Q1 SCAG’s first claim would parallel the oldest Establishment claim in the US: the government is forcing us to pay money

that supports religious causes in which we do not believe, thereby invading our liberty of conscience. SCAG will point out that the Red Lion Fund does not allow groups to earmark their contributions or apply for an exemption. And regardless, the First Amendment’s broad language was specifically intented to prohibit even this type of nonpreferential establishment. As Justice Blackmun acknowledged in Allegheny County, simultaneous endorsement of several religions is still establishment. To bolster their argument, SCAG might argue that not only is the Fund coercion of the worst kind (the pocketbook), it occurs in the most vulnerable context (the school). True, participation is voluntary and the students involved are university- not elementary-school-aged. However, as Sante Fe demonstrates, the Court has been willing to find peer pressure to conform even among older students, at voluntary school functions, when initiated by fellow students like the student committee here, and when the stated purpose was not religious. In response, the University will rely on Rosenberger. Under a combination of the Lemon and endorsement tests (Lynch, O’Connor concurring), the university would state its secular purpose of creating a vibrant student body, its policy’s neutrality toward all religions, and its provision of a generally available good with only an incidental benefit to religion. No reasonable, objective observer would think the University was favoring religion. Even under a coercion analysis the University could respond that registration and therefore contributions to the Fund where wholly voluntary and thus even less coercive than in Rosenberger where all students were obliged to contribute a portion of their tuition. Furthermore, in the voucher cases (Mueller and Zelman) secular schools were eligible for funds; likewise secular student groups are funded here. Overall, the University will assert that the “neutrality of the program distinguishes the student fees from a tax levied for the direct support of a church or group of churches” (Rosenberger). Given the strong parallels to Rosenberger and the Court’s general trend toward nonpreferentialism, I believe the University’s argument is stronger, showing just how far Establishment clause jurisprudence has diverged from its original underpinnings. Second, SCAG might make a Free Exercise claim paralleling Sherbert: the University is coercing us to practice my religion in violation of my conscience because of the threat of losing benefits. SCAG would argue that Sherbert should apply because the registration process for student groups is already a system of individualized exemptions, and that it should be given deference regarding their beliefs and burdens (cf. Smith). However, the University could easily defeat this claim at the final stage of the Sherbert analysis because it has a compelling interest in ensuring the viability of the Fund in order to foster a vibrant student body. This response finds strong precedent in US v. Lee where the Amish were not granted an exemption from Social Security because mandatory contributions were indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the system. See also Lyng (exemptions not appropriate when impairment of government operations results). Moreover, the University would assert that strict scrutiny is not warranted because their policy is neutral and generally applicable (Smith). The University’s arguments are clearly stronger here. A Free Association claim would be equally weak for SCAG. Under Abood, the Fund impermissibly compels SCAG to support ideological causes as a condition of being officially

or for janitorial services to keep school rooms used by student organizations clean. SCAG’s situation lacks Red Lion’s essential characteristic—scarcity. SCAG will not be permitted to advertise in classic public spaces or distribute emails (today’s pamphlets). email. official group recognition) share resources (here. funds. . SCAG’s freedom to communicate its own message is restrained since it will not have email access. etc. However. in which the government required that licensees (here. As Justice Stevens proclaimed in Watchtower Bible. and there’s no worry that other groups’ messages will be attributed to SCAG (Rumsfeld v.) in order to ensure a free market of ideas. and the criteria here that funds go to “worthy causes” is not viewpoint discrimination. depending on what the Fund’s money pays for. advertising space. SCAG might argue that by requiring it to register and pay the fee. the University is not forcing SCAG to admit any members. The University should easily win here. these restrictions are not narrowly tailored. distinguishing Glickman. This is a worthy compromise that balances SCAG’s First Amendment rights and the Fund’s purposes. The University would respond that its requirements are content neutral and objective and therefore are permissible time. SCAG might try to make a Free Speech claim paralleling Red Lion. etc. If the only purpose of registration and the fee are Fund eligibility and financial support. grants from which it would then be ineligible. The appropriate remedy is viewpoint neutrality in the allocation of funding (see also Rosenberger).recognized. but it is less convincing with regard to the fee. FAIR). place. If it does not register and pay. the University has created an impermissible barrier to speech in a public forum. place. Also. it is not required to. and manner restrictions (Cox). but a generic. See also Lambs Chapel (religious speakers must be permitted to use generally available facilities). SCAG could register and access to the public forum without paying into the Fund. This response justifies the registration requirement. subsequent cases like Tornillo clarified that while the government may promote access. and manner response. the University would simply point to Southworth in which the Court held that Abood is unworkable in a university context where it’s impossible to define what is germane to higher learning. hortatory means of dispersing limited funding (Finley). if the money is used to service the email network. Finally. Approaching Free Speech from a different angle. it is offensive to the First Amendment and free society that citizen must inform the government of their desire and obtain a permit to speak. However. And moreover. this supports the time. For example. Also.

we must interact with others. As part of a political document. Jaycees). emphasizing individual dignity avoids the shortcomings of the marketplace. and conventional romantic justifications. authority for discovering truth remains with the individual. the body politic is nothing more than the individuals. it through speech that we each find our own identities. emphasizing individual dignity creates a common theme amongst all of the First Amendment rights. Our interactions with others are our experiments at creating meaning (Abrams. the First Amendment is a deliberate attempt for those sovereign individuals to unite as a means to furthering the collective good life. Individual dignity is the ability to pursue personal truth. In the same way Locke thought it was hypocritical to give away authority for one’s own salvation because it could not be separated from the individual. First. we must agree that there is no one truth (Cohen). Ability to speak and persuade others is essential to forming ones own enlightened opinion (Cantwell). political creatures (Aristotle). but in selecting the word “dignity” instead of autonomy or expression. In our democracy. But if I structure my life around these principles. As social creatures. Especially in diverse and populous society. I take this position for two reasons. who make it up. democratic legitimacy depends on individual dignity (Cohen. but it cannot speak for individuals. the people. Holmes would tell me that I can never be certain that my family really loves me or that global warming is real. truths. I agree that we form consensus. republican. “We live by symbols” (Gobitis). it is impossible to give away your identity. In other words. but real. I intend to modify the typical romantic arguments. thus creating the separate spheres of secular and the spiritual. So like Holmes. This focus on the individual’s relation to the government creates a common bond with the First Amendment’s other religious and expressive freedoms.Q2 The purpose of the Free Speech Clause is the fostering of individual dignity. Second. It is not enough to merely think. but what are symbols other than expressions of personal truths to the world? Moreover. To deny that we each come to individual truths is to deny the human experience. they are true for me and become true in the world through my speech and expressive actions. Locke said we cannot delegate our salvation. Even when we unite as a political unit. whcih are all about the one thing we cannot delegate to the government—our individuality. For this reason I agree with Justice Souter’s dissent in Johanns where he explains that the government can and should speak for the collective community. Whitney concurrence). This is essentially the romantic justification. I agree with Holmes that there is no truth out there in the world waiting to be found. Each person forms guiding principles for his or her life. My legal education has convinced me that the Founders truly believed in the sovereignty of the people. The importance of this question can be seen through the shortcomings of the other justifications of Free Speech and the incorrect case outcomes they have produced. I just believe they are formed based on individual. But I disagree with Holmes’ further assertion that there is no truth at all. The typical version of the romantic justification focuses on individual autonomy—the solitary figure alone .

. I disagree with this notion in principle because it ignores our interpersonal nature. Hudnut. and it also ensures that other constitutional values are not subordinated to it. Thus I choose the word “dignity” to indicate the existence of others—my dignity must be balanced with yours. The republican justification is somewhat compatible with my conception of individual dignity because it respects the process of self-discovery. political. but the hate speech itself. the typical romantic fails to balance liberty with equality. However. Cases invalidating antidiscrimination statues in the name of free speech are the worst examples of the traditional romantic justification at work (R. In this way. artistic. Accordingly. This is what it means to be a progressive American today.A. I disagree with Roth and Miller’s attempt to cabin topics of social value to the literary. This brings me to the opposite conclusion in R. and I disagree with it because it is not pragmatic in our populous. and this requires a prioritization of speech based on social value with which I am uncomfortable. I agree with Beauharnais’ outcome but would justify the result based upon the state’s compelling interest in preventing antidiscrimination rather than by finding group libel outside the scope of the First Amendment. On the other hand. Political discourse should not be elevated above all other speech.V.with his inner thoughts on a mountaintop. I can state that inequality should be the externality that we care most about. and is the truth to which I aspire. self-discovery is undergone in the name of political participation (Whitney). Cases relying on this typical rational note the emotive power of words but on one hand.A. I believe the First Amendment aims to balance liberty with equality. Dale). But since I reject Holmes’ premise about the existence of truth. It is impossible to identify market distortions without making a judgment on what the outcome—the truth—should be. they inform our collective truth. the marketplace analogy only allows for regulations of market failures. I have already discussed one problems with the marketplace analogy—its premise on the nonexistence of truth. equality is an element of Free Speech itself. By focusing on the solitary individual. but deny the possibility of psychic injury on the other (Cohen). and scientific. This is internally inconsistent. But I agree with Gertz’s extension of Sullivan to include public figures who inform out community values—that is. in that theory. I do not see the government’s regulation through antidiscrimination laws as a market failure. and that speech cause more than the acceptance or rejection of ideas (Schenck). I do agree with Holmes that the character of actions depend on their circumstances. . In addition.V. diverse world.

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