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The Journal of Value Inquiry 36: 555562, 2002.

BOOK REVIEW

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John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, 199 pp. (indexed). ISBN 0-674-00079-X, US$ 22.50 (Hb). Reasonable people do not fight with other reasonable people. They do not threaten other reasonable people with violence. They also do not fight or threaten merely somewhat unreasonable people who are willing to accord others similar treatment. It is possible to view John Rawlss publications of the last two decades as working out the implications of these common sense claims for political philosophy. The Law of Peoples extends to their application to the legitimate foreign policy of a liberal democratic regime. In the course of presenting the extension Rawls illuminates the relationship of his more recent work on political liberalism to his earlier defense of the very egalitarian theory of justice for which he is justly famous. We begin by thinking about what justice requires of the social structure that organizes the relations among people in an autonomous country. In the course of thinking about the requirement we arrive at the conception of justice proposed in Theory of Justice. We may, if we agree with Rawls, regard this as the most reasonable conception of justice to govern the basic structure of society, provided that it can be stable. We recognize, however, that good-willed and reasonable people given the liberties protected by the conception will themselves disagree to some extent about what justice requires, as well as about the value of the institutions constituting a just society. We may not think that the others would have ideas which are as reasonable as ours regarding these matters, but we recognize that many of them are reasonable in the sense that they have done their best to consider the matters aright, and that they share a sense of reciprocal commitment to interacting with us on terms that we could justify to one another. Furthermore, we recognize that the liberties to which we are committed forbid acting with the purpose of stamping out other views, and give other people equal democratic rights with ourselves. How then are we to go about cooperating with these others to govern ourselves? Rawls proposes that we try to identify a common core of political ideas about which we can agree with other reasonable people and which will be sufficient to ground arguments of principle and policy. The hope is that the core political ideas can be accepted by other reasonable people with a reciprocal commitment to treat us in the same way, without requiring the repudiation of most of their other moral commitments. Where the line is to be drawn between the political ideas and the more comprehensive ideas to be

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bracketed is not simply a pragmatic matter. While one consideration in identifying the necessary core requirements of reasonableness is that we provide ourselves with enough resources to justify the rough outlines of a basic structure, it is also important that we can regard the basic structure as reasonably just. Thus, the exact contours of the area of overlap between the views we can regard as reasonable will depend to some extent on our own conception of justice, and that conception is a function of what we ourselves find most reasonable to think about justice. Rawls suggests that agreement to treat people as free and equal, for political purposes, and to offer terms of cooperation compatible with that idea and with the burdens of justice will be sufficient, in part because it is sufficient to justify a basic structure that guarantees important basic liberties and a minimum level of economic resources (p. 87). Peoples who agree to govern themselves through public reason beginning with such starting points will still have to settle on particular social arrangements, and this will involve them in arguments that turn on points of disagreement among various more specific conceptions of justice. But as long as the argument proceed in the spirit of offering the argument only to settle political questions that must be settled on any reasonable view, and the arguments are offered as something other reasonable people can accept without thereby repudiating their own basic commitments, all will be acting reasonably. Furthermore, Rawls suggests, people can regard the outcomes of democratic procedures grounded in this mode of interaction as legitimate even whey they regard the outcome as less reasonable than the one they themselves favored. They will agree that the issues must be settled even in the absence of consensus. A society settling on decisions in this way will be stable for the right reasons. Different societies proceeding in this way will wind up with different institutions, and different liberal conceptions of justice may be dominant in them. Insofar as they cooperate under a shared political conception of reciprocal reasonable treatment, they constitute what Rawls calls a people. How are the peoples of such diverse societies to govern their interactions with other peoples? And how are they to interact with other decent but non-liberal peoples, and with aggressive anti-liberal states as well as with societies in circumstances too dire to make a liberal or decent society possible? These are the questions Rawls sets out to answer in The Law of Peoples. The questions are answered by asking what parties who are the rational representatives of liberal peoples would choose behind a modified veil of ignorance. The veil is constructed to model what we would regard as fair conditions and appropriate reasons for choosing a set of principles to govern the basic structure of relations among peoples. The veil leaves them without knowledge of their population size, territory, relative strength, and access to natural resources. They do know that their economic conditions are sufficiently favorable to allow a constitutional democracy, since they represent such

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peoples, but they do not know more than that about their level of economic development (pp. 3233). The parties cannot rely on a comprehensive conception of the good to choose principles, since as a people they have committed themselves to acting only from political conceptions of their good acceptable to all reasonable people. But Rawls thinks that these political conceptions are enough to give them a set of fundamental political interests, including interests in protecting their political independence, their individual political and civil liberties, their territory and the security and well-being of their members. They also have the interest of gaining as a people the equal respect of other peoples, and are themselves willing to give this respect which includes a willingness to offer other peoples fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them (pp. 3435). Rawls believes that parties so situated will settle on a relatively familiar set of principles, which we will ourselves regard as reasonable when we reflect on them. These include: 1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. 2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 4. Peoples are to observe a qualified duty of non-intervention. 5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense, except perhaps in extreme cases to protect human rights. 6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of war. 8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (p. 37). Rawls presents these principles as part of his ideal theory, principles which liberal people would find appropriate for guiding their interactions with other decent peoples. However, at least the last two of these principles actually have more application when conditions are not ideal. Also, the qualifications to the fourth and fifth principle have to do with how to treat states that are not liberal or decent because they violate human rights. Even so, liberal peoples interacting with one another have no reason to reject these clauses. Hence they can be accepted even in the ideal case. The argument that these are the principles that would be chosen is not as fully fleshed out as the arguments in A Theory of Justice for the principles chosen there. But Rawls provides some indications of why he thinks liberal peoples would find these principles most acceptable to govern their inter-

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actions. The insistence of each people to be treated as an equal rules out utilitarianism as a basis for cooperation, as it might require a nation to endure great hardships in order to benefit another nation that is better off (p. 40). In any case, the fact that liberal peoples do not themselves share a comprehensive conception of the good undermines any very determinate basis for making the sorts of comparisons of well-being that utilitarianism requires (p. 40). A people committed to treating other peoples as equals would not allow a principle which allowed war merely for the rational pursuit of its own interest. Hence the fifth principle would be appropriate (p. 41). Much more is said on these issues, but Rawls argues partially by presenting these principles in a way that makes them seem reasonable to us, reasonable people not behind any veil of ignorance. In the real world, not all nations are liberal, let alone decent. Yet, reasonable people have to deal with other peoples and with the citizens of indecent nations. It is not reasonable to allow just any deviation from our conception of what is most reasonable to justify belligerent action or even the lack of respect for other peoples. This point was already admitted when we committed ourselves to cooperating with other liberal peoples who may or may not share our own more determinate, and by our lights most reasonable, conception of justice. Rawls thus asks whether there are any non-liberal peoples who could find the outlined conception acceptable from their own perspective. If they could, our sense that we should respect even the less reasonable as far as we can, would then reinforce our choice of principles. Abiding by them would then allow us to express our respect for non-liberal but decent peoples as well as for liberal peoples. If such cooperation is possible, the commitment of political liberalism to cooperate with others on terms they could reasonably accept requires that we do so. Rawls argues that at least one sort of decent non-liberal people is possible, decent hierarchical peoples. He argues that they too could accept the outlined principles. A decent hierarchical people is peaceful and willingly conducts is dealings with other peoples in such a way as to respect their independence, including their religious and civil liberties. Internally such societies secure for their members certain basic human rights, including a right to the means of subsistence and security, to liberty including freedom of thought and religion, to personal property, and to formal equality before the law. Officials must sincerely believe themselves to be guided by the common good, where the idea of a common good requires that procedures be in place to consult with representatives of various social groups. Finally, the members of decent hierarchical societies must hold that laws create legitimate duties and expectations for its members (pp. 6466, 71). Rawls claims that representatives of such societies in an original position would adopt the same principles as liberal peoples, since they are themselves non-belligerent, and since their common good conception leads them to wish to secure the human rights and good of the people they represent (p. 69).

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In addition to liberal and decent peoples, there exist states that do not honor the law of peoples either in their conduct toward other societies or in their conduct toward the rights of their own citizens. Rawls call such states outlaw states, and he stipulates that their citizens do not form a people. Such states are not owed the toleration and respect that is owed to liberal and decent peoples, and they often threaten liberal and decent peoples. Thus, sanctions aimed at securing compliance with the principles of international justice and human rights are appropriately directed at such nations. Liberal and decent societies have a right to fight wars of self-defense against such states (pp. 91 92). In extreme cases they also have a right to defend the human rights of people within such states (p. 81). Outlaw states are not represented in the choice situation that forms the argument for the law of peoples since their conduct is too unreasonable to merit the respect that a liberal political philosophy accords differing but reasonable views. However, the possible existence of such states is one of the factors that justifies the principles governing war, as no such principles would be necessary among decent and liberal peoples. There are also societies too burdened historically, economically, or socially to organize themselves either decently or liberally. They are also not parties to the agreement that defines the law of peoples, but their existence justifies the last of its principles. The principle does not require that better off societies render aid to the point that an international difference principle might require, so that the least well off are benefitted as much as possible. It only requires whatever level of aid is necessary to allow such societies to organize themselves liberally or decently. Thus it places a cap on the duty to aid, but it also provides qualitative guidance for the sorts of aid that are appropriate in different circumstances (pp. 115199). The aid will be whatever sort best serves the goal of raising the state to the requisite level (pp. 108111). Readers familiar with Rawlss earlier work will see how The Law of Peoples fits into the overall political view that generated A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The clear statements that reasonableness comes in degrees, and that people can regard their own views as most reasonable even while regarding divergent views as reasonable enough to underwrite duties of respect are crucial to the argument. They also serve to explain how Rawls can accept the core ideas in A Theory of Justice, while proposing the seemingly less radical democratic theory of Political Liberalism which constrains the permissible means of implementing the ideas in the earlier book but does not undercut the goal itself. Thus The Law of Peoples is valuable in extending the deployment of liberal ideals to the international realm, and also in showing more clearly the unity of the overall position. Even if we find the overall package attractive, we may have doubts about certain features of it. One such feature is the duty to aid expressed in the last principle of the law of peoples. This principle is less demanding than a maximin principle would be if applied on a global scale, inasmuch as it allows us to

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stop short of raising the economic well-being of the least well off beyond the level necessary to allow the people of a burdened society to become wellordered. Rawls suggests that the difference stems from taking the parties to the agreement to be peoples as opposed to individuals. For the political liberalism of The Law of Peoples a democratic people forms the fundamental agent for purposes of international justice, whereas for a more cosmopolitan view for which the main focus is on global justice among persons, we are more likely to imagine a global original position of individuals (pp. 8283, 119 120). The focus on peoples is not the whole explanation for the commitment to only a limited duty of assistance. But to some extent it distorts the liberal political impulse at the heart of the theory by making the rationale for the duty to aid unclear. The import of the original position as an expository device is to highlight what we take to be legitimate arguments for principles of justice. Thus the original position of The Law of Peoples is to highlight legitimate arguments for principles of international justice. Even if we have good reasons to defer to the decisions of other decent peoples so that certain duties of noninterference are vindicated, not every duty toward those in other countries will take this form. We will have duties to citizens in unjust states, as the principles Rawls presents would have us recognize. It is surprising that Rawls thinks that several of the principles would result from an agreement among only decent peoples, since the main benefits of the principles fall on the unrepresented members of burdened societies and rogue states who go unrepresented in the original position. The self-interested reasons for helping individuals burdened or oppressed in unjust states, reasons of peace and stability, are often not sufficient to justify aiding them given the possible high costs of doing so. More important, given the role of the original position as a device to highlight good reasons, such self-interested reasons are not our best reasons for providing such aid. The most important reasons liberal peoples have to help those in unjust foreign nations fall out of a respect for them as individuals, even if in an ideal world this would be expressed by heeding representatives of the just peoples of which they would be members. This presents a difficulty with taking only peoples as the parties to an original position that is supposed to highlight our good reasons for accepting principles of international justice. We should not ignore the role of a people as a possible agent with reciprocal rights and duties. At various points Rawls offers remarks to justify the focus on peoples. Their sovereignty is necessary to give people an incentive to take care of the land and its resources, and we should no presuppose that a nonliberal form of social cooperation is intolerable (pp. 3839, 8283). Rawlss remarks might be supplemented with an argument that respect for individual members of a just people might require giving great weight to their autonomy and that they themselves would prefer to be represented as members of a

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sovereign people than individually. If that is the case, there may be no problem in allowing representatives of peoples and evaluate the arguments in a second original position, as long as there is some way to represent the interests of individuals not fortunate enough to find themselves a member of a just people. The theory may also not have us take seriously enough reasons liberal and decent peoples have to accept something more than the duty of assistance outlined in the eighth principle. Behind a veil of ignorance it may well be rational for peoples to be risk averse and to choose a maximin principle for the distribution of economic resources for reasons similar to those guiding the parties in A Theory of Justice. Or to make the point without employing the device of representation, it may be unfair or disrespectful for one nation to exploit the position of another to its maximal benefit without sufficient concern for the well-being of its members, even if they are well enough off to be well-ordered. The mention of exploitation highlights one way in which the duty of assistance is perhaps not enough. An international arrangement can be unfair because relations of trade and economics can give advantage to one country or group of its citizens at the expense of another country or group of its citizens. The unfairness can have everything to do with the basic structure of laws and institutions that make such relations possible and very little to do with foreign aid or assistance. As various economic institutions extend their international reach, the issue raised will become even more pressing. It was a strength of A Theory of Justice that Rawls highlighted the ways in which mutually cooperative arrangements could be exploitative and called for the design of institutions expected to minimize the bad effects on any given party. Something similar would seem warranted even when the relevant parties are members of different peoples. Rawls is not completely insensitive to this way of viewing matters in The Law of Peoples. His discussion of principles of fair trade suggests that unjustified distributional effects of trade will have to be taken into account and compensated for by the duty of assistance. But that discussion has not been well enough incorporated into the final principle to make clear what it implies. These criticisms should not hide the progressive nature of The Law of Peoples. The commitment to political liberalism that Rawls uses to frame the issues his principles are meant to address contains the resources to press the particular criticisms we have considered. Insofar as respecting other reasonable people is the core idea, we have reason to represent the interests of decent people who are not lucky enough to be members of decent peoples. A tacit recognition of the point explains why the principles in some respects go beyond what an agreement between only peoples would require. Furthermore, where the principles do not go far enough to protect the reasonable interests of the less well off, an argument for far more generous principles can be made within the position that frames the discussion. Even as they stand, the principles have

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progressive bite. If the better off and more powerful nations of the world conduct themselves in accord with the principles outlined, it would be a large enough step forward that Rawlss label of a realistic utopia might well be appropriate for the resulting world order. Mark van Roojen Department of Philosophy University of Nebraska Lincoln 1010 Oldfather Hall Lincoln, NE 68588-0321 USA

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