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The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes Author(s): Robert H. Dix Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 1982), pp. 554-573 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/447341 . Accessed: 01/05/2013 11:23
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ROBERT H. Dix
RiceUniversity belatedlyby part students of comparative politicsto the clearlyrelated,thoughhardly most identical, questionofthebreakdownof democratic regimes. Similarly, studentsof military and of authoritarian governments, regimesgenerally, have been far more interested in the reasons for militaryintervention in thanin thecauses or processofthedemiseofauthoritarianism. politics Only latelyhas thisbegun to change. In recentyears,forexample, there have been a spate of scholarly analyses of Latin America's latestversionof the bureaucratic-authoritarian authoritarianism, (B-A) regime.2 In the earlier writingsconcerningsuch regimes it was often at least implicitly treatedas the new paradigm of Latin America's politicalfuture,following upon those earlier,failedparadigmsof democracyand socialistrevolution. That is, B-A regimeswere presumedto be boththewave ofthe future and a relatedas theywere to Latin America's situation condition, semi-permanent ofinternational dependencyand the supposed end ofthe import-substitution of economic phase development. More recent scholarship,however, has and to address such begun to questionor qualifysome of thoseformulations ofsuch regimes, as well as the questionsas theweaknessesand vulnerabilities causes and conditions oftheir possibledemise.3 littlecomparative attention Nonetheless,there still has been remarkably breakdown4(apart, thatis, paid to how and whyauthoritarian governments fromstudiesof certainparticularcases). Can some generalpatterns be dis-
ofscholarly concern withtheconditions ofdemocracy have 5YrEARS been followedrather recent attentionon the of
'For the conditionsof democracy see, in particular, Dahl (1971); forthe pioneeringwork on democratic breakdowns see Linz and Stepan (1978). 2Such regimeswould include contemporaryBrazil, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, as well as, by some Mexico, and Peru (1968-80). Their characteristicsare usually said to include dominadefinitions, tion by a coalition consistingof the military(acting as an institution in contrastto militaryleaders acting personalistically), civilian technocrats, the industrial bourgeoisie, and the agents and managers of foreigncapital. B-A regimes are "exclusivist" in that they remove fromthe effective political systemmany (particularlyamong the lower classes) of the previouslymobilized; they are, in addition, typicallyhighlyrepressive. On B-A regimes see especially Collier (1979), especially the chapter by Guillermo O'Donnell; also Malloy (1977), and O'Donnell (1973). 3This is particularly true of Collier (1979), though also see the chapter by Douglas Chalmers in Malloy (1977), and Chalmers and Robinson (1980). 4The term "breakdown" will be used here to encompass overthrow,collapse, "voluntary" exit or any combination thereof that implies the demise of a regime. "Breakdown" at any given point in time does not of course necessarilyimply an indefinitely prolonged condition. However, in three of our cases (see below), breakdown has (so far) meant a "permanent" change in the political system. Thus, two countries, i.e., Colombia and Venezuela, have become democracies (after briefinterformof authoritarianism). regnums); Cuba has become Communist (at the least, a very different The other three countries-Argentina, the Dominican Republic, and Peru-have experienced varying periods of democratic and authoritarian rule since the "breakdown" discussed here. See Wiarda (1980: chapter 2) foran analysis of such cyclical patternsin Latin American politics.
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" All of the countries analyzed here were classifiedas either Stage III ("transitional" societies) or Stage IV ("industrial revolution" societies).more tentative. from Peru and the Dominican Republic at itslower reaches. is to analyze the above-citedcases of authoritarian commoncauses and patterns collapse witha view to extracting thatseem to applyin at least theseinstances.but theyare still to one time.and literacy. level of urbanization.Each of the regimes in a particuquestionwas led by a military strongman.48 on Wed. Togethertheyconstitute the universeof clearcutcases a specified ofauthoritarian breakdown within regionand timeperiod. in which as a cortheregimeclearlycenters on one man. then. Togethertheyrepresent lar variantof authoritarianism. FulgencioBatistain Cuba.42. Bruce Russett et al. THE CASES IN BRIEF We beginwithshort ofthesix cases ofbreakdownin orderto descriptions an our evidential base for provide analysis. thus making it possible to hold such variables as cultureand historical constant. how might from such a pattern or model differ thatofdemocratic breakdown? In an initialattempt to throwsome lighton such questions. intentis to providesome comparativereferents forthe analysis of the breakdownof authoritarian regimesgenerally. there was considerable variation. Manuel Odria in Peru. (as well as to denotedifferences) The larger.and one sub-type of onlysix.at least as measured by such standardindicators as GNP per capita. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .one region. 5Basing theircategorization on data fromthe 1950s and very early 1960s. Marcos Perez Jimenezin Venezuela. wherever found.TheBreakdown Regimes 555 ofAuthoritarian cerned?Is thereeven a kind of model of breakdown?And ifso. 6Descriptions of the rise and fall of five of the six regimes discussed here (all except that of Trujillo) appeared in Szulc (1959). Within this middle range. thereare limitations fairly well. as do most Latin American countries.Any derivedpatterns and a call forfurther therefore verymuchto thepoint. Six cases have the advantage of constituting a much broader empirical basis forthe construction than the singlecase of generalizablepropositions study.112. Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia. the personalistic dictatorship (i. as distinct from themilitary poratebody).6These followin chronological orderofthefinalcollapseoftherespective regimes. This content downloaded from 94. and theyare confined can onlybe suggestive. each of backgroundrelatively in questionfallsbroadlywithin thecountries themiddle "stages" ofdevelopment. Six cases may be betterthan one in certainrespects.the following six cases of dictatorship have been selected: Juan Per6n in Argentina. however.. comparisons Our immediate purpose.5 All our cases are fromthe years 1955-61. The international contextis thus held roughlyconstant.while the distance in time fromthe presentpermits reliance on substantialaccumulated scholarship.while stillremainingmanageable in number and allowing forsome to the design as detailed treatment.. to Argentinaand Venezuela at the higher.e. and Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.Too.and even perhaps for the breakdown of regimes of whateverkind. Obviously. theauthoritarian phenomenon. All are fromLatin America. (1964: 293-303) classifiedthe nations of the world into five "stages of development.
by extensivewage increases and other benefitsforworkers.plus his wife.Eva's. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . included: Potash (1972. and an increasing reluctance on the partof some military to continuetheirde factosupportof the "oligarchy. Odria's alliance with the so-called oligarchybecame more and more tenuous as the resultof actions which includedsome tentative efforts to build his own base of support.42. a deteriorating elements of the Alianza Popular against a civilian government by leftist Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) party. 1980). James Payne (1965). and an attempted coup Strikes. freeelectionin 1951.48 on Wed.much of itsmiddleclass. This content downloaded from 94. Arnold Payne (1968).the increasingly repressive the courts. The economy foundered forseveral reasons: lavish concessionsto labor and an attendant decline in productivity. 7Principal sources forthe followingdescriptionof Peron's fall. included: Collier (1975)." Initialstepsto officers effect theelectionof a compliantsuccessorprovedabortivein thefaceofboth and civilianopposition.and by measurestakenagainsthis opponentsin thepress. Though confirmedin power by a single-candidateelection in 1950. and Pike (1967). and for the subsequent analysis.From his engineereda coup against the civiliangovernment of labor (in additionto his post in the positionas thehead of the department war ministry) Per6n was able to use the influence he acquired over the labor movement.withtheresultthatOdria peacefully military yielded office to an electedciviliannot of his choice at the end of his scheduledterm in 1956.and elsewhere. Even Peron's nationalismbecame in domesticoil exploration. triggereda militarycoup in October 1948. Reelected in a somewhatless than universities. led by General Manuel Odria. again inJune 1955. interest and theexhaustion offoreign exchange reservesbuilt up duringWorld War II. and even some among Per6n's erstwhile comrades. "Principal sources on Odria's fall.to win the presidencyin a substantially freeelectionin 1946.in September1955. which had initially looked on him with favor.556 Western Political Quarterly (uan Domingo Peron)7 Argentina Colonel Juan Peron was a memberof a group of officers who in 1943 of Argentina. sectorin the penalties imposed on the agricultural ofwould-beindustrialization. Peru (Manuel Odria)8 economic situation. theone thattoppledhim. and finally. suspectwhen he agreed to foreign participation military Attempted coups occurredin 1951. the United States government. in at least tacitalliance with Peru's landed and commercial elites. 1964). and Whitaker(1956.112. Per6n began to experienceincreasing oppositionto his rule. and even the Church.especiallyin theslumsof Lima. timelyassistancein mass mobilization. and the subsequent analysis. Per6n's victory came despitethe oppositionof mostofthe extantArgentine politicalparties. military Peron's earlyyearsin powerwere characterized of by the nationalization various foreign of national(as well as by othermanifestations enterprises ism). He had alienatedArgentina'selites.
thoughessentially authoritarthe led Laureano Gomez. the dared to demonstrate that criticism and and even many among the Conservativefaction Church. had turned some in the military who had originally him. Cuba(FulgencioBatista)"I When FulgencioBatistarelinquished in 1944 he had been the presidency 9Principal sources on the fall of Rojas Pinilla. It was not long.and by peasant organizations. and Martz (1962).48 on Wed.TheBreakdown Regimes 557 ofAuthoritarian Colombia (Gustavo Rojas Pinilla)9 In 1953 Colombia was under the civilian. by the construction blatant corruption. rule of the faction of Conservative ian. The resultswere studentdemonstrations. 1957. Dix (1967). included: Berry. and forthe subsequent analysis. Gude (1969).112. Hellman and Solaun (1980). against supported when earlyin 1957 Rojas soughtto legitimize Rojas.Repressiveactionsnotably includedthecensoring. and the so-called "bullringmassacre" of February5. This content downloaded from 94. Oppositioncrystallized his rule (througha regime-selected Constituent Assembly)foranotherfour a "civic strike" involving years.as well as business opposition. included: Dominguez (1978). by party With the countrywracked by violence between Liberal and Conservative partisans. included: Alexander (1964). '?Principal sources on the fall of Perez Jimenez. By 1950 he had become the clearlydominantleader upon the assassination of the head of the junta. Levine (1973) and Taylor (1968). "Principal sources on the fallof Batista. thevoluntary banks and and the defection of the of businesses. closing many thedictator's cause.In the process Perez Jimenez alienated many among civilianpoliticiansand the clergywho had originally withthe sympathized Massive civilianpromilitary's depositionof the pre-1948AD government. and with the Conservatives sharply factionalized. and Thomas (1971). General assumed power in June 1953 with Gustavo Rojas Pinilla ratherreluctantly the connivanceof the anti-G6mezwing of the Conservativesand the good wishesofmostLiberals. Accion Democratica (AD) and its affiliated of massive public works. and forthe subsequent analysis. oftheregimewho 1956. Rojas fellfrom armyfrom powerMay 10. Venezuela (Marcos PerezJimenez)'0 Marcos Perez Jimenezwas one of a military triumvirate that succeeded to power when the army overthrew a civilian governmentin November 1948. Blank (1973). His regime was characterizedby the brutal repressionof the main civilian labor and opposition party. when agentsoftheregimeattackedand killedcritics in public.moststudents.beforeit became clear that Rojas was more a Third in perpetuating in power-and even in founding interested himself labor confederation Force politicalmovementand a government-sponsored to help accomplish that end-than he was in returningpower to the country'scivilianpoliticiansin any near future. MacGaffey and Barnett(1962).led to his deposition by themilitary inJanuary1958. Gonzalez (1974). Perez (1976). 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . and for the subsequent analysis. By 1956 most Liberals.42. In 1952 Perez Jimenez had himselfconfirmedin power by means of a blatantlyfraudulent electoralcount. however. test demonstrations and strikes.of severaloftheleading organs of the nation's press. and eventualclosing.
plagued Batista from several quarters throughout Castro's return from exile in December 1956 to lead the 26th especiallyafter ofJuly movementfromthe mountainsof easternCuba. post-regnum THE CAUSES OF BREAKDOWN To what. triggered thatincludedsome by a conspiracy ofhis erstwhile close associates. Dominican Republic (Rafael Trujillo)12 As commanderof the National Guard which had been organized and trainedby United States Marines duringthe 1920s. may we attribute the causes of breakdownof these six authoritarian in regimesa generationago? Clearly there were differences detail and circumstance.112. led by Castro. and for the subsequent analysis. With his army increasinglyineffective against the guerrillas.makingofthecountry Considerablemodernization ofa materialkindtookplace in the Dominican Republic duringTrujillo's yearsin power.48 on Wed. sequent"election" (1954) soughtto givean aura oflegitimacy of the Ortodoxo party(includingFidel Students.and BatistafledCuba onJanuary1. The attemptto forestall in a election in November (chosen rigged 1958) failed. 1959. This content downloaded from 94. Rafael Trujillo seized power in 1930 and for the ensuing thirty years remained dictatorof the Dominican Republic. A subto his rule. Increasingly over junctureshe ruledthrough theyearshe (and his family and close associates)tightened their hold overthe and mostotherareas ofnational economy. as well as guerrilla his rule. collapse of the governments unemployment.Facing certaindefeat(and by by running now a colonel). life.558 Western Political Quarterly the predominantfigurein Cuban politics since 1933 when. but warfare.and civilianpoliticians Castro) activelyopposed Batista fromthe start.althoughmembersof his family carriedon a brief for several months thereafter. 1953. At times he personallyoccupied the presidency.he had led a revoltof noncommissioned Followingeight to power rule. But were therefactors in common? Is theresuch a thingas a generalizableprocess of breakdown(at least as applied to these cases)? Failure ofPerformance An initial. included: Wiarda (1968.Trujillo was finallybrought down by assassinationin 1961.and plausible. inflation.and with the United States' aid withdrawn military earlyin 1958.as well as overthepoliticalsystem a kindofpersonalfiefdom. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . sergeant.at other relatives or otherpuppets. Batistasoughtto return yearsofcivilian(albeit rather corrupt) as a candidatein the 1952 election. suppositionwould be that poor regime performance-especiallyin the economic area-had played a major role in the in question. then. After all. as an army officers.withan uprisingoccurring on July26. 1980). at the same timethemethods of rule were unusually harsh and tyrannical. Acts of urban terrorism. '2Principal sources on the fall of Trujillo.42. Batista's regimemore or less disintethe end by installinga puppet president grated. he assumed power as the leader of a military coup.
contributedto withRojas.112. soared. higher offin economicperAlthoughin Peru after1953 therewas some falling formance.and for dictatorship way most of Rojas' antagonists the oppositionappeared to have primarily noneconomicroots.. most Latin American countries experienced one or more such changes in the wake of the worldwide depression thatbegan in 1929. Unemployment. unspectacular. and Szulc (1959: 194.42. however. and real wages rose. This content downloaded from 94.Wiarda argues thateconomic decline was in thisinstancein substantial part only the indirectresult of both internal and international on Trujillo whichin turn led to variouseconomiccostsand excesses pressures lavish on and securityforces)that proved armaments expenditures (e. in almost every year between 1948 and 1956. norwas therea particular inflationary problem. Pike (1967: 290-93).though always high in Venezuela. 1967: xiii). 3For example. moreover.48 on Wed. Foreign investment. But investment. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . 1968: 160).and thelike. Coffee prices rose sharplyduring the early years of the Rojas Pinilla regime.14 There is. in a satisfacThe Cuban economy duringthe Batista years performed if and accord economics fashion. Interestingly. Dominguez. was no thanusual. and with it industrial. by such standardindicatorsas economic growthrates. The rate of increase in the cost of living declined. the ochenio (eight-yearrule) was on the whole an economic success. In the case of the Dominican Republic there was a distinctfall-off in after economicperformance about 1955. That "bad luck. Yet the groundswell business' disaffection of oppositionto the well was under before such economic downturn. mining. oppositionon the partof some of them. whichseems to have led to increasamong businessmento the fateof the Trujillo regimeand. 1978: 121-22). and petroleum production. seeJames Payne (1965: 20.g.13 The evidence in our six cases is nonethelessdistinctly mixed.thenslumped by early 1957.the Odria yearswere on the whole prosperousones.and othereconomicills seem to have been associatedwithunscheduledchangesofgovernment throughout muchofmodernhistory.TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian Regimes 559 declinesin ratesof growth or personalincome. considerable(though Suarez. 24.forexample. especiallyin the exportsector. although there was at some of his extravagant on public worksand his resentment expenditures neglectof ruralareas. however. 200)." plus a higherinflation rate and various signs of economic mismanagement. only a tory. and therewas a modesteconomicslump in 1957. There is littleindication. foreign revenues. damagingto theregime(Wiarda.littleevidence that opposition to Odria's continuationin officecenteredaround questions of the country's overalleconomicperformance. 1962: 3-59.theyears 1950-57in themain comprised government a boom era. 14Though a depression hit Peru's exports followingthe end of the Korean War in 1953. many analysts small role in the downfallof the Batista dictatorship (Draper. attributes still secondary) importanceto an economic decline in Batista's last year and among (1958) thathelped to alienate many in the business community organized labor who had previouslyacquiesced in his rule (Dominguez. thateconomic factors were an important contributionto the fall of Perez Jimenez in Venezuela. ing indifference to outright eventually. 33). while government revenues tripled.
In fact. than thatofcivilian regimes.literally economicwoes also led Per6n to sanctionan oil exploration contract witha U.economic performance did tend to weaken toward the end of all of our cases.17 Attemptsby Per6n and. according to Potash (1972). but they made it impossible to continue his "shirtlessones"). a seriesof generouswage and benefit increasesforArgentine workers-resultingin a gain in real wages-Peron after1949 (and especiallyafter1952) was faced with increasinginflationary pressures. the economic situation in 1954-55 was much improved over that of 1951-52 and "the economy was not in a stage of imminentcrisis" (Potash.conwas forthe most part a cerns. suggestion the literature that failureto carryout such policies was a factorin regime breakdown(unless one were to argue that thoroughgoing revolution might have assured long-termstability).declines in productivity in (especially agriculture).S." resulting in "revolution.nor much worse. have a directand primary impacton the stability Having reservesin the nationalizaexpendedArgentina'swartimeforeign currency tionofthe British-owned and havingdecreed railwaysand otherenterprises. Even so.and a partialreversalof the earlierincreasesin real wages.foreigninvestment.48 on Wed. '6In general. to favorworkersor the "popular classes" in one or anotherrespectprobablydid help to alienate important groups and '5Thus. and the like-income rerates. according to Nordlinger (1977: 199)." Yet the economic downturns were not reallyverysharp in most cases. inflation.560 Political Western Quarterly did appear to On thefaceofitthePeron regime'seconomicperformance ofthe government. may something effect at workwhere.and foreignexchange reserves. Rojas and Odria. Yet thereis little in distribution. forexample. or of his finaloverthrow.112. This content downloaded from 94. '7See Huntington(1968: chapter 5) forthis general argument. there was little involvement in policy matters during the Peron years on the part of the militarythat overthrewhim. In all. 1980: 170-71). and there is every indication in his analysis (and others') that the motivationsforPeron's overthrowwere primarilynoneconomic. the economic growth performance of military regimesin the Third World is neithermuch better. economicperformance cause of the fallof (at least secondary(thoughnot necessarily unimportant) regimes. and overalleconomicperformance was more impressive than in mostof the previous or subsequent regimes. "a prolonged and gratifications is followed periodof raisingexpectations by a shortperiod of sharp reversalduringwhichthe gap between expectations and gratifications quicklywidens and becomes intolerable. His largesseto his favoreddescamisados (workers. as Potash concludes elsewhere. company and to seek generallyto encourage foreign investment contraryto his highlytouted nationalism.thereare aspectsofeconomicperformance otherthangrowth balance of trade.42. unemployment. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . Not only did such setbacksserveto solidify the earlyoppositionof Argentina'smiddle and upper classes to Per6n.more directly political. it remains doubtfulthat economic failureswere the leading cause of oppositionto Per6n. much more hesitantly. comparedto the strong virtually showingsin the earlyyears of the respective have There been of a "J-curve" regimes. or agrarianreform. More important.so James Davies (1969: 690) has argued.15 In short.the preponderanceof the evidence indicates that serious opposition tended to precede weakening economic performance and to centeron other.as we shall see.16 these)authoritarian To be sure.
Regime Delegitimation Ifnot. at least. wherethe factthat rural violence had once more accelerated aftera year or two of decline was an important "negative" in the eyes of Rojas' eventual In none ofour cases was defeatin war or similarforeign failure opponents. "gForthe concept of praetorianismsee Huntington (1968: chapter 4). when it resumed in 1954. however.at least forthemostpart. Both Trujillo socioeconomic political and Batista at first lacked the same kind of "secondary" or "crisis" legitimationas the others.in addition to its basic nature of a partisan conflictamong the followersof the elite-ledConservative and Liberal parties. Every political actoremployshis or her own means and resourcesto make himself or herself felt in thepoliticalprocess.are regimesdependenton such secondarylegitimacy. tend to lack legitimacy in the proceduralsense that thereis no commonlymeans of winningand retaining agreed or definitive power. however.anothersense in whichmostoftheregimesunderdiscussion had a fairlywidely accepted claim to rule. Yet in the absence of a generallyaccepted mode of attainingpower. Yet Trujillo. This content downloaded from 94.however.performance.112. powerwithout There is. and thatin Batista's case violentefforts to depose him were continuousforat least two yearsbeforehis collapse)."although theyweretheweakestamong thesix dictatorships.42. With but one exception. sThe violence.48 on Wed. supportfortheirinitialclaims to office probably of the population.mediatedonlyweaklyor intermittently directly by such entitiesas aggregativepoliticalparties or legislatures. also appeared to take on a new potentialformass mobilization and class warfare.Such considerations draw us somewhataway fromeconomicperformance. That is. forthe tentativenature of Latin American regimessee Anderson (1967: chapter 4).failureto preservethe domesticpeace was not a principalfactorin breakdown(other thantheobvious factthatall but Odria wereeventually overthrown by force. of whateverpoliticalstructure or complexion.both essentially forcedtheirway to power in order to forestall electoraldefeat. Even Batistadid not altogether "legitimacy. The Venezuelan coup of comprisedan absolute majority 1948 had the active or tacitsupportof most non-AD sectors. treated A criticalaspect of regimeperformance otherthan the economic is the maintenanceof public order. regimesthatinitially even a formal constitutional mandate.Every governmentor governing coalitionis necessarily"tentative. The exceptionwas Colombia. ifit can be called that.18 a significant factor in breakdown. see in thisconnection Dix (1980). who wereweekingan end to turmoil and of defense the statusquo. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .TheBreakdown Regimes 561 ofAuthoritarian thus contributeto the demise of their governments. if accentuatedin the case of authoritarian take anything.and the 1948 Peruviancoup thebackingofmostanti-Apristas.In the cases of at least Per6n and Rojas Pinilla. thenwhat? Most Latin Americansocietiestend to be "praetorian" in Huntington's sense thattheirgovernments.and will be laterin anotherconnection. they were or appropriategovernment under the politicalcirregardedas the necessary cumstancesby a significant segmentof the society."19 This problemis. was able over the ensuing forhis rule in the eyes of a great yearsto establisha real aura of legitimacy lack claimsto thiskindof manyDominicans.
S. and its failureto maintainpublicorder. eventuallyturnedagainst the legitimacy Church.42. in the sense thatmost regimesin any case are in praetorian Illegitimate theseauthoritarian also tendedto lose-some politicalsystems. government and to U. governments much more rapidlythanothers-theirinitialclaimsto represent the national or to resolve criticalnational problems.theyfailedto live up to their proclaimedreasonsforbeing.notonlyin thecountryside but (against Castro's guerrillas) in the citiesas well.failedto put an end to theviolence. whojustified or socialjustice. Such devicesdid not in any case reflect the real bases of power. or because of the commonpolicyof the Church of accommodatingitself to incumbents in the ofinstitutional interest survival.562 Western Political Quarterly ofcourseextraordinarily in dependenton regimebehavior. of order and stability.that much more patent. It was in this sense that theirperformance fell short. foreign Rojas Pinilla.S. some of these "legal" actions actually accelerated the downfallof the regime by making its fraudulent claim to power. forexample. nor did theyconstitute thedictators'principalclaim to legitimacy (exceptperhapsin the case of the 1946 election in Argentina).as earliernoted. They came increasingly to appear as mere personalistic dictatorships seekinglittlebeyond the perpetuationin powerofa man and a clique.48 on Wed.but theblatantcorruption of the regime. or the prospectfor its indefinite continuance. helped dissipatesuch claims as he did have.in thelatteryearsofhis regimeturnedincreasingly investorsto pull his countryout of its economic difficulties. throughsuch devices as elections. Each of the dictatorships did seek formallegitimation.granted either because ofreal or proclaimed actionson behalfof Church interests and values.however. Perez Jimenez. and Odria came to a head when it became clear that theirclaims to temporary rule in order to right certainwrongsofthepreviousorderhad been forgotten in the interest ofperin themselves Batista's claims to sort of were power.This was notoriously the case in Venezuela wherethe aborted 1952 electiondrove a number of the regime's erstwhile collaboratorsinto opposition. Lastly.112. his actionsin part on the groundsthathe would build a new Argentinafree offoreign to domination.itsties bothto the U.whether or to carrying theybe oppositionto corruption. the enforcement materialprogress. Thus Peron. in arena where his rule was at first Trujillo's case it was in the international most seriouslyand importantly questioned. Of this.more will be said laterin anotherconnection. This content downloaded from 94. An additionalsourceofputativelegitimacy formostoftheseregimeswas theimprimatur oftheCatholicChurch.Pressureto bring an end to the regimesof Rojas.and effectiveness out promisedtasks.20 nationalism. constitutional changes. In fact.or the promotionof communism. petuating any legitimacy weak fromthe start. and the like. whose blessinghe had earlier sought to invoke in supportof his claim to embodythetraditional values oftheArgentine nation. see Lipset legitimacy (1959).and again in 1957 when a plebiscitewhich "re-elected" Perez Jimenezprovedthefinalstrawformany. 20For thetrade-off between and effectiveness. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . privateinterests. Regimes of exception to interest beginwith. Thus Peron.Yet in virtually case state and Church every came into conflictand the regime lost that importantsanction of moral as well.legislatures.
distinct.112. one aspect of the process of breakwas theerosionofthe linked but analytically down. The dictators' construction withparallel came in some cases intodirectconflict dependentorganizations attributes oftheChurch. and social classes (fairlybroad in scope in cases like Peron and Rojas Pinilla. republic works.but of the theoriginalforces "narrowing" oftheinitialsupportcoalitionto thepointwhereusuallyonlya clique of regimeintimatesand hangers-onadhered to the waning cause. membersmay have agreedon little when army officers Thus politiciansoftenbecame disaffected theyhad counted on to assuage a tumultuouspolitical situation and then shortly them to power not onlyfailedto do so.-Perez Jimenez.While deligitimation. power of interests. and of the regimein the popular imagination.and The Church.Regimes 563 TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian " Coalition " andthe"Negative "Narrowing Regime A kind of delegitimation was. a gooddiscussion oftheerosion pro-coup (1979) for and outcomes. Militarycoups in modern Latin America are seldom the work of an came to Each ofour six dictators and his band offollowers. were frequently sentedby businessmenand the middle sectors. individualcaudillo of an the tacit at least the active or with array acquiescence.althoughthisof course occurred. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .48 on Wed. see Almondand Powell(1978).regimenarrowing makeupoftheregimeitself.sooneror laterbecame in thesecases an elementof the negativecoaliof their own ideologies.21 of a "negative coalition" therewas an attendantformation Concomitantly. of the in to the continuance common regime. closely and its coalition initial replacement by a "negative support regimes' of the groupsand indicoalition" based largelyon the perceivedself-interest in the sense we have used the term. a mass base fortheirgovernments Rojas. Another. groups. and Odria to broaden or solidify the opposition of those among their original supadditionallyintensified in such actions. Thus the editor of one of Peru's leading newspapers-originallya backer of the Odria coup-came to view of democracyas the only suitablecontextforthe laissez-faire the restoration he favored approach (Cotler. and Rojas clearlymore than that. who saw a threat to themselves porters the regime'soveralleconomicperfrom Policies and budgets(as distinct at were course also of typically issue. at least a tacitadherentofeach ofour regimes. This content downloaded from 94.or to hold the allegiance of mass publics.least so in thecases ofTrujillo and Batista).Trujillo.ifitially in the cases of Per6n. and Schmitter between thisdistinction 22For outputs (1971).in orderto buy thecontinuedsupportofthearmed forces. even when its opposed else. then. but began to extendrepression restore of the oppositionto criticsamong theirerstwhileallies. viduals involved.and tion. servedto loosen the moorings affected the more to have a broadlydiffuse directly impact.42. Efforts by Peron.22Money spent. support. and taxes formance) or on lavish levied.Policies promotinggreater ran counterto businessmen'spercepin theeconomyoften stateinvolvement tions of appropriateeconomic behavior. In all fourcases the(usually increasingly) repressive 2 See Fitch oftheoriginal coalition. 1978). mystiques. Regime of the resultof the strengthening breakdownwhen it came was not primarily of opposition.
at least. as well. To retain crucial military support.were therefore paramount considerations forall of these regimes. Each of the dictatorswent out of his way to currymaterial favor with the military.112. in thedictator'snotorious reflected of the or (as with Peron life. Yet in the end the same military that played a key role in instituting these regimes.and to keep to a minimum the inevitabledivisions and oppositionwithinthe armed forces. There was.theirinternaldivisions. Partly it was a matter of favoritism.Batista's (including torture) against and someofPeron'sactions theCatholic Church. against This content downloaded from 94.Partlythis was a matter of personalself-indulgence. requirementsofinstitutional survival withforces otherthanthoseofthedictatorship.Most increased militarybudgets.48 on Wed. played an importantpart in their ultimatedemise. Rojas Pinilla) the cause of the Church even became something of a focusforthe counter-legitimacy claims oftheopposition. or the lavish expenditureof public funds on "show" projects of questionable general In any event. In everycase at theheartof the narrowing processseems to have been a tendencyto center both the decisions and perquisitesof the regime on a smallerand less representative group of the dictator'sintimates. Thus the dictators lost not only the aura of legitimacy accorded by initially theChurch (as notedearlier)but the supportof Church-related resourcesas well.23 seem to be inherent vices of at least the kind of personalistic dictatorships under discussionhere. alreadydiscussed) thearmed forces.or personalcorruption (as in all ofour cases exceptthat of Odria)." enjoyment "high gross personal immorality and PerezJimenez). access to importedgoods at discountprices) were common.564 Western Political Quarterly natureof the regimes. power initially werein everycase either reluctant of some.or their virtualdisintegration in the face of militarily weak opposition(the case of 23Afewexamplesamong manythatcould be cited includethe above-noted massacrein bull-ring Colombiain February harshmeasures Cuban students.On the otherhand.and theirgrowingestrangement frommany of their led theChurchto identify bothitsmissionand thelong-run citizens.otherspecial privileges and services(e. The leadersofall six regimeswereprofessional men and came to military withkey backingfromthe armed forces.. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . eitherby theiropposition.in themilitary supporters the seizure of power or opponents of the coup leader. therewas a diversionof resourcesfromthe presumed utility.g.a sensitivity (in the sense thattheystirred Such yet further opposition)acts of repression. TheDefection Elites ofRegime Absolutelycrucial to the breakdownof authoritarian regimes(although and narrowing certainlynot unrelated to the processes of delegitimation is the ultimate of the dissolution political keyregimeelite. nepotism.and was pampered by them. The self-indulgence and and paranoia of the dictator his associatesindeed seem to be centralto theprocessofbreakdown. In at least two of our cases (Peron.42. severalbuiltlavish military clubs and hospitals. 1956. an increasingsensitivity to criticismon the part of the dictatorand his whichoftenled to extremeand counter-productive cohorts. purposesof the originalsupportcoalition(howeverbroad or narrow)to the ofa narrower and narrower benefit particularistic clique.
Rojas Pinilla was forcedto make a number of policy concessions (including dropping the idea of a Third Force as a new movement or partydistinctfromthe traditionalLiberals and Conservatives) in the face of militarydemands for his resignation. in (i. and thuslosingthe military's claim to be the embodiment of national interest and unity).however. eyes generalpublic key narrowing the regime'sciviliansupportcoalition. fighting theirown citizenry. in thecase of Perez Jimenez it was a dreaded secretpolice apparatus that soughtout dissidents within thearmedforces as well as in othersectors ofsociety.42.who by thelast yearsofhis rule controlled (eitherpersonallyor throughhis familyand friends)perhaps as much as three-quarters of the means of production in the Dominican Republic. The mostnotorious case was thatofTrujillo.e.The resultwas an increasingisolationof an increasing thearmed forces from therestofthesociety and. In the case of Per6n it was the unions. more closely controlledby one man and an attendantclique of military officers (plus some civilians). This content downloaded from 94. the armed forces)who had made themwhat theywere. This is not a positionthat the armed forcesare comfortable as withover a long periodof time(i. One element in disaffection seems to have been the process we have the in the discussed: already weakeningofthe regime'srationaleof rulership the of of civilian and the or of elites. blocked access to power forthe potenambitiouswithin themilitary itself...25 Yet anothersourceof military resentment was the effort by mostof these men to establishbases of poweror controlapart fromthose(i.more withrespectnot onlyto the societyat large.cf. Rojas. with promotions.and control of 80 percentof the volume of business in the capital city.e.and other favorsgoing preferentially to familymembersor close personal associates.TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian Regimes 565 Batista's Cuba). but withrespectto personalistic the armed forcesas a body or institution. not incidentally.24 dictatorship.112.in everyinstance. Szulc (1959: 238-40). some nine monthsbeforehis fallfrompower. itwere. in thecase ofRojas Pinilla it was a so-calledThird Force. 25Trujillo's assets included an estimated 50-60 percent of the arable land in the country. Perez Jimenez.For thereappears to have been an Something inclinationfor these dictatorships to have become more exclusivist. In several of the cases-those of Per6n.e. Wiarda (1968: 83 and chapter 5 generally). tially Whateverthe specificreason or circumstances.appointments. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . In theend thedictators could not relyon whathad originally been theprinci24Thus in August 1956. and Odria. posture of confrontation as the armed forces were called upon to suppressthe rising civilian opposition..and less and less broadlybased on thearmed forces. often.even well beforethe finalcollapse there were one or more attempted militarycoups. quote clearly-there was a real sense in whichthe armed forcesat first had collegiallyassumed the reinsof Yet as timewenton each of thedictatorships became more and government. or at least serious from internal thiskeyregimeelitedemandingan earlyend to the pressure. In fact. the leaders of all of the on buildingthemselves a regimesin questionbecame more and more intent circleofpersonalpower. else was at work. self-perpetuation Finally. at continuismo.48 on Wed.therewere the attempts whichmade the regimeappear more a vehicleof a personthan of the office) armed forcesand.
Initially to reverse many soughtprimarily individualpoliciesor actions. and when thediversestrandsof civilianopponentsof the dictatorship eitherformed into a coalitionor tacitly accepted the dominance of one of them (e. despite gesturesas awarding a decorationas "honorary submariner"to PerezJim6nez.42. however. Szulc (1959: 11.48 on Wed. There is.g. aid or sanctionwas continuedright up to theend in threeofthe to preventPer6n's election in countries-Argentina(despite initial efforts Colombia. i.themilitary could thenact to give the finalpush to the dictatorin the name of the new national consensus."upon being received by Peron. focusedon the particularobjectivesand perspectivesofvariousgroupsand parties. 27U.S. and Peru. ing. before Per6n's fall in September 1955.S. but its coalescence around the agreed minimum goal of ridding the countryof a particular was critical to theend ofauthoritarianism.Yet such opposition tendedto be fragmented. then. Not merely the strength of opposition. oppositionwas little 1946). and broadened in withthe delegitimation tandem grew oppositionnaturally oftheregimeand the narrowing of itssupportcoalition. cf." See Porter and Alexander(1961: 192). and threatsto withdraw economic assistance. one U. There is no evidence.26Venezuela. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . in the formof overt intervention. it is improbablethatthe U. and such though.On the whole. or.maintenance..the contrary mightwell be argued in these cases.566 Western Political Quarterly of theircommand. In fact. especiallyon the part of thosepoliticiansor partiesdeposed by the military..little foreign (notablyU. 236). more often. Students. 26Shortly made a speech comparing him with Lincoln to the disadvantage of Lincoln.throughwithdrawal of militaryor economic aid or of political approval.U. that such pressuresplayed any significant role in Rojas' downfall.112. "Narrowing" had occurrednot only in pal instrument relationto the societyat large.S. dictator. played a criticalrole eitherin the launchor overthrow ofthesefourgovernments. more than symbolicand played no apparent role in Rojas' overthrow.and some measureof economicand military aid. onlywhen the oppositionof a numberof different groupscame to centeron thenecessity ofdismantling theregimeitself.27 In fact.S. Such cohesionof theoppositionhad the added consequence of creatinga new counter-legitimacy to the incumbentswhich clearlywent beyond the meredelegitimation notedabove. Coalescence Opposition Elements of civilian oppositionwere of course presentfromthe start. with dictatorship.themilitary. TheInternational Dimension as well as domestic Opposition can of course come frominternational sources.e.S.) sourcesplayed any significant role in the fallof fourof our six dictatorships.not to bringdown thegovernment It was itself. displeasure with Rojas was shown in several ways: Ambassador Philip Bonsal's attendance at an affairhonoring an opposition newspaper editor. In a fourth. evidencethatoppositionderiving from however. official. Perceivingthis.too. oftencame into early conflict Moreover. but withrespectto important of the segments keyregimeelite. Castro and his 26th ofJuly Movementin theCuban case) thattheregime'scollapse was made possible. This content downloaded from 94. thatthe United States played something of a role in sustainingthe regimes.
thus there is some indication that the U. thustippingthe balance of forcesfinally favorof the opposition. The exact U. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .TheBreakdown Regimes 567 ofAuthoritarian It is ratherin the two instanceswhere the U. witha short-term to electoralpolitics. visibility credibility badly In the case of Trujillo. This was the case in Cuba and the Dominican Republic.112.In fact.publishedin theNew York at and he needed the time. propinquity.S.It is the need for"exit" guaranteesforkey elements-especially but not necessarily of theregimebut onlythemilitary-originally supportive in subsequently willingto desertit.althoughhardlyin itself demoralization and disintegration cause.halted all arms shipmentsto Cuba in March 1958.e. in turn imposingheavy taxes on many of those who had been his chiefsupporters. had the clearest supportiverole at one stage that the withdrawalof its supportproved highly damaging. and other size. Moreover.g. 1978).42. guaranteesassured thatassociates of the former dictator would not be treatedtoo harshly(e. probablythe leading North American studentof the Trujillo dictatorship. in later Agency (CIA) assisted in bringingtogetherthe conspirators and even arms to the assasstages. Other.S. "Exit" Guarantees A finalelementin our would-be model would seem to be more nearly universal. according to Wiarda. gave Castro a Times Matthews. motive seems and that its actions played a major role in effecting to have been the desire to avoid "another Cuba" in the wake of reaction to a repressivedictatorship. Thus the U. Too. sination [of Trujillo]. theymightbe 28Wiarda(1968: 171). "the United States Central Intelligence and.S. or by a military-civilian junta. as chiefmilitary supplier.. to have been environment adjudges the pressuresfromthe international thattriggered largelyresponsibleforactionsby the government (or at least the forces thateventuatedin the assassinationof Trujillo greatly intensified) in 1961.to the regime. However.often implicit. the External supportforCastro fromCuban exile politicians being and fromotherLatin American countriesmeanwhileproved invaluable to the Castro forces.while the famous interviewswith Castro by Herbert in February1957.. Rojas Pinilla.S. '28 This content downloaded from 94. the foreign impact on his demise (both personal and political)was even more directand dramatic.Thus Peron. thus probably hastening the ofBatista's army.S. The primaryU. and Perez Jimenezwere each followedby a period of military rule.S. role in the assassination plot is unclear. triedto abort the conspiracy at the last moment (see Diedrich.may even have providedencouragement In sum.Howard Wiarda.The depositionof objectiveof a return the dictatorwas thus less traumaticforthose in the military reluctantto restore civilianrule..48 on Wed. outsideinfluences. the attempted aggressive dent Romulo Betancourt)Trujillo began to spend lavishlyforarms. the externalenvironment role in the breakplayed a significant in only two of our six cases-those two whichby down of authoritarianism and economics were most vulnerableto U. even fatal. Thus in thewake of diplomaticand economicsanctionsimposedon theDominican Republic in 1960 by theOrganizationofAmericanStatesfor assassinationof Presiacts againstVenezuela (i. there stillseems littlequestion that the United States had withdrawnits imprimaturfromTrujillo his downfall. Venezuela was insistenton action against Trujillo if it was to join a united American front against Castro.
29 perhaps by therelevantguaranteesin thiscase were the democraticassurancesgivenby Castro to Cuba's upper and middle classes as an incentiveto forsake Batista. The point.moderatesdominated the first post-Batistagovernment. There were likewisesome contrasts in the revolutionary natureof theregimesthemselves.and the oppositions that eventuallycoalesced to overthrow them.and Trujilloby assassinaby popular revolution tion.althoughPeron did confirm 29See Perez (1976) foran analysis of the reasons forthat disintegration. the major candidates in the successorelectionapparently affordedsomewhat similar guarantees (Pike.from Trujillo's thirty-one years to Rojas' four. This content downloaded from 94. Batista.finally. however.30. of power to a 30Attempts by top militaryofficials.saw guaranteesforthemselves the last momentwent awry. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .these essentiallyauthoritarian governments shareda numberof keyelementsin a common processof breakdown.The durationoftheregimesalso varied. without the in to democratic electionsin Peru and (but Peronists) Argentina. 1976: 164-65). theirbases of support. of overthrown course. The consequence was thatotherTrujillo associates and family memberswere able to retainpower forseveralmonths. constitutional prothe powerhe alreadyheld by means of cedures.568 Western Political Quarterly retired but not broughtto trial foralleged misdeeds). The fact that the apparent guarantees ultimately were not kept does not in the Dominidetract from theirimportance at the time.In fact.42. socialismin Cuba.Batista and thecollapseofhis army. 1967: 294-95).The circumstances can case were. to arrange a transfer militarysuccessor failed(Perez. followedby elections ships also differed. Rojas Pinilla and Perez Jimenez by streetdemonstrations and "civic strikes" which in turn precipitated military coups. Thus Trujillo's rule was in a classic in the many way dictatorship predatorystyle (the rule of the Somozas in Nicaragua having been anotherprimeexample).112. The governments that immediately succeeded the dictatorfromthreeyears of military rule.remains: in everycase the factthat key erstwhile of the dictatordefectedto the oppositionwas in part crucially supporters thattheywould not be ill-treated dependenton at least theperception by the regimewhichfollowed. Trujillo's assassins. and that the forcibly be would assured an honoredplace in the successorcivilianregime. while Per6n's rule had a strong mass base and was legitimizedin 1946 by genuine elections.was ultimately by defeatofhis armyon thebattlefield (or more accurately the However. quite unusual. Odria by "voluntary" exitand elections.None of them came to power throughcommonlyaccepted. In spite of such contrasts. military In Odria's case.spurred by the United States.among whom were in an exitplan thatat former close associates. army's internaldisintegration).at thecostofthelivesofa numberoftheconspirators (Wiarda.48 on Wed. 1968: 172). SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS TheBreakdown Process The end oftheauthoritarian regimeswithwhichwe have been concerned came in a variety of ways: Peron by action of the military.
more unifiedand Opposition grew not only stronger. oftenincludingblatantly at continuismo. or to what extent. And serious divisions When.theytended to have an impacton such significant phases of the breakdownprocess as delegitimation. At whateverlevel a conspicuofadherencetheybegan. though in realitytheymay of course overlap. a significant degreeof supportor at least of acquiescence.Each did stakea claim to thekindof "secondary legitimacy.42. andResearch Directions Comparisons The questionremainsof whether. steps.such a model might informour understandingof other regime breakdowns. guarantees condition of The model is as therefore follows: precipitating regimecollapse.TheBreakdown ofAuthoritarian Regimes 569 a substantially freeelection.Time tendedto ofthe dictator to isolation.thefateoftheregimewas sealed.PerezJimenez' 1957 plebiscite). Batista and a probablycriticalone in Trujillo's case. Opposition coalescence and military disaffectionare the next. each of the regimesbegan with fraudulent attempts Similarly. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . bringincreasing unwise actions which further underminedthe regime (e.112.g. and theirtimingmay be hastyor proand narrowing thepriorstagesand tend to constitute longed.and elitedivisions. regimenarrowing. however..again roughly Exit are the last. of the dictatorship erstwhile who had the most to lose by its key supporters demise were affordedapparent guarantees that a new order would not them.all sooneror laterunderwent ous "narrowing" as theycame more and more to centeraround the person and his close associates.regimeperformance in thissense was onlyof secondary in most of the have cases we examined. more concertedtoward the goal of the dictator'sdeposition.Where present. but most important. undulythreaten The steps in the process have theirown sequence in logic. parallel. were not a generally element. finally.while playingan important role in the fallof Similarly. Per6n's war againsttheChurch. performance or narrowing was earlierseen as contributory in some cases to delegitimation oftheregime'ssupportcoalition. authoritarianor A model ofauthoritarian otherwise.In fact. importance externalactors. Under these circumstances two other things eventually occurred. leadingtypically self-indulgence.and paranoia.themilitary. breakdownwhichplaces itsemphasison the increasingly isolativeand self-indulgent behavior of a dictatoror ruler This content downloaded from 94. Opposition Coalescence _ Delegitimation RegimeNarrowing _ 0 Exit Elite Divisions Guarantees _Regime Breakdown in such areas as economicsand public order Surprisingly.military and civilian.but not forthe mostpartas directcauses of breakdown.48 on Wed."Yet each proceededto lose even thatmeasure of legitimacy by actions which ran counterto those initialclaims. Delegitimation occur more or less in tandem. began to appear in thekeyregimeelite.
theclearcutcases of thebreakdownof corporateauthoritarian rule are as yet 31On the other hand.nonetheless.g. The 1974 demise of a Portuguese regime which mightbe dubbed B-A in nature-see.was restored in 1976. 32An exception to the latter could be defeat in foreignconflict. these to such problemsas isolation. -or at any rate one institution. were the causes of the regime's breakdown. e.42. Chile.570 Western Political Quarterly would appear largelyto fit such recentcases as thoseofAnastasio Somoza in Shah Iran. The Peruvian militaryalso made a voluntary exit from a regime (1968-80) of a corporate military type (although it was reformist.as well tionalization as the new self-perceived militaryrole of permanentinvolvementin the politicalprocess.33 Proof of any parallels in the patternsof breakdown between the two varietiesof authoritarian regimemust remain for anothertime and place. and the central support role typicallyplayed by foreignand domesticbusiness elites. and in the end the contrasts mightoutweighthe similarities. Thus revolutionmay interrupt to short-circuit fails to defect from the military regime. pressures characterof the B-A than in two of our cases. thus in turnrendering exitguaranteesnot effective virtually relevant. International pressures played no discernible role. In any event. and the apparent failureon the part of credible exit guarantees. may have foreclosedthe military's defectionfrom the opposition to offer the regime and made a more revolutionary outcome all but inevitable in the cases of both Nicaragua and Iran. it would be logical to hypothesizethat failuresin would play a larger role in the breakdownof B-A economic performance than in thecases discussedhere. a dimension to breakdown not fullyconsidered in our more consensual the model if the model. his army did forall practical purposes deserthim. see Snow (1979). in a by an oppositionled by persons with revolutionary sense.32 Given the technocratic regimes. Cuba's Batista of course. among his supporters.not conservative or reactionary. and Mexico that are more corporatein nature is more problematic. the military-theyshould generallyprove and less susceptibleto international more stable and long-lasting.thistime in the area of Portuguese colonial policy. see Palmer (1980). was. Less dependent on the whims or capacities of one man. 33The clearest case of the breakdown of a B-A regime to date in Latin America has been the regime initiatedby the militaryin Argentina in 1966.Argenofcontemporary bureaucratic-authoritarian (B-A) regimes tina. This content downloaded from 94. the perceived prospect of radical change.31 breakdownand those Any parallelsbetweenour model of authoritarian likeBrazil. again dominated by the military. It ended in 1973 when the military"voluntarily" gave way to a returnofJuan Peron and his supporters. Performance failures and mounting popular demands. not isolative behavior..as potentially with Argentina in the Falkland (Malvinas) Island dispute withGreat Britainduring the springof 1982. a more thoroughoingB-A regime. Graham (1975)-came as the resultof a coup by elements of a key regime elite-the military. as noted. defeated"in the field.thegreater regimes degreeofinstituin regimeswhererulership is more corporatein nature. similarly broughtdown particularly intentand was.48 on Wed. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions . The motives were primarilyobjections to regimeperformance. More firmly rootedin institutions self-indulgence. and Castro had given implicitexit guaranteesto the can add non-revolutionaries Revolution. in nature). There is one major qualification:the key and the of Nicaragua elites in these cases remained more or less loyal and more or less military to the veryend.112. could be expectedto be less susceptible regimes and individualparanoia." But. Lastly. may mean that "liberalization" or "opening" is a more thanis outright outcomeforsuch regimes likely collapseor deposition.
to be TheBreakdown Democratic stress does place preeminent of Regimes appear sense. Thus it was not so much the dicyetin a ratherdifferent important. breakdown processin thedirections suggested Any parallels with breakdowns in democraticregimes are necessarily of whichAlfredStepan and more tenuous.42.48 on Wed. may in the main be superseded by more directly considerations.or of democratic would confirm. 35See particularly Stepan's section on the overthrow of Joao Goulart in Brazil in 1964.the more a rulership. and declining governmentalextractivecapabilities. breakdown. the more likelyit would be to accord withour model. emphasisplaced on theleadership In conclusion. where he such as increasingdemands on the system develops a kind of model involvingboth macro-factors. based on an analysis of six Latin Americancases from theyears1955-61. theirown erstwhile alienated by the dictators'aggrandizingand supporters isolative behavior.is theextentto whichthe analysisof otherkindsof authoritarian systematic regimes. This content downloaded from 94. and micro-factors such as the skills and tactics of individual leaders.We have also briefly some suggested in the processes of breakdown between different differences varieties of authoritarian government and between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Thus the kindsof macro-factors othersspeak in TheBreakdown ofDemocratic appear to be less germane Regimes in thecases oftheauthoritarian To wit. withtheultimate objectivea ofregimebreakdown.For thepresentwe willmerely hypothesize that the basic lineamentsof our model would remain in place forthe more corporatetypesof authoritarian Nonetheless.It democratic breakdowns. as was the case with rulers.we have triedto put forward a tentative model ofthe breakdown of authoritarianregimes. while hardly irrelevant. Our analysis would thereforetend to confirm the variableby theauthorsofBreakdown. as in nearly it was based on institutional have our expectations of the more we would to modify the Mexico). political theleadershipvariableon whichmostofthecontributors to Nonetheless. and tacticsin handlingsupporters and enemies of tators'choice of strategy the regimethat broughtabout theirpoliticaldemise.increasing regimesexaminedhere. 1 May 2013 11:23:06 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions .while variationsin the government'sextractivecapabilities.refine. likely above.and little scattered studied.Extensionof the comparativeuniversein both space and time would likewisebe in order. bothauthoritarian and democratic.34 end of the continuumof authoriregimeinclinedtoward the personalistic tarianrule. however.TheBreakdown Regimes 571 ofAuthoritarian and few.What is stillverymuch at issue.The agenda is long. theory 34Forthe basic problems oflegitimationin such regimes. the more militaryrule (or party rule.35 are in good partforeclosed by thenatureof populardemandson government the regimes.or discard the proferred model of governments.but rather their greatest politicaldifficulties.but rathertheirbehavioras personalistic which caused these men was not the sworn opponentsof authoritarianism nor theirideologicalopponents.then.see O'Donnell (1979) and Linz (1973).112.
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