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Scott Bing 4/28/04

Background

Joined FAA in 1989, May. Went to Ft Worth ATC, became journeyman in 1992.
Worked ATC for over 2 years and applied for and became TMU until 1997 and was then
selected for Command Center, worked East and QA. In early 2000 brought to HQ as
liaison with CC on staff of ATC. Reported to Tom Davidson in AAT. Also had ties with
John White and Jack Kies at Command Center. His position, on the books, was at the
Command Center.

Normal day prior to 9/11. Focus was on AT delays and system capacity. Each day a
briefing to the powers that be here at HQ, plus telecoms re moving traffic. Goal was
maximum use of a very constrained system

9/11

Arrived 6-6:10 am to get daily reports ready for a 7 am briefing in Director of Air
Traffic's office on 10 floor. Overview of day before. September 10th, doesn't
remember as a day worth note. Morning meeting—Mary Ellen Kraus, Tony Ferrante,
and a member of Administrator's staff, Dave Canoles, and others. ME was chief-of-staff
for AT 1 and 2, Peacock and Griffith.

First awareness was after the meeting. Post-meeting he would generally go back to his
section on the 4th floor to get ready for the 8:30 telecon hosted by the Command Center,
also held on the 10th floor in Tom Davidson's old office. Linda Schuessler hosted the
conference out of the Emergency Operations Room at the Command Center. Attendees
included Catherine Welsh, ATT-10 analyst and Catherine Smith, Secretary. This is
normal Monday-Friday telecom.

Learned of problem when Linda Schuessler asked for a pause, there may be a problem.
"We think we have a hijack situation," is what he recalled her saying. He also recalled
getting the call sign of the aircraft. He put conference on mute and came out of office to
Mary Ellen Kraus who was in Secretaries area. He told her that there was a possible
hijack situation, gave her the call sign and told her she may want to page it out. The page
out would have gone to the extent she needed to notify Director, Deputy and other AT
managers. He then went back into the telcon. Linda pretty much said we are going to
end this telcon now.

Then Mary Ellen Kraus came into Tom Davidson's office and handed him her pager so
that he, Scott, could verify the message. He said it was correct and she sent it out. She
left office and the two Catherine's speculated. One said they are protesting events in
Latin America involving Miami. When came out of office Mary Ellen was on a phone
and had learned that the WTC had been impacted. She was standing outside Davidson's
office and said "we had a plane [hijacked?] that went into the WTC.
At this point he drew sketches for the 10th floor and the AAT suite. He recalled 3 TSD's
at HQ on that day, one in Brown/Challon conference room, one in Peacock Office, and
one in AAT Conference Room.

He associated that impact with AA11 later on.

People were coming in to the AAT conference room. He took the two Catherine's back
down to the 4th floor where he spread the word. Kathy Welsh and he proceed to
conference room at 400E where there was television coverage. He saw a hole in WTC
and heard someone say, "King Air." He knew it was larger than that. While they were
watching the second plane flew into the second tower. He had not heard about a second
hijack. He left the conference room and told the staff to go home.

Internally he knew something was something was wrong. After he told staff to go home
he called Jill Charlton at the Command Center to find out if she knew what was going on.
He told her we have lost two aircraft. At some point before calling Jill he recalled
running into Doug Gould on the 4th floor. Doug said, we are missing some airplanes,
which he thought he got from direct contact with Canoles et al on the 10th floor. This call
to Command Center is distinct from and not associated with Doug Gould's call to the
Command Center. His call was to a personal friend. He thought he knew at the time that
there were a couple of airplanes missing and recalled asking Doug if we knew where they
were. He thought Doug might have said we "may have [some] airplanes coming toward
Washington.

He may have told Jill to look at the TSD concerning a plane out west. He did not look at
any TSD display in FAA HQ that day. He cannot remember asking her about American
11. He might have asked her to go out to the floor.

Doug and he were not very familiar with each other at that time and he believes that
Doug simply shared brief information with him that there were other airplanes missing.

After the Pentagon was hit he left for the day. He was outside the building when he
heard the Pentagon hit and immediately went back in to 4th floor and began shutting
down and went to Bill Peacock's house at around 10 am.

He was not involved with any activities in the WOC, AAT, or ACC on the 10th floor that
day.

Post 9/11

His 4th floor group was involved in putting together information. His part was in
listening to the voice tapes. He listened to UA93 and to AA11 tapes to put together a
package for the Administrator to take to Hill.

There was a meeting in the round room, attended by Dave Canoles, Tony Ferrante, Mello
and himself and the FBI representatives.
He ended up as AAT-10 by himself because everyone else was working on waivers to get
the system back up. He didn't work on the Freeman effort. He was aware that a telcon
was set up in Canoles situation room. Given a Davis/Griffith-White line it would have
been in the WOC/ACC area. He estimated, post-facto knowing Doug Davis, that Davis
would have established his line to John White as close to the power people (Brown
Challon) as he could.

He recalled there were three telcons; one in the AAT Situation Room, one in the WOC,
and perhaps one on the fourth floor which may have been tied to the Situation Room.

He wasn't aware of the requirement for a tactical net and a primary net for hijackings
prior to 9/11.

hi his role as liaison he was asked about training for hijack procedures. He doesn't recall
any.

Concerning contact with the military, he has not look at or have knowledge of that.

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