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CASHION NEVADA SPENDTHRIFT TRUST, STEVEN MARK HAYDEN, Plaintiffs, v. ROBERT S. VANCE JR., Defendant. COMPLAINT COME NOW Plaintiffs, William B. Cashion Nevada Spendthrift Trust and Stephen Mark Hayden (“Plaintiffs”), by and through the undersigned counsel, and hereby files this Complaint suing the above-named defendant for injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to applicable Federal and State statutes and the common law. Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction and alleges as follows: JURISDICTION AND PARTIES 1. Plaintiffs allege violations of Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment; 42 Civil Action File No. ____________________ JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
U.S.C § 1983; and the common law and seeks damages, attorney’s fees and costs, declaratory relief and injunctive relief pursuant thereto. 2. U.S.C § 1983. This is an action for damages, declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42
3. 1343. 4.
This Court is vested with original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C §§1331 and
Venue is proper in this Court, the Southern Division of the Northern District
of Alabama pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 (b) and Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. 5. Plaintiff, WILLIAM B. CASHION NEVADA SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
(hereinafter referred to as “Trust”), is a spend thrift trust duly organized under Nevada state law. The trustee, Angela Rea Hayden is a resident of the State of Alabama. Trust maintains its records within the State of Alabama. 6. Plaintiff, STEVEN MARK HAYDEN (hereinafter referred to as “Hayden”), is
a resident of the State of Alabama. 7. The Defendant, ROBERT S. VANCE, JR., (herein after referred to as
“Vance”) is an individual who resides in Jefferson County Alabama, within the Southern Division of the Northern District. 8. All events giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in the Southern Division of the
Northern District of Alabama. The Northern District of Alabama is the appropriate venue for this matter unless the Court deems it proper to transfer this matter to another division due to any existing relationships with defendant and/or his wife. STATEMENT OF FACTS 9. Trust was sued by William B. Cashion (“Cashion”) in state court, in Jefferson
County Alabama for declaratory relief. Case No. 01 CV 2012 000209.
The state court case was filed on February 8, 2012, in the Birmingham Division of
Jefferson County, an inappropriate venue, as none of the parties reside in or maintain a principal place of business in the Birmingham Division of Jefferson County. 11. Cashion then promptly filed a motion to transfer the state court case to the
“Commercial Litigation Docket” thereby enabling him to select their preferred judge, Robert Vance. 12. The “Commercial Litigation Docket” was created by Jefferson County Circuit
Court (Birmingham Division) Administrative Order No. 2009-23, a copy of which is attached hereto as “Exhibit 1.” 13. Initially, Cashion’s case was assigned to Circuit Court Judge Houston Brown. The
Case Action Summary Sheet for said action which reflects the appointment of Judge Brown has been provided herewith as “Exhibit 2.” 14. On February 8, 2012, Judge Vance signed a Temporary Restraining Order
(“TRO”) in said case despite the fact that said matter was not assigned to his court. 15. Vance had no authority or jurisdiction to rule on Cashion’s case as it had not been
assigned to him. A true and correct copy of said extrajudicial TRO is provided herewith as ‘Exhibit 3.” 16. Jr.(“Vance”). 17. The Case Action Summary Report reflects that Judge Houston Brown was The TRO was signed at 3:30 p.m. on February 8, 2012, by Judge Robert Vance,
assigned to this case at 2:02 p.m. on February 8, 2012, about an hour and a half before Judge Vance signed the TRO. Exhibit 2. 3
At the time that Vance signed the TRO he did so with the knowledge that he did
not preside over the case. The electronic case action summary reflects that Judge Vance had available on his computer the notice and assignment of the case to Judge Houston Brown. 19. It cannot be argued or alleged that the TRO was entered pursuant to some
emergency jurisdiction or exigent circumstances as a result of Judge Brown being unavailable to rule on the case at that particular moment. 20. Judge Brown was in fact available to sign the order at the time Cashion sought out
Vance for an ex parte hearing on the matter. 21. At 2:21 p.m. that same day Cashion had already approached Judge Brown seeking
an ex parte order and hearing on the matter of whether to transfer the case to Vance. Judge Brown entered an order at that time submitting the issue of reassignment to the presiding circuit judge. A true and correct copy of said order of Judge Brown is provided herewith as “Exhibit 23.” 22. However at that time Judge Brown was not relieved of authority to preside over
the case and Vance was not granted authority or jurisdiction over the case. At that time the case was not before Judge Vance. Judge Brown in his order made no claim that he had authority to transfer the case to Judge Vance. In fact, Judge Brown at that time did not have authority to transfer or reassign the case as he was not the presiding judge in the circuit. Judge Vance also had no authority to transfer the case to his own docket. The Alabama Rules of Judicial Administration dictate that only the presiding judge in a circuit may reassign cases within the circuit. ARJA 6, 13, 16, et al.
Judge Vance has acknowledged that the authority to assign dockets rests with the
presiding judge of the circuit. He has also acknowledged that his authority to rule on this matter was only in exigent circumstances. He however failed to identify an exigent circumstance that existed on March 28, 2012, that would justify him entertaining an ex parte hearing or entering an ex parte order. Judge Vance claimed to have an exigent circumstance because the presiding judge was not in his chambers at the time. However, this argument ignores the fact the case was assigned to another judge that was already involved in the case and had in fact entered an order in the case. Judge Brown was present in the courthouse as evidenced by the fact that he had entered an order 2:21 p.m. in the referenced matter. Judge Vance makes no claim that Judge Brown was unavailable to hear the case. A true and correct copy of the Judge Vance’s order refusing to recuse is provided herewith as “Exhibit 28.” 24. It is clear that Cashion and his attorneys wanted Judge Vance to preside over their
case. Cashion first filed the case in a venue where none of the parties to the action reside or maintain a principal place of business. Cashion filed a motion with his complaint requesting that the matter be transferred to the Commercial Litigation Docket. All cases approved for the Commercial Litigation Docket are assigned to Judge Vance unless he declines them on the basis of docket volume. Exhibit 1. Cashion went to an improper venue specifically to select Judge Vance. 25. Judge Vance not only accommodated this forum shopping, he ventured to rule on
the case before the forum shoppers even made it to the checkout aisle. Judge Vance cannot justify his usurpation of authority on February 8, 2012. Further, the flimsy argument of exigent circumstances does not hold up for the next three rulings which he enters without authority. 5
Subsequent to the entry of the TRO, and over the space of a month, Judge Vance
enters three more orders in the case, including extending the TRO. Judge Vance never describes the exigent circumstances that existed for the next month that enabled him to make rulings in a case that was not before him. Exhibit 28. There were in fact no exigent circumstances. Judge Vance simply usurped authority. 27. Exhibit 3 is believed to have been prepared by Cashion’s attorneys at Maynard,
Cooper and Gale (“Maynard”) as it bears the markings of Maynard’s internal documents in the lower left hand corner of each page. Further, the document was prepared before the case had received a case number as the same was handwritten. 28. Below the signature line for the judge the following was typed in: “Robert S.
Vance, Jr., Circuit Judge.” Exhibit 3. Attorneys for Cashion have indicated that Defendant was given the proposed order on a flash drive and that Defendant or his staff edited the same. If so then he and/or his staff certainly had access to his computer which contained the case action summary at the time that he entered the order without jurisdiction, and therefore, had notice that he was acting in a case which was not before him. 29. Regardless of who typed Vance’s name below the signature line it is clear that
Maynard had selected Judge Robert Vance to preside over the case before this matter was filed. Exhibit 3. Counsel offered affidavit testimony verifying that they in fact did prepare this case for Judge Vance. A true and correct copy of the Affidavit of James P. Naftel, II, is provided herewith as “Exhibit 29.”1
1 The attachments to the Affidavit of Naftel have not been filed herewith as they are voluminous and unnecessary for the purposes of this complaint. If the Court desires to see all of the attachments they will be provided on request.
Naftel testified that he along with co-counsel presented the issues of the case and
the proposed TRO to Judge Brown before taking it to Judge Vance. However, Judge Brown declined to provide the requested TRO. Exhibit 29 (“Mr. Miller explained the complaint, the nature of the case, and our request for a TRO to Judge Brown”). The issue of the TRO had already been presented to the judge assigned to the case but he declined to enter a TRO. The matter was then taken to Vance who did not preside over the matter. Vance usurped authority and entered an order where the assigned judge had declined to do so. 31. On March 7, 2012, Judge Vance again entered an order in the trial court though
the case was not before him. Said order is provided herewith as “Exhibit 4.” The same reflects that on March 7, 2012, at 9:17 a.m. Judge Vance extended the TRO though he lacked authority to do so. There is no evidence that exigent circumstances existed that would necessitate Judge Vance entering an order in another judge’s case. Further, the extension of a TRO does not in and of itself present an emergency situation. In fact, the expiration of a TRO is in fact prefigured with the signing of the initial TRO. 32. On March 13, 2012, Judge Robert Vance entered two additional orders in the case
though the case was not before him. The first was entered that morning at 8:15 a.m. and the second was entered at 4:04 p.m. True and correct copies of said orders are provided herewith as “Exhibits 5” and “6” respectively. Again, no exigent circumstance existed necessitating Judge Vance’s interference in the case.
The case was not transferred to Judge Vance until the following day at 4:37 p.m.
when an order signed by the presiding judge was entered into the record. Said order is provided herewith as “Exhibit 7.”2 34. Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure 58 clearly dictates that an order does not
become final or binding until entered on the case action summary. The order transferring this case to Defendant was not entered until March 14, 2012, at 4:37 p.m. when it appeared on the case action summary sheet. 35. Thus, at the instigation of Cashion through counsel, Judge Vance entered four (4)
orders in this matter without authority or jurisdiction to do so. 36. Because these orders were rendered in a matter not assigned to Judge Vance they
represent non-judicial acts under the color of law. Vance’s acts as discussed above violate both the substantive and procedural due process rights of the Trust and Hayden. 37. Said extra-judicial orders were prejudicial to the Trust in that they prevented the
Trust from performing its duties to nurture the trust principal. The Trust suffered the loss of considerable investment returns and interest. The Trust was also deprived of assets valued at more than $20,000,000.00. 38. The Trust and Hayden also continue to suffer considerable costs and attorneys
fees in an effort to overcome Vance’s usurpation of judicial authority. 39. Vance has further exacerbated the damage caused by his illegal TRO and TRO
extension by ordering a Preliminary Injunction.
2 The order for the transfer of the case was rendered March 13, 2012. However, said order was not entered until March 14, 2012. Pursuant to Rule 58 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure an order is not binding until entered
On March 28, 2012, the conspiracy between Cashion and Vance to deprive the
Trust of due process continued as an ex parte hearing was conducted wherein Judge Vance and counsel for Cashion discussed an injunction and settlement of this matter. 41. “Exhibit 8.” 42. Exhibit 8 reflects that present at the hearing were only Judge Vance, Attorney A true and correct copy of the transcript of said hearing is provided herewith as
Bethay for Cashion, and Attorney Miller for Cashion.3 43. A review of the Case Action Summary Report shows that on March 28, 2012, no
Answer had been filed on behalf of the Trust and that no attorney of record had noticed an appearance on behalf of Angela Rea Hayden as trustee for the William B. Cashion Nevada Spendthrift Trust. Exhibit 2. 44. Neither Angela Rea Hayden nor anyone else claiming to represent the trust was
present for the March 28, 2012, hearing. In fact, Mrs. Hayden has never been to the Jefferson County Courthouse. 45. A review of the billing records for John Charles of the Anderson Law Firm,
attorney for individuals Steven Mark Hayden and Angela Rea Hayden, shows that he also was
into the Case Action Summary. Therefore, Judge Vance had no authority to act in the case until 4:37 p.m. on March 14, 2012. 3 Counsel for Cashion has since argued that the transcript of said hearing is in error. They have argued that counsel for some of the other defendants were present though not reflected in the record. This convenient explanation has only come nearly a year after the fact and supported by the hearsay testimony of Naftel who testifies in affidavit that he was not present for the alleged negotiations and hearing. Cashion has also sought affidavit testimony from John Charles, attorney for Hayden at the time. However, Charles’ testimony contradicts his own billing records and is unreliable. Sadly the later concocted story of Hayden being present at the hearing is not supported by the record or any documents. Though there exists a dispute of fact regarding whether or not Hayden was present at the hearing, it is indisputable that counsel for the Trust was not present. In fact, no counsel for trust had yet filed a notice of appearance or filed an Answer at that point in the litigation. Alabama law prohibits an artificial entity, such as a trust or corporation, from appearing in court without counsel.
not present at the hearing. A true and correct copy of the redacted invoice of the Anderson Law Firm is provided herewith as “Exhibit 9.”4 46. Exhibit 8 records that the parties had reached an agreement and that they were
present before the Court to receive the Court’s blessing on said agreement. However, neither counsel for the Trust nor the trust representative was present in court on March 28, 2012, to approve the settlement. 47. Two days later the misconduct of the ex parte hearing is taken a step further.
On March 30, 2012, Judge Vance entered a Preliminary Injunction Order wherein he states that Angela Rea Hayden as trustee for the Nevada Spendthrift Trust was present at the hearing on March 28, 2012. A true and correct copy of said order is provided herewith as Exhibit 24. This statement is a fabrication and is not consistent with the Case Action Summary,5 counsel’s time records, Judge Vance’s prior order6, the contents of the hearing transcript, nor the prior statements of the court. Exhibit 2, 8, 9. 48. At a later hearing Judge Vance also announced that he was not bound by any
statutory provision which limits a judge’s ability to receive campaign contributions. A true and correct copy of said hearing dated November 8, 2012, is provided herewith as “Exhibit 12.”
4 John Charles later provided an affidavit claiming to have been present at the hearing, however, his affidavit is inconsistent with the transcript of the hearing and his own billing records. John Charles does not explain how he traveled to and from court that day from his office located in Montgomery, Alabama but only billed .1 hours for a phone call. His office is more than 100 miles from the courthouse. Also, John Charles was fired as counsel for conspiring with Cashion. 5 No counsel had entered an appearance on behalf of the trustee as reflected in the case action summary. This is of particular import because a Trust must be represented in court by counsel. Alabama law prohibits a trust from appearing pro se in court. Therefore, it is impossible for Judge Vance’s statement that the Trust was present in court to be true. 6 Exhibit 6 reflects the fact that Judge Vance recognized on March 13, 2012 that John Charles of the Anderson Law Firm was counsel for only Steven Mark Hayden and Angela Rea Hayden. Judge Vance does not therein recognize John Charles as attorney for the Trust.
It is believed that he is referring to Ala Code 1975, §12-24-2 which limits
campaign contributions to not more than $2000.00 from any law firm to any circuit court judge. If this threshold amount is exceeded then the Judge is disqualified from hearing the case. Ala Code 1975, §12-24-1 et seq. The law itself indicates that disqualification is required because an appearance of impropriety exists when a judge takes substantial campaign contributions from litigants or counsel. And it is the appearance of impropriety that necessitates the judge’s recusal. 50. A review of the records provided to the Alabama Secretary of State indicate that
the lawyers at the firm representing Cashion contributed at least $3600.00 to Judge Vance’s most recent campaign while Cashion’s case was pending. Provided herewith as “Exhibit 13” are true and correct copies of campaign disclosures of Robert Vance which reflect contributions of more than $2000.00 from lawyers employed by Maynard. Provided herewith as “Exhibit 14” is a list of lawyers employed by Maynard and the amount and date of their campaign contributions. There may have been other contributions from Maynard through PACs however, Vance has refused to disclose that information. 51. At the November hearing Vance also disclosed that he had previously been
involved in a controversy wherein he received excessive campaign contributions from Maynard. Exhibit 12. 52. Judge Vance justified his disregard for the aforementioned statutes by saying that
the issue was never addressed by the Alabama Supreme Court when a Petition for Writ of Mandamus was filed in another case. Exhibit 12.7
7 Cashion has sought to justify Vance’s disobedience by claiming the referenced statutes have never been enforced. It is hardly satisfying to argue that a crime is only a crime when prosecuted.
However, Judge Vance’s disregard for law was never vindicated as it was never
addressed. Exhibit 12. Judge Vance has sought to justify his conduct by claiming that the aforementioned statute has never been enforced. However, the law reflects a public policy concern that pursuant to the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics a judge must recuse if there is an appearance of impropriety. Accepting such donations during the case presents the appearance of impropriety. The Canons of Judicial Ethics have been enforced and regardless of the application of the above-referenced statutes, Vance has an obligation to recuse if there is evidence to show an appearance of impropriety. $3600.00 in campaign contributions is evidence of impropriety and requires recusal. However, Judge Vance has ignored his obligation and persisted in a course of action that continues to deprive Plaintiffs of due process. 54. litigation. 55. Over the course of the litigation, Judge Vance has granted every motion filed by Judge Vance has manifest an unwavering commitment to Cashion throughout the
Cashion and denied every motion filed by the Trust. Exhibit 2-7; 16; 19-20; 22-23. 56. As stated above Judge Vance was so eager to issue orders favorable to Cashion
that he did so four (4) times before he was even assigned to this matter. Exhibits 3 – 6. 57. 58. None of Judge Vance’s orders or rulings cite to any legal justification. Judge Vance’s rulings exhibit prejudice and bias in favor of Cashion. Exhibit 2-7;
16; 19-20; 22-23. 59. For instance, Judge Vance has denied the Trust the right to a jury trial despite the
fact it timely demanded the same in its initial Answer. The right to a jury trial is a due process
right guaranteed by the Alabama Constitution. A true and correct copy of Judge Vance’s order granting Cashion’s Motion to Strike is provided herewith as Exhibit 16.” 60. There is no justification for this denial to be found in the law. And in fact Judge
Vance could not cite to any in his order. Exhibit 16. 61. A true and correct copy of Trust’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Jury
Charge is provided herewith as “Exhibit 17.” 62. The issue of the jury demand is not a complex one. The rules of procedure dictate
that a jury demand must be raised within the pleadings or 30 (thirty) days thereafter. The demand was made in the Answer and the record reflects that the Trust had not made an appearance in this case before the Answer was filed. See Exhibit 2, Case Action Summary which shows that no appearance had been registered with the Court for the Trust before the Answer containing the jury demand was filed. 63. Judge Vance could not and did not cite to any authority justifying his decision to
strike the jury demand. Exhibit 16.8 64. Thus, Judge Vance again reached beyond the bounds of the law to issue a decision
which would again prevent any unbiased review of this case. See Exhibits 3-6 and Exhibit 16 (Judge Vance oversteps authority to prevent the case from going before Judge Brown or a jury). 65. At every turn Judge Vance has acted to prevent this matter from going before an
unbiased tribunal for adjudication. Judge Vance deprived plaintiffs of their procedural and
8 It should also be noted here that Judge Vance’s erroneous and biased ruling was challenged via a Petition For Writ of Mandamus. However, said petition was denied without briefing. Justice Woodall in company with others refused to address the merits of the petition based solely on the reputation of Judge Vance. There can be no other justification as briefs were not even allowed to be submitted.
substantive due process rights when the matter was not before him and he has continued the same path since his appointment. 66. Defendants timely filed affirmative defenses and motions to have this case
transferred to the proper venue. A true and correct copy of Trust’s motions to transfer venue are provided herewith as “Exhibit 18.” 67. There is no question that the Birmingham Division of Jefferson County is not the
proper venue for this action as none of the parties reside in or maintain a principal place of business in this jurisdiction. 68. Again, Judge Vance denied the Trust’s motions without legal basis. A true and
correct copy of Vance’s order denying the change of venue are provided herewith as “Exhibit 19.”9 69. Here again Judge Vance entered an order to prevent this matter from being heard
by a proper and competent tribunal. See Exhibits 3-6; 16 and 19 (Judge Vance oversteps authority to prevent the case from going before Judge Brown, a jury, or any competent judge in the proper venue). 70. Judge Vance has issued orders which manifest extreme bias in that he has stripped
Plaintiffs of due process and actively prevented Defendants from even presenting a defense. 71. Judge Vance has entered a Protective Order in the case which prevents any
discovery of facts relating to 10:16 Mining, Corporation (“10:16 Mining”). A true and correct copy of said Protective Order is provided herewith as “Exhibit 20.”
9 The issue of venue was likewise raised in the aforementioned petition which was never allowed hearing as discussed in the prior footnote.
Cashion claimed that false statements regarding 10:16 Mining have been made by
Defendants. However, Judge Vance’s order prevents any attempt to determine whether or not the statements regarding 10:16 Mining are in fact true. The truth is a complete defense to a defamation claim, but pursuant to Judge Vance’s Order, the truth can have no place in his court. 73. Also, the state trial court case hinges on the actions of an octogenarian Plaintiff
who executed a binding power of attorney. As a defense, Defendants have sought to explore the capacity of the same to act in varying capacities and to contract. Thus, an appropriate Rule 35 Motion for Mental Exam was requested. A true and correct copy of said motion is provided herewith as “Exhibit 21.” 74. Vance denied said motion, and again provided no justification for the same. A
true and correct copy of said order is provided herewith as “Exhibit 22.” This complaint is not an attempt to transfer venue or to merely seek review of state court rulings. Rather, this complaint seeks redress for the violations of the statutes cited below. The actions taken by Vance before he was appointed to the case clearly violated due process rights. All of the actions taken by Vance from February 8, 2012, through March 14, 2012, were extrajudicial in nature and are not subject to judicial immunity. Said acts were done outside of his judicial capacity and without authority though under the color of law. The subsequent actions that he has taken are included herein for context, as they reflect Vance’s prolonged efforts to ensure that the harm he did before appointment continues indefinitely. COUNT I - VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 75. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 15
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the district of Columbia shall be considered shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 76. Defendant Vance deprived Plaintiffs of his constitution right to due process under
the color of law when Plaintiffs were subjected to orders entered without authority or jurisdiction. 77. The TRO and extension that were entered by Vance deprived Plaintiff Trust of
significant property interests valued at over $20,000,000.00 without due process. 78. Four times Vance usurped the authority of Circuit Court Judge Houston Brown by
pretending to be the judge in the trial court case described herein above. 79. Vance’s rulings and orders in a case which was not before him were clearly non-
judicial acts performed outside of his judicial capacity as he had no authority to pronounce orders in the referenced matter. 80. The record reflects that when each of these orders was entered Vance knew or
should have known that he had no authority to act. Vance acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction when he entered said orders. 81. Vance was not the presiding judge at the time that the case was assigned to Judge
Brown. Nor was he the presiding judge of the circuit when he entered his first four rulings in the case involving the Trust. Vance had no authority to appoint himself to said case.
Vance’s actions were completely without authority or jurisdiction. Trust requests that the court declare the actions of Vance taken in the
aforementioned state case, are void as having been entered without authority or jurisdiction. 84. This case centers on a conflict which was not before Vance at the time he acted to
the detriment of Plaintiff’s due process rights as described herein. 85. The visit made by Cashion seeking orders from Vance was outside of Vance’s
official capacity, as Vance did not preside over the case. 86. It cannot be argued that the subsequent transfer of this case to Vance remedies the
earlier unauthorized, illegal acts. Covering up an error is not the same as remedying an error. In fact, now that Vance has been assigned to the case all relief of any kind has been cut off. 87. Vance has exploited the office of judge by purporting to act where he had no
authority. And he did so in furtherance of a conspiracy to deprive the Trust and Hayden of due process. 88. Vance has no immunity as the acts complained of (entry of four orders without
judicial authority or jurisdiction) were not judicial acts. 89. The orders entered by Vance were not judicial acts because Vance had no official
capacity relating to the Trust’s case in which to act. Vance had not been assigned to the case. Vance’s relationship to this case at the time the orders were entered was nothing more than a bystander. He was not a party to the case, he was not a witness to the facts of the case, he was not assigned as the judge to the case, and he was not the presiding judge over the circuit wherein the case was filed. He had no official relationship with this case. Therefore, the orders that he entered were under the color of law but outside of Vance’s judicial capacity. 17
Vances actions of conspiring with Cashion and entering four orders without
authority were personal acts and are thus not subject to any doctrine of judicial immunity. While it is appreciated that judges should be free to act in their judicial capacity without fear of having to fend off law suits such immunity cannot be extended to personal actions taken by a judge in a matter over which he does not preside. To extend judicial immunity to this extreme is to place judges above the law in all of their personal affairs. If we are prepared to say a judge is immune for all of his personal acts then we must be prepared to admit that our courts are no longer courts of law but rather courts of men. WHEREFORE, PREMESIS CONSIDERED, Plaintiff prays this Honorable court will award damages in the amount of $25,000,000.00 for lost principal and interest on assets wrongfully taken from the Trust, further grant attorneys fees and costs. Additionally or alternatively, Plaintiff seeks equitable relief in the form of a preliminary injunction to prevent Vance from acting in any regard until this matter is resolved in this forum or at least until this matter has been heard in open court before this Tribunal. ***PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY STRUCK JURY***
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND NOW, having pled the above complaint the Plaintiffs now further move the Court for an emergency injunction and pray: 1. 2. That Judge Vance, be enjoined from any further usurpation of authority. That Defendant be enjoined from entering any order which violates the Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights discussed above.
That the Defendant, be immediately stayed from executing any order regarding
the property of the Trust. 4. That the proceedings in the Jefferson County Circuit Court involving the
Plaintiffs, be immediately stayed from further hearings until these matters can be heard by this Tribunal.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demand judgment against Defendant and request the following injunctive and declaratory relief: A. That the Court declare Defendant has violated 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 as such relates to the Plaintiff’s right to due process as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution; That the Court enter a Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Defendant from entering an order in this matter until this matter can be heard by this Tribunal; That the Court award reasonable attorney’s fees, costs (including expert fees) and other expenses of suit, to the Plaintiffs; and That the Court award such other and further relief as it deems necessary, just and proper.
Dated this the 11th day of February, 2013. Respectfully submitted,
s/Austin Burdick Austin Burdick Attorney for Plaintiffs The Burdick Law Firm
1020 Ninth Ave. SW Bessemer, Alabama 35022
CLERK OF COURT PLEASE SERVE THE DEFENDANT AT THE FOLLOWING 19
ADDRESS: Robert S. Vance Jr. 716 Richard Arrington, Jr. BLVD N. Birmingham, Alabama 35203
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