to ensure they can be contacted on a 24-hour basis. 7.4 The scale or duration of many emergencies will mean that the resources of the RRT are quickly exhausted. In such cases, RRTs will be able to draw on other staff and expertise from within the GO and on the resources of RRTs in other regions, if appropriate.

Liaison with central government

7.5 There are already well-established lines of communication between local and national levels



copied to the Lead Government Department and any other government department with a significant interest. (See also Chapter 8 on Regional Civil Contingencies Committees.) 7.10 A number of national plans (e.g. the Department of Trade and Industrys Downstream Oil Emergency Response Plan, and Defras Flooding Plan and Severe Weather Plan) also set out specific roles for the GOs and task them with supplying specific information.

government departments, they will receive national statements and press briefings. They can, therefore, help local responders to ensure that a co-ordinated and coherent message is given to the public. 7.14 In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to have a spokesperson for the region as a whole. In this event, one option could be the Regional Director of the GO who is authorised to give media interviews.

Cross-regional co-ordination Consequence management

7.11 Where the scale and nature of an incident is such that the effects are likely to be felt outside the immediate locality or to overwhelm the local response, or to have the potential to do so, GOs can provide help and support consequence management by linking with national and regional agencies. Where, in terrorist incidents, a Home Office-led Government Liaison Team is established at the SCG, the GOs will form part of the Consequence Management Cell. Depending on the scale of the attack and its consequences, the GO representative may be supported by other members of the RRT or impact management experts from government departments. In the most severe emergencies, the GO may be supported by an adviser from the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to facilitate communication with the Governments central crisis management machinery, advise on the potential availability of national impact management assets, and help identify issues of likely national interest. All members of the Government Liaison Team work under the strategic direction of the Home Office Government Liaison Officer. 7.15 The effects of some events will extend across regional boundaries and in some cases they may cross borders with Devolved Administrations (DAs) (see Chapters 912). The lead in co-ordination between regions will be for central government to determine. Where there are significant effects in more than one region, each of the affected GOs will need to mobilise to support the response and will liaise closely with other GOs and DAs. However, there may be occasions when, although an event affects one region significantly, the effects in other regions or DAs are limited. In such circumstances, the most effective course of action may be for the most significantly affected region to take a lead role for the GOs as a whole (and, if agreed, for the DAs). The lead GO will need to work closely with other affected regions to ensure adequate communication and representation.

Support for Regional Civil Contingencies Committees

7.16 Where events justify the setting up of an RCCC (see Chapter 8), the RRT will take the lead in: arranging a location for meetings; establishing video/teleconferencing links when appropriate; drawing up agendas; circulating papers and information to committee members as necessary; and providing the formal record of discussions and decisions.

Ministerial and VIP support

7.12 The GOs have a great deal of experience in arranging ministerial and other VIP visits and will be able to give advice and guidance on such visits. In addition, Ministers offices may task the GOs directly to co-ordinate the arrangements for visits. In this case, the GOs will consult with local partners to establish the local situation, minimise disruption and discuss issues such as security and briefing.

Media and communication

7.13 The GOs work closely with the Government News Network in the regions and, with their links to



Chapter 8 Regional Civil Contingencies Committees in England

Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs) are intended as a means of co-ordinating the response to and recovery from an emergency at a regional level in England. They are likely to be convened only very rarely and only where they can add value to the response (paragraphs 8.18.5). While the detailed role of the RCCC will vary according to the nature of the emergency, generic aspects of that role can be identified (paragraph 8.6). RCCCs will not, except in the most exceptional circumstances, supersede existing command and control structures and will observe the principle of subsidiarity the building blocks of response will remain at the local level (paragraph 8.7). RCCCs are likely to prove particularly useful in wide-area, high-impact, rising tide emergencies where the deployment of scarce resources can be co-ordinated regionally and a fully informed network of responders and affected organisations can be created (paragraphs 8.88.9). RCCC membership will depend on the emergency but will in principle be similar to that of the Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) (paragraphs 8.108.14). RCCCs will be able to meet at one of three levels: prior to an emergency, during an emergency, or when special legislative measures have been taken (paragraphs 8.158.21). RCCCs can be convened at the request of the Lead Government Department, or with its agreement, following a request from a member of a local Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) or from a member of the RRF (level one only) (paragraphs 8.228.25).



Overview what is a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee?

8.1 Most emergencies are dealt with by local responders at a local level. This has always been, and will continue to be, the norm for responding to emergencies. However, recent experience has highlighted that there may be very exceptional circumstances when the response to an emergency would benefit from co-ordination at a regional level. Such circumstances could include where the local response, including locally agreed mutual aid arrangements, is overwhelmed, or where an emergency affects the majority of localities within a region. This is most likely to arise during emergencies without a definable scene. 8.2 Although it is anticipated that such circumstances are likely to occur only very rarely, there are clear benefits from having regional response structures in place so that they can be deployed, as and when needed. Regional Civil Contingencies Committees (RCCCs) will be the key means of delivering the co-ordination of response at a regional level. 8.3 An RCCC is a multi-agency group including representatives from across the region of the emergency services, local authorities, the Government Office (GO) and others, as applicable. It will be charged with improving the co-ordination of the response to an emergency across a given region with a particular, but not exclusive, focus on consequence management and the recovery phase after an incident. 8.4 Although they may have a similar membership, RCCCs are distinct from Regional Resilience Forums (RRFs).1 RRFs have no role in responding to emergencies, being instead focused on driving forward the development and co-ordination of planning for emergencies within each region. 8.5 Local response structures are well developed and understood, and have been shown to work well in a wide variety of emergencies. The development of an ability to co-ordinate response at a regional level in no way supersedes or replaces these tried and tested arrangements. The possibility of a regional response to a crisis is simply another option available to central

government and local responders alike. It is an option that will be used only where it can demonstrably add value.

The role of the RCCC

8.6 The precise role of an RCCC is likely to vary depending on the nature of the emergency at hand. However, generic aspects of the role are likely to include: collating and maintaining a strategic picture of the evolving situation within the region, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management and recovery issues; assessing whether there are any issues that cannot be resolved at a local level; facilitating mutual aid arrangements within the region and, where necessary, between regions to resolve such issues; ensuring an effective flow of communication between local, regional and national levels, including the co-ordination of reports to the national level on the response and recovery effort; raising, to a national level, any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or regional level; ensuring that the national input to response and recovery is co-ordinated with the local and regional efforts; guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the region by identifying regional priorities; and providing, where appropriate, a regional spokesperson. 8.7 RCCCs will observe the principle of subsidiarity. It is recognised that local decisions should be taken at the local level. The RCCC will not interfere in local command and control arrangements unless specifically empowered to do so by emergency regulations (see Chapter 13). But where it exists, it will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take. Where arrangements already exist for the co-ordination of mutual aid (e.g. the Police National Information Co-ordination Centre mechanism for police resources), the RCCC will complement such arrangements and add value by taking a multi-agency overview.

See Emergency Preparedness, Chapter 17



8.8 Where convened, RCCCs will also inform the deployment of national resources. So, for example, an RCCC could take a view on the need for military aid, and on priorities within the region for such aid. It could also be the conduit for putting such requests to the national level. However, as now, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will authorise the use of military aid, and decisions on the deployment and direction of military staff and resources will remain with the normal Military Aid to the Civil Authorities command hierarchy. 8.9 One of the key benefits of the RCCC structure will be in ensuring that the wider impacts of an emergency are highlighted and that all the agencies impacted by, and responding to, an emergency are fully informed of the details of the response and able to feed into its development. RCCCs will, for example, be able to address the wider, non-health, impacts of an infectious disease outbreak within a region (such as the impact on key workers) and feed this back to the national level.

8.12 The GO will provide specialist topic and geographical advice as well as secretariat support for the RCCC.

London 8.13 Unlike other regions in England, many local responder agencies in London have boundaries that align with those of the region. In London there is, therefore, little distinction between an RCCC and the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG). In an emergency, the London Resilience Team would provide the GO representatives to either the SCG or the RCCC. 8.14 In practice, particularly for immediate-impact, police-led emergencies, the group is likely to be referred to as an SCG and will be chaired by the police. A formal RCCC is more likely to be convened for rising tide, non police-led events (e.g. a developing infectious disease outbreak) and in the recovery phase. In London, the RCCC (SCG) for a large-scale emergency would include representatives of the utilities and transport providers, as well as the wider health community, configured as cells to enable greater efficiency at strategic level.

Membership of RCCCs
General 8.10 As with RRFs, the core membership of the RCCC will be drawn from representatives of the emergency services, local authorities, central government departments and agencies with a regional presence (e.g. MoD, the Department of Health (DH), the Health Protection Agency, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency); but other agencies such as voluntary organisations, utilities and transport operators could be invited, depending on the circumstances. The extent and location of the incident will determine which individual agencies should be invited in order to ensure fair representation from all affected agencies. Members of the RCCC will need to have the necessary seniority, skills and experience to allow the Committee to discharge the role set out in paragraph 8.6. 8.11 In the first instance, the RCCC will be chaired by the Regional Director of the GO (or their deputy). However, the Committee can agree another Chair if the circumstances merit it (e.g. a Regional Director of Public Health, a senior police officer, a local authority Chief Executive).

Types of RCCC
8.15 It is anticipated that the RCCC meetings would take place at one of three levels.

Level one 8.16 Level one meetings would be convened in the phase before an emergency, where prior warning is available. The meeting would be held to review the situation, update local stakeholders, and establish the state of preparedness across the region. Examples could include where a significant human or animal disease outbreak seemed likely, or following receipt of an extreme weather forecast. 8.17 It is anticipated that this will be by far the most frequent form of RCCC meeting.

Level two 8.18 Level two meetings will co-ordinate the response to an emergency across a region. They are likely to prove particularly useful in the consequence management effort and the recovery phase of an emergency.



8.19 A level two RCCC could, for example, be convened in the event of a wide-area disruptive challenge affecting a large portion of a region. It might also be convened if a national response or national co-ordination of an event was required, such as an outbreak of human or animal disease.

Where circumstances dictate, it may be appropriate to convene a virtual RCCC via video or teleconferencing. 8.25 An RCCC can be convened at the request of the Lead Government Department, or with its agreement, following: a request from a member of a local SCG; or a request from a member of the RRF (level one only).

Level three 8.20 Level three meetings could only be called following the making of emergency regulations under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. 8.21 Level three meetings would be chaired by the Regional Nominated Co-ordinator or nominated deputy (see Chapter 13). The role of the RCCC would be as under level two but with an additional focus on the implementation of any special legislative measures necessary to respond to the emergency in question.

Triggers for the creation of an RCCC

8.22 An RCCC will only be convened where it will add value to the response and recovery effort. It is unlikely, therefore, that an RCCC will be convened in the event of a single-site emergency (e.g. a conventional car-bomb attack) where the impact of the emergency is contained within a single locality. In these circumstances, even in the most severe event, there would be a direct line of communication between local and national level (see Figure 8.1). In London, the multi-agency SCG is the RCCC so there will in effect be an RCCC for single-site incidents. 8.23 An RCCC is more likely to be required where a number of local SCGs are established within a region and a need for the co-ordination of the response across the region has been identified, or where the response is nationally managed with limited local co-ordination/delivery. 8.24 The RCCC response structure is likely to add particular value where there is an emergency with widespread effects and/or a non-police-led response, e.g. severe weather, infectious disease outbreak, fuel shortages. Regional co-ordination is likely to prove particularly beneficial in emergencies that unfold over a longer timescale and affect very wide areas so-called rising tide or slow burn emergencies.



Figure 8.1: Regional co-ordination arrangements in England when an RCCC has been convened (simplified)2
Central government crisis-management machinery (facilitated by the Cabinet Office)

Lead UK government department

Other government departments/ Devolved Administrations

Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (facilitated by the Government Office)

Local Strategic Co-ordinating Group

Local Strategic Co-ordinating Group

Local Strategic Co-ordinating Group

Local Strategic Co-ordinating Group

This figure shows the lines of communication between national, regional and local levels when an RCCC has been established this is most likely to occur in non-terrorist emergencies without a specific definable scene. It is a simplification and is not intended to demonstrate exhaustively the full range of lines of communication between individual organisations (e.g. between police forces and Home Office)



Chapter 9 Response arrangements in Scotland

The Scottish Executive has devolved responsibilities related to managing the consequences of most emergencies in Scotland. Scottish emergency response arrangements are based on the same principles as those that apply elsewhere in the United Kingdom (paragraphs 9.19.4). The Scottish Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements set out the structure for an integrated response to an emergency in Scotland. The arrangements provide for the Scottish Executive to act as a focus for communications with the UK government when appropriate (paragraph 9.59.6). A Strategic Co-ordinating Group may be established in each police force area to determine the strategy for the response and the appropriate management structures to co-ordinate the local inter-agency response (paragraphs 9.79.11). The Scottish Executive may open the Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER), which will gather and disseminate information, co-ordinate activity and provide appropriate guidance/support the Scottish response to emergencies. It will provide a national picture of the impact of the emergency which, in turn, can be used to advise and inform decisions on the strategic management of the situation for Scottish and UK government (paragraphs 9.129.21). This chapter also addresses: cross-border co-operation (paragraph 9.22); media arrangements (paragraph 9.23); Scottish Emergency Co-ordinator, who will be appointed if emergency powers are used (paragraph 9.24); and debriefing (paragraph 9.25).



Emergency response arrangements in Scotland

9.1 Responsibility for civil protection is largely a devolved matter in Scotland. The balance of activity and interaction between the Scottish Executive and the UK government in relation to emergencies affecting Scotland will depend on the nature of the incident and the devolution settlement. 9.2 The principles of emergency response in Scotland are the same as for the rest of the United Kingdom. The majority of emergencies are dealt with at the local level without any involvement by the Scottish Executive or central government. 9.3 The Scottish Executives arrangements complement response arrangements at the local level and those made by UK government. Lead Government Departments will liaise with the Scottish Executive Emergency Room (SEER), which will ensure that Scotlands response is co-ordinated with UK and local efforts. 9.4 An important aspect of the arrangements is creating an ability to analyse the impact on Scotland of any emergency and to provide coherent support and advice. The arrangements provide for the Scottish Executive to act as the focus for communication and co-ordination with UK government when appropriate.

9.6 In areas of reserved responsibility the UK Lead Government Department (e.g. Home Office in relation to terrorism) will lead the response in Scotland working closely with the Scottish Executive, which will have responsibility for dealing with many of the consequences of emergencies in reserved areas.

Strategic Co-ordinating Groups 9.7 In the preparation phase, Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCGs) in Scotland are the equivalent of the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) in England and Wales. In Scotland, however, the SCGs role also encompasses response and recovery phases. SCGs are based on police force areas. 9.8 Local responders falling outwith devolved competence (e.g. Maritime and Coastguard Agency, British Transport Police) will be members of the SCGs. 9.9 In response to an emergency, a meeting of the SCG may be called, as and when necessary, to determine the strategy of the local response and confirm the management structures necessary to ensure inter-agency co-ordination. Membership of the SCG in the response and recovery phases will be determined locally by the nature of the emergency and its consequences. The SCGs role in responding to emergencies in Scotland is equivalent to that of SCGs in England and Wales. 9.10 Once established, the SCG will gather information on the impact of the emergency on its community and its supporting services to advise and inform strategic decisions and allow co-ordination of joint activity. 9.11 SCGs will establish local strategic co-ordination centres, as required, where key agencies will manage a joint response, on a 24-hour basis if necessary. The implementation of co-ordination centres will be determined locally. The centres will provide a single point of contact for the co-ordination of local activity and for communication and information sharing with the Scottish Executive.

Scottish emergency co-ordination arrangements

9.5 The Scottish arrangements set out a flexible structure for an integrated response to any emergency in Scotland. They reflect the principles contained within this volume. The arrangements provide a framework for the management of emergencies in Scotland and define the roles and responsibilities of agencies and management groups at local and Scottish levels. They also describe the interface between Scottish co-ordinating structures and those at the UK level. The generic nature of the arrangements provides flexibility and can be adapted to form the basis of a response to any emergency affecting Scotland. Further details of the arrangements can be found at

Scottish Executive Emergency Room 9.12 The Scottish Executive will establish its Emergency Room (SEER) in Edinburgh or at other places in Scotland if its Edinburgh facilities are unavailable due to the circumstances of the



emergency. Each Scottish Executive department affected by the emergency is represented in the Emergency Room so that a co-ordinated response from the Executive can be achieved. 9.13 The Scottish Executives response to the situation will depend on the nature of the emergency at hand. In the event of an emergency requiring co-ordination across government, SEER will: collate and maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation in Scotland; assess whether there are any issues that cannot be resolved at a local level; facilitate mutual aid arrangements in Scotland and, where necessary, with UK government to resolve such issues; provide strategic direction for Scotland; co-ordinate and support the activity of Scottish Executive departments; brief Scottish Ministers; ensure effective communication between local, Scottish and UK levels; co-ordinate and disseminate information for the public and the media at the Scottish level; raise at UK level any issues that cannot be resolved in Scotland; inform and advise the development of UK strategies; ensure that UK input to response and recovery is co-ordinated with the Scottish and local efforts; provide, where appropriate, a spokesperson for Scotland; and draw on existing legislation and, in some cases, consider the use of additional powers through the UK government. 9.14 In the event that UK-level arrangements are initiated, SEER will keep in touch with the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR), the Scotland Office and other relevant departments in Whitehall. Scottish interests will be represented in COBR. 9.15 The decision on whether to activate the SEER will depend upon the nature and extent of any emergency in or affecting Scotland. There will be a flexible response to emergencies based on the circumstances that exist at the time. For example, in an emergency impacting primarily on a single police area, the Scottish Executive will maintain a significant interest and will liaise with the SCG to review whether the establishment of SEER could assist the response. Equally, the Scottish Executive

could establish SEER in some circumstances to assist in managing its own response to an emergency. The decision to escalate or scale back the Scottish response will be taken jointly by the main agencies concerned and the Scottish Executive. 9.16 The procedures that support SEER will be activated flexibly. A judgement will be made by the Scottish Executive, in each set of circumstances, about precisely what elements need to be activated. A single point of contact in SEER will be known to SCGs, which will be advised of the activation of SEER. 9.17 In its activity SEER will be supported by the local arrangements established by SCGs. However, there is additional support for SEER if required, provided by the Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee and the Scottish Police Information and Co-ordination Centre.

Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee 9.18 The Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee (SECC) has a role both in preparing for emergencies and in providing advice and support for SEER at a time of emergency. In an emergency, SECC will comprise senior managers of affected Scottish Executive departments and responding agencies. Its role is to: support the local response and provide a further channel for the exchange of information between Scottish and local responders; monitor the wider impacts of an emergency; support the co-ordination of the response where the emergency affects a number of localities in Scotland; and provide specialist support and advice for the Scottish Cabinet. 9.19 In such circumstances, the representation at SECC would be determined by the particular circumstance of the emergency. 9.20 SECC has no executive authority other than that delegated to departmental and other representatives.

Scottish Police Information and Co-ordination Centre 9.21 Where an emergency demands significant police involvement, further information and advice for SEER will come from the Scottish Police



Information and Co-ordination Centre (S-PICC), which may be activated to support the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) (Scotland) representative in SEER, to co-ordinate mutual aid between police forces, and collect information from Scottish police forces on the emergency and its wider impacts.

whenever local resources were stretched during a major or prolonged incident.

Scottish Emergency Co-ordinator

9.24 Under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act, if emergency regulations are made that apply to Scotland, the UK government must appoint a Scottish Emergency Co-ordinator. There will be a list jointly compiled by the Scottish and UK government of designates for this role for particular emergencies. The terms of appointment, conditions of service and functions of the Co-ordinator will be set out in the letter of appointment, though details of the general role may be included in the emergency regulations themselves.

Cross-border co-operation
9.22 During an emergency there may be a requirement for mutual aid and co-operation outside Scotlands administrative boundaries. While local arrangements may already encompass this, SEER can act as a facilitating link with UK government departments.

Media arrangements
9.23 Management of the press and media at the site of the emergency is the responsibility of the lead agency identified in planning. The Scottish Executive Press Office is responsible for providing public information and co-ordinating the media response at Scottish level. The Scottish Executive Press Office would seek to offer support to the lead agency

9.25 The Scottish Executive will conduct a debriefing following implementation of Scottish or UK arrangements by establishing a working group comprised of joint-agency representatives.

Figure 9.1: Emergency response structures in Scotland


Scotland Office

Scottish Emergencies Co-ordinating Committee

Scottish Cabinet

UK Ministers

SCOTTISH EXECUTIVE EMERGENCY ROOM Scottish Police Information and Co-ordination Centre


Strategic Co-ordinating Groups


Local tactical and operational management



Chapter 10 Response arrangements in Wales

The Welsh Assembly Government plays an important role in emergencies in or affecting Wales (10.1). The Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC) is constituted and functions in a similar way to its regional counterparts in England. The Welsh Assembly Government provides support for the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (paragraphs 10.210.9). The Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) is a facility established by the Welsh Assembly Government to gather and disseminate information in Wales on developing emergencies. It supports the Wales Civil Contingencies Committee and Welsh Assembly Government Ministers in providing briefing and advice on emergencies (paragraphs 10.1310.17). A Wales Media Emergency Forum brings together the media in Wales to consider media issues arising from civil contingencies (paragraph 10.21). The Welsh Assembly Government Communications Team will act as a link between the local media and community relations lead and the United Kingdom governments News Co-ordination Centre (paragraphs 10.2210.27). Response arrangements at the local level in Wales are the same as those in England but take into account devolved functions (paragraph 10.29). If emergency regulations are made covering Wales, the UK government must appoint a Wales Emergency Co-ordinator (paragraph 10.30).



10.1 Responsibility for civil protection is largely a non-transferred matter in Wales, remaining primarily the responsibility of UK government departments. However, the Welsh Assembly Government has functional responsibility for a number of important policy areas (e.g. health, the environment, animal health) and plays an important co-ordinating role. The balance of activity and interaction between the Welsh Assembly Government and the UK Government in relation to emergencies affecting Wales will depend on the nature of the incident and the devolution settlement.

raise to a UK level any issues that cannot be resolved at a local or Wales level; guide the deployment of scarce resources across Wales by identifying pan-Wales priorities; provide, where appropriate, a spokesperson for Wales; and draw on existing legislation and, in some cases, consider requesting the use of additional powers through the UK government. 10.5 The WCCC will not interfere in local command and control arrangements but will provide a mechanism for ensuring that local responders can be as fully informed as possible in the decisions they have to take. Where arrangements already exist for the co-ordination of mutual aid, the WCCC will complement such arrangements and add value by taking a multi-agency overview at a pan-Wales level. The WCCC will also inform the deployment of pan-Wales or UK resources. Membership 10.6 The WCCC will comprise senior representatives from agencies crucial to the response. This is likely to include those members of the WRF who are relevant to the crisis. Good communication during a crisis is vital and the Director of Strategy and Communication or Head of News from the Assembly Government will be a member of the WCCC. The membership of the WCCC will be supplemented by key strategic personnel from agencies who will have a central role to play. In emergencies where the lead is at the UK level, this may involve a senior official from the government department concerned. 10.7 The Chair of the WCCC will depend on the nature of the emergency and the expertise and perspective required (e.g. senior police officer, senior local authority officer). The Chair of the WCCC is likely to become the Wales Emergency Co-ordinator (WEC) if emergency powers are invoked to deal with that emergency. Levels of response 10.8 It is anticipated that the WCCC will meet at three levels: Level one Level one meetings would be convened in the phase prior to an emergency, where prior warning is available. The meeting would be held to review the situation and update local stakeholders, with a view to escalating to level two if the situation warranted.

Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)

10.2 The Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC) will be convened in exceptional circumstances in which the scale and geographical extent of an emergency requires the response and recovery effort to be co-ordinated at a pan-Wales level. The WCCC will only be established where it will add value to the response and recovery effort. In this respect, the WCCC will more likely be set up to deal with wide-area disruptive challenges to the infrastructure of Wales, such as severe weather, infectious disease outbreak, or fuel shortages. 10.3 The triggers for the WCCC are broadly similar to the triggers for RCCCs in England. In relation to transferred matters, a WCCC may be established at the request of the WAG, or with the agreement of the WAG following a request from a member of a Strategic Co-ordinating Group or a member of the Wales Resilience Forum (level one only). The WCCC will only meet to discuss non-transferred matters with the agreement of the UK Lead Government Department. The UK Lead Government Department can also request the WAG to establish a WCCC.

Role of the WCCC 10.4 The role of the WCCC will be to: maintain a strategic picture of the evolving situation within Wales, with a particular (but not exclusive) focus on consequence management and recovery issues; assess whether there are any issues which cannot be resolved at a local level; facilitate mutual aid arrangements within Wales and, where necessary, between Wales and the border areas of England to resolve such issues;



Level two Level two meetings would be convened in the event of a wide-area disruptive challenge in Wales. The meetings would be convened by the Welsh Assembly Government, in consultation with relevant members of the WRF. They might also be convened if a national response or national co-ordination of an event was required, such as during a fuel distribution crisis. The WCCC may also be convened for an emergency that occurs in Wales where it can add value to the response. Level three Level three meetings could only be called once an emergency arises that requires the making of emergency regulations under Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act (see Chapter 13). Support for the WCCC 10.9 Where events justify the setting up of a WCCC, the Welsh Assembly Government will take the lead in: arranging a location for meetings; establishing video/teleconferencing links when appropriate; drawing up agendas; circulating papers and information to committee members as necessary; and providing the formal record of committees discussions and decisions.

where established. In relation to non-transferred matters (e.g. maritime pollution, disruptions to the fuel supply) this would be at the request of UK central government. Where the Government Liaison Officer is provided by a UK government department, any Welsh Assembly Government liaison officer would be co-located. 10.12 When the UK Government crisis management mechanisms are brought into play following an emergency in or affecting Wales, the Welsh Assembly Governments Emergency Co-ordination Centre will be activated and will provide situation reports, copied to the UK Lead Government Department and any other government department with an interest. The Welsh Assembly Government will usually be represented by the First Minister who will normally attend by videolink.

Emergency Co-ordination Centre (Wales) [ECC(W)]

10.13 The Welsh Assembly Government will, where appropriate, establish an Emergency Co-ordination Centre (ECC(W)) which can be linked with all SCGs, the Office of the Secretary of State for Wales and the Cabinet Office. The role of the ECC(W) will be to: co-ordinate information and provide appropriate guidance/support to the services for which it is responsible; ensure an effective flow of communication between local, pan-Wales and UK levels, including the co-ordination of reports to the UK level on the response and recovery effort; provide liaison representatives to SCGs involved where appropriate; (according to the nature of the event) act together with the Office of the Secretary of State for Wales to represent Wales at the COBR, and disseminate information from the COBR and Whitehall to relevant agencies via the SCGs; brief Welsh Assembly Government Ministers; ensure that the UK input to response and recovery is co-ordinated with the local and pan-Wales efforts; provide media and community relations support through the Strategy and Communication Group; and assist in the determination of potential consequences of the emergency and be involved in the recovery planning.

Liaison with central government

10.10 In many smaller-scale, non-terrorist events, particularly where UK government Ministers show an interest, government departments will approach the Welsh Assembly Government for information. The Welsh Assembly Government will, therefore, request situation reports from local responders on behalf of its own Ministers and/or UK government Ministers. Using the Welsh Assembly Government as the main point of contact will reduce the risk of duplicated requests from different government departments. Local responders can also use the Welsh Assembly Government as a first port of call for requests for advice or assistance from central government. 10.11 In carrying out this role in relation to some non-terrorist incidents it may be appropriate for the Welsh Assembly Government to provide the Government Liaison Officer who will liaise with SCGs



10.14 The ECC(W)s role is to gather and disseminate information, keeping Ministers and the UK government informed of the implications of emergencies in Wales. At the same time it will keep SCGs and individual agencies informed about developments at the UK level that will affect them. A record will be maintained of all decisions and actions taken by the ECC(W). The ECC(W) can be used to co-ordinate the Welsh Assembly Governments own internal response to an emergency by engaging relevant departments and divisions. On other occasions, the ECC(W) can be used as a means of co-ordinating a multi-agency response by including external partners whose presence in the Centre facilitates links with external agencies and draws experience and expertise into the assessment of information being gathered. 10.15 The decision on whether to activate the ECC(W) will depend upon the nature and extent of any emergency in or affecting Wales. For example, in an emergency impacting primarily on a single police area, the Welsh Assembly Government will maintain a significant interest and will liaise with the SCG to review whether the establishment of the ECC(W) could assist the response. Equally, the Welsh Assembly Government could establish its ECC in some circumstances to assist in managing its own response, for example a crisis in an area of transferred responsibility. 10.16 The ECC(W) will report for Wales as a whole to the Welsh Assembly Government and to Whitehall and will provide information to the SCGs. This information will include: consideration of the risk level; the national situation (UK and Wales); and specific advice or guidance. 10.17 SCGs and the ECC(W) will advise each other of any significant de-escalation of their respective arrangements.

strategic management of the situation in Wales and be reported on a Welsh basis to the UK government. In the same way, the co-ordination arrangements will allow the cascading of information from central government to agencies on the ground in Wales (see Figure 10.1 at the end of this chapter). These are co-ordination arrangements rather than a command structure and there will be direct reporting lines from agencies to UK departments (e.g. police to Home Office). Agencies will endeavour to maintain parallel reporting lines to the ECC(W) under this structure. 10.19 Once established, the SCGs will commence gathering information at the local level from within their respective police areas and detailing the impact of the emergency locally on emergency services, local authority services, utilities and other areas as appropriate. The information will be collated on the situation report template and relayed, routinely or exceptionally, by email or fax, or by other means to the ECC(W). The reports are an extremely useful tool for government in assessing the impact of the emergency. Timely completion will be very important. The frequency and timing of reports will be determined contingent on events. 10.20 Agencies that are not transferred will report as normal to their respective UK department (e.g. police reporting directly to the Home Office). However, they will normally copy any reports about the developing situation in Wales from their agencys perspective to the ECC(W), where appropriate. Each organisation will need to consider the extent to which it is appropriate to share information with the ECC(W) for security purposes, but will wish to ensure that sufficient information is supplied to allow a Welsh national picture to be determined.

Media response
10.21 A Wales Media Emergency Forum (WMEF) brings together the media in Wales to consider media issues arising from civil contingencies. In the event of an emergency arising, under the auspices of the WMEF, the press and media agencies in Wales, the Welsh Assembly Government and the key emergency response agencies agree to act in accordance with the processes defined in the Welsh media protocol. 10.22 Management of the press and media at the emergency site is the responsibility of the lead agency (usually the police). The ECC(W) Communication

Reporting and communication structure

10.18 Once implemented, the pan-Wales response arrangements create a structure whereby information from across Wales will be analysed by the ECC(W) at the Welsh Assembly Government. This will provide a national picture of the impact of the emergency, which in turn can be used to advise decisions on the



Team will offer the lead agency what support it can if local resources become stretched. An initial assessment of the staffing requirement will be undertaken, and any problems discussed urgently with the Communication Team. If necessary, the Communication Team would consider commissioning the Government News Network to provide additional back-up support. 10.23 The Communication Team will act as a link between the local media lead and the UK government News Co-ordination Centre. In this way, there will be greater clarity and consistency in the factual information and messages delivered to the public from the local, Wales and UK levels. 10.24 The Communication Team will be responsible for any interviews and statements from Welsh Assembly Government Ministers in relation to the emergency. 10.25 For wide-area emergencies, the focus for media attention will be on central sources. The Welsh Assembly Government will co-ordinate information to the press on the situation in Wales as a whole through collaboration with the press offices of other agencies. Local reporting will be a matter for the agencies concerned, though close communication with the Assembly Communication Team is advised. The Communication Team is able to present an all-Wales picture, providing public information and co-ordinating the media response of the Welsh Assembly Government. 10.26 In liaising with the press operations of other organisations in Wales during an emergency, the Communication Team will: disseminate all relevant information and guidance (including policy guidance and lines to take); receive and collate all relevant information from other press operations; and as far as possible, monitor press and media coverage and respond to any misinformation and misunderstandings. 10.27 The Communication Team will establish a specific information facility for the Welsh Assembly Government website to provide continuous information to the public and the media. This should be bilingual wherever possible. Further detail on information and the media can be found in Chapter 6.

10.28 The Welsh Assembly Government will co-ordinate debriefing following an emergency by establishing a working group comprised of jointagency representatives. If possible, this will be done within 28 days of standing down, but this will, of course, depend on the nature and extent of the emergency, and timescales may vary. The findings of the working group will be reported to the WRF.

Strategic Co-ordinating Group

10.29 Local response is the building block of resilience and the operational response to most emergencies will be managed at the local level. Structures are in place to respond to emergencies that are within the capacity of the resources in that area (North Wales, South Wales, Dyfed Powys and Gwent). The objectives and arrangements for response at the local level in Wales match those in England. Such a response is the responsibility of the SCG operating at the local level. Decision-making in response to emergencies remains with the SCG. There will, however, be communication and reporting arrangements with the WRF as well as with the UK government, where required.

Wales Emergency Co-ordinator

10.30 Under the provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act, if emergency regulations are introduced covering Wales, the UK government must appoint a Wales Emergency Co-ordinator. There will be a list jointly compiled by the Assembly and the UK government of designates for this role for particular emergencies. The terms of appointment, conditions of service and functions of the Wales Emergency Co-ordinator will be set out in the letter of appointment, though some aspects may be included in the emergency regulations themselves. Further details on the use of emergency powers and the role of the Wales Emergency Co-ordinator can be found in Chapter 13.



Figure 10.1: Co-ordination arrangements in Wales when a WCCC has been convened (simplified)1
UK central government crisis management machinery (facilitated by the Cabinet Office)

Lead UK government department

Other devolved administrations and government departments

Wales Civil Contingencies Committee (facilitated by the Welsh Assembly Government)

North Wales Strategic Co-ordinating Group

South Wales Strategic Co-ordinating Group

Dyfed Powys Strategic Co-ordinating Group

Gwent Strategic Co-ordinating Group

In the event of emergency regulations being made, the WCCC will be chaired by the Wales Emergency Co-ordinator.

This figure shows the lines of communication between the central government, Wales and local levels when a WCCC has been established this is most likely to occur in non-terrorist emergencies without a specific definable scene. It is a simplification and is not intended to demonstrate exhaustively the full range of lines of communication between individual organisations (e.g. between police forces and the Home Office).



Chapter 11 Response arrangements in Northern Ireland

The Northern Ireland Administration plays an important role in emergencies in or affecting Northern Ireland (paragraph 11.1). Northern Ireland emergency response and recovery arrangements are based on the same principles that apply elsewhere in the United Kingdom (paragraph 11.2). Northern Ireland has its own unique administrative arrangements. Details such as the identities of organisations which deliver emergency responses and the arrangements for inter-agency co-ordination differ from arrangements elsewhere in the UK (paragraph 11.2). Emergency response and recovery is carried out at local and sub-regional levels by the emergency services, District Councils and other public service organisations (paragraphs 11.311.7). At the Northern Ireland level, the strategic response is provided by the emergency services, the Northern Ireland Office and the Northern Ireland departments (paragraphs 11.811.10). Arrangements are in place to trigger strategic management co-ordination and convene meetings in response to actual or anticipated emergencies, and to scale up the level of co-ordination if the situation demands it (paragraph 11.11). Strategic co-ordination at the Northern Ireland level is delivered by the Central Emergency Management Group (CEMG) and the Crisis Management Group (CMG) (paragraphs 11.1211.19). The crisis management machinery is supported by the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU), which will establish the Northern Ireland Information Management Centre (NIIMC), if required (paragraphs 11.2011.21). In the most challenging emergencies, especially where they affect the whole of the UK, the Northern Ireland strategic management arrangements would link to the UK arrangements (paragraphs 11.2211.23).



Emergency response arrangements in Northern Ireland

11.1 Responsibility for civil protection is largely a devolved matter in Northern Ireland. The balance of activity and interaction between the Northern Ireland Administration and the UK government in relation to emergencies affecting Northern Ireland will depend on the nature of the incident and the devolution settlement. 11.2 The principles of emergency response and recovery in Northern Ireland are the same as for the rest of the UK (Chapter 2). For example, the emergency services and the health service operate to UK-wide standards and protocols. What varies most in Northern Ireland is the name and type of organisation that delivers the emergency response, and the inter-agency co-ordination arrangements. Details of arrangements in Northern Ireland are available in the Central Emergency Planning Unit (CEPU) document, A Guide to Emergency Planning Arrangements in Northern Ireland.

11.6 Some public services in Northern Ireland are organised at sub-regional level, for example the Education and Library Boards and the Health and Social Services Boards. These sub-regional organisations will also respond to emergencies in their areas and will provide co-ordination, where appropriate. For example, the Health and Social Services Boards will co-ordinate the public health response to disease outbreaks in their geographical areas. 11.7 Responses and co-ordination at local or subregional level would normally be at operational and tactical level. If an emergency was sufficiently serious or widespread to require strategic-level response and co-ordination, this would bring into play arrangements across Northern Ireland.

Northern Ireland strategic arrangements

Overview 11.8 The strategic response to emergencies that cannot be managed effectively at local or sub-regional level would be provided by the emergency services on land (Northern Ireland has one Police Service, one Fire and Rescue Service and one Ambulance Service), along with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) where the emergency affects coastal areas. The Northern Ireland departments will respond in accordance with the lead department arrangements, which mirror those governing Whitehall departments. 11.9 The principles of strategic co-ordination of emergency response in Northern Ireland are the same as those elsewhere in the UK. However, the particular structures used for strategic co-ordination reflect the particular organisation of public services in Northern Ireland. 11.10 Where an emergency is caused by actual or suspected criminal or terrorist activity or where the direct response is led by the emergency services, the strategic co-ordination of the direct response falls to the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Office. The Northern Ireland Administration is responsible for strategic co-ordination of the response to those types of emergency not primarily requiring an emergency services response, and for co-ordination of the impact management and recovery response to any

Local and sub-regional arrangements

11.3 The response to emergencies in a particular area is normally managed by the emergency services, who use standard command and control procedures. For emergencies happening on land, the police would normally have responsibility for inter-agency co-ordination at local level, and would involve the other emergency services, other responding organisations and the District Council, as appropriate. 11.4 Where the nature of the emergency is such that the emergency services do not lead the response, leadership of the multi-agency response and recovery effort will fall to the lead organisation locally (e.g. District Council Chief Executive). 11.5 The District Council Chief Executive would also undertake inter-agency co-ordination in circumstances where the emergency services or another lead agency have been co-ordinating the immediate response to an emergency but where there remains a need for co-ordination of recovery activities after the immediate response has been stood down.



emergency. The following refers specifically to the strategic co-ordination arrangements of the Northern Ireland Administration.

Triggers and activation of co-ordination 11.11 If it becomes apparent that an emergency has occurred or is likely to occur, which requires a strategic, multi-agency response, the department acting as the lead department (or other responding agency, such as the Police Service) may request the formation of an interdepartmental group to facilitate co-ordination of the response. To arrange this, the lead department will contact the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM).

identify key issues that need to be addressed, and any input/action that will be required from other organisations; and provide contact details for department staff dealing with the emergency, so enabling other organisations to provide the necessary information to the department and to make enquiries or report any unexpected developments. CEPU will: chair the meeting; work to achieve agreement on actions and responsibilities; report to OFMDFM top management, including the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, and OFMDFM Ministers/the Secretary of State, as appropriate; circulate notes or minutes afterwards confirming actions agreed and timescales; agree arrangements for any further meetings required; continue to liaise with the lead department between meetings and to circulate any additional information/requests to CEMG members; and circulate information on the developing situation to other relevant organisations, including utilities and other infrastructure providers, and request information on their response to the emergency. Attending organisations will: assess their own situation in respect of the emergency, the likely effect on the delivery of their essential services and any information they have on the likely effects on the wider community, and report on these to the meeting; collect, collate and deliver information as requested by the lead department. This may be supplied to the department verbally or in writing at or after the meeting; agree the actions they will take to manage and co-ordinate the situation within their own areas of responsibility, in accordance with agreements reached at meetings; and provide appropriate contact information to the lead department and CEPU. 11.15 As a result of CEMG meetings, working groups may be formed to deal with specific aspects of the situation. These would not necessarily be chaired by either CEPU or the lead department. Agreement would be reached at meetings on the most

Interdepartmental co-ordination 11.12 Upon receiving the request to establish an interdepartmental group, CEPU will advise on the level and membership of the group and convene the group as agreed. The interdepartmental group may be the CEMG or the CMG, depending on the circumstances at the time of the emergency. It may be that both groups will be formed either simultaneously or sequentially as the emergency response and the recovery progress. The actions required for the functioning of each of these groups are detailed below.

Central Emergency Management Group 11.13 If the lead department and CEPU agree that the serious or catastrophic emergency situation is likely to affect the Northern Ireland infrastructure, including the delivery of public services, CEPU will convene a meeting of the CEMG. This group meets at a senior level and comprises representatives of the Northern Ireland departments, emergency services, District Council Chief Executives, and other key agencies. Membership of the group would be tailored to the particular needs of the situation, and additional organisations would be invited, where necessary. 11.14 CEPU would provide the chair and secretariat for the CEMG. The lead department will: report on the actions that it has already taken and any additional ones that will be required;



appropriate organisation to chair, though CEPU could facilitate working groups by making accommodation and contact information available.

Crisis Management Group 11.16 If the emergency was, or was expected to become, so serious that severe disruption to the community had occurred, or was anticipated, the lead department and CEPU would consider whether a meeting of the CMG was required. This group has the power to direct the response, in Northern Ireland, to an emergency. Membership of the CMG would be at Permanent Secretary/Chief Executive level and the group would normally be chaired by the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service. However, at the lead departments request, it could chair the CMG. In very severe emergencies, the CMG may be chaired and/or attended by Ministers. 11.17 Meetings of the CMG would deal with strategic policy issues and prioritise the management of any issues arising from the emergency. Whichever organisation chairs the CMG, the lead department would be expected to have a key role in briefing the meeting, identifying issues to be addressed, and co-ordinating actions the CEMG may be required to undertake, to give effect to the decisions of the CMG. 11.18 The roles of the lead department, CEPU and attending organisations in the CMG would be similar to those in the CEMG, but the CMG would: report to Ministers; take strategic decisions and monitor implementation; and discuss long-term and high-level policy issues and set objectives for the response and the recovery. 11.19 It follows that representatives on the CMG should be empowered and prepared to take strategic decisions and commit their organisations to implement them.

NIIMC would be to provide co-ordinated briefings to OFMDFM top management and OFMDFM Ministers and to identify any emerging difficulties that need to be notified to responding organisations for resolution. Briefings would also be circulated to Northern Ireland departments and other key organisations, as appropriate. NIIMC would act in support of the OFMDFM Chair of the CEMG and the CMG, as appropriate. 11.21 The lead department would work closely with NIIMC, possibly sending a member of staff to the CEPU office (or any other location used for NIIMC) to act as liaison.

Information and the media 11.22 The Northern Ireland Administration has its own Executive Information Service (EIS), which would undertake liaison with the media and issue public information for those aspects of the emergency response and recovery processes that fall to the Northern Ireland Administration. The EIS would work closely with the Northern Ireland Office information service (the Northern Ireland Information Service) and the UK government News Co-ordination Centre, as required.

Liaison with the UK central government response

11.23 In the most challenging emergencies, especially where they affect the UK as a whole, the Northern Ireland CMG would link into the Northern Ireland Offices crisis management arrangements and the strategic management arrangements of the UK government. The Northern Ireland Office (NIO) is the UK Lead Government Department for terrorist incidents affecting Northern Ireland. The NIOs crisis management response will be co-ordinated through the activation of the Northern Ireland Office Briefing Rooms.

Northern Ireland Information Management Centre 11.20 In situations where there is widespread disruption to public services and infrastructure, CEPU has the facility to activate its NIIMC. NIIMC would gather and collate information on the situation from across the Northern Ireland public services and infrastructure providers. The primary purpose of



Figure 11.1: Lines of communication in Northern Ireland

Central government crisis-management machinery (COBR)

Crisis Management Group

Northern Ireland Office crisis-management machinery (NIOBR)

Central Emergency Management Group PSNI NI departments and agencies Emergency services





Chapter 12 The role Chapter of UK 1central government in response Introduction and recovery

In some instances the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of central government support or co-ordination becomes necessary. Central government will not duplicate the role of local responders who remain the basic building block of the response to an emergency (paragraphs 12.112.5). A designated Lead Government Department (LGD) or, where appropriate, a devolved administration, will be made responsible for the overall management of the central government response (paragraphs 12.612.9). The balance of activity between UK central government and the devolved administrations will depend on the nature of the emergency and the terms of the devolution settlements (paragraphs 12.1012.11). Central government maintains dedicated crisis management arrangements to support this role (paragraphs 12.1212.16). Further information can be found in Central government arrangements for responding to an emergency: concept of operations. This can found at:



Role of UK central government in emergencies

12.1 Most emergencies in the United Kingdom are handled at the local level by local responders with no direct involvement by UK central government. However, in some instances the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of UK central government support or co-ordination becomes necessary. The level of central government involvement will vary and could range from advice and support from the LGD to the 24/7 activation of the central government crisis management machinery. 12.2 Whatever the level of central government involvement, the guiding principles set out in Chapter 2 of this guidance document apply equally to UK central government. These principles support a clearly identifiable set of objectives for the UK central government response to all emergencies, including multiple incidents where a number of incidents occur close together in the same area or in different parts of the country. The strategic objectives for the UK central government response are therefore to: protect human life and, as far as possible, property, and alleviate suffering; support the continuity of everyday activity and the restoration of disrupted services at the earliest opportunity; and uphold the rule of law and the democratic process. 12.3 In practice, not all of these objectives may be achievable at the outset of an emergency. Ministers will provide early strategic direction on the appropriate balance to strike in the light of circumstances at the time. 12.4 To achieve these strategic objectives, UK central government will: respect local knowledge and decision-making wherever possible, without losing sight of the national strategy; prioritise access to scarce national resources; use data and information management systems to gain a national picture and support decisionmaking, without overburdening front-line responders; base policy decisions on the best available science and ensure that the processes for providing scientific advice are widely understood and trusted;

draw on existing legislation to respond effectively to the event, and consider the need for additional powers; apply risk assessment methodology and cost-benefit analysis within an appropriate economic model to inform decision-making; and explain policies, plans and practices by communicating with interested parties (including the public) comprehensively, clearly and consistently in a transparent and open way that addresses national and local concerns while encouraging and listening to feedback. 12.5 UK central government will not duplicate the role of local responders. Instead, it will deliver several clear outputs: providing strategic directions based on: a common recognised information picture; intelligence assessments and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) threat levels in relation to terrorist threats where relevant; advice from the local Strategic Co-ordinating Groups or other key stakeholders invited to attend Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms; advice on the wider impact and longer-term recovery; and scientific advice provided by, or on behalf of, the LGD; deciding on the adequacy of existing legislation and the use of emergency powers at UK or sub-UK basis; authorising military assistance (see Chapter 3); mobilising national assets and UK central government resources and releasing them to support response and recovery efforts as appropriate; determining national protective security and other counter-measures; determining the public information strategy, and co-ordinating public advice in consultation with Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (where appropriate), the devolved administrations (where appropriate) and other key stakeholders; managing the international/diplomatic aspects of the incident; determining the likely development of the emergency and providing early strategic direction of preparations for the recovery phase to ensure coherent management without conflicting with immediate response, including the role of the regional ties; sharing information with the devolved administrations on the evolving situation; and



advising on the relative priority to be attached to multi-site or multiple incidents and the allocation of scarce national resources, consulting the devolved administrations where appropriate.

The Lead Government Department principle and its operation

12.6 Where the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of government co-ordination or support becomes necessary, a designated LGD or, where appropriate, a devolved administration, will be made responsible for the overall management of the government response. In the most serious circumstances, this could involve the activation of COBR to facilitate rapid co-ordination and collective decision-making. In less serious circumstances, the regional resilience tier, on behalf of the LGD, may discharge the central government interest in non-terrorist emergencies. 12.7 A pre-designated list of LGDs is maintained and can be found at Where an emergency occurs that does not permit straightforward LGD categorisation, it will be the responsibility of the Cabinet Office to make a judgement in consultation with the Prime Ministers Office, and appoint the most appropriate LGD. 12.8 Effective performance of designated LGDs in emergencies is crucial to ensuring that response and recovery is handled properly. In order to prepare LGDs for that role, the Government has issued The Lead Government Department and its role Guidance and Best Practice ( This guidance has been set out to enable departments to carry out effectively the responsibilities and functions associated with their role as LGDs. It describes the key processes and disciplines necessary in planning for and responding to crises for which they are either the nominated lead or have key responsibilities to act during the progress of the crisis. It also describes how these processes will be monitored and audited in order to achieve a uniformly high standard of planning and preparation. 12.9 The LGD concept applies in principle to the planning, response and recovery phases of an emergency. However, in some circumstances, for example following a wide-area emergency with wideranging impacts, it may be more appropriate for another department to assume the lead or, where

there are a number of departments with significant ongoing involvement, for a senior Minister to be given responsibility for overseeing the longer-term recovery effort. During the response phase, the LGD will, as the situation unfolds, be considering the likely demands on central government during the recovery phase and how these might best be met in consultation with other departments. The predesignated LGD will, however, remain responsible for leading the central government involvement in the recovery phase unless and until alternative arrangements have been agreed and put in place.

Role of the devolved administrations 12.10 The devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will, within their competencies, play a full role in response to an emergency requiring government involvement. Their role will depend on two things: whether the incident affects Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland; and whether the response to the emergency includes activity within the competence of the administration. This is true even for terrorism-related emergencies where responsibility for consequence management may fall within devolved competence (e.g. responsibility for health, investigation and prosecution of crime is devolved to Scotland). 12.11 The devolved administrations will mirror many of the tasks of the UK-level crisis mechanisms when the issue falls within devolved competence, as well as fulfilling the same tasks as the English regional structures. In every case, the precise balance of activity will depend on the competence of the devolved administration involved (i.e. the terms of their devolution settlement) and the nature of the incident. In areas of reserved responsibility, the UK Lead Government Department will lead the response in the devolved areas, working closely with the relevant devolved administration.

The Governments central crisis management machinery

Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) 12.12 Where the nature of the emergency is such that it affects the business of a number of government departments, a collective response will be required, led by the LGD. Collective decision-making within central government is delivered through the Cabinet



committee system and decision-making during emergencies follows the same pattern. But because of the unpredictable nature of emergencies, the Government maintains dedicated crisis management facilities (COBR) and supporting arrangements which are only activated in the event of a major national emergency. The Prime Minister, Home Secretary or another senior Minister will normally chair key meetings involving Ministers and officials from relevant departments, as appropriate. Key external stakeholders (e.g. the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)) may be invited to attend depending on the nature of the emergency. Meetings will cover all the strategic aspects of the response and recovery effort. Officials in COBR will identify options and propose advice on the issues on which Ministers will need to focus.

Public information 12.15 Any emergency on a scale requiring a co-ordinated UK central government response will need national direction of public information from the outset. UK central government will be responsible for the national communications strategy for responding to the emergency, the development of which will be co-ordinated with the lead local responder. The News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) will be activated at one of these levels to pull together the national media communications effort. In the most demanding circumstances, a government Media Centre will be established. Under Home Office leadership for a terrorist incident or the lead department in other cases, it will work to the policy direction of COBR. Information officers from relevant Whitehall departments and agencies will be attached to the NCC for the duration of the emergency. (Where there is a significant devolved dimension, an information officer from the relevant devolved administration will also normally join the NCC.) Overseeing the implementation of this strategy will be the responsibility of the NCC. All media enquiries and requests for ministerial appearances will be directed to the NCC, which will also generate a rolling brief for ministers and a media summary for meetings in COBR. 12.16 The Cabinet Office leads on warning and informing the public in case of a specific and credible threat that cannot be dealt with using existing local warning provision. There is an Emergency Broadcasting System, under which existing agreements and systems will ensure the rapid dissemination of public warnings through the whole range of radio and television services, including Ceefax, Teletext and websites. Public safety remains the Governments first priority in all decisions about public information or warnings. If a warning is necessary to protect public safety in the face of a specific and credible threat, and cannot be effectively delivered through local mechanisms, the Government will issue one without hesitation, as well as giving out any further information that will help the public respond effectively.

Liaison between central government and the local response 12.13 Where a Strategic Co-ordinating Group has been established and a UK central government response is required, a Government Liaison Team (GLT) will normally be despatched immediately at the onset of an emergency. The GLT is a multidisciplinary team led by the Government Liaison Officer (GLO). For terrorist or potential terrorist incidents in Great Britain, the GLO will be a senior Home Office official. For non-terrorist incidents, the GLO may come from the relevant Government Office for the Regions or the LGD. (In the devolved administrations, officials from the relevant devolved administration would also be part of the Team, or even lead it.) The GLO will be the main liaison channel between COBR and the scene. 12.14 For emergencies without a police lead, or where there is a need to communicate more widely with other police forces, ACPO will channel requests between central government and police forces. ACPO Scotland performs a similar role in Scotland. A senior ACPO representative in COBR will advise central government on the wider implications of response options and will represent the services views on wider policing issues. The organisation can also issue national guidance to forces on specific issues. The Police National Information Co-ordination Centre can be activated to support the ACPO representative in COBR.



Chapter 13 Emergency powers

Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 contains the Governments generic emergency powers legislation. Emergency powers are a last-resort option for responding to the most serious of emergencies where existing powers are insufficient (paragraphs 13.113.8). They are a mechanism for making temporary legislation in order to prevent, control or mitigate an aspect or effect of the emergency (paragraphs 13.913.12). Emergency regulations must be necessary to resolve the emergency and proportionate to the effect or aspect of the emergency they are aimed at (paragraphs 13.113.12). What emergency regulations will contain will depend on the circumstances of the emergency (paragraphs 13.1113.18). There must be no expectation that the Government will agree to use emergency powers and planning and response arrangements must assume that they will not be used (paragraphs 13.413.14).



What are emergency powers?

13.1 Part 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 establishes a new emergency powers framework. Emergency powers allow the Government to make special temporary legislation (emergency regulations) as a last resort in the most serious of emergencies where existing legislation is insufficient to respond in the most effective way. Emergency regulations may make provision of any kind that could be made by an Act of Parliament or by exercise of the Royal Prerogative, so long as such action is needed urgently and is both necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. 13.2 The regulations may extend to the whole of the UK or to any one or more of the English regions and/or the devolved administrations. In English regions, Regional Nominated Co-ordinators (RNCs) will be appointed to co-ordinate the handling of the emergency within each region. In devolved areas they will be known as Emergency Co-ordinators. 13.3 Emergency powers ensure the Government can respond quickly in emergency situations where new powers are needed and there is not time to legislate in the usual way in advance of acting. They ensure the Government can act legally and accountably in situations where temporary new legal provision is required without the time for Parliament to provide it beforehand. 13.4 Emergency powers legislation is not a panacea for difficulties faced in responding to or recovering from emergencies. It is a legislative mechanism for making temporary changes to the law within clearly defined limits. Planning and response arrangements must assume that they will not be used.

prevent or limit an expected emergency, to address an emergency while it is taking place and/or to deal with its aftermath, and to facilitate the return to normality. 13.7 If the situation or event is so serious as to warrant consideration of use of the powers then the deciding factor will be whether existing powers, that could be used to deal with it, are insufficient or ineffective. If they are sufficient then emergency powers cannot be used, no matter how serious the emergency. 13.8 The decision to use emergency powers, or not, is a matter for UK central government and will be handled by the relevant Lead Government Department (LGD), subject to collective agreement. Arrangements are in place to ensure effective consultation and co-ordination with the devolved administrations. These are set out, in detail, in separate concordats with the Welsh and Scottish administrations and in a bilateral agreement with the Northern Ireland administration.

How emergency powers are invoked

13.9 Emergency regulations are made by Her Majesty by Order in Council on the advice of her ministers. If, for whatever reason, this is not possible without serious delay, a senior minister of the Crown may make the regulations by order. The regulations must then be laid before Parliament as soon as it is reasonably practicable. Parliament must approve them (with or without amendment) within seven days of laying or they fall. They may stay in force for up to 30 days beginning on the day the order comes into force, but can be renewed for a further 30 days at any point during, or after, this period if it is necessary and proportionate to do so. 13.10 The length of time it takes to bring emergency regulations into effect will vary depending on the number and complexity of the proposed regulations, the issues they raise that need to be resolved, the practicalities of legal drafting and making an Order in Council. It is difficult to estimate how long this may take in a given emergency some emergencies may require only three or four very straightforward regulations, others may require a few dozen that raise complex legal issues around liability, protection of human rights and devolution that must be resolved before they are made. In either case, it

When emergency powers may be used

13.5 The Act states that emergency powers can only be used if an event or situation threatens: serious damage to human welfare in the UK, a devolved territory or region; serious damage to the environment of the UK, a devolved territory or region; or the security of the UK, from war or terrorism. 13.6 They can be used if such a situation is occurring, has occurred or is about to occur. They can, therefore, be used pre-emptively to attempt to



should be assumed that it will take a minimum of six hours to bring the regulations into effect, or, possibly, a number of days. This must be borne in mind when considering whether it is appropriate to request the use of the powers if the effects of an incident are expected to be felt in a matter of minutes or to be over in just a few hours it is extremely unlikely that emergency regulations could be put in place quickly enough to be of any use. The Goverment will publicly announce when the regulations will come into effect and disseminate their content using the mass media, alongside issuing guidance to relevant organisations.

request. Failure to supply the relevant information or to consult other relevant local organisations before doing so will delay its consideration. 13.14 The Government will assess requests based on its overall response strategy and the safeguards set out in the Act. It should be borne in mind that emergency powers are a last-resort option for dealing with only the effects of the most serious of emergencies. The presumption is against their use. Even if it is agreed that a temporary change to the law is necessary, other options, including introducing an emergency Bill to Parliament, must be considered first. There must be no expectation that the Government will agree to use emergency powers and planning and response arrangements should assume that they will not be used.

Scope of emergency regulations

13.11 The content of emergency regulations depends on the circumstances of the emergency. It must be necessary to make additional provision and the emergency regulations must be proportionate to the effect or aspect of the emergency they are aimed at. This sets clear limits on what can be done in any given situation. All those powers listed in Section 22 of the Act will not be available in a specific emergency; the powers actually used must be tailored to the emergency if they are to meet the robust legal tests and safeguards set out in the Act. 13.12 Any decision to make regulations, and the content of the regulations, will be entirely dependent on the unique circumstances of a particular emergency.

Co-ordinators 13.15 An RNC must be appointed to all English regions to which the emergency regulations apply. In Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the person taking this post will be known as the Emergency Co-ordinator. The post-holder will be appointed to facilitate co-ordination of activities under the emergency regulations in line with the response strategy and objectives set by central government. They will also play a wider co-ordinating role. The role is flexible and will be tailored to the circumstances but will be likely to include: communicating the objectives and priorities of central government to local, regional and devolved actors, and reporting back to central government; providing a strategic overview at the regional/ devolved level; facilitating communication and co-ordination between local, regional and devolved actors, including the chairing of the Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC); acting as a focal point for the communication of government messages to the media; and liaising with neighbouring co-ordinators and facilitating cross-regional co-operation and co-ordination. The role of the Co-ordinator is not designed to impinge on the independence of organisations at the local or regional level; the principle of subsidiarity will apply to all decisions concerning its functions. The role is intended to add value in terms of strategic

Requesting the use of emergency powers

13.13 The decision to use emergency powers, and the content of emergency regulations, are matters for central government. It will assess any request made for their use by the heads of relevant organisations, ideally endorsed by key responders in their area (e.g. members of the Local or Regional Resilience Forum). It should be borne in mind that requests that seem relatively straightforward to those on the ground, may raise a wide range of complex issues that need to be considered at the centre (e.g. liability and compensation issues or compatibility with Human Rights or European Law) and it may take some time before it is possible to issue a response. Those making the request will have to supply detailed information in order to facilitate the process. Annex 13A describes the process for making a



co-ordination and communication, working alongside established chains of command and accountability and established relationships between organisations. 13.16 Co-ordinators will be appointed by a senior Minister from the LGD, and must comply with any direction or guidance issued by the Minister. The level of discretion permitted to Co-ordinators will vary according to the strategy adopted by the LGD. Co-ordinators will be directly accountable to the Minister, who retains ultimate decision-making authority and, in England, will be supported by Regional Resilience Teams. 13.17 Co-ordinators will be selected by the LGD, based on the following criteria: effective crisis-management skills; personal authority and the leadership skills to command the respect and trust of senior local, regional and devolved actors; sufficient knowledge of the policy area in question (e.g. public health) and key responder organisations; and knowledge of the geographical area and local/ regional arrangements. 13.18 The appointment of the Co-ordinator will come to an end when the regulations cease to have effect, even though he or she may continue to play an informal role in recovery efforts, if appropriate.



Annex 1A: Overview of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004

The Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and accompanying non-legislative measures, delivers a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom capable of meeting the challenges of the twenty-first century. The Act is separated into two substantive parts: local arrangements for civil protection (Part 1) and emergency powers (Part 2).

co-operate with other local responders to enhance co-ordination and efficiency; and provide advice and assistance to businesses and voluntary organisations about business continuity management (local authorities only). Category 2 responders (e.g. Health and Safety Executive, Strategic Health Authorities, transport and utility companies) are co-operating bodies, which are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. Category 2 responders have a lesser set of duties co-operating and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. Regulations under the Act require Category 1 and 2 responders in England and Wales to come together to form Local Resilience Forums, which are based on police force areas outside London (there are six Local Resilience Forums in the Metropolitan police area). These are the principal mechanisms for multi-agency co-operation between local responders and help to facilitate better co-ordination and communication, and to foster a sense of partnership.

Part 1: Local arrangements for civil protection

Part 1 of the Act and the supporting Regulations, and the statutory guidance Emergency Preparedness, establish a clear set of roles and responsibilities for those involved in emergency preparation and response at the local level. This helps to deliver greater consistency of civil protection activity at the local level; facilitate more systematic co-operation between responders; and lay the foundation for robust performance management. The Act divides local responders into two categories, imposing a different set of duties on each. Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of emergency response (e.g. emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). Category 1 responders are subject to the full set of civil protection duties. They are required to: assess the risk of emergencies occurring and use this to inform emergency planning and business continuity planning; put in place emergency plans; put in place business continuity plans; put in place arrangements to make information available to the public about civil protection matters and maintain arrangements to warn, inform and advise the public in the event of an emergency; share information with other local responders to enhance co-ordination;

Part 2: Emergency powers

Part 2 of the Act updates the Emergency Powers Act 1920 to reflect the developments in the intervening years and the risks we face in the twenty-first century. It allows for the making of temporary special legislation (emergency regulations) to help deal with the most serious of emergencies. The use of emergency powers is a last resort option and planning arrangements at the local level should not assume that emergency powers will be made available. Their use is subject to a robust set of safeguards they can only be deployed in exceptional circumstances.



Annex 1B: Recovery management

Roles and responsibilities in the response phase of emergencies are well known, understood and rehearsed. Experience has shown that the recovery phase and the structures, processes and relationships that underpin it are harder to get right. The challenges posed by the recovery process will depend on the nature, scale and severity of an emergency. Every recovery process is different. Chapter 4 describes the multi-agency framework for co-ordinating the response and recovery effort. And to help local responders think about some of the substantive issues they may need to address, this section seeks to: define recovery and the activities it comprises; identify the components of the recovery process; and outline some of the support and guidance available.

Exploiting opportunities afforded by emergencies: Establishing what happened, identifying where improvements could be made, and applying lessons learned. Taking steps to adapt systems, services and infrastructure affected by emergencies to meet future needs. The recovery phase begins at the earliest opportunity following the onset of an emergency, running in tandem with the response to the emergency itself. It continues until the disruption has been rectified, demands on services have returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected (directly and indirectly) have been met. In sharp contrast to the response phase, the recovery phase may endure for months, years or even decades.

Components of recovery
Emergencies affect communities in a wide variety of ways. To understand what recovery comprises, one first needs to map out who is affected and how emergencies affect them. As Chapter 5 of this document makes clear, the impact of emergencies goes well beyond those directly affected by an emergency (e.g. through injury, loss of property, evacuation). Emergencies affect, for example, onlookers, family and friends of fatalities or survivors, response and recovery workers and the wider community. To understand how emergencies affect individuals and their communities and thus the scope of the recovery effort it is important also to understand how emergencies impact upon the environment they live and work in. Figure 1B.1 provides a conceptual framework for understanding these impacts and the steps that

Understanding recovery
Recovery is an integral part of the emergency management process. It can be characterised as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. The recovery process comprises the following overlapping activities: Consequence management: Taking steps to prevent the escalation of the impacts of an emergency (e.g. restoring essential services following a disruption or securing evacuated premises). Restoration of the well-being of individuals, communities and the infrastructure which supports them: Emergencies can have enduring impacts and timely action will be needed to identify these, along with longer-term engagement to ensure that they are adequately addressed.



may need to be taken to mitigate them.1 There are four interlinked categories of impact that individuals and communities will need to recover from. The nature

of the impacts and whether and at what level action needs to be taken will depend in large part on the nature, scale and severity of the emergency itself.

Figure 1B.1: The component parts of the recovery challenge

Social impacts

Economic impacts


Health impacts

Environmental impacts
Social impacts Health impacts Economic impacts Environmental impacts Disruption to daily life (e.g. educational establishments, welfare services, transport system) Disruption to utilities/essential services Public displacement and disorder Deaths Suffering (including physical and psychological impacts) Individuals needs Businesses Infrastructure Macro-economy Bio-diversity and eco-systems Built environment Waste and pollution Natural resources

Adapted from Focus on Recovery: a Holistic Framework for Recovery in New Zealand, Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, February 2005.



Experience has highlighted several key factors which underpin success: Clear leadership, robust management and long-term commitment: Recovery work can raise challenging business continuity and financial management issues for those organisations involved. Given the likely breadth and duration of the recovery phase, effective project and programme management will be crucial, along with the visible commitment of senior managers to ensure that focus and impetus are maintained. Community involvement: In the aftermath of emergencies, self-help is an important factor, and steps should be taken to empower individuals and communities to manage their own recovery. Similarly, communities themselves are an important stakeholder in the process of physical reconstruction and the restoration of services and amenities. Community involvement could take the form of public meetings or community representation on relevant committees, for example. Enabling the private sector: The private sector has a pivotal role in the recovery phase. If losses caused by the emergency are insured, the insurance industry will have a crucial role in assessing and settling claims. Likewise, businesses will be directly or indirectly affected by an emergency and will be engaged in business continuity management activity. Local responders should aim to create an environment which facilitates business recovery and enables the private sector to play an effective role in facilitating the recovery of the wider community.

schemes which are most likely to be relevant are described below. For further information on the schemes listed below or other forms of emergency assistance, local responders should consult their Government Office or the Welsh Assembly Government.

Bellwin scheme The Bellwin scheme provides financial assistance to local authorities (including police authorities and fire authorities) to help meet the costs of dealing with an emergency. It is a discretionary scheme for any incident that is deemed exceptional by local standards, and where the damage to life and property in the local authority area causes an undue financial burden on the authority. In England the scheme is administered by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), which assesses each individual case on its merits, before paying grants to successful local authorities in accordance with Section 155(4) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989. This legislation restricts emergency financial relief to any extra expenditure on immediate action to safeguard life or property or to prevent severe inconvenience to inhabitants following an emergency. In Wales the Bellwin scheme is administered by the Welsh Assembly Government.2 There is a claims threshold of 0.2 per cent of the authoritys annual budget, and this must be exceeded before claims are considered. Authorities are expected to meet costs below this threshold from within their existing funds. The threshold applies to the whole financial year (i.e. if an authority is unfortunate enough to have more than one incident in the year it does not have to exceed the threshold in each case before qualifying for a grant). Successful claims are paid at a rate of 85 per cent of spending above the threshold by ODPM/WAG; local authorities are required to meet the remaining 15 per cent. Bellwin has traditionally been paid in response to incidents in which bad weather has threatened life and property beyond all previous local experience, although the law does not rule out its use in response to other types of incident.

Guidance and assistance

Depending on the nature, scale and severity of the emergency, government may be able to offer advice and assistance to local responders in undertaking recovery work.

Domestic financial aid There are a number of organisations and funding schemes (either operated by or accessible through the UK government or the Welsh Assembly Government) that may help local responders meet the extraordinary financial costs incurred during the response to, and recovery from, an emergency. The

Police authorities can claim Bellwin monies within the context of the scheme operated by the Welsh Assembly Government. The relevant local authority will generally be charged by the police and those costs would be shown in the local authoritys Bellwin claim.



The relevant Government Office in the English regions or the Welsh Assembly Government will be able to advise local authorities on how to make their claim, and should be approached for advice in the first instance. Guidance on making a claim, along with a breakdown of thresholds per authority, may be found on the ODPM website at: or the Welsh Assembly Government website at:

London. The Welsh Development Agency works closely with the Welsh Assembly Government, and local responders can liaise with the Welsh Assembly Government for advice on approaching the Welsh Development Agency for financial assistance.3

EU structural funding European Regional Development Fund The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) is one of four structural funds aimed at reducing regional disparities. It aims to enhance economic and social cohesion in the regions by funding projects including sites and facilities for businesses, help for small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), transport infrastructure projects; environmental protection and improvement measures which are linked to regional economic development; and community economic development. ODPM is the managing authority for ERDF programmes in England, although it delegates most of its responsibilities to Government Offices for the regions. Applications for ERDF grants should be submitted to the relevant GO. The Welsh European Funding Office (part of the Welsh Assembly Government) is the managing authority for ERDF in Wales.

Departmental grants and extraordinary funds Many UK government departments have various grants and funding schemes set up to direct money to specific areas in England (or elsewhere on reserved issues) to meet specific needs. For example, DfT operates the Supplementary Transport Grant, which is issued under Section 87 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. Depending on the circumstances, this grant may provide authorities with disaster relief. For information on other funding streams, local authorities should liaise with the relevant Government Office or the Welsh Assembly Government.

Regional Development Agencies Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) are responsible for promoting sustainable economic development and regeneration. There is one RDA in each English region. They are funded by several departments, which pool contributions into a single budget allocated by the Department of Trade and Industry. Depending on the circumstances of the emergency, an RDA may be able to provide financial support for relief measures where such action would be consistent with its statutory responsibilities. The Welsh Development Agency performs similar functions in Wales. The RDAs work closely with the Government Offices, and local responders should liaise with their GO for advice on approaching the RDA for financial assistance. In London, the London Development Agency is a functional body of the Greater London Authority (GLA), so local responders may wish initially to approach either the GLA or Government Office for

European Social Fund The European Social Fund (ESF) is another structural fund and mainly supports the adaptation and modernisation of policies and systems of education and employment. The Department for Work and Pensions is the managing authority for ESF programmes in England but, as with the ODPM and ERDF, delegates most of the responsibilities to GOs. The Welsh European Funding Office is the managing authority for ESF in Wales. Comprehensive information on the European Social Fund and its constituent objectives may be found at Neither the ERDF nor the ESF is an emergency relief fund as such, but they could potentially support projects promoted by local authorities engaged in a

From April 2006 local responders can contact the Welsh Assembly Government direct. From this date the Welsh Development Agency will be merging with the Welsh Assembly Government.



medium or long-term recovery process, provided these projects meet the objectives and priorities of the relevant structural funding programmes.

European Union Solidarity Fund The European Union has a Solidarity Fund (EUSF) to enable it to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergencies. The EUSF is primarily intended to intervene in cases of major natural disasters with serious repercussions on living conditions, the natural environment or the economy in one or more regions of a member state or a country applying for accession. A major disaster is defined as one which results in damage estimated at over 3 billion Euros or 0.6 per cent of Gross National Income. Exceptionally, even when that threshold is not met, a region or devolved administration could still benefit from assistance when it has been affected by an extraordinary disaster (mainly but not exclusively a natural disaster) that affects a major part of its population with serious and lasting repercussions on living conditions and economic stability. The aim of the EUSF is to complement national efforts and to cover a share of the public expenditure on emergency response and recovery operations. Areas that might benefit from the assistance include: immediate restoration of key infrastructure (e.g. energy, water, sanitation, telecommunications, transport, health, education), temporary accommodation, funding rescue services, protection of cultural heritage and decontamination or clean-up efforts. Payments can only be made for losses that are not insured. Applications for assistance must be made by the government of the affected member state to the Commissions Directorate General for Regions within 10 weeks of the event. In deciding on applications, the Commission will take account of other sources of national or international financial assistance, including private insurance coverage to which the member state may have had access. The Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat is best placed to advise on EUSF issues.

of an emergency are many and varied. Local responders will face issues as diverse as dealing with a sudden increase in levels of homelessness, to coping with the detrimental effects on statutory or local performance targets. Between central departments, devolved administrations and their agencies, voluntary and other bodies, there is a wealth of guidance and advice already available to local responders. Where this guidance exists, it will be signposted on A flavour of the type of issues that local responders have faced in the past is given below, but this list is by no means exhaustive. The Government Offices and the Welsh Assembly Government have a number of teams whose policy expertise covers a range of recovery-related issues, as well as a network of contacts. Below are several examples of problems local responders might face. Where the Government Office or the Welsh Assembly Government may be able to help. School closures: Schools may well be damaged during an emergency. During the recovery phase it is possible that part or all of the school premises may not be able to open. This raises a number of issues, especially so during the exam season, when relocating staff and pupils may be particularly challenging. Listed buildings: Listed buildings are subject to strict rules governing what work may or may not be carried out on them. During a clear-up operation, this can cause some extra difficulty for responsible authorities. Local authority performance: As a consequence of the effects of a particular emergency, local authorities may find that their audited performance against targets and indicators in various regimes (e.g. Comprehensive Performance Assessment, Wales Programme for Improvement) suffers. For example, clear-up operations increase the gross tonnage of waste disposed of by local authorities, which thereby reduces the percentage of total waste recycled.

Decontamination The Government Decontamination Service (GDS) was launched on 1 October 2005 as an executive agency of Defra. Its remit is to enhance the United Kingdoms ability to deal with the consequences of accidental or deliberate releases of chemical,

Non-financial aid The numbers of issues that will confront local responders during the course of the recovery phase



biological, radiological or nuclear material affecting the built and open environment, transport and infrastructure. It has four principal functions: to provide advice, guidance and assistance on decontamination-related issues to responsible authorities in their contingency planning for incidents involving contamination, and to assist with regular testing and validation of arrangements that are in place; to identify and assess the ability of specialist contractors in the private sector to carry out decontamination operations in such circumstances, and ensure that responsible authorities have access to those arrangements if the need arises. If required, the GDS will also help co-ordinate decontamination operations; to work with government departments, responsible authorities, specialist suppliers, research organisations and other nations to improve decontamination technologies and capabilities; and to advise central government on the national capability for the decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, mobile transport assets and the open environment, and to be a source of expertise. The GDS will not: act as a first responder; assume responsibility for decontamination; fund decontamination; or deal with humans, animals or their remains. Further information about the Government Decontamination Service can be found on the Defra website at or by contacting



Annex 3A: Civil Contingencies Act 2004: list of responders

Schedule 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 lists the responders, subject to its provisions. As described in Annex 1A, the Act splits local responders into two categories and imposes a different set of requirements on each category. Category 1 and 2 responders in England and Wales are listed below. Section 13 of the Act enables Ministers to amend the list of responders with the agreement of Parliament.

Category 2 responders (co-operating responders)

Utilities Electricity distributors and transmitters Gas distributors Water and sewerage undertakers Telephone service providers (fixed and mobile)


Category 1 responders (core responders)

Emergency services Police forces British Transport Police Fire authorities Ambulance services Maritime and Coastguard Agency

Network Rail Train operating companies (passenger and freight) London Underground Transport for London Airport operators Harbour authorities Highways Agency

Health bodies Local authorities All principal local authorities (i.e. metropolitan districts, shire counties, shire districts, shire unitaries) Port health authorities Strategic Health Authorities

Government agencies Health and Safety Executive

Health bodies Primary Care Trusts Acute Trusts Foundation Trusts Local Health Boards (in Wales) Any Welsh NHS Trust that provides public health services Health Protection Agency

Government agencies Environment Agency



Annex 13A: Requesting the making of Emergency Regulations under Part 2 Of The Civil Contingencies Act 2004
If a responder organisation considers that it is necessary to request the use of emergency powers, it will need to, having taken into consideration the content of Chapter 13, seek the advice of the Government Liaison Officer placed within a Strategic Co-ordination Group, ensuring that in every case the Regional Resilience Director (RRD), or the Devolved Administration where applicable, is kept informed. In seeking advice, the organisation will need to be able to supply detailed information that will allow a consideration of the request in the light of the demands of the emergency and the tests laid out in the Civil Contingencies Act. The organisation will need to be able to answer the following questions before seeking advice: What is the nature of the emergency and which geographical area is it affecting/likely to affect? What action needs to be taken and why? When does this action need to be taken? Why cant this be achieved under existing powers? What specific temporary new powers are requested? What alternative approaches (e.g. voluntary) have been considered and why would they be ineffective? Who will be affected by the operation of the powers and how? Does this raise any human rights issues? What safeguards should be included to ensure the powers are used proportionately and only where necessary? How would the powers be exercised/enforced, and by whom? When are the new powers needed and how long are they likely to be needed for? What is the trigger for their revocation? Would exercise of the powers raise any other issues such as the need to pay compensation, liability issues, etc. What are the implications of not being granted the powers? Which organisations have been consulted, and what are their views? The organisation making the request will need to seek advice from its legal advisers to confirm that there is a genuine gap in legal powers which prevents the necessary action being taken. It will also need to consult with other relevant organisations in the local, and other affected, areas before seeking advice, with a particular focus on Category 1 and 2 responders. The presumption is against the use of emergency powers and a strong case will need to be constructed before advice is sought. Those considering making a request should be conscious from the outset of the sensitivities involved in doing so. Use of emergency powers is controversial and of political significance and as any suggestion that use is being considered will attract considerable media speculation, it will be important to treat all relevant information as confidential.




ACCess OverLoad Control (ACCOLC) The ACCess OverLoad Control scheme gives call preference to registered essential users on the four main mobile networks in the UK if the scheme is invoked during an emergency. Ambulance Incident Officer (AIO) The officer of an ambulance service with overall responsibility for the work of the service at the scene of an emergency. Works in close liaison with the Medical Incident Officer (MIO) to ensure effective use of the medical and ambulance resources at the scene. Ambulance loading point An area, preferably hard standing, in close proximity to the casualty clearing station, where ambulances can be manoeuvred and patients placed in ambulances for transfer to hospital. Helicopter landing provision may also be needed. Ante mortem team Officers responsible for liaising with the next-of-kin on all matters relating to the identification of the deceased. Bellwin Scheme Discretionary scheme for providing central government financial assistance in exceptional circumstances to affected local authorities (e.g. councils, police authorities) in the event of an emergency. Body holding area An area close to the scene of an emergency where the dead can be held temporarily before transfer to the emergency mortuary or mortuary. Bronze The level at which the management of hands-on work is undertaken at the incident site or impacted areas. This is sometimes referred to as the operational level. Casualty A person killed or physically or mentally injured in war, accident or civil emergency. For Casualty Bureau purposes the term encompasses any person involved in an incident, including evacuees. In maritime emergencies, it is also used to refer to a vessel or person in distress. Casualty bureau The purpose of the casualty bureau is to provide the initial point of contact for the receiving and assessing of information relating to persons believed to be involved in the emergency. The primary objectives of a casualty bureau are: inform the investigation process relating to the incident; trace and identify people involved in the incident; and reconcile missing persons and collate accurate information in relation to the above for dissemination to appropriate parties.



Casualty clearing station An area set up at the scene of an emergency by the ambulance service in liaison with the Medical Incident Officer to assess, triage and treat casualties and direct their evacuation. Category 1 responder A person or body listed in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These bodies are likely to be at the core of the response to most emergencies. As such, they are subject to the full range of civil protection duties in the Act. Category 2 responder A person or body listed in Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act. These are co-operating responders who are less likely to be involved in the heart of multi-agency planning work, but will be heavily involved in preparing for incidents affecting their sectors. The Act requires them to co-operate and share information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. Civil Contingencies Act The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 establishes a single framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom. Part 1 of the Act establishes a clear set of roles and responsibilities for local responders. Part 2 modernises the emergency powers framework in the United Kingdom. Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces (CCRFs) Drawn from existing reserve forces, CCRFs are military forces capable of being mobilised to assist in dealing with civil emergencies in support of the civil authorities and regular forces. Civil Contingencies Secretariat The Cabinet Office secretariat which provides the central focus for the cross-departmental and cross-agency commitment, co-ordination and co-operation that will enable the UK to deal effectively with disruptive challenges and crises. Civil protection Preparedness to deal with a wide range of emergencies from localised flooding to terrorist attack. Control centre Operations centre from which the management and co-ordination of the response to an emergency is carried out. Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1998 (COMAH) Regulations applying to the chemical industry and to some storage activities, explosives and nuclear sites where threshold quantities of dangerous substances, as identified in the Regulations, are kept or used. Co-ordination The harmonious integration of the expertise of all the agencies involved with the object of effectively and efficiently bringing the incident to a successful conclusion. Cordon inner Surrounds and protects the immediate scene of an incident. Cordon outer Seals off a controlled area around an incident to which unauthorised persons are not allowed access. Devolved administrations Scottish Executive, Welsh Assembly Government and Northern Ireland Executive.



Emergency An event or situation that threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK or the environment of a place in the UK, or war or terrorism which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK. To constitute an emergency an event or situation must additionally require the implementation of special arrangements by one or more Category 1 responder. Emergency mortuary Demountable (temporary) structures or conversion of existing structures whose function is to provide an area where post-mortem and identification examinations of victims can take place and, where necessary, provide body holding capability prior to bodies being released for funeral arrangements to be made. Also known as a temporary mortuary. Evacuation assembly point Building or area to which evacuees are directed for transfer/transportation to a reception centre or rest centre. Exercise A simulation to validate an emergency plan or business continuity plan, rehearse key staff or test systems and procedures. Family and Friends Reception Centre Secure area set aside for use and interview of friends and relatives arriving at the scene, (or location associated with an incident, such as an airport or port). Family Assistance Centres A one-stop-shop for survivors, families, friends and all those impacted by the emergency, through which they can access support, care and advice. (Police) Family Liaison Officer (FLO) Member of the ante mortem team allocated specific responsibility for one or more families of the deceased. Forward control point Each services command and control facility nearest the scene of the incident responsible for immediate direction, deployment and security. Gold Strategic decision makers at the local level. They establish the framework within which operational and tactical managers work in responding to and recovering from emergencies. Multi-agency co-operation at gold level is delivered through the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. Identification Commission Group representing all aspects of the identification process, which is set up to consider and determine the identity of the deceased to the satisfaction of HM Coroner. Incident control point The point from which an emergency services tactical manager can control his/her services response to a land-based incident. Together, the incident control points of all the services form the focal point for co-ordinating all activities on site. Also referred to as Silver control. In London, incident control points are grouped together to form the Joint Emergency Services Control Centre.



Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) An approach to preventing and managing emergencies that entails six key activities anticipation, assessment, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. IEM is geared to the idea of building greater overall resilience in the face of a broad range of disruptive challenges. It requires a coherent multi-agency effort. Lead Government Department (LGD) Government department which, in the event of an emergency, co-ordinates central government activity. The department that will take the lead depends on the nature of the emergency (i.e. DTI in the event of a disruption in the fuel supply, Defra in relation to flooding). The Government regularly publishes a full list of LGDs. Local Resilience Area The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 and 2 responders to co-operate with other Category 1 and 2 responders in their Local Resilience Area. Each Local Resilience Area (with the exception of London) is based on a police area. The principal mechanism for multi-agency co-operation is the Local Resilience Forum. Local Resilience Forum (LRF) A process for bringing together all the Category 1 and 2 responders within a local police area for the purpose of facilitating co-operation in fulfilment of their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act. Local responder Organisation which responds to emergencies at the local level. These may include Category 1 and 2 responders under the Civil Contingencies Act and other organisations not covered by the Act. Major incident This term is commonly used by emergency services personnel operationally to describe an emergency as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act. Marine Response Centre A co-ordination centre established by the MCA in marine pollution cases requiring a national response. Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) HM Coastguard regional centre responsible for promoting the efficient organisation of search and rescue services and for co-ordinating the conduct of search and rescue operations within a search and rescue region. Maritime Rescue Sub-Centre (MRSC) HM Coastguard unit subordinate to a rescue co-ordination centre and established to complement the latter. Marshalling area Area to which resources and personnel not immediately required at the scene or being held for further use can be directed to stand by. Media centre Central location for media enquiries, providing communication, conference, monitoring, interview and briefing facilities and access to responding organisation personnel. Staffed by spokespersons from all the principal services/organisations responding. Media Liaison Officer Representative who has responsibility for liaising with the media on behalf of his/her organisation.



Medical Incident Officer (MIO) Medical officer responsible for management of non ambulance medical resources at the scene of an emergency. Mutual aid An agreement between Category 1 and 2 responders and other organisations not covered by the Act, within the same sector or across sectors and across boundaries, to provide assistance with additional resource during an emergency, which may overwhelm the resources of an individual organisation. News Co-ordination Centre (NCC) The NCC works with the Lead Government Department to provide co-ordinated media and public communications support during an emergency. Primary Care Trust (PCT) Primary care is the care provided by those professionals the public normally see when they have a health problem (e.g. doctor, dentist, optician, pharmacist). These services are managed by PCTs. Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations 2001 (REPPIR) Implemented in Great Britain, the articles on intervention in cases of radiation (radiological) emergency in Council Directive 96/29/Euratom, also known as the BS596 Directive. The Directive lays down the safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionising radiation. The REPPIR also partly implement the Public Information Directive by subsuming the Public Information for Radiation Emergencies Regulations 1992 (PIRER) on informing the general public about health protection measures to be applied and steps to be taken in the event of an emergency. Receiving hospital Any hospital selected by the ambulance service from those designated by health authorities to receive casualties in the event of an emergency. Recovery The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) A committee that meets during an emergency when a regional response or other action at regional level is required. Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (RNC) Where emergency regulations are used, central government must appoint a Regional Nominated Co-ordinator (or Emergency Co-ordinator in the case of the devolved administrations) in each of the English regions to which the emergency regulations apply. The post-holder will be appointed to facilitate co-ordination of activities under the emergency regulations in line with the response strategy and objectives set by central government. Regional Resilience Forum (RRF) A forum established by a Government Office to discuss civil protection issues from the regional perspective and to create a stronger link between local and central government on resilience issues. Regional Resilience Team (RRT) Small team of civil servants within a Government Office for the Region working on civil protection issues, headed by a Regional Resilience Director.



Rendezvous point Point to which all vehicles and resources arriving at the outer cordon are directed. Resilience The ability of the community, services or infrastructure to withstand the consequences of an incident. Rest centre Premises used for temporary accommodation of displaced persons and evacuees following an incident. Risk Risk measures the significance of a potential event or situation in terms of likelihood and impact. Risk assessment A structured and auditable process of identifying significant events, assessing their likelihood and impacts, and then combining these to provide an overall assessment of risk, as a basis for further decisions and action. Salvage Control Unit A unit established to support the Secretary of States Representative in marine salvage incidents. Scene Access Control Point (SACP) Provides access through the outer cordon for essential non-emergency service personnel. Search and rescue (SAR) Operations for locating and retrieving persons in distress, providing for their immediate needs and delivering them to a place of safety. Search and Rescue Mission Co-ordinator The MCA officer assigned to co-ordinate the response to an actual or apparent maritime distress situation. Senior investigating officer (SIO) The senior detective officer appointed to assume responsibility for all aspects of the police investigation. Shoreline Response Centre A co-ordination centre established by the local authority most affected by a marine pollution incident. Silver Tactical level of management introduced to provide overall management of the response to an emergency. Silver managers determine priorities in allocating resources, obtain further resources as required, and plan and co-ordinate when tasks will be co-ordinated. Site Incident Officer (SIO) If an incident occurs within the perimeter of an industrial or commercial establishment, public venue, airport or harbour, a representative from the affected organisation will liaise with the emergency management structure. Statutory Services Those services whose responsibilities are laid down in law: for example, police, fire and ambulance services, HM Coastguard and local authorities.



Strategic Co-ordinating Group Multi-agency group which sets the policy and strategic framework for emergency response and recovery work at the local level in England and Wales (see also Gold). Subsidiarity The principle wherein decisions are made at the lowest appropriate level, and higher levels only become involved where necessary. Survivor Reception Centre Secure area where survivors not requiring acute hospital treatment can be taken for short-term shelter, first aid, interview and documentation. Temporary mortuary See Emergency mortuary. Triage Process of assessment of casualties and allocation of priorities by the medical or ambulance staff at the site or casualty clearing station prior to evacuation. Triage may be repeated at intervals and on arrival at a receiving hospital. Utilities Companies providing essential services, e.g. water, energy, telecommunications.



Not all acronyms appear in both Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response and Recovery. ABI ACAS ACPO AIO ARCC ATOC BASICS BCI BCRC BTP CBRN CCC CCD CCS CEMG CEPU (NI) CFOA CMG (NI) CMO COBR CPA CSIA CTP DCMS Defra DfES DfID DfT DH DPH DTI DWP EA EBS ECN EPU F&R FCO FSA GDS GLA GLO GLT GNN GO GTPS HA HASSBs Association of British Insurers Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service Association of Chief Police Officers Ambulance Incident Officer Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre Association of Train Operating Companies British Association for Immediate Care Schemes Business Continuity Institute British Cave Rescue Service British Transport Police Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear Civil Contingencies Committee Civil Contingencies Division (of the Scottish Executive Justice Department) Civil Contingencies Secretariat Central Emergency Management Group Central Emergency Planning Unit (Northern Ireland) Chief Fire Officers Association Crisis Management Group (Northern Ireland) Chief Medical Officer Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms Comprehensive Performance Assessment Central Sponsor for Information Assurance, Cabinet Office Contingency Telecommunication Provision Department for Culture, Media and Sport Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Department for Education and Skills Department for International Development Department for Transport Department of Health Director of Public Health (in a Primary Care Trust) Department of Trade and Industry Department for Work and Pensions Environment Agency Emergency Broadcasting System Emergency Communication Network Emergency Planning Unit Fire and Rescue Foreign and Commonwealth Office Food Standards Agency or Financial Services Authority, depending on the context Government Decontamination Service Greater London Authority Government Liaison Officer Government Liaison Team Government News Network Government Office Government Telephone Preference Scheme Health Authority Health and Social Services Boards




Highways Agency Traffic Officer Her Majestys Inspectorate of Constabulary Her Majestys Treasury Home Office Health Protection Agency Health and Safety Commission Health and Safety Executive International Rescue Corps Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre Local Authority London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority London Resilience Team Military Aid to the Civil Authority Maritime and Coastguard Agency Media Emergency Forum Meteorological Office Mobile Medical Team Ministry of Defence Memorandum of Understanding Metropolitan Police Service Mountain Rescue Council Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre Maritime Rescue Sub Centre National Assembly of Wales News Co-ordination Centre National Criminal Intelligence Service Non-departmental public body Non-governmental organisation National Health Service Northern Ireland Administration Northern Ireland Department Information Service Northern Ireland Office National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre National Public Health Service Wales National Traffic Control Centre National Voluntary Aid Society Emergency Committee Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Office of Communications Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Northern Ireland) Office of Water Services Office of Government Commerce Primary Care Trust Port Health Authority Public Housing Assessment System Police National Information Co-ordination Centre Police Service of Northern Ireland Public Switch Telephone Network Radio Amateurs Network Regional Civil Contingencies Committee Regional Development Agency Regional Director of Public Health Royal National Lifeboat Institution




Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Risk Working Group Search and Rescue Strategic Co-ordinating Group Scottish Executive Scottish Emergency Co-ordinating Committee Scottish Executive Emergency Room Strategic Health Authority Small and medium-sized enterprises Society of Local Authority Chief Executives Secretary of State Secretary of States Representative Strategic Road Network Voluntary Aid Societies Welsh Assembly Government Wales Civil Contingencies Committee Wales Programme for Improvement Wales Resilience Forum Womens Royal Voluntary Service




Arrangements for Responding to Nuclear Emergencies HSE Books, 1994 (ISBN 0 7176 0828 X) Bombs Protecting People and Property Home Office, 1994 The British Red Cross Disaster Appeal Scheme (United Kingdom) British Red Cross Society Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency: Concept of Operations Cabinet Office, 2005 Civil Nuclear Emergency Planning Consolidated Guidance Nuclear Emergency Planning Liaison Group Concise Guide to Customs of Minority Ethnic Religions D Collins, M Tank and A Basith, Ashgate, 1993 Dealing with Disaster Together Scottish Executive Emergency Planning Unit Dealing with Fatalities During Disasters Home Office Death and Bereavement across Cultures Routledge, 1996 (ISBN 0415131375) Deaths in Major Disasters: The Pathologists Role A Busuttil and JSP Jones, The Royal College of Pathologists Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material: Strategic National Guidance The Downstream Oil Emergency Response Plan Department of Trade and Industry, 2005 Disasters: Planning for a Caring Response Disasters Working Party, The Stationery Office, 1991 (ISBN 0 1132 1370 0) Emergency Planning for Major Accidents Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations HSE Books, 2003 (ISBN 0 7176 1695 9) Emergency Planning in the NHS Health Service Arrangements for Dealing with Major Incidents Department of Health, Emergency Planning Co-ordination Unit Emergency Plans Health and Safety Executive, The Stationery Office (ISBN 0 11 883831 8) Emergency Preparedness Cabinet Office, 2005 The Event Safety Guide: A Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Music and Similar Events HSE Books, 2002 (ISBN 0 7176 2453 6) Focus on Recovery: a Holistic Framework for Recovery in New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2005 Guidance on Dealing with Fatalities in Emergencies Home Office, 2004



Guide to Emergency Planning in Northern Ireland Northern Ireland Central Emergency Planning Unit Guide to Fire Precautions in Existing Places of Entertainment and Like Premises (6th edition) The Stationery Office, 2000 (ISBN 0 11 340907 9) Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (4th edition) The Stationery Office, 2003 (ISBN 0 11 300095 2) Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 HSE Books, 2001 (ISBN 0 7176 1604 5) Guide to the Pipelines Safety Regulations 1996 HSE Books, 1996 (ISBN 0 7176 1182 5) Guide to the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2001 Guidance on Regulations HSE Books, 2002 (ISBN 0 7176 2240 1) Guidelines for Faith Communities when Dealing with Disasters Brodie, 1997 Improving Security in Schools The Stationery Office (ISBN 0 11 270916 8) Instructions for Establishing Emergency Flying Restrictions within the UK National Air Traffic Services, 1989 Interim Guidance and Update Home Office, 2005 International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual International Maritime Organisation, 1999 Joint Industry Provision of Customer Care following a Major Passenger Rail Accident Association of Train Operating Companies, 2002 The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Part 1 (Lord Cullen) HSE Books (ISBN 0 7176 2056 5) The Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry Part 2 (Lord Cullen) HSE Books (ISBN 0 7176 2107 3) The Lead Government Department and its Role Guidance and Best Practice Cabinet Office, March 2004 LELSP Major Incident Procedure Manual (6th edition) Metropolitan Police Service, 2004 Management of Health and Safety at Work: Approved Code of Practice and Guidance HSE Books (ISBN 0 7176 2488 9) Managing Crowds Safely HSE Books, 2000 (ISBN 0 7176 1834 X) Managing Successful Programmes Office of Government Commerce, April 2003 Military Aid to the Civil Community: Pamphlet for the Guidance of Civil Authorities and Organizations (3rd edition) Ministry of Defence, 1989 (AC 6042l) National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution Maritime and Coastguard Agency The Needs of Faith Communities in Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines Home Office, 2005 Operations in the UK: the Defence Contribution to Resilience Ministry of Defence, March 2005 Pipeline Emergency Planning HSE Books, 2000 (ISBN 0 7176 1393 3) Preparing for Emergencies Home Office, 2005



Protocol for the Disposal of Contaminated Water Water UK Public Inquiry into the Identification of Victims Following Major Transport Accidents (Lord Justice Clarke) The Stationery Office (ISBN 0 10150122 6) Public Inquiry into the Shootings at Dunblane Primary School on 13 March 1996 (Lord Cullen) The Stationery Office (ISBN 0 10133862 7) Recovery: An Emergency Management Guide Home Office, 2000 Refugee Reception Centre Handbook British Red Cross Society Report of the Committee on Death Certification and Coroners (Lord Broderick) 1971 Responding to Disaster The Human Aspects Emergency Planning Society Response to the Deliberate Release of Chemicals and Biological Agents Guidance for Local Authorities Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat Responses of the Faith Communities to Major Emergencies: Some Guidelines Church House Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom Maritime and Coastguard Agency Survivors and the Media Ann Shearer, John Libbey and Company Ltd Thames Safety Inquiry final report (Lord Justice Clarke) The Stationery Office (ISBN 0 10145582 8) Tolleys Handbook of Disaster & Emergency Management: Principles & Practice Butterworths Tolley (ISBN 0 4069 5709 6) Wales National Emergency Co-ordination Arrangements National Assembly for Wales Wise Before the Event: Coping with Crises in Schools William Yule and Anne Gold, Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, London, 1993