Social Capital, Panchayats and Grass Roots Democracy: Politics of Dalit Assertion in Uttar Pradesh Author(s): Sudha Pai

Reviewed work(s): Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 8 (Feb. 24 - Mar. 2, 2001), pp. 645-654 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: . Accessed: 17/08/2012 02:04
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact


Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political Weekly.

is that segmentation arising out of caste/class divisions is a significant contextual variable in determiningthe developmentof trust. A keyfinding of the study in two districts of UP. extrafundsfor programmes for the lower castes.Secondly.The affairs. Meerut and Azamgarh. zens.By means of can to a largeextentdetermine theirsuc. andits impactuponthe withinthepanchayat between relationship the traditionally dominantgroups.This has been due to in civil society of democratisation socio-cultural movements afaster because process in thesestatesby thelate and mobilisationby low caste political andpoliticisation to there 'socialcapital'in ruralsociety. who are demanding improvedsosharein economic AndhraPradeshand to some cial status.A purposive random sample of 45-55 respondent householdsin each Economic and Political Weekly February 24.andcollectiveaction.This was andpoliticalpower. SUDHA PAI in Italy that recentyears attentionhas been status and politicalpower?In otherwords.andthesharpening devolution identities and political consciousness to localgovernment by greater the of powerachieveda modicumof success among the lower castes. the new panchayats led the dominant elites in the countryside thelastfactorhad providean important to theiratrophy. eastern andcentralwithsubstantial-socioeconomicandpoliticaldifferenceswhich have persistedover time.or are they an arenaof conflictandcontestation over scarce resources.Social Capital.moreso becausecertain in the 1990s have changed of thehold developments butstrengthening todemocracy of ruralupper castes elites upon local the context in which they function. dalits. and the backwards.the plains UttarPradesh areaconsistingof threeregions:western. (b) They have been identified as Ambedkar villagesby theUP As this providesthem with government. ab.state of Uttar Pradesh(UP) where our tion beginningin 1977 based upon the study is located has witnessedsince the Ashoka MehtaCommitteereportwhich mid-1980s the new role of panchayats of social shiftedthefocusfromdevelopment perse 'frombelow'. 2001645 . of reservations 1970s andthe granting SCs and STs in the panchayatsallowed Hence. in the 1960s after an initial His workhas shiftedthe debateaboutthe panchayats for economic development either prerequisites failedto generate of optimism period of pro. in selectedblocksin two panchayats in which they functionis important and districtsof the conthe text of the politics of identityin UP. apathy In this context.A second roundof experimenta. particuModelVillage larlyunderthe Ambedkar forthelowercastes.this stultyexamines. This andtheirsamitis(committees).West Bengal. the the ruralpopulationand particularly of sixgram weakersectionsgreater than functioning (village) panchayats participation the lowest before [Crook and Manor 1998]. whether democratic introducedby the 73rd Robert baseduponthe decentralisation Putnam's argument In Amendment has led to greaterparticipation by and successfulimplementation of government-funded programmes.and democracyaway from ideology and or implementation participation but whichhe deemsnecessary Lack of funds. Two districtsMeerutandAzamgarh in the westernand the eastern region respectively .trust.This is in keeping with explores firstly.substantiallya function of networksof mentin the late 1980s andcreatedby the trustand civic engagements amongcitiin coAmendment Act 1992.anda greater Karnataka.extensive empirical analysis the study cess or failure. worthy experiment to understand the been anticipatedby scholars who had of studyin our attempt in the funcsocial to local that of role capital playedby argued granting power institutions in segand tioningof democratic conservative bodiesin the prevailing hierarchical social milieu would lead not mentedsocieties. sence of culturalfactors such as andcapture of theseinstitutions by values and virtues. Indeed.whichhas enabledpanchayats to overcomeexisting social cleavagesand promotegrassroots democracy. social capital between groups and democraticfunctioning. is a largestate.were selected to study the performance of in differingsocioinstitutions. particularly in only four states . shows that the social structure in which level in the new panchayatinstitutions areembedded andthe context createdin 1992. extent Jammu and Kashmir.institutions. as it makesthem participate 73rdConstitutional collectiveaction[Putnam This is becausean earliergenerationof ordinated 1993].dalits. values. it enableda studyof bothparticiof benefitsto pationby and distribution thesegroups.In bothdistrictsthree were selected gram (village) panchayats on the following basis: (a) The sample of dalits villages have a high proportion astudy andlowerbackwards whichenabled of of local governments is first democratic of institutions cused upon the new panchayats performance mootedby the RajivGandhigovern. Roots and Grass Politics of Dalit Assertion Panchayats Democracy in Uttar Pradesh A studyof the new panchayatsof UP provides an opportunity the roleplayed for understanding by social capital in the functioning of democratic institutions in segmented societies. panchayat economiccontexts. bureaucratic insufficient. posed programmes. programme whether within the panchayatsconflict resolution takesplaceamongsocialgroups forthebenefitsof development competing baseduponthecreation of common norms.

Colemandes.andarguesthatthe hierarchy. asamong evidence waspresented.Often ation. but an overarching programme under which in every block. in the post-independence in bothaccounting period. its political importance stems from its enthusiastic adoption by the BSP underMayawati. horizontal aggregations Coleman (1990) also discusses the cre. attempted undergoing rapid formationwhose institutionshave been collectively to rise in the caste hierarchy and the establishedfairly recently.toregister themselves asrajputs inthelatter tutional performance inthecolonialcensus. is segment. divisionsbut allow considerable is better andvice and have been affectedby the forces of institutional performance in anddevelopment versa. posted dalit officers at the block level and a series of government ordersissued from 1995 onwards gave top priority to its implementation. Second.processof sanskritisation. kshatriyas.In the study.historical of Agra. though the programmehas not been implemented in many of them. It is not a separate.andan active associationallife among citizens.castesinnorth suchasIndia capitalrefersto democracy beginning thatinherein family the colonialperiod. None of them were aimed at of thecastesystem. which supplements already existing special programmes for the dalits and backward castes. societalcharacteristic Theyattempted orthakurs.but moreparticularly "theset of resources socialorgani. a total of 25. of social belongingto the same level in the caste anddestruction maintenance ation. dalit assertionand fordalitsin panchayat reservations bodies.fusionor integration social structural entiation [Rudolphand Rudolph 1967]. Between 1991 and 1997-98. 2001 646 . the 73rd Amendment by providing reservation to dalits and women has changed their social composition by giving these groups a predominantposition in these institutions.whicharean important in the action and of social scholars attention 1993]. separate. and features such as "trust. whichcreatesdivisions andsegmentation among them.Thehierarchical of these divisionsof casteand arrangement class especiallyat the top andthe bottom which socialanimosities. Planning of various programmesfor the villages is carried out at the Block Development Samiti (BDS) meetings held four times a year. andin community relations sations".Putnam further developed it in their studies.2 Two featuresof the new panchayatsmake an examination of their democratic performance useful for our study. nityandclasslines. villages with 50 per cent dalit population were selected and provided extra funds to carry on the existing programmes for weaker sections. attended by all the 'gaon' pradhansand block level officials. cleavagesalongcaste. a segmentary in Indiahavecreated society are'cellular'. makingpos.3 The aim was to concentrate developmental funds spread thinly over the state. these are not watertight mobility regions in which social capital is high.However.i e. value of the conceptlies in the fact that ditionally.Thus. socio-economiccleavages Historically.TheKalyan in 1997 decidednot to adopt government villages with less than30 per cent dalits The capture of political in the population. needs to be discussed.fragmentedlocal 'jatis' or sub-castes. [Putnam capital political among While the concept has roots in older countryside.4 At the village level the pradhans are expected to hold monthly meetings of the panchayat samiti at which the funds available. a culture of distrust have historically has developed among the andJames Coleman theories. withinadvanced of institutions In the colonialperiodamongscheduled countries thandeveloping societies6 rather thechamars socialtrans.since independence. Equally important is the initiation in 1991 by the UP government of the Ambedkar Village Programme (AVP) which is implemented by panchayats. Although begun by the Mulayam Singh government in 1991. varioushierarchical segmentsof society.segin Italy. The villages selected remain under the AVP for one year and areprovided an extra fund of Rs 1 lakh for village development.horms. the relationshipbetween social capitalwhichimpliestrust. are not Undoubtedly easily andSegmentation Social Capital conflicts exist in all societies. often leadingto the formation the micro-to-macro The conceptof social capitalhas been parties. nally a kshatriya Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24. and it is in a Transitional Society arguablethat positive attitudesto demos cracy are not partof the normsinherent Putnam' of Robert Sincethepublication workon theimpactof socialcapitalon the in social capital.thattheywereorigiation is a crucial intervening variable the chamars caste who had over the between social capital and democracy. its own [Saberwal 1995].Theformer within the caste system leading which is vidual. were selected keeping in mind their proportion in the population to whom a dewas India.5 they applied. together providea settingfor ourstudyof of panchayat the democratic performance in thesecondhalfof the 1990s. inwhichthevarious segments each havinga distinctlife of i e. The BSP in 1995 loweredthe required government to 22-30 percent thereby dalitpopulation Singh coveringmorevillages. institutions Hence.village. schemes for village development and applicationsof villagers for loans are discussed.rather tothestudy destruction withsomeexceptions. Mayawati created a separate department for the AVP. cribesit as an important hasbeendueto mobilisational 'resource'or capital asset for the indi.been significantin the northernplains: andfission or differordinatedactions"[ibid].segment.Inourstudy.While in the colonial period their it identifiescertainaspects of the social theseeffortswereaimedatimproving aids social position and obtaining concesandthereby structure bytheirfunction for different outcomes sions. andmaking they have been for joint political action actors atthelevelof individual of political transition. industrial providedgreatermobilitywithin it. mentationhas createddeep-seateddivifunctioningof local institutions determinant this concept has attractedconsiderable sions. from four age groups of each caste.changes productive of large caste blocks or of certainends that to the formation sible the achievement in place of small would not be attainablein its absence. trawhichwerenotinter-linked capitalandits impact. Beginningwith the colonialperiodtwo have societal thatcan improvethe closelyinter-related normsandnetworks processes efficiency of society by facilitatingco. First.i e. power by the BSP.An important by meansof census re-definition whichaffectsinsti. when it came to power in collaboration with the SP in 1993 and the BJP in 1995 and 1997. level hascreated overcome.commu. Putnam's study of Italy showed that Nevertheless.lThe tailedquestionnaire at the block level the and village pradhans BDO and other functionaries were also interviewed.434 Ambedkarvillages all over UP were selected on the criteriondescribed above. in villages where dalits are in large numberto provide maximum benefits to them. by increasing the powers and finances of these bodies it has furthered the process of democratisation [Khanna 1994].

whichwas very active in Hastinapur (village)assemblyconstituency close to the sample villages. schedule castes. Beginning from the colonial remainsincomplete.In someownedland. BLD.1987-88 comparedwith 43 per cent in basedchangesin therural economy.selecteddistricts sation in UP leadingto the formationof of significance forourstudy. represent. whichlie Singh(Maithena). Traditionally.'has created Due to rapid expansion of educational rivalryandclass conflictbetweenjatis.7 Albeitnumerically thanthe larger dalits in west UP.and placed the varna system [Owen Lynch 1969]. whichthey majorchara'cteristic of rural societyin UP constituted a specialsectionof the today. However. socially aware and politicisedas the this studya central argued. waves of caste-basedhorizontalmobili. the introduction of sification of theoccupational structure and new landsystems.At the grass roots. However. vegetarianism. arenowcalled.therehas been diverthe colonial period. together promote anddalits. whichthe functioning Thedifferences betweenthe beginningin the mid-1960s.Thoughas poor as thedalits.Thesegroups forchangesin by construct.itbrought groups Dalit Assertion andContext of socialreform within together creating unity.irrigation andcommer.centuries cometobewrongly outside prosperous ahirs.due to rapideconomic a strongwaveof dalitasserdevelopment. of Meerut andAzamgarh. jats in Khanauda.814 (382 families) persons.lationin Meerut district[HD Singh1998].the process the state. aboutthe ideas andlife of Ambedkar [PaiandSingh1997j. quentlybenefitedfrom the post-colonial thecolonial period wages relations withlandlords better policies of landreformandgreenrevolu. quesin theGangetic chamars of social/political plains.[Pai 19931. In recent years.Dalitassertion hasbeenaccompaniedby social and politicalconsciousness amongthe MBCswho arealso quesof themiddle tioningthedominant position castes.easternUP [Drezeand Gazdar1997:49) bined with democratisation.irrevocably alteringintercaste relationships.followedby Khanauda (416 families) and Uldiypurwith 2.Duringthe last threedecades. rivalry has intensified Dalitsform 15-20percent of the popubetween differentsections of the back. to rename in the Thus.upwardlymobile chamarsand the less such as adoptionof ambitiousbalmikisandpasis. Congress Party the middle and lower castes developed Muchliterature exists whichshowsthat networks andshared Meerut values.period the ruralareas have experienced downtraditional differences considerable agriculturaldevelopment pletelybroken between variousjatis or sub-castespro. A parallelpro. dous growthin the consciousnessamong dalits. the traditional structures .etc. landowning groupwho controlledthe panchayats andmaintained an over socio-economic oppressive system the dalits and the lower backwards.aretheextent politicalpartiessuch as the BKD. 2001 colonial period. such as conflictsandpromote collectiveactionfor inthebureaucracy ruraldevelopment? reservations demanding orlegislature.Maithena Inder andUldiypur. fusion has not this process has madeits mark. wardand schedulecastes in partsof UP: Thechamar-jatavs of thedistrict havebeen the relativelybetter-off activesincethelate jats and the less sociallyandpolitically Economic and Political Weekly February 24. dalit assertion has expressed itself in a socio-cultural i e.of ruraldominance based on land and caste have been questioned.This region experienced mobilisationby the RepublicanPartyof Indiain the 1960s.whichhasbeenresponsible ing distinct social identities and joint the functioningof panchayats. tion and establishmentof the BSP.Consequently. within 15-20 km of Meerutcity.955 (810 families) is the population with3. the first two. This phenomenonhas united the jatavs making them aware of their common andneedto redress themcollecproblems tively. Ourstudyindicates thatthese otherbackward castes variables dalitassertion ing the in the rest of Meerut district. In recentyears. cessof fissioncloselyassociated withclass. tion and emergedas a rich Rajpura block.8 Despite their smallernumbers.Bythesemeans. are not open to the idea of collaborationwith the formerin local affairs. Among them Maithena.097 largest.rural poverty was only 26 per cent in ducing homogenisation. political power have been responsible. As the dalits constitutealmost50 in our sample per cent of the population villages and are economicallybetteroff than in other regions.mobilisation. with roughlyequal population Republican partyof India in the 1960s.declineof the RPIin the late 1960s.rise in theselargeconglomerations against upper/middlecaste domination. andbetweenthe UsingSanskritisation theyimitated styles andritualsof the uppercastes spe. with a of 4. rajput 647 . the condicialisationof agriculture createda small. betweenboth these groupsand the most thelife. While they failed in economic development and access to marriage the attemptto be acceptedas kshatriyas.districtshas alwaysbeen muchbetter. only the sainis among them are as united. conflictratherthanconsensusis a themselves theymanaged 1931censusas chamar-jatavs. Though. Panchayat Functioning the community andjoint politicalaction totheformation oftheUP Scheduled The two selected regions of east and leading Caste Federationin the 1940s and the west UP. amongthe cially the brahmins. of economic developmentand low caste JD andmorerecentlythe BSP. mainlythe jatavs.theysee themselvesas 'clean castes'abovethelineof pollution andtherefore.koerisand kurmis.the formed thedominant caste/ rajputs andjats. Thesechangesarevisiblein ourselected villages of Khanauda.werehigher. In facilitiesin Meerut. in Dauralaand the third. anduppercastedominance keptthe dalits in a subordinate positionuntilrecentlyin society and politics. tion of dalits comparedto the eastern prosperouspeasantclass. tremenprocessof 'Ambedkarisation'. successive been studied. Differentialgains from rituals. and povertylevels lower [Singh 1947]. theseactivities failed Though in bringingthemabovethe line of polluII various untouchable tion.A number tionis:canleaders groups ofcaste associations werealsoformed which basedwithinthepanchayats trust generate atistoform helpedj larger 'paracommunities'and cooperative norms of functioning [Rudolphand Rudolph 1967:33] which which could bridgethe existing societal enabled joint political the most prosperous regionin group in politics.whichallowed the western region particularly them to function as a collective social district. political action were able to effectively Meerut District challenge the dominantposition of the [Pai1993]. donningthe sacredthread. which subse. it has affected the mobilejatavsto a greater extent upwardly than the balmikiswho remaineconomically backward and not so politically conscious.backward castes(MNCs). richpeasant. sizes provide two differing contexts in of panchayats Thepost-colonial have periodhas witnessed.

though shawpullingin the cities.pasis and musahars.consist. thoughabsen.western plains as it did not experience dominant andland has contributed to increas. the BSP. Inthecolonialperiod More important than the legacy of past largestnumber of MBCswhileSammapur quences dueto lackof alternative is themobilisation and struggles employment by theleaders has veryfew.remainthe main source ing awareness movements of their socio-economic dominance in in local affairs. unaided and (UAUR)schools particularly taking unrecognised in our sample villages. Most dalits identify with tively held a large amountof land in the remainedbackwardand due to lack of Mayawatiratherthan the BSP. place. Lackingeducationand alternaowningmostof thecultivable tradia few dalithouseholds own largeplots in remainsandthe pace of changehas been tive employment they still perform andprovideservicesto Maithena The MBCs are slow. Named after [Siddiqui1978]. TheKisanSabha andEkamovements overthe landsof the lowercastes.there and ritualstatus. but their individual 648 Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24. leading to increasedemployment caste groups. of tubewellsand our sample villages.not allowed to exercise their vote until own thebiggerplots.resideon one side of the village the dalitchildren in all spheresof life.both HinduandMuswill be ableto competewith labour)[RamNarayan1996].In recentyears. together. The MBCs in the balmikisformthe of holdings.While adequaterainfallthere has been a rare has not fully crystallised combination of extreme thechamars.lim .of untouchability pondents lowerlandceilings.a few paswans.prosperous more recentyears. consolidation impacton the region and was visible in castedominant groups. upwardly their allegianceto the Congress. EastUP is a regionof small mostplotsare identifiedhere as a 'dalit partyof the in the othervillagestherearepasis.whichis educated.10 distribution. The absolutedependenceon land.politicallyconscious.paredto sufferindignities[Kripa vation. povertyanddense of unityevenamong withheavypressure on agricul. a legacy of two anti-feudal in in which the colonial blishment dalits of 'alternative' dalits. While Anauraand Nevrahi mobile. 2001 . but roughly tationof holdings. sectionthatis playinga centralrole in the the largestcastegroup. and jats and industryno alternative employmentwas victoryin the 1998parliamentary in east UP.constitutingabout 50 per ruralelectricity.since the 1980s. the surplusgained havedisappeared and are less preThe ahirsandkurmis. construction pation land.Thechamars tee landlordism disappeared.More impor.poor'andnota chamar partyas in Meerut. thoughpoverty or MBC. has made an inMaithena stillformthemiddle available.heardthe term 'sarvadhik pichadavarg' andjats brick kilns. The dalitsconstitute25 per cent of the were selected as Ambedkarvillages in andvery aggressivetowardsthose above It is this populationin Azamgarhdistrictand are 1995.abolition interaction anda few havebeento college. TheBSP inNevrahi almostallthedalitsarechamars. The three selected villages of Anaura. etc.tionaloccupations and Khanauda.introduction of the chamars and ing inmost agricultural eastern plainsarenumerous. new panchayats of chamars.However.andnot andlow allowingthemto vote have begunto disindebtedness send childrento Meerutfor high school in the 1920s.consistingmainly Anaura is the largestvillage with a popuin Meerutdistrict. While this is 'manuvadis' hada strong basein the a common.pattern in UP. generation amongthejatavsanda section andsocialist of theMBCs. hars and. castes ploughmenbondedto zamindars[Singh processin a regionwherethe dalitswere less thana bighaandthe dominant collec1947].However.with adverseeconomicconse. Their economicand social spreadof HYVs of rice.the dalits owning more ownersandold patron-client anddalitshavegivenup a feudal relationship. have The natureof dalitmobilisation bureaucracy9 becomethe majorcatalystfor change in region is historicallydifferentfrom the populationof Azamgarh. Mostof ourrespondents the mainsourceof occu.musapopulation turalland. However. andthereis lack nantcastes in our samplevillages.130(280families)Nevrahi 1. both the Socialist and the dalits are on the otherside. In our lation of 2. equivalent to the jats in the west and in this constituting about 15 per cent of the and service sector.considerable andurbanisation hastaken cases thanthe dalitsandremaindisparate whiletheMBCsare transformation centof thepopulation fewer in number. -illiterate.andrisingcost of culti. In our sample villages the of 'begar'(unpaid dominant is to spreadhis ideas and to ensurethat theexploitative practice groups. by in thecase of the second. literally of the BSP and spreadof the electoral plots andexceptin Anaura.and in from Azamgarhcity and lie in Rani Ki Saraiblock.386 in there is andSammapur thesmallest (185 families) sample villages Azamgarh. positionhas not beenquestioned tant.Communist hasledtominimum social mainlyfromthelowercastesare easterndistricts and supportedland re. Kurmis ahirs definitely politicisation and awareness 960(183families). thesechangeshavecreated in of landrevenueon smallholdings. and her colonial period. The andassertionamongdalits untilthe rise of the BSP. and rajputchauhansand whichhistorically dalitidentity Muslim Pathans inNevrahi.opportunities Landremains andincomewiththerajputs sites.They sharetheir dominantstatus schoolsprovidepoorqualityof education suchas BabaRamchand [Jaipal Singh 1998]. and rick.due from Akbarpur chauhans Thedalits. village affairs. relationships the middlecastes with whom they retain largelylandless. tained.This is visible in the esta. Conse.clean cultivating fromfarming hasdeclineddue to fragmen. agitation bydalitsin 1946.against Azamgarh.election chauhans in Uldiypur. AzamgarhDistrict inAnaura.only 25 per cent of our totalres. between the two sections.Afterindependence.pendence.educationand jobs in the state 1993]. theywereharwahas. agriculture recently.still form the caste [H D Singh 1998].demeaningoccupations Shankar castes categorisedas OBCs. and attemptsto part.mobilisationby a dalit party/movement. with little to hold them hadnot fordalits andMBCsonfarms.Anaurahas the forthedalits.a spontane.took practices of thepastsuchasbeating. was selected in 1994. land. the oppressive private period. Sammapur themin thecaste/classhierarchy. in Collectively our samplevillages a post-independence the 1960s.with 'upperclass' Muslim Siddiquisin the aim of the privateschools ousrural Ambedkar. formthedomidespitefertile soil and desireto changeit.form a region in among dalits of their low status and a in Sammapur.against and college education as government wages led at times by low caste leaders appearthough social distance is mainandPasiMadari. and second. poorer largestgroup.Afterinde.Followingthedeclineof theleft Nevrahi and Sammapur Khalsa thelowercastesshifted (Sammapur) areapproximately 20-30 km parties. the continuation parties quently.

Whileearlier thejats fromMaithena.prosper.Two different of participation. Analysis participatory patternsrein theelectionsto thepanchayats andtheir vealed thatin our samplevillages. Meerut.At thesame two villagesfromwhereone member hasalsoemerged candidates time. only 25 percenthavestudied up to class 8. sheepandpig rearing.they have yet to openly challenge the position of the dominantgroups. TheMBCsparticularly in Anaura.However. ings of the gaon panchayat dueto theirnumerical Although prepon. percentin rural it is only 39. the winningcandidate most respondents in our sample. therehas been little increase Khanauda and Uldiypur to the BDS in participation in decision-making and Daurala.Priorto the panchayat andheldthat elections.thejatavstakingadvanwhichcontroloverpanchayat andtheir functioning tageof thereservations provided inKhanauda numerical Thisis moreevident havebeenableto gain provides.norhavethejats totallylost control over the panchayat Meerut District system. Khanauda therewere6 candidates and to their residence [Pai 1998]. Despite rise in literacy. at meetingsin the dalitmohalla. All the villages have a primary school.jat. the otheran MBC. the largemajority of dalitsremaindependent uponthe middlecastes for employment. In fact some of a tacitagreement betweenthepowerful expressed akeendesireto attend panchayat and the forward and and families.competition among electedto theBDS. In Maithena. werejatavs.30 per cent in Meerut[Census 1991]. regarding theAVPalthough elections held butionof benefitsunder villages. being 37.someof our Only a few of the youngereducated thesecandidates heldthat were andMBCrespondents in oursample could respondents also approvedand supported of the AVPandits by the jats discussthe advantages andtherefore theirelectionwas the result impact on the village. one composition of the dominant of the from and a fourth from Khanauda. social Thus. institutional patterns and distribution of benefits performance emerge due to the differential socio- economic and politicalcontextin which dalitfamilies. majority andMaithena.In the was a rajput now sharetheirdominance with a small.all candidates . gained cast. In the elections to the grampanchayat ParticipatoryPatterns samitisandtheblockdevelopment samitis Oursurveyof the selectedvillages and (BDS) there was a contest between the of thechangestakingplace j atavsandother castegroups.Muslims.The lies. the personsin the samplefrom the other villages are illiterate.which consistedof 5T persons. jat prosperous meetings arguedthat they were not 649 Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24.ninejatavs.68 percent in ruralAzamgarh against46.44 butamongdalits. Theliteracy ratehasriseninrecentyears butis lowerthanin the west. two tioningof the gramandblockpanchayats Khanauda.although education.hadlittleinformationabout in Khanauda underthe AVP. do not attendthese ing to the dalitcommunity whomwerebalmikisthe restbeingjatavs meetingsand merelysign on paperssent .a few influential'chamars'made all the ous andenterprising dalitfamiliesdecided decisions after 'consulting' influential to put up their women as candidates for membersof the upperand middlecastes. all children areattending schoolin thesample villages and generational change is very marked amongthoseupto 25 yearsof age. amongthe controlof the panchayat is than in more marked of jatavs Uldiypur. of programmes implementation bythelarge Of the two memberselected to the BDS of villagers. pradhan. amoreindependent Inoursample meetandtakealldecisions distriposition.thewinning the jatavs for the status and patronage. apart as poultry farming. the post of pradhan was sharply therulesprescribe discussionon schemes/ contestedbetweenthe leadingdalitfami.carpentry. It is the derance dalitshavebeenpradhans earlier. examination andsixjatavs. In many in all the villages a fewdalitsareinserviceeitherinAzamgarh or Sethwal. in castes. trialdevelopment or employmentexcept in quarries andbrickkilnsnearby.11 In Maithena. dalit However. and 12 percentup to high school butthreedalits andone MBCin Nevrahi.the largestnumber beingamongthe MBCs.followed by the dalits. able. whereassertion bodies.The pradhanis thus.12but only 2-3 candidates casestheelectedmembers of thepanchayat substantial of the a number votes samiti are also not As a result included. poverty and continuation of feudal they areable to pursuetheir traditional of leatherworking. who stoodfor election therewere 14 womencandidates dueto thereserbelong. With little indusmaking.(actually the husband of the thiswasdueto thesupport of thedominant 'pradhanis') some members electedto the havegiventhem BDS and a few influentialvillagers.samiti have never been held.only two of vations for women. fundsavail425/869. and in Uldiyapur programmes 323/659. Education has not substantially contributedto assertionagainst the dominant castes. the only high school being in Anaura.four of the eight candimajority andrajputs controlled thepanchayats.who middle reservations castes. ing dalits. and politicisationhas risen in awareness recentyears amongdalits and MBCs.members wereelectedfromMaithena.Two changes dueto reservations andques.507.were elected consistingof one villages are in a phaseof transition controlby the dominantcaste/richpeas. and they datesbeingjatavs. one MBC and one jat.Thus.andone yadav in Sammapur have been to college. land remainsthemajorsourceof livelihoodwith little diversification of the occupational fromsmallbusinessessuch structure. revealed thatdespite intheirsocial MBCs and two rajputsin Uldiypur. in contrast to Meerutdistrict. representthe democraticchoice of the panchayats placeof theirhusbands . traditionally Ill TwoPatterns of Panchayat Performance Ourfieldstudyrevealed a marked difference in the performance of panchayats in MeerutandAzamgarh districts. follow their traditional occupations of potetc. 2001 . morethanhalf Exceptin Anaura.13 members from women.22 per cent in Azamgarh as against51.holdingswere small and today they are dwarf-holders and agricultural labourers.onebalmiki.ortheirimplementation. one MBC and one balmiki and 10 ants to a more democratic system which the other butinfluential was group ofjatavs. in the panchayat in 1995. understanding . thepostof not are embeddedand function. Intheformer.the numberbeing highest in Nevrahi. However. meetor panchayat patternof functioning.includthe gained520 out a totalof 1. occupation their economic condition is better thanthat of the balmikisand musahars. tioning position jats jointly and rajputs.two to thelower wereelectedunopposed providesgreater participation of thefunc.threeof them in westernUP. Among our respondents. suggestedthatoursample in Maithena. Nevertheless. However.the largest village.applicationspresentedby villagers.votescast.

remain a kurmi. The jats support his style of functioning. mostof the pumps. provide them tradiOursurveyrevealedconsiderable discon. due to heightenedpoliticisation of thepanchayats.only a small section of capturealmost all the elective posts. and powerfullocal receivedsubstantial number of votes.landfor housebuildingand therewereninecontestants for the post of basicamenities suchashandpumps. or the dalits. school buildings. anddictatorial manner towards them. and in Khanauda.panchayats. specially the jats. although pradhan ajatav is close to the jats and invites many of them to the panchayat samiti meetings held by him. which is now available.drainsandbrickroads the latterhave not sharedthe benefitsof Infact. brick roads.The jatavs on periodwhen the BSP was in power. and Rs 10.among the dalits. In Uldiypur the smallest of the villages. there was no metal road to the highway from these villages.dueto theAVP mutual antagonism panchayats. These developments have considerably raised the standard of living of the people and improved the environment.OneMBCrespondent owns The jats and rajputsare acutelyaware a flourmill in the village and two dalit that the jatavs have benefitedfrom the this has bred respondents are contractorswho have AVP.and who they feel are incited ductionof the AVP. The intro. In Sammapur equal to the upper/middle needsareneglected their astheylackleaders tants for the post of pradhan. and there are a total of 56 shops in whateverfundsthey are entitledto. On the other electionof his wife as thedeputypradhan. and the dominant landowning castes. 165and government'and behave in an arrogant 110 out of a total of 1. which are the Intensive Rural Development Programme (IRDP) and the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (JRY). Together they constitute the elite section of the village and control the panchayat. MBCs feel that these are now 'chamar three of them unopposed.More bureaucrats and pradhans the postof deputypradhan was misappropriate important. Theystill alignwiththe amonglow caste groupsin recentyears. meantfor the dalits and the of the MBCs who place themoutsidethe programme MBCs who togetherconstitutethe rural Hindu vama hierarchy. theearlier pradhan tionswhiletherestlikethemselves. attitude theyresentthesuperior althoughthe AVP was conceived as a Moreover. The present of Khanauda forexample.hadto relinquish his post butthe and backward.and even conflict be.and labour. while the BDS.000 in 1995-96. Due to lage resourcesand political preferences implementation TheMBCscomplained hassharpened. Most of these schemes have been implemented in Khanauda and Maithena.among the jatavs due to their control overthepanchayats. and 'socialjealousies'betweenthemover of participation by the large majorityof issues such as.andbehavein a subserviinsteadof findingindependent tent. Khanauda received Rs 15.entmanner tween caste groups. However. a 'chapaul' (community centre) for the dalits was built.tionalservices.13 Table 1 provides the main programmes implemented.Secondly. but 'forward'backwards such as the yadavs this has not given them controlover the and kurmishave benefitedfromreserva. bought city. InAnaura. arguedthat of ill treatment. cycle andmachineryrepairshops. hasensured the BSP government hasgiven helpin the overdisbursement of patronage.The Elevenmembers wereelected from Anaura.000 from the education departmentfor a primary school building. etc. tontrol over commonvil. As a the samplevillagesownedby members of result. especiallyduringthe by the dalits againstthem. While the MBCs and the dalitssharea villagesin Azamgarh revealed district that common antipathytowards the middle the middle castes still control the Thereis also a total absence castes.Table 1 shows that employment. Until Mayawati became the chief minister in 1993.the otherhandfeel thatthe MBCsdespite a new dimension troduced intothealready being part of the ruralpoor do not cosituation conflictual existingin oursample operatewith the dalits in the functioning villages. Patterns whichhascreated resentment amongthese Participatory In contrast.toilets. whom they served earlier and who on for whichthereis greatdemand in Meerut occasion still exploit them. the MBCs can neither identify in themselveswith the upper/middle castes variouscastes. Khanoauda Maithena in 1992-93. and more important and solidarity profited by the road building activity amongthembothcommunal a new sense of self-respect. loan scheme.invited to attend them. it has been used for all round village improvement such as building of link roads. the benefitsare even more narrowly dis. bore-wellsetc. uneducated thecontinuation of his control hand.the villagers in the decision-makingor of programmes. our respondentsagreedthattherehas been implementationof many developmental/welfare programmes under the AVP by the new pradhans. Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24.respondents the formeroppressthem. tributed. 2001 650 . two housing programmes and other smaller ones such as old age pension. Many villagers have taken advantage of the loan scheme under the IRDP programmeand setup tailoringunits. mainly pradhanof whom only three gained a to the dalits.bothin thepastandunderthe AVP. Thus in the sample villages. Institutional Performance and Distribution of Benefits Despite the low participation. thanthe rather Azamgarh really poorwhoaretheMBCsandbalmikis. the schemes selected for village development and the mannerin which the benefits are distributed. lack of trust. the AVP despite their being the poorest havebeenlaidinthedalitmohallas.016 votes cast. who see it as 'their party/ substantial number of votes-408. InAnaura. and Uldiypur in Rajpurablock in 1996-97.Two MBCrespondents Maithena andone in Khanauda sell milk. but as part of a special drive this was done.They also commissionedunderthe AVP. high/middlecastes. Out of a total of 29 villages selected in Dauralablock for the AVP since was selected in 1991-92.only two to voice their needs. from buffaloes under theIRDP whomtheyconsider beneath themsocially. a new nexus has developed between the more prosperous jatavs under the leadership of the pradhan. in most cases the beneficiaries dalits. a new panchayat bhawan costing Rs 72. the dalits have been able to that reservations on the one hand. These villages have also received direct grants from the state government for example. a differentpictureemerges resent losing their hold over the MBCs whenwe examinethemanner in whichthe who traditionally providedthem services benefitshave been distributed. The balmikisfiare nallyaccuseboththeMBCsandthejatavs poor. As no jobs can be provided under the JRY in the village.our study of the sample groupstowardsthem.carpentry units. 1991. installation of 'the gram samitiand two dalitwomento villages' in which the dalits are almost panchayat of the 10 contescastes. in. formof loans.000 from the welfare departmentfor building common toilets as part of the AVP.

IRDP to return Under households were able to buy bullocks.A centralfinding is thatthe contextin whichsocial capital 651 Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24. themainones aregiven in Table2. start setupshops. AlthoughNevrahiwas selected as an Ambedkar villagein 1995-96.fourmainschemes wereundertaken: the linkroadwithsmall nullahsfrom Rani ki Saraito the village at an expenditure of Rs 3. and women have begun sheep rearing. remains an importantobstacle anduneducated sections amongthepoorer of the lower castes. In contrast to our sample villages in Meerut.andthe extrafundsalso made construction of link roads and drains possible. The Sulabhtoilet scheme is very popular and 15 households have benefited fromit. . Despitethese throughthe districtbureauprogramme.which have considerably panchayat primaryschool buildings. InAnaura under JRY. Thisgroupwouldalsoliketo increase dalit in the and chalparticipation panchayats domilenge the power of the traditional nantgroups. which places them onadependent vis-a-vis themiddle position castes. village has benefitedfrom the handpumps.five of them six handpumps programme in thedalitbastisandone on themainroad of the village. two bhars.more funds have been spent on schemes benthanindiefiting the entirevillage rather viduals. Thirteen to the candidates wereelectedunopposed samitibutonly four were chapanchayat consultations mars. outof nine dalit. purchased sewingmachines. the kurmis andin Nevrahithe yadavs.three chamars Four womenmembers and one pasi . buildings.won by a young educateddalit who has of in implementation been instrumental in thevillage. and four. groups. TheMBCsbeinguneducated. programmes developmental wereelectedto the gram Elevenmembers panchayatsamiti.Dalit needto depositonly Rs 150 beneficiaries The initially.while functioning. These villages. dalits. but the kurmis and inyadavsretaincontrolover panchayat wherethey stitutions. under fewjobsareavailable. they have lost considerablegroundvis-a-vis the dalits.theselected were implemented over a 2programmes 3 year At least 14 period. classroomsfor the primaryschool were built at a cost of Rs 60. InstitutionalPerformanceand Distributionof Benefits In all the villages as Table 2 shows. cent of job opportunities createdare reservedforthem.of all castes .000.The dalitsincluding the chamars.000. of whom.special components programme.All villagesweregranted funds on the basis of their population. Under most of the schemesdalitshavebenefitedspeciallyin the field of housing. block officials and the supportof the middle castes in the samplevillages. a smallvillagemanyprogrammes although werein operation. small villages with less than 1.000population. ongoingprogrammes such as TRYSEM. These programmes were implemented due to the efforts of the pradhans. Under the JRY . Other to the SC population schemeswhichmaybe takenuparepublic roads.etc. JRY.third. Onlyin Sammapur. loansto set upsmall ciarieswereprovided businesses.This is dueto the influenceof the kurmiswho are not keen to implement schemes which would materially benefit the dalits and MBCs makingthem more that the entire village can draw water. which theyperceiveas newcentresof powerand followingtheirincreasein stapatronage tus andfunctions. nism to settle disputesamong all the villages there is little participation by the large the functioning of the panchayat whichis instiviewed as a 'sarkari' (government) tutionresponsible for providing fundsfor oras a socialmechawelfare programmes. The captureof elective posts by dalits aqualitative hasintroduced changeinintercaste relationships. confident theAVP has Hence. a of programmes number havebeen implementedunderthe AVP. somefactionssupport thepradhan andare invitedby him to participate in decisionother'anti-pradhan' made making.Thus politically lack of unity among and povertyamong the dalits and MBCs. work can be selected by the village with the provisothat at least panchayat.a numberof the sanctioned Sulabh toilets were built at a cost of Rs 88.420.families below the line of povertywere identified and providedemployment on large civil of link roads workssuch as construction imand drains.are keento control thenewpanchayats. A new schoolbuildingin 1995 and extra classroomsthe following year were built.feel he is nothandling upof younger due to which full village affairsproperly benefit has not been made of the AVP. cannot articulatetheir needs and do not participatein the panchayatswith the exceptionof the bharsin Nevrahiwho are consciousandmorevocal. have been partly financed by the AVP.floodcontrolworks.99.second.on thedemocratic functionin two dising of panchayatinstitutions trictsof UttarPradesh. two were yadavsthe rest dalitsand one member.14 a Gaud(MBC)was ableto win candidates. Women from SC and ST and30 per households weregivenpriority. 2001 . one yadavandthreebrahmins. InSammapur. IV Conclusion Ourstudy has examinedthe impactof socialcapital.and do not favour further increasein the powersof the panchayats. following reservation.About29 houseswerebuiltunder the two majorhousingschemesbetween 1993 and 1998.500.000 was spent.andhastoinitially Rs 300 deposit with the pradhanwho enters it in his accounts and has it constructed. In fact. the post of pradhan due to acrimonybetween the chamarsand pasis. has allowed the latterto continue to dominatepanchayat functioning. poultry farming.the restdue to mutual to avoida contestconsistedof threepasis.a InNevrahi. centres.Therehas not been much progressunderthe IRDPin the village.were elected to the BDS. As cracy for its speedy implementation. not generatedopen conflict amongcaste groupsas in Meerut. etc. 50 per cent of the labourand 15 per cent of thefundsmust beusedtoprovide housing in the village. Lack of educationand understanding of the importance of participation in local affairs. they have attempted InAnaura holdoverpanchayat they do not have thefull theBDS. Therajputs on theother handargue thatthegovernment helpsonly them thedalitswhohavealwaysprovided a vote-bank. for the Anaura diggingwas'begun village drain project on which Rs 72. are fewer in number. aredividedintofactionsand due to lack of unity.Eachindividual is granted Rs2. wereselectedduring exceptforSammapur the period of the short-livedBSP-BJP coalition government in 1995 when Mayawati aggressively pursued this majority of villagers .000 population being counted along with those Anykindof civil having1. brickroads and drains laid and the primaryschool building repaired. whichhavebeenfittedin the schools and the bazaar. buffaloes.capture of power by the BSP and particularly as chief minisMayawati'sappointment to tightentheir ter. have not been able to make their markfelt upon panchayat InAnaura forexample.wereinstalled.

As Hirschman has pointedout. In UP. tion between the dalits and the MBCs castesseemless.Rules and regulationsexist to ensure that the gains of progressare realised. fasterpolitical mobilisation through socio-cultural movements in civil society and political parties thrown up by democratisation.greater participation and democratic functioning of This is because the compopanchayats.the conflictsamongthe various groupswithinthepanchayats neednot be viewed in a negativelight and do not demoalways. it is the state. However. what we are witnessing is increasing differentiation. througha number 652 Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24.Yet. segmentation arising out of caste/class divisions emerges as a significant contextual variable determining the development of trust.competition occupy centralplace. These developments have both positive and negative connotations for the building of social capital. bership common interestswhich need to be adandexperienced is rare dressed. Trustacrosssegments outof memarising andsharing of thesamepanchayat. not homogenisation. Inoursample relationpanchayats. social capital in the form of communal solidarity has united the dalits makingthem conscious of theirspecialproblems. to bridge Theincapacity of socialcapital colhas hindered boundaries.An 'elite' democracyfunctionsin which the large in of members do not participate majority in some not are or. has led to construction of new identities and shifts in the balance of power between caste andclass groups. politicisation in theireconomicposition. Thus. 2001 . in oursamplevillagesin west UP andto a muchlesserdegreein eastUP.avariety conflictsareseen as dangerous Generally andpotentially destructive of social order and collective action. showsthatsocialcapitalexists. it is arguable. leading to horizontal and verticalmobilisation. butthe management the stateand the leadersof varioussocial andbargainnegotiations groups. but voirsof socialcapital they do not facilitate. of theirexperienceof passing andsomehowmanaging or tendthrough of conflicts [Hirschman 1994]. social conflicts themselves thevaluable tiesthatholdmodem produce democratic societiestogether andprovide them the strength and cohesion they requireto functionand survive.In the Indiancontext. social conflict is no longer confined to the dominant and lower castes. helping the poor andunder-privileged. for control over economic resources. cases.which has the capacityto democratic ensure responsive government.butwithin in rural andnotbetweensegments society. In westernsocieties. but has sharpened between sections of the rural poor.a process. decision-making even aware of available programmes resulting in inequitable distributionof benefits of the AVP and competition and conflict between segments. uneq-ual and conflict ships of power. In Azamgarh district.Whilea degreeof socialcohesion is needed in every society.the creationof a more broadbased civically useful and constructive social capital. he holds that the integration of modemsocietieseverywhere.or whenit benefitsall individuals such as buildinga road or flood control works. have the potentialto createstrongreserwithinsegments. creating lower levels of conflict and maintaining existing structures of dominance.creatingboth fusion and fission. closer ties and stronger bonds of social capital have emerged among the jatavs that has enabled them to challenge the dominance of the jats and rajputs. and subcastes within them.have divided thechamars fromother of theirown groups such as the balmikis and community and sectionsof the ruralpoor musahars.the interventionist utive role of the state. ing. which help in building a cohesive democraticorder. where the is uponequalcitizensparticipatemphasis in ing public life for the commongood. andre-distribSecond. Through ing betweengroups. Further the nature of segmentedness in transitional societies is not 'fixed' but fluid with consequences for the natureof social capital. which remainsinof greater completeandholdspossibilities futurepolitical cooperation among variThepossibilityof cooperaous subcastes. though this has created open conflict with the MBCs and other subcastes of dalits. faithfully andsegmented reflecttheunequal society in which they are embeddedand are an arenaof contestation rather thancooperation among variouscaste segmentsover resourcesand benefits. Yet.The pace of economic change andpolitical mobilisation among the dalits has been much slower in east UP.functions is important.undermine cratic functioning. Despite considerable democratisation of theirsocial comdevolution of power. and need to be containedprecisely by the existence of socialcapitalorcommunity spiritin a civil society. since the mid1980s. nents of social capitalare differentfrom those in western societies. leading to differential consequences. upwards. and more egalitarianequationsbetween segments established. In the absenceof an active and democraticcivil society. In positive terms.gain control over the panchayats and more benefits from the AVP. Group ratherthan individualidentities. such as the MBCs with whomthey have Thisdoesnot common economicinterests. At the same time.Someof theseinstitutional structuresareweakor non-existent in developing countries. social statusandpolitical domination.traditional questioned. Thus.has united disadvantaged groups creating larger identities of dalit and MBC that have challenged upper/ middle caste dominance. the dalits remain economically weak.given itscentrality indeveloping societies-which is playing a seminalrole.what is important is nottheexistenceof conflict of conflictby per se. is the result withoutthe citizens realisingit. panchayatinstitutionsin UP. capitalist development and state-funded welfare programmeshave sharpenedcompetition and conflict between dalits and MBCs. andimprovement awareness. onlyduring a crisis. These processes have impacted differently in our two study areas underlining the significance of the context. complex institutionalstructures have been devised to constrain the participants to reduce uncertaintyin social interaction. the chamars are playing the role of a vanguardprovidingleadershipto other subcastes. Rapid change in post-independence India due to the twin processes of democracy and development. bringing forjointsocialandpolitical themtogether actionagainsttheupperandmiddlecastes and providingthem collective mobility Innegative social increased terms. meanthatsocial capitaldoes not exist in morebyconflictual societiescharacterised Ourstudy thanconsensualrelationships.conflicts can be rehierarchies solved. In Meerut district. and democratic functioning of institutions.socialconflictis animportant pillar and in fact builderof democratic society. In developing societies such as India. with divisions even among the chamars and unable to collectively challenge the power of the kurmis and yadavs and play a more effective role in the panchayats. segmentary lective action among all caste groups speciallythe rural capital between groups. positionandgreater the panchayats remainunderthe control of a small groupof jatavs in Meerutand Kurmisin Azamgarhdistrict.and can in fact inhibit. againsttheupper/middle but cannotbe ruledout.

12 SCs. 1MBC.1OSCs. I other 8-10.6MBCs 1SC.) 6 SulabhToilets 115524 150785 43091 175948 49716 35000 5SCs.2MBCs 4-8000 4-8000 3-10000 7-9000 9-20000 5-13000 5-12000 5-15000 Khanauda No and Caste Amount of Beneficiaries (Rs) 8SCs 16others 2Jats. 2MBCs 10SCs. Pension 5 Indira Awas Yojana 6 SulabhToilets 7 Free Boring (cost borneby Panchayat) 3 SCs. caste not known Rs125pm 1 8000 10 8000 10 SCs. 1MBC 11SCs.932 46295 38670 3 Nirbal Awas Yojana 4. 2 MBCs 6SCs.6MBCs 8SCs. Nevrahl and Sammapur Programmes 1 IRDP (loans) 2 JRY Year 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 1997-98 1995-96+ 1996-97 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 1997-98 1991-92 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96+ 1996-97 Anaura BeneficiariesAmount No and Caste (Rs) 5 caste not known 3 caste not known -Forvillage Development - Nevrahi No and Caste of Beneficiaries 14 SCs and 4 others 5SCs. 1MBC 4SCs. 9 chamars pasi.1MBC 3SCs 17SCs. 12 others yet to be begun- 2 chamars 1pasi.2jats 8SCs.8MBCs Uldiypur Amount (Rs) 2 JRY Forvillage Development 6-60000 55. (Rs) 5 chamars4 others 1 MBC 7 chamars 7 chamars 4chamars 1pasi pasi 14 caste not known 3-12000 9750 6-12000 23963 54614 82397 60000 60000 6-10000 6-10000 10000 100pm 7-12500 10-17000 6-10000 NA NA NA 65.5MBCs. 6 MBCs 11SCs.000 4 SCs. 5 others 2500 2 8 --- - 45 SCs. 10SCs. I other 5SCs. Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24. + the figuresin the case of Nevrahiare for 1995 to 1998.10. 2 MBCs 4-7000 5-11000 5-10000 5-15000 7-15000 5-14000 7-7500 No and Caste of Beneficiaries 36SCs.Jat.000 63307 39535 110441 48167 36. 1MBC 22SCs. 4 others - Amount (Rs) 6-22000 56048 56206 50285 46998 10-20000 125 pm 10-12000 - Sammapur No and caste Amount of Beneficiaries. 2001 653 .1MBC 8500 each 6SCs 9500 each 3 caste not known 1. 4 MBCs 9000 2 SCs 9000 25 SCs.25 others 64.300 52992 39185 12130 45017 20.000 3SCs.000 1SC 10000 13.5MBCs 14 5 3 - NA 9000 9000 9000 Table 2: Major Panchayat Programmes: Anaura.2MBCs. 2 MBCs 9000 1MBC 9000 2SCs2MBCs* 10000 34 caste not known(1991-96) 100pm 6SCs 6000 10 SCk 8000 .00pm 1 2 8 15 6000 20 8000 18 8000 8 9000 50SCs. 2 4 1 - - 6 SCs 2 others - - Note. 50 others 1. 1MBC 8500 8SCs.1 rajput 10SCs. 2 chamars .734 33915 3 NirbalAwas Yojana 4 Pension Pension (Widow in case of Uldiypur) 5 IndiraAwas Yojana (Housingloans for SCs.2jats 9SCs.Table 1: Major Panchayat Programmes: Malthena. Khanauda and Uldlypur Programmne 1 IRDP (loans) Year 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1987-88 1989-99 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1997-98 Maithena No and Caste Amount of Beneficiaries (Rs) 7SCs.

ShipraPublishers.through intervention by state officials and local in thefunctioning casteleaders. 1995. Surnames and Titles National Series.but most of them were chamars. June 4. Owen (1969): Politics of Untouchability: Social Mobility and Social Change in a City of India. dhunasand julahs. Khanna. 10 For details about the educationallevel of the respondents see. Pai. andMaithena were selected 13 ThoughKhanauda in the early 1990s.New Delhi. Saberwal. amongMuslimMBCgroupsin Meerutdistrict. Pai. among Hindu and badais. Democratisationin the ThirdWorldConcrete Cases in Comparative and Theoretical Perspective.(1999): Ambedkar Gram Vikas Yojana Sambandith Mahatvapoorn Shasanadesh (Report in Hindi).Economicand Political Weekly. 5 A few examples are:(1) Olle Tomquist 1998.This suggests thata broad-based social capital. Newsman Publication. Moreover the Mayawati government (1997) granted extra funds for completion of schemes begun earlier. in the New Panchayats: Field -(1998): 'Pradhanis Notes From Meerut'. Kripa (1993): 'AgriculturalLabourers in East UP'. educational and political backwardness. Institute of DevelopmentStudies(IDS) Sussex. (2) RenataSerra.Is Social Capitala MeaningfulandMeasurable Concept at IndianState Level?'. Sudha (1993): Uttar Pradesh Agrarian Change Electoral Politics. New Delhi. 2. Richardand James Manor(1998): Democracy and Decentralisationin SouthAsia and WestAfrica ParticipationAccountabilityand Performance. 4 All informationabout the Ambedkarvillage scheme and developmental/welfare programmeswithin it are from the recordsof the block development officer. New Delhi. 1996.AlbertO (1994): 'Social Conflicts As Pillarsof Democratic Market Society'. 3 AmbedkarGram Vikas Yojana Sambandith Shasanadesh(Reportin Hindi) Mahatvapoorn Governmentof UP. Dreze. dhobis. 2001 . .(2000): 'New Social and Political Movements of Dalits: A Study of Meerut District'. Department of History.kayasthaand vaishyacaste groups. UK. 14 The subcastes of the elected dalit members could not be ascertained. Lynch. Singh. KS (1991): Peoples OfIndia:Communities. 1997. economic.Harvard UniversityPress. 654 Economicand PoliticalWeekly February 24. New Delhi:33-128. Siddiqui. mental programmeshave been implementedboth in Meerutand Azamgarh. World Development (1996): special issue 24.I attendeda BDS meeting at Daurala in April 1997. 2: 189Contributions 220. listed 41 castes as most backward on the basis of social.Satish (1995): Wagesof Segmentation: Comparative Historical Studies in Europe and India. Lucknow. May 2:1009-10.capable of bringingtogetherdifferentcaste/class groupsmay evolve over a periodof time out of an interplayof both conflict and consensus. no 6.forming part of the Jajmani system. Vikas. carpenters.E1 Notes 1 Thepaper drawsuponfourroundsof fieldwork: the first was conducted in May 1996. June 7: 1358-61. the AVP and its The last impactuponcaste/classrelationships. H D (1998): 543 Faces of India. Kerala and the Phillipines' in Larse Rudabeckand Olle Tornquist with Virgilio Rojas (eds). New Delhi: 128-151.Cambridge. M/Phil Thesis. 9 The number of SCs employees in the UP government compare favourably with those from the brahmin. (Singh 1991) They includejatis such as dhivars. Synonyms. New Delhi. Rudolph. 24. Singh. is present in our two study of the new panchayats districtsof UttarPradesh.Reforming Social Education Issues in Policy Planning and Implementation. Working Paper no 92. Serra. 2 I am grateful to Jagbir Singh. In our samplevillages. Singh. Mohinder(1947): The Depressed Classes and their Economic and Social Conditions. Torquist. jogis.Ourstudyindicatesthatan ongoing process of conflict-resolution. but the winner in all cases was a jatav. OUP. Putnam. 22.Robert(1993): MakingDemocracyWork Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. barbers. OUP.Social Capital and the Democratic Prospect. University of North CarotinaPress. Economic and Political Weekly. schoolteacher in Meerut.despitethe andlackof particiauthoritarian structure patorydemocracyin the functioningof of welfare/developa number panchayats. Segments. negotiation and bargaining. for his painstakingand dedicated fieldworkwithoutwhich this study would not have been possible. Vikas.SCs and STs. to IndianSociology. 6 A recentexampleis.of welfare programmes. the actual implementation began in 1993 after the SP-BSP government came to power. Deep and Deep. James (1990): Foundations of Social Theory. References Census of India (1991): Series I. Massachusetts. PaperI of 1993. a more detailed one from Februaryto May 1997.B S (1994): PanchayatiRaj:RuralLocal Self-governmentNational Perspectives and State Studies in India. University of Delhi. 1999. 7 Placed on the borderdividing the clean and the unclean castes. Union Primary Abstract. New York. New Delhi. lohars. Jagpal (1998): 'In Search of Quality Education: Alternative Schooling in Meerut District in Western UP' in Yash AggarwalandKusumK Premi(eds). Daurala block. Jean and Haris Gazdar (1997): 'Uttar Pradeshthe Burdenof Inertia'in Jean Dreze and AmartyaSen (eds). June 12: 1211-14. a thirdin November 1998 and a final round in -March 1999. Economic and Political Weekly. May:203-18. etc. Sudha Pai and Jagpal Singh (1997) The second roundconcentratedon the functioning of panchayats. New Delhi.Making Democracy Work Better: Mediating Social Capital.SudhaandJagpalSingh(1997): 'Politicisation of Dalits and Most BackwardCastes: Study of Social Conflict and Poltical Preferencesin Four Villages of Meerut District'. Princeton University Press. New Delhi. two rounds concentratedupon eastern Uttar Pradesh. The resultsof the first February are available in. etc . Olle (1998): 'MakingDemocratisation Work: From Civil Society to Political Inclusion and Politicisation: Theoretical Reflections on Concrete Cases in Indonesia. GovernmentofUP(1975): MostBackward Classes Commission (Sarvadhik Pichada Varg). No 6. as part of the Poverty Research Programme. 1999. . Lucknow. Hind Kitabh. 34.Renata(1999): "Putnamin India'.L I andSusanRudolph(1967): Modernity of Tradition:Political Developmentin India. RobertA. fromwhichdalitsandMBCs have benefited. of leadingto moredemocratic functioning panchayats. Universityof NorthCarolinaPress. 12 The subcastes of the candidatesin Khanauda and Uldiypurcould not be ascertained.andtheDemocratic Structures. Singh. Political Theory. Bombay. Macmillan Press. has played an role in conflict containing important between the privileged and underprivileged. Pai 2000. Narayan. CUP. Meerut. Vol III. Shankar. Coleman. 8 For a descriptionof these villages see Pai and Singh. 1999. M H (1978): Agrarian Unrest in North India: The United Provinces. Ram (1996): The Making of the Scheduled Caste CommunityUttar Pradesh: A Study of the SCF and Dalit Politics 194648. Hirschman. New Delhi. Economic Times. Indian Development Selected Regional Perspectives. Lucknow. Chicago. at which the pradhans andother elected members from our sample villages presentedthe problems of their villages and asked for new grants. Couto. traditionallyMBCs were servicecastes. telis. (3) Articles on India and Mexico in special issue WorldDevelopment. Couto. 11 All informationabout panchayatelections in the sample villages in both Meerut and Azamgarhis from the BDO of the respective block.suchas washermen.RobertA (1999):MakingDemocracyWork Better: Mediating Structures. Crook. Orient Longman. Prospect. The Most BackwardClassess Commissionof UP 1975. London.

Sign up to vote on this title
UsefulNot useful