You are on page 1of 4


modern science anticipates finding laws that are mathematically idealist. Rather than the realism of Aristotle, classical modern science from Descartes on is mathematically idealist in the sense of Archimedes and Pythagoras, betraying its mystic origins. The exactness of classical modern science arises from its desire to extract (exact) from reality an ideal universe of abstract objects, the "return to the world" of scientific ideology (from the medieval focus on the word) is equivocal in that the "world" of modern classical science is not the reality of experience but the ideality of the experimental situation, where anything in reality that might influence the ideality of the ideal phenomenon is excluded to the greatest degree possible. Thus, without radically changing the meaning of 'empirical', experimental science is precisely anti-empirical, where the point of the experiment is to refute observation and experience in favour of an a priori ideal mathematical hypothesis, an idealist insight rather than a realist observation. This idealist insight is posited as an explanation of the real from an ideal origin, while understanding of the real is ignored and neglected. Inverse insight is employed when explanation fails in the face of the unintelligible, the 'empirical excess' that science is at a loss to account for. Inverse insight simply posits that an explanation is unnecessary and irrelevant, such as an explanation as to why inertial transformations are irrelevant to physics, reducing physics to the science of change in motion, rather than the science of motion. This change in the telos of science from understanding how things are, as in Aristotelian realism, to an explanation of the origin of how things are, arises from modern science's embedded theology, which include the ideas of nominalism and efficiency as the arbiter between competing theories. The nominalist, meaningless universe of objects is only a sensible proposition, given that we always already experience meaning in real things, if a separate origin of meaning in the divine is simultaneously posited. Mathematical idealism originates with mathesis as what the experimenter brings to the experiment: an a priori hypothesis that can be tested in the single experiment (the repeatability of the experiment doesn't dispute the cruciality of the single experiment, since it is the

same experiment that is repeated, albeit often with minor changes to remove any remaining interference from reality). A failed experiment often doesn't cause the experimenter to abandon the hypothesis, but to look for features of reality not excluded that are affecting the ideal result. The experiment is thus the origin of the 'as-if' that remains in all scientific explanations. Experiment does not deal with reality but is metaphorical, excluding any aspect of reality that might interfere with the exposition of the ideal metaphor. The "new" mathematics begun with Cantor objectifies the individual mathesis of the experimenter by substituting an ideal world of sets of sets, further removing the ideal mathematical world from reality. Anything can be represented in an ideal set, so long as any dynamic functionality is removed. As arbitrary, sets cannot represent the functionality of systems, but only the measurable features that remain when the system is no longer functioning. The antipathy to systemic emergence and self-organization from scientists, generally posed as the question "can the whole be more than the sum of its parts?", betrays the loss of dynamism inherent in sets, by referring to the totality of a system as a 'sum', when a system is the multiple of relations between subsystems, subsystems that can be replaced without affecting the system as long as they are functionally equivalent, i.e. the relations remain intact. The unpredictability when it comes to measurement of emergent features and self-organizing sysems, and even more so emergent features that form relations, becoming emergent self-organizing systems, is antithetical to modern science's desire to posit exact, ideal mathematical laws that allow for complete predictability of measurement. Technology, as the fundamental revealing that modern science must account for, has no such ideological issues, with such results as that self-organizing, emergent features of cellular telephony, which 3G and 4G networks exploit to enhance the performance of identical hardware systems, is denied by scientists who simultaneously use 3G and 4G cellular networks daily. In order to maintain the studied ignorance of systemic behaviour, modern science has to remain reductionist, insisting on bottom up causality, in the sense that the sparagmos of taking systems apart and

reducing them to non-functioning parts that cannot then be determined causally by the functioning system reaches the height of absurdity in Cian Dorr's anti-ontology of mereological nihilism, where only base particles can be said to properly 'be', everything else is simply an arbitrary set of such determining particles. Although the sciences of complex phenomena, from chemistry to sociology, posit a reductionism where everything can ultimately be reduced to physics, the very need for these sciences betrays the fact that physics cannot account for more complex, emergent phenomena. A further absurdity is that physics itself, while investigating more and more basic particles, simultaneously views the higher levels of systemic complexity as causally determinative of the behaviour of lower level systems, the very situation denied by members of the communities of researchers of more complex phenomena,. As a simple example, although electrons are one of the necessary bases for atomic structure, the atom is causally determinative of the behaviour of its constitutive electrons. Thus in the subject matter of the very science pointed to by the others as determinative bottom-up, top-down causality is assumed. The behaviour of molecules, similarly, cannot be predicted by the behaviour of their atomic constituents, but chemical behaviours do deterministically affect the atoms that make up the molecules. This top-down causality is consistent through biology, psychology and sociology. With the substitution in post-classical modern science of absolute numeric measurement for statistical probabilities, the older laws of classical modern science become ideal limits that experiment attempts to get closer and closer to. As a result the idealist presumption have not fundamentally changed. As an example, Galileo's law of falling bodies only holds precisely in a pure vacuum, which cannot exist in reality, it becomes a limit that can be approached closer and closer as we are able to produce a situation that is closer to a pure vacuum. In more complex situations, the very randomness inherent in probabilistic situations becomes the ideal limit that a representative sample must approach. The a priori ideal must be approached as closely as possible for a given statistical sample to be considered representative. This foundational equivocation between the ideal situation of the experiment and the reality of experience is the sole support for the experiment as crucial to scientific methodology. The current shift to

'knowledge work', which dispenses with the repeatable experiment as an expensive irrelevance simultaneously destroys the common praxis of the experiment that turns a group of individual scientists into a community of researchers. The removal of funding for modern science in favour of knowledge work, which looks for results that can be applied with some degree of predictability across a variety of situations, is often blamed by scientists on religious organizations and their belief-systems when it is in fact a removal by capital and capital-controlled government of their support for modern science. Capital has no further need for modern science to undermine religious authority as a competing power, and thus is now in the process of dismantling the community of scientific researchers as a remaining power that could oppose the power of absolute capital. The idealist and ultimately mystic origin of mathematical modern science only makes this dismantling easier. Simultaneously, by creating a pseudo-conflict between religious organizations (which today are the largest funders of pure scientific research) science is undermined using the remnants of power in religious organizations by creating a false rift between mainstream religion and science. This false rift is exploited by ideological pseudo- scientists such as Richard Dawkins to enhance capitalist privilege at the expense of community, whether religious, scientific or both.