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EDGAR JARANTILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING (Pau) Facts: Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening in lznart Street, Iloilo City" and sustained physical injuries as a consequence. The said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car, was driven by Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol. Jarantilla was charged before the City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in a criminal case. Kuan Sing did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt" Kuan Sing then filed a complaint, a civil action that involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the criminal case. 7 Jarantilla alleged as a defense a lack of cause of action on the part of Sing, and bar by prior judgment in the previous criminal case even if there was a cause of action. the trial court issued an order of denial for Jarantilla’s motion to dismiss, suggesting he take the case to the SC via certiorari. After trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of Sing and ordered Jarantilla to pay the former the sum for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, other actual expenses, for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs. The CA affirmed. Issue/s: 1. whether Kuan Sing could file a separate civil action arising from the criminal complaint filed against Jarantilla when Jarantilla had been acquitted for reasonable doubt. Held: 3B 08-09

Yes. It is a settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence... Another consideration in favor of Kuan Sing is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. The acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of evidence. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages.



ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC v CA (Grip) No Double Recovery Rule Facts: Petitioner moves for the reconsideration of the judgment promulgated in this case, contending that (1) private respondents are NOT permitted thereunder to recover damages twice for the same act or omission. Issue: Can the private respondent heirs recover twice? Held: Yes. Petitioner overlooks the fact that private respondents, as plaintiffs in the actions filed in court, specifically alleged as a result of petitioner’s dredging operations, the soil of their property became infertile, salty, unproductive and unsuitable for agriculture. They also averred that petitioners used their land to park their heavy equipment without paying rent. It is clear that petitioners are guilty of two culpable transgressions. Consequently, both courts correctly awarded damages both for the destruction of the land and for the unpaid rentals. There is consequently no merit in petitioner’s objection. * Case only a resolution, not much facts given. CANCIO v ISIP (Irah) Facts: Cancio filed 3 counts of violation of BP 22 against Isip, who had issued 3 bad checks. The case was dismissed. Subsequently, 3 cases for estafa were filed. The cases were dismissed. Cancio then filed a civil case for collection of sum of money to recover the value of the 3 checks from Isip. Isip moved to dismiss on the ground that the action is barred by res judicata and that Cancio was guilty of forum-shopping. 3B 08-09

Is the civil action barred by res judicata? Held: No. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities: 1. Ex delicto under Art. 100 of the RPC; and 2. Independent civil liabilities such as: a. those not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, such as culpa contractual, violations of Articles 31, 32 and 34 of the Civil Code, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; b. where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action (e.g. Article 33 of the Civil Code) Either may be enforced against the offender, but the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, civil liability ex delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party may file the separate civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence. However, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. In this case, the basis of the complaint is culpa contractual. It is an independent civil action which is based on Isip’s breach of a contractual obligation. This may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings, regardless of the result of the latter. There is no res judicata because there is no identity of causes of action. CITYTRUST v IAC (Ysan) Facts: Herrero, a businesswoman, made regular deposits Citytrust at its Burgos branch in Calamba, Laguna. Oo one occasion, she deposited with petitioner the amount P31,500.00 in cash, in



order to amply cover 6 postdated checks she issued. When presented for encashment upon maturity, all the checks were dishonored due to “insufficient funds”. Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that it was due to private respondent's fault that her checks were dishonored. It averred that instead of stating her correct account number, i.e., 29000823, in her deposit slip, she inaccurately wrote 2900823. Issue: Whether Herrero’s mistake absolves Citytrust from liability Held. No. The Court reiterated its ruling in Mundin v. Far East Bank & Trust to wit: Having accepted a deposit in the course of its business transactions, it behooved upon defendant bank to see to it and without recklessness that the depositor was accurately credited therefor. To post a deposit in somebody else's name despite the name of the depositor clearly written on the deposit slip is indeed sheer negligence which could have easily been avoided if defendant bank exercised due diligence and circumspection in the acceptance and posting of plaintiff's deposit. REYES vs. CA (Krissette) FACTS: • Reyes and Puyat-Reyes, as Phil. Racing Club representatives, were to attend a racing conference in Sydney. In order to pay for the conference fees, they sent the club’s cashier to FEBTS to apply for a foreign exchange 3B 08-09

demand draft for AU$1610, payable to the conference organizer. The application was denied at first because FEBTC did not have an account in any Sydney Bank. However, a roundabout way was found whereby the remittance of the money could be achieved. FEBTC would draw a demand draft against Westpac-Sydney and the latter would reimburse itself from FEBTS’s account in Westpac NY. This arrangement has been resorted to since the 1960s and there has never been a problem. When the conference organizer presented the demand draft, it was dishonored. However, FEBTC’s account in Westpac NY had been debited. In response to the organizer’s complaint of the dishonor, FEBTC informed Westpac Sydney to reimburse itself from FEBTC’s Westpac NY account. FEBTC also instructed Westpac NY to honor the claim for reimbursement. Despite this, the draft was dishonored a second time. When the Puyats arrived in Sydney to register, they were denied because the drafts had been dishonored twice. This allegedly caused them much humiliation, shock. However, after agreeing to pay in cash, they were admitted to the conference. Upon getting back to Manila, the Puyats filed a complaint for damages against FEBTC claiming that as a result of the dishonor, they were exposed to unnecessary shock, social humiliation, and deep mental anguish in a foreign country, and in the presence of an international audience.

ISSUE: Whether FEBTC is liable for damages. HELD: • NOT LIABLE. • The degree of diligence required of FEBTC, in this case, is that degree of diligence expected of an ordinary prudent person under the circumstances obtaining. The rule that a


with the subject matter being a demand draft. 1994 for the amount of P1. In its defense. Sahlee. As a result. 12. the fact that the car was sent flying for 3B 08-09 4 .000. Metrobank cleared the check and debited Cabilzo’s account.000 and the date changed to Nov. This was corroborated by the testimony of the daughter. while driving at an average of 40kph along Quezon ave. Cabilzo demanded that Metrobank recredit the 90. It did all that it could have reasonably done. Cabilzo filed a civil action for damages against Metrobank. contrary to the the 40 kph that he said. ADZUARA v CA (Alpe) FACTS: Adzuara. Metrobank said that it exercised due diligence in examining the genuineness of the signature and the technical entries including the amount in figures and in words to see if there were alterations and found that there was none. the relationship between FEBTC and the PUyats was merely that of seller and buyer. Also. Adzuara should have given him right of way. Martinez was consistent in his testimony that the u-turn had a green light. That ordinary diligence was observed is evident from the numerous follow ups that FEBTC undertook in order to get the demand draft paid. The check was presented to Westmont Bank for payment and the latter indorsed it to Metrobank. 14. Metrobank refused. due to the nature of its relationship with the client. 20 meters says that Adzuara was at a high speed. 24. must exercise extraordinary diligence applies only when the bank is acting in its fiduciary capacity. ISSUE: Was there negligence on the part of Adzuara? HELD: Yes. It was found out later by Cabilzo that the check’s amount was altered to P91.000 to his account. he issued a check payable to cash and postdated on Nov. Westpac Sydney did not recognize the cable message as a request for a demand draft. then a law student. as was seen in the Citytrust case. it is mandated that drivers keep a watchful eye on the road ahead and observe traffic rules and on speed and right of way. 1994. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY.. while the investigating officer saw a blinking red and orange traffic light after arriving an hour later. It is relative and comparable and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. The reason the demand draft was dishonored was because Westpac Sydney mistakenly read FEBTC’s cable message to it (a 1 was read as a 7). He posits that there was no factual basis for the existence of negligence. At 130 am. In the present circumstance. v CABILZO (Kristel) 510 SCRA 259 FACTS: Renato Cabilzo was one of Metrobank’s clients who maintained a current account with the bank’s Pasong Tamo Branch. It further stated that Cabilzo was partly responsible for leaving spaces on the check which made the fraudulent insertion possible. The diligence required in the circumstances in this case is ordinary care and diligence. When Martinez was able to take half of the road while making the u-turn. thus implying that Adzuara’s lane had a red light. On Nov. Adzuara was convicted by the trial court and the CA of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries. and stopped. The RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Cabilzo saying that Metrobank was liable. According to the Court. ABAÑO • bank. Both Adzuara and Martinez claimed that their respective sides had a green light. negligence is that want of care required by the circumstances. collided with the car of Martinez which was making a u-turn at the speed of 5 kph.

and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by Prospero Sabido. always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. (Mayco) August 31. Here. going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. must suffer a loss. although the liability of one arises from a breach of contract. The appropriate degree of diligence required of a bank must a be a high degree of diligence. Issue: W/n the LTB bus is solely liable for the injury and death of Agripino Custodio? Held: No. the alterations on the check are visible to the naked eye but Metrobank failed to detect the alterations which could not escape the attention of even an ordinary person. either by omission or commission. was the cause of injury. 1966 Negligence as proximate cause. Facts: Two trucks. one driven by Nicasio Mudales and belonging to Laguna – Tayabas Bus Company.” Metrobank did not prove that Cabilzo was negligent or that this negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. Banking is a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions. Metrobank cannot rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel which states that “when one of the two innocent persons. ET AL. Negligence is not presumed but it must be proven by the one who alleges it. whereas that of the other springs from quasi-delict. not only those stated in words but also those in numerical figures in order to prevent any fraudulent insertion. Where the contributory negligence of the petitioner was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier’s negligence. as a result Custodio was injured and died. the owners of the two vehicle are liable solidarily for the death of the passenger. it must be borne by the one whose erroneous conduct. Obviously. he was wary enough that he filled with asterisks the space between and after the amounts. who was hanging on the left side as truck was filled of passengers was sideswiped by the truck driven by Aser lagunda. The employees of LTB bus were negligent for they should not have allowed Agripino Custodio to ride their truck in that manner. This negligence is further exacerbated by the fact that it was the cash custodian who examined the check when his functions do not involve the examining of checks. The latter was driving so fast when it met LTB Bus and he could have avoided the mishap if he had been careful and cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. Aser Lagunda was equally negligent. ABAÑO ISSUE: W/N Metrobank should be held liable for damages for its negligence HELD: YES. In fact. The degree of diligence required of a reasonable man in the exercise of his tasks and the performance of his duties has been faithfully complied with by Cabilzo. if not the utmost diligence. the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. their liability is solidary. a passenger of LTB bus. Banks 3B 08-09 are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of employees SABIDO AND LAGUNDA v CUSTODIO. Agripino Custodio. the custodian was not versed and competent in handling such duty. each guiltless of any intentional or moral wrong. The distance between the two vehicles was such that he could have 5 .

Meralco has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction. and in conducting its operation. and the due diligence to discover and repair defects therein. not waiver.  Meralco’s failure to make the necessary repairs and replacement of the defective electric meter installed within the premises of RTCC and RPC was obviously the proximate cause of the instant dispute.” Issue: W/N RTCC and RPC. Reynera was brought to the hospital by the driver. The construction of the terms of a contract which would amount to impairment or loss of right is not favored. it is only logical for public utilities. but Reynera died already due to the head injuries sustained during the accident. conservation and preservation. v CA (Edz) 286 SCRA 544 (1998) Facts:  Ridjo Tape (RTCC) & Ridjo Paper (RPC) received letters from Meralco demanding payment for alleged unregistered electric consumption allegedly due to the defects of the electric meter located in RTCC’s and RPC’s premises. Lagunda saw the passengers riding on the running board of the bus while the same was still five or seven meters away. considering the length of time. Reynaldo Reynera was traveling on the southbound lane of the East Service road on his way home. the liability of RTCC & RPC should be limited by Meralco’s negligence. it is enough that the same had existed for such a length of time that it is reasonable to presume that it had been detected and the presence of a conspicuous defect which has existed for a considerable length of time will create a presumption of constructive notice thereof. 3B 08-09 not only from tampering or intentional mishandling. RIDJO TAPE & CHEMICAL CORP. Failure to perform such duties constitutes negligence. Reynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of an Isuzu truck-trailer which was without tail lights. to employ mechanical devices and equipment for the orderly pursuit of its business.  Notice of a defect need not be direct and express. is the rule. abadonment or forfeiture of a right.  provision on Service Agreement regarding payments: “In the event of the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full amount of energy consumed.  Production and distribution of electricity is a highly technical business undertaking. Therefore.  RTCC and RPC refused to pay. RAYNERA v HECETA Facts: At about 2:00 am. if any. despite absence of evidence of tampering. therefore Meralco advised them that their electric service would be disconnected without further notice. Held: Partly. are liable to pay for unregistered electrical service. RTCC and RPC can’t be ignorant of the fact that stoppages in electric meters can also result from inherent defects or flaws. Clearly he had the last clear chance.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. ABAÑO avoided sideswiping said passengers if his truck was not running at great speed. the Customer shall be billed for such period on an estimated consumption based upon his use of energy in a similar period of like use. Meralco’s failure to discover the defect. such as Meralco. 6 .  On the other hand.  Parties are expected to be aware that these devices or equipment are susceptible to defects and mechanical failure. At some point on the road. amounts to inexcusable negligence.

He was in control of the situation. the credit card company may for some reason fail to promptly notify its member through absolutely no fault of the cardholder. The Heirs filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC. reckless. as extension cardholder. It ruled that the stipulation which still requires the cardholder to wait until the credit card company has notified all its memberestablishments. This was followed by a letter dated August 30. The Court ruled that the resolution of the petition hinged on the validity and fairness of the stipulation in the contract of adhesion being invoked by private respondent in case of loss or theft of a BECC issued credit card. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. The Court held that such stipulation clearly runs against public policy. she informed BECC of the loss via telephone.197. Manuelita lost her BECC supplemental card when her bag was snatched in greenbelt. Traveling behind the truck. CA AND BPI EXPRESS CARD CORP. That same night. SPOUSES ERMITAÑO vs. which found that the proximate cause of the death of Reynera was the lack of tail lights and that the truck was improperly parked. 1989. he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front him. however. The heirs then filed a case to the RTC. 7 . He was traveling the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. Notwithstanding this. by saying that Reynera was the proximate causeof the accident since he was the one who bumped to the rear end of the trailer-truck. as in this case. Issue/s 1. was a credit card holder from private respondent BPI Express Card Corp. The proximate cause of the victim’s death was his own negligence. Issue: Whether the CA was correct that Reynera was the proximate cause of his own demise? Held: YES.70 through Manuelita’s lost card. The spouses refused to pay. the SC deleted the award of exemplary damages. Manuelita. However. (Pau) Luis Ermitaño. but the owners refused. 1989 stating that she shall not be responsible for any and all charges incurred through the use of the lost card after August 29. when Luis received his 3B 08-09 monthly billing. fraudulent. On the matter of the damages petitioners are seeking. To require the cardholder to still pay for unauthorized purchases after he has given prompt notice of the loss or theft of his card to the credit card company would simply be unfair and unjust. On August 29. The owners appealed to the CA which set aside the ruling of the RTC. is the stipulation in the contract invoked by BECC valid? Held: No. (BECC) with his wife.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. puts the cardholder at the mercy of the credit card company which may delay indefinitely the notification of its members to minimize it not to eliminate the possibility of incurring any loss from unauthorized purchases. BECC continued to include in the spouses’ billing statements those purchases made through Manuelita’s lost card. 1989 amounting to P3. 1989. the charges included amounts for purchases made on August 30. BECC pointed out to Luis the stipulation in the contract that in the event the card is lost or stolen the cardholder continues to be liable for the purchases made through the use of the lost card until after the BECC has communicated such loss to its member establishments. absent any clear showing that BECC acted in a wanton. However. Or. ABAÑO The heirs of Reynera demanded compensation from Hiceta and Orpilla since they were the owners of the truck. They protested the billing letter.

The Cause of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion with petheccial hemorrhage.00 for net income loss for the remaining thirty (30) years of the life expectancy of the deceased. Jose Bernardo was a vendor in the Baguio Market. MARY’S ACADEMY v CARPITANOS (Irah) Facts: 8 . in parking his so close to the market stall which was neither a parking area nor a loading area. clearance from the ground mandated by law. hence this petition challenging the award of damages. betrays its gross neglect in performing its duty to the public.000. One day as he was about to leave his stall and board a jeep. far from mitigating its culpability." Caridad Bernardo then filed a case against Benguet Electric (BENECO). He died in the hospital. But this line of defense must be discarded.000. The driver was well within his right to park the vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that any law or ordinance was violated nor that there was any foreseeable danger posed by his act.000.000. P20. P100. They subsequently won. P864. another P20.00 for exemplary damages. or malevolent manner. Indeed. Jose Bernardo's death was an accident that was bound to happen in view of the gross negligence of BENECO. 1985. no accident would have happened had BENECO installed the connections in accordance with the prescribed vertical clearance of fifteen (15) feet ST.00. They also reduced the amount of moral damages to P50. BENECO theorizes in its defense that the death of Jose could be attributed to the negligence of the jeepney driver. Issue: Is Benguet Electric the proximate cause of the death of Jose? Held: Yes. BENECO demonstrated its utter disregard for the safety of the public. as required by Article 2232 of the Civil Code. Several electrical experts testified that Benguet had several violations in installing the electric wire. and to pay the costs of suit. as guardian ad litem of the three minor children of Jose Bernardo P50. One thing however is sure. he got electrocuted as he held the handle bars of the jeepney because the antenna of the said jeep got entangled with an open electric wire.00 for attorney's fees. its primordial concern is not only to distribute electricity to its subscribers but also to ensure the safety of the public by the proper maintenance and upkeep of its facilities.000. around seven (7) years after the open wire was found existing in 1978. By leaving an open live wire unattended for years.00 as indemnity for his death. considering the circumstances of the parties to the case. the lower courts did not commit any reversible error. ABAÑO oppressive. brain bilateral pulmonary edema and congestion and endocardial petecchial hemorrhage and dilation (history of electrocution). BENECO's contention that the accident happened only on January 14. which connection was only eight (8) feet from the ground level. BENGUET ELECTRIC v CA (Grip) Negligence as Proximate Cause Facts: Petitioner assails the decision of the CA ordering it to pay Caridad Bernardo.000. with his antenna so high as to get entangled with an open wire above.00 for moral damages. It is clear to us then that BENECO was grossly negligent in leaving unprotected and uninsulated the splicing point between the service drop line and the service entrance conductor. in particular it 3B 08-09 was below the 15ft.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. There is no question that as an electric cooperative holding the exclusive franchise in supplying electric power to the towns of Benguet province. with interest thereon at the legal rate.

met an accident while riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Villenueva and driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and Sherwin’s schoolmate. “The proximate cause of an injury is that cause. the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. Sherwin Carpitanos. Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the report and the testimony of the traffic investigator that the proximate cause of the death of Sherwin was not the negligence of St. the Carpitanos failed to show that the negligence of St. Mary’s liable for the damages and absolved the rest. Two days later. Sherwin’s parents filed a complaint for damages for the death of their son against James Daniel and his parents. Mary’s be held liable for damages? Held: No. Alberto suffered a fracture at the back of the head. who should be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. The immediate cause was that the heart and lungs stopped functioning and that the underlying cause was the head injury. Thereafter. Villanueva. In this case. There was also no evidence that St. in natural and continuous sequence. it administrators and teachers while in their supervision. CA affirmed the decision. Mary’s was part of the campaigning group. In other words. Between the remote cause and the injury.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. It was alleged in the complaint that James Daniel drove recklessly which caused the jeep to turn turtle. The Carpitanos. there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury. Mary’s or the reckless driving of James but 3B 08-09 the detachment of the wheel guide of the jeep. Mary’s.) (With regard to grant of attorney’s fees: Grant of attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the rule. It was Villanueva who had possession and control of the jeep and who allowed James to drive it at the time of the accident.) Since the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The RTC held St. instruction or custody. but reduced the amount of actual damages. Mary’s Academy. Alberto was discharged from the hospital. Mary’s to be liable. Mary’s was the proximate cause of the death of Sherwin. it is not St. His condition worsened and died thereafter. Alberto fell. Sherwin died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. a student of St. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. However. such that the back of his head hit the asphalt road. Mary’s Academy conducted a campaign to solicit enrollment by visiting the public schools. there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Alberto was re-admitted to the same hospital. for St. and without which the result would not have occurred. but the registered owner.” (With regard to moral damages: Moral damages may be recovered only if they are the proximate result of the wrongful act or omission. which shall apply to all authorized school activities whether inside or outside school premises and Article 219 provides that those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the minor under their supervision. legal and equitable justification. OPERIANO v PEOPLE (Ysan) Facts: Eyewitnesses saw Operiano punch Penales on the face and then kicked him on the abdomen. Mary’s allowed James to drive the jeep. The power of the Court to award these demands factual. Article 218 of the Family Code gives special parental authority over a minor to the school. Villanueva and St. ABAÑO St. Sherwin. The negligence of St. produces the injury. 9 . which. During a trip to Larayan Elementary School. Can St. along with other students. Mary’s was only a remote cause of the accident.

allegedly because of FTI’s failure to maintain the proper temperature.770 cartons of yeast with FTI for cold storage. CA (Krissette) FACTS: • Food Terminal Inc. that under the contract. the ruling of the CA is binding on the parties and may not be reviewed on appeal via certiorari. and were picked up by a hired limousine from their homes. Petitioner’s kick was the proximate and immediate cause of Alberto’s head injury. • FTI claims that it exercised utmost diligence. Nonetheless. After checking in. that any damage sustained was due to the fault of Basic Foods. each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor in a continuous chain of events leading to Alberto’s death. The kicking of the victim by petitioner is the first and immediate act that produced the injury and set the other events in motion. they noticed that their papers were not being processed. their travel agent confirmed their booking. petitioner practically admitted that it failed to maintain the agreed temperature of the cold storage area at 2 to 4 degrees centigrade at all times. 383 cartons worth P161k were damaged. ABAÑO Issue: Whether kick was the proximate cause of Alberto’s death Held: Yes.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. and were told that that flight could not accommodate them because there were no more seats. The check-in employee testified that the 1 st class seats were given to those from the economy class because the flight manifest was closed 40 minutes prior to the plane’s departure. Basic Foods is engaged in the production of food and allied products. CA held there was negligence. They saw their names crossed off from the top of the first class list. Upon their inquiry. 3B 08-09 10 . FOOD TERMINAL. Morris and Whittier had business meetings in Tokyo at the time. petitioner’s liability for damages is inescapable. thus. which requires storage in a refrigerated space to avoid spoilage. MM. Since negligence has been established. • RTC dismissed. and this caused the deterioration of the yeast stored therein. ISSUE: Whether FTI was guilty of negligence in the storage of Basic Foods’ yeast. the issue is factual. HELD: • FTI was NEGLIGENT • In the first place. MORRIS v CA (Alpe) FACTS: Morris (and Whittier) filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of air carriage against Scandinavian Airlines System when they were bumped off a flight to Tokyo from Manila despite being booked in the first class section of the flight. (FTI) is engaged in the business of warehousing storage of goods or merchandise for compensation at its refrigerated warehouse in Taguig. INC. All this were arranged by their travel agent. • In its manufacture of food. • In the second place. Basic Foods uses Red Star compressed yeast. causing his death is beyond cavil. petitioner claimed that temperature was not the sole cause for the deterioration of respondent’s goods. It deposited 1. FTI would not be liable for damage to goods beyond its reasonable control and that Basic Foods was stopped from filing the action because it acknowledged receipt of the yeast in good order. vs.

ABAÑO Morris and Whittier were considered as NOSH (“No show”). However. Crisostomo claims that the agency should be liable because its 3B 08-09 employee Menor was negligent for not informing her correctly of her scheduled flight. Crisostomo then filed a case against the agency for breach of contract of carriage and damages. For reasons of public policy. It is thus not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation. ticketing and accommodation in a tour “Jewels of Europe”. They did not arrive in time for checking-in. a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry. there must be a wanton and injurious breach. worked for the agency and was the one who delivered her travel documents and plane tickets to her. When she went to the airport. the agency refused on the ground that it had already remitted the payment to its principal in Singapore. The CA reversed. This connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily connotes reasonable care consistent with that of a prudent person would have observed when confronted with a similar situation. When she returned from the tour. Menor’s negligence was not sufficiently proved considering that the only evidence presented on this score was petitioner’s uncorroborated narration of events. She was offered another tour (the “British Pageant”) in exchange for the one she missed. she was informed that her plane’s departure was the previous day. passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due regard for all the circumstances. Contrary to petitioner’s claim the evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard procedure to rendering its services to 11 . Lotus Travel. respondent is not a common carrier but a travel agency. CRISOSTOMO v CA (Kristel) 409 SCRA 525 Facts: Estela Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan Travel and Tours International to arrange and facilitate her booking. Because Morris and Whittier did not arrive on time. The nature of contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the degree of care required in the performance of the latter’s obligation under the contract. As earlier stated. Issue: Whether Caravan should be held liable for breach of contract of carriage and damages Held: NO. She did not check the dates of the tickets given to her and relied on this information. The SC said that in awarding a moral damages for a breach of contract of carriage. ISSUE: Did the Airline company wrongfully bump off Morris and Whittier? HELD: No. neither a private nor a common carrier. she asked for the reimbursement of the difference between the first tour and the second one. however. Her niece. The Trial Court awarded damages to Morris and Whittier. She was also the one who informed her of the day of her flight (a Saturday). The standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under 1179 of the Civil Code.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. the Airline employee cannot be faulted because she did not act with fraud or bad faith. Respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore. or an act of fraud or bad faith. Menor. Respondent did not undertake to transport the petitioner from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. She called the agency to complain.

ET AL. The burden of evidence is shifted in this case to the defendant to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. V remained in the hospital for a week after giving birth. Hence. Dr.evidence shows that company performed its duty diligently and did not commit any contractual duty diligently and did not commit any contractual breach. equipment and employees was under the control of the defendants. Facts: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo Street and Rizal avenue. who found an ovarian cyst on each of V’s ovaries and a piece of rubber material on the right side of the uterus embedded on the 12 . In this case.  V consulted another doctor. Manila. There is no fixed standard of diligence applicable to each contractual obligation and each case must be determined upon its particular facts. Kho (K). The Police report given in this case regarding the safety hazards attending the area of the gasoline station such as its crowded area. The gasoline station with all its appliances. and others. v CALTEX (PHIL). and nearness to the sidewalks strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. INC. It started while the gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage. BATIQUIN v CA (Edz) G. 118231. B). ABAÑO petitioner. it affords reasonable evidence. The petitioner was the one negligent. was regularly visited by Dr. in the absence of explanation by the defendant. 1966 Presumption of negligence – Res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for itself) Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. ET AL. The people who knew or could have known how the fire started were the defendants and their employees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.R. 1996 Facts:  Dr. V began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish and of having lost her appetite. right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. She should have at least read the documents given to her. Batiquin (Dr. (Mayco) March 30. Dr. B prescribed meds. Issue: 3B 08-09 Is the doctrine of presumption of negligence under Res ipsa loquitur applicable in this case? Held: Yes. but the abdominal pains and fever kept recurring. The defendant was also negligent in not constructing a higher wall made of concrete that could have prevented the spreading of the fire. presence of a garage and repair shop for its fleet of taxi cabs. No. petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage. but they gave no explanation thereof. Both Caltex Phil and Mateo Borquin were sued the latter being in charge of operation. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses including the personal properties inside them. performed a simple csection on Mrs.  After leaving the hospital. July 5. that the accident rose from want of care. AFRICA. B. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists of failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of his obligation as the nature of the obligation demands. Villegas (V).

The petitioners appealed by saying that Res Ipsa Loquitur was applicable to this case. 2. no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. which arises upon proof that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendant’s exclusive control. 1. It can be invoked when and only when.  Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: The thing speaks for itself. on the issue of correctness of her diagnosis. Blanes ordered compatibility tests with choloromycetin. Issue/s: 1. she administered the drug in 2 ocassions. Dr. 13 . Dr. Whether Res Ipsa Loquitur was applicable? 2. Since the hospital was getting a lot of patients with Typhoid 3B 08-09 Fever. gave george a physical examination and took also his medical history. V has no direct evidence as to how the foreign object ended up in her body. Jorge was found positive of typhoid Fever. Rico ordered a widal test. B can be held liable for fault or negligence Held: Yes. Trial court absolved the respondents. however. Dr. Rico and Dr. Issue: W/N Dr. greater accuracy through repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. Whether the Dr. and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. Rico and Dr. Dr. Dr. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. REYES v SISTERS OF MERCY (Jon) Res Ipsa Loquitur Facts: On January 8. direct evidence is absent and not readily available. in the present case. Furthermore. Aside from the c-section. Blanes were negligent? Held: No to Both. the temperature of Jorge rose to 41c and exhibited chills and convulsions. Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required under the circumstances. Though the widal test is not conclusive. Rebuttable presumption that defendant was negligent. unless through the intervention of negligence.  Doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. B. ABAÑO ovarian cyst. Rico the resident and admitting physician. under the circumstances involved. which does not occur. The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by respondents of standard of care required by the circumstances. Jorge slipped into cyanosis and died. Subsequently even after the administration of drugs to cure the ailment. B failed to overcome the presumption of negligence.  entire proceedings of the c-section were under the exclusive control of Dr. and Jorge was exhibiting similar symptoms. it remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and. gave Jorge a physical examination and took his medical history. The heirs of Jorge filed a complaint for medical malpractice against Dr. finding no adverse reactions. Rico. and CA subsequently affirmed this decision. Blanes. 1987 Jorge Reyes was taken to the Mercy Community Center since he was suffering from recurring fevers and chills. Blanes the subsequent attending doctor. which was a standard test for typhoid fever. V underwent no other operation which could have caused such appearance of the foreign object in her body. At around 1 am of the following day. The alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to justify application of Res Ipsa Loquitur. Rubber material might have been a torn section of a surgeon’s gloves. Dr.

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior. it was just impossible to locate the remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of sacks of human bones.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. A municipal corporation proper has . Domingos. 1971 to June 6. no other document was executed to embody such lease over the burial lot in question. Domingo and father of the litigating minors. 159. Domingo. CITY OF MANILA. the authorities of the North Cemetery headed by Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. died and was buried in Lot No. and thereafter. private and corporate. According to her. a public character as 14 . the City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. When the 3B 08-09 Sto. subject lot was certified on January 25. that the resting place of their dear departed did not anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Apart from the aforementioned receipt. 194 of Manila North Cemetery in which subject Lot No. and to search without let up and with the use of all means humanly possible. No. 194 of the North Cemetery.. In fact. Domingos went to the lot on All Souls Day. Municipal powers are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial. Sr. 1978 as ready for exhumation by the City Mayor of Manila. On the basis of such certification.. The City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. deceased husband of Irene Sto. Domingo. 71159 November 15. Believing in good faith that the lot was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only. Issue/s 1. The lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6. Sr. She was even offered another lot but was never appeased. placed the bones and skull in a bag or sack and kept them in the bodega of the cemetery.. Block No. and EVANGELINE SUVA v IAC (Pau) G. Domingo. for the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Irene was also informed that she can look for the bones of her deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains from the different burial lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until they are retrieved by interested parties. to bury the same in the substitute lot to be chosen by the plaintiffs pursuant to this decision. the lot in question was rented out to another lessee. which ordered the North Cemetery and City of Manila to give her the right to make use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a period corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon. the burial record for Block No. It is a proprietary function. Facts: Vivencio Sto.R. ABAÑO With 15-20 patients with typhoid fever being admitted and considering Jorge’s condition. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set of bones. Is the City of Manila liable for the conduct of its agents? Held 1. any doctor of reasonable skill will get the impression that Jorge had typhoid fever. Sr. Were the operations and functions of a public cemetery a governmental or proprietary function of the City of Manila? 2. Domingo. they discovered to their shock. 159 is situated does not reflect the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. consternation and dismay. 1989 Torts & damages . She filed suit with the RTC. 2021 as evidenced by the rental receipt.

fall within tile operation of this rule of law. yes. which were subsequently consolidated in one action. and that Pestano was negligent. Issue: Are the petitioners liable? Held: Yes. ABAÑO regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government. saying that Pestano as a driver should have taken extra precaution and should not have driven negligently and dangerously. The SC said that the factual findings of the lower and appellate courts are correct. is injured. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. The rule of law is a general one. to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. The acts of dominion exercised by the City over the cemetery clearly demonstrates that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. The CA said that allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. and also found Metro Cebu liable as employer of Pestano. owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. . and are liable accordingly. The bus tried to overtake the motorcycle.. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. The fact that Pestaño was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its 15 . not in that which directly caused the accident.. The CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court. Therefore. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus. there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Both criminal and 3B 08-09 civil cases were filed. he should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated. the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. by which another who is free from contributory fault. and Metro Cebu was likewise negligent for not properly maintaining its vehicles. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. With respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto. since the speedometer of the bus was found to be broken. Respondent Sumayang was riding a motorcycle with a friend when they were hit at an intersection by a bus that was driven by Pestano and operated by Metro Cebu. The trial court found Pestano liable for negligently attempting to overtake the motorcycle at a dangerous speed. Both passengers on the motorcycle died as a result of the accident. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee. 2. that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his employment. PESTAÑO & METRO CEBU AUTOBUS v SUMAYANG (Grip) Presumption of Negligence (respondeat superior) Facts: Petitioners assails the decision of the CA denying their appeal and MR.

after having been informed of Corazon’s condition.” Corazon’s death prompted Rogelio Nogales to file a complaint for damages with the RTC against CMC. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law. which is a dangerous complication. Espinola (head of Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of CMC). was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada noted an increase in blood pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia.” For CMC’s liability to attach under the doctrine of respondeat superior. post partum. CA. her husband. with regard to CMC. Estrada. NOGALES v CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER (Irah) Facts: Corazon Nogales. who was 37 years old and pregnant with her fourth child. Estrada’s negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior under Article 2180 which provides that “[t]he obligation imposed by Article 2176 [on quasidelict] is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. However. Dr. Espinola. any liability for malpractice must be Dr. during which time. it must first be established that an employeremployee relationship existed between CMC and Dr. she was brought to Dr. etc. Due to the profuse vaginal bleeding. No. In Ramos v. ABAÑO vehicles. It concluded that since Rogelio engaged Dr. In this case. Estrada. which not only caused vaginal bleeding to Corazon but also left the baby in a weak condition warranting intubation and resuscitation. The other hospital staff merely became Dr. As such. with regard to the rest. Estrada’s sole responsibility. Estrada is an independent contractor. On her last trimester of pregnancy. Estrada is considered an independent contractor. on the ground that the physicians were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon’s condition and that CMC was negligent in the selection an supervision of its physicians and staff. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry…The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Estrada. CMC is liable for Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges and was allowed to use CMC’s facilities during an emergency did not make him an employee of CMC. who advised her immediate admission to Capitol Medical Center (CMC). Corazon was transferred to the Delivery Room. The RTC held Dr. When Corazon was admitted in CMC. Corazon was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Dr. ordered immediate hysterectomy. the SC has already held that the determining factor to establish such a relationship is the exercise of control as to the means of accomplishing a task of the employer over its employee. Dr. It took an hour for Dr. CMC may still be held liable even if Dr. (The case was final with regard to Dr. Estrada since he no longer appealed to the CA. Dr. signed the “Consent on Admission” and “Admission Agreement”. When Corazon experienced mild labor pains one night. Estrada liable and absolved the rest. the SC finds no evidence of such control. Dr.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. CA affirmed the decision. Dr. Estrada. under the doctrine of apparent authority. Corazon already died due to “hemorrhage. During her labor. Under this 16 . a piece of cervical tissue was torn. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible…Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Estrada applied low forceps to extract the baby but in the process. Estrada and the fact that Dr. Rogelio. Estrada as the attending physician of his wife.) Can CMC and the other physicians and hospital personnel be held liable? Held: Yes. 3B 08-09 Estrada’s temporary servants and agents who are under his supervision and responsibility and not the hospital’s. which is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Later on. Espinola to reach CMC due to typhoon Didang.

who was not duly licensed. With regard to the first factor.. but more importantly because of Dr. Espinola. rather a representation may be general and implied. (3) Dr. Estrada to handle Corazon’s delivery not only because of their friend’s recommendation. as the driver of the vehicle. There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P. Jr. Estrada. driver of the Scout car. could not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they were parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane. which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence. the Scout car was thrown backwards against a protective railing. Jr. and owner of Toyota Corolla while driving rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St. All its ten occupants.. Sta. Paraiso.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. The bus was owned by petitioner Emiliano Manuel.. Due to the impact. Q. Moreover. which included four children were injured. Besides. These are considered contracts of adhesion and are thus construed strictly against hospitals. was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the accident.C.M. and (2) Plaintiff (Nograles) acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent. Jr. a blanket release in favor of hospitals “from any and all claims”. the driver of the bus. which was then being repaired by the 17 . Estrada’s referral of Corazon’s profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. QC GOVERNMENT vs. Issue: Whether the lack of driver’s license absolves petitioners Held: No. (2) CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. which was then negotiating the zigzag road of Bo. Elena. Estrada as a member of CMC’s medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-employed specialists. Jr. DACARA (Krissette) FACTS: • At about 1AM. Sr. it is essential that: (1) CMC acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. petitioners claim the Fernando Abcede. Petitioners (bus and insurance companies) contend that it was Fernando Abcede. who was only 19-years old at the time of the incident. The second factor is also present since the spouses Nogales specifically chose Dr. which left Manila for Camarines Norte one morning with respondent Fernando Abcede. who was at fault. CMC cannot deny liability merely because of the consent or release forms signed by Rogelio. Camarines Norte. was prosecuted for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence. MANUEL v CA (Ysan) Facts: Private respondents were passengers of a Scout Car owned by respondent Ramos. who was then the Head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of CMC. Were it not for the railing. the Scout car would have fallen into a deep ravine. did not have a driver's license. Estrada’s “connection with a reputable hospital (CMC)”. seven of the victims sustained serious physical injuries. As he could not be found after he ceased reporting for work a few days following the incident. Aside from the foregoing. was hit on its left side by a bus. Dacara.. gave the impression that Dr. CMC need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is its employee. ABAÑO doctrine. The following circumstances show that the first factor is present: (1) CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. the private respondents filed the instant action for damages based on quasi-delict. Emiliano Manuel. The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede. would be contrary to public policy and thus void. when the 3B 08-09 Scout car. consistent with ordinary care and prudence.

suffered any emotional and mental suffering. moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. DELSAN V. It dropped anchor at the vicinity of ISSUE: Whether QC government is liable for damages. unbroken by any efficient intervening cause. or deterioration of goods. such will not hold since these matters were belatedly raised by petitioner QC on appeal. The Civil Code provides that common carriers are liable for loss. Jr. CA affirmed. • Considering that QC government points out that Jr. Federal Phoenix is now trying to collect against CF. it is too late for them to raise this new issue. Thus. DSR LINES v FEDERAL (Alpe) FACTS: 3B 08-09 18 . The ship carrying the cargo reached the first port.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. is not among those listed. Sharp (DSRLines). destruction. M/V Delsan Express. ISSUE: Was CF Sharp (DSRLines) liable for the losses? HELD: Yes. The project was completed but was not formally turned over to NHA. and burned down. They claim that they exercised due care by providing the area all necessary measures to avoid accident. The Trial Court and the CA both decided in favor of Federal Phoenix. Federal Phoenix Assurance insured the the cargo against all risks. was driving at 60 kph which is beyond the maximum speed limit of 30 kph and should then be presumed to be negligent for having violated traffic regulation. This diligence is required until the goods are delivered to the person entitled to receive them. the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently. but CF Sharp failed to overcome the presumption by sufficient proof of extraordinary diligence. Defendants QC alleged that the said diggings were barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident. filed a complaint for damages against the QC gov’t and prayed for actual. Destruction by fire. and Berde Plants executed a Subrogation receipt in favor of Federal Phoenix. Sr. • Since lower court and CA are unanimous in declaring petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars the Court from ruling otherwise. Federal Phoenix raised the presumption of negligence against CF. sustained bodily induries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth. however. ABAÑO • • • QC government. and was then reloaded to a feeder ship. • Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence. HELD: • QC is LIABLE except for moral damages since no proof Jr. RTC ruled QC was negligent. caught fired. Thus. Berde Plants contracted with CF Sharp (whose general shipping agent is DSR lines) to deliver artificial trees to Al-mohr Int’l Group in Riyadh. Such is determined from the facts of each case. owned by Delsan Transport. C & A CONSTRUCTION (Kristel) 412 SCRA 526 Facts: C&A Construction was engaged by the National Housing Authority to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area. however. Dacara. Federal Phoenix paid Berde Plants the amount corresponding to the amount of cargo. anchored in the Navotas Fishport to install a cargo pump and clear its cargo oil tank. unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law. The 2 nd ship. Sharp. unless the cause is listed among the exceptions.

The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Even if the latter was already congested. This was not proven by Delsan in this case. Delsan should be held solidarily liable under 2180 of the Civil Code To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. the vessel hit the deflector wall built by C & A. Captain Jusep ordered that the vessel be brought to a full stop. As early as 12 midnight of Oct. Issues:  Whether Captain Jusep was negligent  Whether Delsan should be held solidarily liable for a quasi-delict committed by Jusep Held:  Yes. they filed a complaint for damages against Delsan. 1994. he could have had greater chance of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port was very near North Harbor. he would still have the time to seek refuge in other ports. Delsan’s defense was that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event – the typhoon Katring. an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Capt. Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. but also to the supervision of employees. In an effort to avoid collision with the NAPOCOR power barge. Captain Jusep was negligent. This notwithstanding.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING v BORJA (Mayco) June 10. While knowing 19 . 20. Jusep. Had he moved the vessel earlier. however. C & A demanded payment for the damage but Delsan refused to pay. Due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified. They claim that the captain was negligent in not transferring the vessel immediately to the North Harbor despite having learned of the coming typhoon 8 hours before. Thus. 3B 08-09  Yes. It should be stressed. making them solidarily liable with Capt. ABAÑO Vitas mouth near a NAPOCOR barge after finding out that a typhoon was to hit Manila and that the North Harbor was congested. he did nothing. 2002 Petitioner’s vessel was carrying a chemical cargo – alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer . that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection. until 8:35 am the following morning when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor which was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. inasmuch as the employer is still required to exercise due diligence in supervising its employees. However. he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours.

a sudden explosion occurred setting the vessels afire. Smith Bell is liable. Fearing for his life. PHOENIX v IAC (Edz) 148 SCRA 353 (1987) Facts:  Dionisio (D). Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals. Carbonel (C). Petitioner was therefore negligent. the liquor.  D was negligent the night of the accident and was driving faster than he should have been. smashed into a parked dump truck owned by Phoenix. Issue: Held:  There was no evidence of any curfew pass. ABAÑO that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals. Issue: W/n Smith bell is not liable as it claims that the explosion occurred outside of its vessel? Held: No. Nonetheless. The owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of negligent navigation or management. He was diagnosed to be permanently disabled due to the incident. had parked. Borja who was inside the cabin preparing reports. (2) inhalation of fumes from burning chemicals. and on the way. Another explosion was again heard. petitioner was negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting the cargo.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. Said vessel contained 750 metric tons of alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer . Despite this he mange to swam his wasy for an hour until he was rescued and sent to the hospital. While M/T king family was unloading chemical unto 2 barges. drove home. Respondent Borja suffered the following damage and injuries: (1) chemical burns of the face and arm. (3) exposure to the elements while floating in sea 3B 08-09 water for about three hours. left occipital region with right sided headache and the blurring of the vision of right eye. supervising customs Inspector Manuel Nalgan instructed respondent Catalino Borja to board said vessel and perform his duties as inspector upon the vessel’s arrival until its departure. with no early warning reflector devices. D claimed his headlights suddenly failed and that the truck was parked askew. which must be why D had no headlights and which makes it probable that he was speeding to avoid detection. The lower court and CA ruled that the fire and explosion had originated from the petitioner’s vessel. claiming that the proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which the truck driver. Borja jumped overboard to save himself. Facts: Smith Bell (petitioner) filed a written request with the Bureau of Customs for the attendance of the Latter’s inspection team on vessel M/T king family which was due to arrive at the port of manila.  D suffered physical injuries and commenced an action for damages. ran outside to check. Upon hearing this. his absence of headlights and a curfew pass which caused the accident. and (5) cerebral infract with neovascularization. the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of D’s injuries was the 20 . (4) homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye. its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. On the same day. Phoenix countered that it was D’s recklessness. The water howver was likewise on fire because of the chemicals. after having had a shot or two of liquor at a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss.

Whether Tano was negligent in making a turn while visibility is difficult? 2. decided to make a sharp left towards the airport. that the deceased was not all that free from negligence in evidently speeding too closely behind the vehicle he was following. Issue/s: 1. 3B 08-09 LAMBERT v HEIRS OF CASTILLON (Pau) G. Iligan City and borrowed his motorcycle. When the van was approaching the airport vicinity. it stopped for a while since there were two vehicles that are racing. heading towards Bialig Airport. after eating supper at Hona’s Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY.. February 23. they traversed the 21 . which overturned the decision in favour of the heirs. despite extremely poor visibility. It is true. it was this negligent act of Tano which had directly placed his vehicle on the path of the motorcycle coming from the opposite direction 2. From every indication the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of Tano who. agree with the appellate court that there indeed was contributory negligence on the victim’s part that could warrant a mitigation of petitioner’s liability for damages. The heirs of the deceased appealed the civil case. the driver of the can. Surigao Del Sur.  D’s negligence was “only contributory. Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo. but both were dismissed by saying that Monterola was negligent. A civil case against LBC and a criminal case against Tano was instituted.” that the “immediate and proximate cause” of the injury remained the truck driver’s “lack of due care” and that consequently. however. 160709.. Monterola emerged from the dust and crashed on the right side of the van. LBC AIR CARGO v CA (Jon) Contributory Negligence Facts: In the morning of November Rogelio Monterola was driving his motorcycle along the dusty national road in Bialig. 1991. He then invited his friend. We therefore. The racing vehicles created dust clouds which made visibility of incoming vehicles very difficult to see but nevertheless. hostility executed a left turn without waiting for the dust to settle. Tano. 1. A Cargo van from LBC was travelling on the opposite direction of Monterola. No. ABAÑO wrongful or negligent manner in which the truck was parked. The collision probably would not have occurred had the truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or devices. D may recover damages though such are subject to mitigation by the courts. Sergio Labang. Whether There is contributory negligence on the part of Monterola? Held: YES to Both. The collision of D’s car with the truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of C’s negligence. When he was at the center of the lane.m. At around past 10:00 p. Monterola died due to the sever injuries he sustained in the accident. 2005 Facts: In the evening of January 13. to roam around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider.R.

the court a quo rendered a decision in favor of the Castillon heirs but reduced Lambert’s liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence of Ray. had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. the theory that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the accident is. On June 29. But if his negligence was only contributory. The SC found it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of the victim’s negligence. being the driver of the rear vehicle. Thus. 1993. intervening cause. was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. the evidence shows that he is not the real owner of the motorcycle. was Lambert negligent? 2. No. Raynera. as in this case. 2. Rosario. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. after a full-blown trial. 22 . which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn. Issue/s: 1. sufficiently contradicted by evidence. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of another vehicle. the heirs of Ray Castillon. Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Respondents. which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the collision. On the claim of Joel Castillon. Yes. the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo. without first establishing his right of way.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo for without that left turn executed with no precaution. Does the act of tailgating merely constitute contributory negligence? Lambert insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not liable for damages. Held 3B 08-09 1. Did the CA err in not applying the doctrine of Edna A. and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be “the cause of the accident. Upon reaching Brgy. Raynera vs. in the natural and continuous sequence. unbroken by any efficient. ABAÑO highway towards Tambo at a high speed. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care. he cannot recover damages. and without which the result would not have occurred. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Sto. Accordingly. the plaintiff may recover damages. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio. his complaint is dismissed. Proximate cause is defined as that which. Article 2179 reads as follows: When the plaintiff’s negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla that drivers of vehicles “who bump the rear of another vehicle” are presumed to be the cause of the accident? In other words. Clearly. the mishap in all probability would not have happened. produces the injury. Hiceta. He is not the real party in interest. unless contradicted by other evidence”.

so despite the circumstances. The bus driver claimed that from 30 meters away. 50% of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents. a head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck. Is the doctrine of last clear chance applicable? the the the the No. the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. It does not apply where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. ABAÑO The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. the cargo truck and the passenger bus sideswiped each other. although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio. at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed. all passengers of the Ford Escort. The truck driver and owner should be solidarily liable with the bus driver and owner. in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway.[15] The determination of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. Hence. and physical injuries to George Koh McKee. (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer. Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee. the heirs of Ray Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. The 3B 08-09 heirs of the victims filed an action for damages against drivers and owners of the truck and bus. Loadstar. Kim Koh McKee and Loida Bondoc. he downshifted to increase his speed on the ascending road in order to overtake the vehicle in front of him. the action is not between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but is one brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. In other words. owned by private respondents. he could see that the front tires of the truck were wriggling. At this precise moment. MCKEE v IAC (Ysan) Facts: Between nine and ten o'clock. and a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh. the doctrine is not applicable. Several passengers of the bus were thrown out and five people died as a result of the injuries they sustained. coming from the opposite sides of the highway.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. Pampanga. and driven by Ruben Galang. it was established that Ray. and that the truck was rapidly headed towards his lane. The CA held that truck driver and owner were not liable to the heirs because driver of the bus had the last clear chance to avoid accident but failed to do so. contributed to the same result. between Angeles City and San Fernando. (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney. BUSTAMANTE v CA (Irah) A collision occurred between a cargo truck and a passenger bus. AG & P. The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable only in a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. When the car was about 10 away from the southern approach of the bridge. 2 boys suddenly darted from the right side of the 23 . The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh. In this case.[21] These circumstances. pursuant to Rakes v. In the case at bar. He thought that the truck driver was a jokester. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. since the truck driver was found to be negligent as well. Therefore. The cargo truck and passenger bus were approaching each other.

Not even a single identification card was exhibited by said • 24 . was the initial act in the chain of events. the negligent act of the truck driver. • The real Canlas spouses then informed the bank that the property had been mortgaged without their consent and filed an action for the annulment of the mortgage contract. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car. ABAÑO road and into the lane of the car. holding in trust the money of the depositors. which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence of bad faith. BANK is NEGLIGENT. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck. Before he could do so. which was the opposite lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road. HELD: YES. the truck driver continued at full speed towards the car. CANLAS vs. unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. The boys were moving back and forth. The spouses turned over the certificates of title to Mañosca. his car collided with the truck. The business of a bank is affected with public interest.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck. When Mañosca defaulted on his loan. The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. the bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. the bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas. 51 Furthermore. the checks issued by Mañosca turned out to be insufficiently funded. In this case. • The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on. Issue: Whether the driver of the truck and its owner are liable Held: Yes. It also held that the bank exercised due diligence in approving the loan and mortgage applied for by Mañosca. • CA held Sps. Magno with the help of two impostors who introduced themselves as the Spouses Canlas. • He again mortgaged the properties to the Asian Savings Bank with the aid of the two impostors. ISSUE: Whether the bank was guilty of negligence. applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. CA (Krisette) 3B 08-09 FACTS: • The Canlas spouses agreed to sell two parcels of land to Mañosca for which the latter issued two postdated checks. Therefore.286 meters. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7. • However. which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances. Canlas were not entitled to relief since they were negligent and must bear the loss. Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh. if at all negligent. on the said bridge. swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side with a clearance of 3. it must bear the loss resulting from the fraudulent acts of Manosca. which was the actual cause of the tragedy. 2.661 meters to spare. the bank foreclosed the mortgage. in keeping with the responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing with registered or titled property. he then switched on the headlights of the car. in width. Mañosca managed to mortgage the two parcels to Atty.

covering the same parcel of land in question. The trial court dismissed the case on the ground of laches and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Penas secured a title not only to the 10. B of RA 296 provides that reinvidicatory actions may be brought by the owner within 30 years after he has been deprived of his property. or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident. meters but also to the remaining unsold portion on June 4.000 sq. Section 44. par. and yet. meters of the property claiming that this portion was invalidly included by the Pena spouses in the titling of the land they bought. ABAÑO • • impostors to show their true identity. is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Petitioners argue that their cause of action still subsists because it accrued either on 1962 when delos Reyes died or on 1963 when the TCT was issued to the Cainas. A cause of action being an act or omission of one party in violation of the right of another arises at the moment such right is violated. In the instant case. The Cainas were the 4th transferees in the ownership of the land in question and they were not required to go beyond that DELOS REYES V. even if we apply the 30 year prescriptive period.405 sq.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. real actions over immovable prescribe after 30 years. 1978.000 sq. 1943 when the Pena spouses caused the registration in their name for this was the date when the right of ownership over the remaining 3. IN essence. 1963.405 sq. petitioner’s cause of action accrued on June 4. meters to the Pena spouses. Issue: Whether the case was correctly dismissed on the ground of laches Held: YES. 3B 08-09 25 . and hence all her successors in interest. 1943. Assuming that Canlas was negligent in giving Manosca the opportunity to perpetrate the fraud.405 sq. the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. 3. meters was transgressed. the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other. the land was acquired by Rodolfo and Zenaida Caina who exercised full ownership and possession over the property on July 9. meter land in Valenzuela. Under the doctrine of last clear chance. Metro Manila. PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree) applies in this case. Magno. by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them. the heirs of Evarista delos Reyes filed an action against the Cainas for reconveyance of the 3. They sold 10. Thus. to file a suit for reconveyance of the property wrongfully taken from them. it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to prevent the fraud. From this very moment sprung the right of the owner. Eventually. petitioner’s right to recover has already been effectively foreclosed by the lapse of time having been initiated only after 36 years from the accrual of their cause of action. by entrusting the certificates of title to the parcels of land. On Oct. Under 1140 of the Civil Code. CA (Kristel) 285 SCRA 81 Facts: The Spouses Genaro and Evarista delos Reyes owned a 13. the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so. the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificated bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty.

1410 and 1422 of the Civil Code. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v COURT OF APPEALS (Mayco) Force Majeure: to constitute as an exemption from liability must be one impossible to avoid or foresee or though foreseen is inevitable. ABAÑO appeared in the TCT in the name of their transferor.405 sq. It claims that it is a situation of Damnum absque injuria. 1997 Facts: 26 . a massive flood covered the towns near Angat Dam causing several deaths and the loss and destruction of houses. Further. INC. plants. whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act. Also its claim that it sent notices was not properly given to the proper authorities (as it was not properly addressed to them) that’s why it did not come to the knowledge of the residents in the affected areas. at the height of typhoon “Kading”. on the imprescriptibility of void and inexistent contracts is misplaced. petitioners never raised a restraining arm to the inclusion of the 3. a sign of negligence on their part. They were innocent purchasers for value having acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a clean title. No. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man. July 17. Reliance on 1409. farms. Facts: In the early morning of Cotober 27. the rights of the innocent purchasers of real property such as the Cainas cannot be swamped and drowned by the remonstrations of the inert and petulant who took no care in seasonable asserting their rights of ownership over the land alleged wrested from them through fraudulent means. It cannot be disputed that for 36 years. NPC has a prior knowledge that a typhoon was about to hit its area and yet still maintains the water level a t maximum level. 120262. (Damages but with no legal liabilities) Issue: W/n NPC was excused from liability via the doctrine of Fortuitous event? Held: No. the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. Although the typhoon was primarily the cause why NPC should release water. alleged that it was the victims who took the risk of staying near the dam and that the direct cause. Moreover. It could have released water earlier in a gradual manner but it did not.000 bought by the Pena spouses. the action for reconveyance has now become stale.R. being barred as it were by laches. Without prior notice to the people and at an untimely hour when people where sleeping. the corp. The property passed through 4 owners successively in a span of more than 20 years before it went into the hands of private respondents. 1978. working animals and other properties of people residing near the dam. meters of land in the titling of the 10. Surely. NPC defended itself by claiming that they released the water via the floodgates gradually and that written notices where given to the residents near the dam therefore NPC can not be held liable as there is no causal relationship between the damages and the act of NPC.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. the typhoon which was a fortuitous event was to be blamed. v COURT OF APPEALS & PANTEJO (Edz) G. it was the corporation negligence not to foresee such event that is to be blamed for the damages. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. The flooding was 3B 08-09 caused by the National Power Corporation (NPC) when thru imprudence opened all the three floodgates of Angat Dam.

C. It was even oblivious to the fact that P was exposed to humiliation and embarrassment especially because of his gov’t 3B 08-09 position and social prominence. The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time th[at] [Smith's] wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain." 27 .  Assuming that airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure. Held: "The [Cadwallader] contends in its answer that the captain and all the officers of the steamer Helen C. ABAÑO  Pantejo (P) boarded a PAL plane from Manila to Cebu. v CADWALLADER (Pau) 55 Phil 517 Facts: The steamer Helen C. and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain. an auditor of PNB. officers. The wharf was an old wharf and at the time of the accident was heavily loaded with timber belonger to the [Smith]. P agreed to share a hotel room with his co-passenger Dumlao (D). we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa. therefore.  PAL gave out cash assistance of a total of P300.  P found out that PAL had reimbursed the hotel expenses of a Superintendent Gonzales and a Mrs. Both the TC and the CA found that PAL acted in bad faith in refusing to provide hotel accommodations for P or reimburse him for his expenses in contrast to the other passengers who were favored. what makes PAL liable for damages here is its blatant refusal to accord such amenities equally to all its stranded passengers.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. according to F. were duly licensed and authorized to hold their respective positions at the time when the wharf in question collapsed. carefully and efficiently. in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court. due to typhoon Osang. partially demolishing it and throwing the timber piled thereon into the water.  PAL acted in bad faith in disregarding its duties as a common carrier to its passengers and in discriminating against P. However. authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage. to extend to its passengers cash assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing tie-ups. WALTER SMITH & CO. Zamboanga. and Cadwallader is. Cadwallader. and all the members of the crew of the steamer had been chosen for their reputed skill in directing and navigating the steamer Helen C safely. No compelling or justifying reason was given for such discriminatory and prejudicial conduct. This being so. but P asked instead to be placed in a hotel at PAL’s expense since he did not have cash with him. in the case cited above. absolved from all liability. promising to pay D upon reaching Surigao. Held:  A contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. where he was supposed to take his connecting flight to Surigao City. [Smith] brought an action for damages against defendant for the damage to the wharf and the loss of the timber piled thereon. in the course of its maneuvers to moor at the [Smith’s] wharf in the port of Olutanga. which altogether necessarily subjected him to ridicule. and that said captain. struck [the] wharf. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees could give ground for an action for damages. Rocha. whenever a flight has been cancelled. the connecting flight to Surigao City was cancelled. belonging to [Cadwallader]. PAL refused.  It has been sufficiently established that PAL’s standard company policy. shame and anguish. PAL’s manager only offered to reimburse P as well when he threatened to sue.

Calson’s sold what it thought was part of parcel 4 to the spouses Theis. Gatchalian boarded.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. On the way. parcel 3 was erroneously indicated to be covered by the title to parcel 1. 2 and 3. however. Adjacent to parcel 3 was parcel 4. circumstance. ABAÑO SPOUSES THEIS v CA (Irah) Calson’s Development owned three lots in Tagaytay . went off 28 . The spouses’ insistence in claiming parcel 3 on which stands a house whose value exceeds the price paid by them is unreasonable. and (2) mistake. The spouses then went to Germany. In order that 3B 08-09 mistake may invalidate consent. when the witness for the spouses testified. it should refer to the substance of the thing which is the object of the contract. Article 1390 of the Civil Code provides that contracts where the consent was vitiated by mistake are annullable. La Union. as a paying passenger. This mistake invalidated its consent. and as such. they returned to Tagaytay to plan the construction of their house. The contract can be annulled on the ground of mistake. This would constitute unjust enrichment. Therefore. and that what was actually sold to them were parcels 2 and 3. or a belief in the existence of some fact. or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. and the good faith of Calson’s is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered. of the same province. The spouses insisted that they want parcel 4. which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing. It was then that they discovered that parcel 4.parcels 1. there is lack of full and correct knowledge about the thing. Calson’s then offered to return double the amount already paid by the spouses. it immediately offered two other vacant lots to the spouses or to reimburse them with twice the amount paid. respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio. In a subsequent survey. Moreover. Calson’s delivered the certificates of title to parcels 2 and 3 to the spouses. Parcels 2 and 3 were mistakenly surveyed to be located where parcel 4 was located. Calson’s offered them the real parcels 1 and 2 instead since these were really what it intended to sell to the spouses. which in reality does not exist. The concept of error includes: (1) ignorance. since Calson’s did not own it. The error was an honest mistake. In this case. while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc. could not have been sold to them since a house had already been built thereon by Calson’s even before the execution of the contract and its construction cost far exceeded the price paid by the spouses Theis for the two parcels of land. Upon execution of the Deed of Sale. shortly thereafter. which was not owned by Calson’s. he stated that what was pointed out to the spouses was a vacant lot. Can the contract of sale be annulled? Yes. or event. bound for Bauang. but this was impossible. Calson’s committed an error of the second type. The real parcel 3. Bauang. "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and. GATCHALIAN v DELIM (Ysan) Facts: At noon time. Unaware of the mistake by which Calson’s appeared to be the owner of parcel 4 as indicated in the erroneous survey. In both cases. The spouses still refused. About three years later. the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road. The spouses refused and insisted that they wanted parcel 2 and 3 since the TCTs to these lots were the ones that had been issued in their name. annulment of the deed of sale is proper. which was sold to them. Union. Aringay. was owned by someone else. Calson’s built a house on parcel 3. Calson’s filed an action to annul the contract of sale. they could not have intended to purchase the lot on which a house was already built. which is a wrong conception about said thing.

However. On appeal. MARISCAL v. having been in the hospital for only three days.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing. Issue: Whether there was litis pendentia so that the complaint filed by Mariscal should be dismissed. she had the injured passengers. including petitioner Gatchalian. before Mrs. she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Several passengers. we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. Rogelio Mariscal also filed a complaint for the annulment of the same marriage on the ground that he was forced to marry Bella at gunpoint and that they had no valid license in the RTC Digos. CA (Kristel) 311 SCRA 51 3B 08-09 Facts: Bella Catalan filed a complaint in the RTC Iloilo against Rogelio Mariscal for the annulment of their marriage on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been solemnized without a valid marriage license and for being bigamous. Catalan moved to dismiss the case on the ground of litis pendentia. Mrs. the following requisites are necessary: 1) identity of parties or at leas such as representing the same interest in both actions. she experienced dizziness but that. According to him. visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. sign a waiver on filing a complaint. ABAÑO the road. turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Finally. that while reading the same. The trial court dismissed denied the motion to dismiss.000 which she allegedly sent him to buy properties as investment for their future life together. 2) identity of rights and relief prayed for. Mariscal claims that there would be no res judicata notwithstanding judgment that may be rendered in either of the civil cases since there are different grounds for nullification of their marriage respectively invoked by them. seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document. the relief being founded on the same facts. She also sought to recover $32. Issue: Whether the waiver was valid Held: No. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident. Passengers were confined in the hospital. She also gave petitioner P12. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence. For litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for dismissal of an action. Delim left. Mariscal also filed a counterclaim alleging bad faith of Catalan and asked for damages. wife of respondent. were injured. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. Held: Yes. Adela Delim. including petitioner. and 3) the identity in the 2 cases should be such that the judgment that may be 29 . Two days later. the judgment in one case will not abate the second because the basis for annulment in the former would not have even been passed upon by the latter.

30 . LIM v UNI-TAN MARKETING CORPORATION (Mayco) No damages can be awarded when petitioner given a remedy in the rules of court to stay the execution of judgment fails to avail of it even if upon appeal the decision was reversed. ABAÑO rendered in the pending case would. what is essential is the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. The spouses failed to avail of it and the court sees no one to blame on their present complaint but the spouses themselves. regardless of which party is successful. petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and in the process has lost track of the real issue besetting the 2 actions which is simply the nullification of a marriage contracted by the parties. A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action against the plaintiff in a case. the only one to be faulted were the spouses who failed to post a Supersedeas bond to stay the execution. Hosaka (H). Ramos (R) was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder and was referred to Dr. Gutierrez (G). In litis pendentia.000 reimbursement makes the action of Mariscal puerile and needless. who recommended the services of an anesthesiologist. Issue: W/n the spouses Lim can ask for damages for the execution of judgment on their property which was later on reversed on appeal? Held: No. Indeed the court is puzzled why Mariscal shied away from the RTC of Iloilo where he could have ventilated his defenses and litigated his compulsory counterclaim. 3B 08-09 Facts: Uni-Tan Filed before MTC of Manila a case for unlawful detainer against spouses Lim. Dr. The respondent was in the lawful exercise of its right at the time it effected an execution sale pursuant to the judgment. this is by staying the execution by filing of a supersedeas bond. amount to res judicata in the other. Spouses also file a motion for Partial reconsideration praying that their properties that were unlawfully levied and sold on execution during the proceeding at the lower court be returned to them.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. the supervening event of the RTC of Iloilo nullifying their marriage on the ground that it was bigamous with the award of moral and exemplary damages and disallowing the $32. It is quite evident that the first two requisites are present. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party would be splitting of actions not sanctioned by the Rules. RTC ruled on this motion by ordering that the items not sold be returned to the spouses and with regard to the items sold. Spouses Lim filed an appeal to RTC and the latter reversed the decision by dismissing the complaint of Uni-Tan. Also. RAMOS v COURT OF APPEALS (Edz) 380 SCRA 467 Facts:  Mrs. The spouses were given the remedy by the rules of court to prevent such from happening. The third requisite is the bone of contention. In his effort to have the case resolved in a different venue. Mtc rendered judgment in favor of Uni-Tan.

Calderon (C).) and physical examination (examination of the upper airway. R became comatose after Dr. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician’s Hippocratic Oath. and the doctors alleged that she had bronchospasm. R was admitted to the DLSMC for the operation. etc. R. at different hospitals. R. H is also liable. central nervous system. H was also remiss in his duty of attending to Mrs R promptly.  There is no question that Mrs. 31 . Dr. R. R. G to Mrs. Mrs. She failed to perform a thorough preevaluation for anesthesia (taking patient’s medical history. The bluish discoloration and enlargement of Mrs. ABAÑO  Mrs.  Dr. cardiovascular system and lungs). diverting the supply of oxygen from the lungs to the gastrointestinal tract. R’s nailbeds remained bluish. at the very least. Dr.  Dr. in reckless disregard for his patient’s well being.TORTS AND DAMAGES – ATTY. Injury does not normally occur absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the sue of an endotracheal tube. G failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a patient. G’s act of seeing the patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operation was an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. However. as he was more than 3 hours late. H arrived more than three hours late. R’s physiological make-up and needs.  Dr. H clearly exercised a certain degree of. but Mrs. as he was the one who recommended Dr. reviewing his/her current drug therapy. HELD:  Dr. causing a decrease of blood supply to her brain. which must have adversely affected the administration of anesthesia on her. but remained in a comatose condition almost 14 years after the operation until she died. R and was the attending physician of Mrs.  Dr. R. H who gave instructions to call another anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Mrs. having scheduled 2 procedures on the same day. G had difficulty intubating Mrs. 30 minutes apart from each other. 3B 08-09 supervision over the procedure then being performed on Mrs. G’s performance of the faulty intubation on her. It was Dr. R’s stomach indicated that the tube was improperly inserted into the esophagus instead of the trachea. G was unaware of Mrs. That there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. was taken to the ICU. The unreasonable delay aggravated Mrs. the operation was delayed because Dr. R’s anxiety. and had to be replaced by Dr. She was released form the hospital four months later.