ISHTIAQ AHMED ON RAZI AZMI PAKI ARMY BOOK REVIEW

Dear All, A review of my book has appeared in the Daily Times, which makes interesting reading. Much of it is very positive. I wish the reviewer had not wasted space on trivialities such as the system of referencing by surname because that is standard practice and it would be absurd to have it otherwise. Not my problem if there are so many Khans who are important to tell the story. Each reference given with the year of publication makes it crystall clear which book is being referred to. The second point is a rather strange one: why I have included the picture of Brigadier Yasub Ali Dogar in the book. Actually I wanted to include Col. Aslam Cheema's picture as well and that of Maj. Agha Humayun Amin but the space allowed was for only one more picture and clearly Brigadier Dogar's help from the beginning has been far beyond that one can demand from a friend. Not for a single moment did he interfere with my independence and categorical right to analyse the empirical material according to my own lights. WHEN FRIENDS ARE GENEROUS TO ME I ALWAYS WANT TO REMEMBER THEM AND GIVEN A CHANCE THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MANY MORE PICTURES BUT PUBLISHERS PREFER TO PUT A LIMIT. Without the help of retired military officers and I have some from India as well this book could not have been written. I have not a single day of research in the past on the military and it was the generosity of these fine people that made possible this book. I WOULD CHALLENGE ANYONE TO NAME ITS RIVAL. The reviewer does concede that I have done the analysis with utter objectivity and that is what matters. Apart from these observations the reviewer has done a fair and competent job. I hope more reviews or discussion article will contribute to this discussion. Best regards,

Ishtiaq

PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com Daily Times, Sunday, May 14, 2013 http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013\05\15\story_15-5-2013_pg3_4 Book Review : Pakistan's search for identity — By Dr Razi Azmi Book Review: Pakistan, the Garrison State: Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011 Author: Ishtiaq Ahmed Publisher: Oxford University Press, Karachi (January 2013) Hardcover: 508 pagesA Price: Rs 1,295

The military domination of Pakistan's body politic and the country's tortuous, yet close relationship with the United States have been the subjects of many a book, but it is the first time that both have been comprehensively dealt with in one volume. Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is preeminently qualified for the task, and he has, for the first time, systematically demonstrated that the roots of the creation of Pakistan are firmly anchored in the last-minute British military's decision to that effect. As to the haste with which Lord Mountbatten effected partition, in his incisive book Shameful Flight, the Last Years of the British Empire in India (OUP, 2006), Stanley Wolpert blames it for leaving "South Asia vulnerable to hatred and terror, compounded by ignorant fears and ugly rumours, multiplied by hundreds of millions." "Mountbatten's hyperactive frenzy" led to a killing frenzy, causing up to a million deaths, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu alike.

Ahmed has also shown that the Pakistani leadership started wooing the Americans much before the latter paid any heed. Adlai Stevenson viewed Pakistan as a "tragic outcome of the senseless conflict between blood brothers," while Chester Bowles referred to it as an unfortunate product of religious fanaticism (quoted in M R Azmi, ed., Pakistan-American Relations: the Recent Past, Royal Book Co, Karachi, 1994). Ahmed notes that the US pre-occupation with Europe and NATO in the context of the perceived Soviet threat ensured that the US paid little heed to South Asia at the time.

It is perhaps fair to say that one is a prisoner of one's background, and this includes all scholars and writers in varying degrees. But Ahmed, who unhesitatingly announces himself to be a proud Punjabi, and a Lahori to boot, is perhaps a noble exception. He takes a totally unbiased and highly critical view of the Punjabi domination in the Pakistani decision-making circles and corridors of power, particularly the army. He does so without mincing words and cites facts and figures to back his argument.

I am not sure that the current practice of using the western system of citing Pakistanis by their last names, whether in text or in notes, is the right one. Khan is a case in point. Is it Liaquat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Musa Khan, Akbar Khan, Asghar Khan, Wali Khan, Fazal Muqeem Khan, Gohar Ayub Khan or Imran Khan? In a nation of tens of millions of Khans, the possibilities are immense. Whereas we know who we are talking about when we mention Johnson, Kennedy, Nixon, Kissinger and Carter or Blair, Thatcher or Cameron, which Khan are we referring to when we say just Khan? The same is true of, say, Ali, Ahmed or Chaudhry.

There are times when the author could have dispensed with citations for well-known, incontrovertible facts (eg. p. 107). And there are places where a citation would have been useful, for instance, when he writes that "Mirza became suspicious of Ayub" (p. 115) or "Pakistan's [military] success [in 1965 war] was mentioned in a number of dispatches by western correspondents." (p. 135)

Pakistan's failure to get a democratic constitution for many years is said to be because "Liaquat Ali Khan evaded elections, primarily because he had no constituency from which to ensure his election" (p 104). This has been taken for granted by every Pakistani author and accepted by all without question. In fact, given the high prestige which Liaquat (or, should I say, Khan) enjoyed by virtue of his contribution to the Pakistan movement, building of the state from scratch and as the Quaid-e-Azam's long-time deputy, and the goodwill that existed in the early years, he almost certainly would have been guaranteed to win from any constituency in Pakistan, both West and East. Voters in any part of the country would have felt honoured to vote for him as their member

of parliament. Even now Pakistani politicians win elections from multiple constituencies (Bhutto of Larkana, Sindh, won from four constituencies in 1970, including Lahore!).

And a fact not mentioned anywhere by anyone relates to the Chinese role, or rather the lack of it, in 1971. In September, the Chinese leadership was plunged into a very grave crisis when Mao Zedong's deputy and designated successor, Defence Minister Lin Biao, along with many military commanders, launched an unsuccessful coup and died in a plane crash on Sept 13, 1971 when trying to flee. The coup originated in February 1971 and the crisis did not fully resolve until Deng Xiao Ping took charge in 1978. As a matter of curiosity, the plane that crashed along with Lin Biao in Mongolian territory for lack of fuel was a Trident that had been sold to China by PIA some years earlier!

Throughout the book, Ahmed's mastery of the subject at hand is manifest. One particular strength of the book is his personal interviews with a very large number of participants and scholars from all sides of the equation, namely, Pakistan, India and US, military as well as civilian.

Perhaps Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed has tried to pack too much in one volume. It is perhaps impossible to separate foreign relations from internal socio-economic and political issues, but it may have been a good idea to limit discussions of foreign policy as far as possible. In Pakistan's case, however, that is easier said than done, given the country's crucial dependence on foreign economic and military aid and its search for powerful allies against the perceived Indian threat.

In the event, the learned professor has done as good a job as anyone could have aspired to. This book is not merely a great resource for scholars interested in Pakistan but also for college and university students. It should be required reading at Pakistani institutions and academies of higher education. The book skillfully relates Pakistan's evolution as a garrison state to its search for an identity and the welding of religion and state with very unfortunate results.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, when President Lyndon B Johnson was told by Secretary of State Dean Rusk that President Ayub Khan was desperately seeking US help to bail him out of the quagmire, LBJ complained that Khan took off without even informing him, but now that he was going to crash-land he wanted him (LBJ) to sit with him in the cockpit!

In a twist of irony, the situation has now been reversed and Pakistan probably can have the last laugh. The US got into the Afghan quagmire not only against Pakistan's wishes but even threatened Pakistan to assist in the venture, but now that it wants a safe and honourable exit from there, it is desperate for Pakistan's help.

The photo of Brig (retd) Yasub Ali Dogar on the same page (opposite p. 116) as Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Ziaul Haque and Pervez Musharraf, all coup makers and generals-turned-president, is sure to please the brigadier, but whether he deserves their company is another matter. But surely it brings into sharp focus the words "Garrison State" in the title of the book, for Brigadier Yasub Ali Dogar has served as a Director of Operations in the ISI during some crucial years.

The reviewer is a former academic with a doctorate in modern history. His doctoral dissertation was The US, Pakistan and the Soviet Union, 1947-1965; Problems of Security, Ideology and Geopolitics. He also edited Pakistan American Relations, the Recent Past (Royal Book Co, Karachi, 1994). He can be reached at raziazmi@hotmail.com

Religion & Pakistan Army

THIS PHOTOGRAPH AND OTHERS BELOW WERE SENT TO DR ISHTIAQ FOR HIS BOOK BUT IT IS SAD THAT THESE MOST SYMBOLIC PHOTOGRAPHS WERE NOT PUBLISHED IN DR ISHTIAQS BOOK . THE PAKI ARMY HAS TENTACLES IN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS ALSO ! THE ONLY EXCEPTION THAT I TAKE TO DR ISHTIAQS BOOK IS THAT THE CENTRAL FACT THAT PAKISTAN WAS CREATED BY THE BRITISH AS A THIRD RATE FUTURE CHATTEL MILITARY BASE IS NOT DISCUSSED MAJOR GENERAL AFZAAL ATTENDS MEHFIL I SHABEENA AND THIS PHOTOGRAPH IS PRINTED IN HIS ARMOURED DIVISIONS JOURNAL TO PROPAGATE THAT HE IS A VERY RELIGIOUS MAN- ALL FOR CAREERISM

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-growth-of-islamism-in-the-pakistan-army

THIS ARTICLE LACKS PERSPECTIVE AS IT FAILS TO INCORPORATE LASTEST BOOK PAKISTAN THE GARRISON STATE BY DR ISHTIAQ AHMAD

http://www.scribd.com/doc/117470292/Careerism-Apple-Polishing-Strategic-Assassination-andHistory-Flattery-will-get-you-somewhere

CAREERISM,APPLE POLISHING , STRATEGIC ASSASSINATION AND HISTORYFLATTERY WILL GET YOU SOMEWHERE

In order for a Guerrilla war to succeed three factors matter.First that the war has an indigenous character , ie it has internal support in the country where it is launched.Second and most important , that it has state actors in support who are determined to support it and who hold the view that they will gain more than what they spend if the guerrilla forces that they support will win the war or destabilize the target state. A pioneer ISI , commando officer who was the first to train Afghan guerrillas on behalf of the ISI had the following to state about the Afghan War and his experiences:--"We began with idealistic motives.

Let me clarify that the Afghan by nature is not a fighter of pitched battles.He bargains , manipulates both sides , charges his rent from both sides and rarely fights a pitched battle.Occasional sniping is his style. The extremely low Russian casualties in Afghan War , 14,000 killed in ten years compare to 60,000 killed in Vietnam prove that there was little fighting on the ground.

Most of the real fighting perforce had to be done by Jihadists brought from Middle East and by Pakistani army regulars and civilian Jihadis recruited from various parts of Pakistan. We started the affair inspired by real idealism but soon discovered that it was all about money.Zia and his cronies were all from humble background and saw the Afghan war as a personal affair to preserve their illegally usurped power and to amass private fortunes. I was one of the first to deal with Haqqani who was a third rate average village mullah.Such was the stink emanating from this character that I made him sit in the trucks back body. It is my conviction that Haqqani network is a Pakistani show.Haqqani without Pakistani protection and support is less respectable than a village cobbler or a village hand. I regularly went as far as Kabul city , Gardez city and Shindand Air base to carry out raids. From the beginning the Afghan Mujahids first priority was to make money selling weapons.Jihad we discovered was a misnomer. I was personally disillusioned with the ISI as a biased sectarian outfit. Although I stayed on to train Sikhs for India , Kashmiri Mujahideen for India , I was deeply disillusioned.

The dirty game started by Zia destroyed Pakistan and today as I see it our total demise as a state is not far away.All thanks to a promiscuous flirtation with Jihad adopted as a facade to mint money. Even today the vast bulk of Taliban in Afghanistan are Pakistani proxies.The Afghan part of Taliban are good business men.Afghan war was actually a blessing for both corrupt Afghan Jihadis and their ultra corrupt Pakistani intelligence Jihad masters.The amount of money Afghanistan saw in between

1978 and 1992 and between 2001 and to date is a million times more than all money in circulation in this region from the time of Alexander the Great ! The problem in Afghanistan is simple .It is Pakistani manipulated game with a lot of Saudi and Chinese money flowing in.The Saudis are against Iran and Pakistanis have a feud with India.If the USA can armtwist the Pakistanis and Saudis and tell Indians to behave all will be OK.The main factor in Afghanistan are Pakistanis and taliban are just a petty Pakistani proxy. When this fact is realised the US can make simple policies. In Pakistan the US is dealing with Pakistani generals from a lower middle class backgrounds.The Punjabi Muslims as a race have no martial tradition till the British inducted them in the army. These people can stand any amount of kicking and this should be foreign policy of any power that wants peace in Afghanistan." The ISI officer quoted above has chosen to remain anonymous in the interest of his security. There could have been no Afghan war without Pakistani state support.This was true in 1978 or 1979 and this is true today . Colonel Salman who was one of the pioneers of Afghan War and trained all the characters starting from Hekmatyar and Masud to Mullah Omar and OBL , standing on the extreme right in 1970.Major Musharraf later General Musharraf on extreme left Colonel Salman my distant relative and close friend is regarded as the Godfather of Afghan , Al Qaeda and Taliban in Af Pak. Salman recounted the Afghan war with pride . He is one who believes that Islamists will ultimately win the ongoing global war between the west and the Islamists. Salman thinks that the network of Islamists is huge and will prevail ultimately.I do not agree with his assertions but then every man has his or her world view. The ISI had been involved in various guerrilla wars in neighbouring countries since its establishment.Colonel Sardar Humayun from 25 Cavalry who also trained Lashkar e Tayyaba on behalf of the ISI much later and also raised the Punjab Elite Force in 1990s recounted in 1983 how he had operated in Indian NEFA area with the Naga and Mizo Guerrillas with a heavy spool tape recorder on his back to record the sounds in late 1960s . ISIs obsession with guerrilla war began in 1971 when the Indians used Mukti Bahini guerrillas in then East Pakistan.The humiliating 1971 defeat left a deep scar on the Pakistani military psyche. Because

1971 had to be avenged ,Islam became the centre theme of Pakstani military system.The common man could only be galvanized in the name of Islam. Soon after 1971 debacle in 1971 Pakistani military good a second more rude shock when a new guerrilla war started in Pakistani Balochistan.The army nor the special forces were fully trained to fight a guerrilla war on their own soil. Pakistani state picked up guerrilla war as the central pillar of its foreign policy when Pakistans civilian prime minister sanctioned a guerrilla war in Afghanistan. Colonel Salman then a major and an instructor at the Commando SSG School at Cherat became one of the first teachers of obscure Afghan guerrillas named Ahmad Shah Masood,Gulbaddin Hekmatyar,Gillani and Rabbani.This was 1974. In 2004 I with great difficulty persuaded my friend and Chairman of Afghanistan Study Centre to publish the article quoted below in the first issue of Journal of Afghanistan Studies.What had happened was now the household truth but people were still afraid to say it in print:-- "In 1973, the then Inspector General of Frontier Corps (IGFC), Brigadier (later Major General) Naseerullah Khan Babar presented a paper on Afghanistan and Pakistani tribal areas. Frontier Corps is a border paramilitary force led by Pakistani army officers seconded to the militia which guard's the country's western borders. The main thrust of the paper was the fear of Soviet hegemony and potential of Afghan providing support to tribes residing in Pakistani territory. In the light of this assessment, an Afghan Cell was created. This was a high level secret group, which included four members - Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Bhutto's advisor on Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmad, Chief of Army Staff General Tikka Khan and IGFC Babar. Dissidents from Afghanistan were brought to Pakistan where they were put on the payroll of FC and then sent to different locations and trained in handling of small arms and explosives. Babar's two staff officers Colonel Ataur Rahman Kallu and Captain (later Major and a political leader) Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao helped Babar in coordination of some of these efforts. In this work, the then head of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) detachment in Peshawar, Major (later Brigadier Aslam Bodla) was also brought into the picture. Babar continued to supervise this operation after his retirement from the military when he was appointed governor of North West Frontier Province. Pakistan tried to recruit a small core group from each of the 29 provinces of Afghanistan. They would then go back and recruit more members inside Afghanistan. From 1973-77 about 2000-2500 Afghan dissidents were trained in Pakistan. Pakistanis provided them with Indian guns and explosives to avoid any negative fallout in case of exposure of the plan. (Refers-Love Love Thy Neighbor; Kill Thy Neighbor -Pakistan's Afghan policyBy: Dr. Hamid Hussain Published in first issue of Journal of Afghanistan Studies in July 2004)

6 ARMOURED DIVISION ON TABLEEGHI MISSION NAZIM US SALAAT IN 1984 THE SAME PEOPLE WERE USED TO STAMP BALLOTS OF GENERAL ZIAS BOGUS DECEMBER 1984 REFERENDUM TO LEGALISE HIS RULE

THIS MATTER HAS BEEN DISCUSSED IN GREAT DETAIL IN DR ISHTIAQS BOOK BELOW WHICH WAS RECENTLY PUBLISHED.

AGHA H AMIN

Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origin, Evolution, Consequencec (1947-2011)

Dear All, The first review of my book, Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), by Dr Ehsan Ahrari, a US based Defence Expert appeared recently in the American online, Asia Times. Comments are welcome. Best regards, Ishtiaq PhD (Stockholm University); Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com

Asia Times http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01-250413.html

SPEAKING
The garrison state in

FREELY
Pakistan

By

Ehsan

Ahrari

Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. The high visibility of Pakistan in regional and global affairs is one of the reasons behind the publication of a number of excellent studies explaining the country's internal affairs as well its

regional

and

global

strategic

maneuvers.

Ishtiaq Ahmed's book, Pakistan the Garrison State , is certainly one such book. Borrowing the concept, "garrison state," from noted American political scientist Harold Lasswell, Ahmed develops an
engaging but complex narrative of Pakistan.

His account starts from the birth of that nation in a highly volatile environment, and brings it forward to 2011. Since the Indian top leadership never accepted Mohammad Ali Jinnah's (founder of Pakistan) "two nation theory" as the basis of partition of British India, the chances of any cooperation between the two resulting states after their birth were minimal, to start with.The outburst of the Kashmir conflict in 1947, almost immediately after their inception as separate nations, dealt a severe blow to the prospects of cooperation between the two countries for several decades. The notion of a garrison state suits Pakistan to a tee, in the sense that, in such a state, the military not only remains as the most powerful actor, but also frequently becomes the governing entity. It also subsumes the concept of "national security state", where the power elites of the country under discussion are incessantly preoccupied with both external and internal enemies. In a garrison state, because of the military's (to be precise, the army, since it is the most dominant service in that country) fetish for devouring a substantial portion of the nation's meager but extremely precious capital in order to modernize itself, other vital societal issues - such as investments in developing modern educational institutions, a multifaceted industrial base, and state-of-the-art health care facilities and institutions, etc -are grossly underfunded. The garrison state also describes a state where internal ideological, sectarian, and ethnic conflicts continue to tear the country apart. Sadly, Pakistan not only contains all of these features, but it incessantly suffers from the acutely deleterious effects stemming from them. Domestically, Pakistan was never able to develop into a stable democracy. Consequently, its civilian authorities originally (ie, early 1950s) invited the army to intervene when they could not contain domestic violence and disorder. Later on, the army invited itself to become the ruling power of the state, starting with the coup d'etat of General Mohammed Ayub Khan in 1958. The gross incompetence of Pakistan's army as a governing entity became abundantly clear in the loss of East Pakistan under the military rule of Ayub Khan's successor, General Mohammad Yahya Khan. That tragedy was followed only a few years later by another coup, when the

Islamist General Zia ul-Haq, not only overthrew the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1976, but also hanged him. Breaking from the unhappy events that occurred during the Zia regime, the fourth dictator of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf (who captured the reign of government by ousting the elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharief in 1999), did not hang any civilian leaders. However, Benazir Bhutto, the prospective prime minister in the then impending elections, was assassinated by Islamist terrorists. Thus, Pakistan became a country where democratic governance appeared only sporadically and was frequently interrupted by military dictators. Those autocrats will be remembered for their utmost incompetence, except for Zia, who will be remembered for transforming Pakistan ostensibly irrevocably into a highly explosive Islamist polity. Ishtiaq Ahmed's use of garrison state also underscores the notion of "fortress Islam", the rhetoric that the Pakistani military leaders used unsuccessfully to underscore their resolve to snatch the Indian-administered Kashmir from the grip of India's powerful military. The most disconcerting aspect of that rhetoric is that the Kashmir conflict has been permanently couched as a religious issue dividing the two countries. I say "permanently" because, as far as India is concerned, that conflict was resolved in 1948, and the Line of Control (LOC) separating the armies of those two countries represents the international border between the two countries. Pakistan's emergence, along with India, as a country possessing nuclear weapons since 1998, is an ominous development for two reasons. First, because the conflict between its indigenous Islamists and the army has only intensified since General Musharraf's myopic decision to use brutal force to end the Islamist occupation of the Lal Masjid (red mosque) in 2007. The fact that, under Musharraf, that country had become the frontline state fighting America's "global war on terror" was another principal reason underlying the conflict between the Islamists of that country and Pakistan's military. Since 2007, one can easily chart the worsening of that conflict in the form of several military campaigns in the North-West Frontier Province (now named Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Waziristan. Second, with the growing attacks of the Islamists on the military bases and other facilities of Pakistan-including the General Headquarters of the army and the headquarters of Pakistan's notoriously brutal Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has created worldwide anxieties regarding the

security

of

Pakistan's

nuclear

weapons.

One regularly hears President Barack Obama and other US officials making public statements assuring the world that the Pakistani weapons are safe, while the Pakistani army remains worried about rumors of US-India, Indo-Israeli plans to either attack that country's nuclear plants or snatch its nuclear weapons. US-Pakistan and Indo-Pakistan ties have been highly dynamic and equally noteworthy features of that country's role as garrison state. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, played a crucial role in enabling the United States to defeat and oust the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989. Pakistan's growing Islamization in the late 1970s and 1980s, along with the Saudi finances and the China's economic and military support, came in handy for the strategic purposes of the United States-sponsored jihad to win, as it turned out, the Cold War. The Soviet Union imploded only a few years after its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan. However, once the communist superpower was ousted from Afghanistan, the United States folded its tent and left the area, leaving Pakistan to use the Islamist tool of its foreign policy to establish an acutely Islamist regime of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Ironically, it was also Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban that became the place from where Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist group planned the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Soon after leaving Afghanistan toward the end of the 1980s, the United States also intensified its economic and military sanctions because of Pakistan's not-so-secret program to develop nuclear weapons. The garrison state, though it was devastated by this decision, continued not only to survive, but went ahead with a firm resolve to develop its nuclear weapon. That determination was also mixed with a sense of urgency to develop its own existential nuclear deterrence against India. The highly turbulent nature of the Indo-Pakistan ties is the fuel that has been driving the Pakistan army's India-centric nuclearization objectives, as well as the modalities of its force deployments. Pakistan has always had deep anxieties that India was not happy about the partition and would go to any extreme to unravel Pakistan. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 over East Pakistan left no doubt in the minds of Pakistani generals about India's "evil" designs toward Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan has not only acquired nuclear weapons of its own, but also has consistently refused to extend the "no first use doctrine" toward India. India, on the contrary, has

offered that doctrine to Pakistan. More to the point, the focus of India's nuclear doctrine is primarily aimed at the PRC. However, from time to time, India has amassed troops along the Line of Control in response to terrorist attacks from Pakistan-based Islamist groups. As an added response to such terrorist attacks, India has also publicized such warfighting doctrines as "the doctrine of limited war" and the "Cold Start doctrine", thereby further convincing the Pakistan army that India remains the foremost security threat to their country. US-Pakistan ties suffered another jolt when the lone superpower decided to establish a strategic partnership with its archenemy, India. The process started during the so-called "strategic dialogue" that the United States began with both India and Pakistan. However, the US-India rounds of those negotiations proceeded quite fruitfully, from the strategic perspectives of India. Pakistan felt neglected and marginalized, and its attempts to negotiate a similar arrangement with the lone superpower got nowhere. When President Barack Obama entered the White House in 2008, the US-Pakistan differences stemming Obama's Afghan war and his Af-Pak strategy became a constant source of escalating differences and irritation between Washington and Islamabad. The notion of a garrison state is quite useful in underscoring the struggle between the civilian and military ruling elites to gain the reins of the government and to keep the other side from taking it away. However, the resignation of General Pervez Musharraf in 2008, and the subsequent return of civilian rule in Pakistan could indeed be viewed as a distant promise of the weakening of the garrison state. Such a promise faced a setback, in the wake of a highly inept performance of the Pakistan Peoples Party-dominated civilian government. Even if the civilian government of Pakistan were to establish a reasonably decent record of good governance, the Pakistani army still would have remained as a chief threat to the long-term prevalence of civilian control of the government. For the first time since the unhappy history of Pakistan, the civilian government was allowed to complete its term of office. With the next general election that is scheduled for May 2013, there is a strong hope that civilian rule will prevail there for the foreseeable future. Still, one must continue to think about the ways to dismantle the garrison state in that country. The continuation of civilian rule in Pakistan will be an auspicious development toward that end. The second one will be the success of civilian leaders to negotiate with their Indian counterparts

a political solution to the Kashmir conflict, which, in reality, means acceptance of the Indian stand that the Line of Control is, indeed, the de facto international border between the two warring nations. What that means is that Pakistan should swallow the bitter pill and accept that reality, and look toward negotiating some sort of autonomy for Kashmir along the same line, as was done by General Musharraf with the Indian government in 2006. The control of nuclear weapons is another important symbol of power in Pakistan. However, that authority is not likely to be given up by the army anytime soon. Still, one cannot rule out the likelihood that the future leaders of that entity might be forced to consider that possibility, if or when the civilian authorities propose an institutional arrangement that either complements the present system of national security council, or radically transforms it in favor of civilian leadership. All of these developments are likely to happen only if the next election in Pakistan results in the election of a competent corps of civilian politicians. Pakistan's army has enough trouble trying to de-Islamitize its own ranks and to fight the militant Islamists groups inside its borders while ensuring that Pakistan's quest for sustaining its own version of strategic parity with India is not seriously jeopardized by "rising" India's most visible resolve to become a great power with its own powerful military to boot. Under a democratic and stable Pakistan, it is likely to be persuaded to transform its role from a praetorian guard to a truly professional entity. That will only happen if the garrison state of that country is at least palpably dismantled. Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, an Independent Defense Consultant, is a specialist in great power relations and transnational security who resides in Alexandria, VA, USA. He has 20 years of experience teaching in various senior military educational institutions, including the US Air War College, Joint Forces Staff College of the National Defense University, and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He has consulted with and briefed top officials of USCENTCOM and USPACOM. His latest book on great power relations entitled, The Great Powers and the Hegemon, was published by Palgrave-Macmillan in November 2011. Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have their say. Please click here if you are interested in contributing. Articles submitted for this section allow our readers to express their opinions and do not necessarily meet the same editorial standards of Asia Times Online's regular contributors.

(Copyright 2013 Ehsan Ahrari)

Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origin, Evolution, Consequencec (1947-2011)

Dear All, Last month in a moment of exuberance I announced the publication of my new book. That was wrong as I had not noticed that it was then on the forthcoming list. It is now on the new arrival list. THE BOOK IS NOW A FACT and is available at OUP. Soon it should be available online worldwide as well. Best regards, Ishtiaq The writer has a PhD from Stockholm University. He is a Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University. He is also Honorary Senior Fellow of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. His latest publication is: The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and

First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com

Description This study seeks to solve the following puzzle: In 1947, the Pakistan military was poorly trained and poorly armed. It also inherited highly vulnerable territory vis-à-vis the much bigger India, aggravated because of serious disputes with Afghanistan. Defence and security were therefore issues that no Pakistan government, civil or military, could ignore. The military did not take part in politics directly until 1958, although it was called upon to restore order in 1953 in the Punjab province. Over the years, the military, or rather the Pakistan Army, continued to grow in power and influence, and progressively became the most powerful institution. Moreover, it became an institution with de facto veto powers at its disposal to overrule other actors within society including elected governments. Simultaneously, it began to acquire foreign patrons and donors willing to arm it as part of the Cold War competition (the United States), regional balance-of-power concerns (China), and ideological contestants for leadership over the Muslim world (Saudi Arabia, to contain Iranian influence). A perennial concern with defining the Islamic identity of Pakistan, exacerbated by the Afghan jihad, resulted in the convergence of internal and external factors to produce the 'fortress of Islam' self-description that became current in the early twenty-first century. Over time, Pakistan succumbed to extremism and terrorism within and was accused of being involved in similar activities within the South Asian region and beyond. Such developments have been ruinous to Pakistan's economic and democratic development. The following questions are posed to shed further light:

1. What is the relationship between the internal and external factors in explaining the rise of the military as the most powerful institution in Pakistan? 2. What have been the consequences of such politics for the political and economic development in Pakistan? 3. What are the future prospects for Pakistan? A conceptual and theoretical framework combining the notion of a post-colonial state and Harold Lasswell's concept of a garrison state is propounded to analyse the evolution of Pakistan as a fortress of Islam.
About the Author / Editor Ishtiaq Ahmed was born in Lahore on 24 February 1947. He received a PhD in Political Science from Stockholm University in 1986. He taught at Stockholm University from 1987 to 2007, and was then invited as Senior Research Fellow and Visiting Research Professor by the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, during 2007–2010. He is now Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Stockholm University and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. He has published extensively on Pakistani and South Asian politics. His research interests cover fields as diverse as political Islam, ethnicity and nationalism, human and minority rights, and, indeed, partition studies.

Hardback 508 pages ISBN: 9780199066360 Price: Rs.1,295.00

Dear All, Please forgive my indulgence, I thought some pictures with the new book are permissible. I received one copy by express DHL mail today. I am convinced the findings I present and the argument I advance will not go unnoticed. Best regards, Ishtiaq PhD and Professor Emeritus, Political Science, Stockholm University; and Honorary Senior Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. Latest publications: Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origin, Evolution, Consequencec (1947-2011), Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013; The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-Person Accounts (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012; New Delhi: Rupa Books, 2011). He can be reached at: billumian@gmail.com

HOW THE PAKISTAN ARMY WORKED UNDER ZIA
CAPTAIN KAUSAR THE EME CAPTAIN WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO DEFY A SYCOPHANT GENERALS ILLEGITIMATE COMMAND WHILE ALL OFFICERS OF THE CRACK SO CALLED FIRST ARMOURED DIVISION MEEKLY OBEYED ZIAS ILLEGAL AND ULTERIOR COMMANDS ! LTG FAIZ ALI CHISHTI THE LTG MAHMOOD OF 5 JULY 1977 WROTE ON PAGE 24 OF HIS BOOK BETRAYALS OF ANOTHER KIND— " when zia was a corps commander in multan in 1975,and had invited the PM for lunch,the route nominated ran through the army officers colony there. general zia had asked the ladies and children to come out of their houses to welcome the PM by clapping.one of the officers objected.general zia then asked me to retire him from service.as military secretary i refused to do

so,because the officer had done nothing wrong.but later after zia became COAS he retired this officer prematurely.

CAPTAIN KAUSAR THE EME CAPTAIN WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO DEFY A SYCOPHANT GENERALS ILLEGITIMATE COMMAND WHILE ALL OFFICERS OF THE CRACK SO CALLED FIRST ARMOURED DIVISION MEEKLY OBEYED ZIAS ILLEGAL

AND ULTERIOR COMMANDS !

CAPTAIN KAUSAR THE EME CAPTAIN WHO HAD THE COURAGE TO DEFY A SYCOPHANT GENERALS ILLEGITIMATE COMMAND WHILE ALL OFFICERS OF THE CRACK SO CALLED FIRST ARMOURED DIVISION MEEKLY OBEYED ZIAS ILLEGAL AND ULTERIOR COMMANDS !

Mathew Mavaaks Questions

Then why were so many generals killed along with the US Ambassador and the US military attache? Were these Pakistani generals (onboard) die-hard supporters of Zia and therefore had to be removed?

there are no die hard supporters my dear friend . there are just third rate careerists , apple polishers , pen pushers , sycophants ,B____LL LIFT___RS , men described by my Philosophic Prophet Francis Bacon as men who gain dignities through dignities.

And again Francis Bacon said the way to the top is through a winding stair ?

What was Henry Kissingers modus operandi,read The Price of Power by Seymour Hersh .

you think there are anything like men of conviction in the generals who rise to the top ? a man of conviction is eliminated as a major or maximum a colonel or brigadier ?

The average army officer who rose to two or three star was ready to k___ss the A___S of anyone who mattered in his promotion ?

The same general who zia who hanged prime minister bhutto was literally kissing bhuttos hand previously and when the prime minister bhutto came to multan garrison had ordered that wives of all officers be lined up to greet mr bhutto.only one officer a Major Kausar refused this illegal order and he was summarily dismissed from the army ?

Read General Chishtis book who was first hand witness of this despicable episode :---

Just for your interest is link to an analysis of how promotions are made in the army ;--

http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/2012/11/assessment-of-officers-andmilitary.html

that is history , even Francis Bacon was forced to be like that ?

the system by which promotions are made requires a man either to be ready to be happily kicked or be a careful sycophant ?

how do men come to grief ,Machiavelli tells us , not by being unprincipled but being principled in a society where principles have no value or relative value ?

Social Psychologists in the US agreed a long time back that " FLATTERY WILL GET YOU SOMEWHERE" !

HOW WAS THE US ARMY RUN IN VIETNAM AND WHO MADE IT TO THE TOP -THE HOLE PUNCHERS ? NOT THE REAL SOLDIERS.

There was just one US general on the plane I think and one ambassador from the US ? Now what is the value of two men in foreign policy ? None ? None for the success or failure of a nation which is a super power ? The Americans never took any interest in investigating this crash .Neither did the Pakistani successors of Zia . It was good riddance for all and a WIN-WIN situation for all.

The declassified archives of CIA which I got at the JMH annual meeting organised by the

CIAs Centre for Study of Intelligence Operations in April 1996 shed some light on how it may have all happened:_--

The target were one but the others went to _____ by collateral damage . To kill the right man , innocents die also.That is history , the hard and the ugly albeit actual face of history .

A MAJOR GENERAL WHO WAS GENERAL ZIAS CONTEMPORARY ON GENERAL ZIA A.H AMIN'S QUESTION:--

What were your impressions about Zia as you saw him in the Army tenure? MAJOR GENERAL TAJAMMULS ANSWER (AND I AGREE WITH HIM 100 %) I had not intimately known him before he became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his conduct during the Divisional Commanders Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent and low grade officer. In one of the Division Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw him sleeping with his mouth open. He surpassed all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. I remember my old Brigade Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I served as his Brigade Major, once told me that he had written in Major Zia ul Haq’s ACR when he served under his command, “Not fit to go beyond the rank of a Major”. It is an irony of fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he was finally killed in an air crash. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

16 November, 2012

Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army

Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army What was wrong with Assessment of Officers and Military Training-Pakistan Army and What continues to be wrong till to date as research indicates

Click on scanned pages pictures to enlarge

Major Agha H Amin (Retired)

http://www.scribd.com/doc/61839666/Indo-Pak-Wars-A-Pictorial-History

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21686885/TALIBAN-WAR-IN-PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN-AWRITERS-PERCEPTIONS-FROM-2001-TO-2011

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22457862/Military-Decision-making-and-leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22151765/History-of-Pakistan-Army-from-1757-to-1971PRINTING-ENABLED-Do-acknowledge-to-the-author

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-CitadelJournal

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23701412/War-of-Independence-of-1857

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22107238/HISTORY

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21693873/Indo-Pak-Wars-1947-71-A-STRATEGIC-ANDOPERATIONAL-ANALYSIS-BY-A-H-AMIN-THIS-BOOK-CAN-BE-PRINTED-FROMTHIS-SITE

Complete article for page above on --

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

Also see the military interviews conducted by this scribe with senior Pakistani officers to see role of sycophancy and unrealistic training and assessment in Pakistan Army specially interviews of Major Gen Tajammul and Brig Z.A Khan

http://www.scribd.com/doc/23150027/Pakistan-Army-through-eyes-of-Pakistani-Generals

Selection and Assessment of Commanders in Pakistan Army-Pakistan Army JournalCitadel-Command and Staff College

These articles published in military journals of Pakistan Army endeavour to subject the highly defective system of assessment of officers to criticism despite strict censorship. One must add that some discussion became possible in the army only after 1988 when General M.A Baig took over . In the Zia era , with intellectual honesty buried and hypocrisy and sycophancy being hallmark of the army for 12 long years (1976-88) this was impossible. After 1998 once Brigadier Riaz took over as DG ISPR the situation improved. Three editors of Pakistan Army Journal were outstanding , all in succession , i.e Colonel I.D Hassan (a chronic bachelor and very cereberal and well read) , Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq Naqvi (outstanding) and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad (soft spoken but bold as far as publishing articles and extremely knowledgeable). In the command and staff college there was Lieutenant Colonel Ashraf Saleem (later lieutenant general) , Lieutenant Colonel Tariq Khan (now lieutenant general) and Lieutenant Colonel Ahsan Mahmood (now major general) , all three were well read and had a high intellectual calibre particularly Tariq Khan. After these three the pedants came and pedants and the conformists off course are in preponderance !

I would say the assessments that I made in faulty and fallacious assessment of military commanders continue ! If Tariq Khan ‫هللا شاء ما‬ became a three star it was a triumph of destiny over a thoroughly rotten system !

‫هللا شاء ما‬

‫هللا شاء ما‬

‫هللا شاء ما‬ But then we must remember that Moses survived in Pharohs palace and finally overcame the Pharoah ! This unfortunate country Pakistan needs a Moses , a man who purges this rotten country ! If not , then I dont have the least doubt that Pakistan will be destroyed ! It will cease to exist as a country ! This is my conviction ! This country Pakistan has no soft solutions !

WHEN ORDERS SHOULD BE OBEYED AND WHEN DISOBEYED OR MODIFIED AS SEEN IN MILITARY HISTORY-MARCH 1991

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27648037/Orders-and-Obedience

On the first page a question is raised " if selection and assessment system in an army is realistic" .

There was a big question mark in 1991 when I wrote this , it remained when I retired in December 1993 because the army then was run on whims and likes and dislikes and no one bothered how good an officer was in real command and intellectual ability ! I fear that the large gaps and question marks remain to date ? The very Kargil operation proves that an overambitious man with myopic strategic vision like Musharraf can rise to the highest ranks ,shamelessly abandons bodies of soldiers and then proclaim Kargil as his greatest success ! One could see an ambitious man in him in 1993 , who was obsessed with self projection ! I had asked Lieuenant Colonel Ashraf (then CO 46 Field and my platoon commander in PMA , also GSO 1 , 14 Division what he thought of Musharraf his brother gunner officer .Ashraf an outstandingly honest and straight man hailing from Kalar Saidan near Pindi stated " what can you make of a man who uses generator of his locating unit for his house "

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

No one in kargil had the courage to point out that the operation was a wild gamble ! Brigadier Simon confided that that General Tauqir Zia was against it but then Tauqir Zia never gave his dissent ?

PROBLEM WITH MILITARY TRAINING , MILITARY EXERCISES AND ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

A real soldier in the peacteime environment of jee hazoori and yes man ship hardly has any chance of being promoted ! True in 1992 when I wrote this and true today ! Can Pakistan afford this ?

PROBABLY IN OUR SCENARIO A QUALITY TERMED AS LOYALTY , WHICH IN REALITY IS DOCILITY AND OVERCONFORMITY IS HIGHLY VALUED !AND LOYALTY OF A PERSONAL NATURE IS SHEER INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY !

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

Complete article " Resolution-Cardinal Command Virtue" as published in the Pakistan Army Journal June 1992 may be downloaded from the following link---

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

WHY ASSESSMENT OF OFFICERS QUALITIES IS OF CARDINAL IMPORTANCE

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-DecisionMaking

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-DecisionMaking

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-DecisionMaking

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-DecisionMaking

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22460733/The-Armoured-Thrust-Article-Based-on-Experiences-asan-Umpire-with-a-tank-regiment-in-December-1993

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22460733/The-Armoured-Thrust-Article-Based-on-Experiences-asan-Umpire-with-a-tank-regiment-in-December-1993

For letters as sent to the staff college including the above one see the following link-

http://www.scribd.com/doc/22455178/Letters-to-Command-and-Staff-College-Quetta-CitadelJournal

For letters as published in various military journals see the following link--

http://www.scribd.com/doc/28266915/Letters-to-Editor-as-Published-After-Censorship-inPakistan-Army-Journal-and-Citadel

THE ABOVE ARTICLES MAY BE DOWNLOADED IN COMPLETE FROM FOLLOWING LINKS:---

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27648037/Orders-and-Obedience

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27384291/Intangible-Forces-Behind-a-Military-Manoeuvre-anExamination-of-the-Clausewitzian-Model-of-Military-Leadership

http://www.scribd.com/doc/27386132/Plain-as-Well-as-Subtle-Aspects-of-Military-DecisionMaking

http://www.scribd.com/doc/40295974/Resolution-Cardinal-Command-Virtue

Historical Proof of the argument presented above War Performance had nothing to do with promotion to higher ranks in Pakistan Army Major Agha H Amin (Retired) Altaf Gauhar Ayub's close confidant inadvertently proves this fact once he quite uncharitably, and for reasons, other than dispassionate objective historical considerations, described Yahya as one " selected…in preference to some other generals, because Yahya, who had come to hit the bottle hard, had no time for politics and was considered a harmless and loyal person". Major General Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub continental standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired in the same rank!

Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistan's territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25 Cavalry who had saved Pakistan's territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may be gauged from the fact that at the time of outbreak of the 1971 War Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was only commanding the Armoured corps recruit training centre, a poor appointment for a man who had distinguished himself as a tank regiment commander in stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose unit's performance was described by the enemy opposing him as one "which was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured Division and its objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General Headquarters pedantic officers as fit only to command a recruit training centre while one who was instrumental in failure of the main Pakistani intelligence failure as DMI was promoted to Major General rank and trusted later with the command of Pakistan's 1 Corps with disastorous results !

Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade commander in 10 Division area in Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade commanders of the army who had led from the front. Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely praised anyone had the following to say about Sher's conduct while leading the Pakistan army's most important infantry brigade counter attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15 Division despite considerable numerical superiority was completely thrown off balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep, moved from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops worth their salt could ignore". But the Army's Selection Boards ignored Qayyum Sher once his turn for promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well in war and was awarded the Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the HJ!

But war performance or even performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria for promotion in the Pakistan Army! Qayyum retired as a brigadier, remembered by those who fought under him as a brave and resolute commander, who was not given an opportunity to rise to a higher rank, which Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did. Brigadier Nisar of 25 Cavalry who was praised by Indian historians as outstanding in delaying battle in Shakargarh as commander of changez Force was also sidelined because he was not close to Tikka Khan and company and did not possess Zias mastery of art of sycophancy and appeasement of seniors ! It was typical of Pakistan Army that Brigadier Rahimuddin who did not join his brigade in Chamb on pretext of martial law duty was promoted to general rank while Nisar who fought both the 1965 and 1971 wars exceedingly well sidelined ! In 1965 Nisar by his singular action at Gadgor had literally saved Pakistan ! But promotion in Pakistan Army had nothing to do with war performance or real soldiering ! Pathetic ! Interestingly Brigadier Irshaad heading the military intelligence in 1965 and guilty of Pakistan Armys greatest intelligence failure of 1965 i.e disregarding a genuine report that Indian Armoured division was in kashmir , dismissing it as a deception plan , was promoted to two and three star after the war .He played hell with Pakistans 1 Corps in 1971 War ! Major General Sarfaraz whose conduct as GOC was outstanding in 1965 War was not promoted because his ability was regarded as a threat by Ayub Khan !

Brigadier Tajammul Hussain Malik was praised as an outstanding commander by a person no less than the Indian opponent of his Major General lachman Singh . A special commission was appointed by Indian Army to study Tajammuls brigade actions ! The tragedy is that all starting from Liaquat Ali Khan sidelined officers with outstanding war performance ! The first being the elevation of Ayub Khan to army chief with a proven record of tactical timidity in Burma !

Ayub Khan ,Tikka Khan and Bhutto sidelined the best officers of 1971 ! Tajammul was sidelined because he was not a pathetic sycophant with no war record like Zia ul Haq ! This is a man whose war performance was so outstanding that the Indians appointed a high level commission to study his epic brigade battle at Hilli where he literally repelled a division plus! His direct Indian opponent Major General Lachman Singh praised him as an outstanding and very brave man in his book Indian sword penetrates East Pakistan ! But the Pakistani selection boards criterion for promotion was certainly not war performance ! Major General Abdul Ali Malik noted by Major General Fazal i Muqeem for launcjing the most ill planned and failed counter attacks of 1971 War in Shakargarh Bulge was promoted to three star rank after the war ! General K.M Arif who had no war record in 1971 and no command experience beyond a brigade command for few months was promoted to two three and four star rank ! Brigadier Ameer Hamza who conducted a brilliant brigade offensive battle at Sulaimanke was similarly sidelined as a Lieutenant General whereas many others who had no war record in 1971 war as brigade commanders became corps commanders ! Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik in an interview with this scribe in September 2001 summed up these promotions in the following words:-The peculiarity about these promotions was that except for Jahanzeb Arbab, who had been superseded earlier because of having been found guilty of embezzlement of huge amount of money while in East Pakistan by a Court of Inquiry, headed by Major General M H Ansari but continued to remain in an officiating Command of a Division with the rank of a Brigadier for nearly two years upto as late as February 1976 when he was promoted to the rank of a Major General, all others were those who were on staff in GHQ. Major General Iqbal was doing as Chief of General Staff, Major General Sawar Khan was Adjutant General, Major General Chishti was Military

Secretary and Major General Ghulam Hassan was Director General Military Training. The Division Commanders that is to say myself, Major General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, Major General Fazal e Raziq, Major General Mateen, Major General Ch Abdur Rehman, Major General Jamal Said Mian, Major General Amir Hamza (DG Civil Armed Forces), Major General Wajahat Hussain (Commadant Staff College) were all superseded." General Zia ul Haq had seen my conduct during the Division Commanders conferences expressing my view very candidly. He, therefore, thought that he would not be able to control me. He selected a team of 'yes men' who were more docile and prepared to accept his command without any hesitation." Even the normal and highly defective ACR system in the army was disregarded in promotions. Thus while Major General Tajammul had been graded as "OUTSTANDING", as a Brigadier, in his last Annual Confidential Report and again as a Division Commander was graded "Above Average" by the then Corps Commander Lieutenant General Aftab Ahmad Khan, his contemporaries Lieutenant General Faiz Ali Chisti and Late General Akhtar Abdur Rehman were adjudged on the lower side of the "Average" grade were promoted to three star rank .Chishti in 1976 and Akhtar Abdul Rahman in 1977-78. Tajammul Hussain thus well summed up Pakistan Armys tradition of promotions when he stated:-"In our Army, Field Marshal Ayub Khan since he became Commander-inChief in 1951, made sure that only those people were promoted to higher ranks, who proved their personal loyalty to him rather than loyalty to the state. He did so because he had the ambitions of becoming the Head of State from the very beginning. As I said before, he had a contempt for the politicians and with the passage of time he went on getting extension of his tenure till he finally took over in Oct 1958.

From amongst the senior officers anyone who expressed his opinion against the Army indulging in politics was immediately retired. Some of the very capable generals who had passed out from Sandhurst were superseded when General Musa was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Now that he is dead, it is not proper for me to pass any remarks against him but I have no hesitation in saying that he was a typical Gorkha Soldier, who had learnt to obey the command of their superiors whether right or wrong. The junior officers following examples of the seniors, had also learnt that perhaps sycophancy, rather than professional capabilities, was the only criteria for attaining the higher command. Exceptions are always there, but as a general practice many good officers who would have become very good Generals could not go beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel because they were intellectually and professionally far superior to their seniors and always expressed their views without any hesitation whenever and wherever required. Commanders who attain the higher ranks through following the path of sycophancy soon crumble in the face of danger and cannot stand the test of battle fatigue. That has been an inherent weakness in our Army, which perhaps continues till today. I had not intimately known General Zia before he became the Chief of the Army Staff but from his conduct during the Divisional Commanders Conferences, he appeared to me an incompetent and low grade officer. In one of the Division Commanders promotion conferences, I even saw him sleeping with his mouth open. He surpassed all limits of sycophancy when meeting the Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. While in uniform, he used to bow when shaking hands with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

I remember my old Brigade Commander, Brigadier Hayat, with whom I served as his Brigade Major, once told me that he had written in Major Zia ul Haq's ACR when he served under his command, "Not fit to go beyond the rank of a Major". It is an irony of fate that a person of such a calibre had ruled Pakistan for a long period of eleven years till he was finally killed in an air crash."

There is no second opinion possible about how Pakistan Army suffered because of military rule.Thus Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan in an officially sponsored book admitted this cardinal fact when he wrote :-"We had been declining according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political government, the selection and promotion of officers to the higher rank depended on one man's will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the army, the higher command had been slowly weakened by retiring experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971, in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook were invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage

of senior officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to their efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for" The tradition continued till to date.Lieutenant General Mahmood and Usmani with all their drawbacks was far superior to Generals Aziz Yusuf and Ahsan Saleem Hayat promoted to four star rank but sidelined because feared as more resolute and thus dangerous ! It would be actually comical to match these two groups at all ! Usmani was so upright that he risked his career twice as a brigadier and major general when he took a righteous stand with his direct superiors Malik Saleem Khan in Karachi and Mumtaz Gul at Peshawar ! It is no secret that had Yusuf or Ahsan Saleem Hayat been commander 10 Corps in place of Mahmud on 12 October 1999 , Musharrafs coup would have failed ! Perhaps that was the key selection criterion for both ! Lack of resolution ! But that's what Pakistan is all about ! A Conspiracy against originality and boldness ! An undoubted failure !

Pakistan has no short of talent and military genius but our military system is a conspiracy against talent originality and boldness.Below is an article of this scribe published in Daily Nation summarising whats wrong with Pakistan Army published :---

11 April, 2012
How General Zia Went Down on the 17 August 1988

I WAS SERVING AS MTO 15 LANCERS ON 17 AUGUST 1988 AND 15 LANCERS WAS CHARGED WITH ADMINISRATIVE ISSUES OF ZIAS VISIT TO KANDEWALA RANGES ON 17 AUGUST 1988.

AGHA H AMIN

17 August 1988 by Agha Amin August 17, 2008 22:48 Print E-mail Interacts(32) Share

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Tags: Pakistan Military Rule Dictator army history Zia ul Haq An army chief who should never have been the chief in the first place and should have instutionally retired by 1980 was finally terminated by divine design on 17 August 1988.

It was a hot summer day when a C 130 military transporter crashed almost right on the site of a pre 1947 Hindu Shamshan Ghat on the Sutlej River near Bahawalpur. Pakistan's political equation was transformed within flash of a second. General Ziaul Haq's jaundiced shadow was removed from Pakistan's body politics by divine design and tangible endeavour of some mortals! When Zia was suddenly promoted the army chief in 1976 he was an unknown man in the army. With no war record and known for no professional brilliance , Zia was a gift of the civilian prime minister Z.A Bhutto to the Pakistan Army. Late Maulana Kausar Niazi found an American connection in this dark horse when he stated that the US Ambassaor told the Maulana many days before his actual promotion that a man called Zia may be the army chief. Of humble background Zia did not see any action in any of Pakistan's wars except having been master mind of a dirty war of Jordan's punitive action called Black September against the Palestenians.His immediate superior Major General Nawazish found him unsuitable to be a commissioned officer but he survived by sheer luck , begging General Gul Hassan to save him .The infamous arbitrary retirements of more than 15 general officers by intrigue of General Gul Hassan and Z.A Bhutto in December 1971 created an enormous gap in the army in Pakistan and this helped Zia in quick promotion to the rank of major general in 1972.A reliable army source General Chishti states that while posted in Multan Zia practiced extreme sycophancy cultivating PPP stalwarts like Sahibzada Faruq, Hamid Raza Gillani, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi and Sajjad Hussain Qureshi.Chishti thought that the CIA may have successfully cultivated Zia much earlier in 1950s when Zia attended a military course in USA.Brigadier Z.A Khan remembers him as selling eggs as a colonel in mid 60s in Multan. Ironically the army never recommended Zia for promotion to the rank of COAS. General Chishti then the Military Secretary and directly responsible for promotion boards remembers that Zia was seventh in order of seniority in all lieutenant generals.The army chief Tikka did not even include Zia in the list of potential candidates and had recommended Lieutenant General Akbar Khan in an official letter addressed to Mr Z.A Bhutto for the job. Lieutenant General Sharif the seniormost was not recommended by Tikka in this letter.Generals Aftab and Azmat Baksh Awan the second and fourth in seniority according to Chishti were regarded as unsuitable for lack of ability by Tikka. Lieutenant General Ghulam Jillani Khan sixth in seniority and the then DG ISI was considered unsuitable for lack of formation command experience. Lieutenant Generals

Malik Abdul Majeed and Zia ul Haq sixth and seventh in seniority were not even considered by the army high command to be even fit to be considered as they were newly promoted and had very little higher formation command experience. Zia however had ingratiated himself to Z.A Bhutto by his extreme servility and sycophancy. General Gul Hassan in his memoirs ascribes Zia's promotion to the fact that he took insults,snubs, and other similar indignities from Bhutto,whome he regarded as his his creator with inborn grace ! General Zia's tenure as army chief did not improve the Pakistan Army . Not at least in the period 1981 to 1988 when I saw it as a cadet and officer.Pakistan was transformed into a frontline state in the Soviet Afghan War not because of any religious reasons but simply because Pakistan's military junta lacked legitimacy and was isolated. Seeking US and Saudi assistance was its only way of survival . In the process a dangerous affair with diasastorous consequences , which only became evident in mid 1990s was started with religious extremism. Chaudhry Sardar Ali then an Inspector General of police stated in an interview that Zia adopted draconian Islamic laws like Hudood and Qisas just to please the Saudis and to get financial aid. A dubious partnership was created between an illegitimate military junta,US and Saudi intelligence agencies and dubious banks like the Bank of Crooks and Cheats (BCCI) of the the infamous Agha Hassan Abedi. Pakistan was converted into a base for a so called Jihad to ensure Christian Anglo Saxon supremacy against Soviet Russia with US and Saudi dollars. The army became a one man organization with promotion and success for only those officers who were in Zia's good books. This anachronistic situation continued till 17 August 1988. Great preparations were made when Zia was comin to witness the tank demonstration at Kandewala Ranges. Baba ice cream a special ice cream that Zia loved was arranged from Multan. Special lotahs were bought for Zia and his party's ablution. Chefs were pooled in from various formations to prepare Zia's lunch at Tamewali Rest House on 17 August 1988. Zia never had that lunch. His death was fixed on the Hindu Shamshan Ghat at Basti Lal Kamal. An army chief who should never have been the chief in the first place and should have instutionally retired by 1980 was finally terminated by divine design on 17 August 1988. The harm that he inflicted on Pakistan purely motivated by his selfish policies to stay in power lingers on and haunts Pakistan's very existence today twenty years later on 17th August 2008. Today thanks to Zia political leadership in Pakistan has been nearly destroyed and military talent is non existent.

How General Zia Went Down!

This article, by Edward Jay Epstein, published in Vanity Fair, June 1989, is about the air crash in 1988 which killed Gen Zia, the U.S. envoy and a number of senior officers. Since then, quite a

number of publications came in the market, but this report seems to be the most authentic and incisive. The investigation is thorough and analysis is methodical. This article about the crash is like Agatha Christie's thriller Murder on the Orient Express, in which everyone aboard the train had a motive for murder. The suspects here are, Americans, Indians, Russians, Afghans and even Pakistan Army. Please ignore the poor quality of paper as time takes its toll on papers also, human beings no exception. Please open the attachment and read the thrilling story

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Atlas of a great tank battle

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Atlas of a bloody Indian Pakistan battle

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-Posted By Blogger to Understanding Each Other, Diversity and Dissent at 5/14/2013 08:52:00 PM

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