Messaging, Organizing Go Hand in Hand: An Exit Summary For Project Moon Raker

A Discussion Framework
Evaluating the Successful Re-election of Mayor Michael L. Rama March 2012 to May 15, 2013

Part 1
1

Preliminary Assessment
The project began with a competition analysis based on raw sampling data from the pro-administration Liberal Party and the opposition United Nationalist Alliance outlined as follows:

Part 2
2

Middle-game Adjustments

Middle-game Adjustments
3

Middle-game Adjustments
4

Part 3 End-game Refinements
5

Part 4 How Things Play Down: Strategic and Tactical Review
6

Tommy’s Losses: Sore Campaigns Do Not Pay
WHEN the smoke of political battle cleared, re-election-bound Michael Rama has had 6,376 votes more than Rep. Tomas Osmena, in a surprising upset painted on odds most people thought were largely on the challenger’s favor, analysts say. The final count showed 217,448 for Rama and 211,072 for Osmena, as though history repeated itself before Cebu: little David killed Goliath again! What went wrong for Tommy? What turned out right for Rama? The campaign has had three stages build-up, consolidation, and momentum and obviously Tomas Osmena and his BOPK party should have found themselves deficient and wanting in these aspects, say analysts from privateran Tools & Strategy, a local politico-economic think-tank. The Rama campaign plan was simple: it was meant to draw sharp comparison and/or distinction between two protagonists, in various political hues, socioeconomic colours, and impact to individuals and organizations, Mayor Rama says. The BOPK, on the other hand, from start to finish, was bent on demolition jobs to discredit Rama, painting him as indecisive, unfocused, lacking in vision, and at a certain point, gay. It was powered by one man’s anger and hatred. Tommy had lost more than half of the formidable coalition of 726 organizations he had built when he first ran for mayor in January 1988, analysts say. Against Mayor Rama’s bottom-to-top structure, which was backstopped by strong allies in former Rep. Antonio Cuenco, former mayor Alvin Garcia, 46 barrio captains, 414 barrio councilmen, and a host of former city councilmen, he has little strength to count on when he began campaigning in May 2012. Suspicions of infiltration and loyalty questions within the ranks repeatedly stalled his organizing pace. The BOPK has been decimated by defections, intrigue, bickering, disunity, and brain drain in the last 24 years.

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While Rama was able to organize and empower 64 parallel organizations built around friendships he has forged with city government department heads and CEOs of home-grown companies during the consolidation stage around January 2013, Tommy increasingly relied on 34 allies among barrio captains, 51 newly formed voter fronts and/or alliances with urban-poor sector groups, and money to move volunteers led by untrained, inefficient leaders, says lawyer Jan Ponce, one of Rama’s consultants. Team Rama had thousands of volunteers who served without pay or allowance. Tommy and his party also had thousands, all hired hands, ready for work because he had money to pay, Ponce adds. By the time Rama acquired momentum during most days of April 2013, the BOPK caught itself on the defensive on many fronts, drawing heavy fire on seven decisive issues integrity, experience, competence, charisma, health, performance, and platform all directed on Tommy for which altogether the party eventually failed to respond well, say analysts from the Campaigns & Image Group. Leaks on the BOPK-commissioned political tracking poll and voter preference survey conducted by students of the University of San Carlos and some of its professors, in which Osmena and the BOPK were lackluster and faring less than expected, have had created the strong public perception that Rama has finally gained the upper hand. Twelve days into May 13, during which concluding campaigns by Team Rama zeroed in on Tommy’s character, attitude toward people (peers and subordinates), performance as legislator and past mayor, and platform, the BOPK instead viciously counterattacked with negative campaigning, raising the specter of Rama’s alleged ties with drug lords, Rama’s failed marriage, and Rama’s psychiatry record, that boomeranged altogether and hurt Tommy even more, analysts say. Despite massive election spending for some last-ditch attempt to wrest the initiative, the endgame turned tables in Rama’s favour. Tommy lost 447 votes in Guadalupe, where up to 31,756 of its 32, 411voters turned up to cast their ballots and where he is a registered voter. Worse, in his own precinct, he lost to Rama 27 against one. Rama lost only in 29 of the 80 barrios and 547,681 electors that made up the city’s political landscape.

Summary of Successful Actions
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March to October 2012 Phase I: The Moon Rake project was able to touch base with 64 organizations within Team Rama, succeeded in laying down the Seven-Item Issue Framework, completed indoctrination and trainings for speakers, and empowered them into community engagement through the use of 16 white papers; Phase II: Succeeded in touching base with senior citizen organizations across the wide demographic of 62,000 ageing men and women who are still qualified to vote, and influenced the organizing pace for Senior Citizens of Team Rama or Scooter for short. November to December 2012 Phase III: Touched base with media (radio, TV, newspapers) on social networks, especially Face Book, and planted the issue framework based on 16 white papers; Phase IV: Launched six propaganda initiatives for the grass-root level, riding on the crest of negative public perception and sentiment on key issues, especially the South Road Properties, corruption, and growing public debts incurred; Deployed eight comic strips emphasizing the major issue points; January to February 2013 Phase V: Revitalized speaker groups toward using refined white papers; March to May 10, 2013 Touched base with city council candidates for upgrades in messaging; Laid the ground work for special vote conversion operations and deployment of tactical facilities, including city-owned business, for election day.

Part 5 From the Planning Vantage Point:
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Strategic and Tactical Review
RATIONALE
To lay the ground work for 2013 mayoralty campaign

SITUATION ANALYSIS
Getting MLR re-elected needs a STRONG LIFT from a set of valid issues close to the hearts and minds of the populace—aspirations and dreams to which voters can directly identify themselves to. Through COMMUNITY ORGANIZING and CONSULTATIVE APPROACH on an indirect, sublime, yet highimpact ISSUE INTERCEPTION, we can create and develop a new Social, Politico-Economic, and Ecology Development (SPEED) framework with the direct participation of communities. SPEED will serve as the master plan of city development, endorsed and supported by men and women in the urban poor, youth, industrial, services, agriculture, and faith-based sections of the local economy. The grass-root voters’ dreams and aspirations become Rama’s own. They will find in Rama a clear reason to cast their vote for. They become stakeholders, instead of being kibitzers and fence-sitters. Their quest for solutions to their social and politico-economic needs form part of the Rama political agenda. SPEED will serve as the sounding board or an instrumentality for re-echoing our key messages. This holds the key to a high-impact, less costly campaign. The how-to’s are shown here under.

Reasons for Action
Voter perception tracking data from the US Embassy shows that MLR holds an edge against TRO in terms of incumbency (17.20 percentage points), charisma (6.45 p.p.), and character (3.87 p.p.). These combined advantage of 0.2752, when weighed against an average voter turnout of 85 percent and elector base of 522,476, shows a glimpse of the MLR potential in 143,785 votes. This project is meant to capitalize on the factors fueling these existing perceptions, as illustrated below.

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As illustrated below, voter preference tracking data from the UK Embassy shows TRO’s strength in popularity (18.44 percentage points), financial preparations (12.46 p.p.) and experience (6.91p.p). If weighed against a voter turnout of 85 percent and 522,476 electors, this combination of factors pinpoint where Tommy’s building blocks for support at 197,548 heads will be and where we should be using resources to undermine certain initiatives. Homestretch may run from 1.5% to as high as 4%, weighed against actual voter turnout on the day of balloting. This translates to a winning range of 5,750 votes (baseline) to 15,335.

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Section I – Objectives
1.0 2.0 3.0 Build a Broad Multi-sector Base of Support Establish common ground with congressional and city councilor-candidates Empower Small Teams for Targeted Vote Conversions

FRAMEWORK
• • • • Cost-effective, low-profile, high-impact, barangay level organizing Target sectors: Urban, youth, stakeholders in industrial, services and farm cross-section, and faithbased groups Duration: 14 months Target: 526,476 individual voters in 192,760 households

Section II – Strategies
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Community Relations, Communications, Coalition Building, Voter Conversion, Vote Delivery, Vote Protection

Section III – Tactics
Methodology Training Community Organizing Targeted Communications (Primary Messaging) Advocacy (Secondary Messaging) Agitation Propaganda (Tertiary Messaging) Radio Block timers PR/Media Relations/Reputation Management Barangay-Level Consultative Planning Workshop Citywide Conference on New Social, Politico-Economic, and Ecology Development (SPEED) MLR Adoption of SPEED Framework Councilor-candidates using SPEED framework Congressional candidates adopting SPEED issue framework Hiring Staff: 4 writers, 1 driver, 1 utility

Section IV – Key Messages
Together We Can Make Things Happen (Person-to-Person) A Vote for Rama, a Vote for Your Sector (Person-to-Group) A Vote for Rama, a Vote for Your Dreams (Person-to-Person)

PART V – Tools
Messaging framework Messaging Messaging Messaging Kit #1: 8 PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEED Kit #2: 32 graphic slides for Face Book deployment Kit #3: 48 issue interception modules for radio block timers Kit #4: 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations

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Messaging Kit #5: 36 special speeches

Section VI – Implementation Summary
Descripti on MK #1 Time Line July ’12 to May ‘13 Oct ’12 to May ‘13 Oct ’12 to May ‘13 Jun ’12 to May ‘13 Update Targeted Message Delivery Sched Stor P Pre M2 P2G ule y R ss G SPEE Pitc Con D h Dec    15, 2012 Feb 1, 2013 Jan 2, 2013 Dec 1, 20‘12    Channels Radi FB o + Bloc k  

MK #2

MK #3

MK #4

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

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Seven-Step Implementation Flow
5 Convert 4 Regroup 3 Adjust 2 Launch 1
Tactic t Protec Deliver

Strategy

IMPLEMENTATION FLOW
15

Review P2O M2G Stimu li P2G P2S Refin e Finetune Refin e Refin e Review Regrou p

Rama Rama

Convers ion System Regrou p

Protecti on System

Delivery System

PART VII – Action Plan
This project will be implemented by Chief Strategist Leonardo Chiu and ABC. The following models (as shown below) govern both functional organizational coordination at the policy, strategy and tactical levels of the campaign. Entire plan takes into account the formulation of initiatives in community organizing, PR/media relations, community relations, coalition building, and radio-based propaganda programs. On the ground level, PROJECT MOON RAKER is operationally under the control and supervision of the Chief Strategist, who reports directly to Mike Rama. The coordination flow between Media Relations, under the Campaign Manager, should be clear at this point (as was shown in the diagram).

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Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

Propaganda Management Model
17

Mind

Thinking

Stimulus Stimulus

Imagery Imagery Words Words

Thought s Emotion s Feelings

Choices Choices Percepti Percepti ons ons Preferen Preferen ces ces

Decision

Heart

Vote

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

Grass-root Platform Diversification: The SPEARS Model
Signature Campaign Propaganda Conveyors

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Platform Propagati on Platform Developm Issue Interception Propaganda Conveyors
The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

Issue Interception Platform Developm Platform Propagati on Signature Campaign

Vote Development, Protection and Delivery Model Type A: Family-based
19 Father/Moth

Mother/Fat

Son

Son

Daugh

Figure 1

Type B: Friendship-centered
You

Frien dA

20

Frien dB

Friend C

Friend D

Figure 2

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Figure 4
Organizing Structure across Six Target Fields

Details to Action Plan
22

March 2012

Recruit, train, organize, empower six (6) team leaders (first level) These team leaders, who will be recruited from among Rama’s staff, will assist implementation of Project Moon Raker in the following sectors: Industrial  Services Agriculture/fishery Youth Urban poor Faith-based (Roman Catholic and other Christian/Bible-based denominations) LVC provides the operations center of the team, coordinates with MLR over staff assignments, procures equipment and supplies, and facilitates funding. MLR keynotes the first team meeting. ABC will conduct the one-day briefing and training for the team. The operations and responsibility structures will be presented.

Descriptio Descriptio n n

Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch es 2 2 2 2 2 Media Releas es 2 2 Househ Ne old w Reached Allie s 5,000 25 5,000 25 TV Covera ge 1 1 1 Rama Pres Speech s es Con s 1 1 -

Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio

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Propaganda TOTAL

10

4

10,000

1

2

2

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

2nd Quarter 2012
APRIL/MAY:
Recruit, train, and empower six (6) coordinators in each district or 12 altogether (2nd level) in accordance with the multi-sector targets stated beforehand; All six team leaders and 12 coordinators hold one-day team-building briefings, group dynamics, and training. Operating structure will be discussed. District-level coordinators will recruit six (6) men/women from six sectors from each barrio under their AOR. South District will have 204 representatives; North District, 276. The goal is to identify the key community development needs in each barrio, pinpoint a program-benefit ratio, and create a central document to be called Socio-Political, Economic, and Environment Development (SPEED) plan. This will be the rallying poinht for all community organizing actions and emergence of 80 duly registered people’s organizations.

JUNE:
Deploy MK# 4 and Speeches #1/2/3/4 of MK#5 Organize and sponsor barrio-level SPEED workshops – 480 in 80 villages (3 rd level). We will provide the home venue, snacks, training supplies, and token cash allowance for each representative. Production of eight (8) PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEED framework Production of 32 graphic, issue-illustrative slides for Face Book deployment Production of 48 issue interception modules for radio block timers Production of 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations

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Descriptio Descriptio n n

Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch es 6 6 6 6 6 30 Media Releas es 12 12 6 6 36 Househ old Reached 15,000 15,000 480 5,000 35,480 Individu als Allies 250 250 480 5,000 5,980 TV Covera ge 3 3 3 3 6 Rama Pres Speech s es Con s 6 6 12

Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

3rd Quarter 2012
JULY:
Consolidate all 80 SPEED proposals through a citywide conference of 480 representatives, 12 coordinators, and six team leaders (Total heads: 498 heads). MLR will be keynote speaker. Snacks, lunch,

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and token allowance will be provided. The adoption of the Cebu City SPEED plan will be the main deliverable, on top of collective decision to organize 80 people’s organizations (PO). Deploy MK#1 and Speeches #5/6/7/8 of MK#5

AUGUST:
We will assist in the registration of 80 PO. MLR adopts SPEED as part of the campaign platform. Deployment of eight (8) PowerPoint presentations, each one 8 minutes long, illustrating an issue in SPEED framework We will initiate house-to-house propagation of the SPEED message and recruitment of members who subscribe to our development platform; Deploy 48 issue interception modules for use by radio block timers Dreams and aspirations of each barrio, in accordance with SPEED plan, will be propagated and/or articulated in newspapers, radio, and TV issues in media, and in our own radio propaganda section. Deploy 72 issue interception outlines for PR/media relations Rama’s congressional and city council allies adopt SPEED. The SPEED issue framework integrated in to messaging by councilor-aspirants.

SEPTEMBER:

Increase the pace of SPEED team deployment through group presentations, for house-to-house enumeration, sector-to-sector coordination, P2O educational initiative; consolidate community organizing using the “power of two”. Maintain pace in deployment of MK2/MK3/MK4.

Descriptio Descriptio n n

Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch Media Releas Househ old Individu als TV Covera Rama Pres Speech s

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es Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL 6 6 6 6 6 30

es 12 12 12 6 6 48

Reached Reached 15,000 15,000 250 7,680 5,000 42,930 250 250 500 69,120 5,000 75,210

ge 3 3

es

Con s 6 6

3 3 6

12

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

4th Quarter 2012
Continue/maintain house-to-house issue and SPEED propagation, education, recruitment, and enumeration initiative

OCTOBER:

Deploy MK #3 and Speeches #9/10/11/12 of MK#5 Barrio allies seek SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY funding for SPEED programs; this issue-baiting initiative is meant to pick a fight with local leaders loyal to TRO and who don’t subscribe to the SPEED framework. All resistance and objections will be articulated in media and mass-based agitation in our propaganda sections.

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NOVEMBER:
One at a time our barrio SPEED allies formally write the CITY COUNCIL asking consideration and financial assistance for the implementation of programs. Exploit SP resistance in agitation propaganda, PR/media advantage

DECEMBER:
MLR discusses SPEED before targeted organizations and ask certain corporations to assist SPEEDidentified NGOs in getting financial assistance through corporate social responsibility programs. Any attempts by TRO to disparage the initiative will be articulated in our PR/media relations, community relations, coalition building, and propaganda initiatives. Update MK #1 and Speeches #7 and #8 in MK#5 for the homestretch campaign

Descriptio Descriptio n n

Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch es 6 6 6 6 Media Releas es 12 12 12 6 Househ Individu old als Reached Reached 15,000 15,000 250 30,720 250 250 500 122,88 TV Covera ge 3 3 3 Rama Pres Speech s es Con s 6 6 -

Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition

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Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL

6 30

6 48

25,000 85,970

0 75,000 198,88 0

3

6

12

1st Quarter 2013
JANUARY:
 Update

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

MK #3 for the homestretch campaign  Delivery of Speeches #13/14/15/16 of MK#5
MLR continues to seek corporate funding sponsors for SPEED projects via social responsibility. Barrio-level SPEED formally write letters to TRO and CDM asking for endorsement and financial help for their projects. Resistance, objections, bad comments against SPEED and its framework will be subject of our media releases, commentaries, letters to the editors, and discussions in our radio-based propaganda programs.

FEBRUARY:
 Update

MK #1 for the homestretch campaign

 Delivery of Speeches #17/18/19/20/21 in MK#5

Bring over senators and congressional candidates to address SPEED meetings; deploy additional radio blocktimers (2nd round)

MARCH:
Start house-to-house enumeration tactic (red and white chalk markings; refer to propaganda manual for details; continue block-timer initiatives

 Delivery of Speeches #22/23/24/24/25 in MK#5

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First Quarter 2013
Descriptio Descriptio n n Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch es 6 6 6 6 6 30 Media Releas es 24 24 24 24 24 120 Househ Individu old als Reached Reached 5,000 5,000 250 92,160 5,000 107,41 0 250 250 500 184,36 0 50,000 235,36 0 TV Covera ge 6 3 9 3 3 6 Rama Pres Speech s es Con s 6 6 4 4 20

Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

April 2013
Consolidate amplification of SPEED agenda in media, party causes, P2O presentations; use SPEED initiatives as propaganda Carry out Final Leg Enumeration Strategy using blue chalk. Prepare precinct-level vote conversion strategies and tactics  Delivery of Speeches #26/27/28/29/30 in MK#5

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April 2013 KRI
Descriptio Descriptio n n Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch es 2 2 2 2 2 10 Media Releas es 24 24 24 24 24 120 Househ Individu old als Reached Reached 5,000 5,000 250 112,76 0 5,000 * 250 250 500 368,64 0 25,000 394,64 0 TV Covera ge 6 3 9 3 3 6 Rama Pres Speech s es Con s 6 6 4 4 20

Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL

The Campaigns & Image Group (2012)

May 2013
String up SPEED groups for vote conversion  Delivery of Speeches #31/32/33/34/36/36 in MK#5

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May 2013 KRI
Descriptio Descriptio n n Monthly Key Result Indicators
Story Pitch es 2 2 2 2 2 10 Media Releas es 4 4 4 2 2 18 Househ Potenti old al Reached Allies 9,000 4,500 250 115,00 0 5,000 * 900 450 500 221,0 00 2,500 225,3 50 TV Covera ge 4 2 6 3 3 6 Rama Pres Speech s es Con s 3 3 2 2 10

Media Relations Public Relations Community Relations Coalition Building Radio Propaganda TOTAL

The Campaigns & Image Group

VIII – Estimated Costs
Item Description
% w t

Estimated Cost
Mar-Dec 2012 Jan-May 2013

Total

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Radio block timers PR/media relations Volunteer Staff Allowances Communication (eLoad) Food Gasoline Office supplies Total

25 16 20 10 14 12 3 10 0

218,125 139,600

112,687.50 72,120.0 0 90,150.0 0 45,075.0 0 63,105.0 0 54,090.0 0 13,522.5 0 450,750. 00

174,500 87,250 122,150 104,700 26,175 872,500

330,812 .50 211,720 .00 264,650 .00 132,325 .00 185,255 .00 158,790 .00 39,697 .50 1,323,25 0.00

The Campaigns & Image Group

Cost-efficiency Assumptions
Since built-in city government resources and strategic assets are already in place, there will be a significant reduction in out-of-pocket expenses. Campaign goal: 225, 350 men and women Spending – from March 2012 to May 15, 2013: P5.87 per voter

IX – Areas of Consideration
Average voter turnout in last three elections has been 78% For May 2013, AVT of 407,531 is a close call. Not the best-case scenario yet Uncommitted votes: 86,316 or 21.18%

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A swing vote as large as this—a wide gap—is crucial to both sides The best-defensive-case scenarios for TRO: Line P500 for each of targeted 40,000 voters among urban poor and young voters, and spend P20 million on Election Day Giving money to keep 40,000 of Rama’s supporters at home for P25 million He did that once; he will do it again Rama’s best-offensive-case scenario: Raise voter turnout at the 88% threshold (459,778) Line up 52,247 more votes at no expense in Mike’s favor Diminish TRO initiatives in the Services, Youth, and Agriculture sectors Force TRO into costly defensive propaganda actions, stretching his financial rope to maximum limits Work out “special conversions” in traditionally gray areas of the political economy (W 4, U1, and YMW5) Disrupt vote-buying

X – Expected Results
• • • Advantage #1: MLR is guided by an issue-based framework, which runs parallel to mainstream campaign messaging Advantage #2: By winning hearts and minds, Mike will be able to get win even if TRO spends P50 million on Election Day. Advantage #3: Rama creates and sustains the impression that he values other people’s ideas and inputs more than his own, thereby raising his acceptability and viability as a candidate.
Contested Sectors Across Age Brackets Services 41-60 Est. Vote Mass 163,012 Theaters NORT SOUT H H C/F 30/31 Homestretch MLR TRO 48,903 50,533

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87,860 Industrial 22-40 Youth 19-21 Agriculture 41-55 Others* UP/FBNRC/SC Total
Voter Turnout at 78%;

75,152 32/28 48,483 24,378 27,158 52,470 201,3 92 42,422 28,751 31,152 29,625 182,4 83 69,841 29/31 24,498 31/28 33,716 49/29 37,655 240,8 62 38/34

151,510 81,669 53,129 28,631 73,146 39,430 81,679 522,47 6 44,024 281,6 14

Interpolated data from US/UK political sections (2012): Country Sheet for www.cia.gov, CIA World Fact Book (2012): Average

Inner-core, Election-day Scenarios
• • • • • • • Voter turnout between 71% and 80% Losses from cross-candidate diffusion among councilor-candidates may hit 5% and may favor OSMENA ticket (11/5) OSMENA may attack central positioning anchored on LABELLA and four other candidates in the RAMA ticket via large-scale cash infusion, thereby ensuring that MARGOT VARGAS OSMENA (MVO) gets the top slot in the South District; TRO/MVO spending in South District may take some 4.53% to 5% off Rama’s support lineup, affecting BATUHAN TRO spending in North District may affect MLR a little, if the elder Del Mar runs. If not, diffusion by 3% stands likely. Homestretch may run from 1.5% to as high as 4%, weighed against actual voter turnout on the day of balloting. This translates to a winning range of 5,750 votes (baseline) to 15,335. Adding 15,335 to the 201,392 homestretch potential of Rama may establish the winning point at 216,727 in both South and North districts.

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Prepared By: ABBEY B. CANTURIAS LEONARDO V. CHIU Approved:

Recommending Approval:

MICHAEL L. RAMA

Conceive. Believe. Achieve gobigtoday@yahoo.com Skype: canturias8811; Mobile: +63 918 619 0440 Landline: +6332 417 7559

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