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ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED, PART I.

(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti

PART I TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Signification in the Ante-Predicaments: Categories ch. 1. II. On what is signified according to the Categories. III. On things said denominatively. IV. On signification in relation to substance and accident. V. On things said either with intertwining or without it. Supplement: De Ente et Essenti, cap. 3, nn. 24-36. Supplement: On accidental predicates and the singular in the genus of substance as what exists per se.

I. SIGNIFICATION IN THE ANTE-PREDICAMENTS: CATEGORIES CH. 1. 1. Translations. Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1 (1a 1-15):
(tr. R. Glen Coughlin) Those are called equivocal of which the name alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is different, as both man and a picture of a man [are called] animal, for, of these, the name alone is common but the account of the substance according to the name is different. (tr. unknown) [1a] Things are named equivocally whose name alone is common but the thought of the substance according to that name is different, as a man and a picture of a man are named animal. Only the name of these things is common, since the thought of the substance according to that name is different for each.

For should someone give out what it is for each For if anyone were to say [5] what it is for each of these to be animal, he will give out a proper of these to be animals, he would give the proper account of each. account for each. Those are called univocal of which both the name is common and the account of the substance according to the name is the same, as both man and ox [are called] animal. For each of these is called by the common name animal, and the account of the substance is the same. Things are named univocally whose name is common and the thought of the substance according to that name is the same, as a man and an ox are called by the common name animal, and the thought of the [10] substance is the same for both.

For should someone give out an account of For if anyone were to give an account of what it each, what it is for each of these to be animal, is for each of these to be animals, he would give he will give out the same account. the same account. Those are called denominative, which, differing from something by falling away {by case, by ending, }, have their name according to its name, as the grammarian from grammar, and the brave from bravery. Things are named denominatively which have a name according to another name with a [15] different ending, as grammarian from grammar, and brave from bravery.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1 (1a 1-15):


(tr. E. M. Edghill) Things are said to be named equivocally when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to the name animal; (tr. H. G. Apostle) [1a] Things are named equivocally if only the name applied to them is common but the expression of the substance [i.e. the definition] corresponding to that name is different for each of the things, as in the case of a man and a picture when each is called animal.

yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only. On the other hand, things are said to be named univocally which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both animal, and these are univocally so named, inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other. Things are said to be named derivatively, which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word grammar, and the courageous man from the word courage.

For only the name is common to these, but the expression of the substance corresponding to that [5] name differs for each; for if one were to state what it is to be an animal, he would give a different definition for each of them. Things are named univocally if both the name applied to them is common and the expression of the substance corresponding to them is the same for each of the things, as in the case of animal when applied to a man and to an ox. For a man and an ox may be called by the common [10] name animal, and the expression of the substance [corresponding to that name] is the same for both; for if one were to state for each of them what it is to be an animal, he would give the same definition. Things are derivatively named if they are called by a name which is borrowed from another name but which differs from it in ending. For example, a man may be called grammarian, and this name is borrowed [15] from grammar; and he may be called brave, and this name is borrowed from bravery.

Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1, (1a 1-15) (tr. Richard P. Diamond):


Things are said to be equivocal whose name alone is common, but the definition corresponding to the name of the substance is different; animal, for example, which is both a man and a drawing [of one]. For only the name of these is common, and the definition corresponding to the name of the substance is different.

(a) Forms of translation compared: Those are called equivocal... (tr. Coughlin) Things are named equivocally... (tr. unknown) Things are said to be named equivocally.... (tr. Edghill) Things are named equivocally... (tr. Apostle) Things are said to be equivocal... (tr. Diamond) (b) My trans.: Those (things) are called equivocal.... (see further below)

2. Definition, description, and a division of names into four. Cf. Porphyry, Commentary on the Categories (In: Porphyry: On Aristotles Categories. Translated by Steven K. Strange, Ithaca, New York, 1992, pp. 38-39):
A. I claim that everything possesses both a name and either a definition ( horismos) or a description (hupograph).40 For example, this thing has the name man, and is indicated by that name, but there also exists a definition of it, for we say that man is a mortal rational animal capable of receiving intelligence and knowledge. Each thing is indicated not only by its name but also by the account that defines and conveys its essence, as for example when we say that sound is the proper sensible of hearing. Since everything has both a name and a defining account, there are four sorts of relations that [38-39]
40

The Neoplatonic version of this distinction is well illustrated by Boethius 166A: a definition (diffinitio) reveals the essence of something according to its genus and differentia, whereas a description (descriptio) merely indicates it by means of a common characteristic (propria quadam proprietate).... obtain between defining accounts and names. Things either share both the same name and the same defining account, or the name but not the defining account, or the account but not [25] the name, or neither the account nor the name. 41 When things share the same name but have entirely different accounts, they are called homonyms.1 When they share both the account and a name, they are referred to as synonyms, since together with (sun-) the name they also have the same account. When things share the same account but not the same name, they are called polyonyms, and when they have in common neither [30] a name nor an account, they are called heteronyms. There is a fifth sort of case: when certain things come to be from other things, participating in a way in both the name and the account of the things from whence they come, differing however in grammatical form. These are called paronyms.42
41 42

[note omitted] According to Simplicius, who presumably depends for his information on Porphyrys larger commentary, the division of homonyms, synonyms, heteronyms, polyonyms, and paronyms was reported by Boethus to have been due to Speusippus (Simpl. 38,19-24 = Speusippus fr. 34a Lang). Porphyrys text appears to imply, probably correctly, that Aristotle adopted Speusippus division for his own purposes in the Categories....

Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W. Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975, n. 17), p. 30:
...Boethius remarks, Carefully he says describentes, not definientes: for a definition arises from a genus, but a genus cannot have another genus. E.S. p. 180, 20 -22. 2 A descriptio is given, not a definitio. A descriptio, as we said in an earlier book, is a kind of sketch of a thing based on its qualities and like a characterization from outward appearances . For, when many qualities unite together so that all of them at the same time are equal to the thing to which they applythis is called a descriptio, unless this collection is composed of a genus or differences. E.S. p. 181, 8-13....

Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 29.16-25) (In: Simplicius: On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Translated by Michael Chase. Ithaca, New York, 2003, p. 43):
1 2

On this choice of terms, see my comments further below. N.B. E.S. means Boethius second edition of his commentary on Porphyrys work.

He said account (logos) rather than definition (horismos), in order to include the descriptive account318 as well, which fits both with the highest genera and with individuals [= infimae species]; these cannot be included by a definition ( horismos), since it is not possible to take either a genus of the highest genera, nor differentiae of individuals [= infimae species].319 Descriptions (hupograph), by contrast, which give an account of the characteristic property ( idiots) of substance,320 extend to these321 as well. This is why he did not say the definition[3] (logos) in accordance with the name but the definition [1] (logos) of substance: since a descriptive definition [1] (logos)325 defines the characteristic property of a substance, whereas a definitory ( horistikos) one defines both the quiddity322 of each thing, and the substance itself. Thus definition [1] (logos) of substance includes both the descriptive and the definitory definition[1] (logos).323
318 319

tn hupograpikn apodosin. The highest genera have no genera above them; if they did they would no longer be highest. Individuals, by contrast, as the most specific species ( eid eidiktata), have no differentiae; if they did, then the differentia in question, combined with the new species, would give rise to another lower species; cf. Boethius In Cat. 166A; Simplicius below, 45,24. But the definitions (horismoi) in the strict Aristotelian sense proceed by genus and differentiae (cf. Topics 1.8, 103b14-15), so that in the absence of either of these two elements, strict definition is impossible. 320 cf. Boethius In Cat. 166A. 321 viz. the highest genera and individuals. 322 to ti n einai, an Aristotelian term of art meaning essence. 323 cf. Boethius In Cat. 166B1-2. (emphasis added)

Cf. Susanne Bobzien, The Stoics on Fallacies of Equivocation (In: Dorothea Frede & Brad Inwood ed., Language and Learning: Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age , Cambridge, 2005, Stoic Definitions, p. 186):
Section One: Stoic Theories of Definition The basic evidence for the Stoic theory of definition is given by Diogenes Laertius in an appendix to his report on the grammatical part of dialectic: According to Antipater in Book One of his On Definitions, a definition is a statement by analysis expressed commensurably; alternatively, as Chrysippus has it in his On Definitions, it is a rendering of a peculiar characteristic ( idion). A delineation (hupograph) is an account introducing the things (pragmata) in outline, or a definition having the effect of a definition in a simpler fashion.81 (D.L. 7.60, FDS 621, SVF 2.226)
81

[Greek omitted] ...The translation follows the MSS; Sedleys emendation of the genitive (horou) for the MSS nominative ( horos) in the last clause (Long and Sedley 1987: II.194) yields or <a statement> having the effect of a definition in a simpler fashion than a definition. This implies that there are two kinds of delineation, or two different ways to characterise delineations; the received text instead disambiguates two senses of the word delineation i.e. roughly between introductory book (sic) and provisional definition.

Cf. A. A. Long & D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Translations of the Principal Sources with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 190-191.
C Diogenes Laertius, 7.60-2
3

Obviously, logos here should also be translated account and not definition.

(1) A definition is, as Antipater says in On definitions book I, a statement of analysis matchingly expressed, (2) or, as Chrysippus says in his On [190-191] definitions, a representation of a peculiar characteristic. (3) An outline account is a statement introducing us to things by means of a sketch, or which conveys the force of the definition more simply than a definition does.... E Alexander, On Aristotles Topics 42,27-43,2 (SVF 2.228, part) Those [i.e. the Stoics] who say that a definition is a statement of analysis matchingly expressed (meaning by analysis the filling out of the definiendum, and in succinct fashion, and by matchingly that it is neither broader nor narrower) 4 would say that the definition is no different from the representation of the peculiar characteristic. Note by Long & Sedley, op.cit., pp. 193-194. It must however be admitted that one or two apparent instances of definitions [193-194] which seem not to be the products of division could in fact be not the definitions in the strict sense at all, but outline accounts. Outline account ( hupograph) is an Aristotelian notion inherited by both Stoics (C3; 26H) and Epicureans (19 commentary). It is a formula used for the preliminary marking off of a definiendum, prior to the construction of a true definition. It clarifies what it is that is under discussion, but may not yet reveal that things nature. This contrasts with a genuine definition ( C2), which presents the (or a) peculiar characteristic of a species. One critic of the Stoics, Alexander (in the sequel to E), argued that a peculiar characteristic might itself turn out to be something quite inessential to the nature of the definiendum, e.g. that man might be on the Stoic view defined as animal with a sense of humour. But there seems no doubt (cf. 32D; 58A 5; 63D, M) that peculiar characteristic (idion) is an expression intended by the Stoics to apply only to features which are not just unique but also essential. Alexander is perhaps unduly influenced by the more flexible Aristotelian use of the term.

Cf. C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking (Leiden: Brill, 1977), pp. 129-130:
3. The type of definition favoured by the theologians is the description ( rasm), about which van Ess observes: One was not primarily concerned with the problem to find out the essence of a thing, but rather how to circumscribe it in the shortest way so that everybody could easily grasp what was meant.13 In other words, the aim of the description is to differentiate the object to be defined from other objects resembling it, by mentioning a characteristic property it does not share with any other object. In Frbis words: Both (sc. the definition and the description) share the use of the genus of the thing, and they differ in that the definition
13

van Ess, 1970, 38. [= van Ess, J. The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology, Grunebaum, 1970, 21-50] adds to the genus the substantial differentiae, while the description (adds) the accidental differentiae.14 It is to this type of definition which Za refers when he talks about the difference between various definitions of philosophy: in his view, definitions may indeed differ, since they are made for different aims. 15 It is evident that this type of definition is related to the Stoic description (hupograph), which is defined by Chrysippus as showing the characteristic properties (h tou idiou apdosis).16
4

On this point, see Simplicius (op.cit., pp. 42-43).

14

Translation Dunlop, 1951, 83 [= Dunlop, D.M. The Existence and Definition of Philosophy: From an Arabic text Ascribed to al -Frbi, Iraq, 13, 1951, 76-94]; cf. also Zas analysis of the definition of man, Id. 46, 7-11. 15 [note omitted] 16 SVF 2, 226; cf. van Ess, 1970, 37 sqq. and note 90; van den Bergh, 1954, 2, 84; 129. [= van den Bergh, S. Averroes Tahafut al-tahafut. Translated from the Arabic with Introduction and Notes, 1954]

3. On the art of defining: The difference between the quid nominis and the quid rei. Cf. Michael A. Augros, Excerpt from a letter to Sean Kelsey:
In defining anything, how can we know we have the right definition? Against what do we test it? Let us recall the definition of definition: speech making known distinctly what a thing is (which is composed of genus and differences, etc.). The thing to be defined, then, must be known vaguely or indistinctly before it can be defined. Take for example nougat. What is nougat? Its that whitish sweet gook in a Three Musketeers Bar. That is a vague grasp of what nougat is; in fact, since it does not tell us the intrinsic causes and principles of nougat, it does not tell us what the thing is, but merely points out to us what the word refers to. It is a definition of the name (a quid nominis as opposed to a quid rei). From this we can often reason to a definition of the thing, as Aristotle reasons to a definition of what the soul is from what the name refers to. In short, there must be something in our experience which made us wonder what something is in the first place, and this something in our experience can be a test or starting point for our proposed definitions. In his discussion of place in the Physics, Aristotle says something about a good definition of place that can be extended to many other definitions. A good definition should say what the thing is (not just some property of it), and it should manifest the properties of the thing (i.e. make a good middle term in a demonstration), it should resolve the difficulties surrounding the thing to be defined, and it should show why anyone had difficulties about it in the first place.

Cf. Michael A. Augros, Excerpt from another letter to Sean Kelsey:


Knowing is a word used by everyone, and by quid nominis all we mean is what are you talking about? If no one had any idea what they were talking about, if they meant nothing by the word, it would soon fall from common speech.

Cf. E.D. Buckner, On Connotation:5


Introduction. The distinction between nominal and real essence originates with Aristotle. In the passage from the Posterior Analytics below [= II.7], he argues that we can know the meaning of a made up name (he gives the example goat stag) that denotes no-thing, without knowing what he calls the essential nature of the thing that the name would denote, if there were such a thing. These brief remarks, as with many of his brief remarks, are the starting point of a huge controversy and discussion which lasts throughout the Middle Ages, which occupies a defining position in the early modern era (it occupies most of book III of Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding), and which is a philosophical issue today....
5

(http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/connotation/nominaldefinitions.htm [3/14/08])

They imply the following distinctions. First, between the meaning of a name such as man, which the medieval logicians called the quid nominis or whatness of the name, and the underlying nature common to all the things it names, which they called the quid rei or whatness of the thing. (Early modern philosophers like Locke used the corresponding English terms nominal essence and real essence). The name hobbit, for example, is perfectly meaningful. It has a quid nominis. But we could not know the real nature of hobbits, even if there were such things (presumably there would be a hobbit genetic structure, but we cannot tell this from the meaning of the word hobbit). So we cannot know the real nature, the quid rei of hobbits. By contrast, the name man denotes real things (men) that have a certain quid rei. The meaning of a name is distinct from the nature that thing must have in order that the name apply to it. Second, between nominal and real definition. A nominal definition is the definition explaining what a word means, i.e. which says what the nominal essence is. (The Latin corresponding to the English term nominal definition is definitio exprimens quid nominis , literally a definition expressing the quid nominis or nominal essence of the term). A real definition is one expressing the real nature or quid rei of the thing. Third, between the meaning or connotation or intension of a name, and the objects that the name applies to or denotes. Connotation is a term introduced by Mill, which closely corresponds to the idea of nominal essence. (He claimed it was derived from the Latin connotare, however in Latin logic this term has a slightly different use - see Ockhams discussion of connotative terms). Mill makes it clear that what he calls connotation is what we would ordinarily call meaning. In the case of connotative names [i.e. common nouns], the meaning, as has so often been observed, is the connotation ( System of Logic, I. viii. 1). The definition of a name, in turn, is any proposition that says what its connotation is. 6 Note that Mill, following Locke, makes no distinction between nominal and real essence, or nominal and real definitions.

N.B. The consideration of connotation versus denotation will be met with in several places below.

4. On homonuma or equivocals. Cf. Porphyry, Commentary on the Categories (In: Porphyry: On Aristotles Categories. Translated by Steven K. Strange (Ithaca, New York, 1992), pp. 39-40:
Q. Why does he begin with homonyms {= equivocals}, 7 not with synonyms {= univocals}, if synonyms {univocals} are things that share both the same name and the same account, and something sharing both its account and its name would be a clearer case than something that has only [39-40] its name in common with something else? A. I claim that Aristotle discusses homonyms {equivocals} first because he holds that being is a homonym {equivocal} and because predications ( kategoriai) are homonymously {equivocally} said to be predications of that of which they are predicated. 43 Q. Why does he not discuss homonymy {equivocity} before discussing homonyms {equivocals}, given that homonymy{equivocity} is a word, whereas homonyms {equivocals} are things, and you claim that he is primarily concerned in this treatise with words, not with things?44 A. Because what produces homonymy {equivocity} in words is not the character of the expression itself, but rather things are found to be different and in no way have anything in common yet acquire one and the same expression as their name. 45 Until it is recognised that a word applies to a number of things that do not share the same account, there cannot be homonymy {equivocity}.
43 44

[Note omitted] [Note omitted] 45 [Note omitted]

Cf. ibid.:
Q. How then does Aristotle define homonyms {= equivocals}? A. Those things are said to be homonyms {equivocals} that have only their name in common, and have a different account of the essence corresponding to the name (1a1-2).

5. On sunonuma or univocals. Cf. ibid., p. 49.


[Concerning Synonyms {= Univocals}] A. Those things are called synonyms {univocals} that have the name in common and the same account of the essence corresponding to the name, as for example <both man and ox> are animal.73 For both man and ox are called by the common name animal, and the account is also the same. For if one is to give the account for each of them, what it is for each to be an animal, one will give the same account. Q. Explain this definition. A. He is saying that synonyms {univocals} are things that have their name in common, but not merely their name, as in the case of homonyms {equivocals}. It is clear that name here must be taken in its general sense, as applying to all parts of speech, and in common must be understood in the way previously explained.74
73

Supplying zoion <ho te anthropos kai ho bous > at 68, 6-7 as Busse suggests, following Cat. 1a8.
7

In order to avoid misunderstanding, here and in what follows I have inserted the more familiar term.

10

74

At 62, 17-33.

6. Aristotle on homonuma understood as equivocals and sunonuma understood as synonyms. Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. III, 2 (1404b 361405a 2) (tr. J. H. Freese; rev. B.A.M.):
In regard to names, equivocals8 [homonumiai] are most useful to the sophist, for by their help he does his damage, and synonyms [sunonumiai] to the poet. By synonyms which are current [kuria] [1405a] I mean, for example, going [preuesthai] and walking [badizein], for these words are both current and synonymous with each other [sunonuma allelois].

7. That sunonuma has one meaning in the Poetics and Rhetoric and another in the Categories. Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 36.13, citing Porphyry) (tr. Richard Janko, but rev. B.A.M. after James Huttons translation of the definition of sunonuma):
Aristotle in the Poetics9 said that synonyms are names more than one in number [ pleio] but with the same account [ logos], like the poluonuma [polyonyms] (of Speusippus), such as cloak [lupion], and wrap [himation], and mantle [pharos]. But there is nothing strange, says Porphyry, in the fact that Aristotle uses both meanings (of synonymy), since the usage is twofold. (there is one usage in the logical works, but) where his concern is entirely with vocal sounds or the multiform nomenclature of each (thing), as in the Poetics and the third book of the Rhetoric (cf. ch. 2, 1404b 37 ff.), we need the other kinds of synonym, which Speusippus called the polyonym.

8. On Aristotles understanding of sunonuma. From Simplicius report we may recover Aristotles definition of sunonuma in the sense proper to poetics and rhetoric: sunonuma [synonyms] are names more than one in number [pleio] but with the same account [ logos], such as cloak [lupion], and wrap [himation], and mantle [pharos]. This sense of the term must be distinguished from the meaning appropriate to logic proper: those (things) are called sunonuma [univocal] whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corresponding to the name, as man and ox are animal (Cat. 1, 1a 6-9, tr. B.A.M.). 9. On polyonyms, heteronyms, and the other kinds of names. Cf. Simplicius, Commentary on the Categories (Kalbfleisch 38.1-40.11) (In: Simplicius: On Aristotles Categories 1-4. Translated by Michael Chase, Ithaca, New York, 2003, pp. 53-54):

That Aristotle intends homonuma here to be understood as equivocals is proven by Soph. Ref. III, 4, 165b 25-27 where the he lists equivocation (= homonumia) as one of the ways an apparent refutation may arise from the language (lexis). 9 Presumably in the lost second book.

11

Now, whereas Aristotle has spoken of homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms, he omitted both heteronyms and polyonyms. Polyonyms were omitted because they do not present any difference or common feature with regard to realities ( pragmata), but only multiple expressions (lexeis) [i.e. they are synonyms (B.A.M.)], while heteronyms were omitted because the present discussion does not carry out a division of expressions which are numerically infinite, but of those which signify something generically [15] ( kata genos).398 Moreover, as has been said, Aristotle omitted both of them because they pertain more to rhetorical and poetical punctiliousness than they do to philosophical speculation. 399 Nevertheless, it is as well to include these [two classes of words] as well into one single division, together with those that have been taken up. Now Boethus reports400 that Speusippus adopted a division which included all names. Of names, he says, Some are tautonyms, and [20] others are heteronyms. Of tautonyms, some are homonyms, and others are synonyms and here we understand synonyms according to the usage of the ancients. Of heteronyms, he says, some are heteronyms properly ( idis), others polyonyms, and others paronyms. An account has already been given of the other types. 401 As for polyonyms, they are several different names for one reality, when [25] their account ( logos) is one and the same, as in aor, xiphos, makhaira, and phasaganon.402 Heteronyms, by contrast, are things which differ [39,1] in names, accounts (logoi), and realities, such as grammar, man, and wood. They differ from each other, then, in so far as polyonyms have in common both the same account (logos) and the same reality, whereas heteronyms differ in both respects. 403 With regard to the first, 404 polyonyms are convertible (antistrephei) with homonyms {= equivocals}, in [5] so far as in the case of homonyms the name was common, while the definition (horos) of each thing was particular (idios). In the case of polyonyms the reverse is true: the reality (pragma) and the definition are common, but the names are different. Heteronyms, for their part, are the opposite of synonyms {univocals}; for while the latter have something in common in both respects, the former have nothing in common in either respect.405 We must watch closely, in the case of polyonyms, lest we mistakenly consider that things which are not polyonyms are such. It is not [10] the case, for example, that if several names are predicated of one thing, they are eo ipso already polyonyms. Rather, [such names are polyonyms] only if, in addition, the same predicate is said of one thing. For instance, partless (ameres) and smallest (elakhiston) are two names, and are said of one reality, e.g. the letter A or B; and convex and concave are said of a circle, but that of which they are said is by no means a polyonym. For since the account ( logos) of each one [sc. of [15] [53-54]
398 399

cf. Porph. In Cat. 70, 29-30. cf. above, 23, 13-19 (opinion of Syrianus). 400 On the following passage (Speusippus fr. 32a Lang = fr. 68a Tarn); cf., in addition to Tarns commentary ad loc., J. Pepin 1980, with further bibliography 275 n. 1. Again, it seems that Simplicius has his information from Boethus via Porphyrys commentary Ad Gedalium. 401 See above, 22,20-3, 10. 402 All of which mean, as <Sophonias> reminds us ( Anon; Paraphr. 4,5), a two-edged piece of iron; i.e. a sword. Cf. Porph. In Cat. 69,1ff. 403 Porphyry (69,10ff.) gives a rather different account of heteronyms; he uses different examples (fire/gold; Socrates/bravery) and leaves the reality ( pragma) out of consideration, speaking only of the logos and the name being different. 404 sc. name and logos. 405 cf. the following table: polyonyms heteronyms homonyms synonyms

12

logos onoma pragma

same different same

different different different

different same

same same

If the values of a column are different, then the types of words are opposite or convertible; here this is true of the couple polyonyms/homonyms, and of the couple heteronyms/synonyms. convex and concave] is different, each does not belong to it [ sc. the circle] in the same respect.406 It is worth noting, however, that even in the case of polyonyms properly so called as when, in the case of man, the same person is called both meropes and brotos each of the names is given in accordance with different aspects of mans nature. For instance, man is given one [20] name in so far as he is analogical, 407 another in accordance with the ethnic differences in his dialect, and another according to his mortal condition; 408 and the account (logos) of each of these things is different. What, then? Do polyonyms not exist at all? Rather, those things alone are polyonyms to which different names apply not with regard to their various natures, but as if with regard to the same nature, either because different people name them differently with regard to any random aspect, or because different names have been given out [25] with regard to the same aspect, not etymologically, but in accordance with whatever license the imposer of names may have had. This is shown by the fact that names which apply to one reality are often substituted for the names of others, as however ( alla mn) was transferred to become a name of a slave;409 for if we do not follow etymology, we can impose as many names, and of as many kinds, as we wish.410 It must also be a property of polyonyms that they are called by [30] many names within the same ethnic group; otherwise hmera and hamera411 will be considered polyonyms. They also do well to note the following fact: whereas in the case of homonyms, homonymy denotes both the homonymous name and the relation ( skhesis) itself, in the [40,1] case of polyonyms polyonymy denotes only the reality ( pragma), but not the name. Moreover, homonyms are at any rate said relative to something else: O homonym of the blessed Dardanids412 whereas polyonyms do not have their being in any relation ( skhesis). [5] Why, however, did Archytas omit this instruction about names in his On the Universal Formulae? The answer is that since the Pythagoreans say that names are by nature and not by imposition, they reject both homonyms and polyonyms, saying that by nature one name is said of one reality. It is therefore fitting that they should distinguish homonyms by ancestral or hopeful reference,413 but that [10] they should show that polyonyms, when they are genuinely words, are not said with reference to one thing, but are given according to different etymologies.414 They will also appropriately explain the change in form (paraskhmatismos) that takes place in the case of paronyms by means of the couplings (suzugiai) of realities.415
406

For two predicates to be polyonyms, they must fulfil two conditions: (i) they must be the same (to auto legetai); and (ii) the subject of which they are predicated must one and the same (kathhen). Partless, and least fulfil both conditions and are polyonyms, as is that of which they are said (e.g. letters of the alphabet); but since convex and concave are different (Simplicius says they have a different logos), they do not fulfil condition (ii), either: for convex and concave cannot be predicated of the same circle; rather, they are names for different circles. At De Caelo 1.4, 270b35f., Aristotle states that convex and concave lines are (apparently) contrary; yet at Physics 4.13, 222b3-4 he says that the convex and the concave are in what is in a sense the same circle. Presumably what Aristotle means in the latter passage is that convex and concave are both said of a circle in the abstract and generic sense of the term, although they can never simultaneously characterize the same individual circle.

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407

This appears to be an imperfect recollection of Platos Cratylus 399c, where the word man (anthrpos) indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider (analogizetai), or look up at (anathrei) any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner seen that is, oppe than he looks up at and considers ( logizetai) that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man ( anthpos), because he looks up at (anathrei) what he has seen (oppe). Thus, while Plato, etymologises anthrpos as deriving from anathrei + oppe, Simplicius has recalled analogizetai from the same passage, and wrongly thinks that analogizomai is connected to the etymology of anthrpos. 408 Simplicius seems to be following here the same school tradition concerning the etymological explanation of anthrpos, merops and brotos, as that given by Ammon. In De Interp. 38,9ff.: man is called merops because he uses a divided-up voice (meristi opi), i.e. different languages; while brotos refers to the fall of his soul into the realm of becoming and the contamination it incurs down here, i.e. to his mortality. 409 By Diogenes; cf. above, 27,19f. and n. 294. 410 There is thus the implication that we always should follow etymology; indeed, since, for the Neoplatonists, names had been imposed by an onomatothets/group of onomatothtai, if not divine then at least extremely wise, to make up names arbitrarily that is, without regard to the natural consonance of names and realities would be to fly in the face of nature. 411 Respectively, the Epic/Attic and Doric Greek words for day. Simplicius point is that dialect variations in the form of a word do not constitute instances of polyonymy. 412 Pindar Encomium to Alexander son of Amyntas, fr. 120-1 Schroeder = Ecloges fr. 2 Puech (Bud) = fr. 126 Tuyrn = fr. 120 Maehler/Snell (Teubner). 413 homnuma ti progoniki katelpida anaphorai. As we learn from Philoponus ( In Cat. 22,7ff.) we have hopeful (katelpida) homonymy when a father names his son Plato in the hope he will turn out to be like the Philosopher, while homonyms by ancestral reference occur when the child is named after his grandfather, so that the latters memory may be preserved. 414 Since, for the Pythagoreans, one name corresponds to one reality, they had to account for apparent cases of polyonymy. They seem to have done so in at least the following ways: (i) In the case of proper names, polyonymy could be explained by the intentions of parents (see previous note); such names were definitely thesei, not phusei. (ii) Some ostensible polyonyms, they claimed, were not words at all. (iii) Finally, if two non-proper genuine names really do designate the same object, the this is not due to arbitrary naming, as in the case of Diogenes slave; instead, the two apparent polyonyms have two different etymological derivations. 415 The Pythagorean suzugiai are the series of contrasting couples of opposed realities such as we find in Aristotle Metaphysics 1, 986a22; but how these may be used to explain changes of linguistic form in paronyms is not clear to me.

Cf. Christos Evangeliou, Aristotles Categories and Porphyry (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp. 49-50.
c. Paronymy In comparison to o(mw/numa and sunw/numa the case of parw/numa was the least discussed by the ancient commentators. In contrast to the other two there were not variant writings of Aristotles definitions of them. This is best explained by the fact that in the Categories doctrine the role of paronymous things is not as important as the roles of the synonymous and homonymous things. Accordingly, the treatment of them can be brief. To begin with, it seems that derivative names designate paronymous things. With regard to this issue, the examples which Aristotle gives speak for themselves. The grammarian and the courageous are paronymously called from grammar and courage respectively (1a

14

13-15). However, Porphyry specified three criteria which must be met in any case of genuine paronymy. (a) Sharing in name (mete/xein tou= o)no/matoj) (b) Sharing in reality (mete/xein tou= pra/gmatoj) (c) Transformation (metasxhmatismo/j) (p. 69, 33-35)144 Unless all three criteria are met, it would not be correct, Porphyry suggests, to speak of
parw/numa. He proceeds to give examples....
144

[note omitted][49-50]

From the text of the Categories it is evident that Aristotle makes use of parw/numa in two cases: (a) In his discussion of the category of poio\n (quality); and (b) in his discussion of the category of kei=sqai (position). The relevant passages are as follows: These, then, that we have mentioned are qualities, while things called paronymously because of these or called in some other way from them are qualified. Now in most cases, indeed in practically all, things are called paronymously, as the pale man from paleness, the grammarian from grammar, and so on. (10a 27-32) Again: Lying, standing, and sitting are particular positions; position is a relative. To-be-lying, to-bestanding, or to-be-sitting are themselves not positions, but they get their names paronymously from the aforesaid positions. (6b 11-14) Consequently, Aristotle, needed parw/numa in order to distinguish between qualities (poio/thtej) and things qualified (poia\) in the first case and, in the second case, in order to separate the category of position ( kei=sqai) from the category of relation or relatives ( pro/j ti).10 In this respect, the doctrine of paronymy was useful to Aristotle, though it was not as important as the doctrines of homonymy and synonymy were. 11

10

Actually, Aristotle is making a distinction between being a position and being named from being in a position: When one says Socrates is standing, he is denominated standing from being in a certain position for to-be-standing differs from to-be-sitting by position. 11 It hardly needs to be said that the ways of naming things are equally important for the Categories.

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10. Supplement: A review of the doctrine of paronymy. Cf. D. P. Henry, Why Grammaticus?12
2. PARONYMS IN ANCIENT LOGIC AND GRAMMAR. The dialogue [sc. of St. Anselm] with which we are concerned takes its customary title from its incipit, viz: De grammatico..., and from the fact that grammaticus is employed as a crucial example. However, as its first sentence also makes clear that this word is used as an instance of a paronym (nomen denominativum, denominative name, denominative) from which generalisations are permissible 5, a more illuminating title would be Dialogue on Paronyms. The last notable use of the term denominative is one which occurs in J. S. Mills System of Logic6, and is enlarged on below, the tradition of its use extends back to the ancient grammarians and logicians. Priscian 7 employs the term to cover any kind of derivation from a nomen, or name; as nomen is for the ancient Latinists a wider term than the modern noun (it embraces what would nowadays be distinguished as adjectives) a very wide range of types is here in question. Of course, the notion of derivation must not be taken too seriously here: usually some species of word-similarity is in question. The same applies to the cases envisaged by Aristotle in Chapter 1 of the Categories8: things are there stated to be named paronymously (or derivatively) which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the literate derives his name from literacy and the courageous man from courage. However, Boethius, when commenting on this passage 9, appears to restrict his account 5. SL 159.3, 161.11.12. 6. Bk. I, Ch. II 5. 7. Inst. Gramm. Bk. IV. References to this work will henceforward take the form of volume, page and line-numbers of Keils Grammatici Latini, prefaced by a K , e.g. KII 55.6. 8. 1a 12-15 (The Oxford translation has been used and amended as required). 9. Patr. Latina Vol. 64 Col. 167D. References to this volume will hereunder consist of a B followed by the column-number and letter. 167 to contexts of the elementary sort which are indicated by Aristotles concrete examples, and asserts that the (supposed) derivation of the nomen reflects participation in whatever is named by the cognate abstract noun; e.g. because a given man participates in the virtue of justice, we denominate him just 10. This Platonic-sounding supplement does not necessarily have as its consequence that those who make use of the term paronym (or denominative) are committed to holding that we first perceive, e.g. the quality, subsequently note the participant, and finally consider ourselves licensed to use the paronym in respect of that participant. Boethius remarks that the opposite is the case: whites and literates are cognitively prior ( notior) to whiteness and literacy respectively 11. In all, he holds, three marks distinguish paronyms: (i) participation in something by the thing paronymously named, (ii) participation by the paronym in the name of that something mentioned in (i), i.e. the two names must differ in termination only, and (iii) the non-identity of the paronym and the name of that in which the thing paronymously named participates12. When condition (iii) is unfulfilled, says Boethius, equivocation results.[13] Thus musica names both a female musician and the art in which she is versed 13.
12 13

(http://irevues.inist.fr/bitstream/2042/3099/1/04+TEXTE.pdf [3/13/08]). Cf. the discussion of Porphyrys position outlined above by Evangeliou.

16

Leaving aside this third condition, at least three variable factors are apparent here, and thinkers of the Middle Ages were quick to exploit them. The first such variable is the word participation used in respect of things. Now while derivative words may be said to participate in the words from which they are derived, or which have the same stem, and this in a perfectly familiar and intelligible sense, nevertheless the use of participate in respect of things is far from intelligible. In practice this was later, e.g. at the hands of Aquinas, to be interpreted as any kind of connection implied by the purposive transference of words in accordance with human needs and interests. The second variable lies in the range of objects in which such participation is envisaged. Boethius examples appear to 10. B168A. 11. B240C. 12. B168A Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales (ed. Bochenski) 2.22, 3.01. References to of this edition will hereafter be prefaced by PH only. 13. B168B-C. 168 confine this range to qualities in which things might be said to participate in common. But there seems to be no reason why this range should not be extended to other categories (quantity, state, etc). The most serious question here is, however, still to be faced: what kind of a thing is a quality, if it really is a thing at all? The third variable is the language used. Thus, suppose participation in qualities is in question: exactly what is to count as a paronym will then depend upon the extent to which names given to things on account of their qualities happen to have, in the language of the period, corresponding abstract names of those qualities. A simple example of the effect of this third variable can be drawn from Boethius own text: virtus (excellence, virtue) is the name of a quality to which, it would appear, the Latin of Boethius time had no corresponding paronym, since he tells us that a man having virtus was called sapiens (wise) or probus (honest14); virtus could hence not be considered by him in connection with paronyms. Yet in medieval Latin the corresponding paronym (virtuosus) exists and is used freely. In a situation of the kind described, two reactions are possible: one can either recognise that there are limits to the use of linguistic classifications for the delineation of logical problems, or one can make artificial additions to the language in an attempt to force it to reflect those problems. Aristotle, on whose text Boethius comments, is quite alive to the dangers of circumscribing a class of cases by reference to the contingent features of nontechnical language, and hence takes the first course: he merely uses the notion of paronymy as a rough guide, and concludes by noting that the name borne by a thing in virtue of a given quality possessed by that thing may or may not be derivative from the name of that quality 15. Boethius, following him, used the general heading qualia for things having qualities, whether paronymously named or no16. The medievals tended to take the second course, and invented constructions to fit their needs: this is particularly evident in the case of abstract nouns like animalitas, corporeitas, and the like, against which Locke inveighs17, 14. B254B. 15. Categ. l0b 9. 16. B253B cf. PH 3.26, 3.27. 17. Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III, Ch. 8, 2. 169 although these are no worse than the abstract nouns formed by the addition of ness or hood to the concrete noun, and used in contemporary philosophical writings in English. However, this possibility of systematic artificial amendment of a language can, unless used

17

with great caution, give the impression that all cases which are linguistically alike are susceptible of like logical classification. The difference between the cautious and incautious attitude on this point may be exemplified by the cases of Aquinas and J. S. Mill: both hold explicitly that white and man are paronymous: in Aquinas terms, ... things are ordinarily denominated from their forms, as the white from whiteness and man (homo) from humanity (humanitas)18 [14], and Mills, Snow, and other objects, receive the name white because they possess the attribute which is called whiteness; Peter, James, and others, receive the name man because they possess the attributes which are considered to constitute humanity. The attribute, or attributes, may therefore be said to denominate those objects, or to give them a common name 19. Now this is part of Mills evidence for the possibility of treating both man and white as belonging to the class of connotative names, and so of regarding them as signifying in the same fashion. Aquinas, on the other hand, was not thus misled, as an inspection of his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics20 makes clear. Boethius description of paronyms not only contains the variables which have been mentioned, but is also such that any change in the interpretation of one of those variables tends to affect the interpretation of the others: thus it would appear that the meaning of paronyms such as sweet or white is bound up in some sense with the corresponding qualities (sweetness, whiteness), hence such denominatives were said to signify a quality21. Now given the use of humanitas in medieval Latin to mean human nature, and granted that white signifies the quality whiteness, are we to say also that homo (man) si18. Summa Theologica I, q. 37, art. II, corpus. 19. System of Logic, Bk. I, Ch. II, 5. 20. Ed. Spiazzi, 285. 295; cf. 87, 259, 281, 289. 21. Nihil enim a album n significat quam qualitatem, B194C cf. ARISTOTLE, Categ. 3a 18. 170 gnifies the quality humanitas (humanity, attributes constituting human nature)? Hence arise repercussion (sic) in the range of the second variable: is humanitas a quality in which men participatea set of attributes, a form, a nature, or a quiddity? And leaving aside the vexed question of the ontological status of attributes, one can still ask: if man signifies, say, a quality in this way, does this not exclude the view that man is a substance, as opposed to a quality? In Mintos words: When we say This is a man do we not declare what sort of a thing he is? Do we not declare his Quality? If Aristotle had gone further along this line, he would have arrived at the modern point of view 22 that a man is a man in virtue of his possessing certain attributes, that general names are applied in virtue of their connotation 23. Minto goes on to suggest, most significantly, that Aristotle failed to take this further step, which would make man into a quality-signifying word, only because he had not at his disposal a separate name in common speech for the common attributes of man 24. Boethius, when commenting on the topic of secondary substances, appears to go quite a long way in the direction suggested by Minto, when he admits that man shows what a substance is like, i.e. shows its qualities26. Indeed, he holds that both man and white signify qualities in ways sufficiently similar to establish the need for further criteria to distinguish which of the two indicates a substance 26, e.g. lack of contrary, insusceptibility of degree, and so forth27.

14

In view of the fact that they do not have the same definition, one should not suppose that for St. Thomas, denomination in the case of a name like man means the same thing as it does in the case of accidental predicates. Hence it is inaccurate to attribute to the Angelic Doctor the view that saying something like Socrates is a man is an instance of paronymous naming.

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22. i.e. that of J. S. Mill, mentioned in the previous paragraph. 23. W. MINTO, Logic Inductive and Deductive, London, 1894, p. 117. He is here referring to Aristotles Categ. 3 b 10-24, cf. B194B195C. 24. Op. cit., p. 118. 25. Qualis substantia sit demonstratur, cum dicitur homo .B194D. 26. B195C. 27. B195D et seq.

11. Note on the foregoing. While I shall return to this subject below, here let it suffice to note that in determining the signification of a name like man Aristotle was well aware of the relation of substance to quality: Cf. Categories ch. 5 (3b 21), where the Philosopher states that genus and species determine a quality with respect to substance, for they signify such a substance. Cf. also Soph. Ref., ch. 22 (178b 37178b 10) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge): Again, there is the proof that there is a third man distinct from Man and from individual men. But that is a fallacy, for Man, and indeed every general predicate, denotes not an individual substance, but a particular quality.... Also to be noted is that this question has nothing to do with paronyms or denominatives properly so called, but rather with substantives. On the whole matter of naming things from accidents, see further below on denominative naming, where I give further texts of St. Thomas, as well as the relevant excerpt from Minto and related passages from other authors reviewing the doctrine of certain medievals and moderns on this subject.

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12. Definitions of paronym. Cf. The Hutchinson Encyclopaedia. Helicon Publishing LTD 2008. s.v paronym:
paronym n. [a] word having [the] same derivation as another, or formed from [a] foreign word, or having [the] same form as [a] cognate foreign word. paronymic, paronymous, a.

Cf. Robert Lawerence Trask, A Dictionary of Phonetics and Phonology (Routledge, 1996), s.v. paronym:
Any word derived from a second word or from the same root; a derivative or a cognate.

Cf. Wikipedia, s.v. paronym:


A paronym or paronyme in linguistics may refer to two different things: A word that is related to another word and derives from the same root, e.g. a cognate word; Words which are almost homonyms, but have slight differences in spelling or pronunciation and have different meanings.

13. On paronymy in the Tractatus Coislinianus.15 Cf. Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy. With an Adaptation of the Poetics and a Translation of the Tractatus Coislinianus (New York, 1922), p. 225:
Laughter arises (I) from the diction [= expression] (II) from the things [= content]. (I) From the diction, through the use of (A) Homonyms (B) Synonyms (C) Garrulity (D) Paronyms, (?1) addition and (?2) clipping (E) Diminutives (F) Perversion (1) by the voice (2) toward the better (G) Grammar and syntax

Cf. Ibid., The Tractatus Illustrated, pp. 233-234:

15

See also the relevant discussion in Richard Janko, Aristotle on Comedy: Toward a Reconstruction of Poetics II (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1984), pp. 175-178, a passage I excerpt below. In agreement with Cooper and Janko, I believe the Tractatus, garbled though it is, preserves in outline certains parts of the lost second book of the Poetics on comedy, although it requires much argument to make this thesis persuasive.

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(I) Paronyms. They are formed (1) by adding to a word, and (2) by taking something away from it. [Or the sense may be that they are formed by first dropping some part of a word and then adding something to what remains. A paronym is, so to speak, a name lying at the side of another. In each case, two words are concerned, one of them being derived from the other, generally by a change of termination. The relation may be a true one according to scientific principles. Or it may be a fancied one according to popular notions of etymology as in the time of Aristophanes, before the advent of strict linguistic science. Or it may be a pretended one based upon an assumed principle. Thus Hermippus (frg. 4, Kock 1.225-6) derives the rolling year ( e)niauto/j), which contains all within itself, from e)n au=t%. Similar derivatives are common in everyday speech while a language is in the making. In comedy they are extempore formations, or else formations otherwise rare in the language. In a given instance it may be difficult to say whether the word is a coinage of the poet, or a term, not previously recorded, from common usuage. If the reading great oneyers is authentic, a paronym formed by addition is found in Gadshills I am joined with no footland-rakers, no long-staff sixpenny strikers, none of these mad mustachio-purple-hued-maltworms, but with nobility and tranquility, burgomasters and great oneyers ( I Henry IV 2.1. 76-9). So also (from au=to/j, by dropping j and adding -tatoj) au=to/tatoj in Plutus 83: Are you really he? I am. Himself? His own selfs self. Here, too, perhaps, belongs kunto/tatoj the most shameless (most doglike) of all (see above, pp. 29, 150). 16 In a comic compound epithet, if we take the first element as a base, the whole may be regarded as a paronym derived from it. Those of Gadshill (as long-staff sixpenny strikers and mad mustachio-purple [233-234] -hued-malt-worms) he formed by addition.... But the device, strictly considered, seems to involve a stem of some word in regular usage: the customary termination of the word may be dropped, and then something may be added.]

14. On paronuma in sum: Paronyms are things which have a name according to another name, but with a difference in ending. Hence, to say that things are said to be called something from paronymy means from naming one thing after another thing. A paronym, then, is the name by which one thing is named after anotherthat is, it is the appellation one thing has when it is appellated after another, but differing from it in ending, as when Socrates is named grammarian after grammar, which is the grammatical knowledge he has: the name grammarian is that by which he is named or appellated after grammar. But, as we have seen, in rhetoric and poetic there is a related meaning of paronymy that is not the same as denominative naming, as in the language employed by comedy there are names by which a thing is named after another thing, but with a difference in ending, as by an addition, a subtraction or shortening, by use of a diminutive, or from an alteration of the word, as one may see from Richard Jankos version of the Tractatus, excerpted below. 15. Definitions of synonyms, homonyms, and paronyms. SUNONUMA (SYNONYMS). (1) Synonyms [sunonuma] are names more than one in number [pleio], but with the same account [logos], such as cloak [lupion], and wrap [himation], and mantle [pharos];17 (2) sometimes synonym signifies a
16

Cf. p. 150: We may close the section with the interesting gloss, not found in our Poetics, of the AntiAtticist: kunto/twn. )Aristote/lhj peri\ poihtikh=j: to\ de\ pa/ntwn kunto/taton . I translated: (21) Most dog-like [= shameless], Aristotle, On the Art of Poetry: the most shameless of all.3 (Cf. Coopers note 3: Anti-Atticista in Bekker, Anecdota Graeca I. 101. 32; Aristotle frg. 77, Rose, p. 81.) 17 Cf. Simplicius on Aristotles Categories 36.13 Kalbfleisch, drawing on Porphyry: o( )Aristote/lehj e)n t
%= Peri\ Poihtikh=j sunw/numa ei)=pen ei)=nai w(=n plei/w me\n ta\ o)no/mata lo/goj de\

21

plurality of names with a unity of account and of the thing signified, which Speusippus called polyonyms, and which at the present time among the Latins are called synonyms, like Paris and Alexander, which were names of the son of Priam; 18 (3) synonyms are things which agree in account, but differ in the names;19 (4) synonyms are names which signify one thing according to one account; 20 (5) for synonyms are names which signify exactly [omnino] the same thing.21 HOMONUMA (HOMONYMS). (1) Homonyms (homonuma) are names more than one in number which are the same (or similar sounding), but with differing accounts, such as pear, pair, and pare (B.A.M., after Aristotle via Simplicius and Porphyry); (2) sometimes homonym signifies a unity of names with a plurality of account and of the thing signified (B.A.M., after Ferrariensis); (3) homonyms are things which agree in name, but differ in account ;22 (4) homonyms are names which signify more than one thing according to more than one account (B.A.M., after St. Thomas Aquinas); (5) homonyms are similar sounding names which signify different things (B.A.M., after St. Thomas Aquinas). PARONUMA (PARONYMS). (1) Paronyms are names by which a thing has an appellation after another thing, but with a difference in ending; 23 or again (2) [a] paronym is, so to speak, a name lying at the side of another. In each case, two words are concerned, one of them being derived from the other, generally by a change of termination. (Lane Cooper, op.cit.); according to Richard Jankos composite text of the Tractatus Coislinianus, paronymy comes about in four ways: (a) by addition, when something extraneous is attached to the current name, e.g. [**]; and (b) by shortening, e.g. Im called Midas the scrounge, instead of scrounger; (c) from a diminutive, e.g. Socratididdles, Euripidipides, instead of Socrates, Euripides; (d) from an alteration, e.g. the worstest of all.24 16. Some dictionary definitions. Cf. Liddell Scott Greek English Lexicon:

o( au)to/j, oi(=a dh/ e)sti ta\ polouw/numa, to/ te lw/pion kai\ i(ma/tion kai\ fa/roj. Aristotle in the

Poetics said that synonyms are when there are several words with the same meaning, like (Speusippus) polyonyms indeed, such as cloak, wrap and mantle. (tr. Richard Janko, rev. B.A.M. after James Hutton in his edition of the Poetics) 18 Aliquando enim significat pluralitatem nominum, cum unitate rationis et rei significatae ; quae Speusippus, polynyma vocabat; quae et nunc etiam a latinis dicuntur synonyma, ut Paris et Alexander quae fuerunt nomina filii Priami. (Sylvester of Ferrara (Ferrariensis), Comm. in Lib. Quat. Contra Gentes, cap. 35, tr. B.A.M.) 19 Illa (synonyma) vero sunt, quae conveniunt in ratione et differunt nominibus. (Ferrariensis, ibid.) 20 Cf. In I Sent., dist. 22, q. 1, art. 3, c.: non tamen significant unam secundum unam rationem; et ideo non sunt synonyma. nonetheless they do not signify one thing according to one account, and so they are not synonyms. (tr. B.A.M.) 21 synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem significant . For names are called synonyms which signify exactly the same thing. (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 4, obj. 1, tr. B.A.M.) 22 Ista (homonyma) enim sunt quae conveniunt in ratione in nomine et differunt in ratione (Ferrariensis, ibid.). 23 B.A.M., after Aristotle, Cat. 1, 1a 14, in the light of the Philosophers definition of homonyms. 24 See my separate discussion.

22

sunw/nu m-oj , on , having the same name as, c.gen., h( . . sunw/numoj th=j e)/ndon ou)/shj e)/gxeluj Antiph.217.1 , cf. E. Hel.495; o( j. th=? po/lei [potamo/j ] Plb.9.27.5. II. in the Logic of Arist. sunw/numa are things having the same name and the same nature and definition, Cat.1a6, cf. Top.123a28, 148a24, Thphr.HP9.11.5; e)/sti tij a)diki/a para\ th\n o(/lhn a)/llh e)n me/rei, sunw/numoj, o(/ti o( o(rismo\j e)n tw=? au)tw=? ge/nei Arist.EN1130a33 ; ta\ polla\ tw=n j. toi=j ei)/desi the many particulars which have the same name as the forms, i.e. things denoted by the same univocal or unambiguous word , e.g. man and ox, both called zw=?on in the same sense of zw=?on, opp. o(mw/numa (v. o(mw/numoj IV), Id.Metaph.987b10. Adv. -mwj Id.Cat.3a34 , Plb.3.33.11, Phld. Rh.1.148 S. 2. of pairs of the form A: non-A, opp. e(terw/numa (q. v.), Procl. in Prm. p.955 S. III. in Rhet. ta\ j. are synonyms, words having different forms but the same sense , as poreu/esqai and badi/zein, Arist.Rh.1405a1; to\ j. tou= ne/fouj, i.e. nefe/lh, A.D.Synt. 199.27. o(mw/nu m-oj , (o)/nwma) having the same name, Il., etc.

Cf. Robert J. Shubinski, Glossary of Poetic Terms, s.v. Homonym, s.v. Synonym:25
HOMONYM One of two or more words which are identical in pronunciation and spelling, but different in meaning, as the noun bear and the verb bear. Although often called homonyms in popular usage (indeed, in some dictionaries as well), homophones are words which are identical in pronunciation but different in meaning or derivation or spelling, as rite, write, right, and wright, or rain and reign. Heteronyms are words which are identical in spelling but different in meaning and pronunciation, as sow, to scatter seed, and sow, a female hog. Homographs are words which are identical in spelling but different in meaning and derivation or pronunciation, as pine, to yearn for, and pine, a tree, or the bow of a ship and a bow and arrow. SYNONYM One of two or more words that have the same or nearly identical meanings.

17. On homonymy and synonymy. Cf. PHIL 410: Classical Philosophy (Spring 2005) Instructor: Robin Smith (rasmith@tamu.edu). Predication, Homonymy, and the Categories:26
Homonymy and Synonymy

25

Glossary of Poetic Terms from BOBS BYWAY. Compiled, edited and cross-referenced by Robert G. Shubinski. Copyright 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002. rgs@poeticbyway.com. 26 (http://aristotle.tamu.edu/~rasmith/Courses/Ancient/predication.html [3/9/08])

23

A good place to begin is with the very beginning of the Categories, in which Aristotle makes a distinction between homonymous and synonymous things. Though these terms look just like English words, its a good idea to pretend that youve never seen them before: those English words are just close enough to Aristotles in meaning to be seriously confusing. Here are Aristotles definitions: A and B are homonymous = A and B are both called F, but with different definitions of F A and B are synonymous = A and B are both called F and with the same definition of F Homonymous things, not words. The first point to notice is that these define relationships of things, not of words.27 In English, homonymy and synonymy are relationships between words. Two words are homonyms if they sound alike but have different spellings, or at least different meanings, and two words are synonymous if they have different sounds (or at least spellings) but the same meaning. From a modern philosophical viewpoint, this at once raises questions about whether it is words or occurrences of words that are homonymous or synonymous and what the identity conditions are for words. Those issues do not really arise for Aristotles distinction, however, since for him it is things, not words, which are homonymous or synonymous. Homonymous really means like-named, and synonymous means named together. Things are homonymous, in Aristotles sense, if the same word applies to them both but not in virtue of the same definition, and things are synonymous if the same word applies to them in virtue of a single definition. Aristotle gives as an example a human being and picture. The Greek word zion (usually translated animal) applies to these both, but with different definitions: it applies to a human being because a human being is a certain kind of living entity, whereas it applies to a picture because the Greeks used this same term of drawings or illustrations (rather like our use of the word figure).28 For an English example, a fingernail and a roofing nail are both called nails, and a fingernail file and a computer file are both called files, but in each case with different definitions. <...> Intracategorial and Cross-Categorial Predication Since the categories are fundamentally different kinds of thing, nothing in one category can be the same as anything in another category. This much may seem obvious. However, what is not obvious, and what is equally important for Aristotle, is that when A and B belong to the same category, A can express what B is. For instance, Socrates, human, and animal are all substances, and it is true to predicate animal of human and human of Socrates. Aristotle describes these predications as saying what the subject is. The relationship between predicate and subject in a true same-category predication has certain properties. Same-category predication is synonymous. That is, if A and B are in the same category and A is predicated of B, then the definition of A will also be predicated of B. This is precisely Aristotles definition of synonymy: both A and its definition are true of B as well as A, so A and B are synonymous.

27

Compare Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4, a text to be cited more fully below): In the ante-predicaments there are really two main uses of the word substance. One is in Chapter 1, where the Greek says that univocal things have both a name in common...and the logos tes ousias.... 28 Cf. H. L Cookes note to his Loeb translation: Z%=/on had two meanings, a living creature and the representation of a living creature. (We have no corresponding ambiguous noun, although we use the word, living of real living things and for certain artworks that are true to life). I myself employ the word figure below.

24

Same-category predication is transitive: if A is predicated of B and B is predicated of C, then A is predicated of C. For instance, if animal is predicated of man, and man is predicated of Socrates, then animal is predicated (synonymously) of Socrates. In a case such as this, Aristotle describes the predicate as saying what the subject is. Contrasted with these are cross-categorial predications, with subjects and predicates from different categories. In Socrates is pale, for instance, the subject is a substance and the predicate is a quality. Since the definition of a quality cannot apply to a substance, this predication cannot be synonymous: from the fact that Socrates is pale, it does not follow (and indeed it cannot be true) that the definition of pale applies to Socrates. Similarly, cross-categorial predications are not transitive. Thus, though Socrates is pale and pale is a color, it does not follow that Socrates is a color. From the standpoint of modern (post-Fregean) logic, this contrast seems to make little sense. A Fregean analysis of Socrates is pale decomposes it into a proper name, Socrates, and an incomplete expression is pale which becomes a statement when an appropriate number of arguments is supplied (in this case, one). The meaning of Socrates is that which it names, Socrates. The meaning of is pale is the class of objects to which it applies.29 The sentence is true if and only if the object named by Socrates is a member of the class named by is pale. Exactly the same form of analysis applies to Socrates is a man: it is true if and only if the object designated by Socrates is a member of the class of objects satisfying ___is a man. Aristotle approaches this matter differently. He regards pale as designating, not the class of pale things, but paleness. That is to say, paleness is a name of paleness in the same way that Socrates is a name of Socrates. The difference between Socrates and paleness (and therefore between Socrates and paleness) is a categorial one: Socrates is a substance, whereas paleness is a quality. Now, Aristotle notes that we do not say Socrates is paleness but Socrates is pale. He calls this a matter of paronomy, naming after: pale things are named pale because they are named after paleness. 30 Since paleness and Socrates are categorially different, Socrates cannot be paleness. He can, however, have paleness, that is, paleness can be present in him as a subject. When that is the case, then Socrates is paronymously called pale after paleness.

29

While there is a class of objects which are pale, this is not what the name means. Rather, when used in a sentence such as Socrates is pale, it supposes or stands for this accident existing in him. In sum, one must distinguish what names stand for from what they signify, although the latter includes the former. 30 N.B. Just as pale things are named pale after paleness, so human things are named human after humanity, an essential, not an accidental, predication, for which sort of denomination, see further below.

25

18. The treatment of these matters in the Categories and the Topics. Cf. Isaac Husik, The Categories of Aristotle [In: Philosophical Essays, Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern - Edited by Milton C. Nahm and Leo Strauss, Oxford, Blackwell, 1952, pp. 96-112, pp. 97-103.] (Greek citations omitted):31
(...) When we pass over to matters of doctrine, it is surprising how many points of contact there are between the two works [ Categories and Topics]. I shall follow the Categories and point out the parallels in the Topics. The homonyms, which are given a definition and an illustration in the beginning of the Categories, have a whole chapter devoted to them in the Topics, the fifteenth of the first book, where they are also called pollachos legomena [= things said in many ways]. Of particular significance is 107a 18-20, for in 20 we seem to have a direct allusion to the definition in the Categories. We must see, Aristotle says, if the genera designated by the given name are different and not subordinate to one another, (...) (which is therefore a homonym), for the definition of these genera as connected by the name is different (...). The greater space given to homonyms in the Topics is not due so much to a development in doctrine as to the necessities of the subject. The object of the Topics is a purely practical one, to provide the disputant with ready arguments properly pigeon-holed, and a single general definition of homonyms is not adapted to such use. We must needs go farther and show in what different special ways homonyms can be detected. The Categories have more the appearance of materials gathered in the shape of preliminary definitions of necessary concepts. Synonyms are referred to in the Topics 109b 7, 123a 27, 127b 5, 148a 24, and 162b 37. Of these, the first is the most important, since it states that the genera are predicated synonymously of their species; for the latter admit both the name and the definition of the former (...), assuming it as established that this condition constitutes synonymity. This is neither more nor less than a silent reference to the definition in the Categories (1a 6) [When things have the name in common and the definition of being which corresponds to the name is the same, they are called synonymous]. Moreover we have almost the very words of the Topics in another place in the Categories, 3b 2, [And the primary substances admit the definition of the species and of the genera, and the species admits that of the genus; for everything said of what is predicated will be said of the subject also.] 148a 24 also gives the same definition of synonyms merely in passing. Aristotle is dealing with the definition, and makes a statement that if the opponent makes use of one definition for homonyms it cannot be a correct definition, for it is synonyms and not homonyms that have one definition connoted by the name (...). He speaks of the definition as already known. (...). Paronyms also are made use of in the Topics, 109b 3-12, in a way which shows the definition in the Categories is not purely grammatical, as it may seem at first sight, but has a logical significance quite as important as that of the former two. Paronymous predication is predication per accidens, as contrasted with synonymous, which may be per se (cf. also Trendelenburg, Geschichte der Kategorienlehre, p.27 et seq. and 30). Here also paronyms are not defined. It is assumed that the reader knows what they are. (...) Categories 3, p. 1b 10-15 expresses very much the same thought as Topics IV, 1, p. 121a 20-6. The former states that whatever is true of the species is true of the individuals under the species (...), the latter that to whatever the species applies the genus does also (...). They both involve the logical hierarchy of genus, species and individual, and the two principles are: (1) The genus applies not only to the species but also to the individual; (2) to the individual belongs not only the species but also the genus. What is especially important to
31

(http://www.formalontology.it/aristotle-categories.htm [3/24/08])

26

notice is that, in the Topics, the principle is stated as already known and is applied to the particular case, thus assuming the existence of another treatise where these principles are stated and proved for the first time. The treatment of the difference develops gradually in the Topics in the following passages: 107b 19 sq., 144b 12 sq., and 153b 6. The first of these is word for word the same with the statement in the Categories, 1b 16 sq., and they were both quoted above. Moreover the way in which the passage in the Topics is introduced, (...) makes it a direct reference to the Categories. Aristotles doctrine concerning the difference so far is that of different genera which are not subordinated one to the other: the differences are different in species. In the second passage quoted above, 144b 12, Aristotle corrects this view by adding that the differences in the given case need not be different unless the different genera cannot be put under a common higher genus. In the third passage, 153b 6, Aristotle adds some more qualifications which make it clear that in the preceding statements the word etron, in the phrase etron ghenon, must be understood as including contrary genera ( enanta). For there the case is different. If the contrary genera belong to higher contrary genera, their differences may be all the same. The preceding examination seems to show very clearly that the Topics build upon the basis laid down in the Categories and carry the structure higher and broader. It would be a very absurd alternative to suppose that a later writer, making use of the Topics, found nothing else on the subject of logical difference than the first passage, which he copied verbatim in his treatise, where, besides, it has no particular reason for existence. As a thought tentatively suggested, with the view of further elaboration and insertion as a proper link in a chain, the passage in the Categories assumes a different meaning, and its lack of connection with the preceding and following ceases to cause us serious difficulty. If the view of the Categories taken here is justified by the preceding arguments and by what is still to come, it might even be a legitimate procedure to make use of the Topics in determining a disputed reading in the Categories. And we have one at hand in the passage quoted above on the difference.

19. On the categories in relation to signification. Cf. Aristotle, Topics, I. 9 (103b 27-39) (In: Aristotle. Topics Books I and VIII. Translated With a Commentary by Robin Smith, Oxford University Press, 1997):
It is clear at once that an <expression> signifying the what-it-is will sometimes signify a substance, sometimes a quantity, sometimes a quality, and sometimes one of the other categories. For, supposing the example under consideration is a man, if it says that the example is a human or an animal, then it says what it is and signifies a substance. On the other hand, supposing the example under consideration is a white color, if it says that the subject is a white or a color, then it says what it is and signifies a quality. Similarly, supposing that the example under consideration is a foot-long length, if it says that the example is a foot-long length, then it says what it is and signifies a quantity. And likewise with the other <categories>. For any of these, both in the case in which the same thing is said about itself and in the case in which its genus is said about it, signifies what it is. But when it is said about another <category>, then it does not signify what it is, but how much or what sort or one of the other categories.

Cf. John Marmysz, Is Heidegger Telling the Truth? Notes:32

32

(http://users.aol.com/geinster/Heid.html [3/9/08])

27

In the Categories, Aristotle undertook an examination of language which he claimed would be useful for an inquiry into the question of being. According to Aristotle, things may be called by equivocal, univocal, or derivative names. If things are named univocally, then the definition of the things so named is the same. If things are named equivocally, then those things have differing definitions but the same name. If things are derivatively named, then those things derive their names from a common source, yet find their ultimate, specific definitions in differing places.

20. On homonuma and sunonuma. Those are called homonuma (= equivocals) whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different: e.g. the bark of the dog and the bark of the tree: both the sound made by the dog and the covering of the tree are called bark, which is the same name; hence they are said to have the same name or are homonymous. Those are called sunonuma (= univocal) whose name and whose account of the substance corresponding to the name are both the same. In sum, homonuma are things having the same name, sunonuma, things having the same meaning. homonuma: having the same name and the same account of the substance corresponding to the name of the thing sunonuma: having the same name and the account of the substance corresponding to the name of the thing differing

In sum: things can either have the same name or not if they have the same name then either the account of the substance corresponding to the name of the thing is the same or not

21. Note on the definitions of Categories Chapter 1. As a glance at the Greek, as well as the foregoing commentaries, makes clear, in laying down the three ways in which things are named, Aristotle says that they or those (things) are called something, and then gives the name variously translated as homonyms or equivocals (or synonyms or univocals, etc.)which name, being singular, should not be translated as a plural, nor as an adverb (= equivocally, etc.)nor does he say that they are named this or that, nor that they are said to be x or y. Hence all such translations are inaccurate.

28

II. ON WHAT IS SIGNIFIED ACCORDING TO THE CATEGORIES. 1. On three ways in which things are said. Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 1, 1a 1-15 (tr. B.A.M.; Lat. Boethius):
Those (things) are called equivocal whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different, as man and picture are zion.33 For of these only the name is common, but the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different. For if one were to assign what it is for either of these to be to zi, he would give the account proper to each.34 But they are called univocal whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corresponding to the name, as man and ox are animal. For each of these is called by the common name animal, and the account of the substance is the same. For if one were to give the account of each, what it is for each of these to be animals, he would give the same account.35 But they are called denominative which, with a different ending [or case, or fall, ptosei], have an appellation [prosegorian] from something corresponding to the name, as grammarian from grammar, and brave from bravery. 36

The subjects being determined about, which are certain things: (1) things whose name alone is common, but the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different, as man and picture are zion (2) things whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corresponding to the name, as man and ox are animal (3) things which have an appellation from something corresponding to a name but differ only by endingthat is, the designation each has (or derives) from its source-name differs solely in case or fall, as grammarian from grammar, and brave from bravery Hence, things may either have a name in common or not, or they may either by named from another name or not. But, as we learn from the Peri Hermeneias, names are vocal sounds, the significations of which are pragmata. Now although the latter word does not occur here, it is nevertheless implied: for if one were to ask, What is it that are called equivocal or univocal or denominative?, the answer would be, certain things which are signified by agreed upon vocal sounds. Hence, in one way, what we might call the thing of a name (res nominis) is seen to be the signification of a vocal sound.
33

In Greek, zion signifies both animal and figure or image, as in a painting (cf. LSJ, s.v. zw=?on); an English equivalent to Aristotles example would be, as a famous person and a triangle are figures, the account of what it is to be a figure for each of these being different although the name is the same. 34 Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversae. Si quis enim assignat quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia, propriam assignabit utrique rationem. Note that substance here means the what it is and not the this something of a name. 35 Univoca vero dicuntur quorum nomen commune est, et secundum nomen eadem ratio substantiae, ut animal homo atque bos, communi enim nomine utraque animalia nuncapuntur, et est substantiae ratio eadem. Si quis enim assignet utriusque rationem quid utrumque sit, quo sint animalia, eamdem assignabit rationem. 36 Denominativa vero dicuntur quaecumque ab aliquo, solo differentia casu, secundum nomen habent appellationem, ut a grammatica grammaticus, et a fortitudine fortis.

29

2. The way in which the foregoing definitions are to be understood. In support of our reading of the text, let us take our example of the name figure: When we say things like The President is a (public) figure and A triangle is a figure, both man and geometrical object are called something, namely, figure. Now in both cases we observe that the significative vocal sound figure is uttered and hence what is signified by the name (which is a thing) is said. Still, each time it is said the account of the substance corresponding to the name (which is what it signifies) is different, for which reason we say that they are called equivocal, and that the name figure is said of them equivocally.37 Were we, however, to call both a triangle and a square a figure, they (meaning the things signified by the name figure in both statements) are said univocally because their accounts are the same. Now, so far as I can see, the only interpretation consistent with Aristotles ipsissima verba is to understand by things the significations of the vocal sounds naming them (cf. the comment by Joseph, excerpted below). Hence, when we look at the things signified by the vocal sound figure, they, meaning the things of which the name is said, are either called equivocal or univocal: they are called the one when the account of the substance corresponding to the name is different; but they are called the other when it is the same. Likewise, in the case of denominatives, when one says grammarian or brave of someone, a vocal sound is uttered and a thing is said; the one thing being named by a name taken from another thing, but with a different case or ending. And note here that if instead of Those (things) are called equivocal, etc., the text were to read, Those (things) are said equivocally (aequivoce, o(mwnu/mwj), the continuity of the argu-ment would be more in evidence, inasmuch as in Chapters 2 and 4 Aristotle takes up the signification of things said. (For more on this point, see further below.) In sum, then, we distinguish (1) three ways in which things are said, equivocally, univocally, and denominatively; (2) the things signified by names, in virtue of which observation we may understand the thing of a name to be its signification; and (3) the account of the substance corresponding to the name, telling us what these things are. 3. On the ways in which things are predicated according to St. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
And this is so because they are equivocal [ aequivoca sunt] whose name alone is common and the account of the substance different. 38

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Principiis Naturae, cap. 6 (tr. B.A.M.).


But being is not a genus, since it is not predicated univocally, but analogously. In order to understand this one must bear in mind that something is predicated of many things in three ways, namely, univocally, equivocally, and analogously.39

37

We then go on to speak of equivocal naming and the like, and then of names themselves as being equivocal or univocal, even though it is not the names as such which produce equivocation or univocation, but rather their use; there being certain instances where usage establishes different meanings. 38 et hoc ideo est, quia aequivoca sunt, quorum nomen solum commune est et ratio substantiae diversa . Hence, they are univocal [univoca] whose name is common, as well as the account of the substance corresponding to the name. For the complete passage from which this excerpt is taken, see further below. 39 ens autem non est genus, quia non praedicatur univoce, sed analogice. ad huius intelligentiam sciendum est, quod tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: univoce, aequivoce et analogice.

30

That is predicated univocally which is predicated according to the same name and according to the same accountthat is, definition, as animal is predicated of man and ass. For both are called animal, and both are animated sensible substance, which is the definition of animal.40 That is predicated equivocally which is predicated of certain things according to the same name, but according to a different account, as dog is said of what can bark and of the celestial object (the star), which agree only in name, but not in definition or signification: for what is signified by the name is the definition, as is said in the fourth book of the Metaphysics.41 That is said to be predicated analogously which is predicated of many things whose accounts and definitions are diverse, but are attributed to some one and the same thing, just as healthy is said of the body of an animal and of urine and of medicine, but it does not signify entirely the same thing in all three. For it is said of urine as of the sign of health, of the body as of the subject, and of medicine as of the cause. But nevertheless, all of these accounts are attributed to one end, namely to health. 42

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 2, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):


Then when he says, But one must consider, he manifests the definition of the soul from its parts, saying that what has been said about the whole soul and the whole living body one must consider in each of its parts. The reason for this is, if the eye were an animal, its sight would have to be its soul, because sight is the substantial form of the eye, and the eye is the matter of sight, just as the organic body is the matter of the soul. But sight being lacking, the eye would not remain except equivocally, just as an eye rendered in stone or depicted in a painting is called an eye equivocally. And this is so because equivocal are those things of which only the name is common and the account of the substance diverse: and so the form by which it is the account of the substance of the eye being taken away, the name of eye would not remain unless said equivocally.43

N.B. For more on equivocation as founded on a difference in things, see further below, but for an account which anticipated my interpretation, cf. the following:

40

univoce praedicatur quod praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, idest definitionem, sicut animal praedicatur de homine et de asino.utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata sensibilis, quod est definitio animalis. 41 aequivoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen, et secundum diversam rationem: sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, quae conveniunt solum in nomine, et non in definitione sive significatione: id enim quod significatur per nomen, est definitio, sicut dicitur in quarto metaph.. 42 analogice dicitur praedicari, quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes diversae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem: sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus. dicitur enim de urina ut de signo sanitatis, de corpore ut de subiecto, de potione ut de causa; sed tamen omnes istae rationes attribuuntur uni fini, scilicet sanitati. 43 deinde cum dicit considerare autem manifestat definitionem animae ex partibus, dicens, quod id quod dictum est de tota anima et de toto corpore vivente, oportet considerare in partibus utriusque; quia, si oculus esset animal, oporteret quod visus esset anima eius, quia visus est substantialis forma oculi, et oculus est materia visus, sicut corpus organicum materia animae. deficiente autem visu, non remanet oculus nisi aequivoce, sicut oculus lapideus aut depictus aequivoce dicitur oculus. et hoc ideo est, quia aequivoca sunt, quorum nomen solum commune est et ratio substantiae diversa: et ideo sublata forma a qua est ratio substantiae oculi, non remanet nisi nomen oculi aequivoce dictum.

31

Cf. H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford, 1916), Ch. II, Terms and Their Principal Distinctions, p. 47:
The history of the words univocal, equivocal, and analogous will illustrate the tendency to treat Logic from the standpoint of an affair of names. The Aristotelian distinction already alluded to (p. 31) between suno/numa and o(mo/numa was one of things. Univocum and equivocum are merely translations of suno/numa and o(mo/numa, and they were defined in the same way (cf. Crackenthorpes Logic, Bk. II. c. i. Aequivoca ita describuntur: aequi-voca sunt quorum nomen solum est commune, ratio vero illius nominis est alia atque alia. c. ii. Univoca describuntur in hunc modum: univoca sunt res vel entia quorum nomen est commune, et ratio illius nominis est una et eadem in omnibus quibus nomen convenit). Similarly, it would have been not the word foot, but the mans and the mountains foot that would have been called analogous. 44 If we remember that terms are not primarily names, but the objects of thought intended by the names, 45 we might still say that equivocal terms are different objects of thought with the same name, rather than the same name with different meanings. But in English usage the distinction of names has really displaced that of things: we do not even retain both, like the Latin, when it was said that aequivoca were either aequivocantia, ipsae voces aequivocae, or aequivocata, res ipsae per illam vocem significatae. And even in Aristotles Rhet. g. ii. 2 1405a 1, we find the example of the use which calls words synonymous....]

44 45

Unfortunately for Joseph, his chosen example is one of metaphor, not analogy. That is, those things I call, after Aristotle, pragmata. See further below.

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4. Supplement: Additional texts of St. Thomas from the Thomas-Lexikon. aequivocatio a) gleiche Benennung, Gleichnamigkeit, Namensgleichheit zweier oder mehrerer Dinge, welche ihrem Begriff und Wesen nach voneinander verschieden sind (vgl. aequivocus sub a), synonym mit univocatio ( sub a): secundum aequivocationem id est communicationem nominum,46 th. III. 2. 6 c; diversa ratio (Begriff, Wesen) minus communium non facit aequivocationem in magis communi, 47 ib. I. 29. 4 ad 4; aequivocatio inducitur ex diversa forma significata per nomen, non autem ex diversitate suppositionis (Bedeutung), non enim hoc nomen homo aequivoce sumitur ex eo, quod quandoque supponit ( sub c) pro Platone, quandoque pro Socrate,48 cg. IV. 49.

Zu fallacia aequivocationis fallacia sub b; zu significare per modum ae. significare. Als Arten der aequivocatio gehren hierher: aequivocatio pura sive multum distans & ae. propinqua sive proxima (th. I. 13. 5 c; cg. I. 33; 1 sent. 35. 1. 4 c; pot. 7. 7 c; 7 phys. 8 g) = die reine oder rein zufllige und deshalb (ab unitate generis) weit abstehende oder entfernte (ubi est pura aequivocatio, nulla similitudo in rebus attenditur, sed solum unitas nominis,49 cg. I. 33) und die wegen einer grern oder geringern hnlichkeit der mit demselben Namen bezeichneten Dinge nahe oder sehr nahe gelegene Gleichnamigkeit (per similitudinem et propinquitatem ad unitatem generis multorum aequivocatio latet. Sunt autem quaedam aequivocationum multum distantes, in quibus sola communitas nominum attenditur, sicut si canis dicatur caeleste sidus et animal latrabile. Quaedam vero sunt, quae habent quandam similitudinem, sicut si hoc nomen homo dicatur de vero homine et de homine picto, inquantum habet similitudinem quandam veri hominis. Quaedam vero aequivocationes sunt proximae, aut propter convenientiam in genere, sicut si corpus dicatur de corpore caelesti et de corpore corruptibili, aequivoce dicitur naturaliter [im Sinne der Physik] loquendo, quia eorum non est materia una [conveniunt tamen in genere logico, et propter hanc generis convenientiam videntur omnino non aequivoca esse], aut etiam sunt propinquae secundum aliquam similitudinem, sicut ille, qui docet in scholis, dicitur magister, et similiter ille, qui praeest domui, dicitur magister domus aequivoce, et tamen propinqua aequivocatione propter similitudinem; uterque enim est rector, hic quidem scholarum, ille vero domus. Unde propter hanc propinquitatem vel generis vel similitudinis non videntur esse aequivocationes, cum tamen sint,50 7 phys. 8 g).

46 47

according to equivocation, that is, a communication of names a diverse account of the less common does not produce equivocation in the more common 48 equivocation is introduced from diverse things signified by a name, but not from a diversity of sup-position, for this name man is not taken equivocally from the fact that sometimes it supposes for [stands for] Plato, sometimes for Socrates 49 where there is pure equivocation, no likeness in the things is taken into consideration, but only a unity of name 50 by a likeness and nearness to the unity of the genus the equivocation of many things lies hidden. But there are certain instances of equivocation very far apart, in which only a community of names is taken into consideration, just as if dog were said of the star in the sky and the barking animal. But there are certain ones which involve a certain likeness, just as if the name man were said of a true man and a painted one, inasmuch as [a picture of a man] has a certain likeness to a true man. But certain equivocations are near at hand, either by reason of an agreement in genus, just as if body were said of the heavenly body and or the

33

b) Zweideutigkeit: multiplicitas (Vielheit) horum sensuum non facit aequivocationem aut aliam speciem multiplicitatis (Vieldeutigkeit), th. I. 1. 10 ad 1; ne intelligerentur tres essentiae propter nominis aequivocationem,51 ib. 30. 1 ad 1; vgl. ib. III. 2. 6 c; 1 sent. 23. 1. 3 c; deceptus est Galenus ex aequivocatione eius, quod est per se,52 7 phys. 1 b; in his autem, quae multum distant, magis manifestatur aequivocatio, si idem nomen eis imponatur,53 5 eth. 1 g. aequivoce a) nach Weise oder im Sinne der Gleichnamigkeit (vgl. aequivocus sub a): Augustinus aequivoce utitur nomine creationis,54 th. I. 45. 1 ad 1; non est intellectus agens et possibilis, nisi forte aequivoce,55 cg. II. 96; vgl. ib. IV. 29; 2 anim. 2 b.

Zu causa aequivoce agens causa sub b; zu commune ae. communis sub a; zu dicere omnino sive proprie sive pure ae. dicere sub c; zu praedicare omnino sive pure ae. praedicare sub b.

b) nach Weise oder im Sinne der bloen Gleichnamigkeit, synonym mit omnino sive pure aequivoce ( sub a).

Zu accipere aequivoce accipere sub c; zu dicere ae. dicere sub c; zu praedicare ae. praedicare sub b; zu sumere ae. sumere sub c.

aequivocus, a, um a) gleichnamig, namensgleich im weitern Sinne des Wortes, wie alle diejenigen Dinge heien, welche zwar an demselben Namen, nicht aber an dem nmlichen Begriff und Wesen teilhaben, gleichviel, ob sie einander hnlich sind, oder nicht, der Gegensatz zu univocus ( sub b): largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga (),56 th. I. 13. 10 ad 4; aequivoca id est non (simul) convenientia in nomine et ratione (Begriff, Wesen),57 5 phys. 7 a; aequivoca sunt, quorum nomen solum commune est et ratio substantiae diversa,58 2 anim. 2 b.

Zu agens aequivocum agens; zu causa ae. causa sub b; zu effectus ae. effectus; zu generatio ae. generatio sub a.

corruptible body, it [body] is said equivocally naturally speaking, since there is not one matter of them [still they agree in a logical genus, and by reason of the agreement of the genus they are seen not to be entirely equivocal], or also are near at hand according to some likeness, just as he who teaches in a school is called magister [of a school = school teacher], and likewise he who presides over a house is called magister domus [= major domo] equivocally, and yet the equivocation is near at hand by reason of the likeness; for each one is a ruler, the one of students, the other of a house. Whence by reason of the nearness either of the genus or of a likeness they do not appear to be instances of equivocation, when they still are. 51 lest three essences be understood by reason of the equivocation of the name 52 Galen was deceived by its equivocation, which is per se 53 but in these which are far apart, the equivocation is more obvious, if the same name be imposed on them 54 Augustine uses the name creation equivocally 55 for [in separated substances] there is no agent and possible intellect, except perhaps equivocally 56 He takes equivocal largo modo, according as they include analogy in themselves 57 equivocal, that is not (at once) an agreement in name and in account 58 they are equivocal of which the name alone is common and the account of the substance diverse

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Eine Art des aequivocus im weitern Sinne des Wortes ist das aequivocus a casu sive per casum et fortunam sive omnino sive pure (th. I. 13. 5 ad 1; cg. I. 33; 1 sent. 35. 1. 4 c; pot. 7. 7 c; 7 phys. 8 g; 1 eth. 7 i) = zuflligerweise oder gnzlich oder rein und blo gleichnamig (ista dicuntur aequivoca a casu, quia scilicet casu accidit, quod unum nomen unus homo imposuit uni rei et alius alii rei, ut praecipue patet in diversis hominibus uno nomine nominatis,59 1 eth. 7 i), der Gegensatz zu analogicum oder analogum () . Omne aequivocum reducitur ad univocum 60 (th. I. 13. 5 ob. 1; vgl. ib. ad 1; pot. 7. 7 ob. 7) = jedes aequivocum ist mit seinem Benennung auf ein univocum zurckzufhren, m. a. W. wesensverschiedene Dinge werden deshalb mit einem gemeinsamen Namen bezeichnet, weil es wesensgleiche Dinge gibt, denen der betreffende Name zuerst zukommt.

b) gleichnamig, namensgleich im engern Sinne des Wortes, was von denjenigen Dingen gilt, welche zwar denselben Namen tragen, aber nicht blo dem Begriff und Wesen nach verschieden, sondern auch nicht einmal einander hnlich sind, synonym also mit aequivocus a casu ( sub a), der Gegensatz zu analogicus oder analogus (): univocorum est omnino eadem ratio (Wesen), aequivocorum est omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero oportet, quod nomen secundum unam significationem acceptum ponatur in definitione eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti,61 th. I. 13. 10 c; aequivocum enim dividitur secundum res significatas, univocum vero dividitur secundum differentias, sed analogum dividitur secundum diversos modos,62 1 sent. 22. 1. 3 ad 2.

Zu dictio aequivoca dictio sub b; zu nomen ae. sive pure ae. nomen sub b; zu praedicatio ae. praedicatio sub b.

59

these are called equivocal by chance, because it happens by chance that one name of one man was imposed on one thing and by someone else on another thing, as is especially clear in different men named by one name (cf. standard example of the two Ajaxes; cf. also Boethius, In Categorias, near the beginning) 60 every equivocal is reduced to a univocal 61 of univocals the account is entirely the same, but of equivocals the account is entirely diverse, but in analogates, it is necessary that the name taken according to one signification be placed in the definition of the same name taken according to other meanings 62 for the equivocal is divided according to the things signified, but the univocal according to differences, but the analogous is divided according to diverse modes (see further below on substance and accident)

35

5. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas on animal said equivocally. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 10, sc. (tr. B.A.M.):
But to the contrary, it must be said that what is in the intellect is a likeness of that which is in the thing, as is said in the first book of the Peri Hermeneias. But animal said of a true animal and of a painted one is said equivocally. Therefore the name God, said of the true God and of god according to opinion, is said equivocally. 63

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 10, ad 4 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the fourth it must be said that animal said of a true animal and a painted one is not said purely equivocally: but the Philosopher largo modo [speaking largely] takes equivocal according as it includes analogy in itself. And the reason is because being, which is said analogously, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of diverse predicaments. 64

N.B. Notice how in the first excerpt St. Thomas speaks of things being said equivocally, but in his reply to the fourth objection he states that things are said to be predicated equivocally, etc. With regard to equivocation, then, we observe three ways of speaking: (1) things are called equivocal; (2) things are said equivocally; and (3) things are said to be predicated equivocally, etc, as is also the case with univocation. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, q. 2, art. 11, ad 8 (tr. B.A.M.):
obj. 8. Further, our science is nothing other than an image of divine science. But the name of a thing does not belong to an image except equivocally; whence animal is said equivocally of a true animal and a painted one according to the Philosopher in the Categories (ch. 1, 1a 1-6). The name of science, then, is said purely equivocally of ours and of the science of God.65 ad 8. To the eighth it must be said that the name animal is not imposed to signify the exterior figure in which a picture imitates a true animal, but to signify the interior nature in which it does not imitate it, and so the name of animal is said equivocally of a true one and a painted one; but the name of science belongs to the creature and the Creator according to that in which the creature imitates the Creator, and so it is not predicated of both wholly equivocally.66

6. The foregoing in sum.

63

sed contra, illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, ut dicitur in i periherm.. sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. ergo hoc nomen deus, dictum de deo vero et de deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur. 64 ad quartum dicendum dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non dicitur pure aequivoce: sed Philosophus largo modo accipit aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de diversis praedicamentis. 65 praeterea, scientia nostra non est nisi quaedam imago divinae scientiae. sed nomen rei non convenit imagini nisi aequivoce, unde animal aequivoce dicitur de vero animali et picto secundum philosophum in praedicamentis; ergo et nomen scientiae pure aequivoce dicitur de scientia dei et nostra . 66 ad octavum dicendum, quod hoc nomen animal imponitur non ad significandum figuram exteriorem, in qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum interiorem naturam, in qua non imitatur; et ideo nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen scientiae convenit creaturae et creatori secundum id in quo creatura creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.

36

Notice how the equivocation of the Latin term, as with its English equivalent, does not arise from a difference in meanings, as does its Greek counterpart, but rather from a difference in the things of which the name is being said, for since a hand in a painting cannot do the work of a hand truly so called, it is called a hand equivocally. For the foundation of equivocation in things, cf. De Part. Animal. I. 1 (640b 30641a 7) (tr. William Ogle.):
Does, then, configuration and color constitute the essence of the various animals and of their several parts? For if so, what Democritus says will be strictly correct. For such appears to have been his notion. At any rate he says that it is evident to every one what form it is that makes the man, seeing that he is recognizable by his shape and color. And yet a dead body has exactly the same configuration as a living one; but for all that is not a man. So also no hand of bronze or wood or constituted in any but the appropriate way can possibly be a hand in more than name. For like a physician in a painting, or like a flute in a sculpture, in spite of its name it will be unable to do the office which that name implies. Precisely in the same way no part of a dead body, such I mean as its eye or its hand, is really an eye or a hand.

Cf. also St. Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physic., lect. 5, n. 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
Now for the evidence in support of these arguments one must consider that among all the qualities, figure [or shape] more than anything else follows on and reveals the species of things. This is most evident in plants and animals, in which no more certain judgement of the diversity of species can be made than by the diversity of figures [shapes]. And this is so because, just as among the other accidents quantities stand nearest to substance, so figure, which is a quality around quantity, stands nearest to the form of the substance. 67

It will be understood, then, that the doctrinal point with which we are here concerned, namely, what the signification of vocal sounds consists in, remains unaffected by the foregoing distinction in kinds of equivocation. In sum: equivocation founded in a difference between meanings founded in a difference between things equivocation what is wholly [purely] equivocal (e.g. a baseball bat and a flying mammal, which are far apart) what is equivocal according to a likeness which is near at hand what is not wholly equivocal but analogous (e.g. healthy as said of its instrument or its final cause)
67

ad evidentiam autem harum rationum considerandum est, quod inter omnes qualitates, figurae maxime consequuntur et demonstrant speciem rerum. quod maxime in plantis et animalibus patet, in quibus nullo certiori iudicio diversitas specierum diiudicari potest, quam diversitate figurarum. et hoc ideo, quia sicut quantitas propinquissime se habet ad substantiam inter alia accidentia, ita figura, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, propinquissime se habet ad formam substantiae. unde sicut posuerunt aliqui dimensiones esse substantiam rerum, ita posuerunt aliqui figuras esse substantiales formas .

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Excerpts from Commentary on Peter of Spains Tractatus By Simon of Faversham Ed. De Rijk, Vivarium VI 2, pp. 69 ff. Translated by John Longeway Square brackets [] are used to indicate summaries. Diamond brackets <> indicate words supplied by the translator.
Prooemium: The Philosopher says in Metaphysics IV that every natural thing is determined by its proper function (operatio)when it is capable <in that function> it is called a singular, that is, a <single> being of that sort, and when it is not, it is only called a singular equivocally. And he gives the eye as an example. For the eye, when it is capable in its proper function, which is seeing, is called an eye, but when it is not capable, it is only called an eye equivocally. But since a human being is of the number of natural things, it must have a proper operation, and when it is capable in it it is called a human being, and when it is not it is only called a human being equivocally. But being is not a function of this sort, since being is an actuality of every being. Nor is vegetative activity, since it agrees with plants; nor sensing, since it is in every animal; nor understanding, since intelligences also understand. The Philosopher, noting that these are not functions proper to human beings, says that human being agrees with all beings in being, with plants in vegetative functions with brutes in sensing, with angels in understanding. It follows therefore that these are not functions proper to human beings. But the function proper to a human being is reasoning, and this is evident from both reason and authority. First, by reason thus: That is the operation proper to human beings from which the specific difference of human being is taken, but the specific difference of human being is taken from reasoning; therefore this is the function proper to human beings. The major premise is obvious from Avicenna, who says that its difference is taken from the form proper to each reality. But the proper function arises from the proper form. Therefore etc. Again, that is the function proper to human being which agrees with human being alone, but the act of reasoning agrees with human being alone; therefore reasoning is its proper function. The major premise is obvious, since a property is what agrees with only one reality. The minor premise is explained through the definition of reasoningJohn the Grammarian <Philoponus> defines it in this way: reasoning is the passage of reason from things known beforehand to things that are to be known afterwards. But it is certain that Intelligences dont understand in this way. Therefore this function, reasoning, agrees with human being alone. This appears in authoritative remarks of the Philosopher, first in the Epistle to Alexander, lust certainly, and anger and the rest occur in all the rest of the animals, but reason in none of them except human beings. The Philosopher means by this that reasoning is the function proper to human beings. The Philosopher in Metaphysics I: others certainly live by imagination and memory, but the race of men alone lives by art and reasoning. And it is apparent from this that reasoning is the primary function of human beings. Again, Seneca: Human beings and lions are more beautiful, and peacocks, of those who have voluntary motion and impetus; and as other beasts and worms have voice, but a tom-cat the loudest and most distinct, dogs the sharpest and the eagle the deepest, the bull the most delightfully glowing. . . Reason, therefore, is the good proper to human beings, and the other goods are common enough with the other animals. It appears from what has been said, then, that reasoning is the function proper to human beings, and when a human being is capable in this function, it is called a human being, and when it is not, it is only called a human being equivocally. Restating the argument, then: each natural reality is determined by its proper function. When it is capable in this, it is called a singular, that is, a being falling under its kind. When it is not capable in this, it is only called a singular, falling under its kind, equivocally. But since human being is of the number of natural realities, it therefore has a proper function.

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This is reasoning. Thus it is obvious from what has been said that when it is capable in this function, reasoning, it is called a human being, and when it is not, it is only called a human being equivocally. One ought to note that the Philosopher, in De Caeli et Mundo II, says that each reality of which there is some function, is ordered to that function as to an end. Since, then, the act of reasoning is the function proper to a human being, a human being is related to the act of reasoning as to an end. And whoever does not have reasoning, such a human being is called useless and a beast. And so three things appear: that a human being who does not have the act of reasoning is called a human being equivocally, second, that such a human being is useless, and third, that such a human being is a beast. But since we cannot have the function, reasoning, except through logic, therefore logic is greatly to be sought. And immediately you will ask, dont all human beings reason naturally? I reply that although all do reason naturally, still one can never reason perfectly without logic. That we have the act of reasoning perfectly through logic is obvious from the authority of Al Farabi, for he says, just as grammar directs discourse and speech so that one does not err in interpretation, so logic directs reason so that one does not err in reasoning. It follows therefore that a human being reasons rightly and perfectly by means of logic. Again, this is explained through the interpretation of this word logic. In one way it is called log from logos, that is, discourse, and ic means sciencethe science of discourse, as it were. And through this interpretation it is one of the sciences of discourse, and extends to the entire trivium. In another way, it is called logic from logos in Greek, which is reason (ratio) in Latin, and ycos, scienceso the science of reason, as it were, which directs ones reason, the function proper to human beings. It is apparent, then, from what has been said, that a human being without logic is not human except equivocally.

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7. On substance in the expression logos tes ousias. Note that in the phrase the account of the substance, substance means the quid est or what it is (for which see below), in Aristotles examples these differing as follows: the account of man: an animal with reason (or mortal rational animal) the account of to z: a likeness in species or in a sign of the species68

Hence, looked at in one way, we see that the signification of such names consists in the account of the what it is of the things they name, in accordance with which observation it is commonly said that the logos or ratio which a name signifies is the definition,69 but in another way, what is signified is a thing, like a man, which has the definition. Note also that in logic the sort of names said univocally of many things are the five predicables. But, as one may gather from the Isagoge of Porphyry, among the predicables only genus and species are predicated in the what it is, genus being a name said univocally of many things other in species, signifying what they are, but a species a name said univocally of many things under a genus, signifying what they are. Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat. 4). Excerpt from a Seminar delivered at Thomas Aquinas College:
Maybe we can stop here for a moment and read it in the Greek; youll notice that Aristotle in the Categories is using the word substance in more than one way. In the ante-predicaments there are really two main uses of the word substance. One is in Chapter 1, where the Greek says that univocal things have both a name in common and the logos (which can be translated either as the speech or as the thought) tes ousias (of the substance). Now, what does substance mean there? Does it mean the category of substance? No. It means the nature, the what it is, of a thing. Is substance in that sense placed under some genus? No. Its found in some way in all the genera. But if you take it in the abstract like that, the nature of a thing, even the nature of man is not directly in the genus of substance, but what has that nature. And substance in that sense is not an individual or a species or a genus under any one of the ten, but what it in fact is is the formal beginning of all the species, the genera, and so on. Theres one text in the Metaphysics where Aristotle is giving a division of substance. He says it can mean what it is, meaning the nature, it can mean this something, the individual substance, or it can mean the genus, the universal. <...> In the ante-predicaments you already have to distinguish those two senses of substance. The first sense is substance meaning the nature, the essence, the what it is of a thing, and not only in the first genus but in all ten, e.g. the what it is of virtue, the substance of virtue. Thomas, when he talks about that sense, says thats what we mean when we say definition is speech signifying the substance of a thing; its the what it is of a thing. The second sense you meet is in the fourth chapter, the genus of substance. And now we are meeting in Chapter 5 two other senses.

68

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 35, art. 1, c. where he defines image in this way. Needless to say, in English the word animal never has the proper meaning of image or picture, which is why I have taken the word figure as a substitute. Cf. the remarks of Robin Smith excerpted above. 69 Of course, one must then go on to distinguish the various kinds of definition, as one would first give the meaning of a name (which is a nominal definition) before being able to define it through its principles (which is a real definition) once these are discovered or recognized as such. As for the logoi of the highest genera, which have no definition, in addition to the texts cited above on hupographe, cf. the explanation of ratio discussed in the second passage excerpted from Duane Berquist below, a text I give in extenso further on.

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Cf. Duane H. Berquist, The Categories. The Ante Predicaments: Things as Named:70 APPENDIX What is meant by the logos of the ousia in the first two definitions? Perhaps logos is more universal than definition in the strict sense. Consider Thomas teaching here in the Latin word for logos which is ratio:
...ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio, secundum quod Philosophus dicit, IV Metaphy., text. 11: Ratio quam significat nomen est definitio. Sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et

14
qualitas, et hujusmodi, quae non definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. Et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas. Unde non refert, utrum illa quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem.14 [71]

If the species immediately under a highest genus have a name common to them univocally, but a genus that is not a species cannot be defined in the strict sense, then we would have to understand logos not as the definition of what it is, but as the same thought of what it is. And what is the meaning of ousia or substance in the first two definitions of Chapter One? The following text of Thomas gives the two meanings of substance in the ante-predicaments:
...substantia duplicitur dicitur, ut ex V Metaphysicorum, text. 15, patet. Uno enim modo dicitur substantia, secundum quod significat rationem primi praedicamenti: et hoc est vel forma, vel materia, vel compositum, quod per se in genere est. Alio modo dicitur substantia illud quod significat quid in omnibus rebus, sicut dicimus quod definitio significat rei substantiam: et hoc modo quidquid positive dicitur, in quocumque genere sit, substantia est vel substantiam habet.15 [72]
70

(www.aristotle-aquinas.org/.../ 02-categories/02-ante-predicaments/01-Things% 20as%20Named%20Ch.1.pdf [2/28/08]) Note that I furnish English translations of the texts of St. Thomas quoted by Dr. Berquist. 71 Regarding what pertains to the first point, it must be understood that ratio, as it is taken here, is nothing other than that which the intellect apprehends from the signification of a name: and thisin those things which have a definitionis the definition itself of the thing, according to what the Philosopher says: the ratio which the name signifies is the definition. But some things are said to have a ratio in the way mentioned which are not defined, such as quantity and quality and the like, which, since they are the most general genera, are not defined. And nevertheless the ratio of quality is what is signified by the name of quality; and this is that from which quality has what quality is [ illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas]. For this reason, he does not refer to whether those things which are said to have a ratio either have or do not have a definition. (tr. B.A.M.) 72 [I reply that it must be said that] substance is said in two ways, as is evident from Metaphysics V, text 15. For in one way substance is said according as it signifies the ratio of the first predicament [category]: and this is either the form, or the matter, or the composite, which is in the genus per se. In another way substance means that which signifies the what in all things, just as we say that the definition signifies the substance of a thing: and in this way whatever is said positively, in whatever genus it is, is substance, or has substance. (tr. B.A.M.)

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Why does Aristotle gives examples from substance in the definition of things named univocally? But does this mean that accidents cannot be named in this way? Thomas explains Aristotles teaching in the seventh book of Wisdom or First Philosophy:
...dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non est accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est. Ipsum enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum
14 15

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio II, Quaest I, Art. III, Solutio Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

15
praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia hujusmodi talia. Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, aliis autem alio modo, idest secundum quid.73 Quod enim aliquo modo, idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in aliis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum in quibus est quod quid est. 74 Non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis. Cum enim quaero quid est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam. Sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. Et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. Et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia. 75 Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam simili73

1331 ....He accordingly says, first (582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution (581:C 1325) that there is no definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to another solution it is necessary to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies each of the other categories, such as quantity, quality and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other categories, although not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, in a similar fashion whatness belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, but in another sense to the other categories, i.e., in a qualified sense. (In VII Meta., tr. John P. Rowan) 74 1332. For the fact that it belongs to the others in another sense, i.e., in a qualified sense, is clear from the fact that in each of the other categories some reply may be made to the question What is it? For we ask of what sort a thing is, or what its quality is, as What is whiteness? And we answer, Color. Hence it is evident that quality is one of the many things in which whatness is found. 75 1333. However, quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense but the whatness of quality. For when I ask what man is, and one answers Animal, the term animal, since it belongs in the genus of substance, not only designates what man is, but also designates a what, i.e., a substance, in an unqualified sense. But when one asks what whiteness is, and someone answers, Color, this word, even though it signifies what whiteness is, does not signify what something is in an unqualified sense, but of what sort it is. Hence quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but with some qualification. For this kind of whatness is found in quality, as when we say that color is the whatness of whiteness; and this kind of whatness is substantial rather than substance.

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tudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter sed quia non ens est non ens. Et similiter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.16 [76]
16

In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 1331-1334

16 This sense of substance is also found in the sense of how which is that of the speciesmaking difference. Thomas repeats the teaching of Aristotle in the fifth book of Wisdom:
....unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur differentia substantiae, idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae.17 [77]

Is the example of things named equivocally an example of things named purely equivocally? Consider this text of Thomas:
hoc nomen animal imponitur non ad significandum figuram exteriorem, in qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum naturam, in qua pictura non imitatur; et ideo nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen scientiae convenit creaturae et Creatori secundum id in quo creatura Creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.18 [78]
17 18

In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio XVI, n. 987 De Veritate, Q. 2, Art. 11, Ad 8

DUANE H. BERQUIST

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1334. For by reason of the fact that all the other categories get the notion of being from substance, the mode of being of substance, i.e., being a what , is therefore participated in by all the other categories according to a certain proportional likeness; for example, we say that, just as animal is the whatness of man, in a similar fashion color is the whatness of whiteness, and number the whatness of double; and in this way we say that quality has whatness, not whatness in an unqualified sense, but a whatness of this particular kind; just as some say, for example, in speaking of non-being from a logical point of view, that non-being is, not because non-being is in an unqualified sense, but because non-being is non-being. And in a similar way quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of quality. 77 He says therefore first that one mode of quality is according as quality means the difference of substancethat is, the difference by which something differs substantially from another, which enters into the definition of a substance. (tr. B.A.M.) 78 [To the eighth it must be said that] the name animal is not imposed to signify the exterior figure in which a picture imitates a true animal, but to signify the interior nature in which it does not imitate it, and so the name of animal is said equivocally of a true one and a painted one; but the name of science belongs to the creature and the Creator according to that in which the creature imitates the Creator, and so it is not predicated of both wholly equivocally. (tr. B.A.M.) For more on this matter, cf. the previous section.

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III. ON THINGS SAID DENOMINATIVELY. As will become clear from what Aristotle explains further on, when we say things like Trypho is a grammarian or Achilles is brave, we are naming them from certain accidents existing in them as in a subject, which are grammar and bravery respectively. Consequently, we say that things like grammarian and brave are called denominative inasmuch as they are derived from the names grammar and bravery with a change in ending, the reasons for which are well-explained in the following texts: 1. Denomination explained. Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.2):
So Aristotle has indicated that logic is ordered to knowing things, that it has a foundation in things, but at the same time, the third bird, which you can obviously see from what hes saying what it would mean to speak about a univocal name, or an equivocal name. A fourth thing, which I havent mentioned yet, is that his procedure will help you to understand when you get to the division ton onton, of beings, well, what kind of name is being, which is said of substance and accident? It is said equivocally. And when you come to Chapter 4, you dont say that man is virtue, but that man is virtuous, and you dont say that man is courage, but that man is courageous, so something is being said denominatively. Well, weve talked about that in the first chapter. So maybe weve killed five or six birds. Lets look a bit at Chapter 1 in particular. In Chapter 1 we have three definitions. Is this a division? Is he dividing something into three, here? Notice the difference in the way he speaks here in Chapter 1, and the way he speaks in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 he says ton legomenon, of those said, and then he divides. Later on, in Chapter 2, he says ton onton, of beings, and then he divides. He doesnt say of ways said, or something, in Chapter 1, does he? He just gives the three definitions. And you can see a certain opposition, of course, in the first two definitions, but is it fair to introduce a division in between those first two? No. He has the same example in both; thats the first point to make. But in the third, theres a difference here between, lets say, the word virtuous, and the word virtue, and we can say the same about courage and honor and so on. And the word virtuous is a denominative, taken from virtue in some way, with a difference in its ending. But basically it has the same meaning. But, if you have a substance like man, you dont really say virtue of man, you dont say man is a virtue, no matter how good he is. But you might say of a good man that he is virtuous. When you say virtuous of man, this is being said denominatively, but when I say virtuous of courageous, and of moderate, and of just, then what do we say? Is virtuous being said denominatively of courageous, moderate, and just? No; theyre said univocally, the same way that virtue is said of courage, moderation, and justice. Looking at it this way, it seems to be essentially the same, and it seems to be what kind of predication? All of these are said to be virtuous with the same speech about what they are in mind. But when virtuous is said of man, virtuous is not saying what man is, but something outside of the nature of man; theres another nature there, another what-it-is. This is important, because when he comes to Chapter 2, at the division ton onton, and he makes the distinction between substance and accident, and accident is not said of substance, but it exists in substance, its not said of substance in the strict sense of saying what it is , but it exists in it. And because it exists in, thats why there can be denomination. And that way of speaking with denominatives is going to tie up with accidents, and then youll see when you get to Chapter 4, when he distinguishes the nine genera of accidents, what words does he use? Does he use words such as virtue or virtuous? Does he use quality or qualis, poion or poios? He uses the denominative names. And there is a reason for that. For the denominative name corresponds to its nature as an accident. When you say virtue, its

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almost like youre talking about a substance, a thing in itself. But when you say virtuous, youre thinking of it in the manner of an accident, and in the way that it can be said of substance. And yet when we compare virtuous to courageous or moderate or just, it seems to be really the same relation between virtue and courage and moderation and justice; they just differ in ending. But you are still talking about what they are in both cases. So its not really a division that we have in Chapter 1, is it? But there is something of opposition in the first two. Now when you use equivocal and univocal, there, in the first two definitions, Ive said already that this is a more narrow sense of univocal than you have in the Isagoge.

Cf. ibid.:
What about the third definition, the denominative? Albert the Great, I think, is good on this. Should you understand this grammatically? Is it talking about how one word might be derived or formed from another word? Albert the Great uses the example of the word just and the word justice. The grammarian, looking at the words just and justice, will say just is the original word, and it comes before justice. In the same way you would have hard before hardness. But is it the word justice and the word hardness that will be said denominatively? No. If you think so, youre confusing logic with grammar. Grammar is concerned with the physical word itself. The actual word justice might very well be derived from just, but what you mean in the case of denomination is you have two natures, say the nature of this man, and the nature of this virtue. And you are going to say this alien nature of man. And so you change the ending of the word, even though youre talking about the same reality. Just can be said of man, and justice cannot. So justice not only will not be said denominatively of man, but it wont be said of man at all. It is just that is said denominatively of man. So that is what is called denominative; it gets its name from another, but in terms of the nature, there are two natures involved there. One of those natures is adapted to the other, and in order to do that, we change the name, so just in that sense is the denominative, even though grammatically the word just might come before justice. But there is the nature of justice, the nature of a virtue, there, which is going to have a name derived so that it can be said of substance. The nature is something in itself before it is something you apply to another. The key thing about denomination is that none of these accidents exists by itself. The word just, in a way, is more true to accident than the word justice. So when he distinguishes the nine genera of accidents, he uses the denominative names, because they are being distinguished by the ways they are said of individual substance. And the abstract name is not said of. As we were saying in the prologue, logic is concerned with the way something is said of something or not said of something. Here, youve got something that can be said of substance, and something that cannot be said of substance. Justice almost signifies the accident as if it were a substance by itself, and just does not. Lets look at a few places where Thomas talks about denomination. In the Sentences in Distinction 17 Question 1 Article 5 Ad2, he says denomination is properly secundum habitudinem accidentis ad subiectum [according to the relatedness of an accident to a subject] In that text, hes talking about the words dilectum and dilectione meaning loved and love. You might say, isnt the word loved derived from love? Thomas says thats not what we mean by denomination, because in talking about love and loved we are not talking about the accident with respect to its subject, youre talking about the object of the love. The loved is the object of love. This is not what we mean by denomination, which is when we are talking about an accident in relation to a subject. A second text from Thomas is from the De Potentia Question 7 Article 10 Ad8. He says

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that from which something is denominated, it is not necessary that it always be a form according to the nature of the thing. It suffices that it be signified by way of form [in the mode of a form], grammatically speaking. For man is denominated from action and from his clothing and from other things of this sort, which really are not forms. 1 Notice the difference in what hes saying. Lets say Im clothed, and lets say Im courageous. Courage is like an accidental form in me, a habit or disposition. Is clothing really a form of me? No. But grammatically, there is a certain similarity there. By my courage Im said to be courageous, and by my clothing Im clothed. Im denominated by my clothing and Im denominated by my courage. What are the examples Aristotle gives for denomination? From what category are they taken? Quality. Is that by chance? No. There you have forma secundum rei naturam, a form according to the nature of the thing, it actually is a form. But clothing is not. So you could take clothing and clothed as an example, but it would not be the most perfect example. We dont speak as much of a mans quantity or size as a form, do we? But we do think of his virtue or his knowledge as form. That is most perfectly there in quality. Another aspect of that is to say the others seem to denominate insofar as they are how in some respect. How much? How tall? Or how in some other way, but simply or without qualification how means quality. See how carefully he chooses? There is always a reason why Aristotle picks the examples he does. When Thomas comments on Aristotles examples, he always sees a reason for the example. In the second book of the Physics, Aristotle talks about the maker, the mover, he gives the examples of the father and the advisor. Thomas says there are two movers, reason and nature, and thus you have the advisor and the father. Later on we find the examples of the doctor (from art, again) and the seed. So he gives an example from reason and one from art, and two from nature. There is always a reason why he chooses the examples he does. Aristotle takes his examples of quality from the first species, not the third. Why does he do that? Why doesnt he take red or white, or something like that? Notice the examples he takes: grammatikos, which is taken from an art or science, and courage. Why does he take such examples? The others are more connected to the nature; some people are naturally healthy, and white seems to be something by nature, but grammar is something I was born without, and I had to acquire it, and likewise with virtue. So he picked things that we have to acquire to some extent by our own efforts, which brings out the idea of denomination where you have two different natures. One is being denominated from the other. I didnt always have grammar, I didnt always have courage, so if Im grammatical or if Im courageous, Im certainly being denominated from something other than my very nature. See how he chooses not only that species of quality, but perhaps even those within it that are more obviously acquired? He wrote with extreme care.

Cf. ibid.:
But the other distinction, between accident and substance, where the accident exists in the subject, but is not said of it, how is that going to be relevant? One genus is substance, and the rest are going to be accidents. But is there something more subtle in addition to that, for which this will be useful and, in fact, necessary? Theres a connection between this distinction between exists in a subject and does not exist in a subject and what we had in chapter one in the discussion of denominative names. The distinction between equivocal and univocal names has more a connection with the distinction between whats universal and whats singular, since the universal is being said univocally, although its limited to being said of its subject in
1

Ad octavum dicendum est, quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae. Cfr. the obj.: Praeterea, omnis denominatio est a forma. Forma autem est aliquid inhaerens ei cuius est. Cum ergo deus nominetur a relationibus ad creaturam, videtur quod ipsae relationes aliquid sint in deo .

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terms of what it is. But [the distinction between exists in a subject and does not exist in a subject is connected more with] denominatives. An accident is something existing in a subject, but its not that subject. But there is some reason to say something of the subject because of this thing it has existing in it. Ive got health existing in me or Ive got sickness existing in me, and so theres reason to say something about me, because of this thing Ive got existing in me. But you cant say it univocally of me in the sense of saying this is what I am, health, or this is what I am, sickness. But you could say something important about me denominatively. Instead of saying health of me (you cant get away with that), you can say healthy of me, or sick, courageous or cowardly, virtuous or vicious, beautiful or ugly, or whatever. In other words, in order to see the importance of denominative naming you have to understand the distinction between the accident and that in which it exists, and how there is thus a foundation in things for saying something denominatively of me such as Im healthy, or Im white, or Im logical (perhaps). <...> You see how these three things tie together? [We have just seen the connection between] the third definition of Chapter 1, and exists in a subject. But then the key thing to note in Chapter 4, where he distinguishes the genera of accidents, is that the words he uses there are all denominatives. Now later on, when you get into the chapter on quantity or quality, then you use words like quantity or quality. And thats not denominative. Hes already gotten through the labor of distinguishing the genera of accidents. And once he gets to talking about quantity, hes thinking of quantity in comparison to its species, or hes thinking of quality in comparison to its species. And if he used the denominative there, he wouldnt be using it as being said denominatively. If he were thinking of virtue, say, as said of courageous, moderate, and just and so on, he would still be thinking of it more as genus and species, since he is not now interested in these things in comparison to substance (thats the first thing to see) but more in the order of the universal to the less universal below it and all the way down to those of us in the lowest rank who are singular. Any questions now about Chapter 2 and why its necessary for understanding the division of Chapter 4? It is necessary to understand why he uses denominative words in making that division. And its necessary to see the connection between denomination and what an accident is.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.3):


But without getting into the order yet, apart from that, notice that he names the other nine by what kind of word that we studied before? Denominatives. And theres a reason why he does that. The denominative word fits the nature of the accident which, as we know from Chapter 2, exists in a subject. When you say healthy, as opposed to health, you bring out better the accidental nature of the thing. My health seems to be something existing by itself, the way its said. But healthy signifies something that exists in another, and implies something else. So its important to note that he does that. But when he takes up these ten, he may use not the denominative, say how much (which in Greek would have one word, poson), hell just give the word for quantity. Instead of saying how hell say howness, instead of poios, poiotes, hell give the abstract word, wed say. Because then hes no longer concerned with seeing how these things are towards substance, but how they are toward the species that come under them. You first distinguish them, as youll see when we get into the texts of Thomas, you distinguish them by how they are said of individual substances. And Thomas will go into that. But theyre not said of substance at all if you use the abstract name. See how careful he is? So you should notice that difference.

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Cf. Duane H. Berquist, The Categories. The Ante Predicaments: Things as Named:79
The third definition of Chapter One has a much different purpose than the first two. Things are named denominatively so they can be said of another thing. We cannot say truly that Socrates is virtue or justice and that a dog is health. But we can truly say that Socrates is virtuous or just and that a dog is healthy. When Aristotle first distinguishes the nine genera of accidents in the Fourth Chapter, he will speak denominatively. And this is necessary, for as we shall see there, the ten genera are distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances. And accidents can be said of individual substances only denominatively. But when he orders genera and species of accidents under their own highest genera, there is no need to speak denominatively. We can place courage, moderation and justice as species under virtue and likewise we could place courageous, moderate and just under virtuous. But only the latter could be said of Socrates. What is denomination and what is it to be named denominatively? Perhaps the first thing to be considered is the difference between logical and grammatical denomination or what denomination means in these 5 two arts. And before this difference, there is another one as regards the nature of things or what they are. In a text which Msgr. Dionne first called to my attention, Thomas Aquinas pointed out a likeness of logic and natural philosophy in distinction from grammar. The former are about the nature of things while the latter is more concerned with the words themselves. In talking about passion or undergoing, the logician and the natural philosopher, in distinction from the grammarian, consider undergoing as regards the nature of the thing. Here is the text: passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat, et hoc modo non oportet omnem poenam passionem esse, sed quamdam poenam, scilicet poenam sensus; vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout grammaticus considerat, et sic illud passive dicitur quod a verbo passivo derivatur. 2 As Albert the Great teaches us, logical denomination is not the derivation of one word from another, but from the name of the nature itself. In the chapter on things named denominatively, St. Albert distinguishes between denomination in grammar and in logic: Quamvis secundum grammaticam justitia derivetur a justo, tamen secundum naturam et rationem denominationis et denominati, a justitia formatur justus. Grammaticus enim nominum modos et formas attendit: et quia in declinatione sic declinatur justus, justi, addita tia fit justitia: ideo dicit justitiam formari vel derivari a justo: hoc enim modo justum a justitia formari non potest. Natura autem denominationis e contrario est: quia denominans est alienam naturam informans: et ideo nomen illius naturae praeintelligere oportet.3 Albert explains that three things are necessary for denomination as the word is used in logic: In denominatione ergo haec tria necessaria sunt, scilicet natura aliena, subjecto extrinsecus aptata et circumposita, in principali et denominativo eadem res significata, et diversi modi significandi.4
2

Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Dist XXXV, Q. 1, Art . 1, Ad 5

79

(www.aristotle-aquinas.org/.../ 02-categories/02-ante-predicaments/01-Things% 20as%20Named%20Ch.1.pdf [2/28/08])

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3 4

De Praedicamentis, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14a De Praedicamentis, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14b 6

The from something of the definition touches upon the alien nature, the differing in case or ending that they do not differ in their principal signification but in the mode of signifying only, and the last part are called according to the name that the alien nature is brought to the subject in some way. Thomas states that denomination strictly speaking is according to how an accident is toward a subject when explaining that the loved is not a denomination from love, but as its object: denominatio proprie est secundum habitudinem accidentis ad subjectum. Sic autem dilectum non denominatur a dilectione, sed magis sicut objectum. 5 Thus denomination is from what is like a form, but as Thomas explains elsewhere it does not have to be really a form: illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.6[80] However, when the nine genera of accidents are signified denominatively in the Categories, they signify only accidents for the reason Thomas gives when rejecting the position of Avicenna. Consider this more at length. What do names like colored and virtuous signify? And can they be placed in a category? What is the difference in meaning between colored and color? (Or between virtuous and virtue?) It is a mistake to think that color means the quality and colored the substance that has this quality. Or that virtue means the quality and virtuous the substance that has the quality. This is the error of Avicenna as Thomas explains: Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti,
5 6

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XVII, Q. I, Art. V, Ad 2 De Potentia, q. 7, Art. 10, Ad 8 7 inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.7

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That is, something is called loved (dilectum) by being the object of love ( dilectio); but to be related to something as its object is other than being an accident in a subject, by virtue of which relation a thing is truly said to be denominated. Cf. Dr. Berquists explication in the text excerpted above. (B.A.M.)

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The difference between colored and color (or between virtuous and virtue) is thus not in what they chiefly signify because they both signify the same quality. They differ in that colored (or virtuous) signifies this accident per modum accidentis while color signifies this accident per modum substantiae (as does virtue). From the above text, it can also be seen that colored is placed in a category. (If one examines the above text carefully, one will also see that it confirms the position that the praedicatum which is the subject of the Categories is a nomen or name.) If colored signified a substance with a color, it would be accidental being in the sense of the fifth book of Wisdom (Or Metaphysics). Accidental being there does not mean accident as distinguished from substance, but accidental as distinguished from as such or per se. The distinction of being according to the figures of predication, the ten highest genera, is one of the two main distinctions of being as such or through itself. We have said that Chapter One contains three definitions while Chapter Two will contain two divisions: the division of those said and the division of beings. This is also the way Cajetan speaks in his commentary on the Categories.8 This seems correct because in Chapter Two he begins with what is to be divided and then gives the division into parts. But since division and distinction are before definition, is there some division or distinction implied in the definitions of Chapter One? There seem to be two distinctions implied in Chapter One. The three definitions do not correspond to one distinction or division. They are not parts of one division.
7 8

In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, n. 894 Cajetan, De Praedicamentis ed Doyon, p. 13B: diffinitionibus tribus praeponendis iam completis, divisiones inchoat. 8 The first two definitions imply a distinction which can be made with one name or two names. Things can have a name in common with or without the same definition of what it is that is meant when that name is said of each of them. The baseball bat and the bat in the belfry have the name bat in common, but the definition of what it is for each to be a bat is not the same. The square and the oblong have in common the name quadrilateral and the definition of what it is for each to be a quadrilateral is the same. In these examples, we used two different names, bat and quadrilateral. But in Aristotles examples, one name, animal, was used (but with different things having that name). But the third definition corresponds to a distinction between two names, one of which in meaning is derived from the other. This is, for example, the distinction between healthy and health or between virtuous and virtue or between wise and wisdom or between good and goodness. In the first two examples, the first word is derived from the second. But in the last two examples, the second word seems to be derived from the first. However, as far as the meaning of these words is concerned (and the logician is concerned with words only insofar as they mean something), the first word is derived from the second in all four examples. For to say that the body is healthy means that it has health. And to say that Socrates is virtuous means that Socrates has a virtue. And to say that Aristotle is wise means that he has wisdom. And to say that someone is good means that they have goodness. The distinction of these two names is important for the logic of the Categories, for the logic of definition, for natural philosophy, and for theology; but in different ways. In the logic of definition, there is a distinction between the definition of the concrete such as healthy and the abstract such as health. The subject of an accident is found diversely in its definition when the accident is taken in abstraction and concretely. The subject is a difference when the abstract is defined. One might define health as the good condition of the body. But if we defined healthy, body would be a genus. For the healthy is a body in good condition. Thomas explains:

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accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subiectum non ponitur in definitione accidentis ut 9 genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: Simitas est curvitas nasi. Alio modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subiecto; unde sic non assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus.9 The natural philosopher wants to understand change. And following Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle, he discovers that change is between contraries. But when the natural philosopher considers that change is between contraries, he sees an important difference between the contraries health and sickness and the contraries healthy and sick. Health never becomes sickness, or sickness, health. But the healthy can become sick, and the sick can become healthy. For the healthy involves health and what has the health (the body) and the latter can lose its health and become sick. Likewise, the sick signifies sickness in a body which can lose that sickness and acquire the opposite health. Hence, in some way, at least by happening, if not as such, the healthy can be said to become sick, and the sick can become healthy. The natural philosopher sees that if the body was its health, it could never become sick. And if the body was its sickness, it could never become healthy. Thus change is between composed things, things composed of the pure contrary and its subject. The theologian finds the limitation of our words and thoughts in speaking of God who is good and wise, but altogether simple. Since God is completely simple, He is whatever He is said to have. When we say that God is good and wise etc., we seem to admit in our way of speaking, some composition in Him. And to avoid this, we say that God is goodness itself and wisdom itself. But when we say this, we seem to be saying that he is that by which something is good and wise etc. rather than being good and wise Himself. Hence, we must also say that He is good, wise etc. Neither way of speaking, derived from our understanding of material things (where form and what has it are not the same) is adequate to speaking about God. But the logician in the Categories considers this distinction because the abstract name cannot be said of substance, but the denominative can. And the genera of categories are distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances. But when the logician considers a genus of accidents by itself, he can use the abstract name of a genus or species.
9

De Veritate, Q. 3, Art. 7, Ad 2 10

Further, the logician in the Categories takes the denominative as signifying only the accident per modum accidentis and not also its subject when he is distinguishing the ten highest genera. Aristotle in Chapter One, with marvelous brevity, 10 shows the three ways things are named that are relevant to the treatise of the Categories. Some of the Greek Commentators at this point bring in other ways that things are named, But Aristotle ( brevitati studens) defines only those ways things are named that are necessary for understanding the Categories. As happens many times, three is enough. To see fully the necessity of these three definitions for the Categories and their order requires a long discourse. As one proceeds, one perceives that these three definitions are necessary for the rest of the ante-predicaments and that the order in which they are given in Chapter One corresponds somewhat to their use in the remaining ante-predicaments.

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But before entering into this longer discourse, one can perhaps indicate briefly the necessity and order of these three definitions by comparison to the skopos or aim of the Categories. We name things as we know them. But we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. Hence, we first name things equivocally calling them things or beings before we separate them under highest genera which involves naming them univocally. And the names of the highest genera are also said univocally of what is below them while things in some genera (the genera of things that exist in another subject) are said denominatively of first substances. An understanding of things named equivocally or of names said equivocally of many things is necessary for understanding well the division or distinction of beings. Things such as substance and accident are said to be equivocally, or being is said equivocally of substance and accident. The division of those said is necessary for determining the skopos or the subject of the Categories (those said without intertwining) and distinguishing it from the subject of the Peri Hermeneias (something said with intertwining, the statement or enunciation). Substance and accident can be said with or without intertwining.
10

brevitati studens to use the phrase of Thomas in his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias, n. 53 11 The second definition of Chapter One is clearly relevant to the three rules of Chapter Three. These rules are concerned with placing species under the highest genera and dividing genera by appropriate differences so as to see how species and differences are ordered under diverse highest genera. This is by an order of univocal predication and hence the second definition of Chapter One is relevant here. The highest genera are said with one meaning of the species below them and, if these species have species below them, they are also said univocally of them. Likewise, the differences are said univocally of the species below them. The third definition of Chapter One, the definition of things named denominatively, is necessary for understanding the division of the meaning or signification of those said without intertwining according to ten highest genera or for distinguishing those ten highest genera themselves. The reason for this is that accidents (which we already know to exist in a subject, substance, from the division of beings) must be named denominatively before they can be said of substance; and the highest genera can be distinguished in logic only by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. Hence, the nine genera of accidents must be named denominatively before they can be distinguished from substance and each other by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. This is why when Aristotle distinguishes them in Chapter Four; he names them denominatively, (but when he considers each genus of accident by itself, he may speak univocally, but not denominatively.) <...> 12 <...> By way of summary, we can give some questions and their answers. What is the reason for the first two definitions? The logic of the first act of reason is ordered to knowing what things are. Since we begin to know what things are by knowing their genus, we need to know how to place things in their genus. Things are not placed in a genus (or species) insofar as they are named equivocally. Rather things are placed in a genus insofar as they are so named univocally. Hence, we see the need 11 Categories, Chapter 5, 3a 15 and 3a 33-3b 9 12 Bk. I, Ch. 32

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13

In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio II, nn. 1288-1289 13

for the first two definitions to find how things as named can or cannot be placed under some genus. Why does he define things named equivocally before those named univocally? The division of beings must come before the distinction of the genera of categories because the latter will be distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances and the latter is arrived at by the division of beings. Substance and accident are called being equivocally. But things will be placed under one of the ten highest genera insofar as they are named univocally. What is the reason for the third definition? When he distinguishes the Categories, the genera of accidents are named denominatively, but not when each genus is divided into its species. Diverse genera of accidents are distinguished by diverse way of denominating substance. Hence, there is a need to speak of denomination in the ante-predicaments. Why is the third definition last? In the division of beings, accident is not said denominatively. Accidents are first said denominatively when the ten genera are distinguished. (emphasis added)

2. Some further observations on denominative naming. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IIIa, q. 60, art. 4, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the first it must be said that each thing is principally denominated from that which belongs to it first and through itself, but not through that which belongs to it through another.81

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 7, art. 10, obj 8, ad 8 (tr. B.A.M.):
obj. 8. Further, every denomination is from a form. But a form is something inhering in that to which it belongs. Since, then, God is named from relations to the creature, it seems that the relations themselves are something in God. 82 <> ad 8. To the eighth it must be said that that from which something is denominated need not always be a form according to the nature of the thing [i.e. in reality], but it suffices that it be signified in the manner of a form, grammatically speaking. For man is denominated from action and from clothing, as well as from other things of the sort, which in reality are not forms.83

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 37, art. 2, c. (in part) (tr. English Dominican Fathers):

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ad primum ergo dicendum quod unumquodque praecipue denominatur et definitur secundum illud quod convenit ei primo et per se, non autem per id quod convenit ei per aliud. 82 praeterea, omnis denominatio est a forma. forma autem est aliquid inhaerens ei cuius est. cum ergo deus nominetur a relationibus ad creaturam, videtur quod ipsae relationes aliquid sint in deo.... 83 ad octavum dicendum est, quod illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae .

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To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as white from whiteness, and man from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say, this man is clothed with a garment, the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the actionthat is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the trees form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God to love is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost? The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than to spirate love; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding. 84

Cf. Duane H. Berquist. Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4):


There is an interesting text of Thomas in this regard where hes talking about, of all things, creation, and certain things are mentioned explicitly, and others are not. The creation of time is mentioned explicitly in the text that hes commenting on, referring to, but not that of place. And thats an occasion for him to say that place is more intrinsic, and therefore theres less need to mention that as opposed to time. The text is from the commentary on the Sentences, II, D12 Q1 A5 Ad2: Some accidents denominate that in which they are, as whiteness. And such are understood to be created in the creation of their subjects [ so there is no separate mention of them], if they are about those things that follow upon the first being, as figure and quantity and things of this sort. Some things denominate also that in which they are not as in a subject, as place. For the place of the containing body, in which place is as in a subject, is not the place of that body, but is of the body contained. And time is the number of all motions, although first of that in which it is as in a subject, namely the motion of the first mobile, by which other
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Unde ad huius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, cum res communiter denominentur a suis formis, sicut album ab albedine, et homo ab humanitate; omne illud a quo aliquid denominatur, quantum ad hoc habet habitudinem formae. Ut si dicam, iste est indutus vestimento, iste ablativus construitur in habitudine causae formalis, quamvis non sit forma. Contingit autem aliquid denominari per id quod ab ipso procedit, non solum sicut agens actione; sed etiam sicut ipso termino actionis, qui est effectus, quando ipse effectus in intellectu actionis includitur. Dicimus enim quod ignis est calefaciens calefactione, quamvis calefactio non sit calor, qui est forma ignis, sed actio ab igne procedens, et dicimus quod arbor est florens floribus, quamvis flores non sint forma arboris, sed quidam effectus ab ipsa procedentes. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod, cum diligere in divinis dupliciter sumatur, essentialiter scilicet et notionaliter; secundum quod essentialiter sumitur, sic pater et filius non diligunt se spiritu sancto, sed essentia sua. Unde Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quis audet dicere patrem nec se nec filium nec spiritum sanctum diligere nisi per spiritum sanctum? Et secundum hoc procedunt primae opiniones. Secundum vero quod notionaliter sumitur, sic diligere nihil est aliud quam spirare amorem; sicut dicere est producere verbum, et florere est producere flores. Sicut ergo dicitur arbor florens floribus, ita dicitur pater dicens verbo vel filio, se et creaturam, et pater et filius dicuntur diligentes spiritu sancto, vel amore procedente, et se et nos.

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things are numbered. Nevertheless there is another reason about time and about place, because place is the same by essence as the surface of the body containing. Time, however, is not the same in number with any accident founded in a substance. And moreover, place has its whole completion in the thing, but the definition of time is completed in some way from the action of the soul numbering. [You may recall that from the fourth book of the Physics, that you wouldnt have time fully without the numbering soul, because it is the number of the before and after in motion, and these dont exist together, so the soul has to take them together in order to number, and thats necessary to complete the definition of time. The key thing here now, as far as the question of order is coming up next. From the two things before, he concludes] Whence it has more the aspect of something extrinsic than place does, and therefore one more numbers it with the things created than place, or some other accident. 1 Interesting. That might cast some light, too, on when he talks about place and time in the category of quantity. But it also casts some light on why he puts where before when; its based on something that is not as extrinsic as time.

Cf. Michael Augros, Subjectivism and the Internal Principles of Knowing (Thomas Aquinas College Senior Thesis), Sec. 2, A Dialectical Critique of the Arguments for Subjectivism:
[A subject is denominated from what is in it; for, as St. Thomas says, every accident denominates its proper subject. (Ia Q77 A5.) For example,] ...Socrates is called white from the whiteness that is in him. But Socrates is not called a horse when he thinks of a horse; rather, he is called a thinker. And yet the horse is what Socrates knows. Therefore what is known (the horse) and the thought are not in him in the same sense of the word, since he is denominated from one and not the other.

3. On thought in relation to denomination. Note that observations such as the foregoing are indispensable for distinguishing a thought from its object. Some commentators, mistakenly thinking Aristotle failed to do so, understand the Stoics to have observed the distinction with their terminus technicus lekton. We, however, believe Aristotle himself to have used that word for a thing which, being the object of a thought, is sayable before being said, a usage preserved in Diogenes Laertius and the Suda, for which texts see Part II of this paper.

ad secundum dicendum, quod accidentia quaedam denominant illud in quo sunt, sicut albedo; et talia intelliguntur creata in creatione suorum subjectorum, si sunt de illis quae esse primum consequuntur, ut figura et quantitas, et hujusmodi. quaedam autem denominant etiam illud in quo non sunt ut in subjecto, sicut locus. non enim est locus corporis continentis in quo est ut in subjecto, sed corporis contenti: et tempus est numerus omnium motuum, etsi primo ejus in quo est ut in subjecto, scilicet motus primi mobilis, per quem omnes alii numerantur, ut in 10 metaph. dicitur. sed tamen alia est ratio de tempore et de loco: quia locus est idem per essentiam quod superficies corporis locantis; tempus autem non est idem numero cum aliquo accidente in substantia fundato: et praeterea locus totum complementum suum habet in re; sed temporis ratio aliquo modo completur ex actione animae numerantis; unde magis habet rationem extrinseci quam locus; et ideo potius connumeratur primo creatis quam locus, vel aliud aliquod accidens. et praecipue hoc factum puto ad removendum antiquum errorem philosophorum, qui tempus posuerunt aeternum,praeter platonem, ut in 8 physic. dicitur. [DS12QU1 AR5- RA2]
1

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4. Definitions. DENOMINATIVE. (1) (a) A name taken (or derived) from another name, but with a change in ending; hence, (b) a name, taken (or derived) from the name of an accident belonging to a subject, whose ending is changed so that it may be said of the subject; hence (c) a name of an accident signifying in the manner of an accident. Note that some denominations are extrinsic, as when we say the wall is seen, others are not, as when we say Socrates is white or musical. 5. Supplement: On a wholes being denominated from the element which gives it form. Cf. D. S. Margoliouth, The Poetics of Aristotle (London, 1911), pp. 25-26:
In 1461a 27 we are told that certain difficulties in the poets can be solved by the usage of ordinary language; thus people say a dilution is wine 1, whence we get the half verse greaves of new-wrought tin. The reader will probably fail to see the connexion, whence amateur emendations are suggested; but the teacher is expected to refer the student to the discussions in the first book de Generatione on molecular mixture. There we are told why a dilution is called wine; viz. because in certain mixtures one element counts as form and the other as matter, and in such a case the whole is named after the element that gives form ; wine and water does the work of wine, and therefore is called wine [321b 1]. If, however, the amount of wine be so small that the whole does the work of water, then it should be called water [Cf. 328a 27]. The same, we are told in the last chapter, is what happens with tin and copper; the tin counts as form and the copper as matter; for the tin colours the surface but adds little or nothing to the bulk [328b 9]; and that which is at the top belongs to the form [De Caelo 312a 12]. Tin and copper, therefore, in their molecular mixture come under the rule which causes wine and water to be called wine; and the whole may on the same principle be called tin. That the two mixtures to some extent follow the same rule is also insisted on in the de Generatione Animalium [747b 4, 7]. Hence this matter, which is obviously a puzzle to the outsider, is a commonplace to the Aristotelian. But it is only to the Aristotelian that it will be intelligible; for it is based on the philosophy of form and matter, and the doctrine that things are called after the work which they do [Meteorology 390a 12]. 2
1

The reading of B ton kekramenon is clearly right. O kekamenos is the Greek for wine and water. Problems 874a 30. 2 and see In I Pol. text.

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6. The principal point of doctrine to be understood from the foregoing. As we hope to have shown by our remarks above, inasmuch as Aristotles concern in the Categories is with things said, the Philosopher begins the work of logic by distinguishing the three ways in which things are said, while in his definitions of the first two he describes their meaning or signification by the phrase the account of the substance. But, as we have also pointed out, substance here names the what it is expressed by a name rather than a this something, a point to which we shall return below. But we have also noted a distinction to be observed in the meaning of signification: the signification of a vocal sound the thing of the name (res nominis), which is a pragma (which some call its denotation) the account of the thing, which is either a definition or a description (which some call its connotation) 7. On accidental predicates as being adjectival. A. That names predicated denominatively are concrete adjectivally. Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tract. 2, cap. 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
But those things are said to be predicated denominatively which are concrete adjectivally, and are denominated or derived from certain abstract accidents, 85 as white is predicated of man and horse denominatively because white is derived from this abstract thing which is the whiteness which is in man, which, when taken in the abstract, cannot be predicated of man; for, as was said above, no part can be predicated of the wholefor whiteness is a certain accidental part of a white man, and so it cannot be predicated of him. But what is considered together with and is called white is the same as that (thing) having whiteness; and such a thing can be predicated of man.86

B. That predicates in the genera of accident do not signify substance principaliter and accident per posterius; rather, they signify accident principally and the subject ex consequenti. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 10 (tr. B.A.M.):
Nor is what Avicenna says true, that predicates in the genera of accident signify substance principally and accident per posterius, as when I say white87 and musical. For white, as it is said in the predicaments, signifies only a quality. Now this name white signifies the subject ex consequenti, insofar as it signifies whiteness in the manner of an accident. And so it is necessary that it include the subject in its account
85

N.B. To say ...and are denominated and derived, etc. seems strange, inasmuch is it is the things named which are denominated, but it is the names themselves which are derived. 86 denominative vero dicuntur praedicari, quae concreta sunt adjective, et ab aliquibus accidentibus abstractis denominantur seu derivantur: ut album de homine praedicatur, et de equo denominative: quia album derivatur ab hoc abstracto quae est albedo quae est in homine, quae sic in abstracto sumpta de homine praedicari non posset: nulla enim pars, ut supra dictum est, potest de toto praedicari: albedo enim est quaedam pars accidentalis hominis albi, et sic de eo praedicari non posset. concernitur autem et dicitur album, quod idem est quod habens albedinem: et tale potest de homine praedicari. 87 Or the white, or the white thing. In Latin, one may say album currit the white runs, whereas in English to speak so would sound strange (although we do say that the just live by faith, and the like).

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consequently. For the being of an accident is to be in. For whiteness, although it signify an accident, nevertheless does not do so in the manner of an accident, but in the manner of a substance. And so in no way does it consignify the subject [as does album]. For if it [sc. album] were principally to signify the subject [rather than to consignify it, as has been said],88 then Aristotle would not have placed accidental predicates under being according to itself, but under being according to accident [sc. accidental being]. For this whole which is a white man, is a being according to accident, as has been said. 89

8. Summary of St. Thomas teaching on predicates in the genera of accident. Predicates in the genera of accident, or accidental predicates, such as album, (the) white, or musicum, musical, do not signify substance principaliter and accident per posterius; rather, they signify accident principally and the subject ex consequenti. Now the name album, (the) white, signifies only a quality (which is an accident), but it signifies the subject ex consequenti, insofar as it signifies albedo or whiteness in the manner of an accident, the being of which is to inhere. But whiteness itself, although it signify an accident, does not do so in the manner of an accident, but in the manner of a substance, for which reason it in no way consignifies the subject. white (album) signifies an accident principally and the subject consequently (for it signifies a quality) signifies an accident in the manner of an accident, and hence consignifies its subject an accidental predicate placed under being according to itself

whiteness (albedo) signifies an accident in the manner of a substance therefore in no way does it consignify the subject as does white

Note. As will be seen from texts to be cited below, in marked contrast to their lucid treatment by St. Thomas Aquinas, representative accounts of connotative and denotative names (as in J.S. Mill), as well as of substantive and adjectival names (as in certain Modistae or speculative grammarians of the Middle Ages), show great confusion.

88 89

It seems to me that the words I have added are necessary to complete the sense. nec est verum quod avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. nam accidentis esse est inesse. albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.

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9. Supplement: On being supposed by a name and being coupled by it. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 9, art. 4, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
And so in order to make this question clear, it must be understood that the proper ratio of the name is what the name signifies, according to the Philosopher. But that to which a name is attributed, if it be taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determined under the undetermined, is said to be supposed by the name [ dicitur supponi per nomen]; but if it not be taken directly under the thing of the name, it is said to be coupled by the name [dicitur copulari per nomen],90 just as the name animal signifies animated sensible substance, and white signifies a color which pierces the sight. But man is taken directly under the ratio of animal, as the determined under the undetermined. For man is a sensible substance animated by such a soul, namely, rational; but he is not taken directly under white, which is outside his essence. And so man is supposed by the name animal, but is coupled by the name white. And because the inferior which is supposed by the common name stands to the common as the determined to undetermined: that which was supposed produces the significatum by a determination placed next to the common: for rational animal signifies man. But it must be understood that something signifies in two ways: in one way formally, and in another way materially. Formally, in fact, is signified by the name, that for which the name is principally imposed in order to signify, which is the ratio of [or the account lying behind] the name, just as the name man signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul. But materially is signified by the name that by which such a ratio is preserved, just as the name man signifies something having a heart and a brain and parts of this sort, without which there cannot be a body animated by a rational soul. 91

Examples: statements: Man is an animal. Man is white. definitions: animal is animated sensible substance; white is a color which pierces the sight

Man is that to which the name animal is attributed. But man is also that to which the name white is attributed. Now man is taken directly under animal, for man is an animated sensible substance; but man is taken indirectly under white; for
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That is, they belong to separate categories. Cf. Robin Smith on the transitivity of same-category predications. 91 et ideo ad evidentiam huius quaestionis sciendum, quod propria ratio nominis est quam significat nomen, secundum philosophum. id autem cui attribuitur nomen, si sit recte sumptum sub re significata per nomen, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato, dicitur supponi per nomen; si autem non sit recte sumptum sub re nominis, dicitur copulari per nomen; sicut hoc nomen animal significat substantiam animatam sensibilem, et album significat colorem disgregativum visus: homo vero recte sumitur sub ratione animalis, sicut determinatum sub indeterminato. est enim homo substantia animata sensibilis tali anima, scilicet rationali; sub albo vero, quod est extra essentiam eius, non directe sumitur. unde homo supponitur nomine animalis, copulatur vero nomine albi. et quia inferius quod supponitur per nomen commune, se habet ad commune sicut determinatum ad indeterminatum: id quod erat suppositum, fit significatum, determinatione apposita ad commune: animal enim rationale significat hominem. sed sciendum, quod aliquid significat dupliciter: uno modo formaliter, et alio modo materialiter. formaliter quidem significatur per nomen ad id quod significandum nomen est principaliter impositum, quod est ratio nominis; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid compositum ex corpore et anima rationali. materialiter vero significatur per nomen, illud in quo talis ratio salvatur; sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid habens cor et cerebrum et huiusmodi partes, sine quibus non potest esse corpus animatum anima rationali.

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white, which is a color which pierces the sight, is outside his essencethat is, it belongs to another category. Hence man is said to be supposed by the name animal, but to be coupled by the name white. To be supposed by a term, then, means to be taken as standing directly under that term; but to be coupled by a term means to be taken under it indirectly. 10. The meanings of suppositio and copulatio according to St. Thomas: That to which a name is attributed, if it be taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determined under the undetermined, is said to be supposed by the name (dicitur supponi per nomen). Hence, the supposition of a name is that to which a name is attributed when it is taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as the determined under the undetermined. That to which a name is attributed, if it not be taken directly under the thing of the name, is said to be coupled by the name (dicitur copulari per nomen). Hence, the copulatio (or coupling) of a name is that to which a name is attributed when it is not taken directly under the thing signified by the name, as belonging to another category. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia q. 39. art. 5, ad 5 (tr. B.A.M.):
To the fifth it must be said that there is this difference between substantive and adjectival names, since substantive names bear their own supposit, but adjectives do not, but rather place the thing signified around a substantive. Whence the Sophists say that substantive names suppose, but adjectives couple. Personal substantive names, therefore, can be predicated of the essence by reason of an identity of the thing, nor does it follow that the personal property determine a distinct essence; rather it is placed around the implied substantive by the substantive name. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless adjoined to some substantive. Whence we cannot say the essence is generating. Yet we can say that the essence is a thing generating, or God generating, if thing and God suppose [or stand] for the Person, but not if they suppose [or stand] for the essence. Whence there is no contradiction if it be said that the essence is a thing generating, and a thing not generating, since by the first thing is taken for the Person, by the second, for the essence.92

substantive names bear their own supposit, and hence are said to suppose but adjectives do not, and hence are said to couple

N.B. For a closely-related account of supposition from a work earlier than St. Thomas, cf. the following excerpt from the Dialectica Monacensis (c. 1200), of which I first give the Latin as edited by De Rijk, followed by an English translation taken from the Internet.
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Ad quintum dicendum quod haec est differentia inter nomina substantiva et adiectiva, quia nomina substantiva ferunt suum suppositum, adiectiva vero non, sed rem significatam ponunt circa substantivum. Unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina substantiva supponunt; adiectiva vero non supponunt, sed copulant. Nomina igitur personalia substantiva possunt de essentia praedicari, propter identitatem rei, neque sequitur quod proprietas personalis distinctam determinet essentiam; sed ponitur circa suppositum importatum per nomen substantivum. Sed notionalia et personalia adiectiva non possunt praedicari de essentia, nisi aliquo substantivo adiuncto. Unde non possumus dicere quod essentia est generans. Possumus tamen dicere quod essentia est res generans, vel Deus generans, si res et Deus supponant pro persona, non autem si supponant pro essentia. Unde non est contradictio, si dicatur quod essentia est res generans, et res non generans, quia primo res tenetur pro persona, secundo pro essentia.

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Dialectica Monacensis, VI De Dictione Significativa (In: L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, Volume II Part 2 published by Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Company N.V. Assen, The Netherlands, 1967, pp. 605-607).
VI DE DICTIONE SIGNIFICATIVA De dictionum divisione

Dictionum alia significativa, alia consignificativa. Dictio signi- [f. 115vb] ficativa est que per se et sine adiunctione alterius dictione significantis aliquid significat, ut hec dictio homo. Consignificativa est illa que non [5] per se sed cum alia dictione significante adiuncta aliquid significat, ut sunt prepositiones et coniunctiones et similiter hoc verbum est secundum quod solam compositionem importat: sic enim infinitum est et finiri habet per ea que componit. Sciendum tamen quod predicta divisio dictionis eadem est cum [10] hac: dictionum alia categoreumatica, alia sincategoreumatica. Categoreumatica idem est quod significans; syncategoreumatica idem est quod consignificans. Et dicitur sincategoreumatica a sin, quod est con, et categoreumatica, quod est significans; inde sincategoreumatica quasi consignificativa.
De dictionum divisione

[15] Relicto autem ad presens de dictione sincategoreumatica agendum est de dictione categoreumatica, idest de dictione significativa. Cuius talis solet proponi divisio: dictionem significativarum alia supponit, alia copulat. Supponit ut homo, et quodlibet nomen substantivum [20] vel aliqua pars substantiva. Copulat, ut albet, et quodlibet adiectivum manens adiectivum.
De termino

Sed quia eadem divisio solet fieri sic: terminorum alius supponit, alius copulat, ideo ad horum intelligentiam videndum est quid sit [25] terminus. Dicitur autem terminus proprie id quod terminat aliquid, ut punctus, instans, et similia. Punctus enim terminat lineam, quia post punctum nil est de linea. Similiter instans est terminus diei, quia est [605606] instans nil magis est de die; et sic de aliis. Unumquodque istorum dicitur terminus a terminendo sive finiendo; est enim idem terminare quod finire. Sciendum autum quod dialectus subiectum et predicatum vocat terminos proprie eo quod terminant propositionem. Sicut enim linea, [5] per se inperfecta est93 et infinita et finiri habet per duo extrema et est finis eius ex una parte subiectum et predicatum. Et notandum quod non solum sibiectum et predicatum dicuntur terminus a dialecto, sed etiam quelibet dictiones que determinare habent habitudinem vel respectum aliquem in locutione. Quales habitudines in- [10] portantur per verbum et prepositiones et coniunctiones. Ut patet in hac: ego video Sortem cum Platone,
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sc. propositio.

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in qua hec dictio Sortem non est subiectum nec predicatum; similiter hec dictio Platone. Et tamen dicuntur termini quia terminant aliquas habitudines. Quod patet in eadem locutione, in qua iste accusativus [15] Sortem determinat habitudinem huius prepositionem cum. Ex hiis patet quod prepositiones et coniunctiones non possunt vere dici termini, qui nil terminant, sed solum exigunt terminari. Et similiter hoc verbum est, secundum quod solam compositionem importat. [20]
Quid sit supponere, quid copulare

Viso quid sit terminus, videndum est quid sit supponere et quid copulare. Supponere siquidem est substantive <rem> significare et per se et sine dependentia tali que est in principali significatione. Copulare est adiective rem significare et in tali dependentia que est de principali [25] significatione. Dicitur autem terminus ille supponere qui nullam dependentiam habet in principali sua significatione. Ut patet in hoc termino homo, qui substantiam cum qualitate finite significat, que sunt de principali significatione. Et similiter pateat de quolibet substantivo. Dicitur autem ille terminus copulare qui dependentiam habet in principali [30] [f. 116ra] sua significatione. | Ut patet in hac dictione albus, que significat qualitatem finite, substantiam vero infinite; unde dependens est ad subiectum per quod suam finiat substantiam. Ex hiis patet quod licet obliquus termini supponentis aliquam [606-607] habeat dependentiam, tamen supponit, quia illa dependentia non est ex principali significatione, sed consignificatione, scilicet ex casu. Ut patet, in hoc genitivo hominis, qui solum dependens est ex modo significandi genitive propter quod exigit aliquam dictionem per quam determinetur. [5] Patet etiam quod predicta divisio, scilicet terminorum alius supponere, alius copulat, non debet habere medium, quia omnis terminus aut habet dependentiam in principali significatione, aut non. Si non, tunc est supponens; si sic, tunc est copulans. Si autem queratur de hiis terminis magister, miles, dux, [10] statua utrum supponant aut copulant, dicendum est quod, si manent adiectiva, copulant tantum; si vero substantiva, supponunt tantum, quia tunc nullam habent dependentiam. Notandum autem quod huiusmodi termini quando substantivantur determinant circa suas substantias illarum rerum species ad quas substantivantur. Unde hoc nomen [15] magister determinant humanitatem circa suam substantiam, per quam finit eam. Similiter hoc nomen album cum substantiavatur determinant circa suam substantiam corporeitatem. Unde idem est dicere: album est quod corpus album est. De hiis autem terminis: res, ens, unum et similia, dicendum [20] quod substantivantur ad res predicamentorum, scilicet ad substantiam, qualitatem, et ita de aliis, et hoc secundum prius et posterius. Dicitur enim ens primo et principaliter de substantia, secundario vero de qualitate, et de aliis, sicut sanum dicitur de urina et de animali. On Significant Words. A Selection from The Monacensis Dialectic [A translation of the first third of section VI of Dialectica Monacensis (author anonymous) Part (pages 605-616) of Item XI (pages 453-638) of L. M. De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, Volume II Part 2 published by Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Company N.V. Assen, The

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Netherlands, 1967. Draft by Calvin Normore, and Terry Parsons with suggestions by Steve Barney July 1997] Version 2.0 Copyright (c) 1999 by the translators. This translation is not in final form; it is made available for the convenience of readers. The manuscript may be duplicated for noncommercial purposes only. Origin of the Text: De Rijk (Part 1 of Volume II, page 443) dates this text: (410) as early as the second half of the twelfth century, (414) not later than the last decades of the twelfth century, and he cites some evidence that (411) seems to point to the sixties or seventies of the twelfth century. Translation Conventions:
[ . . . ] Square brackets contain material that is not explicitly present in the Latin text; this material is meant to be read along with the rest of the text. It conveys information needed to render the English grammatical, or to clarify some matter in keeping with the translators views about what is being said. Normal liberties are taken with most of the text without being indicated by brackets, such as supplying definite and indefinite articles (which do not exist in Latin); but these are often bracketed in quoted examples when exact syntax may be important. In the case of homo we occasionally use our square bracket convention backwards, translating it [hu]man when English grammar allows man but human is only marginally grammatical. { . . . } Curly brackets contain brief explanatory comments or translations or paraphrases. Material in them is not meant to be read along with the text. We have generally followed de Rijks punctuation, paragraphing, and use of quotation marks, but since very little of this is present in the original manuscript we have felt free to make changes when they seemed natural to us.

This long work contains an introduction plus six sections: Introduction I. Syllogistic Argumentation II. Universals III. Kinds of Categories IV. Topics V. Sophistical Argumentation VI. Significant Words There follows a translation of a portion of the last section. VI ON SIGNIFICANT WORDS Concerning the Division of Words Of words, some are significative, others consignificative. A significative word is one which in itself and without the addition of another signifying word signifies something, as this word human. A consignificative one is one which not through itself, but together with another adjoined signifying word, signifies something, such as prepositions and

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combining [words], and similarly the verb is according as it only brings in composition: for as such it is inspecific {infinitum}1 and it has to be specified {finiri} through those things which it compounds. It should be known however that the foregoing division of words is the same as this one: of words, some are categorematic, others syncategorematic. Categorematic is the same as signifying, and syncategorematic is the same as consignifying. And it is called syncategorematic from syn, which is, together with, and categorematic, which is signifying; hence syncategorematic as if significative-with {consignificativa}. Concerning a Significative Word However, leaving aside for the present the syncategorematic word, we should treat of the categorematic word, that is, the significative word. Of this it is customary for a division of this kind to be proposed: of significative words, some supposit and others combine { copulat}. One supposits, like human and any substantive name or some substantive part. Another combines, as whiten, and any adjective which persists as adjectival.2 Concerning a Term But because the same division is customarily made thus: of terms, some supposit, others combine, therefore, for understanding this it should be seen what a term is. Properly, term is said to be that which terminates something, as a point, or an instant, and similar things. For a point terminates a line, because after the point there is nothing of the line. Similarly, an instant is the endpoint of a day, because after /606/ the instant there is nothing more of the day, and thus in other cases. And any one of these is called a term from terminating or specifying, for it is the same to terminate as to specify. It should be known, however, that the dialectician properly calls subjects and predicates terms, in that they terminate a sentence. For just as a line by itself is imperfect and inspecific, and has to be specified through two extremes, the specification of it {the sentence} on one side is the subject and on the other side the predicate. And it should be noticed that not only are the subject and predicate called terms by the dialectician, but also any words which have to bound {determinare} some condition or relation in speech. Such conditions are brought in through the verb, and through prepositions and conjunctions. As is evident in this: I see Socrates with Plato, in which this word Socrates is neither subject nor predicate; similarly this word Plato. However they are called terms because they terminate some conditions. This is evident in the same locution in which the accusative Socrates bounds the transitive function of the verb I see; and the word Plato bounds the condition of this preposition with. From these things it is evident that prepositions and conjunctions cannot truly be called terms because they terminate nothing, but only require terminating. And similarly this verb is, according as it brings in only composition. What it is to Supposit, What to Combine Having seen what a term is, it should be seen what it is to supposit and what to combine. Indeed, to supposit is to signify a thing substantively, and through itself, and without

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such a dependence as is in the principal signification. To combine is to signify a thing adjectivally {adjoiningly}, and in such a dependence as is in its principal signification. That term is said to supposit which has no dependence in its principal signification, as is evident in this term human, which signifies specifically a substance together with a quality, which are in its principal signification. And similarly it may be evident concerning any substantive. That term is said to combine which has a dependence in its principal signification, as is evident in this word white, which signifies a quality specifically, but a substance unspecifically; hence it is dependent on a subject through which it specifies the substance. From these things it is evident that although an oblique 3 suppositing term may have /607/ a dependence, nevertheless it supposits, because that dependence is not from its principal signification, but from its consignification, namely from its [grammatical] case, as is evident in the genitive, of-a-human, which has dependence only from the genitive mode of signification, on account of which it requires some word through which it may be determined. It is evident also that the foregoing division (namely: of terms some supposit, some combine) should not have an intermediate case, because every term either has a dependence in its principal signification, or not. If not, then it is a suppositing [term]; if so, it is a combining [term]. But if it be asked of these terms teacher, soldier, general, statue, whether they supposit or combine, it should be said that if they persist as adjectives 4 they only combine, but if [they persist as] substantives, they only supposit, because they have no dependence. It should be noted however that terms of this sort, when they are made substantives, determine with respect to the substances of their things the species according to which they are made substantives. 5 Hence this name teacher determines humanity with respect to its substance, through which it specifies it. Similarly this term white [thing], when it is substantive, determines corporeity with respect to its substance. Hence it is the same to say a white [thing] is as A white body is. However of these terms: thing, being-, one and similars, it should be said that they are made substantive with respect to the categories, namely substance, quality, and so on of the others, and this according to prior and posterior. For being- is said primarily and principally of substance, secondarily of quality, and so on for others, as healthy- is said of urine and of animals.[94] Notes
1

Throughout this work we translate finitum and its cognates as specific- and infinitum as inspecific. A more orthodox translation would be finished, or completed, or, sometimes, bounded, but these fit only awkwardly with some of the passages below. There is no relation suggested between this word and species. 2 In Latin, most adjectives can be used alone substantively, as if they were nouns; one can say A white runs- meaning that a white thing runs. Presumably an adjective -persists as adjectival when it is not used as a noun in this way. 3 Oblique means any grammatical case other than nominative. 4 Although adjectives are regularly used as nouns in Latin, the reverse is not true; the words cited here cannot be used grammatically as adjectives. We are not sure what the author has in mind. 5 We are quite uncertain about the translation of this sentence.
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N.B. The text continues with a division of supposition, for which, see the relevant Appendix.

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N.B. For St. Thomas Aquinas account of relative names like teacher and soldier, see further below.

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11. On connotative names. Cf. William Minto, Logic, Inductive and Deductive (London, 1893), The Elements of Propositions, note 1, pp. 46-48:
The whole denotation, etc., is the class; the whole connotation, etc., is the concept. 1
1

It has been somewhat too hastily assumed on the authority of Mansel (Note to Aldrich, pp. 16, 17) that Mill inverted the scholastic tradition in his use of the word Connotative. Mansel puts his statement doubtfully, and admits that there was some licence in the use of the word Connotative, but holds that in Scholastic Logic an adjective was said to signify primarily the attribute, and to connote or signify secondarily (proshmai/nein)95 the subject of inhesion. The truth is that Mansels view was a theory of usage not a statement of actual usage, and he had good reason for putting it doubtfully. As a matter of fact, the history of the distinction follows the simple type of increasing precision and complexity, and Mill was in strict accord with standard tradition. By the Nominalist commentators on the Summulae of Petrus Hispanus certain names, adjectives grammatically, are called Connotativa as opposed to Absoluta, simply because they have a double function.96 White is connotative as signifying both a subject, such as Socrates, of whom whiteness is an attribute, and an attribute whiteness: the names Socrates and whiteness are Absolute, as having but a single signification. Occam himself speaks of the subject as the primary signification, and the attribute as the secondary, because the answer to What is white? is Something informed with whiteness, and the subject is in the nominative case while the attribute is in an oblique case ( Logic, part i. chap. x.). Later on we find that Tataretus (Expositio in Summulas, A.D. 1501), while mentioning (Tract. Sept. De Appellationibus) that it is a matter of dispute among Doctores whether a connotative name connotat the subject or the attribute, is perfectly explicit in his own definition, Terminus connotativus est qui praeter illud pro quo supponit connotat aliquid adjacere vel non adjacere rei pro qua supponit (Tract. Sept. De Suppositionibus). And this remained the standard usage as long as the distinction remained in logical text-books. We find it very clearly expressed by Clichtoveus, a Nominalist, quoted as an authority by Guthutius [page 47] in his Gymnasium Speculativum, Paris, 1607 (De Terminorum Cognitione, pp. 78-9). Terminus absolutus est, qui solum illud pro quo in propositione supponit, significat. Connotativus autem, qui ultra idipsum, aliud importat. Thus man and animal are absolute terms, which simply stand for (supponunt pro) the things they signify. White is a connotative name, because it stands for (supponit pro) a subject in which it is an accident: and beyond this, still signifies an accident, which is in that subject, and is expressed by an abstract name. Only Clichtoveus drops the verb connotat, perhaps as a disputable term, and says simply ultra importat. So in the Port Royal Logic (1662), from which possibly Mill took the distinction: Les noms qui signifient les choses comme modifiees, marquant premierement et directement la chose, quoique plus confusement, et indirectement le mode, quoique plus distinctement, sont appeles adjectifs ou connotatifs; comme rond, dur, juste, prudent (part i. chap. ii.). What Mill did was not to invert Scholastic usage but to revive the distinction, and extend the word connotative to general names on the ground that they also imported the possession of attributes. The word has been as fruitful of meticulous discussion as it was in the Renaissance of Logic, though the ground has changed. The point of Mills innovation was, premising that general names are not absolute but are applied in virtue of a meaning, to put emphasis on this meaning as the cardinal consideration. What he called the connotation had
95

N.B. In the De Interpretatione Aristotle uses this word to mean consignifies, as the verb consignifies time. 96 On this distinction, see the excerpt from John of St. Thomas below.

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dropped out of sight as not being required in the Syllogistic Forms. This was as it were the point at which he put in his horn to toss the prevalent conception of Logic as Syllogistic. The real drift of Mills innovation has been obscured by the fact that it was introduced among the preliminaries of Syllogism, whereas its real usefulness and significance belongs not to Syllogism in the strict sense but to Definition. He added to the confusion by trying to devise forms of Syllogism based on connotation, and by discussing the Axiom of the Syllogism from this point of view. For syllogistic purposes, as we shall see, Aristotles forms are perfect, and his conception of the proposition [page 48] in extension the only correct conception. Whether the centre of gravity in Consistency Logic should not be shifted back from Syllogism to Definition, the latter being the true centre of consistency, is another question. The tendency of Mills polemic was to make this change. And possibly the secret of the support it has recently received from Mr. Bradley and Mr. Bosanquet is that they, following Hegel, are moving in the same direction. In effect, Mills doctrine of Connotation helped to fix a conception of the general name first dimly suggested by Aristotle when he recognised that names of genera and species signify Quality, in showing what sort a thing is. Occam carried this a step farther towards clear light by including among Connotative Terms such general names as monk, names of classes that at once suggest a definite attribute. The third step was made by Mill in extending the term Connotation to such words as man, horse, the Infimae Species of the Schoolmen, the Species of modern science. Whether connotation was the best term to use for this purpose, rather than extension, may be questioned: but at least it was in the line of tradition through Occam.

Cf. E.D. Buckner, Joseph on Ockham on Connotation:97


The following passage is from An Introduction to Logic (pp 140-2)98 by the Oxford logician H.W.B. Joseph, where he explains the origin, as he sees it, of the scholastic distinction between connotative and non-connotative terms. He says that the distinction is found in Ockham, and he characterises it in two ways. 1. A term is connotative when we can suppose that it does not apply to the individual thing that in fact it does apply to.99 We can suppose that this piece of paper, though white, could have been a different colour, and so its whiteness is not a necessary part of my notion of the paper. White is therefore connotative: it denotes two things, white paper, primarily, being white, secondarily. By contrast, given that John is a man, we cannot abstract being a man from him, or he disappears too. Thus man is not connotative. It denotes only John, Jim, Joseph &c. 2. A connotative term is either adjectival, or a relational word like father, or a noun from which an adjective can be formed like pedant (for example, pedant pedantic, circle circular, Englishman English). Neither of these definitions appears explicitly in the passages of Ockham that he mentions, from chapter 10 of part I of the Summa Logicae (all quotations from which he apparently took from a secondary source, Geschichte der Logik by the German historian Carl Prantl). Ockham does not say that what is signified by a non-connotative term is logically or psychologically inseparable from the subject of which it is truly predicated. Nor does he say that connotative terms are essentially adjectival in meaning. (He considers body to be a connotative name, for example).
97 98

(http://uk.geocities.com/frege@btinternet.com/connotation/josephconnote.htm [3/14/08]) In my edition, the excerpt comes from pages 156-158, and I have edited Buckners text accordingly. 99 This is most inaptly worded.

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This may have influenced Prior, who frequently refers to Josephs writing. Prior says ( The Doctrine of Propositions and Terms, p. 57, that and adjective is never, in its meaning, complete in itself there is always an implied reference to something qualified, and mentions the medieval distinction between absolute and connotative term. Again, this is not entirely accurate. Ockham considers body to be connotative. The comment that Mill misunderstood the scholastic distinction is not entirely fair. See here [omitted]. [H.W.B. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic (Oxford, 1916), Ch. VI, Intension and Extension of Terms, pp. 156-158.] [For the sake of the curious, a few words may be added on the history of the term connotative. In William of Occam a distinction is found between absolute and connotative terms. Absolute terms have not different primary and secondary significations; nomen autem connotativum est illud, quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario. He gives as instances relative names (for father signifies a man, and a certain relation between him and another): names expressing quantity (since there must be something which has the quantity): and certain other words: v. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, Abs. xix. Anm. 831, vol. iii. p. 364. Johannes Buridanus said that some terms connote nothing beyond what they stand for (nihil connotantes ultra ea, pro quibus supponunt); but omnis terminus connotans aliud ab eo, pro quo supponit, dicitur appellativus et appellat illud quod connotat per modum adiacentis ei, pro quo supponit. [N1] Thus meus and teus stand for something which is mine or yours; but they connote or signify further and appellant me et te tanquam adiacentes (id. ib. xx. 111, vol iv. p. 30). In the same way elsewhere we are told that rationale connotat formam substantialem hominis (xx. 232, vol. iv. p. 63: cf. Anm. 459, p. 109). Album and agens are given elsewhere by Occam (ib. xix. 917, vol. iii. p. 386) as examples respectively of connotative and relative terms; and it is explained (ib. Anm. 918) that a connotative or relative term is one which cannot be defined without reference to one thing primarily and secondarily another; thus the meaning of album is expressed by aliquid habens albedinem; and when by any term anything connotatur vel consignificatur, pro quo tamen talis terminus supponere non potest, quid de tali non verificatur [N2] such a term is connotative or relative. Thus a term was called connotative if it stood for (supponit pro) one thing, but signified as well (connotat) something else about it; as Archbishop Whately says (Logic II. c. v. ~1, ed. 9, p. 122), it connotes, i.e. notes along with the object [or implies], something considered as its attribute therein. The Archbishop suggests the term attributive as its equivalent; and though connotative terms were not all of them adjectives, since relative terms also connote, and so do terms like mischief-maker or pedant, which though adjectival in meaning are substantives in form, yet adjectives are the principal class of connotative terms, in the original sense of that word. Connotation and denotation were thus originally not opposed to each other, and the terms were by no means equivalent (as they have come to be treated as being) to intension and extension. And James Mill, who probably by his remarks upon the word connote had some influence in directing his sons attention to it, says that white, in the phrase white horse, denotes two things, the colour, and the horse; but it denotes the colour primarily, the horse secondarily. We shall find it very convenient to say, therefore, that it notes the primary, connotes the secondary, signification. (Analysis of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 34, ed. [157158] 1869.) By the schoolmen it would commonly have been said to connote the colour, and the primary signification was that pro quo supponit. J.S. Mill, in a note to p. 299 of the same volume, objects to his fathers inversion of the usage. But he himself, by extending the term connotative to cover what the schoolmen called absolute, and opposed to connotative, names, introduced a complete alteration into its meaning. John and man are both absolute names in Occams sense. Man, no doubt, according to some (though not according to a nominalist like Occam) may stand for either an individual or an universal; for an individual

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when I say this man, for an universal or species when I say that man is mortal. (Occam would have said that in the latter case it stood for all the individuals). But even when I say this man, meaning John, the name man does not denote two things, man and John; for John is a man; and if I abstract from that, John disappears too; I have no notion of John as something with which I can proceed to combine in thought another thing, viz. man. With white it is different; I have a notion of paper, and a notion of whiteness, and whiteness is no necessary part of my notion of paper; and so with any other subject of which whiteness is only an attribute and not the essence. Hence the name white may be said to denote two things, the colour, and that which is so coloured; for these can be conceived each without the other, as John and man cannot. James Mill, who thought that objects were clusters of ideas, and that we gave names sometimes to clusters (in which case the names were concrete) and sometimes to a particular idea out of a cluster (in which case they were abstract), could also say that white, when predicated of this paper, denoted two things the whiteness, and the cluster not including whiteness which I call paper. But John only denotes one thing the cluster of ideas which make John; and man only one thing, the cluster of ideas common to John and Peter. J.S. Mill, however, distinguished what is common to John and Peter from John or Peter, and said not indeed that man denoted two things, but that it denoted one and connoted the other. But if he had been asked what John, the subject, was as distinct from man, his attribute, he would either have had to say that he was not something different from man, any more than slowness is something different from a fault, though fault was also held by him to denote one thing and to connote another; or that John was just the uncharacterised substance, in which those attributes inhered, the unknown subject; or else that he was what remained of the concrete individual when his humanity had been left out of his nature. None of these answers would be very satisfactory. Again, coloured is connotative, in the original meaning of that word, because it is predicable, say of a horse, and to be a horse is something else than to be coloured; in J.S. Mills usage, because it is predicable of brown, though to be brown is to be coloured. Mill treats as two, when he opposes a terms denotation to its connotation, things like John and man, brown and colour, whereof the latter is simply the universal realised in the former, and the former nothing without the latter: as well as things like horse and colour, which are conceptually two. Originally, only a name that was predicated of something thus conceptually distinct thing from the attribute implied by predicating it was called connotative; and it is only where there are thus conceptually two things, together indicated by the name, that the word connotative has any appropriateness. (Cf. also on the history of the word Connotative a note in Mintos Logic, p. 46).] [N1] i.e. to use J.S. Mills terms, it denotes id pro quo supponit, and connotes id quod appellat. For appellatio cf. Prantl, vol. III. xvii. 59 (proprietas secundum quam significatum termini potest dici de aliquo mediante hoc verbo est. Cf. ib. xix 875. [N2] Occam means that, e.g. snow can be referred to as album, but not as albedo.

N.B. The reader will note that, as indicated by the foregoing witnesses, the use of the term connotes in certain authors in the later Scholastic tradition departs significantly from the perfectly logical and unproblematic account of accidental predicates found in St. Thomas Aquinas, an account which, as we have seen, is made in terms of what is signified principaliter and what ex consequenti: the former being the accident itself, the latter, the subject in which the accident inheres. Now, since the con- in connote means with, if one wishes to employ the term connotes in this regard, the word could be used logically and defensibly in the same way as consignifies, and hence for the latter principle only, so that the meaning would be that a name for an accident not only signifies the accident itself, but also imports, or brings with it, the subject in which that accident exists, which is to additionally signify the subject. Of course, the fact that St. Thomas speaks of a substantive as bearing its supposit may be thought to undermine my argument, since one could take

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connotes to mean the very same thing, but in its defense I would merely point out that my claim is founded on a manner of speaking that is more in keeping with the way in which such words are customarily used, in the light of which it seems to me that, just as to speak of what consignifies something when this is taken to mean what signifies something ex consequenti is perfectly logical, so, too, the same sensibility requires that what something is said to connote be other than the principal thing signified. Hence to apply a term like connotes to what is signified principally rather than to what is signified ex consequenti can only lead to confusion. It also goes without saying that the practice of a thinker like Buridan, who is found using the term connotes for both the principal and consequent things signified, rather than for just oneeven if it is the wrong oneis even less defensible; such an unnecessary multiplication of terms being the sort of thing bringing Scholasticism into disrepute. 12. Peter of Spain on the twofold composition of the noun. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum (ap. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Translated by Joseph P. Mullaley, Ph.D, p. 19):
Therefore one must note that the composition of a noun is twofold. One is the composition of an essential quality with a substance, as in the case of a substantive noun, as man has for its object the reality under humanity. There the reality is a substance and humanity is a quality of it. The other is the composition of an accidental quality with a substance, as exists in the case of adjectival names; for example, white signifies an accident in relation to an indefinite substance which is contained in such a noun as a substance and the accident as a quality. And in each composition of a quality with a substance, the quality is compounded with a substance without an intermediate because of a tendency which it has toward the substance, as every form and every accident are naturally united in that in which they are. For if such a composition be other than and distinct from the quality and from the substance, it would be united with them, and, therefore, without an intermediate. And then for the same reason it will have to be determined in the first way or through an intermediate. However, one should ask about that intermediate through which it would be united with the extremes. The process then would be infinite unless something were naturally united with another.

N.B. Notice how Peters account, like that of St. Thomas cited above, is perfectly clear and logical, avoiding any occasion for confusion.

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13. Martin of Denmark on substantives and adjectives with respect to their modes of signifying. Cf. Martin of Denmark (d. 1304), Tractatus de Modis Significandi (tr. B.A.M.):
CAPUT XVIII De modo significandi per se stantis et adiacentis. 37. Viso quomodo modus significandi per modum communis dividitur in modum per se stantis et in modum adiacentis, consequenter de utroque illorum specialiter videamus, et primo de modo per se stantis, postea de modo adiacentis. 38. Iuxta primum notandum quod res extra non est ens per alterum nec ens in altero, sed modum essendi per se stantis sive fixi habet. CHAPTER XVIII On the mode of signifying of standing by itself and (the mode) of the adjacent. 37. Having seen how the mode of signifying through the mode of the common is divided into the mode of standing by itself and the mode of the adjacent, consequently let us see about both of them in particular, and first about the mode of standing by itself, and afterward about the mode of the adjacent. 38. With respect to the first it is to be noted that the thing outside is neither a being through another, nor a being in another, but it has the mode of standing by itself or of having been fixed. For speaking according to the reality of the case, nothing has being through another or in another except an accident, which properly means the disposition of a thing. Now from this mode of being is taken the mode of signifying of standing by itself, which makes the substantive noun.

Nam realiter loquendo nulla res habet esse per alterum sive in altero nisi accidens, quod proprie dicitur disposito rei. Ab hoc autem modo essendi acceptus est modus significandi per se stantis qui facit nomen substantivum. Significat enim nomen modum per se stantis. substantivum

per For the substantive noun signifies through the mode of standing by itself. 39. With respect to the second it is to be noted that there is nothing which is adjacent to another or depends upon another besides certain dispositions or accidents of things which do not have being by themselves, but in another, because they have a natural dependence on or inclination to the thing, of which sort are white and black and the like. For accidents of this sort have a certain property or mode of being, namely, the mode of the adjacent, or the mode as being in another. And from such a property or from such a mode of being in the thing is taken the mode of signifying through the mode of the adjacent to another, or <as> being in another,

39. Iuxta secundum notandum quod nulla res est quae alteri adiacet sive ad alteram dependet, praeter quasdam dispositiones sive accidentia rerum quae non habent esse per se, sed in altero, quia habent naturalem dependentiam sive inclinationem ad res, cuiusmodi sunt album et nigrum et similia. Habent enim huiusmodi accidentia talem proprietatem sive modum essendi, scilicet modum adiacentis sive modum ut esse in altero. Et a tali proprietate sive a tali modo essendi in re acceptus est modus significandi per modum adiacentis alteri vel <ut> esse in altero,

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et hic modus significandi est qui facit nomen adiectivum, scilicet modus adiacentis alteri sive modus ut esse in altero. 40. Sed nota quod aliquid esse in altero est duobus modis: vel prout essentialiter habet esse distinctum contra subiectum, et sic est nomen abstractum ut albedo. Et omne tale secundum grammaticum est nomen substantivum et secundum loycum huiusmodi ponuntur in genere. Et nota quod abstrahere nihil aliud est quam aliquid contra alterum distinctim accipere. 41. Alio modo potest aliquid esse in altero, non ut essentialiter contra ipsum distinctum est, sed prout accidentaliter facit unum cum subiecto, et hoc modo est concretum sive adiectivum secundum grammaticum. 42. Incidenter nota quod duplex est concretum: quoddam est quod essentialiter concernit sua supposita ut homo, equus et similia.

and this mode of signifying makes the adjectival noun, namely, the mode of the adjacent to another, or the mode as being in another. 40. But note that something <can> 100 be in another in two ways: either according as it essentially has being distinct from the subject, and thus there is the abstract noun like whiteness. And every such thing according to the grammarian is a substantive noun, and according to the logician such (names) are placed in a genus. And note that to abstract is nothing other than to take something distinctly from another. 41. In another way something can be in another not as essentially distinct from it, but according as it accidentally makes one thing with the subject, and in this way there is the concrete or adjective according to the grammarian. 42. In passing note that the concrete is twofold: there is a certain one which relates to its supposits essentially, like man, horse, and the like.

Homo enim hoc modo concretionis concernit For man in this mode of concretion relates to omnia sua supposita ut Socratem, Platonem et its supposits like Socrates, Plato, and the cetera. rest. Et generaliter omne superius concernit inferius hoc modo concretionis. Quod autem talia concreta sint, patet; nam bene dicitur Socrates est homo, Plato est homo, sed non bene dicitur Socrates est humanitas. And generally every superior relates to its inferiors in this mode of concretion. But that such things are concrete is clear: for it is well said (that) Socrates is a man, or Plato is a man, but it is not well said (that) Socrates is humanity.

Unde talia concreta semper habent poni in And so such concrete things must be placed in a genere, quia huiusmodi concreta non respiciunt genus because concrete things of this sort do not nisi res sui generis. regard anything except their own genus. 43. Aliud est concretum, quod accidentaliter respicit suum subiectum vel quod semper respicit res alterius generis, ut album, niger et generaliter omnia accidentia concreta. 43. The other is the concrete thing which regards its subject accidentally, or which always regards a thing belonging to another genus, like white, black, and generally all the concrete accidents.

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Reading potest aliquid esse, which is how the text expresses the second way of esse in in n. 41 below.

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Primus modus concretionis nihil differt a nomine substantivo secundum grammaticum. Et secundus modus concretionis est idem cum nomine adiectivo.

According to the grammarian, the first mode of concretion in no way differs from the substantive noun. And the second mode of concretion is the same as the adjectival noun.

44. Unde ista nomina pater, magister, dominus 44. And so these names father, teacher, et similia adiectiva sunt sive concreta, quia lord and the like are adjectives 101 or concrete accidentaliter faciunt unum cum subiecto things because they accidentally make one thing with their subject, et habent se per modum adiacentis alteri respectu subiecti determinati sexus. Patet ergo quod nomen substantivum significat per modum per se stantis; nomen vero adiectivum per modum adiacentis sive per modum concretionis quod idem est. Nam concretum et adiectivum idem sunt, et substantivum et abstractum idem sunt. Patet etiam cum hoc quod modi significandi nominis substantivi et adiectivi modo significandi essentiali generali nominis non repugnant, quia nomen substantivum significat per modum per se stantis ut ipsum est per se quiescens, nomen vero adiectivum significat per modum adiacentis ut ipsum est quiescens in altero et ita utrumque significat per modum quietis. and they have themselves through the mode of the adjacent to another with respect to a subject of determinate gender. It is clear, then, that the substantive noun signifies through the mode of standing by itself; but the adjectival noun through the mode of the adjacent, or through the mode of concretion, which amounts to the same thing. For the concrete and the adjective are the same thing, and the substantive and the abstract are the same thing. It is also clear that the modes of signifying of the substantive noun and of the adjective are not repugnant to the general essential mode of signifying of the noun because the substantive noun signifies through the mode of standing by itself as it is resting by itself, but the adjectival noun signifies through the mode of the adjacent as it is resting in another, and so both signify through the mode of rest.

14. Thomas of Erfurt on the nomen adjectivum as signifying through the mode of inhering in another according to being. Cf. Thomas of Erfurt, De Modis Significandi, sive Grammatica Speculativa (ante 1310), cap. x (tr. B.A.M.):
CAPUT X De modis significandi subalternis minus generalibus Nominis communis. [6. Modus adjacentis unde sumatur.] Modus significandi per modum adjacentis sumi101

CHAPTER X On the less general subalternate mode of signifying of the common Noun. [6. Whence the mode of the adjacent is taken.] The mode of signifying through the mode of the

For the character of such names according to St. Thomas, see on relatives further below.

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tur a proprietate rei, quae est proprietas alteri adhaerentis secundum esse. Sicut enim modus generalissimus Verbi sumitur a proprietate ipsius esse absolute, ut postea patebit, sic modus adjacentis in [N]omine sumitur a proprietate ipsius esse, inhaerentis alteri secundum esse: et hic modus constituit Nomen adjectivum. Nomen ergo adjectivum significat per modum inhaerentis alteri secundum esse, ut Albus, lapideus, etc. [7. Instantia.] Et si instetur, nomina differentiarum in genere substantiae, sicut corporeum, et animatum, sensible, rationale, adjectiva quidem sunt, congrue enim substantivis adjunguntur, dicendo corpus animatum, animale rationale, et tamen non significant per modum inhaerentis alteri secundum esse; quia significant substantiam, quae secundum esse alteri non inhaerent. [8. Solutio.] Dicendum, quod hujusmodi nomina sunt substantiva, quia significant substantiam, et probatur; nam idem significat rationale quod homo: et animatum quod animal, et cum dicitur quod congrue cum substantivis conjunguntur, dicendo animale rationale, corpus animatum; dicendum quod ibi est constructio appositoria, et est incongrua de se, tamen per appositionem admissitiva, hoc est, propter specificationem specificandam.

adjacent is taken from the property of a thing which is the property of adhering to another according to being. For just as the most general mode of the Verb is taken from its property of being absolutely, as will be shown hereafter, so the mode of the adjacent in the Noun is taken from its property of being, of inhering in another according to being: and this mode constitutes the adjectival Noun. Therefore the adjectival Noun signifies through the mode of inhering in another according to being, like White, stoney, etc. [7. Objection.] And if it be objected that names of the differences in the genus of substance, like bodily, and animate, sensible, rational, are in fact adjectives, for they fittingly are joined to substantives, as when one says animate body, rational animal, still they do not signify through the mode of inhering in another according to being because they signify substance, which does not inhere in another according to being. [8. Solution.] It must be said that nouns of this sort are substantives because they signify substance, and it is proved; for rational signifies the same thing as man, and animate as animal, and when it is said that they are fittingly joined to substantives when one says rational animal, animate body, it must be said that there one has an appository construction, and of itself it is ungrammatical, still it is admissible through apposition; that is, because the specification is to be specified.

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15. On Thomas of Erfurts account of the adjectival name. Unless properly qualified, to say, as Thomas the Modist does, that rational signifies the same thing as man, is seriously misleading. 102 Rational does not signify the same thing as manat least not tout courtsince the latters definition includes rational as its species-making difference, so that that words signification is only a part and not the whole of the definition of man. In sum, one must see that rational signifies a property of man, which is used as the differentia in mans definition, and hence signifies only a part of his substance, whereas man signifies the genus animal in addition to the difference rational, and hence signifies the whole substance. Further, such names do signify in the manner of an accidentthat is, as inhering: As with other adjectival names, while signifying the subject, they do so ex consequenti, and through the mode of inhering: white, for instance, signifies a thing having whiteness. Similar criticisms could be directed at the other examples Thomas cites. Consequently, by calling them substantives and accounting for them by bringing in apposition, Thomas is very wide of the mark and so must be corrected. Further, his statement that they do not signify through the mode of inhering in another according to being betrays a stunning lack of understanding of the independence a mode of signifying may have from the mode of its thing, as with an accident signified in the manner of a substance, thereby vitiating his entire argument. 16. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas on relative names: That some relatives are imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes themselves, and these are called relativa secundum esse; but some are imposed in order to signify the things which certain habitudes follow upon, and these are called relativa secundum dici. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 30, q. 1, art. 2, c. (tr, B.A.M.):
DS30QU1 AR2- CO aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen dominus, et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse, et alia dicta de deo, sunt quidem relativa, quia etiam significant ex primo suo intellectu habitudinem quae secundum rationem est in deo; sed ex consequenti faciunt intellectum essentiae, secundum quod talis habitudo fundatur in aliquo essentiali. aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo, sicut hoc nomen scientia, qualitatem, quam consequitur respectus quidam ad scibile. For sometimes a name is imposed in order to signify the relationship itself, just as the name Lord, and the like, which are relatives secundum esse [according to being], and other things said of God which are in fact relatives, since they also signify from their first understanding a relationship which is in God according to reason but subsequently produce an understanding of the essence according as such a relationship is founded on something essential. But sometimes a name is imposed in order to signify that upon which a relationship is founded, just as the name knowledge, a quality upon which follows a certain respect to a knowable thing.

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Cf. St. Thomas on the way in which the genus and difference are taken from the matter and form.

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unde ista talia non sunt relativa secundum esse; sed solum secundum dici. unde ista principaliter dant intelligere rem alterius praedicamenti, et ex consequenti important relationem. ita etiam in divinis; ut patet in hoc nomine creator, quod imponitur ad significandum divinam actionem, quae est ipsius essentiae, quam consequitur habitudo quaedam ad creaturam: et ista principaliter essentiam significant, et ex consequenti important respectum ad creaturam.

And so these sorts of things are not relatives secundum esse [according to being], but only secundum dici [according to being said]. And so these principally give us to understand a thing belonging to another predicament [category], and subsequently imply a relation. So also in the divine, as is clear in the name Creator, which is imposed in order to signify the divine action, which belongs to the essence, upon which follows a certain relationship to the creature. And these things principally signify the essence, and subsequently imply a respect to the creature.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 13, art. 7, obj. 1, ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU13 AR7 AG1 ad septimum sic proceditur. videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad creaturas, non dicantur de deo ex tempore. omnia enim huiusmodi nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. unde et ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis, quae est divina substantia, et creator significat dei actionem, quae est eius essentia. sed divina substantia non est temporalis, sed aeterna. ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de deo ex tempore, sed ab aeterno. QU13 AR7 RA1 ad primum ergo dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. quaedam vero sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam habitudines, sicut To the first, then, it must be said that certain relatives are imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes [or relationships] themselves, like Lord, servant, father, and son, and the like, and these are called relatives secundum esse [according to being]. But some are imposed in order to signify the things upon which certain habitudes [or To the seventh one proceeds as follows. It seems that names which imply a relation to creatures are not said of God from time [or temporally]. For every name of this sort signifies the divine substance, as is commonly said. And for this reason Ambrose says that the name Lord is the name of a power, which is the divine substance, and Creator signifies the action of God, which is His essence. But the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore, names of this sort are not said of God from time, but from eternity.

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movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia relationships] follow, like mover and the huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum thing moved, head and the thing having the dici. head, and others of the sort, which are called relatives secundum dici [according to being said]. sic igitur et circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. In this way, then, this difference is also to be taken into consideration in the case of the divine names.

nam quaedam significant ipsam habitudinem ad For certain ones signify the very relationship to creaturam, ut dominus. the creature, like Lord. et huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. quaedam vero significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant actionem dei, quae est eius essentia. utraque tamen nomina ex tempore de deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte. And names of this sort do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, insofar as they presuppose it, just as lordship presupposes power, which is the divine substance. But some signify the divine essence directly, and imply the relationship subsequently, just as Savior, Creator, and the like, signify the action of God, which is His essence. Still, both names are said of God from time [ or temporally] with respect to the relationship which they imply, whether principally or subsequently, but not with respect to the fact that they signify the essence, whether directly or indirectly.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Potentia, q. 27, art. 1, ad 11 (tr. B.A.M.):
QU7AR10RA11 ad undecimum dicendum, quod distinctio ista relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis. quaedam enim sunt relativa secundum esse quae non sunt realia, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna; et quaedam sunt relativa secundum dici, quae tamen important relationes reales, sicut patet de scientia et sensu. To the eleventh it must be said that this distinction between relatives secundum esse and secundum dici has nothing to do with what is a real relation. For some things are relatives secundum esse which are not real, like right and left in a column; and some are relatives secundum dici which nevertheless imply real relations, as is clear in knowledge and sensation.

dicuntur enim relativa secundum esse, quando For they are called relatives secundum esse nomina sunt imposita ad significandas ipsas when the names are imposed in order to signify relationes; the relations themselves;

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relativa vero secundum dici, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates vel aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen consequuntur relationes. nec quantum ad hoc differt, utrum sint relationes reales vel rationis tantum.

but relatives secundum dici when the names are imposed in order to signify qualities or principally something of the sort which relations follow upon. Nor do they differ according to whether they are real relations or [relations] of reason only.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp de Veritate, q. 21, art. 6, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
QU21AR6 CO responsio. dicendum, quod ratio boni in tribus praedictis consistit, secundum quod augustinus dicit. ad huius autem evidentiam sciendum est, quod aliquod nomen potest respectum importare dupliciter. In reply it must be said that the account of the good consists in the three things mentioned [namely, species, mode, and order], as Augustine says. To see that this is so, it must be understood that some name may imply a respect in two ways.

uno modo sic quod nomen imponatur ad In one way such that the name is imposed in significandum ipsum respectum, sicut hoc order to signify the respect itself, as does the nomen pater, vel filius, aut paternitas ipsa. name father, or son, or fatherhood itself. quaedam vero nomina dicuntur importare respectum, quia significant rem alicuius generis, quam comitatur respectus, quamvis nomen non sit impositum ad ipsum respectum significandum; sicut hoc nomen scientia est impositum ad significandum qualitatem quamdam, quam sequitur quidam respectus, non autem ad significandum respectum ipsum. et per hunc modum ratio boni respectum implicat: non quia ipsum nomen boni significet ipsum respectum solum, sed quia significat id ad quod sequitur respectus, cum respectu ipso. But some names are said to imply a respect because they signify a thing belonging to some genus upon which a respect follows, albeit the name is not imposed in order to signify the respect itself, just as the name knowledge has been imposed in order to signify a certain quality upon which a certain respect follows, but not in order to signify the respect itself. And in this way the account of the good implies a respect: not because the very name of good signifies the respect itself alone, but because it signifies that upon which a respect follows, together with the respect itself.

17. Relative names in sum. names relativa secundum esse are imposed in order to signify the relative habitudes themselves, like Lord, servant, father, and son, which sort do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, insofar as they presuppose it, just as lordship presupposes power, which is the divine substance names relativa secundum dici are imposed in order to signify that upon which a relationship is founded, just as the name knowledge, a quality upon which follows a certain respect to a knowable thing; hence some signify the divine essence directly, and imply the relationship subsequently, just as Savior, Creator... 79

IV. ON SIGNIFICATION IN RELATION TO SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT. 1. That accident is said in two ways. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Veritate, q. 3, art. 7, ad 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
Accident can be taken in two ways. In one way in the abstract; and thus it is considered according to its proper notion; 103 for thus we assign genus and species to accidents; and in this way the subject is not placed in the definition of an accident as genus, but as difference, as when it is said, Snubness is a curvature of the nose . In another way they can be taken in the concrete; and thus they are taken according as they are one per accidens with a subject; whence in this way genus and species are not assigned to them, and so it is true that the subject is placed in the definition of an accident as its genus. 104 [I.e. Snub is a curved nose.]

In sum: accident taken in the abstract: snubness (the subject is placed in its definition as a difference) taken in the concrete: snub (the subject is placed in its definition as its genus) Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Physic., lect. 1, n. 2 (tr. Richard J. Blackwell et. al.):
2. It must be understood, therefore, that there are some things whose existence depends upon matter, and which cannot be defined without matter. Further there are other things which, even though they cannot exist except in sensible matter, have no sensible matter in their definitions. And these differ from each other as the curved differs from the snub. For the snub exists in sensible matter, and it is necessary that sensible matter fall in its definition, for the snub is a curved nose. And the same is true of all natural things, such as man and stone. But sensible matter does not fall in the definition of the curved, even though the curved cannot exist except in sensible matter. And this is true of all the mathematicals, such as numbers, magnitudes and figures. Then, there are still other things which do not depend upon matter either according to their existence or according to their definitions. And this is either because they never exist in matter, such as God and the other separated substances, or because they do not universally exist in matter, such as substance, potency and act, and being itself.105

103

For the being of an accident is to be in ( nam accidentis esse est inesse. ) (St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 10, tr. B.A.M.). 104 accidens dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subiectum non ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: Simitas est curvitas nasi. Alio modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subiecto; unde sic non assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus. 105 sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia, nec sine materia definiri possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione materia sensibilis non cadit. et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum et simum. nam simum est in materia sensibili, et necesse est quod in eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis, est enim simum nasus curvus; et talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis: curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et figurae. quaedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel quia nunquam sunt in materia, ut deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens.

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 53, art. 2 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for whiteness is that whereby a thing is white. Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that simitas [snubness] is a curvature of the nose. But if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for a white thing is something that has whiteness. Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a simum is a snub-nose. [i.e. Snub is a curved nose] Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained (Q[52], A[2]). 106

Cf. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), Book VII, lect. 11, n. 1532:
1532. For the substance, of which matter is not a part, is the specifying principle, i.e., the form, which is present in matter; and from this form and matter the whole substance is derived, i.e., made determinate and defined ; for example, concavity is a form of this kind, for from this and from nose snub nose and snubness are derived. And in the same way man and humanity are derived from soul and body. For if nose, which plays the part of matter, were part of curvature, then when curved nose is referred to, the term nose would be expressed twice; for it is expressed once by its own name, and it is included again in the definition of the curved. However, this would be the case if nose were placed in the definition of the curved as part of the essence of curvature, and not by addition, as was stated above (624:C 1472). And even though matter is not present in the essence of form, it is nevertheless present in the whole composite substance; for example, curvature is present in snub nose, and individual matter is also present in Callias.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotles De Anima translated by Kenelm Foster, O.P. & Sylvester Humphries, O.P. (New Haven, 1951), Bk. II, lect. 1, n. 3:
106

ad tertium dicendum quod, quocumque modo significetur accidens, habet dependentiam ad subiectum secundum suam rationem, aliter tamen et aliter. nam accidens significatum in abstracto, importat habitudinem ad subiectum quae incipit ab accidente, et terminatur ad subiectum, nam albedo dicitur qua aliquid est album. et ideo in definitione accidentis abstracti non ponitur subiectum quasi prima pars definitionis, quae est genus; sed quasi secunda, quae est differentia; dicimus enim quod simitas est curvitas nasi. sed in concretis incipit habitudo a subiecto, et terminatur ad accidens, dicitur enim album quod habet albedinem. propter quod in definitione huiusmodi accidentis ponitur subiectum tanquam genus, quod est prima pars definitionis, dicimus enim quod simum est nasus curvus. sic igitur id quod convenit accidentibus ex parte subiecti, non autem ex ipsa ratione accidentis, non attribuitur accidenti in abstracto, sed in concreto. et huiusmodi est intensio et remissio in quibusdam accidentibus, unde albedo non dicitur magis et minus, sed album. et eadem ratio est in habitibus et aliis qualitatibus, nisi quod quidam habitus augentur vel diminuuntur per quandam additionem, ut ex supradictis patet.

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213. It should be noted here that, according to the teaching of Book VII of the Metaphysics, there is this difference between defining substance and defining accidents that in the former case nothing extrinsic is included: every substance is defined in terms merely of its material and formal principles; but in the latter case something extrinsic to the thing defined is referred to, i.e. the subject of the accidents in questionas when one defines snubness as curvature of the nose. The reason is that a definition must express what a thing is, and while substance is something complete in its being and kind, accidents have being only in relation to a substance. In the same way no form as such is complete in kind; completeness in this sense belongs only to the substance composed of form and matter; so that the latters definition is complete without reference to anything else, whilst that of the form has to include a reference to its proper subject which is matter. Hence, if the soul is a form its definition will not be complete without reference to its subject or matter.107

Cf. Aristotle: On Interpretation. Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan . Translated from the Latin with an Introduction by Jean T. Oesterle. Milwaukee, 1962, lect. 4, n. 5:
5. It should be noted, however, that while it is true that artificial things are in the genus of substance on the part of matter, they are in the genus of accident on the part of form, since the forms of artificial things are accidents. A name, therefore, signifies an accidental form made concrete in a subject. Now the subject must be posited in the definition of every accident; hence, when names signify an accident in the abstract the accident has to be posited directly (i.e., in the nominative case) as a quasi-genus in their definition and the subject posited obliquely (i.e., in an oblique case such as the genitive, dative, or accusative) as a quasi-difference; as for example, when we define snubness as curvedness of the nose. But when names signify an accident in the concrete, the matter or subject has to be posited in their definition as a quasi-genus and the accident as a quasidifference, as when we say that a snub nose is a curved nose. Accordingly, if the names of artificial things signify accidental forms as made concrete in natural subjects, then it is more appropriate to posit the natural thing in their definition as a quasi-genus. We would say, therefore, that a salver is shaped wood, and likewise, that a name is a significant vocal sound. It would be another matter if names of artificial things were taken as signifying artificial forms in the abstract.108
107

sciendum autem est, quod sicut docet philosophus in septimo metaphysicae, haec est differentia inter definitionem substantiae et accidentis, quod in definitione substantiae nihil ponitur quod sit extra substantiam definiti: definitur enim unaquaeque substantia per sua principia materialia vel formalia. in definitione autem accidentis ponitur aliquid quod est extra essentiam definiti, scilicet subiectum; oportet enim subiectum poni in definitione accidentis. sicut cum dicitur simitas est curvitas nasi. et hoc ideo est, quia definitio significat quod quid est res; substantia autem est quid completum in suo esse et in sua specie; accidens autem non habet esse completum, sed dependens a substantia. similiter etiam nulla forma est quid completum in specie, sed complementum speciei competit substantiae compositae. unde substantia composita sic definitur, quod in eius definitione non ponitur aliquid quod sit extra essentiam eius. in omni autem definitione formae ponitur aliquid, quod est extra essentiam formae, scilicet proprium subiectum eius sive materia. unde, cum anima sit forma, oportet quod in definitione eius ponatur materia sive subiectum eius. 108 sed dicendum quod artificialia sunt quidem in genere substantiae ex parte materiae, in genere autem accidentium ex parte formae: nam formae artificialium accidentia sunt. nomen ergo significat formam accidentalem ut concretam subiecto. cum autem in definitione omnium accidentium oporteat poni subiectum, necesse est quod, si qua nomina accidens in abstracto significant quod in eorum definitione ponatur accidens in recto, quasi genus, subiectum autem in obliquo, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simitas est curvitas nasi. si qua vero nomina accidens significant in concreto, in eorum definitione ponitur materia, vel subiectum, quasi genus, et accidens, quasi differentia; ut cum dicitur, simum est nasus curvus. si igitur nomina rerum artificialium significant formas accidentales, ut concretas subiectis naturalibus, convenientius est, ut in eorum definitione ponatur res naturalis quasi genus, ut dicamus quod scutella est lignum figuratum, et similiter quod nomen est vox significativa. secus autem esset, si nomina artificialium acciperentur, quasi significantia ipsas formas artificiales in abstracto. For the difference between abstract and concrete names,

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Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, cap. 7 (In: Aquinas on Being and Essence, tr. Gyula Klima).109
We should know, however, that in the case of accidents, genus, species, and difference are taken in a different manner from the case of substances. For in the case of substances, from the substantial form and matter conjoined in one nature, there results something that is one per se, which properly falls into the category of substance; 77 therefore, in the case of substances, their concrete names, which signify the composite, are properly said to be in this category as species and genera, as are the names man and animal. But matter and form are not in this way in this category, except by reduction, as principles are said to be in a category.110
77

I am following here Roland-Gosselins reading, noted by Boyer in his n. 122, according to which it is the thing that is per se one (and not its nature, as Boyers reading would have it), that properly falls into the category of substance. To be sure, the nature of a substance is also in the category of substance, insofar as it is signified by all substantial predicates of the thing. But those predicates are predicated of the thing, and not of its nature, although they are predicated of the thing on account of its having this nature signified by these predicates. However, from an accident and its subject there does not result something that is one per se, whence they are not conjoined in one nature to which the intention of genus or species could be attributed. Therefore, the concrete names of accidents, such as white [thing] [album] or educated [person] [musicum], do not fall under the categories as species and genera, except by reduction, only insofar as [the species and genera of accidents] are signified by the corresponding abstract names, such as whiteness [ albedo] and education [musica]. And since accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus cannot be taken from their matter and their difference from their form, as is the case with composite substances, but their first genus has to be taken from their mode of existence [modus essendi], insofar as being is predicated in different, primary and secondary, senses in the ten categories, as for example quantity is said to be [a being] insofar as it is a measure of substance [i.e., of what is a being in the primary sense], and quality [is said to be a being] insofar as it is a disposition of substance, and so on, as the Philosopher explained in Book 4 of the Metaphysics.78
78

Aristotle, Metaph., 4, c. 2, 1002b57; Commentary of St. Thomas, lc. 1. Cf. also In Meta., Bk. 5, lc. 9. Their differences, on the other hand, are taken from the diversity of the principles causing them. And since its proper attributes are caused by the proper principles of the subject, in the definition of an accident defined in the abstract form (in the form in which it is properly in a category), in the place of the difference one has to include its subject, as for example, pugness is defined as the curvature of a nose. But it would have to be the other way around if it were defined in the concrete form. For in that case their subject is included in their definition as their genus; since then they would be defined similarly

see further below. 109 (www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/Blackwell-proofs/MP_C30.pdf [2/28/08]). 110 sciendum est etiam quod in accidentibus alio modo sumitur genus, differentia et species quam in substantiis. quia enim in substantiis ex forma substantiali et materia efficitur per se unum una quadam natura ex earum coniunctione resultante, quae proprie in praedicamento substantiae collocatur, ideo in substantiis nomina concreta, quae compositum significant, proprie in genere esse dicuntur sicut species vel genera, ut homo vel animal. non autem forma vel materia est hoc modo in praedicamento nisi per reductionem, sicut principia in genere esse dicuntur.

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to material substances, in the case of which the nature of the genus is taken from their matter, as we say that a pug is a curved nose.111

2. On the manner in which accidents exist and are signified. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Qu. Disp. de Pot., q. 8. art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that, having supposed that relations exist in the divine, it is necessary to say that they are the divine essence, otherwise one would have to hold that there is composition in God, and that relations in the divine are accidents, because everything inhering in something beyond its substance is an accident . It would also be necessary that some things be eternal which will not be the divine substance, all of which are heretical. 112 Accordingly, to see that this is so, it must be understood that among the nine genera which are contained under accident, some are signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident: for the ratio of an accident is to be in; and so I maintain that those things are signified in the manner of an accident which are signified as inherent in another , like quantity and quality; for quantity is signified as belonging to that in which it is, and likewise quality. But toward something [ad aliquid] is not signified in accordance with the ratio of an accident: for it is not signified as something of [= belonging to] that in which it is, but as to that which is outside. And on this account the Philosopher also says that knowledge, insofar as it is a relation, is not of the knower, but of the knowable. 113 And so some men, paying attention to the mode of signifying in relatives, have said they do not inhere in substances, as, so to speak, being attached to them [ eis assistentia]: because they are signified as a sort of intermediate between the substance which refers, and that to which it refers. And from this it would follow that in created things relations are not accidents, because the being of an accident is to be in . And so certain theologians, for instance, the followers of Porretanus, have extended an opinion of this sort even to the divine

111

sed ex accidente et subiecto non fit unum per se. unde non resultat ex eorum coniunctione aliqua natura, cui intentio generis vel speciei possit attribui. unde nomina accidentalia concretive dicta non ponuntur in praedicamento sicut species vel genera, ut album vel musicum, nisi per reductionem, sed solum secundum quod in abstracto significantur, ut albedo et musica. et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum philosophum ix metaphysicae. differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. et quia propriae passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. sed e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur. sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum, in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus. 112 respondeo. dicendum quod, supposito quod relationes in divinis sint, de necessitate oportet dicere quod sint essentia divina: alias oporteret ponere compositionem in deo, et quod relationes in divinis essent accidentia, quia omnis res inhaerens alicui praeter suam substantiam est accidens. oporteret etiam quod aliqua res esset aeterna, quae non erit substantia divina; quae omnia sunt haeretica. 113 ad huius ergo evidentiam sciendum est, quod inter novem genera quae continentur sub accidente, quaedam significantur secundum rationem accidentis: ratio enim accidentis est inesse; et ideo illa dico significari per modum accidentis quae significantur ut inhaerentia alteri, sicut quantitas et qualitas; quantitas enim significatur ut alicuius in quo est, et similiter qualitas. ad aliquid vero non significatur secundum rationem accidentis: non enim significatur ut aliquid eius in quo est, sed ut ad id quod extra est. et propter hoc etiam dicit philosophus, quod scientia, in quantum est relatio, non est scientis, sed scibilis.

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relations, saying that the relations are not in the Persons, but are, so to speak, attached to them [eis quasi assistere].114 And because the divine essence is in the Persons, it would follow that relations are not the divine essence; and because every accident inheres, it would follow that they would not be accidents. And they understood in accordance with this the words adduced from Augustine, namely, that relations are not predicated of God with regard to substance, nor with regard to accident. But upon this opinion it follows that relation is not some thing, but only according to reason: for everything is either a substance or an accident . Wherefore some of the ancients also held that relations are of second things understood [ esse de secundis intellectis], as the Commentator says in the eleventh book of the Metaphysics. And so it was also necessary for the followers of Porretanus to say that the divine relations do not exist except according to reason. And thus it would follow that the distinction of Persons will not be real, which is heretical.115 And so it must be said that nothing prevents something from being inhering, although it is not signified as inhering , as even action is not signified as in the agent, but as from the agent, and yet it is undeniable that action is in the agent. And likewise, although something is not signified as inhering, still it is necessary that it be inhering. And this is when the relation is some thing; but when it is merely according to reason, in that case it is not inhering. And just as there must be accidents in created things, so there must be substance in God, because whatever is in God is His substance. And so relations with regard to the thing [= in reality] must be the divine substance, which, nevertheless, do not have the manner of a substance, but have another manner of predicating from those things which are predicated in God.116

3. Supplement: Metaphysics VII. 5: Text and Commentary. Cf. Commentary on Aristotles Metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas (translated by John P. Rowan. Chicago, 1961 [slightly rev. B.A.M.]):
Chapter 5

114

unde quidam attendentes modum significandi in relativis, dixerunt, ea non esse inhaerentia substantiis, scilicet quasi eis assistentia: quia significantur ad quoddam medium inter substantiam quae refertur, et id ad quod refertur. et ex hoc sequebatur quod in rebus creatis relationes non sunt accidentia, quia accidentis esse est inesse. unde etiam quidam theologi, scilicet porretani, huiusmodi opinionem usque ad divinam relationem extenderunt, dicentes, relationes non esse in personis, sed eis quasi assistere. 115 et quia essentia divina est in personis, sequebatur quod relationes non sunt essentia divina; et quia omne accidens inhaeret, sequebatur quod non essent accidentia. et secundum hoc solvebant verbum augustini inductum, quod scilicet relationes non praedicantur de deo secundum substantiam, nec secundum accidens. sed ad hanc opinionem sequitur quod relatio non sit res aliqua, sed solum secundum rationem: omnis enim res vel est substantia vel accidens. unde etiam quidam antiqui posuerunt relationes esse de secundis intellectis, ut commentator dicit xi metaph.. et ideo oportet hoc etiam porretanos dicere, quod relationes divinae non sunt nisi secundum rationem. et sic sequetur quod distinctio personarum non erit realis; quod est haereticum. 116 unde dicendum est, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse inhaerens, quod tamen non significatur ut inhaerens, sicut etiam actio non significatur ut in agente, sed ut ab agente, et tamen constat actionem esse in agente. et similiter, licet ad aliquid non significetur ut inhaerens, tamen oportet ut sit inhaerens. et hoc quando relatio est res aliqua; quando vero est secundum rationem tantum, tunc non est inhaerens. et sicut in rebus creatis oportet quod sit accidens, ita oportet quod sit in deo substantia, quia quidquid est in deo, est eius substantia. oportet ergo relationes secundum rem, esse divinam substantiam; quae tamen non habent modum substantiae, sed habent alium modum praedicandi ab his quae substantialiter praedicantur in deo.

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585. Now if one denies that a logos which involves the addition of something else is a definition, the problem arises how there can be a definition of things which are not simple but compound; for this must come about by way of addition. I mean, for example, that there is nose and concavity and snubness, which is a word compounded of the two, because the one is found in the other; and neither concavity nor snubness is an accidental attribute of nose, but an essential one. Nor do they belong to nose as white belongs to Callias or to man (because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as male belongs to animal and equal to quantity, and as all those attributes which are said to belong to something else essentially. Now these attributes are those in which is found either the logos or name of the subject to which each one belongs, and which cannot be explained apart from it; for example, it is impossible to explain white apart from man, but not female apart from animal. Hence there is either no essence and definition of any of these things, or if there is, it is in the way we have described (582-84). 586. And there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose and concave nose are the same, snub and concave will be the same; but if they are not, then, since it is impossible to use the word snub without the thing of which it is a proper attribute (because snub is concavity in a nose), either it is impossible to speak of a snub nose, or the same term is used twicea concave nose nose. For a snub nose will be a concave nose nose. Hence it is absurd that such things should have an essence. And if they have, there will be an infinite regression; because some other nose will be found in the nose of snub-nose. It is clear, then, that there is definition of substance alone; for if the other categories also had a definition, this would have to be a result of adding something, just as there is no definition of equal and odd without number or of female without animal. And by adding something I mean those expressions in which the same thing happens to be said twice. And if this is true, there will not be any definition of those things which are compounded, for example, odd number. 587. But this is hidden from us, because the logos of these things are not expressed exactly. But if these things also have formulae, either they have such in a different wayor, as we have said (582-84), definition and essence must be used in many senses. Hence in one sense there will be no definition of anything, and definition and essence will be found only in substance; and in another sense the other things will have a definition and essence. It is evident, then, that a definition is a logos of the essence of a thing, and that essence belongs to substances either alone, or chiefly, primarily, and without qualification. COMMENTARY 1331. Here he gives the second solution to the question which was raised; and in regard to this he does three things. First (582:C 1331), he gives the solution. Second (584:C 1339), he proves it (Now it is evident). Third (585:C 1342), he dispels certain difficulties which could arise from the previous discussion (Now if one denies). He accordingly says, first (582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution (581:C 1325) that there is no definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to another solution it is necessary to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies each of the other categories, such as quantity, quality and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other categories, although not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, in a similar fashion whatness belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, but in another sense to the other categories, i.e., in a qualified sense. 117
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hic ponit secundam solutionem propositae quaestionis: et circa hoc tria facit. primo ponit solutionem. secundo probat eam, ibi, illud autem palam, etc.. tertio removet quasdam dubitationes, quae possent ex praedictis oriri, ibi, habet autem dubitationem. circa primum duo facit. primo ostendit quomodo definitio et

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1332. For the fact that it belongs to the others in another sense, i.e., in a qualified sense, is clear from the fact that in each of the other categories some reply may be made to the question What is it? For we ask of what sort a thing is, or what its quality is, as What is whiteness? And we answer, Color. Hence it is evident that quality is one of the many things in which whatness is found.118 1333. However, quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense but the whatness of quality. For when I ask what man is, and one answers Animal, the term animal, since it belongs in the genus of substance, not only designates what man is, but also designates a what, i.e., a substance, in an unqualified sense. But when one asks what whiteness is, and someone answers, Color, this word, even though it signifies what whiteness is, does not signify what something is in an unqualified sense, but of what sort it is. Hence quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but with some qualification. For this kind of whatness is found in quality, as when we say that color is the whatness of whiteness; and this kind of whatness is substantial rather than substance. 119 1334. For by reason of the fact that all the other categories get the notion of being from substance, the mode of being of substance, i.e., being a what, is therefore participated in by all the other categories according to a certain proportional likeness; for example, we say that, just as animal is the whatness of man, in a similar fashion color is the whatness of whiteness, and number the whatness of double; and in this way we say that quality has whatness, not whatness in an unqualified sense, but a whatness of this particular kind; just as some say, for example, in speaking of non-being from a logical point of view, that non-being is, not because non-being is in an unqualified sense, but because non-being is non-being. And in a similar way quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of quality.120 1335. Therefore it is also (583). He now shows that whatness and definition are predicated of the nature found in substance and in accidents. He says that, since definition and whatness are found in some way both in
quod quid est invenitur in substantia et accidentibus. secundo quomodo de utrisque praedicetur, ibi, oportet quidem igitur intendere. dicit ergo primo, quod dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non sit accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est. ipsum enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. alio modo significat singula aliorum praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia huiusmodi talia. sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, aliis autem alio modo, idest secundum quid. 118 quod enim aliquo modo, idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in singulis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum, in quibus est quod quid est. 119 non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis. cum enim quaero quid est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam. sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid. invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia. 120 propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter, sed quia non ens est non ens. et simpliciter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.

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substance and in accidents, therefore one must try to consider how we should predicate it, i.e., predicate the definition, of each thing, yet no more than its condition warrants; so that, namely, we do not say that those predicates are applied univocally which do not have one essential character in reality.121 1336. And for this reason the things which have been said about definition and whatness in regard to substance and accidents is clear, namely, that whatness will belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substance, and secondarily to the other categories, not, of course, so as to be whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of this or that particular category, namely, of quantity or quality. For it is evident that definition and whatness must be predicated of substance and accidents either equivocally or by adding or removing something to a greater or lesser degree; or in a primary or secondary way, as being is predicated of substance and accident, and as we say that the unknowable is known in a qualified sense, i.e., secondarily, because so far as the unknowable is concerned we can know that it is not an object of knowledge; and thus we can also say of non-being that it is not.122 1337. For the truth is that whatness and definition are not predicated of substance and accidents either equivocally or unqualifiedly and according to the same meaning, i.e., univocally, but as the term medical is predicated of different particulars in reference to one and the same thing, although it does not signify one and the same thing in the case of all the things of which it is predicated; nor is it also predicated equivocally. For, a body is said to be medical because it is the subject of the art of medicine, and an activity is said to be medical because it is performed by the art of medicine, as purging; and an instrument, such as a syringe, is said to be medical because it is used by the art of medicine. Thus it is clear that the term medical is not used in a purely equivocal sense of these three things, since equivocal things have no relationship to some one thing. Nor again it is used univocally according to the same meaning, for the term medical is not predicated in the same sense of one who uses the art of medicine and of something that assists the art of medicine to produce its effect, but it is predicated analogically in reference to one thing, namely, to the art of medicine. And similarly whatness and definition are not predicated of substance and accident either equivocally or univocally, but in reference to one thing. For they are predicated of an accident in relation to substance, as has been explained. 123
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deinde cum dicit oportet igitur. ostendit quomodo quod quid est et definitio praedicetur de eo quod invenitur in substantiis et accidentibus; et dicit, quod ex quo definitio et quod quid est invenitur aliquo modo in accidentibus et in substantia, oportet igitur intendere ad considerandum quomodo oportet dicere, idest praedicare definitionem circa singula; non tamen magis quam quomodo se habent; ut videlicet, non ea dicamus univoce praedicari quorum non est una ratio in essendo. 122 quapropter id quod dictum est de definitione et quod quid est in substantia et accidentibus, est manifestum: scilicet quod quod quid erat esse primo et simpliciter inest substantiae, et consequenter aliis: non quidem ita quod in aliis sit simpliciter quod quid erat esse, sed quod quid erat esse huic vel illi, scilicet quantitati vel qualitati. manifestum est enim quod oportet definitionem et quod quid est vel aequivoce praedicari in substantia et accidentibus, vel addentes et auferentes secundum magis et minus, sive secundum prius et posterius, ut ens dicitur de substantia et accidente. et sicut dicimus, quod non scibile est scibile secundum quid, idest per posterius, quia de non scibili hoc scire possumus quod non scitur; sic et de non ente hoc dicere possumus, quia non est. 123 non enim est rectum quod quod quid est et definitio dicatur de substantia et de accidentibus, neque aequivoce, neque simpliciter et eodem modo, idest univoce. sed sicut medicabile dicitur de diversis particularibus per respectum ad unum et idem, non tamen significat unum et idem de omnibus de quibus dicitur, nec etiam dicitur aequivoce. dicitur enim corpus medicabile, quia est subiectum medicinae; et opus medicabile, quia exercetur a medicina, ut purgatio et vas medicinale, quia eo utitur medicina, ut clystere. et sic patet quod non dicitur omnino aequivoce medicinale de his tribus, cum in aequivocis non habeatur respectus ad aliquod unum. nec iterum univoce dicitur secundum unam rationem. non enim est eadem ratio secundum quam dicitur medicinale id quo utitur medicina, et quod facit medicinam. sed dicitur analogice per respectum ad unum, scilicet ad medicinam. et similiter quod quid est et definitio, non dicitur nec

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1338. And since he had given two solutions, he adds that it makes no difference as to the way in which one wishes to answer the above question, i.e., whether one says that accidents do not have a definition, or that they have one in a secondary and qualified sense. However, the statement made in the first solution, to the effect that accidents do not have a definition, is to be understood in a primary and unqualified sense. 124 1339. Now it is evident (584). Second he proves the solution which was given. He says that it is evident that definition and essence belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substances, yet not to substances alone since in a sense accidents also have a definition and essence, though not in the first way. This is made clear as follows: not every logos by which a word is explained is the same as a definition, nor is the word explained by each logos always something defined; but it is proper that there should be a definition of any determinate logos, namely, of one that signifies one thing. For if I say that Socrates is white and musical and curly-headed, this logos does not signify one thing, except perhaps accidentally, but signifies many; and therefore such a logos is not a definition.125 1340. However, it is not enough that the thing signified by a logos should be one thing from the viewpoint of continuity in order that there may be a definition of it; for then the Iliad, i.e., the poem about the Trojan war, would be a definition, because that war was waged over a continuous period of time. Nor again is it enough that the thing should be one by connection; for example, if I were to say that a house is stones and mortar and wood, this logos would not be a definition of a house. But a logos that signifies one thing will be a definition if it signifies in some one of those senses in which the term one is predicated essentially; for the term one is used in as many senses as being is. And in one sense being signifies this particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in another, quality, and so on for the other categories. Yet it is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of the other categories. Therefore the term one in an unqualified sense will apply primarily to substance and secondarily to the other categories.126 1341. If, then, it is characteristic of the notion of definition that it should signify one thing, it follows that there will be a definition of white man, because white man is in a sense one thing. But the logos of white will be a definition in a different sense than the logos of
aequivoce nec univoce, de substantia et accidente, sed per respectum ad unum. dicitur enim de accidente in respectu ad substantiam, ut dictum est. 124 et quia posuerat duas solutiones, subiungit quod nihil differt qualitercumque aliquis velit dicere de praemissa quaestione; sive dicatur quod accidentia non habent definitionem, sive quod habent, sed per posterius secundum quid. quod tamen dicitur in prima solutione quod non habent definitionem accidentia, intelligitur per prius et simpliciter. 125 deinde cum dicit illud autem probat secundo positam solutionem dicens, illud palam esse quod definitio et quod quid erat esse, primo et simpliciter est substantiarum, non tamen solum et substantiarum, cum etiam accidentia aliquo modo habeant definitionem et quod quid erat esse, non tamen primum. et hoc sic patet. non enim omnis ratio, qua nomen per rationem exponitur, idem est quod definitio; nec nomen expositum per quamcumque rationem, semper est definitum; sed alicui determinatae rationi competit quod sit definitio; illi scilicet quae significat unum. si enim dicam quod socrates est albus et musicus et crispus, ista ratio non significat unum, sed multa, nisi forte per accidens, et ideo talis ratio non est definitio. 126 non tamen sufficit quod sit unum in continuitate illud quod per rationem significatur, ad hoc quod sit definitio. sic enim ilias, idest poema de bello troiano esset definitio, quia illud bellum in quadam continuitate temporis est peractum. aut etiam non sufficit quod sit unum per colligationem; sicut haec ratio non esset definitio domus, si dicerem, quod domus est lapides et cementum et ligna. sed tunc ratio significans unum erit definitio, si significet unum aliquod illorum modorum, quorum quoties unum per se dicitur. unum enim dicitur multipliciter sicut et ens. ens autem hoc quidem significat hoc aliquid, aliud quantitatem, aliud qualitatem, et sic de aliis; et tamen per prius substantiam et consequenter alia. ergo simpliciter unum per prius erit in substantia, et per posterius in aliis.

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substance, because the logos of substance will be a definition in a primary sense, and the logos of white will be a definition in a secondary sense, just as the term one is predicated of each in a primary and in a secondary sense. 127 1342. Now if one denies (585). He clears up some of the difficulties pertaining to the point established above; and this is divided into two parts corresponding to the two difficulties which he removes. The second (586:C 1347) begins where he says And there is also. Now there are two things which have to be noted first of all in order to make the first part of this division evident. The first is that some said that no definition comes about by way of addition, i.e., no definition contains anything extrinsic to the essence of the thing defined. And they seemed to have in mind the fact that the definition signifies the essence of a thing. Hence it would seem that whatever is extrinsic to the essence of a thing should not be given in its definition.128 1343. The second thing which has to be noted is that some accidents are simple and some compound. Those are said to be simple which have no determinate subject included in their definition, for example, curved and concave and other mathematical entities; and those are said to be compound which have a determinate subject without which they cannot be defined.129 1344. Hence a problem arises if someone wants to say that a logos which is formed by addition is not a definition of those accidents which are simple, but of those which are compound; for it seems that none of these can have a definition. It is clear, then, that if compound accidents are defined, their definition must be formed by addition, since they cannot be defined without their proper subject. For example, if we take the following three things: nose, concavity, and snubness, then concavity is an accident in an unqualified sense, especially in relation to nose, since nose is not contained in the logos of concavity. And snubness is a compound accident, since nose is a part of its logos. Thus snubness will be an expression of both inasmuch as it signifies that the one is found in the other, i.e., a definite accident in a definite subject, and neither concavity nor snubness is an attribute of nose in an accidental way, as white belongs accidentally to Callias and to man, inasmuch as Callias, who happens to be a man, is white. But snubness is an essential quality of nose, for it is proper to nose as such to be snub. Another translation has aquiline in place of concave, and its meaning is more evident, because nose is given in the definition of aquiline just as it is in the definition of snub. Concavity or snubness, then, belongs to nose essentially, just as male belongs to animal essentially, and equality to quantity, and all other things which are said to be present essentially in something else, because the logos of all is the same; and these attributes are those in which, i.e., in the logos of which, there is found either the name of
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si igitur ad rationem definitionis pertinet quod significet unum, sequitur quod erit ratio albi hominis definitio, quia albus homo est quodammodo unum. sed alio modo erit definitio ratio albi, et ratio substantiae; quia ratio substantiae erit definitio per prius, ratio albi per posterius, sicut unum per prius et posterius de utroque dicitur. 128 deinde cum dicit habet autem removet quasdam dubitationes circa praedeterminata; et dividitur in duas, secundum duas dubitationes quas removet. secunda, ibi, est autem et alia dubitatio. praenotanda autem sunt duo ad evidentiam primae particulae. quorum primum est, quod quidam dicebant nullam definitionem esse ex additione, idest quod in nulla definitione ponitur aliquid, quod sit extra essentiam definiti. et videbantur pro se habere hoc, quod definitio significat essentiam rei. unde illud quod est extra essentiam rei, non debet poni in eius definitione, ut videtur. 129 secundum est, quod quaedam accidentia sunt simplicia, et quaedam copulata. simplicia dicuntur, quae non habent subiectum determinatum, quod in eorum definitione ponatur, sicut curvum et concavum et alia mathematica. copulata autem dicuntur, quae habent determinatum subiectum, sine quo definiri non possunt.

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the thing to which this attribute belongs, namely, substance, or its logos. For in definitions the logos can always be given in place of the name; for example, when we say that man is a mortal rational animal, the definition can be given in place of the term animal, just as it may be said that man is a mortal rational sensory animated substance. And similarly if I say that a male is an animal capable of generating in another, I can also say that a male is a sensory animated substance capable of generating in another. 130 1345. Thus it is clearly impossible to explain this, i.e., to convey knowledge of, one of the accidents mentioned above which we called compound, apart from its subject, as it is possible to convey knowledge of whiteness without giving man in its definition or logos. But it is not possible to convey knowledge of female without mentioning animal, because animal must be given in the definition of female just as it must be given in the definition of male. Hence it is evident that none of the compound accidents mentioned above have a whatness and real definition if there is no definition by way of addition, as happens in the definitions of substances.131 1346. Or if they have some kind of definition, since they can be defined only by way of addition, they will have a definition in a different way than substances do, as we said in the second solution. Hence in this conclusion he states the solution to the foregoing difficulty; for the statement which he made there, namely, that there is no definition by way of addition, is true of definition insofar as it applies to substances. Hence the accidents mentioned above do not have a definition in this way but differently, i.e., in a secondary sense. 132 1347. And there is (586). Here he states the second difficulty; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he raises the difficulty; and second (587:C 1350, he gives its solution (But this is hidden). He
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est ergo dubitatio, si aliquis velit dicere quod ratio, quae est ex additione, non est definitio illorum accidentium quae sunt simplicia, sed copulatorum erit definitio. videtur enim, quod nullius eorum possit esse definitio. palam est ergo, quod si illa definiuntur, necesse est eorum definitionem ex additione facere, cum sine propriis subiectis definiri non possint. sicut si accipiamus haec tria, idest nasus, et concavitas, et simitas: concavitas est simpliciter accidens, praecipue in comparatione ad nasum, cum non sit nasus de intellectu concavi. simitas autem est accidens compositum, cum sit nasus de intellectu eius. et ita simitas erit quoddam dictum ex duobus, inquantum significat hoc in hoc, idest determinatum accidens in determinato subiecto, et nec concavitas nec simitas est passio nasi secundum accidens, sicut album inest calliae et homini per accidens, inquantum callias est albus, cui accidit hominem esse. sed simum est passio nasi secundum se. naso enim inquantum huiusmodi competit esse simum. alia autem translatio loco eius quod est concavum, habet aquilinum. et est planior sensus; quia in definitione aquilini ponitur nasus, sicut in definitione simi. sed sicut masculinum per se competit animali, et aequale quantitati, et omnia alia quaecumque secundum se dicuntur existere in aliquo, quia de omnibus est eadem ratio, et huiusmodi sunt in quibus, idest in quorum rationibus existit nomen eius cuius est passio, idest substantia, aut etiam ratio eius. semper enim in definitionibus potest poni ratio loco nominis: sicut si dicimus quod homo est animal rationale mortale, potest poni loco nominis animalis definitio, ut dicatur quod homo est substantia animata sensibilis rationalis mortalis. similiter si dicam quod masculus est animal potens generare in alio, possum etiam dicere quod masculus est substantia animata sensibilis potens generare in aliquo alio. 131 et sic patet, quod non contingit separatim ostendere, idest notificare aliquod praedictorum accidentium quae diximus copulata, sicut contingit notificare album sine hoc quod in eius definitione sive ratione ponatur homo. sed non contingit ita notificare femininum sine animali; quia oportet quod animal ponatur in definitione feminini sicut et in definitione masculini. quare patet, quod non est alicuius praedictorum accidentium copulatorum quod quid erat esse et definitio vera, si nulla definitio est ex additione, sicut contingit in definitionibus substantiarum. 132 aut si est aliqua definitio eorum, cum non possint nisi ex additione definiri, aliter erit definitio eorum quam substantiarum, quemadmodum diximus in solutione secunda. et sic in hac conclusione innuit solutionem dubitationis praemissae. quod enim dicebatur, quod nulla definitio est ex additione, verum est de definitione prout invenitur in substantiis. sic autem praedicta accidentia non habent definitionem, sed alio modo per posterius.

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accordingly says, first (586), that there is another problem concerning the points discussed above. For to say snub nose and concave nose is either to say the same thing or not. If it is the same, it follows that snub and concave are the same; but this is clearly false since the definition of each is different.133 1348. But if to say snub nose and concave nose is not to say the same thing, because snub cannot be understood without the thing of which it is a proper attribute, i.e., without nose, since snubness is concavity in a nose (although concave can be spoken of without nose being involved), and if what I call snub involves more than concave, then it follows that this thing which I call nose either cannot be called a snub nose, or if it is called such, the word will be used twice, namely, inasmuch as we might say that a snub nose is a concave nose nose; for the definition of a word can always be given in place of that word. Hence when the word snub nose is used, the word snub can be removed and the definition of snub, which is a concave nose, can be added to the definition of nose. Thus it would seem that to speak of a snub nose is merely to speak of a concave nose nose, which is absurd. And for this reason it would seem absurd to say that such accidents have an essence. 134 1349. For if it is not true that they do not have an essence, the same word may be repeated an infinite number of times when the definition of the word is put in place of that word. For it is obvious that, when I say concave nose, the word snub can be understood in place of concave, because snubness is merely concavity in a nose; and the term concave nose can also be understood in place of snub; and so on to infinity.135 1350. Hence it would seem to be evident that only substance has a definition; for if the other categories also had a definition, this would have to be a result of adding something to their subject, as the definition of equal and that of odd must be derived from the definition of their subjects. For there is no definition of odd without number, or of female, which signifies a certain quality of animal, without animal. Therefore if some things are defined by way of addition, it follows that the same words may be used twice, as was shown in the example given above. Hence if it is true that this absurd conclusion would result, it follows that compound accidents do not have a definition.136 1351. But this is hidden (587).
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deinde cum dicit est autem ponit secundam dubitationem: circa quam duo facit. primo movet dubitationem. secundo ponit solutionem, ibi, sed latet etc.. dicit ergo primo, quod est alia dubitatio de praedictis. aut enim est idem dicere nasus simus et nasus concavus, aut non. si idem, sequetur quod idem sit simum et concavum: quod patet esse falsum, cum alia sit definitio utriusque. 134 si autem non est idem dicere nasum simum et nasum concavum, propter hoc quod simum non potest intelligi sine re cuius est per se passio, idest sine naso, cum simum sit concavitas in naso, concavum vero potest dici sine naso; sequetur, si hoc quod dico simum plus habet quam concavum, quod hoc, scilicet quod est nasus, vel non possit dici nasus simus, vel si dicatur, erit bis idem dictum, ut dicamus, quod nasus simus est nasus nasus concavus. semper enim loco nominis potest poni definitio illius nominis. unde cum dicitur nasus simus, poterit removeri nomen simi, et addi naso definitio simi, quae est nasus concavus. sic ergo videtur dicere, quod nasum simum, nihil aliud est quam dicere, nasum nasum concavum, quod est inconveniens. propter quod, inconveniens videtur dicere quod in talibus accidentibus sit quod quid erat esse. 135 quod si hoc non est verum, quod in eis non sit quod quid erat esse, in infinitum fiet repetitio eiusdem nominis, semper posita nominis definitione pro nomine. constat enim, quod cum dico, nasus concavus, loco concavi potest accipi simum, quia concavitas in naso non est nisi simitas, et loco simi iterum nasus concavus, et sic in infinitum. 136 palam est itaque, ut videtur, quod solius substantiae est definitio. si enim esset aliorum praedicamentorum, oporteret quod esset ex additione subiecti, sicut definitio aequalitatis et definitio imparis oporteret quod sumeretur ex definitione suorum subiectorum. non enim definitio imparis est sine numero; nec definitio feminini, quod significat quamdam qualitatem animalis, est sine animali. si ergo definitio aliquorum est ex additione, sequetur quod bis accidat idem dicere, sicut in praemissis est ostensum. unde, si verum est quod hoc inconveniens sequatur, sequitur quod accidentia copulata non habent definitionem.

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He solves the problem raised above. He says that anyone who raises the above question is ignorant of the fact that these logoi are not expressed exactly, i.e., with exactness, as those which are used univocally, but are employed in a primary and secondary way, as was stated above (582:C 1331). But if the compound accidents mentioned above have a formula, or conceptual expression, they must have such in a different way than definitions do, or definition and essence, which is signified by definition, must be used in different senses. 137 1352. Hence in one sense, i.e., primarily and without qualification, only substance will have a definition, and only substance will have an essence. And in another sense, i.e., secondarily and with some qualification, the other categories will also have a definition. For substance, which has a quiddity in the absolute sense, does not depend on something else so far as its quiddity is concerned. An accident depends on its subject, however, although a subject does not belong to the essence of its accident (in much the same way as a creature depends on the creator, yet the creator does not belong to the essence of the creature), so that an extrinsic essence must be placed in its definition. In fact, accidents have being only by reason of the fact that they inhere in a subject, and therefore their quiddity depends on their subject. Hence a subject must be given in the definition of an accident at one time directly and at another, indirectly.138 1353. Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an accident when an accident is signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that snubness is a concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus in order to signify that accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is signified in the abstract, after the manner of a substance, then the subject is given in its definition indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is the concavity of a nose. 139 1354. Hence it is clear that when I say snub nose, it is not necessary to understand concave nose in place of nose; because nose is not included in the definition of snub as though it were part of its essence, but as something added to its essence. Hence snub and concave are essentially the same. But snub adds over and above concave a relation to a determinate subject; and thus in this determinate subject, nose, snub differs in no way from concave, nor is it necessary that any word should be put in place of snub except the word concave. Thus it will not be necessary to use concave nose in place of snub, but only concave. 140
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deinde cum dicit sed latet solvit praemissam quaestionem; dicens, quod moventem praedictam quaestionem latet, quod rationes, non dicuntur certe, idest certitudinaliter, quasi ea quae dicuntur univoce, sed dicuntur secundum prius et posterius, ut supra dictum est. si autem praedicta accidentia copulata habent terminos, idest rationes aliquas, oportet quod alio modo sint illi termini quam definitiones: aut quod definitio et quod quid erat esse, quod significatur per definitionem, dicatur multipliciter. 138 quare sic quidem, idest simpliciter per prius, nullius erit definitio nisi substantiae, nec etiam quod quid erat esse. sic autem, idest secundum quid et posterius, erit etiam aliorum. substantia enim quae habet quidditatem absolutam, non dependet in sua quidditate ex alio. accidens autem dependet a subiecto, licet subiectum non sit de essentia accidentis; sicut creatura dependet a creatore et tamen creator non est de essentia creaturae, ita quod oporteat exteriorem essentiam in eius definitione poni. accidentia vero non habent esse nisi per hoc quod insunt subiecto: et ideo eorum quidditas est dependens a subiecto: et propter hoc oportet quod subiectum in accidentis definitione ponatur, quandoque quidem in recto, quandoque vero in obliquo. 139 in recto quidem, quando accidens significatur ut accidens in concretione ad subiectum: ut cum dico, simus est nasus concavus. tunc enim nasus ponitur in definitione simi quasi genus, ad designandum quod accidentia non habent subsistentiam, nisi ex subiecto. quando vero accidens significatur per modum substantiae in abstracto, tunc subiectum ponitur in definitione eius in obliquo, ut differentia; sicut dicitur, simitas est concavitas nasi. 140 patet igitur quod cum dico, nasum simum, non oportet loco simi accipere nasum concavum; quia nasus non ponitur in definitione simi, quasi sit de essentia eius; sed quasi additum essentiae. unde simum et concavum per essentiam idem sunt. sed simum addit supra concavum, habitudinem ad determinatum

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1355. In bringing his discussion to a close he draws the conclusion which follows as obvious, namely, that a definition, which is the logos of a things essence and the essence itself, belongs to substances alone, just as the first solution maintained. Or substances are defined in a primary and unqualified sense, and accidents in a secondary and qualified sense, as has been stated in the second solution.141

4. On the ways in which substance is said. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., dist. 37, q. 1, art. 1, c., ad 1 (tr. B.A.M.):
c. I reply that it must be said that substance is said in two ways, as is evident from Metaphysics V, text 15. For in one way substance is said according as it signifies the ratio of the first predicament (category): and this is either the form, or the matter, or the composite, which is in the genus per se. In another way substance means that which signifies the what in all things, just as we say that the definition signifies the substance of a thing: and in this way whatever is said positively, in whatever genus it is, is substance, or has substance.142 ad 1. To the first, therefore, it must be said that that objection procedes with respect to substance according as it signifies a thing of the first predicament [or category]: and taking substance in this way, in no way is sin a substance.143

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 29, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
I reply that it must be said that, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, substance is said in two ways. In one way substance means the whatness of a thing, in accordance with which [usage] we say that the definition signifies the substance of a thing, which substance, in fact, the Greeks call ousia, [and] which we may call essence. In another way substance means the subject or supposit which subsists in the genus of substance. And this, in fact, taking it commonly, can also be named by a name signifying an intention, and thus it means the supposit.144

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.4):

subiectum: et sic determinato subiecto quod est nasus, nihil differt simus a concavo; nec oportet aliquid loco simi ponere nisi concavum: et sic non erit dicere loco eius, nasus concavus, sed solum concavus. 141 ultimo concludit ex praedictis, quod palam est, quod definitio quae est ratio eius quod quid erat esse, et ipsum quod quid erat esse, solum est substantiarum, sicut prima solutio habebat. vel est primo et simpliciter earum, et per posterius et secundum quid accidentium, ut in secunda solutione dicebatur. 142 respondeo dicendum quod substantia duplicitur dicitur, ut ex V Metaphysicorum, text. 15, patet. Uno enim modo dicitur substantia, secundum quod significat rationem primi praedicamenti: et hoc est vel forma, vel materia, vel compositum, quod per se in genere est. Alio modo dicitur substantia illud quod significat quid in omnibus rebus, sicut dicimus quod definitio significat rei substantiam: et hoc modo quidquid positive dicitur, in quocumque genere sit, substantia est vel substantiam habet. Note that the ratio of the first predicament is what is neither said of a subject nor in a subject. (cf. Cat. ch. 5, 2a 11) 143 ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illa objectio procedit de substantia secundum quod significat rem primi praedicamenti: et hoc modo sumendo substantiam, peccatum nullo modo substantia est. 144 respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in v metaphys., substantia dicitur dupliciter. uno modo dicitur substantia quidditas rei, quam significat definitio, secundum quod dicimus quod definitio significat substantiam rei, quam quidem substantiam graeci usiam vocant, quod nos essentiam dicere possumus. alio modo dicitur substantia subiectum vel suppositum quod subsistit in genere substantiae. et hoc quidem, communiter accipiendo, nominari potest et nomine significante intentionem, et sic dicitur suppositum.

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There is a text I mentioned before in the Sentences where Thomas, when discussing the definition of person, distinguishes all four senses together. There are other texts where he distinguishes just the two senses in the ante-predicaments, and you can bring those texts in. When we are just doing the ante-predicaments, I bring in the texts that just distinguished those two senses. But now that were distinguishing two more, I will bring in the text with all four meanings. First the texts that you use when doing the ante-predicaments. The first text is from the commentary on the second book of the Sentences Distinction 37 Question 1 Article 1 in the Solution: Substance is said in two ways, as is clear from the fifth book of the Metaphysics. In one way substance is said as it signifies the ratio of the first predicament. And this is either form or matter in the genus of substance, or the composite, which is per se in the genus [in some sense mans soul and mans body are in the genus of substance, but per se or directly just the composite]. In another way substance is said that which signifies what in all things, as when we say that a definition signifies the substance of a thing [you can have a definition of virtue, or a definition of number, or a definition of what a father is, as well as a definition of what a man is; it can be found in all these genera]. And in this way, whatever is said positively [as opposed to a negation] in whatever genus it is, is a substance or has substance. Those are the two senses you meet in the antepredicaments. Substance can signify one of the ten genera, which in the Topics is called what it is, or it can signify the nature of anything, as it does when Aristotle says that things are named univocally when they have not only the name in common but also the speech about their substance, logos tes ousias. Translating that into Latin, sometimes theyll say ratio substantiae. They have the name in common, and the ratio substantiae. You could translate logos with oratio, too. It is either the speech about their substance or the thought about their substance, but what substance means there is the nature of the thing, the essence of the thing, the what it is of the thing. And that is found not only in the category of substance, but also quantity, quality, and the rest. And Thomas says that is what you mean when you say that a definition signifies the substance of a thing. And thats what we mean when we say that the Son is consubstantial with the Father, Hes of the same substance, He has the same nature, there is only one nature there, for those two persons. Thats one very important meaning. And he says in another text from the Metaphysics that thats the formal beginning of the individual, the species, and the genus. And the formal is the kind of cause which it is proper to the logician to consider. But then another sense of substance is one of the ten highest genera, and thats the sense of substance that we meet in the fourth chapter when he distinguishes the ten highest genera. Thomas will distinguish those two from Chapter 5 in addition, when he gets into the context of discussing Boethiuss definition of person. Boethiuss definition is individua substantia rationalis naturae, an individual substance of a rational nature. Of course Thomas has to go through this definition word by word. Sometimes you have an objection: what does the word substance mean in the definition? Does it mean first substance, or does it mean second substance? If it means second substance, then youre not talking about a person, are you? A person is a first substance. But if it means first substance, why do you have to add individual? Thomas says that in the definition the word substance doesnt mean first substance, it doesnt mean second substance, it means substance as its common to both. Then its restricted by the word individua, individual. Now for this text where he distinguishes all four of them. Even though hes not talking about the Categories, one can see the applicability of what he says to it. This is again from the commentary on Book I of the Sentences Distinction 25 Question 1 Article 1 Objection 7 & Reply. Ill read you part of the objection: Substance in the use of the Latins is equivocal for essence and hypostasis. When, therefore, person is said to be individual substance, either its laid down for the essence

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[which is, again, one sense] or for the hypostasis. If for the hypostasis, since that is a particular substance or individual, it seems that individual is added superfluously This objection you will find elsewhere; Thomas takes it up a lot of times when he discusses the definition of person. In the reply, he says To the seventh objection it should be said that substance is said in four ways. In one way, substance is the same thing as essentia, the essence or the nature of a thing [thats the sense you meet in Chapter 1 of the Categories]. And thus substance is found in all genera, just as essentia or nature is found [nature being taken in the sense of what it is]. And this is signified what is albedo? and the answer is color [he takes an example from a genus of accident in order to show that that sense is not limited to substance]. In another way, it signifies an individual in the genus of substance, which is called first substance or hypostasis. In a third way it is called second substance [so the two meanings from Chapter 5 are the second and third of the senses he is talking about here]. And then in a fourth way substance is said commonly insofar as it abstracts from first substance and second substance. And thus it is taken here [he gives that last because thats the one he wants] in the definition of the great Boethius]. And by individual, as it were through a difference, it is drawn to standing for first substance. That last sense is the one you have in Chapter 4, which is in a way common to first and second substance. This sense resembles something common, but its something imperfectly abstracted. Ive always been a little bit puzzled by similar things in the distinctions of the meanings of the word nature in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. One of the senses of nature there is the very definition of nature in the Physics. But then Aristotle gives matter and form in the genus of substance as two other meanings of the word nature. In the Physics, after he defines nature, then he shows that matter is nature, and its more known to be nature, and then he shows that form is also nature, and then he shows that even more so is it nature. If he said that nature had only these two meanings of matter and form, there would be no reason why Aristotle or Thomas would distinguish the definition of nature as another meaning from those two. But still it doesnt seem to be said altogether equally of those two. Its not a strict genus, or anything like that. He gives it as a separate meaning. You cant really avoid a lot of difficulties unless you see that as a separate meaning. Somehow, when you say that form is more nature than matter, you have some common notion of nature there. Now if you take this formula, and you consider first substance and second substance, and someone says you have two words in each case, substance and first, substance and second, then if you say first substance, what does the word substance mean? If you say it means first substance, then the word first is superfluous. Unless you have some common thought, you might say, of substance, as what does not exist in a subject or something of that sort, it would have to mean either first substance or second substance. One would be false and the other would make the word first superfluous. You have to make the distinction, there.

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V. ON THINGS SAID EITHER WITH INTERTWINING OR WITHOUT IT. Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 2 (1a 151b 6) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin):
4. Of things said, some are said with intertwining, some without intertwining: the ones, therefore, with intertwining are like man runs, man wins; the ones without intertwining are like man, ox, runs, wins.145 5. Of beings [lit. of those which are], some are said of something underlying, but are in no underlying thing, as man is said of something underlying, of this man, but is in no underlying thing.146 6. Some, however, are in an underlying thing, but are said of no underlying thing. (I call in an underlying thing what is in something, not as being a part [but as] unable to [exist] separately from that in which it is, as this grammar is in an underlying, the soul, but is said of nothing underlying, and this white is in an underlying, the body, for every color is in body, but is said of nothing underlying.)147 7. Some, however, are both said of an underlying and are in an underlying, as science is in an underlying, the soul, but is said of an underlying, grammar. 148 8. Some, however, are neither in an underlying nor are said of an underlying, as this man or this horse. For not one of such things is either in an underlying or said of an underlying. 149 9. Simply, however, things indivisible and one in number are said of no underlying thing, but nothing prevents some [of these] from being in an underlying, for this grammar is among things in an underlying.150

1. In sum: Since substances come before all else, the first thing a name will signify is ousia. Now among substances some are universal, but others particular. Again, following upon substances are accidents which themselves may be either universal or particular. Consequently, in the meaning of names we must distinguish the foregoing principles. 2. In relation to predication, those which are, or beings, are of four kinds:
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Eorum quae dicuntur, alia quidem secundum complexione dicuntur, alia vere sine complexione; et eas quae secundum complexione dicuntur sunt ut homo currit, home vincit; ea vero quae sine complexione dicuntur sunt ut homo, bos, currit, vincit. 146 Eorum quae sunt, alia de subjecto quodam dicuntur, in subjecto vero nullo sunt, ut homo de subjecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine, in subjecto autem nullo est. 147 Alia in subjecto quidem sunt, de subjecto autem nullo dicuntur. In subjecto autem esse dico quod cum in aliquo non sicut quadam pars sit, impossible est sine eo esse in quo est, ut quaedam grammatica in subjecto quidem est in anima, de subjecto autem nullo dicitur, et quoddam album in subjecto est corpore (omnis enim color in corpore est), de subjecto autem nullo dicitur. 148 Alia et de subjecto quodam dicuntur, et in subjecto sunt, ut scientia in subjecto quodem est in anima, de subjecto autem dicitur, ut de grammatica. 149 Alia neque in subjecto sunt neque de subjecto dicuntur, ut aliquis homo, vel aliquis equus; nullam enim horum neque in subjecto est neque de subjecto dicitur. 150 Simpliciter autem quae sunt individua et numero singularia de nullo subjecto dicuntur; in subjecto autem nihil prohibet horum aliqua esse; quaedam enim grammatica in subjecto est, de subjecto autem nullow dicitur.

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(1) (2) (3) (4)

universal substance (man, animal) particular accident (this grammar, this white, this science) universal accident (grammar, whiteness, science) particular substance (Socrates, Plato, this ox, this horse)

Inasmuch as beings are things signified by vocal sounds, things signified by vocal sounds are, in one way, divided into these four. Hence, what is signified is either a substance or an accident; and it is either universal or particular. But in the names of these four one must go on to distinguish the principles of their signification, as, for instance, particular substance will prove to signify a what it is and a this something, as we shall observe hereafter. 3. On the two ways in which things are said: (1) according to intertwining: (a) affirmations or negations; (b) complex words like white man (2) according to not one intertwining: simple words like white or man 4. On what the things said signify: substance, and the nine genera of accidents 5. On the way in which things said signify: in the manner of a substance or an accident but if in the manner of an accident, then in the manner of a quantity or a quality, etc. 6. On what things said or beings said without any intertwining signify. Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 2 (1a 17-19) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin).
Of things said, some are said with intertwining, some without intertwining: the ones, therefore, with intertwining are like man runs man wins; the ones without intertwining are like man, ox, runs, wins.151

Cf. ibid. ch. 4 (1b 25-27) (tr. R. Glen Coughlin).


Of what are said according to not one intertwining, each signifies either substance {ousia}, or so much {poson}, or such {poion}, or relative {proj ti}, or where {pou}, or sometime {pote}, or to be positioned {keisqai}, or to have {ecein}, or to do {poiein}, or to suffer {pascein}.152

7. That what signifies are vocal sounds.

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Eorum quae dicuntur, alia quidem secundum complexione dicuntur, alia vere sine complexione; et eas quae secundum complexione dicuntur sunt ut homo currit, home vincit; ea vero quae sine complexione dicuntur sunt ut homo, bos, currit, vincit. 152 Eorum quidem quae secundum nullam complexionem dicuntur, singulum aut substantiam significat, aut quantitem, aut qualitatem, aut ad aliquid, aut ubi, aut quando, aut situm, aut habere, aut facere, aut pati.

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Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.1):


14. Lets take the opinion that the Categories is about names, vocal sounds. Well, in the second chapter Aristotle will give a division there, saying of those said, there are those said with intertwining, and those said without intertwining, and those said with intertwining are those in which something is affirmed or denied of something, where you have a statement. And in the Perihermeneias, Aristotle will define the statement as a h, a vocal sound. And then he says there are those said without intertwining, without affirming or denying. And later on, he says that these signify either substance, or how much, or how, and so on. But what signifies? Its not things that signify; things are signified. But Aristotle will say in Chapter 4 signifies. He seems to be talking about words, names, vocal sounds. On the other hand, vocal sound seems to be far below the dignity of logic, and seems to pertain to grammar. Notice how different these things are. In the first opinion, logic seemed to be confused with metaphysics, and with this opinion it comes down to grammar.

8. On what those said according to not one intertwining means. Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.3):
Now, the first thing I want to do in regard to Chapter 4 is to go through the chapter a bit with you, and then well look at Thomass two distinctions. But I want to get more of a material knowledge of the chapter first. Do you all have the English translation before you? Now Aristotle seems to be picking up on the end of the division that he gave in the beginning of Chapter 2. He says Of those said without any intertwining ... Now you recall that in the beginning of Chapter 2 he said of those said, some are said with intertwining, and some without intertwining. So hes going to subdivide, if you wish, hes going to distinguish the univocal names said without intertwining. Now he does add (perhaps) something here, because he says without ANY intertwining, whereas before he had just said without intertwining. What did that mean, when he spoke of it before? Well, he spoke of affirmation, making a statement, like man runs, or something like that. And that is the kind of intertwining that involves truth or falsity. But some of the commentators say he may add. The Greek says kata medemian, which he [Coughlin] translates correctly here, in the sense of without any. According to NO intertwining. So maybe he has in mind other kinds of intertwining. Suppose we gave a name to a substance with an accident. Suppose you had a black man. And suppose you gave one name to a black man, like negro, lets say. Could negro be put under one of these genera? No: man would be under substance, and black would be under quality. If by saint I meant a man with some virtue, lets say, could I put saint under a category if thats what I meant by it? No. Now, if you go back to the division of beings, where you distinguish between subject and accident, if you have an intertwining of two different natures, the nature of the substance and the nature of the accident, can you place that in one category? No. So he may want to eliminate not only the intertwining that you have in a statement, as when you say man is a stone, or man is white, but also if you were to signify by a name something that involved intertwining. The second thing to be noted, as we have said many times before, he says of those said without any intertwining, each SIGNIFIES and thats the key that hes talking about names, and not about things, that the categories are names. And then he enumerates them:

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each signifies either substance, or how much, or how, or toward something, or where, or when, or laid out [however you translate keisthai], or to have, or to act upon, or to undergo. He enumerates the ten there. We will talk eventually about the order of those ten. Its already pretty obvious why substance comes first; because everything else will be said of substance or exist in substance.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.8):


Now we have the ten genera of names said per se with the same speech or thought (the Greek word is logos which can be translated as speech or thought) tes ousias, about what it is, in mind. But before I add of things, I must add from the beginning of Chapter 2, without intertwining. If we want to be really complete, remember we mentioned how in Chapter 2 he said that of those said some are said with intertwining and some without, and he explained intertwining by when you affirm one of another. But when he got down to dividing the ten in Chapter 4, he said not of those said without intertwining, but of those said according to no intertwining, as if he had in mind other kinds of intertwining, not just affirmation and negation (although those primarily). As I mentioned at the time, if negro is a name meaning a black man, if thats what that means, then there is an intertwining of two different natures. One would be the nature of a particular kind of color, the other is the nature of a particular kind of animal, a man, then you couldnt put negro under one of the ten, because there is an intertwining of two natures that are not in the same genus. You have to put man under substance, and black under color and quality. So we have to add without any intertwining, or as Aristotle says, with no intertwining. Finally, we add of things. The ten genera of names said per se, univocally, and without any intertwining, of things. Let me mention something which I dont know if I made explicit. Aristotle calls those ten the genera of categories, and the word category is used to mean all those things that I spelled out. Sometimes I think even Aristotle himself, and I know everyone else does, uses the word categories to mean the genera themselves. Some use the word categories just to mean the ten highest genera. We saw the reason for that before by antonomasia: these are the said-ofs, because nothing is said of them univocally, whereas if you go down the line you get something that is both a predicate and a subject. I continue to call these ten the categories, but Aristotle calls these ten the genera of categories. You do find that use of the word.153

9. On things said with respect to intertwining: things said without any intertwining: the ten genera of names with some sort of intertwining of a subject with a predicate: affirmation or denial of a subject with an accident, etc. the intertwining of a subject with a predicate: e.g. Socrates is pale. the intertwining of a subject with an accident: e.g. pale Socrates.
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Hence, according to Dr. Berquist, the word categories means, first of all, the ten genera of names said per se, univocally, and without any intertwining, of things; but by an extension of its meaning, the things receiving this name, the ten highest genera of beings, are also called categories.

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10. What substances signify in the acceptation of the logician. Cf. Aristotle, Categories ch. 5 (3b 10-24) (tr. not given, rev. B.A.M.; Lat. Boethius):
[10] Every substance appears to signify a this something [= hoc aliquid]. It is indisputable and true that first substances signify a this something, for what is signified is something individual and one in number. But with second substances, although by the appearance of the appellation it seems likewise to signify a this something, as when someone says either man or [15] animal, this is not true, but rather it signifies such a something [= quale quid]; for the subject is not one in the way a first substance is one, but rather man and animal are said of many. Now this sort of name does not signify such a something simply, in the way [20] white does; for white signifies nothing other than quality, whereas genus and species determine a quality with respect to substance, for they signify such a substance. Now more is in the determination of the genus than of the species; for saying animal embraces more than man.154

11. What certain names signify in sum: 1. a this something (hoc aliquid) (e.g. first substance, like Socrates) 2. such a something (quale quid) (that is, it signifies a sort or quality) (a) what signifies such a something simply (e.g. an accident like white) (b) not simply (e.g. second substance like man, a substance of a sort) Note how the foregoing account makes clear that a name like man signifies such a something, where the such names the form or nature, not the substance of Chapter 1; substance here meaning the supposit and not the what it is. 12. On quality in relation to substance. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia-IIae, q. 49, art. 2, c. (tr. B.A.M.):
[F]or, properly, quality imports a certain mode of substance. But as St. Augustine says (Super gen. ad litteram), a mode is what a measure establishes beforehand , for which reason it implies a certain determination according to some measure. And so, just as that according to which the potency of matter is determined according to substantial being is called a substantial quality, which is the difference of substanceso that according to which the potency of a subject155 is determined according to accidental being is called an accidental quality, which is also a certain difference, as is clear through the Philosopher in Metaphysics V (cf. ch. 14, 1020a 33).156
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Omnis autem substantia videtur hoc aliquid significare, atque in primis quidem substantiis indubitabile et verum est quoniam hoc aliquid significant. Individuum enim et unum numero est quod significatur. In secundis vero substantiis, videtur quidem similiter appellationis figura hoc aliquid significare, quando quis dixerit vel hominem vel animal, non tamen verum est, sed magis quale aliquid significat; neque enim est unum quod subiectum est, quemadmodum prima substantia, sed de pluribus homo dicitur et animal. Non autem simpliciter quale quid significat, quemadmodum album; nihil enim aliud album significat quam qualitatem, genus autem et species circa substantiam qualitatem determinant, qualem enim quamdam substantiam significant. [In] plus autem in genere quam in specie determinatio fit; dicens enim animal plus complectitur quam hominem. 155 On the difference between subject and matter, cf. St. Thomas little work De Principiis Naturae, cap. 1: item, proprie loquendo, quod est in potentia ad esse accidentale dicitur subiectum, quod vero est in potentia ad esse substantiale, dicitur proprie materia. ...., Again, properly speaking, what is in potency to accidental being is called subject, but what is in potency to substantial being is properly called matter.

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substantial quality is that according to which the potency of matter is determined to substantial being (i.e. the substantial form) accidental quality is that according to which the potency of a subject is determined to accidental being (i.e. an accidental form)

St. Thomas Aquinas, In V Meta. lect. 16, n. 1 (tr. B.A.M.).


He says therefore first that one mode of quality is according as quality means the difference of substancethat is, the difference by which something differs substantially from another, which enters into the definition of a substance. And for this reason it is said [in the Isagoge] that difference is predicated in the quale quid . For example, if one were asked, What sort [quale] of animal is a man? we answer, Two-footed: And what sort of animal is a horse? we answer, Four-footed: And what sort of figure is a circle? we answer sidelessthat is, without an angle; as if (a) quality were the very difference of substance. In one way, then, quality means the very difference of substance. 157

13. On the difference between the quid est and the quale quid in predication. Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, cap. 1, On Genus (In: Porphyry. Introduction to the Predicaments of Aristotle. By Charles Glen Wallis. Annapolis: St. Johns College, 1938, p. 5):
And again, genus is distinguished from differences and common accidents in that, although differences and common accidents are predicated of many differing in species, they are not predicated in answer to what is it?* For when someone asks us of what differences and common accidents are predicated, we reply that they are not predicated in answer to what is it? but rather in answer to of what quality [or sort] is it?** For we reply, Rational, to the question, of what quality is man? and to of what quality is the crow? we reply, Black. For rational is the difference, and black is an accident. But when we are asked what man is, we answer that he is an animal. For animal is the genus of man. * e)n t%= ti/ e)/sti [= in the what is it?] ** e)n t%= poi=o/n ti e/)sti [= in the of what sort is it?]

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proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. modus autem est, ut dicit augustinus, super gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in v metaphys.. Note that since, in the next passage cited, St. Thomas explains the difference of substance by taking specific differences, one must learn how the difference entering into a definition is taken from the substantial form, the doctrine concerning which will be found below. 157 dicit ergo primo, quod unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur differentia substantiae, idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae. et propter hoc dicitur, quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid. ut si quaeratur, quale animal est homo? respondemus quod bipes: et quale animal equus? respondemus quod quadrupes: et qualis figura est circulus? respondemus quod agonion, id est sine angulo; ac si ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas sit. uno igitur modo ipsa differentia substantiae qualitas dicitur. Note that these differences, inasmuch as they are species-making ones, are essential. Cf. Edward Warrens remark on Porphyry, excerpted on the next page.

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Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician Isagoge. Translation, Introduction and Notes by Edward W. Warren (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1975, n. 25, pp. 32-33):
The doctrine in this passage separates the specific difference qua quality from the essence. Porphyry is following the thrust of the discussion in Topics 128a 20-29 where Aristotle asserts that the genus most appropriately indicates essence. Also Metaphysics 1024b 5-6. At Topics 122b 16-18 he asserts ...no differentia indicates the essence, but rather some quality, such as pedestrian and biped (Loeb). To indicate the essence of the species one names the genus. To indicate the essence of a primary substance one names the species and a fortiori the difference. Categories 2b 7-22.... Later in Porphyrys discussion of difference, pp. 42-47 of the translation, he distinguishes three kinds, one of [32-33] which is specific difference which brings about the division of genera into species. Thus, two kinds of difference are qualitative and accidental, and the third is specific and essential. At a conclusion of this discussion Ammonius remarks, Consequently, the genus is analogous to matter, the difference to form. Since matter provides existence 158 for each thing while the form supplies the qualitative difference, it is reasonable that the genus be predicated essentially, analogous to matter, and for difference to be predicated qualitatively, analogous to form.

Cf. Porphyry the Phoenician, Isagoge, cap. 1, On Difference (In: Porphyry. Introduction to the Predicaments of Aristotle. By Charles Glen Wallis. Annapolis: St. Johns College, 1938, pp. 10-11):
Again, they define difference also thus: difference is predicated in answer to of what quality [or sort]? of those differing in species. For rational and mortal are predicated of man in answer to of what quality [or sort]?. For when we are asked what man is, we properly reply that he is animal; but when we are asked what quality [or sort] of animal he is, we properly reply that he is rational and mortal. For since things are constituted of [10-11] matter and form, or have a constitution analogous to matter and form,as a statue is constituted of bronze as matter and figure as form, man as common and specific is constituted of genus as the analogue of matter and of difference as the analogue of form; yet man is the whole,animal, rational, mortal, in the same way as the statue.

14. On quale quid as meaning how something is what it is. Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.2):
So it [sc. difference understood as a predicable] is a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, but instead of signifying what it signifies how, although not an accidental how, but it signifies how they are what they are. This is expressed in Latin with quale quid. Aristotle says that how simply means an accident, particularly something in the genus of quality, as if I asked how are you today, and you said healthy or sick, you are answering from quality. Anything else would be how only in some respect or in a qualified way. When you get to quantity, for example, we dont say simply how, but how much or how many. Now for difference, the Greek is very precise, and the Latin expresses something of the word for how there, quale quid. Thats again qualified. Its not how period, but how you are what you are. And so how is unique to the genus of quality insofar as how is said without qualification. If I want to talk about quantity, I say how much or how many, and if I want to talk about the essential differences of things, I say how is it what it is. In grammar, the genus is often a noun, and often both an accident and a difference would be, grammatically, an adjective (not necessarily, but usually). I say equilateral triangle and green triangle, so I
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Since matter has existence only through form, I am not certain what this statement means.

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have two adjectives modifying triangle, and so from a grammatical point of view theres no difference. But the logician looks at these and says that green is something accidental, it has nothing to do with nature of triangle at all. On the other hand, he sees that it is of the very nature of a triangle to have three sides, and equilateral says something about how those sides are, and therefore says something about how the triangle is what it is. This is difference in the sense of a species-making difference (sometimes the word difference is used for accidental things too).

15. On quale quid in reference to the species-making difference. Cf. Duane H. Berquist, Commentary on the Categories (Cat.7):
This is true even of the sense of how that is in the Metaphysics that isnt in this chapter in the Categories. The sense of how that you have in the definition of difference in logic. In Latin they express that quale quid; the difference doesnt signify quid or what, like genus and species do, but the difference signifies quale quid. But using how for quale, which is the closest translation in English, I say that a difference signifies how it is what it is. Its a name said with one meaning of many things other in kind, signifying how they are what they are. So I give the genus of square, and I say square is a quadrilateral. But not only is a square a quadrilateral, but a rhombus and a rhomboid and an oblong and a trapezium and so on. Then I use a difference like equilateral or right angled and so on. And so I limit quadrilateral; even there you see the idea of determination. When I say four sided, that says nothing about the length of the sides, that says nothing about the angles at which they meet, all of that is undetermined. And the difference determines which it is. But the difference signifies how they are what they are under the genus. Youll see that in various uses of the word how: how much. Someone says this is a long sofa, and I say I have a long wall, or this stretch limousine, but I have a long garage. You have to say how long.Were sending you up for many years. Well, how many years? You can see in these many uses of the word how that it has what Thomas is saying. Its the idea of a determination, it determines something. Thats going to be important for the reason Thomas will give for distinguishing these species. Now in the next paragraph he makes a comparison, a bit like I was doing, between an accidental how, or a how that is tied up with one of the kinds of accident, and the other that I mentioned, the quale quid, which you can have even in substance. He says: Just as that according to which the potency of matter according to its substantial being is determined is called a quality, which is the difference of substance, so that according to which the potency of the subject is determined according to accidental being is called accidental quality, which is also a difference in a way, as is clear through the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. I think, if you look at the Isagoge, youll see that Porphyry is distinguishing the speciesmaking difference from accidental differences. So if some triangles are red and some triangles are white and some triangles are blue, those are differences, but not species-making differences. And Porphyry is defining species-making difference, although we often call it difference for short. But the word difference can actually be applied to accidental differences, like red white and blue triangles. So Thomas is comparing what determines the potency of matter in its substantial being, what we call the substantial form, with the accidental determination of something by a quality in the genus of quality. In both cases what you have in common is the idea of determination, of limiting something that could be more than one way. [end excerpt]

Supplement: Plato on the foregoing principles: 104

Cf. Plato, Timaeus (tr. Benjamin Jowett):


In the first place, we see that what we just now called water, by condensation, I suppose, becomes stone and earth; and this same element, when melted and dispersed, passes into vapour and air. Air, again, when inflamed, becomes fire; and again fire, when condensed and extinguished, passes once more into the form of air; and once more, air, when collected and condensed, produces cloud and mist; and from these, when still more compressed, comes flowing water, and from water comes earth and stones once more; and thus generation appears to be transmitted from one to the other in a circle. Thus, then, as the several elements never present themselves in the same form, how can any one have the assurance to assert positively that any of them, whatever it may be, is one thing rather than another? No one can. But much the safest plan is to speak of them as follows: Anything which we see to be continually changing, as, for example, fire, we must not call this or that, but rather say that it is of such a nature; nor let us speak of water as this; but always as such; nor must we imply that there is any stability in any of those things which we indicate by the use of the words this and that, supposing ourselves to signify something thereby; for they are too volatile to be detained in any such expressions as this, or that, or relative to this, or any other mode of speaking which represents them as permanent. We ought not to apply this to any of them, but rather the word such; which expresses the similar principle circulating in each and all of them; for example, that should be called fire which is of such a nature always, and so of everything that has generation. That in which the elements severally grow up, and appear, and decay, is alone to be called by the name this or that; but that which is of a certain nature, hot or white, or anything which admits of opposite equalities, and all things that are compounded of them, ought not to be so denominated.

16. The difference between quale quid and quid est in the Isagoge of Porphyry and their agreement in the Categories of Aristotle. Note the difference between the roles played by the foregoing terms in their respective parts of logic: In Porphyrys treatment of the predicables, quale quid is opposed to quid est, inasmuch as differences and common accidents are predicated in the what sort is it?, but genera and species in the what is it? But in Aristotles treatment of the predicaments, quale quid and quid est come together, inasmuch as the form or nature expressing the what it is or essence of a substance by that very fact says the sort of thing it is, as saying a man tells us the sort of thing Socrates is. 159 Hence, in the Isagoge we observe that Porphyry distinguishes between the quale quid and the quid est in the exercise of predication, whereas in the Categories Aristotle, by explaining how the what it is of a name expresses the sort of thing it is, brings them together. As for the question of how the difference of substance is explained in one way by the substantial form but in another by the specific difference, cf. the passages quoted below in which St. Thomas explains the way in which genus and difference are taken from matter and form. 17. Supplement.

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Cf. Dirk M. Schenkenveld and Jonathan Barnes, Hellenistic Philosophy, Part II. Logic and Language, Ch. 6, Language, p. 196: The word cow signifies an animal of such-and-such a sort. Cf. the remarks of Henry and Buckner questioning Aristotles grasp of this point cited above.

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Cf. Michael Augros, Porphyrys Isagoge as an Introduction to Logic:


We can now see the chief reason why the logician must discuss various predicables before investigating how to make definitions. A definition itself is composed of many names for the thing defined, and so we must know the thing well enough to name it by any one of those names before we know it well enough to name it by all of them together and in a certain order, i.e. before we know it well enough to define it. In short, we name things before we define them. Therefore some consideration of naming must precede any consideration of defining. The art of naming, then, is a part of the logic of the first act presupposed to its chief part, the art of defining. Since, for example, every name in a definition (or in a premise or a syllogism) must be a proper name of the thing defined, it is necessary before beginning the art of defining to distinguish the proper name from the improper name such as the metaphor or metonym. And among proper names, it is necessary to distinguish between those said of many things and those said of only one, such as Socrates, since the definition will employ only names said of many things. And among those said of many, it will be necessary to distinguish between those said of many for the same reason, and those said of many for different reasons. One begins to see, here, why Aristotle opens his Categories as he does. Finally, one must understand names said univocally of many things before one is ready to begin the art of defining, since such names are the only kinds of names to be used in definitions. But name said univocally of many things is the definition of predicable, and hence Porphyrys Isagoge, which defines and distinguishes the predicables, should be read before Aristotles Categories. If the chief purpose of the logic of the first act is to direct reason in making definitions, then it must determine what are the parts of definition and in what order they are to be put together. Now a perfect definition is composed of many names, namely of a genus and several species-making differences, and the name of the thing being defined is a species in comparison to the first name in the definition. All three of these predicables, therefore, are mentioned explicitly in the Categories. But, as Aristotle notes in other logical works, and even in his writings concerned with other sciences, it is not always possible to define a thing so perfectly. Sometimes it is difficult or altogether impossible for reason to discover the species-making differences, in which case it is necessary to use names less perfect in making the definition, namely properties. For a property, like a species-making difference, distinguishes and separates things. Although the species-making difference signifies how a thing is what it is, and the property does not signify the what-it-is of its subject at all, at least the property signifies what the subject has because of what it is. The property, then, is not entirely disconnected from the what-it-is of its subject, but names an effect of it, and so may be used in place of a species-making difference. But in no case is it acceptable to use the kind of name called an accident in making a definition of a thing, since the accident not only does not signify the what-it-is, but signifies what the subject has because of something other than what it is. Such a name is worthless in defining a thing, but perhaps useful in defining a name (which nominal definition might be a useful starting point in finding the definition of the thing signified by the name). For example, in explaining what is meant by the name chalk, one might include that it is something white. One might define each of the predicables, then, in two ways. First, in themselves and in their order to each other. Accordingly, a genus is a name said univocally of many things other in species signifying what they are, a difference is a name said univocally of many things other in species signifying how they are what they are, a species is a name said univocally of many things under a genus signifying what they are, a property is a name said univocally of many things signifying what they have because of what they are, and an accident is a name said univocally of many things signifying what they have because of something other than what they are. Second, in their order to definition. Accordingly, the species is the name of a thing being defined, the genus is the first name in the definition, a

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difference is one of the other names in the definition, a property is the second-best name to use if we do not know the difference, and an accident is a name wholly useless in the definition of the thing (though perhaps useful in the definition of its name). It is necessary, then, to understand the different kinds of names said univocally of many things (predicables) before one can understand the nature of success and failure in definition. Therefore, if one does not know the various kinds of names, one will not see the order Aristotles Categories has to the work of making definitions. In summary, the logician investigates the various categories or highest genera because they are found at the roots of every definition. Hence, to the extent that ones understanding of the highest genera is weak and vague, so too is ones understanding of what anything is. Moreover, one road to definition is by appropriate division of a genus. But one cannot possibly divide the genus of a thing if one does not know what its genus is. Hence it is necessary to understand well the genera of all things before defining, for the genus is the beginning of a definition. But does this mean that nothing is to be read before the Categories? Obviously, one cannot understand what the Categories is about if one does not understand what a category is. Since a category is a highest genus and a genus is a kind of predicable, one cannot understand what the Categories is about without understanding what a predicable is and how a genus differs from the other kinds of predicables. But Aristotle does not discuss this in the Categories itself. Consequently, it is necessary to read the Isagoge (or something very like it), which defines and distinguishes all the predicables, before reading the Categories, and so before any of the later parts of logic.

18. Supplement. Cf. De Ente et Essentia by Thomas Aquinas translated as Aquinas on Being and Essence a translation and interpretation by Joseph Bobik, cap. 3, nn. 24-36:
24. It is clear, therefore, that the essence of man and the essence of Socrates do not differ, except as the non-designated from the designated. Whence the Commentator says in his considerations on the seventh book of the Metaphysics that Socrates is nothing other than animality and rationality, which are his quiddity.160 25. The essence of the genus and that of the species also differ in this way, i.e., as the nondesignated from the designated, although the mode of the designation differs in each case. Whereas the designation of the individual with respect to the species is through matter determined by dimensions, the designation of the species with respect to the genus is through the constitutive difference which is taken from the form of the thing. 161 26. This designation which is in the species with respect to the genus is not through something in the essence of the species which is in no way in the essence of the genus; rather, whatever is in the species is also in the genus, but as undetermined. For, if animal were not the whole that man is, but a part of man, it would not be predicated of man, since no integral part may be predicated of its whole. 162
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sic ergo patet quod essentia hominis et essentia socratis non differunt nisi secundum signatum et non signatum. unde commentator dicit super vii metaphysicae: socrates nihil aliud est quam animalitas et rationalitas, quae sunt quiditas eius. 161 sic etiam essentia generis et speciei secundum signatum et non signatum differunt, quamvis alius modus designationis sit utrobique, quia designatio individui respectu speciei est per materiam determinatam dimensionibus, designatio autem speciei respectu generis est per differentiam constitutivam, quae ex forma rei sumitur. 162 haec autem determinatio vel designatio, quae est in specie respectu generis, non est per aliquid in essentia speciei exsistens, quod nullo modo in essentia generis sit, immo quicquid est in specie, est etiam in genere ut non determinatum. si enim animal non esset totum quod est homo, sed pars eius, non praedicaretur de eo,

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27. We can see how this comes about if we examine how body taken as part of animal differs from body taken as genus; for body cannot be a genus in the same way in which body is an integral part.163 28. The word body can be taken in many ways. Body according as it is in the genus substance is so called from the fact that it has a nature such that three dimensions can be designated in it; but the three designated dimensions themselves are a body according as body is in the genus quantity. Now, it happens in things that what has one perfection may also attain to further perfection. This is clear, for example, in man who has a sensitive nature, and further an intellectual nature. Similarly, another perfection, such as life or some other such perfection, can be added to the perfection of having a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it. The word body, therefore can signify some real thing which has a form from which follows the possibility of designating in it three dimensions, and signify this in an excluding way, i.e., in such a way such that no further perfection may follow from that form; in a way such that if anything be added, it is outside the signification of body. Taken in this way, body will be an integral and material part of animal because soul will be outside what is signified by the word body; the soul will be something over and above the body, in a way such that animal is constituted out of these two as out of parts, i.e., out of soul and body.164 29. The word body can also be taken in another way, namely, to signify a thing which has a form such that three dimensions can be designated in it, no matter what sort of form it is, whether some further perfection can come from it or not. And taken in this way, body will be a genus of animal, because there is nothing in animal which is not implicitly contained in body. Soul is not a form other than the form through which three dimensions could be designated in that thing; thus, when we said that body is that which has a form such that because of it three dimensions can be designated in the body, form meant any form, whether animality or stoneness, or any other form. And so the form of animal is implicitly contained in the form of body, when body is its genus.165
cum nulla pars integralis de suo toto praedicetur. 163 hoc autem quomodo contingat videri poterit, si inspiciatur qualiter differt corpus secundum quod ponitur pars animalis et secundum quod ponitur genus. non enim potest eo modo esse genus, quo est pars integralis . 164 hoc igitur nomen quod est corpus multipliciter accipi potest. corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis. Contingit autem in rebus, ut quod habet unam perfectionem ad ulteriorem etiam perfectionem pertingat, sicut patet in homine, qui et naturam sensitivam habet et ulterius intellectivam. similiter etiam et super hanc perfectionem, quae est habere talem formam, ut in ea possint tres dimensiones designari, potest alia perfectio adiungi, ut vita vel aliquid huiusmodi. potest ergo hoc nomen corpus significare rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua sequitur in ipsa designabilitas trium dimensionum cum praecisione, ut scilicet ex illa forma nulla ulterior perfectio sequatur; sed si quid aliud superadditur, sit praeter significationem corporis sic dicti. et hoc modo corpus erit integralis et materialis pars animalis, quia sic anima erit praeter id quod significatum est nomine corporis et erit superveniens ipsi corpori, ita quod ex ipsis duobus, scilicet anima et corpore, sicut ex partibus constituetur animal. 165 potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia. et sic forma animalis implicite in forma corporis continetur, prout corpus est genus eius.

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30. And such likewise is the relation of animal to man. For, if animal were to name only that thing which has a perfection such that it can sense and be moved by a principle within itself, and name this thing as excluding other perfection, then any further perfection would be related to animal as a part, and not as implicitly contained in the notion of animal; and so, animal would not be a genus. Animal is a genus according as it signifies a thing from whose form the senses and movement can come forth, no matter what sort of form it is, whether a sensible soul only or a soul which is both sensible and rational.166 31. The genus, thus, signifies indeterminately everything that is in the species; it does not signify the matter alone. Similarly, the difference, too, signifies everything in the species, and not the form alone; the definition, too, signifies the whole, and so does the species, but in diverse ways.167 32. For the genus signifies the whole as a name determining what is material in the real thing without the determination of the proper form. Whence the genus is taken from the matter, although it is not the matter. And from this it is clear that a body is called a body from the fact that it has a perfection such that three dimensions can be designated in the body, and that this perfection is related materially to further perfection.168 33. The difference, on the contrary, is a name taken from a determinate form, and taken in a determinate way, i.e. as not including a determinate matter in its meaning. This is clear, for example, when we say animated, i.e., that which has a soul; for what it is, whether a body or something other, is not expressed. Whence Ibn-Sn says that the genus is not understood in the difference as a part of its essence, but only as something outside its essence, as the subject also is understood in its properties. And this is why the genus is not predicated essentially of the difference, as the Philosopher says in the third book of the Metaphysics and in the fourth book of the Topics, but only in the way in which a subject is predicated of its property.169

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et talis est etiam habitudo animalis ad hominem. si enim animal nominaret tantum rem quandam, quae habet talem perfectionem, ut possit sentire et moveri per principium in ipso existens cum praecisione alterius perfectionis, tunc quaecumque alia perfectio ulterior superveniret, haberet se ad animal per modum partis et non sicut implicite contenta in ratione animalis, et sic animal non esset genus; sed est genus secundum quod significat rem quandam, ex cuius forma potest provenire sensus et motus, quaecumque sit illa forma, sive sit anima sensibilis tantum sive sensibilis et rationalis simul . 167 sic ergo genus significat indeterminate totum id quod est in specie, non enim significat tantum materiam; similiter etiam differentia significat totum et non significat tantum formam; et etiam diffinitio significat totum, et etiam species. sed tamen diversimode, 168 quia genus significat totum ut quaedam denominatio determinans id quod est materiale in re sine determinatione propriae formae. unde genus sumitur ex materia, quamvis non sit materia, ut patet quod corpus dicitur ex hoc quod habet talem perfectionem, ut possint in eo designari tres dimensiones; quae quidem perfectio est materialiter se habens ad ulteriorem perfectionem. 169 differentia vero e converso est sicut quaedam denominatio a forma determinate sumpta praeter hoc quod de primo intellectu eius sit materia determinata, ut patet, cum dicitur animatum, scilicet illud quod habet animam; non enim determinatur quid sit, utrum corpus vel aliquid aliud. unde dicit avicenna quod genus non intelligitur in differentia sicut pars essentiae eius, sed solum sicut ens extra essentiam, sicut etiam subiectum est de intellectu passionum. et ideo etiam genus non praedicatur de differentia per se loquendo, ut dicit philosophus in iii metaphysicae et in iv topicorum, nisi forte sicut subiectum praedicatur de passione.

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34. The definition, lastly, and the species include both, namely the determinate matter which the name of the genus designates, and the determinate form which the name of the difference designates.170 35. From this it is clear why the genus, the difference, and the species are related proportionately to the matter, to the form, and to the composite in nature, although they are not identical with them. 36. The genus is not the matter, but taken from the matter as signifying the whole; nor is the difference the form, but taken from the form as signifying the whole .171 Ibid., nn. 48-49. 48. It is clear, therefore, that the word man and the word humanity signify the essence of man, but diversely, as we have said; the word man signifies it as a whole, inasmuch as it does not exclude designation by matter, but contains it implicitly and indistinctly, as we have said before that the genus contains the difference. And this is why the word man is predicated of individuals. But the word humanity signifies it as a part, because it contains in its signification only what belongs to man as man, and it excludes all designation by matter. Whence it is not predicated of individual men. 172 49. And this is why the word essence is sometimes found predicated of a real thing, for we say that Socrates is a certain essence; and sometimes it is denied, as when we say that the essence of Socrates is not Socrates.173 (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., Ia, q. 76, art. 4, obj. 3, c. (in part), ad 4 (tr. English Dominican Fathers):
Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But rational, which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; 174 while he is called animal by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. 175
170

sed diffinitio vel species comprehendit utrumque, scilicet determinatam materiam, quam designat nomen generis, et determinatam formam, quam designat nomen differentiae. 171 ex hoc patet ratio quare genus, species et differentia se habent proportionaliter ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa, quia neque genus est materia, sed a materia sumptum ut significans totum, neque differentia forma, sed a forma sumpta ut significans totum . Note that this last statement makes clear the relation of the substantial form to the difference of substance. 172 sic igitur patet quod essentiam hominis significat hoc nomen homo et hoc nomen humanitas, sed diversimode, ut dictum est, quia hoc nomen homo significat eam ut totum, in quantum scilicet non praecidit designationem materiae, sed implicite, continet eam et indistincte, sicut dictum est quod genus continet differentiam; et ideo praedicatur hoc nomen homo de individuis. sed hoc nomen humanitas significat eam ut partem, quia non continet in significatione sua nisi id, quod est hominis in quantum est homo, et praecidit omnem designationem. unde de individuis hominis non praedicatur. 173 et propter hoc etiam nomen essentiae quandoque invenitur praedicatum in re, dicimus enim socratem esse essentiam quandam; et quandoque negatur, sicut dicimus quod essentia socratis non est socrates . 174 Which is mans substantial form. Consequently, considered as a principle of his being, the difference of substance is referred to his substantial form, which is the intellectual soul; but considered as that from which he is what he is, his quality is referred to the specific difference, rational. 175 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in VIII Metaphys., quod genus sumitur a materia, differentia vero a forma. Sed rationale, quod est differentia constitutiva hominis, sumitur ab anima intellectiva; animal vero dicitur ex hoc quod habet corpus animatum anima sensitiva. Anima ergo intellectiva comparatur ad corpus animatum anima sensitiva, sicut forma ad materiam. Non ergo anima intellectiva est eadem per essentiam cum anima

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corp. ...The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three different reasons.176 In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, a white man. If, therefore, man were living by one form, the vegetative soul, and animal by another form, the sensitive soul, and man by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), what contains them?that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.177 Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one anotheror that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because animal is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.178
sensitiva in homine; sed praesupponit eam sicut materiale suppositum. 176 ...Opinio autem Platonis sustineri utique posset, si poneretur quod anima unitur corpori, non ut forma, sed ut motor, ut posuit Plato. Nihil enim inconveniens sequitur, si idem mobile a diversis motoribus moveatur, praecipue secundum diversas partes. Sed si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. Quod quidem triplici ratione manifestari potest. 177 Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus. Si igitur homo ab alia forma haberet quod sit vivum, scilicet ab anima vegetabili; et ab alia forma quod sit animal, scilicet ab anima sensibili; et ab alia quod sit homo, scilicet ab anima rationali; sequeretur quod homo non esset unum simpliciter, sicut et Aristoteles argumentatur contra Platonem, in VIII Metaphys., quod si alia esset idea animalis, et alia bipedis, non esset unum simpliciter animal bipes. Et propter hoc, in I de anima, contra ponentes diversas animas in corpore, inquirit quid contineat illas, idest quid faciat ex eis unum. Et non potest dici quod uniantur per corporis unitatem, quia magis anima continet corpus, et facit ipsum esse unum, quam e converso. 178 Secundo, hoc apparet impossibile ex modo praedicationis. Quae enim sumuntur a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta cum dicimus quod

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Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.179 We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And ( De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonalso neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man.180 Reply to Objection 4. We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material.

album est dulce, vel, si formae sint ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se, in secundo modo dicendi per se, quia subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati. Sicut superficies praeambula est ad colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus superficiatum est coloratum, erit secundus modus praedicationis per se. Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur homo, sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent; vel quod sit ibi praedicatio in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una animarum sit ad aliam praeambula. Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal per se de homine praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis, sed e converso. Ergo oportet eandem formam esse per quam aliquid est animal, et per quam aliquid est homo, alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine praedicetur. 179 Tertio, apparet hoc esse impossibile per hoc, quod una operatio animae, cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam. Quod nullo modo contingeret, nisi principium actionum esset per essentiam unum. 180 Sic ergo dicendum quod eadem numero est anima in homine sensitiva et intellectiva et nutritiva. Quomodo autem hoc contingat, de facili considerari potest, si quis differentias specierum et formarum attendat. Inveniuntur enim rerum species et formae differre ab invicem secundum perfectius et minus perfectum, sicut in rerum ordine animata perfectiora sunt inanimatis, et animalia plantis, et homines animalibus brutis, et in singulis horum generum sunt gradus diversi. Et ideo Aristoteles, in VIII Metaphys., assimilat species rerum numeris, qui differunt specie secundum additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Et in II de anima, comparat diversas animas speciebus figurarum, quarum una continet aliam; sicut pentagonum continet tetragonum, et excedit. Sic igitur anima intellectiva continet in sua virtute quidquid habet anima sensitiva brutorum, et nutritiva plantarum. Sicut ergo superficies quae habet figuram pentagonam, non per aliam figuram est tetragona, et per aliam pentagona; quia superflueret figura tetragona, ex quo in pentagona continetur; ita nec per aliam animam Socrates est homo, et per aliam animal, sed per unam et eandem.

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And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the genus; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the difference of man.181 (emphasis added)

Cf. Ignotus Auctor, Summa Totius Logicae Aristotelis, tract. 1, cap. 2 (tr. B.A.M.):
TR1 CP02 genus, ut hic sumitur, est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid. ad videndum autem particulas hujus descriptionis, sciendum est, quod genus dicitur praedicari de pluribus speciebus, seu dividitur in plures species. et cum non sit unum re, sed solum secundum rationem, ideo non dividitur secundum rem. et quia genus non est unum re; ideo partes subjectivae, seu species in quas dividitur, sunt realiter diversae et distinctae inter se: ideo oportet quod aliquod reale habeant in se, per quod reale una sit diversa ab alia. ubi nota, quod una et eadem res per suam essentiam cum essentia alterius rei habet aliquam conformitatem seu convenientiam, et aliquam difformitatem realem: quae conformitas vel difformitas potest esse major vel minor per comparationem ad diversas res. verbi gratia, socrates per essentiam suam quae est ex hac anima et hoc corpore, conformatur platoni, et huic equo, et huic plantae: socrates enim per suam essentiam est rationalis, sensibilis et vivus: in omnibus his tribus est conformis platoni:
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Genus, as it is taken here, is what is predicated of many things differing in species in the what it is. In order to see the particulars of this description, it must be understood that genus is said to be predicated of many species, or divided into many species. And since it is not one in the thing [i.e. in reality], but only according to reason, therefore it is not divided according to the thing. And because a genus is not one in the thing; therefore the subjective parts or species into which it is divided are really [in reality] diverse and distinct among themselves. And so it is necessary that something real be possessed in itself through which real thing one is diverse from another. Where note that one and the same thing by its own essence has a certain conformity or aggrement with the essence of another thing, and some real difformity [difference in form]: which conformity or difformity can be greater or less in comparison to diverse things. For example, Socrates by his own essence which is from this soul and this body, is conformed to Plato, and to this horse, and to this plant: for Socrates by his own essence is rational, and sensitive, and living: in all three things he is conformed to Plato:

Ad quartum dicendum quod non oportet secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere, quia ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest. Quia igitur, ut dictum est, anima intellectiva virtute continet id quod sensitiva habet, et adhuc amplius; potest seorsum ratio considerare quod pertinet ad virtutem sensitivae, quasi quoddam imperfectum et materiale. Et quia hoc invenit commune homini et aliis animalibus, ex hoc rationem generis format. Id vero in quo anima intellectiva sensitiva excedit, accipit quasi formale et completivum, et ex eo format differentiam hominis.

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huic autem equo est conformis in duobus, scilicet in sensibili et in vivo, et in uno est difformis, quia in eo est realiter rationale, quod non est in hoc equo: huic vero plantae conformis est in uno, scilicet, in vivo. quia vero intellectus noster ea quae in re sunt conjuncta potest distinguere, quando unum eorum non cadit in ratione alterius; et cum rationale in se consideratum non sit de ratione sensibilis, nec sensibile de ratione vivi, ideo ea in socrate separatim accipit, ut dictum est, per respectum ad diversa. quando ergo intellectus considerat in re illud in quo convenit cum aliis rebus, illi rei conceptae attribuit intentionem universalitatis. et quia in qualibet re singulari est considerare aliquid quod est proprium illius rei in quantum est haec res, sicut in socrate est considerare aliquid quod est ita proprium socratis in quantum est hic homo, quod nulli alii convenit. rei ergo sic conceptae attribuit intellectus intentionem singularitatis, et vocat illud singulare vel individuum: et hae secundae intentiones sunt, scilicet universalitas et singularitas. unde, licet supra dictum fuerit quod intentiones fiunt ab intellectu, tamen oportet quod aliquod fundamentum habeant in re extra: nam intentioni singularitatis respondet extra illud quod est proprium socratis in quantum est hic homo; intentioni vero universalitatis respondet extra ut fundamentum illud in quo socrates est conformis cum aliis rebus. cum igitur ea quae in uno conformantur et in alio sunt difformia, dummodo talis difformitas sit secundum formam, et non secundum materiam signatam, vel secundum illud quod est

but to this horse he is conformed in two things, namely, in sensitive and in living, and in one difform, because in in him rational really exists, and not in this horse: but to this plant he is conformed in one thing, namely, in living. But because our intellect can distinguish those things which are conjoined in the thing, when one of them does not fall into the account of the other and since rational considered in itself is not of the account of sensitive, nor sensitive of the account of living, therefore each is taken separately in Socrates by a respect to diverse things. When, therefore, the intellect consider in a thing that in which it agrees with other things, to those things conceived it attributes the intention of universality. And because in any singular thing there is to consider something that is proper to that thing inasmuch as it has this thing, just as in Socrates there is to consider something which is thus proper to Socrates inasmuch as he is man, which belongs to no other other things. Therefore to the thing thus conceived the intellect attributes the intention of singularity, and calls that singular or individual: and these, namely, universality or singularity, are second intentions. Whence, although it was said above that intentions are made by the intellect, still it is necessary that they have a foundation in the thing outside: for to the intention of singularity corresponds outside that which is proper to Socrates inasmuch as he is this man; but to the intention of universality corresponds outside as a foundation that in which Socrates is conformed to other things. Since, therefore, those things which are conformed in one thing and are difform in another, even though such difformity be according to a form, and not according to designated matter, or

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proprium huic individuo in quantum hujusmodi; illi uni in quo talia conveniunt, attribuit intellectus intentionem generis, et vocat genus. ubi nota secundum avicennam quod duplex est forma: quaedam est quae est pars compositi, sicut anima est forma hominis: ex anima enim et corpore componitur homo; quaedam autem sequitur totum compositum, ut humanitas, quae etiam est forma hominis: et isto modo sumpta forma dicitur quidditas, et est illud quod intellectus intelligit de re. quando ergo intellectus intelligit praedictam formam seu quidditatem ut est determinata ad hanc materiam, puta humanitatem ut est in hac materia signata, scilicet in his carnibus et in his ossibus et hujusmodi; tunc faciendo concretum, puta hunc hominem, intelligit singulare, et huic attribuit intentionem singularitatis. si vero dictam formam intelligit non ut est determinata ad hanc materiam, quia omnis talis forma de se plurificabilis est ad hanc et ad illam materiam; habenti talem formam intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis, unde homo est universale. et si ea quae in hac forma conveniunt, non habent inter se difformitatem pertinentem ad dictam formam, sed solum sunt difformia per materiam signatam istius vel illius, in qua dicta forma determinata est in isto vel in illo, secundum modum qui dicetur in tractatu de specie, illa dicuntur solum differre numero; et concretum substantivum hujusmodi formae acceptae ut plurificari potest, puta homo, dicitur species specialissima. si vero ea quae conveniunt in aliqua forma

according to that which is proper to this individual inasmuch as he is of this sortto that one thing in which they agree, the intellect attributes the intention of genus, and calls it genus. Where note according to Avicenna that form is twofold: there is a certain one which is part of a composite, as the soul is the form of man: for a man is composed of soul and body; but a certain one follows a composed whole, as humanity, which is also the form of man. And taken in this way the form is called a quiddity, and it is that which the intellect understands of a thing. But when the intellect understands the aforesaid form or quiddity as it is determined to this matter for instance, humanity as it is in this designated matter, namely, in this flesh and in these bones and the like then by making it concrete, for instance, this man, it understands a singular, and it attributes to this the intention of singularity. But if it understands the said form not as it is determined to this matter, since every such form is of itself plurifiable to this and to that matter to the thing having such a form the intellect attributes the intention of universality, and so man is universal. And if those things which agree in this form do not have between them a difference in form pertaining to the said form, but only differ by the designated matter of this or that thing, in which the said form is determined in this or in that thing, according to the mode which will be discussed in the treatment of species, those things are said to differ solely in number and the concrete substantive of this sort of form taken as it may be plurified, for instance, man, is called the most particular species. But if those things which agree in some pluri-

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plurificabili, ut dictum est, sunt inter se difformia non solum quantum ad materiam signatam, ut dictum est, sed quantum ad difformitatem specificam: puta, quod talis forma est animalitas, in qua conveniunt socrates et hic equus, qui inter se non solum sunt difformes quantum ad has carnes et haec ossa, sed in hoc quia hic homo habet formam humanitatis, et ille equinitatis; talia dicuntur differre specie: et talis forma in qua conveniunt in concreto sumpta, puta, animal, est genus. et quia, ut dictum est, talis natura sumpta in concreto, de pluribus formaliter differentibus, quae sunt in diversis speciebus, dici potest; hinc est quod tali naturae intentio generis potest attribui: ideo dicitur quod genus praedicatur, idest praedicabile est de pluribus differentibus specie, seu dicitur dividi in plures species. et hoc quod dictum est in concreto sumptum intelligitur solum in praedicamento substantiae: in aliis vero praedicamentis, et maxime in absolutis, sumitur genus et species in abstracto. dicitur autem genus praedicari in eo quod quid est, idest, substantive secundum grammaticos; ut animal quod de homine et de equo praedicatur, est substantivum et non adjectivum. sensibile enim quod de animali praedicatur, quamvis sit de essentia animalis, non tamen dicitur praedicari in quid, sed in quale; et causa est quia est adjectivum. sciendum est autem quod quia ea quae in quid praedicantur sunt de essentia seu quidditate eorum de quibus praedicantur; ideo praedicari in quid non solum potest dicere modum significandi, ut dictum est; sed etiam dicit quidditatem ipsius de quo prae-dicatur. et patet quid sit genus.

fiable form, as has been said, are different in form not only with respect to designated matter, but with respect to a specific difference in form for instance, that such a form is animality, in which Socrates and this horse agree, which differ not only with respect to this flesh and these bones, but in this, that this man has the form of humanity, and that of equinititysuch things are said to differ in species: and such a form in which they agree when taken concretely, for instance, animal, is the genus. And because, as has been said, such a nature taken concretely, may be said formally of many differing things, which are in diverse speciesit is from this that the intention of genus can be attributed to such a nature: and so it is said that a genus is predicated, that is, is predicable of many things differing in species. And this that is said taken concretely is understood solely in the predicament of substance: but in the other predicaments, and chiefly in the absolute ones, genus as well as species is taken abstractly. But genus is said to be predicated in the what it is, that is, substantivally, according to grammarians; as animal which is predicated of man and horse, is a substantive and not an adjective. For sensitive predicated of an animal, even though it is not of the essence of animal, is nevertheless not said to be predicated in the what, but in the what sort, and for this reason it is an adjective. But it must be understood that because those things which are predicated in the what are of the essence or quiddity of those things of which they are predicated, therefore, to be predicated in the what not only may express the mode of signifying, as has been said, but it also expresses the very quiddity of that of which it is predicated. And so genus is clear.

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Cf. ibid., tract. 1, cap. 4 (tr. B.A.M.).


differentia, ut hic sumitur, dupliciter describitur. primo sic. differentia est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale. secundo sic. differentia est qua species abundat a genere. ad videndum autem primam descriptionem sciendum est, quod, ut supra dictum est, in aliquibus formis potest esse latitudo in eadem forma secundum gradus formales, quorum unus secundum se est nobilior et perfectior alio: et ab hac forma sumitur genus. ubi nota, quod in entibus sunt diversi gradus essendi, sive sint gradus substantiales, sive accidentales: qui gradus licet in aliquibus entibus sint dispersi, tamen aliquando invenitur aliquod unum plures gradus perfectionis substantiales vel accidentales comprehendens. verbi gratia, vegetabile, sensibile, rationale, sunt gradus entium substantiales: planta enim substantialiter est vegetabilis: canis vero substantialiter est sensibilis: et homo substantialiter est rationalis; et isti gradus dispersi in multis, aliquando inveniuntur in uno solo, puta in homine: homo namque per suam formam substantialem quae est in una, habet omnes istas tres perfectiones: nam est vegetabilis, et est sensibilis, et est rationabilis: unde socrates per unam suam essentiam conformatur plantae et cani et platoni, ut supra dictum est. haec autem conformitas quae est socratis ad plantam, potest esse una duorum: sicut enim similitudo duorum nigrorum est una amborum, quia unius ut subjecti, et alterius ut termini; sic talis conformitas est socratis ut subjecti, et illius plantae ut termini. nec propter hoc dico quod talis conformitas sit relatio secundum esse; sed est relatio secundum dici, ut fundamentum relationis secundum esse. Difference, as it is taken here, is described in two ways. In the first way thus: Difference is what is predi-cated of many things differing in species in the what sort? In the second way thus: Difference is that by which the species exceeds the genus. In order to grasp the first description it must be understood that, as was said above, in any form there can be a latitude in the same form with respect to formal grades, one of which in and of itself is more noble and perfect than another: and from this form the genus is taken. Where note that in beings there are diverse grades of being, whether they be substantial grades or accidental ones: which grades, although they be dispersed in certain beings, still at times there is found something one comprehending many grades of substantial or accidental perfection. For example, vegetative, sensitive, rational, are grades of substantial being: for plant is substantially vegetative: but dog is substantially sensitive: and man is substantially rational; and these grades, dispersed in many things, sometimes are found in one thing alone, such as man; For man through his substantial form, which is in one thing, has all three of these perfections: for hr is vegetative, and he is sensitive, and he is rational: whence Socrates by his one own essence is conformed to plant and dog and Plato, as was said above. But this agreement in form which is of Socrates with respect to plant, can be one of two things: for just as a likeness of two black things is one thing of both, being of one thing as of a subject, and another as of a term, thus such an agreement in form is of Socrates as of a subject, and of a plant as of a term. Nor on this account do I say that such an agreement in form is a relation according to being; rather it is a relation according to being said, as the foundation of a relation according to being.

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talis autem conformitas quae realiter una est, ut dictum est, movet intellectum nostrum ad unum conceptum, puta vivum, a quo conceptu sumitur genus, vel aliquando species, ut ex supradictis haberi potest. unde talis conformitas se habet ad genus ut fundamentum remotum. conceptus vero vivi ad quem talis conformitas movet intellectum, se habet ad genus ut fundamentum propinquum: et sic licet unitas generis sit unitas rationis, tamen aliquo modo habet fundari in uno secundum rem. difformitas vero quae est inter socratem et plantam, est, quia socrates sentit, non autem planta: a qua difformitate sumitur differentia, quae dividit vivum quod commune est homini et plantae. unde per hanc differentiam ostenditur, quod vivum invenitur in habente aliquam aliam perfectionem, quae non est in planta. et quia in tali perfectione, puta sensibili, convenit socrates cum cane; similiter inter eos est una conformitas movens ad unum concepttum; a quo, si sumatur in concreto substantive, ita quod tale concretum de suo significato dicat explicite et vivum et sensibile, sumitur aliud genus, scilicet animal. si vero sumatur in concreto adjective, ita quod de suo significato dicat solam illam perfectionem explicite, scilicet sensibile, sumitur differentia, puta in quantum dicatur sensibile: et sic de aliis usque ad ultimam differentiam specificam, infra quam non est perfectio formalis. cum ergo de tot possit dici sensibile de quot dicitur animal: sed animal quod est genus, praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie: similiter et sensibile quod est differentia, praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie.

Now such an agreement in form which in reality is one thing, as was said, moves our intellect to one concept, such as living, from which concept the genus is taken, or sometimes the species, as one may gather from what was said above. And so such agreement in form stands to the genus as a remote foundation. But the concept of living to which such an agreement in form moves the intellect stands to the genus as the foundation near at hand. And thus although the unity of the genus be a unity of reason, still, in some way it must be founded on one thing in reality. But there is a disparity of form which exists between Socrates and plant, because Socrates senses, but a plant does not: from which difformity the difference is taken, which divides the living that is common to man and plant. Whence by this difference it is shown that in the thing having life there is found some other perfection which is not in plant. And because in such a perfection, for example, sensitive, Socrates agrees with dog, likewise between them there is an agreement in form moving the intellect to one concept; from which, if it be taken in the concrete substantively, such that such a concrete of its own signification express explicitly both living and sensitive, another genus is taken, namely, animal. But if it be taken in the concrete adjectivally, such that of its own signified it express that perfection alone explicitly, namely sensitive, the difference is taken, for example, inasmuch as it be called sensitive: and thus of the others up to the ultimate specific difference, below which there is no formal perfection. Since, therefore, as many times as animal is said, so many times may sensitive be said, but animal is a genus predicated of many things differing in species: likewise sensitive, which is a difference, may be predicated of many things differing in species.

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notandum quod forma substantialis habet duplex esse. unum est objective in intellectu; et secundum hoc esse intellectus attribuit sibi nomen abstractum: considerat enim eam intellectus non considerando materiam in qua est; et propterea dat sibi nomen abstractum, ut humanitas. aliud esse habet in materia: ad quam habet duplicem habitudinem. una est, quia inhaeret ei tamquam salvata in ipsa; et sic aliquo modo habet modum accidentis: et sic dat ei intellectus nomen concretum adjectivum, quale est nomen accidentis, ut humanum. secunda comparatio quam habet ad materiam, ut complens et perficiens ipsam; et sic non habet modum accidentis, sed modum substantiae: et sic dat ei intellectus nomen concretum substantivum, ut homo. notandum, quod animal differt a sensibili: quia animal dicitur ab anima sensibili; sensibile autem dicitur a sensibilitate. et quia anima ad sensibilitatem se habet, sicut potentia ad actum; ideo differentia magis est actualis quam id cujus est differentia, licet tantum ambiant ambo. dicitur autem differentia praedicari in quale, idest adjective: hujus ratio est. ut enim dictum est, differentia divisiva alicujus generis sumitur a perfectione quam non habent omnia quae sunt sub genere: quae perfectio comparata ad illud unde sumitur genus, se habet ut quoddam perfectum, et per consequens ut formale. et quia adjectiva communiter a formis sumuntur, quae formae habent adjacere; ideo ad designan-

It must be noted that a substantial form has a twofold being. One is objective in the intellect; and according to this being the intellect attributes to it an abstract name: For the intellect considers it by not considering the matter in which it is; and then it gives to it an abstract name, such as humanity. It has another being in matter, to which it has a double relationship. One is, because it inheres in it as being preserved in it; and thus in some way it has the mode of an accident: and thus the intellect gives a concrete adjectival name to it, of which sort is the name of an accident, such as human. But the second comparison which it has to matter [is] as completing and perfecting it; and thus it does not have the mode of an accident, but rather the mode of a substance. And thus the intellect gives to it a concrete substantive name such as man. It must be noted that animal differs from sensitive because animal is said from the sensitive soul, but sensitive is said from the ability to sense. And because the soul relates to sensibility just as potency to act, therefore the difference is more actual than that of which it is the difference, although both [sc. animal and sensitive] embrace as much But the difference is said to be predicated in the of what sort?, that is, adjectivally, of which this is the reason: For, as has been said, the difference divisive of any genus is taken from a perfection everything under the genus does not have: which perfection, compared to that whence the genus is taken, stands as something perfect, and consequently as formal. And because adjectives are commonly taken from forms, which forms have to be adjacent

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dum quod differentia sumitur a solo formali, et illud solum dicit explicite, perfecta est differentia per modum adjectivum in sui praedicatione. ad videndum autem secundam definitionem differentiae, sciendum quod impossibile est partem de toto praedicari; sed quidquid de alio vere praedicatur, oportet quod dicat totum. cum autem de socrate praedicetur homo et animal et rationale, oportet quod homo dicat totum formale quod est in petro: et dico formale, loquendo de forma quae sequitur totum compositum. similiter oportet quod animal dicat totum formale, et similiter rationale dicat totum formale: sed diversimode: nam rationale dicit totum illud quod dicit homo, non tamen explicite, sed implicite: rationale enim dicit habens rationem. unde de suo principali significato dicit solum rationem. sed quia dicit habens rationem in hoc quod dicit habens intelligitur implicite homo quicumque sit ille: et sic dicit totum quod dicit homo; aliquid tamen explicite, et aliquid implicite. similiter etiam animal dicit totum quod dicit homo, non tamen explicite; dicit enim animal habens vitam et sensum; unde de suo principali significato solum dicit vitam et sensum: sed in hoc quod dicit habens implicite intelligitur homo.

therefore for the purpose of designation that difference is taken from what is solely formal, and it expresses that alone explicitly, the perfect is the difference in the mode of an adjective in its predication.182 But in order to see the second definition of difference, it must be understood that it is impossible for a part to be predicated of a whole; but whatever be truly predicated of another, it must express the whole. Now when man and animal and rational is predicated of Socrates, it is necessary that man express the formal whole which is in Peter: and I say formal, by speaking of the form which follows on the composed whole. Likewise it is necessary that animal express the formal whole, and likewise rational express the formal whole; but in different ways: for rational expresses the whole which man expresses, but not in an explicit manner, but implicitly: for rational means having reason. And so of its principal signified it expresses reason alone. But because it expresses (the one) having reason in this that it says (the one) having there is understood implicitly man whoever he is: and thus it expresses the whole that man expresses; the one explicitly, the other implicitly. Likewise animal expresses the whole which man expresses, but not explicitly; for animal expresses (the one) having life and sense ; whence of its principal signified it expresses life and sense alone: but insofar as it expresses (the one) having, man is understood implicitly.

homo vero dicit explicite totum formale quod But man expresses explicitly the formal whole est in socrate: that is in Socrates. nam dicit habens humanitatem: quae humanitas dicit explicite motum et sensum, quod dicit animal, et rationem quam dicit rationale.
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For it expresses (the one) having humanity: of which humanity expresses explicitly movement and sense, which animal expresses, and reason

That is, the difference, which expresses explicitly a perfection the thing has that other things in the genus do not, signifies in the manner of an accident in its predication.

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which rational expresses. unde homo de suo principali significato dicit animal rationale: comparando enim significata istorum explicite: cum genus et differentia, ut dictum est, non significent quodlibet eorum nisi partem, species vero explicite significet illud quod significat. utrumque ergo significatum explicitum speciei excedit significatum explicitum generis in significato explicito differentiae. similiter etiam excedit significatum differentiae in significato generis. bene ergo dicitur in praedicta descriptione, quod differentia est qua species abundat a genere: quia species abundat, idest excedit in suo significato etiam illud quod explicite significat differentia. et sic patet quid est differentia secundum sui rationem. Whence man of its principal signified expresses rational animal; for by comparing the signifieds of these things explicitly with the genus and difference, as has been said, they do not signify any of them except a part, but the species explicitly signify that which it signifies. Therefore both [?] the explicit signified of the species exceeds the explicit signified of the genus in the explicit signified of the difference. Likewise also the signified of the difference exceeds the signified of the genus. Therefore it is well said in the aforementioned description that the difference is that by which the species exceeds the genus, that is, exceeds in its own signified also that which the difference explicitly signifies. And thus it is clear what difference is with respect to its own account.

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19. Supplement: On accidental predicates and the singular in the genus of substance as what exists per se: Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. An., lect. 10, n. 5 (In: Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., lect. 10):
Lecture 10 (73a34-b26) HOW SOMETHING IS SAID TO BE PREDICATED PER SE OF A THING a34. Essential attributes are a38. (2) such that, while b5. Further (a) that b10. In another sense again b16. So far then as concerns b25. Thus, then, we have After determining about said of all, the Philosopher now determines about said per se [i.e., said in virtue of itself] and does three things. First, he shows the number of ways something is said per se. Secondly, how the demonstrator makes use of these ways (73b16). Thirdly, he summarizes (73b25).183 In regard to the first it should be noted that this preposition per [in virtue of or by] denotes a causal relationship, although sometimes it also signifies a state, as when someone is said to be per se, i.e., by himself, when he is alone. But when it designates a relationship to a cause, sometimes the cause is formal, as when it is stated that the body lives in virtue of the soul; sometimes the relationship is to a material cause, as when it is stated that a body is colored in virtue of its surface, i.e., because the surface is the subject of color; again, it might even designate a relationship to an extrinsic cause, particularly an efficient cause, as when it is said that water is made hot in virtue of fire. But just as this preposition per designates a relationship to a cause, when something extrinsic is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject, so also when the subject or something pertaining to the subject is the cause of that which is attributed to the subject. This latter is what per se, i.e., in virtue of itself, signifies.184 Therefore, the first way of saying something per se (73a34) is when that which is attributed to a subject pertains to its form. And because the form and essence of a thing are signified by its definition, the first mode of that which is per se is when the definition itself or something expressed in the definition is predicated of the thing defined. This is what he means when he says, Essential attributes are such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature, i.e., included in the definition which indicates what it is, whether those elements are stated in the nominative case or in one of the oblique cases. Thus, line is stated in the definition of triangle. Hence line is in triangle per se. Again, in the definition of line, point is mentioned; hence point is per se in line. And the reason why they are mentioned in the definition is stated when he says, for the very being or substance [i.e., the essence, which the definition signifies] of triangle and line is composed of these elements, namely, of lines and points. However, this does not mean that a line is formed out of points,
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n. 1. Postquam determinavit philosophus de dici de omni, hic determinat de per se. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, ostendit quot modis dicitur aliquid per se; secundo, ostendit qualiter his modis demonstrator utatur; ibi: quae ergo dicuntur et cetera. 184 n. 2. Circa primum sciendum est quod haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae; designat etiam interdum et situm, sicut cum dicitur aliquis esse per se, quando est solitarius. Causae autem habitudinem designat, aliquando quidem formalis; sicut cum dicitur quod corpus vivit per animam. Quandoque autem habitudinem causae materialis; sicut cum dicitur quod corpus est coloratum per superficiem: quia scilicet proprium subiectum coloris est superficies. Designat etiam habitudinem causae extrinsecae et praecipue efficientis; sicut cum dicitur quod aqua calescit per ignem. Sicut autem haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae, quando aliquid extrinsecum est causa eius, quod attribuitur subiecto; ita quando subiectum vel aliquid eius est causa eius, quod attribuitur ei, et hoc significat per se.

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but that point is involved in the very notion of line, just as line is involved in the very notion of triangle. And he asserts this in order to exclude things which are part of a things matter and not of its species: thus, semicircle is not mentioned in the definition of circle, or finger in the definition of man, as it is stated in Metaphysics VII. He states further that all those items which are found universally in the definition expressing what a thing is are attributed to it per se.185 The second mode of saying per se is when this preposition per implies a relationship of material cause, in the sense that that to which something is attributed is its proper matter and subject. For it is required, when defining an accident, to mention its proper subject in one of the oblique cases: thus when an accident is defined abstractly, we say that aquilinity is a curvature of a nose, but when it is defined concretely, the subject is put in the nominative case, so that we say that the aquiline is a curved nose. Now the reason for this is that since the being of an accident depends on its subject, its definitionwhich signifies its being must mention that subject. Hence it is the second mode of saying per se, when the subject is mentioned in the definition of a predicate which is a proper accident of the subject. 186 And this is what he means when he states (73a38), essential attributes are those such that while they belong to certain subjects, i.e., to subjects of accidents, the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attributes own defining formula, i.e., in the expression which describes what the accident is, i.e., in the definition of the accident. Thus straight and curved belong to line per se. For line is mentioned in their definition. For the same reason odd and even belong per se to number, because number is mentioned in their definition. Again, prime and compound are predicated per se of number, and number is mentioned in their definition. (For a prime number, for example, seven, is one which is exactly divisible by no other number but 1; but a compound number, for example, nine, is one which is exactly divisible by some number greater than 1. Again, isoplural, i.e., equilateral, and scalene, i.e., having three unequal sides, belong per se to triangle, and triangle is mentioned in their definition. Accordingly, he adds that their respective subjects belong to each of the aforesaid accidents and are mentioned in the expression which states what each is, i.e., in the definition: thus line belongs to some of them, and number to others.187
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n. 3. Primus ergo modus dicendi per se est, quando id, quod attribuitur alicui, pertinet ad formam eius. Et quia definitio significat formam et essentiam rei, primus modus eius quod est per se est, quando praedicatur de aliquo definitio vel aliquid in definitione positum (et hoc est quod dicit quod per se sunt quaecunque insunt in eo, quod quid est, idest in definitione indicante quid est), sive ponatur in recto sive in obliquo. Sicut in definitione trianguli ponitur linea; unde linea per se inest triangulo: et similiter in definitione lineae ponitur punctum; unde punctum per se inest lineae. Rationem autem quare ista ponantur in definitione subiungit dicens: substantia, idest essentia, quam significat definitio ipsorum, idest trianguli et lineae, est ex his, idest ex linea et punctis. Quod non est intelligendum quod linea ex punctis componatur, sed quod punctum sit de ratione lineae, sicut linea de ratione trianguli. Et hoc dicit ad excludendum ea, quae sunt partes materiae et non speciei, quae non ponuntur in definitione, sicut semicirculus non ponitur in definitione circuli, nec digitus in definitione hominis, ut dicitur in VII metaphysicae. Et subiungit quod quaecumque universaliter insunt in ratione dicente quid est, per se attribuuntur alicui. 186 n. 4. Secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando haec praepositio per designat habitudinem causae materialis, prout scilicet id, cui aliquid attribuitur, est propria materia et proprium subiectum ipsius. Oportet autem quod proprium subiectum ponatur in definitione accidentis: quandoque quidem in obliquo, sicut cum accidens in abstracto definitur, ut cum dicimus, quod simitas est curvitas nasi; quandoque vero in recto, ut cum accidens definitur in concreto, ut cum dicimus quod simus est nasus curvus. Cuius quidem ratio est, quia cum esse accidentis dependeat a subiecto, oportet etiam quod definitio eius significans esse ipsius contineat in se subiectum. Unde secundus modus dicendi per se est, quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati, quod est proprium accidens eius. 187 n. 4. Et hoc est quod dicit, et per se dicuntur quibuscunque eorum, idest de numero eorum, quae insunt ipsis, idest subiectis accidentium, ipsa subiecta insunt in ratione demonstrante quid est ipsum accidens, idest in definitione accidentis. Sicut rectum et circulare insunt lineae per se: nam linea ponitur in definitione eorum. Et eadem ratione par et impar per se insunt numero, quia numerus in eorum definitione ponitur: nam

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In each of these subjects that have been mentioned, I say that its accident is in it per se. But those predicates which are neutral, i.e., of such a nature as not to be mentioned in the definition of their subjects, nor the subjects in their definition, are accidents, i.e., are predicated per accidens: for example, musical and white are predicated per accidens of animal.188 (emphasis added)

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. An., lect. 10, n. 6 (In: Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle by Thomas Aquinas, translated by Fabian R. Larcher, O.P., lect. 10):
Then (73b5) he sets down another mode of that which is per se, i.e., the sense in which it signifies something in isolation [ solitarium]. Thus something which is a singular in the genus of substance and which is not predicated of any subject is said to be per se. The reason for this is that when I say, walking or white, I do not signify either of them as something isolated or apart, since something else which is walking or white is understood. But this is not the case with terms which signify a this something, i.e., with terms that signify first substance. For when I say, Socrates or Plato, it is not to be supposed that there is something else, over and above what they really are, which would be their subject. Therefore, things which are thus not predicated of any subject are per se, but things which are predicated of a subject, as being in the subject, are accidents. However, not all things predicated of a subject, as universals of their inferiors, are accidents. It should be noted, however, that this mode is not a mode of predicating, but a mode of existing; hence at the very start he said that they exist per se and not that they are said per se.189

20. In sum: what signifies something solitarius: the singular in the genus of substance which is not predicated of any subject is said to be per se; e.g. man what signifies something else besides a hoc aliquid or first substance: accidents, which are things predicated of a subject as being in a subject; e.g. white or musical

par est numerus medium habens. Et similiter primum et compositum per se praedicantur de numero, et numerus in definitione eorum ponitur. Est enim primum in numeris, numerus qui nullo alio numero mensuratur, sed sola unitate, ut septenarius. Compositus autem numerus est, quem etiam alius numerus mensurat, sicut novenarius. Et similiter isopleuros, idest aequilaterum, et scalenon, idest trium inaequalium laterum et altera parte longius, per se insunt triangulo, et triangulus ponitur in definitione eorum. Et ideo subiungit quod, subiecta quae insunt omnibus praemissis accidentibus in ratione dicente quid est, idest in definitione, sicut alicui praedictorum accidentium inest linea, alicui vero numerus, et similiter in aliis, unicuique, inquam, ipsorum subiectorum, per se inesse dico suum accidens. 188 n. 4. quae vero praedicata neutraliter insunt, idest neque ita quod ponantur in definitione subiectorum, neque subiecta in definitione eorum, sunt accidentia, idest per accidens praedicantur, sicut musicum et album praedicantur de animali per accidens. 189 deinde cum dicit: amplius quod non etc., ponit alium modum eius, quod est per se, prout per se significat aliquid solitarium, sicut dicitur quod per se est aliquod particulare, quod est in genere substantiae, quod non praedicatur de aliquo subiecto. et huius ratio est, quia cum dico, ambulans vel album, non significo ambulans vel album, quasi aliquid per se solitarium existens, cum intelligatur aliquid aliud esse quod sit ambulans vel album. sed in his, quae significant hoc aliquid, scilicet in primis substantiis, hoc non contingit. cum enim dicitur socrates vel plato, non intelligitur quod sit aliquid alterum, quam id quod vere ipsa sunt, quod scilicet sit subiectum eorum. sic igitur hoc modo quae non praedicantur de subiecto sunt per se, quae vero dicuntur de subiecto, scilicet sicut in subiecto existentia, accidentia sunt. nam quae dicuntur de subiecto, sicut universalia de inferioribus, non semper accidentia sunt. sciendum est autem quod iste modus non est modus praedicandi, sed modus existendi. unde etiam in principio non dixit, per se dicuntur, sed, per se sunt.

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Cf. John of St. Thomas, Outlines of Formal Logic, translated from the Latin with an introduction by Francis C. Wade, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1955, Absolute and Connotative Terms, p. 36:
Some categorematical terms are absolute, others connotative. The absolute term is one that signifies a thing as a per se being, i.e. after the manner of a substance, whether it be in itself a substance, as man, or an accident conceived without its subject, such as whiteness. The connotative term is one that signifies a thing as modifying another, such as white, blind. Whence the connotative term ought to have one principal and direct signified object which is the same as its absolutesuch as white and whitenessand another indirect signified object, viz. that which it modifies and in which it is found. And the connotative does not signify indirectly and connotatively anything other than what it truly fits; not what it fits imaginatively and falsely. Nor is it enough to connote an object, as do science and wisdom, which are absolutes and yet look to their objects and connote them. The connotative term ought to connote the subject in which it is found. And beware not to confuse connotative, concrete, and adjective. For the concrete is opposed only to the abstract and can be found in an absolute term, e.g. man; whereas the abstract signifies it as that by which it is constituted, e.g. humanity. Also, the adjective is opposed to substantive, not to connotative. Whence a connotative term can be found that is not an adjective expression, such as father, creator, even though every adjective is connotative.

21. Categorematic terms in sum: The absolute term is one that signifies a thing as a per se being, i.e. after the manner of a substance, whether it be in itself a substance, as man, or an accident conceived without its subject, such as whiteness. The connotative term is one that signifies a thing as modifying another, such as white, blind. Whence the connotative term ought to have one principal and direct signified object which is the same as its absolutesuch as white and whiteness and another indirect signified object, viz. that which it modifies and in which it is found.

connotative terms relatives, which, as absolute terms, are substantives adjectives Cf. ibid., p. 63.
CHAP. 10 Supposition (excerpt) We conclude secondly, that supposition, as explained in the definition, is so generally defined that it can be applied also to adjectives, when they are taken in the adjectival sense. For instance, if I say, Peter is white, white also is accepted for something of which it is verified and which fulfills the nature of a white thing according to the demands of the copula. However, if supposition is taken more strictly for that which is not only to be accepted for something , but especially to supply a supposit to the verb, which is the stricter way of supposing, then adjectives do not have supposition in this sense; rather they join their own formally signified objects to another supposit, as the ancient logicians used to say.

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(c) 2013 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved. N.B. For the continuation of this paper, see On What Is Signified, Part II.

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