IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT PAUL SHAFER AND JOSHUA HARDER. Plaintiffs, ) ) v.

) ) ) CASE NO.___________________ LOWER CASE NO. 3:12-CV-39-AWT JUDGE THOMPSON

RODERICK BREMBY, Defendants.

MOTION OF BETTY J. KING FOR RULE 60B RELIEF AS THE SOLE REASON FOR INTERVENTION DENIAL HAS BEEN MOOTED Now comes Betty J. King, incapacitated, by and through her duly-designated Power of Attorney, to note that she hereby voluntarily dismissed her pending Appeal in the Instant matter. The withdrawal is not based on her belief of the strength of her position as outlined in the pending Motion for Reconsideration but is rather based on the fact that she now has valid Connecticut Power of Attorney status to reflect the fact that she is domiciled and a resident of Connecticut per In re Bachand, 306 Conn. 37 (2012). Note further that in Connecticut Christopher King, Esq. is authorized to stand in place of his mother whether or not he is licensed in Connecticut or anywhere else, pursuant to established Connecticut Law, Clark v. Visiting Nurse Serv., 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 434 (2001) as noted in the following section. LAW AND ARGUMENT I. INTERVENTION AND CONNECTICUT GEN STAT §1-42. It is indisputable that the sole rational for denial of the right to Intervene in the Lower Court was based on the Power of Attorney being from Ohio, and the allegation that a non-licensed attorney may not litigate on behalf of another. The problem with the Court’s analysis was that none of the cases cited dealt with incapacity of the principal. The Court followed Defendants example in citing to Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Coleman, 88 Ohio St. 3d 155 (200), a case in which a man had hung a shingle in a for-profit venture and was offering legal advice to complete strangers who were of sound mind and body, not incapacitated by Alzheimers.

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The board found that respondent, who is not an attorney at law, conducted a business under the name "Trouble R Us Consumer Advocates" in Pomeroy, Ohio. During the course of his business, respondent gave legal advice to a resident of Ohio and prepared and filed complaints on her behalf in an Ohio court. Naturally the Court found that such activity constituted Unauthorized Practice of Law.1 Neither Defendants nor the Court provided any Decisional law from Connecticut. The Law in Connecticut is quite clear however, and it provides: Gen. Stat. § 1-42 et. seq. Sec. 1-51. Claims and litigation. In a statutory short form power of attorney, the language conferring general authority with respect to claims and litigation shall be construed to mean that the principal authorizes the agent: (1) To assert and prosecute before any court, administrative board, department, commissioner or other tribunal any cause of action, claim, counterclaim, offset or defense, which the principal has, or claims to have, against any individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, government, or other person or instrumentality, including, but not limited to, power to sue for the recovery of land or of any other thing of value, for the recovery of damages sustained by the principal in any manner, for the elimination or modification of tax liability, for an injunction, for specific performance, or for any other relief; (2) to bring an action of interpleader or other action to determine adverse claims; to intervene or interplead in any action or proceeding, and to act in any litigation as amicus curiae; There is nothing equivocal about the Plain Language of the Statute when a valid Connecticut Power of Attorney is involved. The Court did not address this argument on prior occasion because it impliedly determined that Ohio Law still governed this matter. Ms. King filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the contrary, however with her new Power of Attorney firmly set in Connecticut she is authorized to have her son stand in her shoes before the Court. Note further that in Connecticut Christopher King, Esq. is authorized to stand in place of his mother whether or not he is licensed in Connecticut or anywhere else, pursuant to established Connecticut Law, Clark v. Visiting Nurse Serv., 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 434 (2001)(Appendix A).

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Ohio, in contrast to Connecticut, does not have Plain Statutory language specifically granting a Power of Attorney the right to prosecute actions before the court, including motions to interplead.

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The Connecticut Short Form Power of Attorney Act, General Statutes § 1-42, et seq., confers upon the attorney in fact authorization to engage in litigation on behalf of a principal in the statutory short form power of attorney. General Statutes § 1-43. This means that HN4 "the principal authorizes the agent: (1) To assert . . . before any court . . . any cause of action, claim, counterclaim, offset or defense, which the principal has, or claims to have, against any individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, government, or other person or instrumentality, including, but not limited to, power to sue . . . for the recovery of damages sustained by the principal in any manner . . ." General Statutes § 1-51. The power of attorney presented by Alfred Clark, prepared in conformance with § 1-43, expressly vests him with the authority to assert a cause of action before this court on behalf of Gertrude Clark . . . [*5] While Alfred Clark has not established that he was appointed guardian or next friend of Gertrude Clark, he has proffered a copy of the power of attorney executed by Gertrude Clark. Therefore, Alfred Clark has established that he has the authority to bring the present action. In this action, the plaintiff was designated inaccurately as a guardian and next friend of Gertrude Clark, rather than designated as an attorney-in-fact pursuant to General Statutes § 1-43. The plaintiff in this case is Alfred Clark. Such mis-designation of the plaintiff's capacity is a misnomer which does not prevent the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and is amendable by the plaintiff. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.2

II.

RULE 60B Federal Rule 60B is designed to address a manifest injustice such as this, where Ms. King’s

substantive and procedural due process rights are being trammeled: The net effect of the Court’s ruling, were it to stand in the presence of the new Connecticut Power of Attorney, is to take away the pro se status of Ms. King, and that is Unconstitutional.3

The Defendants Motion to Dismiss did not cite to any Connecticut Law. The Court’s Decision did not cite to any Connecticut Law. While persuasive law may be admissible pursuant to Rule 201, it does not carry the same import as the Law of the jurisdiction. That is such an axiomatic Truth that it is basically the first thing taught in legal writing.
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Defendants may argue that it is not a Constitutional Breach but we need not reach that level of abstraction because what it clearly is, however is a Statutory Breach according to Connecticut Decisional Law, and that is the only law that matters.

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Specifically, (b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief. In this case there is of course evidence of arguable fraud in the sense that the Defendant issued materially conflicting affidavits that in part directly proved that Ms. King did indeed file appropriate financial documents in a timely fashion, in December 2011. However the more appropriate rubric would be under subsection (5) because applying the law set when Ms. King’s Power of Attorney was in Ohio is no longer equitable (much less lawful) now that Connecticut Statutory and Decisional law are in effect. As far as the timeliness component of Rule 60, the Defendants themselves raised this issue late in the litigation in their Supplemental Memorandum in support of dismissal so it is a fairly new issue in a case that had already been pending for approximately one whole year. As such, the Lower Court is now bound to accept the Connecticut Power of Attorney and allow Intervention as there is no undue prejudice given that this matter has been before the Court for nearly a year now, whereas the Robert B. Davis Motion for Intervention was filed as recently as March 20, 2013 and still granted on April 11, 2013 and the Motion to Intervene filed by Jeri James was filed on April 18, 2013 and granted just last week, on May 6, 2013. A Trial Date has not yet been set, but even if one were to be set in the coming week justice law and equity demand that Ms. King be GRANTED the right to Intervention. Respectfully submitted, /s/ Christopher King, J.D. _____________________________ Christopher King, J.D. http://KingCast.net -- Reel News for Real People kingjurisdoctor@gmail.com 617.543.8085

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I the undersigned, solemnly swear that a true copy of this Rule 60B Motion Was delivered via hand delivery (Bremby) and Regular U.S. Mail (Shafer) this 16th day of May, 2013 Defendant Roderick Bremby c/o Hugh Barber, Esq. CT AG 55 Elm Street PO Box 120 Hartford, CT 06141 hugh.barger@ct.gov Plaintiffs Shafer and Harder Sheldon Toubman (ct08533) New Haven Legal Assistance Assoc. 426 State Street New Haven, CT 06510-2018 Phone: 203.946.4811 Fax: 203.498-9271 stoubman@nhlegal.org /s/Christopher King, J.D. __________________________________ KingCast.net By and through Christopher King, J.D. 617.543.8085m

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