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China Not A Threat – General
China can’t deploy forces beyond its borders until 2015 Armed Forces Journal, June 2009, p. 16
Even so, the study said China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far beyond its borders before 2015. Further, China would not be able to deploy and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade, the report states .
PLA force projection limited for decades Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
The PLA's force projection capabilities will remain limited over the next decade as the PLA replaces outdated aircraft and maritime vessels and adjusts operational doctrine to encompass new capabilities. These changes will require tailored logistics equipment and training which will take time and money to develop proficiency. Although foreign produced equipment and maintenance parts, as well as the civil sector, may help to fill near-term gaps, continued reliance on non-organic assets will hinder PLA capabilities to sustain large-scale operations over time. (93) A July 2008 press article on the PLAAF states: The Chinese have released photos of a Chengdu J-10 fighter refueling in flight, "so it certainly wants the world to believe that it is equipping its Air Force to project power," said Thomas Kane, author of "Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power." "I keep hearing people talk about the PLAAF beyond Taiwan, but it is all fluff," [a] former U.S. defense official said.
Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22
China Doesn’t Threaten U.S. Hegemony
China is not trying to counterbalance U.S. global leadership Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, China’s International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. xxi
China does not seek to displace the United States as the predominant global power. Its elites do not currently want China to be a global leader on par with the United States—a peer competitor. They view their domestic challenges as too great to assume the risks and responsibilities associated with such a role, and they recognize that they lack the material resources to do so. They also fear that such a global role would divert much needed resources from national development and could foster regional backlashes against China. To be sure, Chinese leaders welcome a more multipolar world, one in which multilateralism reigns and U.S. power is constrained. Chinese leaders also want China to be eventually recognized as a great power—although that aspiration has very general attributes and is not well defined. Chinese leaders aspire to such a status as external validation of China’s achievements, but they are also wary of the burdens and costs associated with it.
U.S. will remain the global leader; China can’t challenge
Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, China’s International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 216-7 A further consideration is that even as Chinese capabilities and influence grow, the costs of confronting the United States will remain high and the benefits of doing so will remain unclear, if not low. U.S. economic and military power will not remain static over the next 20 years, even if the gap in relative capabilities narrows. And the United States is not likely to take an overtly confrontational strategy toward China, which would fundamentally alter Beijing’s cost-benefit calculus in its international behavior. The United States will continue to remain important (but not as central as before) to Chinese perceptions of their external security environment and the structure of the international system. Even assuming that the world becomes distinctly more multipolar, the U.S. economy and military will continue to cast a long shadow over Asian and global affairs.
Medeiros. In the words of China’s 2008 national defense white paper.pdf.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. Chinese leaders understand that China’s current growth model combined with the acceleration of globalization have deeply connected China to the international community. China’s success in accomplishing national revitalization depends on close and continuing interaction with global and regional powers. and Diversification. first. RAND Corporation. To be sure. RAND Corporation. Activism. 35 Third. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. One is a widely held belief that China’s future is inextricably (and increasingly) linked to the international community.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 3 China Not a Threat to the U.S.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. avoiding conflict and overt geopolitical competition with the United States is critical to China’s effort to ensure a stable and peaceful security environment. China wants to integrate with the global community to sustain its growth Evan S. http://www. nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.rand.pdf. and stable relations with the United States is critical to both.S. and Diversification. 20 But. Chinese scholars write about the need for “space” and “time” for China’s rise. two overarching beliefs shade China’s view of its current security environment. p. it is by no means a sufficient one. August 2009. August 2009.pdf. Russia and China have not formed an alliance against the U. p. Medeiros. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. http://www. Medeiros. August 2009. Evan S. China wants to avoid military conflict with the U. relationship with the United States is a necessary condition for its rise.S. major strategic competition or outright military conflict with the United States—more than with any other nation—would significantly disrupt China’s security environment.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. 3 . to sustain its own rise Evan S. Activism. relations between the two countries remain complex. xxi Some of China’s foreign policy actions are directed at eroding relative U. Activism. and Diversification.rand. Under severe conditions.S. Russia has been a useful Chinese partner in this effort. and they do not currently constitute a united front against the United States. and institutions.rand. RAND Corporation.”3 Even in the wake of the global financial crisis in fall 2008 and the resulting rapid declines in Chinese growth. p. markets. influence in certain regions and institutions. Chinese analysts also recognize that although a stable. http://www. Hu Jintao affirmed during the December 2008 Central Economic Work Conference that the direction of global economic integration for China was correct and should continue. However. if not amicable. “the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. it could lead China to shift national resources from economic development to military modernization—an outcome not desired by China’s leaders.
membership and also those that the United States is not a part of. Beijing has pursued bilateral ties with nations close to the United States and also those alienated from Washington. China’s international behavior reflects a continued recognition that an adversarial relationship with the United States would have a very negative effect on China’s security environment and on its ability to accomplish both its long-standing and its more immediate objectives.D.S. defense spending is equal to almost half the total defense expenditure for the entire world.S. in national security policy from George Washington University. p. China has not adopted a confrontational posture with the United States. power. in applied economics and Ph. Medeiros. the gap between U. this increase followed a period of slack spending and starts from a much lower base level than the gargantuan U. despite its discomfort with U. U. p. democracy-promotion agenda.rand.A. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. in national security policy from George Washington University. Even during the Bush years.S. August 2009. including U. and Chinese defense spending remains vast. allies.S. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M. including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. April 13. Sudan. in applied economics and Ph. and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues. April 13. China appears to have quietly rejected such approaches by leaders from Venezuela and Iran. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute.S. unipolar status and the U.S. China has been embracing multilateral organizations that include U.S.B. U. The independent.S. North Korea). and Chinese leaders have broadened their channels of diplomatic exchange. The most important finding in the Pentagons report was that China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far away from its 4 .S. online Furthermore.S.D. whereas Chinas is only 17 percent of that at $122 billion annually.S. These new channels have resulted in limited changes in Chinese behavior on key international security issues such as North Korea. Dr. CATO. coalition to balance U. Dr. and Diversification. And. including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office.S.S. Although Chinas defense spending has increased by double digits in recent years. China’s deployments don’t threaten the U.-China relations (especially after 9/11). defense budget.A. yearly spending on defense is $711 billion. U. China not confronting the U. Evan S.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. put effort into stabilizing U.. military deploys far forward around China. and Burma.S. The massive U. The independent. CATO. Chinas general military forces do not deploy in the Western Hemisphere and do not threaten the United States.g.pdfp. RAND Corporation. Furthermore.B. http://www. Iran. Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. defense spending massively exceeds China’s Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues. 2009. China has not sought to create an anti-U. 214-5 Third. Chinese leaders avoided confrontation with the United States (such as on Iraq in 2003).Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 4 China Not a Threat to the U.S.S. China has not sought to dominate them and has deferred its advances when they have been met with resistance from regional states. Activism. in regional organizations such as the SCO and EAS. 2009. online In addition. and sought to expand areas of practical cooperation (e.S. the U. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.
the Pentagon concluded that China is modernizing its military for short conflicts around its borders. very safe. Instead. 5 5 .Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 borders before 2015. and the faraway U.S. Chinas capability to project conventional power is and will remain pathetic far into the future" thus making most of Chinas neighbors relatively safe. The report continued that China would not be able to deploy and sustain large units in combat far away from China until well into the decade after that. against a Chinese attack. In other words.
deterrence and developing war-winning capabilities to such a degree that East Asia's maritime countries would question the value of their strategic alignment with the United States. Each country possesses significant port facilities that can contribute to U.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 No China threat to U. September. computers.S. interests. whether it be over Taiwan or North Korea. risks exaggerated. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security 6 . and its advanced command. Yet China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today. ongoing American confidence in its capabilities and in the strength of its regional partnerships allows the United States to enjoy both extensive military and diplomatic cooperation with China while it consolidates its regional security interests. AMERICA'S VITAL security interests. The United States developed and sustained its strategic partnerships with East Asia's maritime countries and maintained the balance of power both during and after the cold war because of its overwhelming naval superiority. which provide secure "stealth" platforms for retaliatory strikes. surveillance and re-connaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. Rather.nationalinterest. The United States also has developed strategic cooperation with Malaysia. China has begun to develop a new generation of military technologies that significantly advance its strategic capabilities. despite China's military advances. including the high seas and space.S. nuclear readiness sufficient to counter China Robert S. These advances underscore the potential challenge China poses to U. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. America's power-projection capability has assured U. strategic partners that they can depend on the United States to deter another great power from attacking them. Neither alarm nor exaggerated assessments of contemporary China's relative capabilities and the impact of Chinese defense modernization on U. but also on its subsurface ships. and. And despite China's military advances and its challenge to America's ability to project its power in the region.S. intelligence. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a wide range of weaponry that enables it to project power off of the Asian mainland and into new theaters. though China's capabilities are increasing. in no way do they challenge U.S.S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. America's maritime security is based not only on its superior surface fleet. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. capabilities during periods of heightened tension.org/ AFTER MORE than thirty years of post-Mao economic reforms and average annual economic growth rates of approximately 10 percent. should war ensue. tomorrow or at any time in the near future. policy toward China. it has not developed the necessary technologies to constitute a grave threat. are all in the maritime regions.S.S. to contend with a rising China and to maintain a favorable balance of power. In each of these areas.S.S. East Asia possesses plentiful offshore assets that enable the United States to maintain a robust military presence.October 2009. The China threat is simply vastly overrated . With superior maritime power. the United States can not only dominate regional sea-lanes but also guarantee a favorable balance of power that prevents the emergence of a regional hegemon. http://www. This American security guarantee is as robust and credible as ever. Here Be Dragons. security guarantee is strong 6 Robert S. control. The National Interest. alliance with Japan and its close strategic partnership with Singapore provide Washington with key naval and air facilities essential to regional power projection. security interests in East Asia is needed because. The U. that they would incur minimal costs. Beijing's strategic advances do not require a major change in Washington's defense or regional security policy. supremacy.S. communications. The critical factor in assessing the modernization of the PLA's military forces is thus whether China is on the verge of challenging U. the United States can be confident in its ability to retain maritime dominance well into the twenty-first century. security and the importance of paying vigilant attention to the developments in the U. But.S. which enables it to project airpower into distant regions. and the U. including in East Asia. Current U.S. China is far from successfully posing any kind of serious immediate challenge. or in U. Indonesia and the Philippines.-China balance of power.
S. its long-range conventional missiles and its ability to dominate space-based communications systems make China's offensive capabilities highly vulnerable to American retaliation. but then what does it do on the third day of the war. reconnaissance.S. Only a 1% risk that China will attack the U. http://www. which challenge U. surface vessels. Here Be Dragons.S.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. retaliatory deterrent capability and nuclear stability that the B-2 stealth bomber will soon be obsolete and that the United States must spend huge sums to develop a more advanced strategic bomber that would provide marginal. additional security. September. including missiles and submarines. 7 .nationalinterest. Bush administration's costly and ultimately counterproductive international and domestic security policies. strengths. Perhaps China could launch a surprise attack. cyber-warfare capabilities.S.org/ Critics of U. after the United States has degraded its communication. The National Interest.S.S. Robert S.nationalinterest.org/ China has made progress in developing a narrow range of capabilities.October 2009. His one novel proposal is that the United States respond to China's advancing nuclear capability by improving its strategic deep-strike air capability. Here Be Dragons. 7 China Won’t Attack the U.October 2009. September. But it is not plausible that China's limited nuclear arsenal and its minimal deterrent capability has so undermined U. The United States is doing nearly everything Professor Friedberg argues it should do. and targeting systems and then engaged China with its superior and secure air and naval capa-bilities? The notion that China might launch a war against the United States is the essence of the "1 percent doctrine" that contributed to many of the George W. if any. But Professor Friedberg's worst-case assessment fails to consider either Chinese vulnerabilities or U. http://www. U.-China policy offer little in the way of an alternative. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. The National Interest. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.S.
S. Beijing will have to be able to construct its own advanced aircraft to go on these carriers--rather than depend on imported Russian models and supplies.S. will be a lengthy process. http://www. The PLA Navy will also confront challenging organizational demands as it attempts to put a completed carrier into operation. Since the early 1990s--especially later in the decade as the Taiwan conflict escalated and following the 1996 U. We can no longer guarantee the security of a carrier.S. The National Interest. Navy is acutely aware of Chinese advances and is responding with measures to minimize the vulnerability of aircraft carriers.org/ CHINA IS buying and building a better maritime capability. maritime security.S. But such complications to U.-China Taiwan Strait confrontation-. maritime forces and Chinese concern for force protection will likely contribute to greater caution in Beijing's use of its naval forces to challenge U. China has been planning construction of an aircraft carrier since the mid-1980s.S.S. 8 . A carrier strike force may well have to follow a less direct route into the area and maintain a greater distance from China's coast to reduce its vulnerability to Chinese capabilities. Moreover. Nevertheless. China’s naval modernization. improved technologies and peacetime surveillance of Chinese submarines.S. This. The requirements for effective management of a carrier and its aircraft are extremely difficult. However. observers.S. In addition. Thus. One or even two Chinese carriers will be insufficient to maintain a constant presence in distant waters. strategic partnerships.S. the U. particularly in the case of a conflict over Taiwan. interests. These highly capable diesel submarines are difficult to detect. naval operations and require greater caution in operating an aircraft carrier near the Chinese coast. Here Be Dragons. maritime assets. American power-projection capabilities in East Asia are more vulnerable now than at any time since the end of the cold war. the unintended effect of China's carrier program may be to augment U.S. China complemented its submarine capability with a coastal deployment of Russian Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft and over one thousand five hundred Russian surface-to-air missiles.S. The combined effect of these deployments has been greater Chinese ability to target an American aircraft carrier and an improved ability to deny U. The United States still possesses the only pow-er-projection capability in East Asia. the American carrier strike group's ability to track them and the U. China's deployment of a carrier may contribute to both the strength of the American ability to deter Chinese challenges to the regional order and also to the stability of U. It purchased twelve Kilo-class submarines from Russia and it has developed its own Song-class and Yuan-class models. insofar as it diverts China's defense resources from its more effective submarine-based accessdenial capability.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 8 China’s Naval Modernization Doesn’t Threaten the U.S. China will also have to develop state-ofthe-art C4ISR capa-bilities so it can defend its carrier and target U. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.S. strike group's counter-electronic-warfare capabilities can also interfere with the PLA Navy's reconnaissance ability. operations do not significantly degrade Washington's ability to project superior power into maritime theaters. Robert S.S.S. ships and aircraft access to Chinese coastal waters. an intrinsically unreliable source of military power.October 2009. Improved Chinese capabilities complicate U.S. China will need multiple large carriers before it can develop a war-fighting capability. maritime superiority is negligible. IN ANOTHER attempt to counter U. Building many will take decades. too. a Chinese aircraft carrier will not improve the PLA's naval capability. Due to better funding. China's developing naval capabilities have yet to undermine U.S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. maritime superiority.S. a Chinese carrier may simply become an additional target for U. Navy's antisubmarine capabilities are constantly improving. Indeed.nationalinterest. maritime security. aircraft and cruise missiles. maritime partnerships or the regional security order. September. Any carrier threat from China on this front is decades away .S. Ultimately. Contrary to the worst-case assessments of some U. the stability of U. the acute vulnerability of a Chinese carrier to U. The U. operations in a Taiwan contingency . including aircraft carrier development.S. In addition.S. the net effect of China's naval advances on U. does not threaten the U.Beijing focused its maritime-acquisitions program primarily on the purchase of modern submarines to contribute to an access-denial capability that could limit U. and it will soon begin building its first.
But even a cursory examination of regional trends reveals that our maritime allies in East Asia are actually enhancing defense cooperation with the U. Robert S. In recent years. Tokyo has shown minimal interest in either accommodating Chinese power or developing an independent security capability.S. Here Be Dragons. Malaysia. http://www.S. naval cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia continues to improve.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 9 China Doesn’t Threaten the U. The U. Navy and Air Force.S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.S. even as China has modernized its military forces and become a global economic power. remains the dominant military power in East Asia Robert S. security. it cannot allow strategic complacency to undermine U. September.S.S. defense policy continues to stress advancement of those capabilities that support American power projection in the western Pacific Ocean. strategic part-nerships with the maritime states in China's neighborhood and a favorable regional balance of power.October 2009.org/ THE UNITED States enjoys military superiority in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. Washington must maintain those capabilities that underpin U. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College.S. The National Interest. The National Interest. despite its resistance to cooperation with its former 9 .nationalinterest. Despite China’s modernization. Short-term contingencies cannot preclude attention to long-term greatpower competition. Despite prolonged Japanese anxiety over the American commitment to its defense.org/ Professor Friedberg worries that the China threat will undermine American strategic partnerships in East Asia. as well as the ability to deter the use of force against maritime states and to defend them during hostilities. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.S. as these countries welcome the U. Here Be Dragons. U.October 2009. contribution to their security and regional stability. U. in maritime East Asia the United States retains military superiority and effective deterrence and war-fighting capacities. despite the constant hand-wringing and doubt in Japan over the U. Even the Philippines. September. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College.nationalinterest. subsurface platforms and information technologies.October 2009.-Japan defense cooperation is better today than at any time during the cold war or the 1990s. Singapore. http://www. Respect for Beijing's strategic potential requires that U.S. Here Be Dragons. The National Interest. and it continues to improve. deterrence and war-fighting capabilities have been the decisive factors in developing and sustaining strategic partnerships that are critical to Washington's efforts to maintain a favorable regional balance of power.nationalinterest.org/ Despite impressive Chinese advances. Asian allies enhancing military cooperation with the U.S.S. in Asia U. U. the United States has consolidated these relationships. U. If the United States maintains its focus on the multiple sources of maritime supremacy. But just as the United States cannot base policy on an exaggerated assessment of the China threat.S. Indonesia and the Philippines continue to improve naval cooperation with the United States. it can continue to engage the rise of China without undermining U. even as the United States prepares for a protracted era of counterinsurgency warfare. http://www.S. and they have exhibited minimal interest in meeting Chinese territorial demands in the South China Sea. has strong alliances in East Asia to counter China Robert S.-Japan alliance remains as important as ever to Japanese security. security. Southeast Asia. Similarly.S. commitment to the country's defense. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. including carrier-based power projection. September.S.
rather than alarmed. Navy. is improving cooperation with the U. The United States should be confident.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 colonial power.S. in its ability to retain its strategic presence in East Asia. 10 10 .
alliances. it has focused on growing economic cooperation and reassuring U. Rather. China is challenging the United States by trying to reduce its relative influence. at least for now . Activism. http://www. RAND Corporation. Some of China’s international behaviors are directed at eroding U. 215-6 Fourth. and Diversification. influence in specific regions and in certain institutions. China seeks political influence to increase the costs.S. more Chinese strategists recognize that—official rhetoric aside—U. Rather. Thus.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. China seeks to maximize its freedom of action and leverage as means of countering perceived U. out of Asia Evan S. expanding bilateral interactions to shape these nations’ preferences.S.S. alliances. and generally reassuring countries on its periphery about China’s intentions and capabilities. in Asia China not trying to push the U. A core Chinese objective is to hinder the U. for the United States and its allies. China’s approach is more gravitational than confrontational—pulling nations toward China (to bind them) rather than pushing them away from the United States or each other. Medeiros. joining multilateral organizations to shape regional agendas. It is not offering U. In this sense.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 11 China Doesn’t Threaten the U. Activism.S. Chinese leaders recognize the dangers and likely failure of such an approach. military diplomacy and defense cooperation is perhaps the smallest part of China’s bilateral diplomacy with Asian nations. RAND Corporation. in Asia. of constraining China. 11 .S. China is pursuing this approach by deepening economic interactions with Asian nations. ability to constrain China. in Asia Evan S.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. August 2009. Since the beginning of this decade. China is trying to increase its power and influence relative to the United States. Medeiros. China not trying to confront the U. and Diversification. allies by participating in regional institutions and committing to their norms of behavior.S.S. China is not actively trying to break up U. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity.S. http://www.S.S. China is not promoting itself as an alternative security partner to the United States. The most competitive aspects of China’s foreign policy are evident in the Asia-Pacific region. As noted above.pdfp. security interests. and some recognize the stability provided by U. security commitments play a stabilizing role in Asia.pdfp. August 2009. efforts to limit Chinese choices. Indeed. 208 This does not mean that there are not competitive aspects of China’s foreign policy that challenge U. but it does not seek to confront the United States by trying to expel it.rand.S. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity.rand. China is not currently trying to push the United States out of this region. that is. allies security assurances and military cooperation as a replacement to their security arrangements with the United States.S.
and they won’t be there during combat Ronald O’Rourke.com/document/RL33153/ Every piece of equipment [on China's Sovremenny-class destroyers] from hull. These ships largely remain in the Russian support cocoon in Dinghai rather than at a fleet base. It is no coincidence that the Sovremnyi and Kilo submarine home bases are in an enclave of Russian support in an isolated area near the Eastern Fleet headquarters at Ningbo. China cant maintain its equipment Ronald O’Rourke. China has minimal capability even to repair peacetime losses in port.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 12 China Naval Modernization Answers China can’t run the ships without Russians on board.. This key weapon responsible for downing incoming cruise missiles is probably lacking documentation and training because it must be illegally obtained. PLAN officers and crew are not expected to be able to handle operations when under fire. sustaining hits and suffering system degradation or loss... sonar.com/document/RL33153/ What kind of record is provided by prior Chinese built warships with imported Russian and Western technology? These include sensors. Navy air. (109) 12 .S.. Congressional Research Service.. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress. illegally copied import equipment and illegal examples with no local production capability at all. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. . Signaal and the Dutch government deny exporting the equipment or production rights to China.. Unfortunately for the PLAN. fire control. electronic countermeasures (ECM) and missiles are totally new to the PLAN. July 17. foreign imports with production rights. some of them are in the highest mission-critical areas. surface and subsurface threats.] China is dependent on Russian advisers for training. July 17. operations and maintenance. except for three noted. The latter two represent serious training and maintenance problems. This could include problems in night or rough weather environment as well.S. http://opencrs.S. weapons and communications as well as HM&E.. communications. It is unlikely that Russian advisers would be onboard during actual combat operations against Taiwan and U. For example. Isolation from other ships and crews hurts fleet integration and coordinated operations. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. The Chinese new-construction DDGs are a mix of local designed and manufactured systems. http://opencrs. 2009. . Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress. mechanical and electrical (HM&E) technologies to guns. . . 2009. Congressional Research Service. Because all of the combat systems. [For these ships. the DDGs being built have a rapid-fire Gatling gun close-in weapon system that looks like the Dutch Goalkeeper system. are modern Russian equipments..
But similar to the evaluation of China's aircraft-carrier capability. Here Be Dragons. they could transform the U. and the vulnerability of an ASBM system to U. carrier as well as Chinese air-defense systems would be easily detectable and degraded with U. Following the first such test. OF FOREMOST concern to many observers is Chinese research and development of a mobile antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of over one thousand five hundred kilometers. and here too Chinese capabilities would be vulnerable to a U.S. naval operations in much of the western Pacific and the South China Sea. penetrating the ship's defenses would be extremely difficult. http://www.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 13 Chinese Military Modernization Answers Many obstacles to Chinese military modernization Robert S. a balanced assessment of the country's military-modernization program requires attention to the obstacles to Beijing's developing and effectively operating these technologies. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. accurately track and then penetrate the defenses of U. none of these technological obstacles is necessarily insurmountable. power-projection capabilities in maritime theaters. Thus. cost-effective decoys that interfere with the missile's tracking capability.S.S. Finally. a Chinese ASBM force has the potential to preclude U. ability to protect its strategic partners throughout the region. weaponry.S. its antiship capability would likely be short-lived and it would have a limited impact on U. such as electronic countermeasures. the United States can adjust its operations in response to new PLA capabilities--we are not a stagnant military. Should these advances significantly enhance the PLA's ability to degrade U. and China is devoting considerable resources to building an ASBM force. Since America's use of high-technology. it is dependent on its surveillance systems. the intrinsic difficulty of designing and producing high-technology. China will require a protracted period of additional research and testing to develop an ASBM capability effective in real-world conditions. remains highly challenging.S.2 Once China employed its ASBM capability. Following detection.S.October 2009. China's surveillance. including "fog machines. operations.S.nationalinterest.S. air-launched missiles. that would dramatically degrade U. China has actively researched a broad spectrum of advanced military and dual-use civilian technologies. attack--far more vulnerable than U. such as a carrier. Of course. Though a mobile and concealed Chinese land-based ASBM would be difficult to destroy before launch. satellites would be to one from China.S. The PLA is now introducing many of these technologies into new weapons systems that are transforming the PLA's asymmetric military capability. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. precision-guided weaponry in the Gulf War. surface ships. China's ground-based radar that would support maritime reconnaissance and the tracking of a U. China's ASBM program is not a "silver bullet" that will magically transform the U. As an access-denial weapon. experimental weapons systems. and basic camouflage techniques." Such potential U. countermeasures have created considerable uncertainty and a wide-ranging debate among Chinese specialists on the feasibility of this project.org/ But China's post-cold-war defense research program has not exclusively focused in this area. tracking and targeting systems are also dependent on its satellite capability. And even if China could eventually construct a functioning ASBM system it would face considerable obstacles to achieving wartime effectiveness. But it would be unwise to underestimate the obstacles China faces in developing ASBMs and to exaggerate the strategic implications of such a capability. Chinese leaders would have only minimal confidence after destroying the first aircraft carrier that the United States would not target China's land-based radar facilities immediately thereafter. undermining the U. September. surface-ship capabilities.S. 13 . countermeasures.S. But China has yet to carry out its first successful public test of an ASBM.1 Detection of a small moving target on a large ocean.S.S. carrier strike forces can include defenses against ASBMs. the argument that China is on the verge of developing and deploying a transformative asymmetric force rests on unrealistic worst-case estimates that do not reflect the limits of current Chinese capabilities. U.S. The PLA may eventually develop the necessary ASBM surveillance and targeting capabilities to enable it to significantly degrade U.S. There are also the clear vulnerabilities of these technologies to U. low-technology. deterrent posture in the region or undermine American alliances. power-projection capability and on the course and outcome of hostilities. real-time tracking of a moving carrier is necessary for accurate targeting--this is an additional major technological obstacle.S.S. And even more so.-China strategic balance and have a far-reaching impact on regional alignments and the great-power security order. The National Interest. If land-based ballistic missiles could target.
maritime war-fighting capability is not limited to its surface fleet. 14 . the United States can deploy additional counterattack and offensive weaponry on subsurface platforms.S.October 2009. China can’t effectively utilize UAVs Robert S. UAVs cannot significantly contribute to China's effort to challenge U. nuclear-powered guidedmissile submarines (SSGNs) contain 154 western-Pacific-based Tomahawk cruise missiles that can target critical Chinese assets and penetrate Chinese coastal waters with minimal fear of detection.org/ China has been carrying out extensive research into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). thereby negating any new Chinese capabilities. they would be as vulnerable to a U.S. the UAV's surveillance technologies would all suffer from the same vulnerabilities as the ASBM surveillance technologies. SSGNs provide the United States with a powerful sea-based retaliatory capability and a persuasive and credible deterrent. ships. has many options to counter Chinese modernization Robert S. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.nationalinterest. and it would be foolish to underestimate the vast array of systems the United States has at its disposal. But the Chinese military lacks a secure platform for launching the UAVs.S.org/ Moreover.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 14 Chinese Military Modernization Answers U. Without the full array of secure C4ISR capabilities and a secure maritime capability. Chinese land-based UAVs would lack the range to target distant U.S.S. September. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. attack as a Chinese aircraft carrier. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://www. Moreover. U. The National Interest. Chinese UAVs could provide the PLA with an advanced reconnaissance and weapons-delivery capability. U.nationalinterest.S. Should China make progress on its ASBM force. http://www. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. Here Be Dragons. U. Here Be Dragons.October 2009.S. Chinese surface vessels would not be a secure UAV platform. The National Interest. maritime superiority. September.
though that milestone is likely several years away.3 billion people.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 15 China Naval Modernization Answers – No Aircraft Threat Several years until China has an aircraft carrier Breaking News from globeandmail. April 21. which is to include the first public showing of China's nuclear submarine fleet. Beijing also has recently confirmed that it is moving toward developing its first aircraft carrier.com. and one of quiet concern for some of its neighbours. will also serve notice that the country has arrived as a global naval power. 15 . p. online But the display of force. 2009. It's a moment of obvious pride for this nation of 1.
The third-generation indigenous J-10 and J-11 fighters are potential candidates but both require substantial structural modifications before they can take off and land on the carrier deck. pending the introduction of the first operational Chinese aircraft carriers perhaps by 2020. (The U. according to a report in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in Tokyo. Another major obstacle faced by the PLAN is the lack of suitable aircraft. The only plus for the United States here is that construction might not begin until 2020 on the carriers that would be based on designs for the discontinued Russian Ulanovsk Class carriers displacing about 60.500 ton vessel.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 16 China Not A Threat – A2: Aircraft Carriers U.S. a source within the Chinese shipbuilding industry has confirmed that the PLAN is planning to convert the ex-Soviet navy carrier Varyag into a training carrier. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress. Varyag will serve as a capable platform for the PLAN's future shipborne flight training programme. carriers more powerful and China won’t build until 2020 Space & Missile Defense Report.) China doesn’t have any fighters to take off from the aircraft carriers Ronald O’Rourke.000 tons empty and 101. In the past. February 16. Nimitz Class nuclear powered carriers displace about 78.com/document/RL33153/ Although an operational carrier is unlikely to be commissioned soon. though China will begin building two conventionally powered aircraft carriers this year.S. http://opencrs. 2009 China is planning to build at least two nuclear powered aircraft carriers. PLAN pilots have reportedly undertaken short-range take-off and landing using the indigenous J-8 fighter on a simulated carrier deck but the aircraft's poor aerodynamic performance makes it impossible for real shipborne operations. If the PLAN manages to overcome the technical difficulties involved in fitting the vessel with a new propulsion system and the necessary take-off and landing systems. bought from Ukraine for USD20 million in 1997. has been docked at the Dalian Shipyard for refurbishment since 2002. Congressional Research Service.000 tons loaded.000 tons.S. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. July 17. The 67. 2009. 16 .
Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 17 Nuclear Modernization Has Not Created Sub Threats Nuclear modernization has not resulted in increased sub patrols Ronald O’Rourke. http://opencrs. nor the two new Jinclass (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines--the first of which was launched in 2004--have ever conducted a deterrent patrol. July 17. Only the future will tell. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress.. Xia (Type 092).S. The new information confirms that neither the Xia. the fourth year since 1981 that China's submarine fleet did not conduct any patrols despite introduction of several new classes of more advanced submarines for greater reach. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress. July 17. aircraft carriers have been largely absent in 2007. Lack of patrols means Chinese subs are only for coastal defense Ronald O’Rourke. China has yet to conduct its first deterrent patrol. 2009. But the operational experience from the 55 patrols conducted by the entire submarine force between 1981 and the end of 2007 suggests that China's submarine force--at least for now--remains a coastal defense force. Congressional Research Service. . Implications Despite the rebound in general purpose submarine patrols. (45) 17 . 2009. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. six patrols do not provide very much operational experience for more than 50 submarines and their crews.com/document/RL33153/ Yet for the Chinese submarine force overall.S. After all. one might expect the patrol rate to continue to increase in the next couple of years. http://opencrs. it follows a complete absence of submarine patrols in 2005.com/document/RL33153/ Twenty-five years after it launched its first ballistic missiles submarine.S. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.. That modernization has (not yet) manifested itself in the form of a clear increase in submarine patrols. If China did plan a more extended reach for its submarine force. The meaning of the patrol rebound is yet unclear. dramatic reports from recent years about Chinese submarines operating inside Japanese territorial waters or surfacing close to U. Congressional Research Service.
but its limited targeting capability and American redundancy in satellites minimize China's ability to destroy America's satellite communications systems. ships.S.nationalinterest. which can contribute to its ability to target U. The National Interest.October 2009. China is making advances in its satellite program. 18 . But alarmists exaggerate China's capabilities and underestimate U. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. http://www. superiority in space technologies and U. China's antisatellite program is also developing. ability to degrade Chinese satellite capabilities. security. Here Be Dragons. September.S.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 18 China Space Threat Answers Chinese space capabilities exaggerated Robert S.S.S.org/ BEIJING'S PROGRESS on its other high-technology programs is equally unsure and does not threaten U. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
but exaggerated assessments of this capability fail to evaluate China's own emerging vulnerability to such attacks. The United States is thus vulnerable to cyber attacks. http://www. are highly dependent on advanced communication and surveillance technologies that are par-ticularly vulnerable to U. an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. security. Nonetheless.S. including ASBMs. even if the United States suffered from an effective Chinese cyber attack. And once the United States degrades the PLA's advanced communication technologies. China would lose its hightechnology asymmetric capability that so alarms America's pessimists. cyber attacks. sea-based forces. Cyber-warfare technologies and skills are readily accessible and U.S.nationalinterest. advanced munitions are increasingly dependent on high-technology communication and surveillance technologies. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College. The National Interest. The same advanced Chinese technologies and weaponry that pessimists argue present a major threat to U. September.S. the reciprocal effect of Washington's cyber-warfare capability on Beijing's ability to wage hightechnology warfare is equally significant.October 2009. Here Be Dragons.org/ Beijing is also developing cyber-warfare techniques. and a Chinese cyber offensive against the United States could influence U. 19 . operations in the western Pacific.S.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 19 China Cyberwarfare Answers China’s cyber warfare developments exaggerated Robert S.S. and it would be very susceptible to a wide range of superior U.
with the possible exception of Russia. such as with Russia. There is no single. unilateralism is one of the drivers of its strategic partnerships. Russia has shown itself to be an unreliable partner in the past.S.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. Beijing prefers. if China’s regional influence grows. power. August 2009. France. which founded that strategic partnership during a period of trans-Atlantic tension. Activism. Chinese diplomacy has focused on economic opportunism and expanding its multilateral cooperation. China has not favored or relied on alliances (or even strong bilateral partnerships) in its diplomacy. These themes and motivations were readily apparent in the 2003 EU-China Joint Statement. 56 To be sure.S. as well as in the Russia-China Joint Communiqué and the SCO’s summit statement in July 2005.rand. China’s interests with all of these major powers. China has used its strategic partnerships with major powers. China not counterbalancing the U. China’s partnerships are not designed to counterbalance the U. Specifically. China would actively try to pull and prod U. historically. These nations have numerous interests in positive relations with the United States . the China–Soviet Union alliance of the 1950s). for example. and Diversification. and Diversification. http://www. but they diverge on economic issues and security questions revolving around access to Central Asian energy supplies and Chinese influence in Russia’s Far East . China’s strategic partnerships with these major powers are bounded by two considerations that limit their potential to be potent mechanisms for balancing U.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 20 China Not Counterbalancing the U. especially if that power is directed at Chinese interests. Thus. these partnerships allow China greater options and help it to foster an environment that could be used to constrain U. First. they are also fraught with tensions on both economic and security questions. Some states may not be willing to jeopardize their ties with the United States to coordinate with China in an effort. influence is diluted. even before 9/11. p. countercontainment is not the primary objective in Chinese global diplomacy or in Asia. but China’s discomfort with perceived U. but it does not manifest itself in a confrontational set of policies that emphasize defense cooperation and zero-sum interactions. and the EU.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.S.-China relations become more competitive. RAND Corporation. power. countercontainment is a distinct Chinese objective. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. allies away from the United States by proffering China as an alternative security partner. Also. Evan S. instead. unilateral actions.S.S. In particular. missile defense policies. suggest a third possible constraint on the scope of China’s strategic partnerships: Most major powers have more interests at stake in their relations with the United States than with China.g.S. Medeiros.pdf.S. it was never entirely comfortable with them. 87 To varying degrees. A second major consideration is that. Activism.31 Also. element in such Chinese diplomacy . it has been seeking to create new and expand existing multilateral organizations in which the United States has a limited role but also as a way to develop a regional order in East Asia in which U. http://www.S. For example.33 China’s historical predispositions were further confirmed in 2001 when Russia shifted away from its emerging anti-U. to constrain the United States. Russia and China may have common interests related to constraining U.S. p.32 This enduring predisposition is evident in the intensifying concerns among Chinese elites about the economic and security vulnerabilities that have resulted from China’s global interdependence and the globalization of national security challenges. If it were. although there are many cooperative dimensions to China’s strategic partnerships.S.S.S. especially Russia and India.pdf. China’s unwillingness in summer 2008 to endorse the Russian position on the independence of the Georgian enclaves exemplifies the limits of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. and if Beijing sees itself as less dependent on stable relations with Washington. Chinese diplomacy would likely be far more confrontational with the United States and its regional allies.rand. These major power partnerships do not amount to building an anti-U. and to seek support for its vision of a multipolar global order.S. Evan S. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. RAND Corporation. influence globally and in Central Asia. August 2009. greater autonomy to maximize its leverage and maneuverability. thus.S.S. Indeed. Although China has formed alliances in the past (e. powe r.S. cooperation with China and turned back toward greater rapprochement with the United States. However.. most of China’s strategic partners are not interested in creating a de facto coalition to balance U. implicit or explicit. dominant political or strategic logic to any of these strategic partnerships that could serve as the basis for collectively and consistently countervailing U. These events. both converge and diverge—on different issues and to different degrees. And China seeks to do this gradually so as not to appear to directly oppose the United States or its allies. Medeiros. Russia abandoned China in their joint opposition to U.30 There is no overtly anti-U. power. to broaden its economic relationships. to foster the development of other power centers in global politics. China’s historic disposition in favor of independence and against relying on alliances calls into question the extent to which it can or will rely on them now. coalition to balance against U. Rather.S. 20 . for China. This objective may receive greater expression in the future if U.
pdf. They also fear that playing such a role could deplete much needed resources and might foster a backlash against China. Activism. They view their domestic challenges as too great to assume the burdens associated with such a role. its behavior would look far different than it does.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 21 China Not Counterbalancing the U. Evan S. as discussed below. China not trying to counterbalance the U. China’s International Behavior: Opportunity. and they recognize that they lack currently the material resources to be able to project and sustain military and economic power all over the world.S. if China were seeking to become a global competitor to the United States. Medeiros. August 2009. p.rand.S.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850. trying to play such a role would represent a major break from Dengist orthodoxy on foreign affairs—a significant but not insurmountable political barrier to a major change in strategy. http://www. In addition. and Diversification. 208-9 China does not seek to displace the United States as the global superpower . Such a course correction would likely only come about in reaction to a dramatic shift in China’s external security environment—one that precipitated a complete reassessment by China’s top leaders. RAND Corporation. 21 . Chinese leaders do not want China to be a global power on par with the United States—a peer competitor. For Chinese leaders.
government securities are considered the safest place to keep foreign currency holdings—but the political benefit of linking the two economies surely has not escaped China's decision makers. The value of the dollar tumbled as international investors sold their dollars. served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U. the head of China's central bank said that the bank in tended to diversify more of its Si trillion reserves into currencies other than dollars.S.-China War Answers Economic interdependence prevents conflict Susan Shirk. China bought U. State Department from 1997 2000.. 22 . 249 China started recycling the huge amount of foreign currency reserves it earned from exports and foreign investment to buy up U."' The timing may have been coincidental. The day after the Democratic Party won control over both houses of Congress in No vember 2006.S.CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER. they have become economic "Siamese twins..S.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 22 U. treasury bonds with over percent of its massive economy Chinese capital flows to America allowed American consumers to enjoy low interest rates and high levels of consumption.S. but it was a vivid reminder that American prosperity and global influence increas ingly depend on decisions made in Beijing. government debt.S. The primary motive is economic—U. Yet reliance on China to keep our economy afloat triggers the anxiety that one day China could pull the plug."" According to one 2005 Chinese estimate. p. The two sides need each other now—as one Chinese writer put it. 2007.
Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 23 Taiwan War Answers Political barriers block a Chinese invasion of Taiwan Ronald O’Rourke. These stresses. would achieve tangible territorial gain. rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment on shore. Congressional Research Service. Congressional Research Service. An invasion of Taiwan would overwhelm China’s military capabilities Ronald O’Rourke. 2009.S. and therefore difficult.S. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress.com/document/RL33153/ Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and logistics-intensive. Such a limited invasion of a lightly defended island could demonstrate military capability and political resolve. combined with the combat attrition of China's forces. http://opencrs. http://opencrs. With few overt military preparations beyond seasonally routine amphibious training. However. July 17. Success depends upon air and sea supremacy in the vicinity of the operation. military maneuvers.com/document/RL33153/ Regarding the option of an amphibious invasion. Modest targeted investments by Taiwan to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could have measurable effects on decreasing Beijing's ability to achieve its objectives. July 17. the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency--assuming a successful landing and breakout--make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for China's leaders. DOD states furtherthat: The PLA currently is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. 23 . and an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter. and could be portrayed as showing some measure of restraint. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U. 2009. An invasion of Taiwan would strain the capabilities of China's untested armed forces and would almost certainly invite international intervention. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress. such an operation includes significant--if not prohibitive--political risk as it could galvanize the Taiwan populace and generate international opposition. China could launch an invasion of a small Taiwan-held island such as Pratas or Itu Aba.
At the geostrategic level as well as in operational doctrine as it is understood.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 24 U. China's approach to nuclear strategy has emphasized elements that would be inconsistent with a large buildup: coun-ter-value rather than counter-force or war-fighting doctrines. That said. The further development of those U. 24 . they will again move the U. California. would Beijing view posi. Deepening engagement on nuclear and nuclear-related strategic issues would be constructive in this regard. credibility in other regions. The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for two reasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U. Yet. arsenal toward an important rhetorical threshold that China has used to justify its own stance on bilateral arms control. and. p. The differences in national interests held by Beijing and Washington are not likely to be materially affected by Barack Obama's inauguration as president. Twomey co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs. A blanket no-first-use pledge might undermine U.S. Instead. The Chinese have often asked why the United States is unwilling to offer a no-first-use pledge.S. The risk of enticing China to engage in an arsenal buildup to U. which is incompatible with serious ne-gotiations over arms control. Certainly. these are rational strategies when nuclear arsenals are small. particularly in the area of declaratory policy.S. arsenal remains much larger than China's. Christopher P. Bilateral confidence measures between China and the United States could be discussed. This poses risks and opportunities. Yet.S. Beijing's emphasis on ambiguity about its arsenal. p. Twomey co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs. The opportunity to bring the other nuclear powers to the table. If follow-on agreements to START and SORT include further quantitative reductions.S. The United States can actively reduce these risks further. arsenal remains much larger than China's. January 2009 . but so too did fundamental changes in Soviet threat perceptions. both at the Naval Postgraduate School.4 Although the former seems unlikely in China in the near term. Monterey. a pledge narrowly confined to the Chinese-U. China won’t engage in arms control with the U. Arms Control Today. Arms Control Today.S. as is likely. January 2009 .-China Arms Control Answers China won’t engage in arms control with the U.S. the unilateralist and anti-institutional approach to arms control that characterized the Bush admin-istration is likely to wane. as the Russian-U.February 2009.-Russian arms control discussions will have critical implications for China. relationship with the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U. discussions progress would be a useful vehicle to elicit China's interest in serious moves in this area.S. avoidance of a strategic arms race. even informally.S.S. both at the Naval Postgraduate School. 17 The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for two reasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U. arena would seem to have fewer costs.S. What benefits would the United States garner from such a pledge from Beijing? Similarly.February 2009. it is wrong to expect such views to hold in perpetuity. Monterey. 17 There is no simple solution for this set of problems. is not a cultural predisposition toward "strategic deception" any more than was the Soviet Union's early Cold War emphasis on secrecy.tively a definitive statement that the United States accepts the existence of a Chinese secure second-strike capability? For what might the United States hope in return? These questions remain unanswered.S. Intrusive verification eventually became conceivable even to hard-line Soviet leaders. explicitly.S. economic exhaustion contributed to that change. Christopher P. a historical to-lerance of much lower arsenal sizes given a perception of the limited utility of nuclear forces. the latter is something that might be fomented. levels is not one that should be overstated. relationship with the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U. California.
tongshuaibu refers to the CMC. PLA military writers eschew completely automated command and control systems. and a number of previous leaders. in return. as evidenced by the continuing interest in securing a bilateral no-first-use pledge from the United States. Hu was wearing a PLA uniform without insignia or rank. Control. (China sought such an assurance in the 1990s. however. Doctrine. president is likely to attempt a disarming first strike against another nuclear-armed power. Civilians control Chinese nuclear weapons now 25 .army. https://www.97 Thus.S.” There are those in the United States who would believe U. first commander of the organization. and require human authentication. At the very least. and to the CMC as the tongshuaibu. 2007. might propose additional transparency measures to assure the United States that China seeks only a minimal deterrent and will not attempt to move toward numerical parity with the United States as it continues to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Moreover. and Campaign Planning. One writer specializing in command and control issues makes the point that “no matter how advanced a computer is used in a command and control system. Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Strategic Studies Institute. while it is possible that the reference to a valid firing order means that it comes from the commander of the Second Artillery.) Chinese leaders. an effort by Washington to engage China more deeply on disarmament issues will require bureaucracies in both Washington and Beijing to more thoroughly consider the ramifications for stability of their respective strategic force modernizations. July 2009. Hu is quoted as saying “The Second Artillery Corps is a Second Artillery command orders are centralized. in another account of Hu Jintao’s speech published by Xinhua News Service. encoded and protected. it will never substitute for the strength and utility of the human brain. Extensive human authentication prevents unauthorized use Larry Wortzel. 197-209 Chinese leaders continue to seek such assurances. Command.mil/pdffiles/PUB776. Training. miscalculations. or misunderstandings. opening such a dialogue can reduce the possibility of accidents. again expressed China's interest in having the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first against China. in the 2008 bilateral talks with Rood. This is the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the Chinese Communist Party. Hu Jintao spoke to an assemblage of people that included Xiang Shouzhi. There is a very strong emphasis on the need for a “man in the loop” even in modern. articles have referred to the PLAN headquarters as the Navy’s tongshuaibu. and Chairman of the Communist Party CMC.pdf Second Artillery. Nonproliferation Review. security is best maintained by acquiring the ability to negate China's deterrent through technological superiority and to “dissuade” competition through overwhelming numerical advantage. resulting in the so-called “non-targeting agreement” signed by President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin. He Yafei. 96 In Jiefangjun Bao. This would contribute to what Chinese officials have called “mutual strategic trust. No matter which view one takes. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations.S. China's possession of the minimum means of reprisal—and how that deterrent evolves—is now the central issue for the future of both countries' nuclear forces. the consensus among American scholars who follow the PLA closely is that in the context of nuclear and missile-firing orders.strategicstudiesinstitute. An alternative view. 98 In the photo of Hu Jintao that appeared in Jiefangjun Bao depicting his 40th Anniversary speech to the leaders of the Second Artillery. to confirm that the tongshuaibu is the CMC. is that keeping China's modernization within the confines of minimum deterrence and a doctrine of no-first-use is manifestly in the interest of the United States and requires a political commitment that reflects the simple reality that no U. At best.”100 The implications of this insistence on a “man in the loop” for nuclear firing orders is that the PLA will likely reject calls for automated protective action links in its doctrine. p. information age warfare. Hu was present in the combined capacity of President of China. New America Foundation.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 25 Various Counterplans CP – Transparency measures Jeffrey Lewis.
S.pdf Examining the doctrinal text. Training. Another critical factor in the nuclear threat equation faced in the United States is the calculation by the CMC that China is able to absorb nuclear strikes with less catastrophic effects that the United States. https://www. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations. At present. and Campaign Planning. Combining the examination of authoritative doctrinal text with materials from the Chinese press and those obtained through the Open Source Center helped to confirm the authenticity of the doctrinal text and provided supporting evidence for judgments about the nature of China’s strategic rocket forces. Control. 2007. and Campaign Planning. readiness levels.Planet Debate – Deficit Supercommittee – September 22 26 Larry Wortzel.strategicstudiesinstitute. 26 . Training.strategicstudiesinstitute. and an intentional state-directed policy of civil defense and risk distribution. However. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations. younger scholars. and their control. control the CMC.111 For the United States.mil/pdffiles/PUB776. geography. China may miscalculate U. command and control. 2007. https://www. and survivability measures than has been available in the past.pdf This is important to follow because the CMC of the Chinese Communist Party ultimately has the finger on China’s nuclear trigger. Strategic Studies Institute. not former leaders of the PLA. The decision by Beijing Larry Wortzel. the debate inside China over the viability of its “no first use” policy is real. 2007. which requires continued attention and strategic dialogue with China’s policy community. this means that Chinese leaders may miscalculate American will a and mistakenly take risky actions.mil/pdffiles/PUB776. Strategic Studies Institute. their organization.army. and diplomats will keep up the pressure to pull back from this policy.mil/pdffiles/PUB776. Doctrine. force deployment.pdf Internal debate in China over NFU policy Finally. soldiers. Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan (A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory) provided more information on China’s nuclear doctrine. China’s Nuclear Forces: Operations. good will. Control. and Campaign Planning. triggering war Larry Wortzel. older veterans of the Foreign Ministry and the PLA insist that the policy stay unchanged.army. Doctrine. Strategic Studies Institute. Command.strategicstudiesinstitute. Control. This judgment is a function of China’s historical military culture. and technologically oriented civilians today. https://www. Doctrine.army. Command. Command. Training.
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