You are on page 1of 14

G.R. No.


March 9, 1934

CLEMENTE A. LAZARO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. FELICIANA MARIANO, ET AL., defendants. CARMEN JULIANA GARRICHO and FRANCISO AGUADO, appellees. Facts: On November 26, 1928, plaintiffs-appellants Clemente A. Lazaro and Maria Simon filed a complaint, docketed as civil case No. 5073 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, against the herein defendant Feliciana Mariano, praying that the contract of sale be declared rescinded and that an order be issued directing the cancellation of certificate of title No. 9303 of the registry of deeds of Nueva Ecija and the issuance of another in lieu thereof in the name of the said plaintiffs-appellants. On the same date, a notice of lis pendens was filed in the office of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, which notice was noted on the back of said certificate of title No. 9303. A hearing was scheduled but the plaintiffs failed to appear and their counsel was not ready for trial so the court, upon petition of the defendant's counsel, dismissed the case. The order of dismissal was noted on the back of said certificate of title No. 9303. On September 23, 1929, Feliciana Mariano, the defendant in the aforesaid civil case No. 5073, constituted two mortgages on the parcel of land described in the aforementioned certificate of title No. 9303, in favor of the herein defendants-appellees Carmen Juliana Garricho and Francisco Aguado.

Issue: Whether or not the notation of the order of dismissal of civil case No. 5073 on the back of the certificate of title No. 9303 is legal and valid and operated as a cancellation of the notation of the notice of lis pendens.

Held: The dismissal of the complaint in civil case No. 5073 was due to the failure of the therein plaintiffs, who are also the plaintiffs in this case, to appear before the court when the said case was called for trial on the date set therefor, and to their counsel's statement made in open court that he was not ready to proceed with the case. Section 127, case 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, provides that the court may dismiss an action when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial, and the defendant appears and asks for the dismissal; in which case the said dismissal shall not be a bar to another action for the same cause. By provision of law, such dismissal does not therefore give to the subject matter so dismissed, the character of res judicata and consequently the order of dismissal does not finally determine the controversy and is not appealable, in accordance with the provisions of section 122 of the same Code. The order dismissing a case upon petition of the defendant by reason of the plaintiff's failure to appear, not being appealable, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relative to the period for, and the steps to be followed in, the filing and perfection of an appeal are not applicable, and the plaintiff has no other remedy but to ask for the reinstatement of the case or to file another complaint upon the same cause. Upon failure to resort to

either remedy, there will be no pending case before the court, which may be noted in the registry of deeds. The notation of the order of dismissal issued in civil case No. 5073, which eliminated it from the court's docket, operated as a cancellation of the notation of the pendency thereof. At any rate, due to the delay in the filing of the new complaint, which was done on June 10, 1930, the dismissal having taken place on July 2, 1929, the herein plaintiffs-appellants lost the benefit of the lis pendens. In view of the foregoing, this court is of the opinion and so holds: (1) That the order dismissing a civil case, upon petition of the defendant by reason of the plaintiff's failure to appear, is not final and does not constitute res judicata, and therefore, not appealable; and (2) that the dismissal of a civil case upon petition of the defendant by reason of the plaintiff's failure to appear, operates as a cancellation of the notation of lis pendens.

CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., vs. MONTELIBANO Facts: These are appeals from two orders entered by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, acting as land registration court, in Cadastral Case No. 9, LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 86.GR 133891. April 10 1957: Capitol Subdivision, Inc. and Montelibano Subdivisions filed a motion in the CFI of Occidental Negros alleging that Lot No. 21 of subdivision plan No. Psd-12392, a part of Lot No. 77of the Silay Cadastre, registered in the names of Alfredo Montelibano and Alejandro M. Montelibano, share and share alike, covered by TCT No. T5979, was sold to Corazon J. Lacson of Silay, Occidental Negros, payable by installment; On August 1947, the vendors mortgaged the said parcel of land together with other properties of the petitioners to the Philippine National Bank, Bacolod Branch , which mortgaged was duly noted at the back of TCT No. T-5979. On 24 September 1954: vendee paid in full the agreed price of the parcel of land and on the same date the vendors executed the deed of sale in her favor. On 29 January 1957: the mortgagee executed a deed of release of real estate mortgage on the parcel of land in question; On 12 March 1957: Alfredo L. Montelibano and Concepcion Montelibano Hojilla brought an action against Alfredo Montelibano in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros civil case No.4272) and, pursuant to the provisions of section 79, Act No. 496, as amended, and section 24, Rule 7,of the Rule of Court, who caused anotice of lis pendens to be annotated in the title to all the realities of the defendant in the province of Occidental of Negros, including that sold to Corazon J. Lacson; and that the vendee was an innocent purchaser. They prayed that the Register of Deeds of the province of Occidental Negros be directed to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated on the back of TCT No. T-5979, insofar as it affectsLot No. 21, and issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title in favor of Corazon J.Lacson free from the annotation of the notice of lis pendens. On 22 May 1957 the oppositors Alfredo L. Montelibano and Concepcion Montelibano Hojilla filed a motion for reconsideration.8. On 3 June 1957 the petitioners filed an objection thereto. On 11 November 1957 the Court denied their motion. Hence this appeal interposed by the oppositors. Held: The deed of sale in favor of Corazon J. Lacson, executed by the vendors on 24 September 1954,was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds on 9 May 1957 (entry No. 48590), after the notice of lis pendens had been noted on back of the title to the property on 12 March 1957. In the second case, the deed of sale in favor of Marcelino Lalantakan executed by the vendors on 29 June1936 was not registered at all. The parcels of land in question covered by transfer certificates of title Nos. 5979 and 5986 were registered in the name ofAlfredo Montelibano and Alejandro Montelibano and Alejandro M. Montelibano, share and share alike. Although an unrecorded sale of a parcel of land registered under the Torrens System is binding upon the parties, yet " The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land. Such being the law any acquired right in a registered land is effective as between and binding upon the parties and their privies but not as to third parties.4. The sale made of the two lots by the registered owners to Corazon J. Lacson and Marcelino Lalantakan, respectively, not having been registered, such sales do not affect third parties. The lots continue or remain the property of the registered owners. And when the latter are sued by a party concerning or involving or affecting the lots thus sold by the registered owners and the

suing party causes a notice of lis pendens to be noted on the back of the certificates of title to the lots sold, such notice cannot be cancelled upon motion of the vendors or vendees predicated upon the fact that the vendees had acquired the lots prior to the noting of the notice of lis pendens. If judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the action brought against the registered owners, the unrecorded right acquired by the vendees in the lots sold to them is subject or subordinate to the right of the plaintiffs in whose favor judgment is rendered. If judgment is rendered against the plaintiffs in the action, the notice of lis pendens noted on the certificate of title to the lots loses its efficacy or is ipso facto cancelled. The orders appealed from are reversed, with costs against the petitioners and appellees.

heirs of marasigan vs ca and maria marron facts:

fe and felicisimo bazaar- owner of the land, married marron- caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens marasigan- bought land with notice of lis pendens

1975- maron filed before cfi for the execution of regustrabledeed of sale between her and the bazars

1976- while case was still pending maron caused the annotation on the title.. -on the same year judgment was rendered and execution of the registration of deed of absolute sale was ordered by the court in favor of maron -however, bazars refused to surrender the title and execute the required Deed of sale

in the the records it appears that prior to the case filed by maron in 1974- marasigan bought the property to bazars bazars executed a DOS in favor of marasigan

1977- only time where deed of sale bet. bazars and marasigan registered in registry of deed - new title issued in name of marasigan

1978-since the bazars refused in the execution of deed of sale in favor of marron, court ordered the clerk of court to execute the deed of sale in behalf of the erring spouse

1979-maron instituted a land registration case captioned "mari maron vs maria marasigan" = dismissed for lack of jurisdiction bec it should be ventilated before the court that issued the order on Nov1978 ordering the clerk of court to execute the DOS

-on the same year, maron filed a civil case to have Marasigan's title cancelled=dismissed for being premature bec. prev case was not yet final and executory since still subj to petition of relief

-on appeal,CA reversed the decision and ordered: 1.cancel the tct in the name of M.Marasigan and issue another in name o M.Marron 2.The registry of deed to refrain registering any deed of sale in name of Marasigan 3.Marasigan to pay atty fee 10k


Who has a better right to the property in question, MARASIGAN- the party who bought it with a notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title or MARRON-the party in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was made?


Maria Maron has better right ca decision affirmed. case filed by heirs dismissed

-it was only on July 5, 1977 that the sale between Maria Marasigan and the Bazaars became effective as against third persons. The registration of the deed of sale over the subject property was definitely subsequent to the annotation made on January 27, 1976. Consequently, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors. (See Rivera v. Tirona, et al., 109 Phil. 505). l -petition for relief ng bazars filed out of time. they only filed it 10months after the finality. (according to the rule it should be filed

w/in 60 days after petitioner learned the judgment but not more the 6months after such judgment was entered

-"Notice of lis pendens will be carried over to the new title" and the old title will be cancelled.


1916 TCT No. 414 involving 61 hectares in Tarlac issued to Angeles and 17 other tenants (Angeles Heirs) 1921 A deed executed by 11 persons in interest conveyed 47 hectares to Manuntag (son of Angeles) o No technical description of conveyed land o Certificate not cancelled (in accordance to Sec 57 and 58 of LRA) o No TCT issued to both vendor and vendee o Non-compliant with LRA Sec 57 and 58 It was proven that the deed was forged o One conveyor of land already dead during time of conveyance Manuntag (w/ the owners duplicate of original certificate of title cont aining memorandum of sale) mortgaged property to Hernandez 1922 Mortgaged cancelled; absolute deed of conveyance made to Hernandez Did not again comply with Sec. 57 and 58; but owners duplicate of original certificate is w/ Hernandez Hernandez executed deed of sale to Mijarez

Angeles heirs became claimants to cadastral (public record of the extent, value, and ownership of land) case o Court: awarded property to Angeles Heirs in respective shares According to Hernandez, certificate should be issued to her because she bought it from Manuntag 1924 court decides in favor of Hernandez

ISSUE: W/N Hernandez acquired title to property notwithstanding the forgery of the deed by Manuntag?

HELD: NO. Mere memorandum of conveyance upon the orig certificate of title is not sufficient registration.

SEC 57 grantors duplicate certificate shall be produced and presented register of deeds make new certificate of title to grantee grantors certificate be cancelled SEC 58 (when deed is for part only of land) also enter new certificate of title in case land described in certificate is divided and designated properly, instead of cancelling, enter a memorandum. Certificate cancelled only as to such lots. ** Certified copy must be first recorded

NOTE: Issuance of TCT to enjoy full protection of registration system.

SC: Neither Manuntag or Hernandez held a certificate of title No sufficient legal conveyance by deed or registration Certificate 414 (in favor of Angeles Heirs) never cancelled; it was the only certificate in existence There was no complete conveyance by Manuntag

AS TO HERNANDEZ: Purchase from person who did not exhibit proper muniment of title thus also guilty of negligence and not in position to complain of loss

Conveyance in Fee

SECTION 57. An owner desiring to convey in fee his registered land or any portion thereof shall execute a deed of conveyance, in which thegrantor or grantee may present to the register of deeds in the province where the land lies. The grantors duplicate certificate shall be produced and presented at the same time. The register of deeds shall thereupon, in accordance with the rules and instructions of the court, make out in the registration book a new certificate of title to the grantee, and shall prepare and deliver to him an owners duplicate certificate. The register of deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificates the date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book where the new certificate is registered, and a reference by number to the last prior certificate. The grantors duplicate certificat e shall be surrendered, and the word cancelled stamped upon it. The original certificate shall also be stamped canceled. The deed of conveyance s hall be filed and indorsed with the number and place of registration of the certificate of title of the land conveyed.

SECTION 59. When a deed in fee is for a part only of the land described in a certificate of title, the register of deeds shall also enter a new certificate and issue an owners duplicate to the grantor for the part of the land not included in the deed. In every case of transfer the new certificate or certificates shall include all the land described in the original and surrendered certificates: Provided, however, That no new certificate to a grantee of a part only of the land shall be invalid by reason of the failure of the register of deeds to enter a new certificate to the grantor for the remaining unconveyed portion: And provided further, That in case the land described in a certificate of title is divided into lots, designated by numbers or letters, with measurements of all the bounds, and a plan of said land has been filed with the clerk and verified pursuant to section forty-four of this Act, and a certified copy thereof is recorded in the registration book with the original certificate, when the original owner makes a deed of transfer, enter on the original certificate and on the owners duplic ate certificate a memorandum of such deed of transfer, with a reference to the lot or lots thereby conveyed as designated on such plan, and that the certificate is canceled as to such lot or lots; and every certificate with such memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantors title to the remainder of the land not conveyed as if

the old certificate had been canceled and a new certificate of such land had been entered; and such process may be repeated so long as there is convenient space upon the original certificate and the owners duplicate certificate for making such memorandum of sale of lots.

ISSUANCE OF TCT ENJOY FULL PROTECTION OF REGISTRATION SYSTEM SECTION 39. Every applicant receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith, shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except those noted on said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:

First. Liens, claims, or rights arising or existing under the laws or Constitution of the United States or of the Philippine Islands which the statutes of the Philippine Islands cannot require to appear of record in the registry.

Second. Taxes within two years after the same have become due and payable.

Third. Any public highway, way, or private way established by law, where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such highway or way have been determined. But if there are easements or other rights appurtenant to a parcel of registered land which for any reason have failed to be registered, such easements or rights shall remain so appurtenant notwithstanding such failure, and shall be held to pass with the land until cut off or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate, or in any other manner.


MERALCO vs. CA G.R. No. L-33794 May 31, 1982 On February 12, 1948, respondent Pedro J. Velasco (VELASCO, for short) purchased three (3) lots from the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC, for short), located at the corner of the then South D and South 6 Streets of Quezon City. The Deed of Sale, among others, provided that: o construction shall be exclusively for residential purposes only o The vendor ... shall have the right to enter the premises ... for the purpose of ... installing electric ... lines or any other utility for the community. o This sale is made under the following terms and conditions the violation of any of which shall entitle the Vendor to rescind this contract and seek the cancellation of the title issued as a result hereof and to repossess the property o The terms, burdens, conditions, limitations, incumbrances and restrictions herein contained shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the respective parties The foregoing conditions were substantially, but not word for word, annotated on the title issued to VELASCO. On January 31, 1952, VELASCO sold two of the aforesaid three lots (the PROPERTY, for short) to petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO, for short) The following year, MERALCO established a substation within the PROPERTY, the construction of which "was started in September, 1953 and was finished the following November". On November 29, 1954, VELASCO wrote a letter to MERALCO complaining the severe noise and electrification of the ground The following year, on February 1, 1955, VELASCO filed a complaint (NUISANCE CASE) before CFI praying that MERALCO be ordered "to remove and abate the nuisances herein complained against," with damages. The trial Court dismissed the complaint On appeal to SC - the dismissal was set aside and, on August 6, 1971, MERALCO was "ordered to either transfer its sub-station at South D and South 6 Streets, Diliman, Quezon City, or take appropriate measures to reduce its noise meanwhile, on November 23, 1957, VELASCO had instituted a complaint (CANCELLATION CASE) for the rescission of the sale of the PROPERTY to MERALCO and to collect rentals for the use and occupation of the PROPERTY while in the latter's possession. The TC dismissed the case for splitting of causes of action CA reversed the ruling of TC ISSUE: Whether or not, Velasco has a cause of action or right of action against MERALCO HELD: No. Velasco has no cause of action against MERALCO.
THE RIGHT OF ACTION.- The contract of sale between PHHC and VELASCO provided that only constructions exclusively for "residential purposes" shall be built on the PROPERTY. That requirement, naturally, was binding on VELASCO himself, as it is also binding on MERALCO as his assignee. Be that as it may, that contract implies that it is PHHC itself which has the right of action 11

against any assignee of VELASCO. Cancellation of the title to the PROPERTY would be by virtue of the condition imposed in the PHHC- VELASCO contract, and not by virtue of the contract between VELASCO and MERALCO.

It will be seen that if the PROPERTY were used by VELASCO himself not for "residential purposes", PHHC can rescind "this contract", which is the contract between PHHC and VELASCO, and PHHC can "seek the cancellation of the title" issued as a result "of this contract". The PROPERTY' having been transferred to MERALCO, PHHC cannot rescind the contract between VELASCO and MERALCO because PHHC was not a party to that VELASCOMERALCO contract. PHHC's redress would be to directly "seek cancellation of the title" of MERALCO, and torepossess the PROPERTY.


EN BANC G.R. No. L-39596 March 23, 1934 "CONSULTA" No. 1013 OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TAYABAS. GOTAUCO & CO., applicantappellant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TAYABAS, oppositor-appellee.

Godofredo Reyes for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Fourth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a consultasubmitted by the register of deeds of Tayabas.

FACTS:On August 12, 1932, when Exhibits A and B were presented to the register, by which a levy of execution against the judgment debtor, Rafael Vilar was made on fifteen contracts of land described in Exhibit B and registered in the name of Florentino Vilar, the register properly denied the inscription of said levy of execution because the title to the lands was in the name of Florentino Vilar and no evidence was submitted that Rafael Vilar had any present or possible future interest in the land. On September 17, 1932, there was presented to him a copy of a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of the province, entitled, "Intestado del Finado Florentino Vilar", from which he could properly infer that Florentino Vilar was dead and that the judgment debtor Rafael Vilar is one of the heirs of the deceased Florentino Vilar. Although the value of the participation of Rafael Vilar in the estate of Florentino Vilar was indeterminable before the final liquidation of the estate, nevertheless, the right of participation in the estate and the lands thereof may be attached and sold.

ISSUE: Does the judgment debtor(RAFAEL VILLAR) hold such a beneficial interest in the property that he can sell or otherwise dispose of it for value? HELD: YES Nothing appears in this record to indicate that Rafael Vilar being sui juris could not dispose of his interest or share as heir in the estate of Florentina Vilar. Having this right, he could by a conveyance defeat pro tanto the provisions of section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus deprive the judgment creditor of the benefit of a lawful execution. (SEC. 450. Property liable to execution. All goods, chattels, moneys, and other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not excempt by law, and all property and rights of property seized and held under attachment in the action, shall be liable to execution. Shares and interests in any corporation or company, and debts, credits, and all other property, both real and personal, or any interest in either real or personal property, and all other property not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution, in like manner as upon writs of attachment.
itc - alf

The term "property" as here applied to lands comprehends every species of title, inchoate or complete; legal or equitable. This statute authorizes the sale under execution of every kind of property, and every interest in property which is, or may be, the subject of private ownership and transfer. It deals with equitable rights and interests as it deals with legal, without anywhere expressly


recognizing or any distinction between them.)

Judgment in this consulta is Reversed