Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Policing Terrorists in the Community Sahar F.

Aziz1 Abstract Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to stop terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and local police to combat “Islamist homegrown terrorism.” Developed in response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships among local law enforcement and the communities they serve. While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril – both for collective civil liberties interests and local police’s interests in preserving relationships of trust. Accordingly, this Article examines how community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims post-9/11 as manifested in preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. The Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism: 1) it is more akin to counterradicalization taken from military counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based traditional community policing model; 2) to the collective detriment of communities it divides them into “Good Muslims” willing to cooperate with law enforcement on the federal government’s terms and “Bad Muslims” who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities’ civil rights and liberties; and 3) it deputizes Muslim leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their communities that may be used adversely to their collective interests as part of the predominantly federal prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime. Unless systemic reforms are made to federal preventive counterterrorism strategies, community policing is likely to aggravate
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Associate Professor, Texas Wesleyan School of Law (to become Texas A&M School of Law as of Fall 2013). J.D. University of Texas School of Law, M.A. Middle East Studies, University of Texas. Professor Aziz previously served as a Senior Policy Advisor at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Professor Aziz thanks Dean Fred White and the Texas Wesleyan School of Law for their generous research support, and the Texas Wesleyan Law Librarians for their exceptional research support. Professor also thanks Professors Kevin Johnson, Aziz Huq, Richard Delgado, Angela Harris, Steven Wizner, Ali Khan, Sudha Setty, David Super, Ben Davis, and William Banks for their thoughtful insights and feedback of earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks to the able research assistance of Casey Brown, Chuck Hill, and Natalia Cashen. And a special thanks to Rusty Roeger and Danielle Jefferis for going the extra mile on this project. All errors are mine alone.

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222083

Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author existing civil liberties violations and impair otherwise good relations between Muslim communities and local police. Thus, a serious rethinking of proposals to implement community policing in counterterrorism is warranted. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. II. INTRODUCTION COMMUNITY POLICING IN COUNTERTERRORISM A. COMMUNITY POLICING AS PREVENTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM B. DISGUISING COUNTERRADICALIZATION AS COMMUNITY POLICING C. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, OUTREACH, AND COMMUNITY POLICING III. IV. A. COMMUNITY POLICING AND SUBORDINATION POST-9/11 i. PROPPING UP THE DIVISIVE “GOOD MUSLIM” AND “BAD MUSLIM” PARADIGM ii. DEPUTIZING COMMUNITY LEADERS TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE B. COUNTER-CRITIQUES AND THE RHETORIC OF EMPOWERMENT i. DEMYSTIFY MUSLIMS AND COUNTER NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES ii. DE-SECURITIZE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES iii. DELEGATE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM TO MUSLIM COMMUNITIES iv. INCREMENTALLY REFORM COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES THROUGH RELATIONSHIP BUILDING V. CONCLUSION CRITIQUES AND COUNTER-CRITIQUES OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN COUNTERTERRORISM

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Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222083

Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, federal government officials have expressed concerns over an increasing “Islamist homegrown terrorist” threat.2 High profile cases involving “lone wolves” accused of terrorist plots on US soil coupled with public perceptions of Muslims as prone to terrorism have triggered a flurry of Congressional hearings and Executive reports recommending harsher counterterrorism enforcement focused on Muslim communities. Meanwhile, critics of “hard” counterterrorism tactics propose increasing community outreach to Muslim communities, through community policing in particular, as the solution to homegrown terrorism. As a consequence, community policing has become popular both among policy makers seeking to be more preventive in counterterrorism and Muslim community leaders concerned with protecting the civil liberties of their constituents.3 Challenging the underlying presumptions of those calling for community policing in counterterrorism, this Article argues that adversarial federal counterterrorism enforcement cannot be reconciled with the partnership-based local community policing model.4 Community policing in counterterrorism as currently envisioned betrays its rhetoric of empowerment and mutual trust, and serves as another weapon in the federal government’s toolkit that perpetuates the “terrorist other” stereotype.5 Until this stereotype can be stripped away from “hard on terror” preventive counterterrorism strategies, the benefits gained in the traditional local community policing model of the 1990s are unlikely to be realized.6 In contrast to traditional community policing where citizens seek the protection of local law enforcement from third-party drug dealers, gangsters, and other criminal elements, Muslim communities engage with federal law enforcement to dissuade them from spying on their mosques and social gatherings,7 targeting their vulnerable youth in informant-led

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Matthew. C. Waxman, Police National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 377, 382-83 (2009) 3 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 5 (Spring 2010) 4 See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (defining interest convergence theory); David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11 , 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 162 (2010); Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 185 (2012). 5 Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002); Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf, Terrorizing Academia, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 433, 436 (2010-2011); Margaret Chon & Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 229 (2004-2005); see also Madalla A. Alibeli and Abdulfattah Yaghi, Theories of Prejudice and Attitudes toward Muslims in the United States, 2 INT’L J. OF HUMANITIES & SOC. SCI. 1 (January 2012) (discussing the scapegoating of American Muslims). 6 John Murray, Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities, 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347, 348 (September 2005). 7 David A. Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123 (2010).

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Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author terrorist plots,8 prosecuting their charities for giving humanitarian aid to conflict zones,9 and adopting invidious counterterrorism tactics that destroy community bonds. And as they beseech their government to respect their civil liberties, Muslims must also seek the protection of law enforcement against private acts of violence and discrimination.10 For many Muslims, the government may come across as more a foe than a friend.11 Thus, counterterrorism community policing (“CCP”) is not, nor is it intended to be, the same as community policing in the traditional criminal context.12 Rather than fundamentally change relations between law enforcement and communities into a partnership, CCP perpetuates preventive counterterrorism strategies that prioritize surveillance, investigation, prosecution, and conviction of Muslims.13 Put simply, community policing co-opts Muslim community leaders into gathering and sharing intelligence on Muslims’ political beliefs, religious practices, and other information otherwise unavailable to law enforcement due to constitutional constraints.14 Believing they are

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Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 645-46; See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2011 26, Center on Law and Security, New York University School of Law (2011) (reporting that in 2007 and 2009, 71% of terrorism cases involved an informant). 9 David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilty by Association and the Paradigm of Prevention in the ‘War on Terror,’ in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE (Bianchi & Keller eds., Hart. Pub. 2008). 10 Murad Hussain, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 934; Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (2001-2002). 11 See the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf), and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, December 2011 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf); National Security Preparedness Group, Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 10, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011); Marc Santora, Woman is Charged with Murder as a Hate Crime in a Fatal Subway Push , NY TIMES (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/nyregion/woman-is-held-in-deathof-man-pushed-onto-subway-tracks-in-queens.html?_r=0 (woman pushed man on tracks where he was fatally crushed by an oncoming train because he “looked Muslim or Hindu” and the woman “hate[d] Muslim and Hindus ever since 2001”); Vera Chinese and Simone Weichselbaum, Man stabbed outside Queens mosque, attacker screamed anti-Muslim rant, says, NY DAILY NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/man-stabbed-queens-mosque-article-1.1204122. 12 See, e.g., Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering, supra note ___, at 132. 13 See, e.g. Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (testifying “to meet the growing demand for surveillance, the Bureau has increased the number of unarmed surveillance teams by 127 percent since 2001.”). Marc Lynch, Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 14, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). McCulloch, J. BLUE ARMY. Melbourne (2001). 14 Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering, supra note XX, at 161; Will McCants & Clint Watts, US Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment, FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012) (highlighting contradiction in White House’s Countering Violent Extremism Strategy in that claims to want to avoid securitization of Muslims but its exclusive focus on Muslims still sends the message “You Muslims are a potential threat and we, the government, have to co-opt you”). Matthew. C. Waxman, Police National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11, 3 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 377, 401-02 (2009).

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Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author serving the best interests of Muslim communities,15 many unwitting participants disclose the on-goings of the community and provide information about the politics of community leaders and mosques. This enables law enforcement’s investigative arm to reach deeper into Muslim communities’ affairs than they could otherwise, resulting in a de facto deputization effect.16 All the while, aggressive counterterrorism enforcement practices and policies focused exclusively on Muslims remain unchanged.17 Herein lies the paradox —Muslims have little choice but to engage with the same entities that both violate their civil liberties and legitimize civil rights violations by private actors.18 Indeed, for many Muslim proponents of community policing, it offers a formal mechanism to reform counterterrorism practices that adversely impact Muslim communities. Accordingly, this Article examines how community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims post-9/11 manifested in racialized counterterrorism policies19 notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups.20 Proponents of community policing between law enforcement and Muslim communities erroneously presume a convergence of interest between the two. Moreover, they shortsightedly focus on local policing when in practice federal law enforcement agencies drive counterterrorism enforcement. I challenge the underlying assumption that the interests of law enforcement and Muslim communities converge. Indeed, community policing is merely an extension of the federal government’s prosecutorial approach that prioritizes law enforcement’s interests in expanding the

Ryan Hunter and Danielle Heinke, “Radicalization of Islamist Terrorists in the Western World,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (September 2011), pp. 27-29, http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications/law-enforcementbulletin/september-2011) (finding voluntary cooperation by Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing more likely when authorities are viewed as more legitimate). 16 Harris, Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering, supra note XX, at 127. 17 ACLU, ESTABLISHING A NEW NORMAL: NATIONAL SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (2010), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/EstablishingNewNormal.pdf. 18 See the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, August 2011 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf), and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, December 2011 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf) (; Hussain, supra note XX, at 934; See Sameer M. Ashar, Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2001-2002). 19 See Hilal Elver, Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting Pot to Islamophobia , 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 139-45 (2012) (discussing racial element of immigration laws and PATRIOT ACT); David Cole & Jules Lobel, LESS FREE, LESS SAFE 102-28 (2007) (providing additional examples of policies proven ineffective in promoting national security while also reinforcing racial bias.). 20 See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2011 3, CENTER ON LAW AND SECURITY, New York University School of Law (2011) (reporting that of the 1,054 total terror-related cases prosecuted since 9/11, 578 involved Muslims and 476 did not involve Muslims or Islam); Terror from the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City, Southern Poverty Law Center (2012) (detailing out the nearly 100 plots, conspiracies, and racist acts of radical right groups and individuals since 1995).
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Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. travel to their countries of origin without fear of being watch listed or exiled on No Fly Lists. Harris. 6 . Jerome P. 2012.pdf. III. Part II examines and critiques community outreach and engagement programs that precede current calls for CCP.com/cair-officials-man-sentenced-to-life-without-airtravel/article/3754641/?page=1 23 The American Muslim Response to Hearings on Radicalization within their Community . Police National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11 . 2011). C. e.sfgate. to counter-radicalize and gather intelligence on Muslim communities.F. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 17 (Spring 2010) (recognizing tension between federal law enforcement investigations and local partnerships to stop violent crime). 13. Gate (Apr. 4:00 AM). 13.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author number of anti-terrorism investigations and prosecutions21 at the expense of key collective rights of American Muslim communities’ and community alliances essential to defeat genuine terrorism threats. and local CVE engagements in furtherance of White House’s strategy). 1:05 AM). Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. I call into question the federal government’s motives behind CCP based on the record of civil liberties violations arising from community outreach and engagement programs promoted. CAIR Officials: Man sentenced to life without air travel. As a result. community policing bolsters the broader strategy of integrating local police as the eyes and ears on the ground in the federal counterterrorism regime. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. 22 See. Mueller. Police Power in Post-9/11 America.opb. These include the rights to be free from surveillance.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553. practice their religion without undue scrutiny by the state. Sam Adams. NewsOK (Feb.dhs. Portland Back In Joint Terrorism Task Force With Some Reservations.g. OPB (July 17. 2013). But see April Baer. S. Matthew. Waxman. available at http://www.24 In the end. http://www. After describing the preventive counterterrorism strategy that underpins CCP. partnerships with local communities. 2012). 3. Statement for the Record of Principal Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator John Cohen for a House Committee on Homeland Security (June 22..com/opinion/openforum/article/Portland-offers-model-on-terrorism-investigations3454219. for community policing to work federal law enforcement culture and practices must abandon the adversarial model.fbi.. Congressional Research Service 7 (2012). 3 J. such changes are unlikely in the near future. available at http://newsok. Bjelopera. 399-400 (2009) 24 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council.fas.g. available at http://www. Portland offers model on terrorism investigations.org/news/article/portland-back-joint-terrorism-task-force-somereservations/) (rejoining the JTTF).php. L. Robert S.g. e. supra note ___. & POL’Y 377. In light of the post-9/11 politics built on the assumption that Muslims are inherently prone to terrorism. and politically mobilize their communities without inviting further government scrutiny.gov/news/2012/06/22/statement-recordprincipal-deputy-counterterrorism-coordinator-john-cohen-house (DHS has expanded FY2012 grant guidance to include funding for CVE training.22 Rather than meaningfully address these problems. http://www. federal funding will seduce some local law enforcement into the process through attractive federal grants23 while others eventually will abandon the project to preserve the credibility necessary for decreasing non-terrorism crimes with the assistance of the communities they serve. Gadeir Abbass && Adam Soltani. e. See. NAT’L SEC. Part III proceeds to argue that community policing is an extension of a counterterrorism strategy that 21 See. they take many forms—including recruiting potential intelligence sources”).gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (“The FBI’s actions are not limited to arrests and prosecutions. 2012. in part. http://www. at 43 (noting police’s refusal to participate in immigration enforcement because impedes their ability to combat crime).

community policing co-opts them into not only accepting. See. Community policing’s popularity is based on the premise that in a democratic society. FOREIGN POL’Y RESEARCH INST. supra note XX. 80 POL.28 In theory. 26 Skogan. See DAVID A. David Stevens. L. GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING (2005) (discussing the widespread use of community policing) 7 . 2012). 19. U. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. supra note ___. from a decentralized place. schools.S. 517. (December 2012) (suggesting that the government should abandon countering violent extremism and just stick with traditional law enforcement). and ultimately desecuritize the relationship between Muslims and government such that they are treated like any other American community that is more concerned with jobs. can it work. working in a proactive partnership with its citizens to 25 Harris. accordingly.washingtonpost. but also legitimizing such practices. remove the counterterrorism objectives from community policing with Muslim communities. police need the assistance and resources of residents to effectively address crime. communities and local law enforcement alike should reject community policing in counterterrorism. also called countering violent extremism.g. Muslims are not measured by the exemplary work of its mainstream. Rather than empower communities to reform rights-infringing government practices.html 27 Although others agree with my argument that community policing. community policing is intended to empower minority communities to define policing priorities and. and health care than terrorism. I will engage in a programmatic critique based on a recognition that the political economy of community policing created by federal grants and a cottage industry of experts.27 II.26 So long as countering terrorism is driven more by the identity of the suspect rather than the nature of the crime. U. Will McCants & Clint Watts. The model teaches communities to engage in self-help by acting and engaging in ways that the local government is unable or unwilling to do alone.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author collectively subordinates Muslim communities. xx. As one scholar succinctly describes it. Q. at 173. Beutel. “[community policing] is a philosophy of full-service personalized policing where the same officer patrols and works in the same area on a permanent basis. coupled with the politics of terrorism in the US nearly guarantees its near term survival despite the detrimental subordinating effects. Community policing was introduced in the 1960s as an alternative to the traditional paramilitary policing model that soured relations between law enforcement and minority communities. better serve the safety and socio-economic needs of their communities. available at http://www.com/blogs/guestvoices/post/us-muslims-are-not-measured-by-the-exemplary-work-of-itsmainstream/2012/09/19/ef651132-0277-11e2-8102-ebee9c66e190_blog. 522-23 (October-December 2009) (arguing against government intervention in Muslim communities affairs because an unfettered religious environment creates more moderation among religious institutions). In a future paper. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. should be abandoned. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. 26 Jihad Turk and Salam Al-Marayati. at 17 (calling for increased funding for community policing as a means of “promoting better intelligence gathering and minimizes the negative impact on both community-police relations”). they focus on cost-benefit analysis as opposed to the subordinating and racialization basis of this Article.A. COMMUNITY POLICING IN COUNTERTERRORISM Calls to incorporate community policing into counterterrorism is not a new innovation. e.25 Part IV concludes with recommendations to de-racialize domestic counterterrorism. HARRIS. TIMES (Sept.S. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy.

Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat and the Long War on Terrorism.. of Homeland Sec. Fox 8 WGHP (Feb.g.. 32 John Murray. (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft. and Jessica Zuckerman. Heritage Foundation (Dec. 2011). 2013). 352 (September 2005). http://www. Scott Erickson. stating. Fox News (March 06. Comm. available at http://www. 5. Chicago style. and creates new channels for the police to learn more about neighborhood problems. counter-radicalization. Bucci. 3 J. 4. http://www. Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy Before the Senate Jud. countering Islamic extremism. inter alia. Notably. 111 th Cong. 106th Cong.dhs.heritage. Community policing. Violent Extremism Continues to Plague Homeland Security. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. Police National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11 . stating that citizens getting involved and keeping police well-informed helped stop many crimes before they could happen). 8 . Community Policing.35 the government invokes more soothing terms such as 29 Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux.heritage.. (2009) (oral testimony of Janet Napolitano. Greensboro Police release 2012 crime statistics. Steve P. Chicago Style (1997). and fighting homegrown terrorism. Matthew. that the Department of Justice was shifting its focus from enforcing the nation’s laws to becoming an anti-terrorism outfit).30 Nonetheless. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities.foxnews.33 Community policing’s arrival in counterterrorism comes on the heels of informal efforts by federal law enforcement agencies to engage with Muslim communities. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011). 28 Skogan & Hartnett. community policing remains a work in progress that has produced mixed results across the country. James Jay Carafano.31 Although it took nearly three decades for police departments to earnestly adopt community policing.). http://blog.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author identify and solve problems.com/us/2011/03/06/national-focus-debate-muslim-radicalization/ (focus on terms radicalization and extremism). it is now hailed as one of the most effective means to prevent crime by combining law enforcement’s and communities’ unique skills and resources. it was only a matter of time before community policing was introduced into counterterrorism. COMMUNITY POLICING: HOW TO GET STARTED 3 (1994). http://myfox8. 35 National Security Preparedness Group. On Homeland Sec. Mitch Carr. FY 2010 Budget Request: Hearing Before S.org/research/reports/2012/04/fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-the-homegrownthreat-and-the-long-war-on-terrorism (focus on homegrown terrorism and radicalization). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 26. & POL’Y 377. Wesley Skogan & Susan Hartnett. government officials often invoke terms such as counterterrorism. 31 John Murray. Waxman. Se’y of the Dept.34 When speaking to Muslims and civil libertarian audiences concerned with the erosion of civil rights and liberties in the post-9/11 era. 381 (2009) 34 National focus on debate on Muslim radicalization. encourages police to work with social services agencies to prevent crime before it occurs. Comm.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1242307132501. Heritage Foundation (April 25.org/2011/12/14/violent-extremismcontinues-to-plague-homeland-security/ (focus on counterterrorism and violent extremism). Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. 2011). NAT’L SEC. 2012). C. federal government engagement with Muslims has a different name depending on the audience and the political context in which it is referenced. L.32 Thus. 14. particularly in light of the massive federal reallocation of resources into countering terrorism post-9/11.com/2013/02/04/greensboro-policerelease-2012-crime-statistics/ (Police chief credits community policing for drop in crime. e. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347 (September 2005) 33 See.shtm.”29 Community policing also facilitates twoway communication between the police and the public. When speaking to politically conservative audiences willing to fight terrorism at the expense of civil liberties.

there is little that differentiates prosecution-driven counterterrorism from counterradicalization.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author countering violent extremism. 4 Comm. Irrespective of the term employed.fbi. the following provides a brief summary of each term as evidence that the government’s use of milder terminology to debunk allegations of rights violations is a red herring. If one focuses on what the program actually does. 40 Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism.40 While an in-depth explication of the debates surrounding these terms is beyond the scope of this Article.39 These variations in nomenclature are distinctions without a difference.whitehouse. http://www.gov/sites/default/files/sipfinal. 38 Community Outreach.36 community engagement. critiques of government actions should focus on substantive practices rather than fall prey to semantic distractions. a component of counterterrorism. http://www. 2013. 22. 36 Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. Department of Homeland Security. Mueller.usdoj. Accordingly. available at http://www. http://www. countering violent extremism.37 community outreach. is disguised as community policing as a tactic to persuade otherwise skeptical Muslim communities to trust the government. accessed January 1.gov/html/dispatch/11-2011/partnering-with-americanmuslims. Partnering with American Muslim Communities to Fight Crime. And Section C examines the flaws in community outreach programs — the more informal predecessors to the community policing programs currently being promoted through federal grants and federal counterterrorism policy. accessed January. 41 Rather. community outreach. 37 Community Engagement.fbi.42 Section III then proceeds to critique CCP as an extension of a subordinating racialized counterterrorism strategy based on the premise that Muslims are collectively prone to become terrorists. and community policing. Section A describes the preventive counterterrorism model that undergirds CCP.s 9 .fbi. 22. U. the federal government’s objectives are the same — to preventively and aggressively combat terrorism within Muslim communities through an adversarial criminal justice system.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11-confronting-the-terroristthreat-to-the-u. Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the U.gov/about-us/partnerships_and_outreach/community_outreach. 1 2013. 2010). III Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. 42 Robert S.asp. countering extremism. Federal Bureau of Investigation. as opposed to what it is called. community engagement.38 and most recently community policing. 39 Dep’t of Justice. White House (December 2011). (Sept.S.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11-confronting-the-terrorist-threat-to-the-u.pdf.gov/community-engagement. Mueller.s. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (March 2009) (assessing counterradicalization and countering extremism in context of counterterrorism strategy) 41 Robert S. http://cops. 2010) available at http://www. Policing Dispatch 11 (2011).S.dhs. Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. Section B demonstrates how counterradicalization.

FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012). success in counterterrorism is measured by the number of investigations.org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment. community policing will remain the handmaiden of counterterrorism insofar as it is merely an additional tool in law enforcement’s toolkit.46 Similar to law enforcement priorities in other criminal contexts.”) 44 Marc Lynch. REV. Providing “Supplemental Security”—The Insurrection Act and the Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises. How to Define Terrorism. regardless of the individual motives or group dynamics…”).R. Martin Innis. XX-XX (2013) (discussing problems with defining “terrorism”). counterterrorism combines the military.g. Vol. 6: 473-507 (June 2003) (states “terrorism is a purposeful activity. 465 (2008). Mueller. Battlefield Borders. the use of 'deliberate' targeting of civilians in order to achieve political objectives is what distinguishes a terrorist act from guerrilla warfare. Joshua Sinai. 45 See 22 U. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 7. counterterrorism is synonymous with anti-terrorism law enforcement such that it involves surveillance. Approach to the War on Terrorism.48 Preventive tactics in the post-9/11 43 See. 48 Benjamin G. 2. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). and prosecution of terrorism suspects. prosecutions. 1 NAT’L SECURITY L. 3 J. ANNUAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. III. No. 4 (2008) (defines terrorism as "a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against civilians in order to achieve political goals.43 In the international context. § 2656f(d)(2).44 Worth noting are the multiple definitions of terrorism within the US criminal code. Threat Rhetoric. Rascoff. F. 88 TEX. Davis. Jefferis. 47 John Murray. Samuel J.F.I. 28 C.12. e. BR. Policing Uncertainty: Countering Terror 10 . available at http://www. 27. 352 (September 2005). Vol.fpri. see also Danielle C. Probs. Banks. and most notably counterinsurgency tactics of counter-radicalization that to disrupt terrorist groups’ messaging and ability to recruit. the Bureau has increased the number of unarmed surveillance teams by 127 percent since 2001. McCormick.47 So long as these objectives are the primary indicia of success. A Citizen Observer’s View of the U. COMMUNITY POLICING AS PREVENTIVE COUNTERTERRORISM Counterterrorism is the most accurate descriptor of the federal government’s motives and objectives in its dealings with Muslim communities in the United States. Terrorist Decision Making. Dep’t of Defense Directive 2000. Eric Lichtblau. XX. U.10 (2010). Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. § 0. William C.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author A. Jan. In counterterrorism. carried out in the name of a larger political objective. N. Robert S.C. available at http://www.fbi. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. 46 See Will McCants & Clint Watts. 2011). Director Federal Bureau of Investigation.TIMES. law enforcement.S. Tells Offices to Count Local Muslims and Mosques.85. Perspectives on Terrorism. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. Nat’l Security L & Pol’y 39 (2009). Gordon H. 1715. and the Militarization of State and Local Law Enforcement. 1718 n. 17 Transnat’l & Contemp. The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism. regardless whether couched in religious or secular narratives. where military units are targeted). L. Domestically. including within the community policing model. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. and convictions.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (testifying “to meet the growing demand for surveillance.Y.S. intelligence.45 In this Article. federal law enforcement relies heavily on both preventive and reactive tactics.S. 13. 2003 (reporting the FBI’s explanation for counting mosques as establishing a yardstick for the number of terrorism investigations and intelligence warrants that a field office could reasonably be expected to produce). I adopt the generic definition that terrorism is the attack on civilians for larger political objectives.B. investigation.

50 and 3) ideologically-based public relations programs that focus on developing a counter narrative to terrorist organizations in the purported battle for the “hearts and minds” of Muslims assumed to be intrinsically vulnerable to becoming recruited by terrorists. Documents show NY police watched devout Muslims. mosques. 353 (September 2005). in contrast to murder.. Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the U. 2010). (Sept.S. 2001-September 11. Counter-Terrorism Symposium. 2012 (stating preventing terrorism is one of DHS’s core missions and describes CVE and community policing as ways of achieving prevention of terrorism at the community and local level). and incarceration. http://www. Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 3.S. or countering violent extremism depending on the speaker’s politics and the audience. 88 TEX. http://www. Dep’t of Homeland Security.pdf. Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman.51 The last of these three preventive methods is often called counterradicalization. countering extremism. 19. U.54 Thus. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. 2011 4. Written Testimony on Homeland Threats and Agency Responses. 1718-19 (2010). burglary.com/2011/09/19/holder-addresses-u-n-counter-terrorism-symposium/. Advisory Council (2010). L. Center on Law and Security.g. See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. New York University School of Law (2011) (reporting that in 2007 and 2009. The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism.S.ap. AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations. ASSOC.52 In contrast. Press. available at http://www. 2011 26. ASSOC. REV. Holder Addresses U. and Muslim-owned businesses.org/Content/AP-In-TheNews/2011/Documents-show-NY-police-watched-devout-Muslims. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group. 6. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010).org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-built-secret-files-onmosques-outside-NY. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. or other forms of “traditional crimes” where law enforcement does not get involved Throuh Community Intelligence and Democratic Policing . the federal government has stated on multiple occasions that its counterterrorism strategy is primarily preventive insofar as it seeks to prevent a terrorist act from ever occurring. But see Will McCants & Clint Watts. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. 22. 2011). http://www. Mueller. 605 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 222. reactive law enforcement tactics include investigation of criminal activity. David Stevens. FOREIGN RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012) (critiquing the “hearts and minds” approach adopted from military counterinsurgency because there is no Muslim insurgency in the homeland).N. 22. conviction. 1715. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11-confronting-the-terrorist-threatto-the-u. 50 Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11.ap. PRESS (Sept.49 2) aggressive use of FBI sting operations employing informants and undercover agents. New York University School of Law (2011) (finding that since 2009 nearly 50% of terrorism cases involved informants and 15% of those informant cases can be considered sting operations). 19. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 16 (March 2009). Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization.dhs. 53 John Murray.fbi.org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD.S. Center on Law and Security. U. prosecution of suspects in the process of committing or after committing a terrorist act. 71% of terrorism cases involved an informant). 54 Samuel Knight. available at http://www. 226 (May 2006) 49 E. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517 (October-December 2009. 52 Samuel Rascoff. PRESS (Feb. 51 Marc Lynch. Main Justice (Sept. U.s (stating FBI’s number one priority is the prevention of terrorist attacks through working with state and local law enforcement to share information and conduct operations to prevent and dismantle terrorists plots). Robert S. See generally Assoc.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author era include 1) surveillance of Muslims. Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano. 2001-September 11. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.53 Notwithstanding the use of traditional reactive tactics. http://www. 2012).gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_cve_working_group_recommendations. 2011). Sept.ap. 11 .mainjustice. NYPD build secret files on mosques outside NY.

6 (2006) 59 See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. 56 Attorney General John Ashcroft. using obscure statutes to arrest and detain suspected mobsters”). Harris. Oct. 61 Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. L. http://phys. REV. community policing concentrates on crime prevention as its primary objective). The War on Terror. 25.org/spy-files/more-about-suspicious-activity-reporting. Local Police. More About Suspicious Activity Reporting. using obscure statutes to arrest and detain suspected mobsters”). 1. Local Police. 4. The War on Terror. Moreover.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author until after the criminal act has occurred.org/news/2013-02-homegrown-muslim-american-terrorism-straight-year. 2013). COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW (2005).60 The most common charges in terrorism-related cases include conspiracy to commit terrorism. Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution. Kennedy’s Justice Department was “aggressive. Duke University (Feb. 38 RUTGERS. 60 Homegrown Muslim-American terrorism down third straight year. Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference. false statements to a federal agent. of which 576 cases involved Muslim defendants. and Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups . According to the New York University Center on Law and Security.59 Since 9/11. 25. Stuntz. David A. Sects. 1. 2001-September 11. Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation. Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. for which Robert F. 2001 (comparing terrorism prosecutions to mob prosecutions. Prepared Remarks for the US Mayors Conference .ucrdatatool. 2011. for which Robert F. 359 (September 2005) (highlights the traditional policing model as an inflexible structure that is predominately reactive and unable to develop and sustain close working relationships with the community in helping to control crime. terrorism has claimed thirty-three lives in the United States compared to 180. and Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America. there is significant disagreement about the point in time at which law enforcement powers should be employed against individuals and groups. in counterterrorism they seek to predict and preempt the criminal act. 1201. ACLU (Jan. or other nonterrorism related laws against Muslims the government speculates will one day become terrorists based on unsavory political or religious beliefs.html (since 9/11 “terrorism” has claimed 33 lives in the United States out of more than 180. Center on Law and Security. 1203-04 (2003-2004).aclu. 2001 (comparing terrorism prosecutions to mob prosecutions. and Immigration Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America.000 murders during the same time period. this was the dominant investigative approach because it was more rights-protective of political dissent and religious beliefs and practices of minority groups. 58 Daniel C.. Kennedy’s Justi ce Department was “aggressive. L.58 But the government’s claims of an ominous homegrown terrorist threat are belied by the facts. whereas.000 murders during that same period).J. 2011 23-24. 6 (2006). Lies. David A. New York University School of Law (2011) 12 . and providing material support to terrorist groups.57 Until shortly after 9/11.61 During that 55 John Murray. counterterrorism enforcement has resulted in 1.cfm. 2001-September 11. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. Richman & William J.55 While the objective of preventing terrorism before it occurs invites little criticism from civil rights and liberties advocates. 18. 89 IOWA L. Harris.S. civil liberties advocates criticize pretextual charges for violations of tax. 38 RUTGERS.054 terror-related cases from September 11. http://www. http://www. immigration.56 Critics of existing counterterrorism strategies argue that law enforcement should not be authorized to spy on or investigate any person or group without individualized suspicion of a predicate act of criminal activity.J. 57 Tom Lininger. U. New York University School of Law (2011). Oct. Attorney General John Ashcroft.gov/Search/Crime/State/RunCrimeStatebyState. 2013). 2011 7. weapons of mass destruction possession and training. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. Center on Law and Security. 2001 to September 11.

edu/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_final2013.g. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. Battlefield Borders. at XX-XX (discussing rhetoric of homegrown terrorism threat). Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 10. Symposium Three: Employing Smart Power.pdf 65 Samuel J. DISGUISING COUNTER-RADICALIZATION AS COMMUNITY POLICING Counter-radicalization is the label used to describe the preventive component of counterterrorism strategy that confronts and challenges the ideologies used by terrorist organizations to justify the use of violence.fpri. 64 See.nytimes.sanford. and U.S. the fact remains that homegrown terrorism’s risk to public safety is not commensurate with the significant resources and political capital expended on strategies that disproportionately compromise the civil liberties of Muslims. and Global Security. Foreign Policy Research Institute (December 2012). the federal government prosecuted 300 counterterrorism cases involving Muslim defendants.pdf (refers to internationally implemented counter-radicalization tactics as an area of defensive soft power and goes on to discuss the rule of law in soft power). 67 Dealing With Today’s Asymmetric Threat to U.” a racialized version of domestic terrorism with an explicit reference to Muslim terrorists63 — even though only fourteen Muslim-Americans committed or were charged with terrorist crimes in 2012. Muslim American Terrorism: Declining Further. After Coordinated Bombs. B.duke. Marc Lynch.68 This led to heightened concerns with (Muslim) homegrown terrorism and debates on how best to approach the perceived problem. 127 (2012). Charles Kurzman. http://asymmetricthreat. 13 . Southern Poverty Law Center (2012). 1. 26 in 2010 and 49 in 2009. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010) (listing only cases involving Muslim defendants when discussing the rise of domestic radicalization and homegrown terrorism notwithstanding the documented rise in right wing. the government has focused on “homegrown terrorism.S.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.67 The London bombings triggered fears in Western countries that their Muslim citizens may be a figurative “ticking bomb” inside their borders. 15 (September 2009).org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment (“Like the United Kingdom. 66 Alan Cowell. 2013). 87% of which resulted in conviction mostly through plea agreements. National Security Preparedness Group.66 the US government employed counter-radicalization primarily in the international context as a “soft” tactic in the War on Terror and counterinsurgency strategy. 125. 68 National Security Preparedness Group. REV.69 US government officials 62 63 Id. 69 Will McCants & Clint Watts. e.65 Prior to the 2005 subway bombings in London. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (calling for a domestic equivalent to the State Department’s Countering Violent Extremism policy “to prevent young Americans form being radicalized at home”). 64 STAN. L. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011). white hate groups).com/2005/07/07/international/europe/07cndexplosion. Terror from the Right: Plots.net/docs/asymmetric_threat_3_paper.. Naval Institute pp. 2005). See Jefferis. down from 21 in 2011.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author same ten-year period. available at http://tcths.62 Since 2009. supra note XX. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 7. Rascoff.64 Notwithstanding the potential for significant loss of life caused by a terrorist act. http://www. Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization. available at http://www. U. London is Stunned. the United States launched its CVE enterprise in response to a perceived increase in radicalization among its Muslim citizens”).S. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 12. NY Times (July 7. Bloodied and Stoic. CACI International Inc. Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City. DUKE TRIANGLE CENTER FOR TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb.

Spooked. Scott 14 . Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. and U.g. Marc Lynch.K. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517 (October-December 2009) (describing Britain’s ‘Radical Middle Way’ initiative that is aimed at “articulated a relevant mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic. Amna Akbar. SOUTHERN POVERTY L.worldpublicopinion. and policy papers analyzing the philosophical and theological underpinnings of different interpretations of Islam used to justify violence in pursuit of a political agenda. supra note 71. 448-53 (2011). IRVINE L. Arun Kundnani.” U.74 Despite the documented rise in right wing White supremacists and militia groups. Aziz. THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (2009) (offering an insightful critical assessment of Britain’s Prevent program based on interviews with Muslims in Britain). Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism 20. Sahar F. Policing “Radicalization..S. 75 See. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). “hearts and minds” facet of counterterrorism that complements the harsher preventive and prosecutorial tactics described above. proactive and relevant to young British Muslims”). Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism 10. 77 See generally.75 counter-radicalization programs in the US focus almost exclusively on challenging certain interpretations of Islam exploited by terrorist organizations to morally justify violence in furtherance of the adherents’ perceived notions of justice. counter-radicalization is the softer. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012).76 The 9/11 attacks triggered a spike in scholarship.77 With that came a cottage industry of 70 Will McCants & Clint Watts. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012) (noting that decreased sympathy for terrorist organization does not necessarily translate into decreased support). political commentary. But see Will McCants & Clint Watts.REV. e.fpri. at 11 (highlighting British government’s focus on Muslim communities and disregard for right wing violent extremism). www. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. Spooked. 76 A similar contradiction occurs in Britain where it has implemented the Prevent program. L.org (April 24. Homegrown Terrorists in the U. the objective is to stop people from embracing extreme beliefs (an inherently subjective and vague term) that might lead to terrorism. 3 J. Scott Carpenter. 429.73 Operationally. Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam.S.. See Arun Kundnani. supra note 71. CENTER (2012). THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (2009). Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 7 (April 2009) (defining radicalization as “the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of beliefs. Foreign Policy Research Institute (December 2012). Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 12. & POL’Y 301 (2009). at 8.S. RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST (2005) OLIVIER ROY. FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 17 (April 2009) (noting that America’s most notorious homegrown terrorists are white males of Christian backgrounds). Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson.72 Thus. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. REV. U. available at http://www. (forthcoming Fall 2013).. 47 GONZ. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. Terror From the Right. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman. U. 72 J. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman. 2007) (finding that nearly three quarters of Muslims surveyed in four countries believed that the goal of US foreign policy was to “weaken and divide the Islamic world”). U.. MARC SAGEMEN. which has guided the US government’s countering violent extremist strategies. and U. A Kundnani.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author conferred with military experts70 and looked to Britain’s Preventing Violent Extremism program (commonly referred to as “Prevent”).S. Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America. LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2008) QUINTAN WIKTORIWICZ.C. as well as reduce active support for terrorist groups. L. GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH (2004).K. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment.org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment 71 David Stevens.71 which emphasized empowering whomever the government deems are mainstream ideological alternatives to the terrorists’ “us against them” narrative. NAT’L SEC. but to their imposition on the rest of society”). manuscript on file with the author. J. 73 Kundnani. 74 Will McCants & Clint Watts.

mpac. they are able to perpetuate subordinating narratives of Muslims and terrorism unchecked. Benjamin Doherty. 80 Guy Lawson. Scott Carpenter. THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (2009). NAT’L SEC. & POL’Y 301. Not Qualified: Exposing the Deception Behind America’s Top 25 Pseudo Experts on Islam. John Horgan. David Stevens. Scott Carpenter. ASSE 25. 305 (2009).”78 many of whom lack formal education or degrees in Islamic history and theology. See. 11. Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism 35.. 25-26 (2010). http://www. e. How a clueless "terrorism expert" set media suspicion on Muslims after Oslo horror . the White House issued its “ Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” (August 2011). counterterrorism. 3 J. Scott Carpenter. In Extremis: A SelfDefeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. L. leading to many primarily white. & POL’Y 301.net/blogs/benjamin-doherty/howclueless-terrorism-expert-set-media-suspicion-muslims-after-oslo-horror.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author purported experts on “Islamic terrorism. mainstream Muslim voices to provide choices that distract and dissuade those Muslims who may be tempted to join extremist causes. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (March 2009). such that they become “radicalized” on a path that may lead to political violence. 519 (October-December 2009). Adam Serwer.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-25-Pseudo-Experts-On-Islam. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517 (October-December 2009) (describing Britan’s ‘Radical Middle Way’ initiative that is aimed at “articulated a relevant mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic. ROLLING STONES (Feb. 2008. Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. 3 J. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Two years after this article was published. 81 J. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. 83 J. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. available at http://www.start.mpac. 304 (2009) (recommending the creation of a “counterradicalization forum” where policymakers and practitioners from various countries compare notes and best practices). 7.79 Many of these experts argue for an aggressive preventive model that focuses law enforcement’s attention on those holding ideologies of Islamic radical extremism.pdf (highlights 25 “experts” on Islam.edu/start/announcements/announcement. Dec. politically conservative males monopolizing that title.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-25Pseudo-Experts-On-Islam. 2012). and other Muslim related areas and the lack of training and/or knowledge these individuals have in said areas of expertise). Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. 28. 324 (2009).asp?id=416 (arguing that radicalization does not necessarily lead to terrorism). & POL’Y 301. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. counterterrorism.whitehouse. Arun Kundnani. Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. Beutel. The Fear Factory.. http://www.. supra note ___. L. e. 2012. NAT’L SEC.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf. 3 J. 82 J. NAT’L SEC. Muslim Public Affairs Council (Sept. NAT’L SEC. http://www. Muslim Public Affairs Council (Sept. & POL’Y 302 (2009) 78 The title ‘terrorism expert’ requires seemingly minimal objective criteria.g. at 8. L. deemed radical by the US government. 2011).81 Proponents of counter-radicalization programs assert that the government should focus on “break[ing] the radicalization cycle”82 by promoting moderate. 3 J.80 and thus prioritize counter-radicalization in counterterrorism strategy.umd. With their access to contacts in mainstream media. 2012). Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. 11. ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (July 23. L. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. and other Muslim related areas and the lack of training and/or knowledge these individuals have in said areas of expertise) 79 Not Qualified: Exposing the Deception Behind America’s Top 25 Pseudo Experts on Islam. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson.83 Such claims are problematic because scholars and policy analysts have yet to adequately theorize what causes an individual to adopt certain interpretations of Islam. David Stevens. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 4 15 . 84 See.g.pdf (highlights 25 “experts” on Islam. available at http://electronicintifada.84 Carpenter. proactive and relevant to young British Muslims”). Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. The Recruits: Why Some Young Western Muslims Find al-Qaeda’s Narrative So Appealing.

ACLU Lens: Obama Plan to Fight Violent Extremism a Step in the Rights Direction.g.edu/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_final2013. But…. Margaret Chon & Donna E. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012). DUKE TRIANGLE CENTER FOR TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb.. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (accepting the claim that Muslims are vulnerable to radicalization by virtue of being Muslim). 87 Steve Gosset. and are first or second generation immigrants from Muslim majority countries deemed unassimilated into the dominant Anglo Judeo-Christian American culture. 2012. 215. hold unsavory or critical political views of American domestic or foreign policy. 3.umd. 68 LAW & CONTEMP.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lens-obama-plan-fightviolent-extremism-step-right-direction.aclu. & POL’Y 301. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson.asp?id=416 (discussing low rate of actual terrorist acts and evidence that not all who engage in violent behavior necessarily possess radical beliefs and vice versa). John Horgan. 86 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman.start. PROBS. 28. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 7. Arzt. J. government officials and experts who call for counter-radicalization now (March 2009.86 Continued criticism by civil liberties advocates that the term extremism connotes lawful political dissent87 caused the government to adopt the term “countering violent extremism”88 to emphasize its focus on those who engage or plan to engage in violence. Walking While Muslim. http://www. 88 See.duke. 90 Marc Lynch.92 To circumvent these critiques.fpri. WHITE HOUSE. 91 Charles Kurzman.90 Aside from the disproven claim that Muslim communities in the US are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment.S. Muslim American Terrorism: Declining Further. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). National Security Preparedness Group. 85 See. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 17. ACLU (Aug. the default strategy becomes to scrutinize Muslims who are highly religious. 2011). National Security Preparedness Group. 307 (2009) (noting some terrorists are driven by feelings of exclusion from their own societies. e. 1. 3 J. and U.89 Nonetheless.K. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 5. see also Quintan Wiktorowicz. available at http://tcths. NAT’L SEC. Scott Carpenter. and provides little insight for law enforcement’s preventive and reactive counterterrorism objectives. countering violent extremism mirrors counter-radicalization in its focus on messaging and programs designed to counter extremist narratives attractive to a small but potent pool of jihadists and populations vulnerable to radicalization. L. http://www.85 Without any empirical evidence guiding law enforcement. 216 (2005). Homegrown Terrorists in the U. Dec. available at http://www.pdf 92 Will McCant & Clint Watts. or are well-educated and live in Western democracies but struggle with issues of belonging and identity). Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 6.sanford.91 critics point out that domestic countering violent extremism is defined differently depending on the implementing agency.edu/start/announcements/announcement. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. the social sciences literature is still under development. 16 . Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West 11-17 2005) (summarizing the different theories on why individuals become terrorists). 2013).S. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and the Strategic Implementation Plan 89 Marc Lynch. U. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011).Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Beyond a general consensus that there is no profile or single path of “radicalization” towards violence. Discussion Point: The End of Radicalization?. trapped in poverty or hopelessness within authoritarian Middle East regimes. FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 26 (April 2009) (noting the absence of a reliable terrorist profile has caused law enforcement to stereotype immigrant and Muslim communities as potential terrorists). CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010)..org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment.

96 As early as 2003. especially in light of the FBI’s egregious violations in the 1960s and 1970s as part of COINTELPRO. See Kundnani. But instead of de-racializing counterterrorism strategy.gov/crt/publications/post911/post911summit_report_2012-04. skepticism among Muslim community leaders and constituents is due more to the government’s glaring failure to change counterterrorism policies and practices that adversely impact or intentionally discriminate against Muslims. Subcommittee on Intelligence. 22. 97 Former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Ch ertoff stated “[a]n effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic radicalization requires that we not only engage these communities. community policing is the government’s latest iteration of focusing on form over substance. Information Sharing. Mueller. http://www.18 CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). FBI Records: The Vault. 95 COINTELPRO.94 Critiques of the terminology of the federal government’s preventive. AND COMMUNITY POLICING Prior to community policing’s introduction into the post-9/11 counterterrorism discourse.” Micheal Chertoff.95 At the grassroots level. 2011).justice. the US Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division. Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security. but also take proactive steps to build trust and respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities. and Terrorism Risk Assessment (March 10.gov/news/testimony/working-with- 17 . CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010) (arguing for coordination between engagement and combating violent extremism) 94 Marc Lynch.s. 4 (Oct. Office of Public Affairs Federal Bureau of Investigation. Community Relations Unit. Brett Hovington Chief. 19. “community engagement” and “community outreach” were the labels most often used to describe the interactions between Muslims and the federal agencies tasked to protect the public from civil rights violations.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author use community engagement as the descriptor. 14. community engagement is a counterradicalization tactic and a preventive component of the prosecution-driven counterterrorism strategy. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. A Report on the Civil Rights Division’s Post-9/11 Civil Rights Summit pp. supra note 71.fbi. the US Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL).S. p. C. at 11. 96 Confronting Discrimination in the Post-9/11 Era: Challenges and Opportunities Ten Years Later. 2010). OUTREACH. U. ideologically-based counterterrorism programs have led to the rise of community policing as the nom du jour. Written Testimony on Radicalization. http://vault. THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (2009). 98 Robert S. Mar. Spooked. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 4. the government simply adopts a new name in an attempt to persuade the Muslim communities to be more cooperative. Among academics.pdf. Working With Communities to Stop Terror Plots. COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT. the skepticism lies in the reasoning that any law enforcement program defined by the ideology of the targets is flawed by design and a nonstarter.gov/cointel-pro. and faiths.2. As such. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 4. available at http://www.fbi. 2010) available at http://www.fbi.97 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hate Crimes section98 held meetings with 93 Marc Lynch. III Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept.93 Despite its innocuous name. 2007.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11-confronting-the-terrorist-threat-to-the-u. cultures.

available at http://brennan. Scott Carpenter. Police Power in Post-9/11 America.php (reporting cases where individual Muslim’s religious rights are defended). THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (2009) (critiquing Britain’s Preventing Violent Extremism program as imposing government agendas on local Muslim communities). In Extremis: A SelfDefeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (stating that Secretary Napolitano views countering violent extremism as a more community-oriented form of counterterrorism because it provides more “tips” from within the community).Y. social inclusion. See also Arun Kundnani. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY (March 2009).pdf 103 Id. at 55 (describing FBI’s community outreach with Muslims).3cdn. removing social and economic inequalities and ethnic ghettoization. 100 Harris. many outreach meetings have devolved into superficial meet and greets wherein the same civil rights and liberties grievances are rehashed with minimal policy reform. 102 Faiza Patel. civil rights outreach and engagement meetings have been narrowly limited to individual cases of discrimination or hate crimes by private actors. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 17.99 But due to these offices’ political weakness within their respective agency bureaucracy.S. leaving unaddressed the broader systemic causes of both private acts of discrimination and government civil liberties infringements. 10.gov/crt/spec_topics/religiousdiscrimination/newsletters. Brennan Ctr. see also David Stevens. N. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. Sch. 104 Id. (explaining that outreach meetings are generally perceived "as insincere" and "as a one-way means for the government to gather information about community members' religious practices"). for Justice. 99 Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Univ. 322 (2009) (recommending that US government only work with Muslims and Arabs who have a demonstrated track record of competing with violent and nonviolent extremists).101 Members of Muslim communities are rarely consulted in the selection of community representatives to outreach meetings. or national security investigations. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 15 (Spring 2010). Federal Bureau of Investigation.104 Community leaders serious about effectuating policy changes usually stop attending or boycott the meetings.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author varying frequency with Muslim communities across the country to discuss civil rights concerns and grievances. of Law. 18 . Hate Crimes Accounting: Annual Report Released (Dec. & POL’Y 301. 523 (October-December 2009) (recommending that government focus on for fairer treatment.justice. Rethinking Radicalization 26-27 (2011). Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517. L. NAT’L SEC.100 Operationally.net/3ff468de1211ff853e_hwm6beu15. Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization. they have limited capacity to influence the policies or actions of other offices tasked with immigration enforcement.gov/news/stories/2012/december/annual-hate-crimesreport-released/annual-hate-crimes-report-released 101 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council. Department of Justice. available at http://www. Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism 16.fbi. outreach meetings are often run by low-level federal bureaucrats who set the agenda with the same pre-selected and vetted community members that purport to represent diverse Muslim communities within a particular locale. leaving individuals to fill their spots who may not have representational communities-to-disrupt-terror-plots (describing community outreach as a tactic for preventing violent radicalization). U. J. supra note ___. As a result. 3 J.102 Nor are they informed of the content of such meetings. Religious Freedom in Focus Newsletters.103 Thus. available at http://www. national security prosecutions. 2012) (noting that nearly all cases involve an individual victim). overcoming systemic discrimination. achieving greater level of integration as opposed to countering radicalization). But see National Security Preparedness Group.

For if those allegations were true.109 Since 2008.html (many leaders see such meeting as merely a pro forma. and U. Specifically. Information Sharing. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. 13. REV. 19. they can create the appearance of collaboration that fulfills executive directives to engage Muslim communities. Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. 1195. federal agencies are looking for potential recruits to serve as informants. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. Huffington Post (Dec. available at http://www.gov/news/testimony/working-withcommunities-to-disrupt-terror-plots (describing community outreach as a tactic for preventing violent radicalization). available at 19 . the 105 Innes. 108 But see Hussain. there may be a more insidious motive for outreach to Muslims.S.108 But the flaws of community outreach and engagement extend beyond the usual incompetency associated with some government programs or failures to implement systemic reforms.huffingtonpost. and Terrorism Risk Assessment (March 10. supra note XX.107 Moreover. Legislative Director of ACLU (April 26. Homegrown Terrorists in the U. 40 AM. 2010). 2012). CRIM. FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 15 (April 2009). at 234 (noting difficulty to determining who really represents a community’s views).S.106 So long as government officials can honestly claim that they met with Muslims a specific number of times.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (testifying that “The FBI’s actions are not limited to arrests and prosecutions. see also Letter to Inspector General of U. community outreach and engagement has been dismissed by some civil liberties advocates as a mere public relations campaign aimed to diffuse allegations of religious and racial profiling. and gathering intelligence about the mosques and Muslim community life in that locale.com/news/news/crimelaw/aclu-fbi-used-outreach-collect-info-bay-area-musli/nFrPF/. identifying targets for investigation. 109 Robert S. 2011). they take many forms—including recruiting potential intelligence sources”). Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security. Office of Public Affairs Federal Bureau of Investigation.K. http://www. Department of Justice from Laura Murphy. check-thebox event providing political cover to the government). Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author legitimacy or prioritize self-promotion over the communities’ collective interests. the outreach meetings offer the government a rebuke to critiques that it discriminates against or does not respect the rights of Muslims. Rather. III. Policing Uncertainty. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman. then such meetings would not be held. the efforts tend to focus on eliminating the perception of inequity.com/sahar-aziz/obama-americanmuslim-outreach_b_1152359. Ramirez. 1231 (2003). The Contradictions of Obama’s Outreach to American Muslims. 107 Brett Hovington Chief. Sahar Aziz. the government and community participants have little incentive to produce tangible policy reforms that systemically change counterterrorism practices.105 Because no public oversight or accountability mechanisms exist. which focus on systemic changes in policy and practices to which the government often has no meaningful response. Community Relations Unit. this diversionary tactic misses the mark of the critiques. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 17. available at http://www.fbi. Instead.. Working With Communities to Stop Terror Plots. Of course. ACLU: FBI used outreach to collect info on Bay Area Muslims. Deborah A. at 925 (critiquing the replacement of religious profiling with cultural profiling as producing the same subordinating effect). the reasoning goes.ktvu. 2011). supra note ___. Thus. Subcommittee on Intelligence. http://www. L. 2012) (requesting an investigation into abuse of community outreach to gather intelligence and coerce Muslims into serving as informants). 106 National Security Preparedness Group. KTVU and Wires (March 27. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (stating that one of the core objectives of counterradicalization is to address the perception of discrimination or mistreatment). Mueller.fbi.

gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.e. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 8. ACLU National Security Blog (Feb. Jerome P. Harris.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and DHS have been working together to formulate a coherent strategy for combating domestic violent extremism. 34 N. 114 Williams.112 Their participation as the lead conveners aggravates the inherent divergence between Muslim communities’ interests in protecting their civil liberties and prosecutors’ mandate to prosecute and show tangible results in the form of convictions to account for the billions of taxpayer dollars spent on counterterrorism.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners. 112 See the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. some community leaders have accused the FBI and NYPD of exploiting the good faith of the Muslim communities at engagement meetings to gather intelligence for law enforcement purposes. REV.pdf). National Security Preparedness Group. Is the FBI’s Community Outreach Program a Trojan Horse? . 140-41 (2010).111 Recent FBI policies assigning US Attorneys as the anchors of federal outreach at the local level also raise questions as to the relationship between counterterrorism enforcement and community engagement given that US Attorneys are also the lead prosecutors of anti-terrorism laws. available at http://www. 2013).114 Community policing has become popular both among policy makers seeking to be more preventive in counterterrorism and Muslim community leaders concerned with protecting the civil liberties of their constituents.U. the NCTC) with CRCL.aclu. L. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 5 (Spring 2010) 20 . on counter-radicalization programs raises legitimate concerns about the motives of government outreach programs.org/files/assets/letter_to_oig_re_fbi_privacy_act_violations_and_improper_targeting. David A.whitehouse. Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. 110 The collaboration of an intelligence agency created to counter terrorism (i.org/blog/national-security/fbis-communityoutreach-program-trojan-horse.. 115 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council. & SOC. 113 Setty.115 For government officials. guns. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). community policing has the benefit of being a less politically charged term than counter-radicalization or countering violent extremism. 2012). whose mandate is to safeguard civil rights and liberties.113 In response to these critiques. 17 and 42. and gangs context. August 2011 (http://www. at XX. Bjelopera. Similarly. Congressional Research Service 7-8 (May 31. the government has begun pushing for community policing to replace community engagement and outreach as a more formal program based on models developed in the 1990s in the drugs. National Security Preparedness Group. supra note ___. Congressional Research Service 4-5 (May 31. 111 Mike German. Bjelopera.Y. 13. December 2011 (http://www.pdf). CHANGE 123.aclu. http://www. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities After 9/11. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 7. while CRCL has been engaging in outreach efforts with American Muslim communities to address civil liberties grievances. 2012).p df 110 Marc Lynch. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011). Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 10. see also. Jerome P. and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. Countering Violent Extremism in the United States.whitehouse.

Charles Kurzman and Ebrahim Moosa. 2) withhold using their investigative authorities to open threat assessments on Muslims without individualized suspicion of criminal activity. underestimates the deeply entrenched adversarial nature of America’s criminal justice system. if not outright entrap. Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization .g. CRIM. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 7. In the end. supra note ___. L. L. http://www. e. community policing allows Muslims to provide more accurate information to law enforcement with the expectation that this will fundamentally change counterterrorism practices. e. Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. REV.. LXXVII.118 Like in the community outreach context. U. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan. 119 Anita Khashu.119 Thus. Policing with Muslim Communities in the Age of Terrorism. See also Deborah A. vulnerable young Muslim men. at 231. Innes. 118 See. 4 (April 2010). 2117 (1998). Community Oriented Policing Services.. Vera Institute for Justice. Spooked. Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. This will give Muslim communities the necessary political access to persuade law enforcement to 1) stop infiltrating Muslim communities and mosques with shady informants that induce. Ramirez. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. 40 AM.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=2050&i ssue_id=42010. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan. Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. 1196 (2003) 21 . 66 Fordham L. National Security Preparedness Group. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011).org/magazine/index.policechiefmagazine.117 Muslim American proponents of community policing believe it offers a formal mechanism to reform selective counterterrorism practices. 122 See also Deborah A. http://www. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 18 (March 2009). and Zainab Latif.122 and misunderstands the incentive structure governing law enforcement agents 116 117 Williams. state. Lynch.120 Their optimism. supra note ___. Kundnani. Beutel. Department of Justice (August 2005). 6. Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans. at 10. 1195.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author It has a positive connotation from a record of relative success when used to improve relations between local police and African American communities in inner city neighborhoods. Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice. David Schanzer. however. 17 See. Muslim leaders in favor of community policing believe the root cause of aggressive counterterrorism tactics is based on law enforcement’s misunderstanding of Islam. REV. supra note 71. 2010). Ramirez. Muslims in America. CRIM. no. at 10.gov/Publications/Building_PoliceImmigrant_Relations. 121 Gerard E. Building Strong Police-Immigrant Community Relations: Lessons from a New York City Project. Robin Busch. Rev.pdf. 120 Beutel. 40 AM.usdoj. The Police Chief Vol. Policing Uncertainty. 1215 (2003). 121 overlooks the long history of disparate treatment of racial and ethnic minorities. 3) permit Muslim charities to donate humanitarian aid to Palestine.g. and other conflict zones where designated groups operate without prosecuting them for material support.S.cops. they believe that engaging with local. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. and 4) refrain from exercising prosecutorial discretion based on religious practices.116 It also facilitates outsourcing counterradicalization objectives to nongovernmental Muslim organizations. Mark G. supra note ___. and federal law enforcement on a regular basis builds relationships of trust. 1195. Kashmir. and the cultural practices of the diverse ethnicities that comprise American Muslim communities. Stainbrook. National Institute of Justice (Jan.

Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities.127 While police have historically been a source of civil rights grievances for minorities due to excessive force and pervasive racial profiling. 1999) 126 See. 14. 21. available at http://www. In traditional community policing.123 More importantly. businesses.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author and prosecutors. communities in crime-infested inner-city neighborhoods seek the assistance of local law enforcement to protect them from drug dealers.org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment. 2007. Mar. U. gangsters. Reisig. 22 . p.com/ten-valuable-community-policing-strategies/ (highlights 10 policing strategies that have been recognized internationally regarding community policing). 2003). which thus far has been unsuccessful in terms of empowering Muslim communities or stopping harsh counterterrorism practices. Michael D. 6 (2010). III.125 locally-based community policing will further the subordinating effects of post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies and alienate local police from Muslim communities. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. resulting in a fundamentally different power dynamic than the traditional community policing context. CRITIQUES AND COUNTER-CRITIQUES OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN COUNTERTERRORISM CCP paradoxically causes Muslims to engage with the same entities that threaten their liberty and privacy interests. The next section argues that absent structural reforms to counterterrorism strategy and the paramilitary culture of federal counterterrorism enforcement.S. this harms both Muslims and local police who cannot effectively combat crime without the trust of the communities they serve. Ten valuable community policing strategies.g. and homes. CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. Foreign Policy Research Institute (December 2012). 352 (September 2005) (finding that community policing works only when law enforcement agencies change their culture from an “us versus them” view of communities to a partnership approach). 26. e. participants in locallybased community policing are likely to be deputized as counterradicalization agents for the federal government.2 125 John Murray. Green Heritage News (Jan. U. Warrior Cops: The Ominous Growth of Paramilitarism in American Police Departments. 127 Lara Herschberg. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. http://greenheritagenews.124 Without structural reforms to federal counterterrorism strategy and attendant practices. Community and Problem-Oriented Policing.S. Diane Cecilia Weber. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment.. and a low police presence to engage in violent crime. As in the immigration enforcement context. proponents fail to recognize that there is likely to be little substantive difference between community policing and community outreach. and other violent criminals threatening the safety of their schools. Written Testimony on Radicalization. 1.fpri. low quality schools. It also considers the counter-critiques in support of community policing. 39 Crime & Just. 124 Micheal Chertoff. 126 Local law enforcement and the communities have a common interest in protecting their neighborhoods from being targeted by third-party criminals who exploit high rates of unemployment. the communities are primarily concerned with the takeover of their neighborhoods by criminals 123 Will McCants & Clint Watts.

timesunion. http://www. In counterterrorism. and gangs context. 132 Specifically. NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2007).Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author and the consequent risks to their lives. Att’y Gen. The Fear Factory. at 101. state. available at http://www. local. Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and state fusion centers comprised of local and federal agents prioritize preventive counterterrorism based on federal priorities. Another notable difference between traditional community policing and CCP is that local police enforce the crimes that are the focal point of traditional community policing.S.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007. Accordingly. Spooked. to All U.org/irp/agency/doj/agdirectives5. available at http://www. JTTFs are interagency squads lead by federal agents for the purpose of investigating terrorism matters and coordinating federal counterterrorism efforts across the United States. locally operated CCP cannot be effective without inclusion of the federal government. 23 . 2001). Section B then examines critiques of this Article’s thesis by highlighting the four most often cited assertions by community policing supporters.php#page-2. props up the divisive “Good Muslim/Bad Muslim” paradigm based on an individual’s willingness to accept government practices and policies.pdf.130 JTTFs are also the primary vehicle by which the intelligence community and federal. 131 Memorandum from Ashcroft John Ashcroft. Muslims engage with federal law enforcement and to a lesser extent with local police to protect their communities from governmental infringements on their civil liberties and consequent private acts of discrimination. Albany police emphasize stats. drugs. community policing defines relations between Muslim communities and local government around federal counterterrorism priorities. supporters claim that engagement through community policing de-mystifies Muslims to law enforcement and thereby counters 128 129 Broken Windows Bryan Fitzgerald. 7. Times Union (Jan. and tribal law enforcement are integrated in domestic counterterrorism operations. 132 Kundnani. 13. community in reducing crime.131 Thus. however. which requires major changes to the locally-driven traditional community policing model. Section A challenges proposals to apply community policing programs developed in the 1990s in the guns. 130 WHITE HOUSE.. 2008) (finding there are over 2000 FBI agents assigned to 102 JTTFs as of 2008).128 Thus. I argue that community policing is likely to subordinate Muslim communities by bolstering implementation of adversarial counterterrorism strategies.129 In contrast. Asserting that the interests of Muslim communities in America do not converge with law enforcement’s interests.pdf (instructing AUSAs to work with state and local officials on countering terrorism). traditional community policing objectives merges the common interests of police and communities to eradicate crime from their neighborhoods. 7. Cooperation with State and Local Officials in the Fight Against Terrorism (Nov. supra note 71. Att’ys.com/local/article/Albany-police-emphasize-stats-community-in4170427. Guy Lawson. and deputizes Muslim leaders into unwittingly sharing intelligence about their communities. ROLLING STONES (Feb. First.dhs.fas. 2013). federal agencies enforce anti-terrorism laws.

Community Policing.ucdavis. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Volume 15.edu/rstaylor/papers/Hate%20Speech. Walking While Muslim. REV. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11. 68 LAW & CONTEMP. The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law . Arzt. Muslims are subordinated as the racialized “Terrorist 133 134 Wesley Skogan & Susan Hartnett. 137 Hussain. PROBS.psdomain. Third. 220 (2004-2005). 215. at 934. the Priority of Liberty. and the Temptations of Nonideal Theory . 1196 (2001-2002). L. 24 . Issue 3. Gil Gott. 1073. While each of these claims is reasonable in the abstract. A. 136 Robert S. and the political powerlessness of Muslim communities in the U.134 These “out-groups” disproportionately carry the burden of distributional inequalities arising from abusive practices sanctioned by the majority. The adversarial nature of the criminal justice system. And finally. 50 VILL. Margaret Chon & Donna E.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author negative stereotypes of the “Terrorist other” that they believe contribute to harsh counterterrorism tactics. COMMUNITY POLICING AND SUBORDINATION POST-9/11 Subordination theory posits that particular groups are racialized into the outsider “Other” deserving of harsh treatment by the state to protect the majority from a perceived threat. 357 (June 2012). pp. 135 See Sameer M. the structural incentives of federal counterterrorism agents to boost their numbers of investigations and prosecutions. 1185. Ashar. proponents claim the relationships built in community policing can result in incremental reforms to counterterrorism policies. Hate Speech. collectively minimizes the likelihood that CCP will be as successful as traditional community policing in African American communities.135 Calling into question the efficacy of the prevailing emphasis on individual discrimination.S. supra note XX. the secondary role of local police departments in a federally-run counterterrorism regime. http://faculty. Unless federal law enforcement agencies undergo the same paradigm shift in their approaches to counterterrorism as their local law enforcement counterparts in the 1990s. 34 CONN. in practice they will leave supporters disappointed.133 which is unlikely in the current political climate. then Muslim communities should be weary of community policing as the velvet glove disguising the iron fist of preventive counterterrorism. REV. some community policing supporters argue that the Muslim community should engage in countering violent extremism through internal conflict resolution mechanisms that in theory are supposed to shield wayward youth from entering the criminal justice system. L. 1073-75 (2005).136 anti-subordination principles call for group-based remedies that take into account how enemy groups are racialized and constructed as outsiders137 In the post-9/11 era. proponents believe community policing will de-securitize Muslim communities by shifting the focus to the underlying sociological causes of radicalization rather than reactive investigation and prosecution. Chicago Style (1997). Taylor. Second.pdf.

at 435. SURV. 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 141 Id. PROBS.Y. 143 Id. Margaret Chon & Donna E. at 442. proceduralists. interventionists insist that rigid constitutional interpretation favoring individual rights by an intrepid judiciary preserves America’s constitutional values especially during times of national emergency. 145 Id. L.U. at 433.144 Although they agree with the unilateralists and proceduralists that 9/11 created a national emergency. 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims. supra note XX. ANN. and Immigration Law After September 11.139 I would add that this is especially so when those individuals are members of an outgroup of “Terrorist Others. not just an individual basis. Arzt. The Patriot Act Reader: Understanding the Law’s Role in the Global War on Terrorism (September 20. Race. AM. Joseph Margulies and Hope Metcalf insightfully categorize scholars writing on post-9/11 national security law and policy into three groups: unilateralists.143 In contrast. Susan Akram and Kevin Johnson. 58 N. 299 (2002) 139 Margulies & Metcalf.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Other” targeted by aggressive national security laws and policies in response to the September 11th terrorist attacks. Unilateralists favor granting the Executive more power during emergencies because the state’s interest in survival outweighs any individual liberty interests.amazonaws. 295. the death penalty.” Proceduralists focus on bolstering structural and procedural protections in order to preserve essential American constitutional values and decrease the risk of eroding the constitutional framework. Walking While Muslim. religious See John Tehranian. 216 (2004-2005). 144 Id.141 For them. at 433.com/2004/pdf/the-patriot-act-reader.145 Interventionists face an uncomfortable dilemma wherein they critique Bush and Obama policies as a deviation from the norm while simultaneously cognizant that pre-9/11 the American criminal justice system subordinated communities of color through police brutality. at 446-47. and interventionists. available at http://thf_media.138 Thus. see also THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION. remedies to the adverse consequences should focus on systemic disparities that violate Muslims’ civil liberties as a collective. are not as concerned with where the pendulum swings between state power and individual rights so long as the procedures that allow the pendulum to swing in either direction are preserved. 142 Margulies & Metcalf. WHITEWASHED: AMERICAN’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY 65 (2009). But see Gil Scott.pdf (providing a proceduralists’ analysis in support of the PATRIOT Act by politically conservative scholars). the interventionists argue in favor of restraining Executive authority to protect civil liberties. institutionally oriented frameworks for examining the legality of government action in national security emergencies). 138 25 .140 Proceduralists. at 436.s3.142 Hence Muslims’ group and individual rights are justifiably subordinated to procedural and structural protections. at 440. 1084 (critiquing the limitations of process-based. supra note ___. 215. therefore. The Devil We Know. Civil Rights. 2004). protecting the rights of out-group minorities is not a focus in the short term provided in the long run their rights can be protected after the public recovers from the expected overreaction to the national emergency. 140 Id.

Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism). and discrimination are the most effective means of preventing extremism that may lead to violence). subsequently. 1185 (2001-2002). CRIM. 147 Margulies & Metcalf. L. 2012. (highlighting that under the Obama administration there has been a marked increase in retributive and venomous narratives about Islam and national security). thereby relegating Muslims to second-class citizenship. disloyal and unworthy of empathy because “they” want to kill and terrorize “us” Americans. 148 David Cole.U. at 444-45. REV. policies. See generally James Forman. of pre-9/11 subordination of communities of color. Wash.U. groupbased social harms on Muslim communities across the country. they seek to highlight post-9/11 violations as a continuation. Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible. e. see also Deborah A. David Eldridge.. Thus. at 923 (2008) (noting history of suspicion of cultural minorities when the nation faces external threats).146 Thus. 1073. White House. 26 . Jr. I argue against CCP. supra note XX. REV. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan. Obama: America not at war with Islam. even if more egregious in degree. 50 VILL. Jr. Change 331 (2009). Sept. & SOC. Karen Engle. REV. & Soc. Jr. 54 Stan. 1214 (2003) (noting that the onus imposed by constant suspicion by law enforcement causes targeted communities to share a massive sense of injustice and destroys relations with law enforcement). Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible. L. David Stevens. James Forman. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. agrees with interventionist scholars that the state of pre-9/11 civil rights and liberties for communities of color left much to be desired. 1100 (2005).Y. Enemy Aliens. a critique of post-9/11 policies must be contextualized against pre-9/11 laws that disparately impacted minority groups. at 445. Margulies & Metcalf. Hussain.g.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author intolerance. gangs.. political exclusion. Rev. The Devil We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law. e. L. 523 (OctoberDecember 2009) (arguing that overcoming segregation. See Sameer M. 59 (2004). 1195. thereby making it a racially subordinating counterterrorism strategy analogous to. which laid the foundation for post9/11 policies targeting Muslims. 33 N. L.149 My thesis. who argues that the War on Terror is merely a replication of the War on Crime and. L. and practices that effectively signal to the public that “those” Muslims are forever foreign. 8. 150 Implicit in my thesis is an agreement with James Forman. Rev. 151 See.Y. which falls under the latter approach.151 government practices impose racialized. Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. supra note XX. 33 N. and guns efforts where police work with communities to protect them from third-party criminals. Notwithstanding official government statements that not all Muslims are terrorists. Ashar. supra note XX. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517. at 438-39... 75 U. 953 (2002). the War on Drugs. Subordination of Muslims post-9/11 manifests itself in various laws. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11.150 As such. 149 Gil Gott. Times. Ramirez.152 Pervasive government scrutiny of Muslim communities imposes significant dignitary and stigmatic costs 146 Id.g. L.147 Some interventionists base their critiques in immigration and alienage law148 while others argue that racial subordination is the critical center of gravity that explains the cause and effect of post-9/11 national security laws. L. CHANGE 331 (2009). 40 AM. Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (2011) . the subordinating “wars” on crime and drugs but for a different target community. and a post-9/11 extension of. 34 CONN. In contrast to anti-drugs. Colo. 152 See. Rev. community policing in counterterrorism co-opts Muslims into participating in a preventive counterterrorism regime that perpetuates Muslim communities’ subordination in American society. and racial profiling. REV.

Ashcroft... Rev. Imposing guilt-by-association. 11 Attacks. Ashar. Muslims are pressured to downplay their religious identity while attempting to assimilate154 by drawling their English in domestic accents. Muslims are disempowered from shaping their relationships with other Americans so long as government counterterrorism strategies target and stigmatize their communities. 34 CONN.153 As a consequence.aclu. TIMES. REV. Nov. at 484 (discussing congressional hearings criticizing Muslim leaders’ cooperation with government). remaining deferential and cheerful in the face of government targeting.edu/law/pdfs/academics/pfp-execsum-dnld-ver. at Paragraph 31 (E.g. Mich. 40 Conn. at B6.g. Muslim Comty. 11. L. or duplicitous. 9 Hastings Race & Poverty L. 155 See. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2009). supra note ___. the Group is Asking Those Who Have Been Victimized to Step Forward. From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality. Civ.A. Aziz. PROBS. or other activities that foster a Muslim group identity. 7 UCLA J. The Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative. L.156 Muslims cease engaging in identity performance expressed through public prayer. attending Muslim community events. law enforcement has yet to invest in community policing programs focused on Christian evangelical communities that staunchly 153 Hussain. available at http://www. at best. Islamic & Near E. Preventive Dragnet. e.155 In addition. Margaret Chon & Donna E. at 46-47 27 . wearing a headscarf. Aziz. 1196 (2001-2002).g. available at http://www.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author onto individuals and chills their willingness to engage in religious and cultural practices that define them. 68 LAW & CONTEMP. Nov. A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary 2 (2004). 157 Teresa Watanabee. Sameer M.pdf..S. The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U. AM. Freezing Charity. 3. available at 2003 WL 2447352. they fear becoming too active in the religious activities of a Muslim community because this will be viewed as anti-assimilationist and indicative of terrorist inclinations. e. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11 . J. 227 (2012). supra note XX. Police Power in Post-9/11 America. e. L. Harris. WHITEWASHED: AMERICAN’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY 65 (2009). 191. John Tehranian. 121. 215. at worst. 2003) (“Some members have asked me and other Friday prayer leaders to avoid speaking about political issues fearing that any public discussions of controversial political issues will place more suspicion upon the [Muslim community center] and make us more likely targets of government investigation and surveillance”). 0372913.northeastern.159 For example. at 935-36. Sasha Cohen O’Connell & Rabia Zafar. No. Sahar F. 125-29 (2008-2009). Nagwa Ibrahim. L. Ass’n v. Walking While Muslim. at 134 (accepts this assumption when arguing for community policing between law enforcement and Muslim communities). 1224 (2008). see also Deborah A. Ramirez.org/human-rights/report-blocking-faith-freezing-charity.D. as a group. are aware of individual Muslims’ terrorist inclinations or plots by virtue of sharing the same faith. John Tenranian. 1201. law enforcement expects Muslims to know more about each other than other communities with members that have engaged in domestic terrorism. 156 See Blocking Faith.158 In the end. supra note XX. supra note XX. 158 See. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering . Arzt. 159 Harris. Law. Quakers Promote Immigrant Rights: Citing an Increase in Abuses Since the Sept. 1185. and engaging in hyper-patriotic acts such as displaying American flags in their homes and businesses. 154 See. 46 (2004-2005). 2003. Selective Racialization: Middle-Eastern American Identity and the Faustian Pact with Whiteness. Muslims’ civic participation is discredited as disingenuous .157 Instead of being welcomed as an act of citizenship. CCP aggravates these problems by presuming that Muslims.

Militia Charged With Plotting to Murder Officers.story (Muslim man harassed over lengthy period of time when traveling because on watch list).164 it is worth highlighting some of the most problematic practices that form the basis of most Muslims’ civil liberties grievances.4387436. 2011. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. REV. 162 See. Shirin Sinnar. 77 Brook.com/news/local/breakingnews/os-muslim-suesdhs-watch-list-20121222..167 and the large number of Muslims targeted for “voluntary” interviews by law enforcement and immigration agencies. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 22.html.nytimes. 161 See.orlandosentinel.html?_r=0. supra note XX. July 25.g. available at 28 . e. The answer.161 or predominantly Anglo patriot groups that oppose immigration reform and question the validity of President Obama’s birth certificate.com/2010/03/30/us/30militia. Bobby Joe Rogers Sentences to 10 Years for Firebombing Abortion Clinic in Pensacola. at 924. Times.0. 21.Y. e. Muslim businessman sues Homeland Security.html?pagewanted=8&_r=0&ref=georgertiller..nytimes. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 11. http://www. Press. N..162 This obvious inconsistency in the treatment of domestic terrorists based on identity begs the question of why law enforcement is pursuing community policing with Muslims. government religious and racial profiling manifests itself in the disproportionate number of false positives of Muslim names on travel watch-lists and the No Fly Lists. State Lawmakers Debate ‘Birther’ Bills.g. 2009). e. Questioning Law Enforcement: The First Amendment and Counterterrorism Interviews.165 They can be categorized into three categories: religious and racial profiling. supra note ___. Sahar F. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010). David Barstow. e. at A1. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010) (noting that terrorist no-fly watch lists continue to expand). available at http://www.g. 164 See.nytimes. N. 41 (2011) (discussing “voluntary” interviews and their consequences for interviewees). it appears. N. 2010. http://www. selective counterterrorism enforcement. HUFF. July 26. Mar. An Abortion Battle. 29. 2012). 11-35407 (9th Cir.html. Caught in a Preventive Paradigm: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post9/11 America. 2009. 163 John Murray. TIMES. is that doing so offers an additional tool for law enforcement to gather intelligence in furtherance of an adversarial system that prioritizes bolstering the number of terrorism investigations. L. 352 (September 2005).g. 4. Apr.huffingtonpost. POST (Oct. 47 GONZAGA L. 165 Marc Lynch. at 939-40 (highlighting case where federal agents gave coercive effect to private cultural profiling when passenger aircraft crew kicked a Muslim doctor off of the plane and another crew that refused to fly unless passengers wearing traditional Afghan dress were run through a second security screening)..Y. available at http://www. Fought to the Death. First.com/2011/04/22/us/politics/22birthers. 429 (2012). 168 Hussain. 2012.Y. Holder. Kirk Johnson. and convictions of Muslim in America. 166 Marc Lynch. Times. says harassed while traveling. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. Nick Bunkley & Charlie Savage. ADC Requests DHS Civil Liberties Investigation Into Operation Frontline Targeting Muslims in 2004 . at 56 (noting the FBI seeks to build relationships with Muslims to exchange intelligence). Rev.168 160 See. Amy Pavuk. Assoc.com/2009/07/26/us/26tiller. Latif v.com/2012/10/04/bobbyjoe-rogers-10-year-sentence-firebombing-abortion-clinic_n_1940670. Harris. 2012) 167 Hussain. Aziz. prosecutions. Police Powers in Post-9/11 America. No. 22.. Al Jazeerah Cross Cultural Understanding (Feb.160 far-right Christian communities that stockpile weapons because they wish to overthrow the government or believe the end of the world is near. Orlando Sentinel (Dec. 28.163 While a substantive critique of government actions that subordinate Muslim communities as the “Terrorist Other” is beyond the scope of this Article.166 the prevalence of Muslims stopped for heightened border screening. supra note XX. and private acts of discrimination. Evidence Aside. at A11. 4:21 PM).Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author oppose abortions. http://www.

Rev.com/2013/01/17/3187003/judge-throwsout-taliban-terror.. LA Times (July 16. and Muslim owned businesses. available at http://www. Trevor Aaronson.com/News/world/archives/2007/01/11/2003344292.169 tasks dubious informants170 to prey on Muslim men with diminished mental capacity and financial problems.htm 169 See generally Assoc.pdf.go.g. Sept. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering.ap.L. see also Harris.html. 645. 225 (2004-2005) (discussing parallels between deportation of imams post-9/11 and arrests and detentions of Buddhist priests during Japanese internment and WWII). Fear. The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling. MOUSTAFA BAYOUMI. AM. 2006). AM. 11. 29 .ap. http://abcnews. and Secrecy.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/Documents-show-NY-policewatched-devout-Muslims. ROLLING STONES (Feb. Will Drop Charges: 2 Lodi Men to Be Deported . selective counterterrorism enforcement disproportionately targets Muslims for terrorism investigations and surveillance. FBI: Informant Close to Entrapping Would-Be Bomber. Associated Press (Dec. and Eileen Sullivan. Miami Herald. 2011.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Second. available at http://www.176 http://www. Jay Weaver.172 imposes special registration requirements of Muslim men between the ages of 15 and 45. 2007). Miami Herald (Jan. 2011). 20-25 (2011). Former Ohio imam’s deportation to Israel angers US Muslims.info/article9488.g. MuslimAmericans’ Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Centralized Terror-Free Donor Advised Fund?. 68 LAW & CONTEMP. NSEERS: The Consequences of America’s Efforts to Secure Its Borders. 172 Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman.ap.g. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP (2012). PBS (July 7. 5. Associated Press (Feb.com/watch?v=BXjwGCvnDpY&sns=em.com/2013/01/17/3187003/judge-throws-out-taliban-terror. U. available at http://www. 2013). The Fear Factory. La Ganga and Rone Tempest. Charles Hawley and Matt Apuzzo. at 128-29 (summarizing the FBI and NYPD’s abusive use of untrained civilians as informants to spy on Muslim religious and cultural institutions).miamiherald.adc.taipeitimes.ap. 215. Walking While Muslim.org/PDF/nseerspaper. Associated Press (Oct. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2009). 6.aclu. 171 Harris. Arzt. 11. 13 Roger Williams U. Press.informationclearinghouse. Rev. L. RACING RELIGION (2006) 174 See. http://www. http://www. 375.174 deports imams and religious leaders whose sermons are too critical of the American government. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. 7. 15.org/Content/AP-In-TheNews/2011/NYPD-infiltration-of-colleges-raises-privacy-fears.175 and criminalizes charitable giving and political associations through broad material support to terrorism laws. Federal judge throws out Taliban terror case against Margate imam.pbs. (2013). 2008) (critiquing the government’s use of informants to induce vulnerable defendants who posed little if any demonstrable threat to anyone or anything into government concocted terrorist plots on). Jan. Matt Apuzzo.html.com/US/wireStory/fbi-informant-close-entrapping-bomber-18405031. supra note XX. CIN. REV.html. 12 Rutgers Race & L.org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD.org/Opinion%20Editorials/2009/February/28%20o/ADC%20Requests%20DHS%20C ivil%20Liberties%20Investigation%20into%20Operation%20Frontline%20Targeting%20Muslims%20 in%20the%20US%20in%202004. Video: Calif. 2011). Assoc.ccun. 17. Profile: Imam Fawaz Damra. Adam Goldman. Associated Press (Jan... 170 Alexandra Natapoff. NYPD infiltration of colleges raises privacy fears. (2009). http://www. ARAB ANTIDISCRIMINATION COMM. mosques. e. Maria L. Freezing Charity. supra note XX.youtube. e. The Erosion of Civil Rights: Exploring the Effects of the Patriot Act on Muslims in Higher Education. 390-91 (2008). 73 U. see also Margaret Chon & Donna E. 1. Guy Lawson.pdf.171 maps and spies on Muslim student associations. Documents show NY police watched devout Muslims. 2013.org/human-rights/report-blocking-faith-freezing-charity. at 171. 2013) http://www. http://www.173 issues thousands of National Security Letters to banks and businesses that service Muslim clients. http://www.org/sites/default/files/RWGPenn_NSEERSReport_060412.org/now/shows/227/imamfawaz-damra.S. 175 E. http://www. Federal judge throws out Taliban terror case against Margate imam. 173 See. 17. AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations. Press. PROBS. Shafiqa Ahmadi. 2005).miamiherald. http://www. http://www. Nina J.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-spying-programs-yielded-only-mixedresults. see also Jay Weaver.rightsworkinggroup. 2013). 23. 176 See Blocking Faith. http://www. Crimm.htm. The Terror Factory: Inside the FBI’s Manufactured War on Terrorism. Man Arrested in Terror Plot May Need Psychiatric Evaluation (Feb. NYPD’s spying programs yielded only mixed results.

Attorney General’s Guidelines on Domestic Security Investigations (1976). supra note XX. Arlington.180 As the public interprets the government’s actions as part of rational national security policies.I. L. Office of the Attorney General. 2001. at 155.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Selective enforcement is facilitated by relaxed investigative guidelines. The Attorney General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of Confidential Informants Section I. e. 14. Comm. available at http://articles.washingtonpost.g. 177 30 . REV. housing.2933. Pig legs found at proposed mosque site in Ontario in apparent vandalism act. 1225 (2003). Because informants were a key component of the illegal spying on these peaceful.S.S. Sept. 11 Days.com/kabc/story?section=news/local/inland_empire&id=8770248.Y. Pamela Constable & Tara Bahrampour. area Muslim leaders call for calm. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan.181 Even worse. 1195. then-Attorney General Edward Levi established internal investigative guidelines that constrained the FBI’s use of informants in political and religious groups to only those instances when the agent could provide “specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged in activities which involve the use of force or violence” and upon approval from FBI headquarters. Dep’t of Justice. Aug... at 157-58. Uzma Kolsy. compared with other travelers.182 burning down children’s play centers. N.salon. After 9/11.. Texas.H (2002). the Department of Justice reminds the complainant that the guidelines do not create enforceable rights for private actors. 2008. Assoc. mostly likely to be Muslims.g. Islamic & Near E. the FBI relaxed its internal investigative guidelines for counterterrorism to allow agents to conduct threat assessments without having to show a predicate act of illegal activity. and 32% backed ‘special surveillance’ for them”). law-abiding groups. Dep’t of Justice (Oct.183 and Office of the Attorney Gen. schools. The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U. irrespective how tenuous. Fox News. Defining Racial Profiling in a PostSeptember 11 World. or convergence of interest is a public relations strategy to offset the expected grievances arising from the attendant civil liberties violations Finally. A National Challenged: Civil Liberties. 182 See. 2012). 2012. Theoharis ed. L.foxnews. 40 AM.00. available at http://www. private actors appear to believe they are protecting public safety by vandalizing mosques with anti-Muslim graffiti and dead pigs.330504. Press Release. Man Sentenced to 14 Months in Federal Prison on Federal Hate Crime Conviction.go. Law. 11. Wash.B. Dep’t of Justice.com/2012-0915/local/35496968_1_first-mosque-mosque-officials-muslim-leaders. Further expanding investigative powers. On the Judiciary. Press. ABC News.html. 121.177 In 2002. Feb. 179 See e. available at http://abclocal. 181 Nagwa Ibrahim. Ramirez.S. 50-53 (1977). available at http://www.178 In the few instances when agents are caught violating these lax guidelines. e. 49% favored special identification cards for such people. Eight Attacks. 24. SALON.g.com/2012/08/14/eight_attacks_11_days/ 183 See. 95 th Cong. Attorney General Mukasey in 2008 allowed agents to initiate threat assessments on anyone so long as there was a national security objective. 23. The requirement to show predicate acts indicative of criminal activity was imposed in the 1970s after congressional investigations uncovered a pervasive pattern of abusive and illegal domestic intelligence of dissident religious. 12. former Attorney General Ashcroft granted FBI agents authority to spy on religious groups and houses of worship. reprinted in FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 1999) (reviewing the Levi Guidelines) 178 Id.COM (Aug. and social groups. 180 Deborah A.. 2012. U..: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 38 (Athan G. Harris.com/story/0. THE F. private actors feel justified in discriminating against Muslims in employment. political. Virginia mosques vandalized. the third category — private acts of discrimination — is a consequence of the legitimizing effect of government subordination of Muslim communities. CRIM. Times. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. at A1 (reporting that “58% of Americans surveyed backed more intensive security checks for Arabs. Sept. U. 2011). Americans Give in to Racial Profiling . 15. including those who are United States citizens. Post. mutual trust. 7 UCLA J.179 These policy developments demonstrate that the rhetoric of cooperation. and public accommodations. 144-45 (2008-2009). Sam Howe Verhovek. Feds Charge Three Suspected White Supremacists for Tennessee Mosque Bombing.

17. Devil We Know. too. 2010.187 and targeted by high profile counterterrorism sting operations.”). and employment discrimination. Informants Endanger Democracy. Freezing Charity. THE BLAZE (Jul.. State Senator’s Remarks Have CAIR Outraged . ISPU.g. http://www. 184 Hussain..org/Index/AP-In-The-News/NYPD.g.S. the Words That Hurt: Entrenched Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11. HUFF. 2012.senate.gov/usao/txn/PressRel11/glaspell_sen. like the NYPD has.188 These fears are validated as more Muslims experience hate crimes. http://www.”). REV. Aziz.com/2013/01/17/3187003/judge-throws-out-talibanterror.g.org/GetPressRelease/49/12/PRCenter. “Permits should not be granted to build even one more mosque in the United States of America . 186 See.g. Christian Conservative Leaders Calls for No More Mosques in U. some Muslims feel they are watched closely by their co-workers or neighbors.185 Presumed to be collectively suspect. NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW (2009) 190 See. [because] each Islamic mosque is dedicated to the overthrow of the American government. . 11:00 AM).g. POST (May 29. executive director of Islamic Shura Council in southern California: “What these [informants] have done is create an environment where every person begins to suspect the other and with the infighting and inward suspicion.aspx. MIAMI HERALD (Jan. Blocking Faith.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. 3:35 PM). Press Release. 645. supra note XX. http://www. supra note ___.ap. Gil Gott. From Movements to Mosques.pdf (statement of Muslim law student: “I and other community members feel betrayed by our own police force. The bullying of Muslim children is on the rise. Sahar F. e. of being terrorists. CBS News (Aug.g. 684. Press. among other acts). Travis Loller.publiceye.gov/pdf/12-417RomeroTestimony. Thomas Cincotta.186 spied on by informants and undercover agents. at 939. Hearing on “Ending Racial Profiling in America 7 (Apr. Anthony D. many of whom have lived in the area for decades and were born there.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author throwing firebombs to scare “those” terrorist Muslims away from “our” country. available at http://www.. AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations.html (quoting Shakeel Syed. Civil Rights and Human Rights. Public Eye (2009). Erica Ritz. Sticks and Stones. 187 Alexandra Natapoff. 2012. even though we’ve done nothing wrong . Jay Weaver.184 The effects of subordination are expressed through Muslims’ palpable fears of being under constant scrutiny and consequently vulnerable to adverse government action or private acts of bias. the community becomes its own victim.. 17.html#storylink=cpy (reporting that the FBI sent a confidential informant to infiltrate a Miami mosque). e. e.html.miamiherald. Stephanie Condon.com/8301-503544_162-20013448503544. 189 See.191 These contentious public debates demonstrate the extent to which the “Terrorist Other” stereotype has become a staple in http://www. http://www. http://www.. 6:40 PM). 119 (citing ADC report that documented 74 cases of violence or threatened violence in schools in the first 6 months after September 11). They are afraid that if they are seen as ‘too Muslim’ in their views. My fellow students describe censoring themselves in classes to avoid saying anything that might be taken as controversial or out of the mainstream on contemporary political issues even where they should be most free—in academia. Romero.theblaze. Assoc. http://www. Subcommittee on the Constitution.190 Opponents of the mosque constructions unabashedly accuse Muslim citizens.html (defendant admitted to setting fire to playground equipment at mosque. 12.html (American Family Association’s Bryan Fischer says. CIN. at 123334.. e.189 Many towns have pressured local governments to bar mosque constructions and expansions on grounds that they are terrorist breeding centers. 73 U.judiciary.ispu. Written Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. non-Muslim students and professors will see them as suspect. 188 See. 31 . Lininger. school bullying. at 90.”). 2012).cbsnews. 191 See. .com/2012/05/29/murfreesboro-mosque-const_n_1553622. 2013) available at http://www. Judge throws out Taliban terror case against Margate imam.huffingtonpost. supra note ___. Rules Chancellor Robert Corlew. e. L.. Banning Mosques? Colo. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. 17.justice. 185 See. . e. Murfreesboro Mosque Construction Will Be Stopped.com/stories/2012/07/17/banning-mosques-colostate-senators-remarks-have-cair-outraged/. . and the fact that it’s the police singling out Muslims for unfair treatment makes us all deeply concerned that other parts of society see us as suspect.

17.g. Public Eye (2009). Meanwhile. 2007). 2010. REV. Civil Rights and Human Rights.judiciary. 198 See. It also leaves them feeling physically unsafe. http://www. 21. Worship and Worry. http://www. not knowing if their neighbors’ hateful speech may one day turn into physical violence against them and their children. these practices result in individual and communal self-censorship. Press. Center on Law and Security. 2012).ground. At a Brooklyn Mosque. Subcommittee on the Constitution. CNN (Jul. this leaves communities distraught at the collective guilt and scrutiny imposed upon them merely because they are Muslim.195 Cumulatively. Has Post-9/11 Dragnet Gone Too Far?. available at http://www. THE NEW YORKER. much less vocally disapprove of government policies. PROBS.philly.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author American culture. 16. 73 U. Apr.publiceye. Romero. See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11.pdf.g.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-monitored-Muslim-students-all-overNortheast (officers monitored student websites).194 and implement an aggressive. More critically. Chris Hawley. 68 LAW & CONTEMP. For example. 2012. Feb. former Attorney General Ashcroft stated “You want any population that might be thinking about committing a crime to be unsettled and distressed about it. After months of controversy.senate. So you have an elevated profile of enforcement. Arabs. Muslims are becoming suspicious of each other. 193 Alexandra Natapoff. 8. Robust and open debates on social and political questions become glaringly absent. http://articles. To avoid getting caught in the government’s counterterrorism dragnet. 2011 26.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-tomosques. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. Ashcroft’s Ascent.198 decline to donate to CNN Wire Staff.196 Muslims become afraid to openly discuss political issues.”).html (quoting opponent of mosque construction: “It would be a terrible mistake to destroy a 154 -year-old building in order to build a monument to terrorism. 2003. There is going to be awareness in the community that we are going to ask people to do that in such a way as to elevate a sense among those who would break the law that this isn’t the thing to do. Muslims Pray in the Shadow of Terrorism. Nov.192 Unsurprisingly. they limit or stop their attendance at mosques. 71% of terrorism cases involved an informant). opponents ask ‘why there?’. Lynn Duke. Informants Endanger Democracy. CHRISTIAN SCI. 645. 18. 194 See. NYPD monitored Muslim students all over Northeast. Hearing on “Ending Racial Profiling in America 7 (Apr. 215. CIN. 8:26 AM). Mosque Attendance Falls After Terrorism Arrests (National public Radio broadcast May 30. Written Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 12..193 monitor Muslims’ online activity and social media communications. and South Asians was publicly announced soon after 9/11. Warren Richey & Linda Feldman. Assoc.” Jefreey Toobin. 195 Selective enforcement of immigration and criminal laws against Muslims. at 53. From Movements to Mosques.mosque/index.. a unanimous yes for mosque.”). POST. see also Margaret Chon & Donna E. the government has deployed substantial resources to infiltrate Muslim communities with informants and undercover agents.197 They know there are informants in their midst but they do not who they are. 224-25 (2004-2005). 192 32 . at 166-67 (quoting a community leader admit that news of an informant in the community “brought mistrust among the brothers in the mosque. MONITOR. Edward Colimore. Inquirer.. at C1. Walking While Muslim.ap. Thomas Cincotta.zero.cnn. e.com/2010/US/07/14/new. 655 . Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences.com/2003-11-08/news/25461940_1_zoning-boardsite-plan-mosque (anonymous fliers warned public that new mosque could “attract worshipers with links to terrorists”). L. 2003. because they think the government is listening”). Sept. WASH.york. Arzt.html. April 15. In battle to build mosque near Ground Zero. 2003 at 1 (quoting one community leader as saying that “[s]ome people are afraid to cite verses of the Koran that include the word “jihad” when leading prayers.gov/pdf/12-4-17RomeroTestimony. 2001-September 11. 2002. http://www. 197 Harris. 196 Anthony D. supra note XX. e. preventive strategy that measures success by the number of terrorist investigations and prosecutions. New York University School of Law (2011) (reporting that in 2007 and 2009.

Karen Engle.205 An individual willing to accept the disproportionate curtailing of Muslims’ civil liberties to purportedly protect the national security of the majority is deemed a loyal. AND THE ROOTS OF TERROR (2005). available at http://www. 33 . 73 U.200 In the aggregate. But those who demand equal protection under the law are deemed treacherous agitators both within and outside Muslim communities. community policing exacerbates the subordinating effects of counterterrorism policies and practices by: 1) dividing communities among “Good Muslims” and “Bad Muslims” based on their willingness to accept community policing on the government’s terms. CIN. 206 Rascoff. 200 Harris. 59 (2004) 204 But see Alexandra Natapoff. available at http://www. 75 U. Sci.html.206 Indeed. Rev. e. which reduces the privacy interests of these communities to pursue prosecutorial goals). which only perpetuates their subordination. 59 (2004). supra note XX. supra note ___. Thomas Cincotta. 207 Harris. L. See Arun Kundnani.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Muslim charities and organizations. they continue to be a politically marginalized minority. the “Bad Muslim’s” failure to cooperate with law enforcement207 and vociferous dissent becomes a form of transgression that leads to 199 See Blocking Faith. Spooked! How Not to Prevent Violent Extremism 20. 645. REV. Public Eye (2009).aclu. Informants Endanger Democracy. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. COLO. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2009).publiceye.203 and 2) deputizing community leaders as gatekeepers who share information with law enforcement about Muslim community affairs as part of a seemingly innocuous process. 194 (2011). 75 U. Public Eye (2009). 203 For a more in-depth analysis of how post-9/11 national security policies create “Good Muslims” and “Bad Muslims. 202 See.html. L. Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terrorism. however. Freezing Charity. REV. Acad.201 Consequently. supra note XX. L.. BAD MUSLIM: AMERICA. available at http://www. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences.org/human-rights/report-blocking-faith-freezing-charity. 205 Mahmood Mamdani. Colo. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. 695 (discussing how informants are deployed to infiltrate African American communities to purportedly save those communities from criminals. THE INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS (2009) (critiquing Britain’s Preventing Violent Extremism program as using bolstering community gatekeepers to persuade Muslim communities to cooperate with the Prevent program by sharing information and refraining from criticizing foreign policy). at 167. In practice. 637 Annals Am. and socially. at 140. PROPPING UP THE DIVISIVE “GOOD MUSLIM” AND “BAD MUSLIM” PARADIGM The aftermath of the September 11th attacks created a “Bad Muslim/Good Muslim” paradigm. From Movements to Mosques. Neil Gotanda. Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the War on Terror(ism). at 173. THE COLD WAR. 201 Thomas Cincotta. community policing aims to create opportunities for government and Muslim communities to work together to address the forementioned concerns as well as assist law enforcement in combating terrorism. GOOD MUSLIM. Informants Endanger Democracy. Pol.204 1. From Movements to Mosques.199 and generally avoid association with Muslims. & Soc. AM. good citizen.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. 184.202 In theory. The Racialization of Islam in American Law.publiceye.g.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. economically.” see Karen Engle. Muslim civil society and community development is significantly stunted as communities are impeded from fully mobilizing their financial and human resources to empower themselves politically.

supra note XX. Muslims suspicious of government motives in community policing initiatives fall under the “Bad Muslims” whose skepticism is censured as a cause of Muslims’ radicalization post-9/11. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517. whether under the auspices of community policing or community engagement. supra note ____. supra note ___. see also Alejandro J.212 Rascoff’s solution is to outsource counterradicalization. Spooked. 34 . 2009).”210 Rascoff argues that the government’s engagement with Muslims goes beyond providing a political and public relations platform for select Muslim groups and individuals to speak out against terrorism. under the guise of outreach or community policing.. at 21. non-governmental organizations. 210 For a thorough and insightful critique of the government’s potentially unconstitutional entanglement with religion arising from countering violent extremism programs. the “Good Muslims’” willingness to cooperate with law enforcement’s CCP programs represents her attempts to assimilate so she can return to her rightful place in the White majority. See also National Security Preparedness Group. With government funding. Britain’s Prevent program demonstrates the perils of this flawed 208 209 Tehranian. Id. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (warning against government meddling in religious debates). 520-22 (showing that state sponsorship of churches in Europe leads to lower attendance and radicalization of those that remain). MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL (Nov. at XX. 211 But see David Stevens. As noted by Anund Kunandri’s field work. see also Beutel. his recommendation still results in the creation of an “official Islam” due to the coercive power of the purse. Beutel. Building Bridges to Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise between Muslim Americans and Law Enforcement 18. the government may be violating the First Amendment’s Establishment clause – enacted to prevent politicization and exploitation of religion.214 Despite this seemingly benign approach. Their participation in advocacy is associated with militant ethnics who are racialized at the bottom of the racial hierarchy. Kundnani. at 130. Muslim communities should lead efforts to make it difficult for terrorist recruiters to cherry pick their vulnerable youth.208 As such. 214 Rascoff. 212 Rascoff. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 8. at 35-38 (showing how Britain’s Prevent program defines moderate Muslims as those who do not criticize British policy and extremists as those who express dissenting political views coupled with religious Salafi orthodoxy). to private. non-governmental actors.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author government and public suspicions of Muslims as having something to hide. see Rascoff.209 Demanding that the government rely heavily on empowering specific Muslim organizations and individuals to provide counternarratives in theological debates comes dangerously close to state entanglement in religion in what Sam Rascoff provocatively critiques as “establishing official Islam. but gets problematically close to developing an official version of American Islam palatable to the US government. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. supra note XX. supra note ___. at XX. which most organizations have done irrespective of their relationship with the government. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. at XX. In contrast. 213 Id.211 Consequently. government entanglement in Islam rightfully critiqued by Rascoff will merely be effectuated through private. supra note 71. at 83.213 As such.

Rascoff. Birmingham: Anti-terrorist ‘community outreach’ plan complete failure. http://www. which receives government money to openly challenge extremist groups).COM (Feb. a cadre of interlopers and gatekeepers formed to discipline internal dissent.216 Moreover.org/ (site dedicated to counter-acting and speaking against CAIR.217 As a result.com/article/birmingham-anti-terrorist-community-outreach-plan-complete-failure (criticizing Muslim community for not informing police of defendants’ travels to a training camp in Pakistan but also recognizing community for bringing them back to England only to be prosecuted). supra note ___.221 As such. supra note 71. at 17. 80 THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY 517 (October-December 2009). 217 Id. 220 Kundnani. 221 Setty. at 192 (discussing realist political theory’s prediction that interests of minority groups can be furthered only to the extent those interests are co-extensive with the self-interest of the legislator). 23. at 11. at XX (describing work of the Quilliam foundation in Britain’s Prevent program). which it claims is an organization founded by terrorists).anti-cair-net. Timothy Whiteman. 2009). Building Bridges to Strengthen America.220 Britain’s experience is a cautionary note that outsourcing counter radicalization within a community-policing model is likely to create a government-funded “official Islam” that subordinates Muslim communities into accepting a racialized counterterrorism paradigm. at ____. supra note ___. at 1. Joseph Abrams. Spooked! supra note ___. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 5 (March 2009) (supporting the work of the non-governmental Quilliam foundation in Britain. supra note 71. House Leaders Wary of CAIR After FBI Shuns Islamic Advocacy Group. 218 David Stevens. 219 Beutel. 216 Kundnani. counter-radicalization programs reinforce a false dichotomy between the “good Muslims” who actively work with the government to implement counter-radicalization programs (usually under the guise of community outreach or engagement) on the government’s terms 222 and “bad Muslims” who criticize the discriminatory effects of Kundnani. 2013). and ultimately promote the devel opment of an “official Islam”—using the more politically correct term “moderate Islam”218—purportedly created indigenously within Muslim communities. Spooked.219 Meanwhile. Spooked. While Rascoff’s narrow critique of the First Amendment implications is useful. EXAMINER. they censored criticism of the government out of fear of losing funding or being labeled ‘extremists’— the very groups they sought to marginalize from the Muslim communities. Rascoff. at 16 (critiquing Britain’s Preventing Violent Extremism program as imposing government agendas on local Muslim communities). participating organizations were disappointed with the government’s disinterest in making structural reforms to policies and practices that contributed to discrimination against Muslims. available at http://www. 222 Much of the government’s influence in propping up “good Muslims” is manifested in private conversations among (predominantly male) Muslim leaders who invoke pragmatic arguments to dissuade those deemed to be a problem by the government from being too critical of the government lest they invite collective punishment against entire community.215 Muslim organizations in Britain that accepted government funding in a good faith effort to protect their youth from being exploited by terrorist recruiters found themselves pressured to serve as providers of information to the police. Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization.foxnews. it misses the mark in identifying the underlying divergence of interests between Muslim communities and the federal government within a structurally prosecution-driven counterterrorism system. at 16. supra note XX. http://www. Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. In Extremis: A Self-Defeating Element in the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Strategy. cooperate with the government on the government’s terms. 3.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author approach.examiner.com/politics/2009/02/03/house-leaders-wary-cair-fbishuns-islamic-advocacy-group/ (stating the FBI and several Congress members believe CAIR has ties 215 35 . Fox News (Feb. supra note ___.

Huq. 231 See Leti Volpp. Scott Shane.cnn. and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes. Deal in Wen Ho Lee case may be imminent. N. Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. 3 J. by de-mystifying Muslims in the eyes of law enforcement. 30. FBI Cuts Ties With CAIR Following Terror Financing Trial. 772...wenholee/. 645. See.afro.g. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. Asian Americans continue to be stereotyped as the model minority whose national loyalties are suspect.nytimes. or practice a stringent form of Islam. e. L. http://www. NJ finds NYPD Muslim surveillance is legal. FOX NEWS (Jan. 227 See. 228 Alexis Taylor.S. 651 & 692. 1195.. Rhetoric and Reality: Countering Terrorism in the Age of Obama 11. 579. See also Deborah A. http://news.S. Police Engage Faith Leaders in Crime Fight.g. Associated Press (May 24. Arzt.yahoo.foxnews.229 But their optimism overlooks decades of subordination experienced by other minority communities at the hands of the US government. African Americans are still disproportionately prosecuted and incarcerated in American’s criminal justice system. available at http://www.. Muslims. REV. 2012).com/sections/news/Baltimore/story. civil liberties violations will consequently decrease.230 Similarly.231 and their communities are essentialized as cutthroat overachievers. and prosecutions of Muslims. and underrepresented in electoral politics. 229 See. Aziz Z. Keith Aoki.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author counterterrorism practices.com/2011/03/12/us/politics/12muslims. CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY (June 2010) (noting the perceptions that community engagement is simply counterterrorism in disguise). 9. 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 44 Law & Soc’y Rev. adversely impacted by voter registration laws. CRIM. CNN (May 22.228 And. 223 Kundnani.232 And Latinos are presumed to be illegally in the U. World War II Propaganda. 365 (2010). Bill Mears.com/2006/LAW/05/22/scotus. 40 AM. & POL’Y 301.html. 5:30 PM).J.224 vehemently disagree with American foreign policy. NAT’L SEC. e. 1196 (2003). 3009). Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans. supra note 71. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism.htm?storyid=77167. 232 See. 215. L. 217 (2004-2005) (discussing suspicions of Japanese Americans as having a propensity for espionage and sabotage). Despite more than a hundred years since the end of slavery. investigations. e. “Foreign-ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface. Am. 73 U.Y. 1. 225 Joseph Abrams. Spooked.com/politics/2009/01/30/fbi-cuts-ties-cair-following-terrorfinancing-trial/#ixzz2LNkBnjZc. REV. at 35-38 (showing how Britain’s Prevent program defines moderate Muslims as those who do not criticize British policy and extremists as those who express dissenting political views coupled with religious Salafi orthodoxy). http://www. TIMES (March 11. 11 (1996) (discussing 36 . available at http://www. 365 (2010). they believe. L. CAIR on Hot Seat at Hearing on U. Aziz Z. Walking While Muslim. L. Huq. followed by decades of Jim Crow laws. e.html?_r=0 226 J.227 Supporters view community policing as an opportunity to engage with law enforcement to communicate the communities’ concerns about systemic and individual violations of civil liberties and rights. Ramirez. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan.g. Scott Carpenter. 2013).. 2011).223 refuse to engage with government unless on terms that meaningfully protect civil rights and liberties. 44 Law & Soc’y Rev. The Culture of Citizenship 8 THEORETICAL INQ.com/ap-nj-finds-nypd-muslim-surveillance-legal-183326533. 317 (2009). 230 See also Alexandra Natapoff. Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. AFRO (Jan.225 This co-opts Muslim communities through divide and conquer tactics discussed in more detail in Section IV. CIN. 224 Samantha Henry. PROBS. Margaret Chon & Donna E. 2006. See also Marc Lynch.226 Some well-meaning community leaders embrace community policing believing it will end negative government scrutiny manifested in disproportionate surveillance. 4 Asian Pac.g. to terrorist organizations).

deportation. J. Ashar. Facing the Past. The Culture of Citizenship 581.” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law. 9 Hastings Race & Poverty L. 1. 685-88 (2000) 234 Sameer M. 76 Or. the government targets Muslims based on its assumption that certain national origins from which there is an Al Qaeda presence are suspect for purposes of detention. or Muslim is presumed a terrorist or affiliated with terrorists.239 As aptly noted by Leti Volpp. American Exceptionalism and American Muslims. Natsu Taylor Saito. e. 8 Asian L. 121 (2008-2009). Pat K. 1188 (2001-2002) (noting the author’s client was arrested for discernible reason other than fact he was brown-skinned. L. Asian Americans: The “Reticient” Minority and Their Paradoxed. 59-65 (2012) 237 See generally Kevin R.236 Indeed. 78 WASH.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author notwithstanding many are descendants of families who lived in the southwestern states prior to U. “Foreignness. including that Asian Americans assimilate well and are aggressive over-achievers”). 239 See generally Sahar F. Rev. Islamic & Near E. The Culture of Citizenship 582 37 .”). regardless of its connotations of “model minority” myth. L. 1185. Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists”. fear. Ashar. The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U. Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs: “[Many Native Americans continue to] live lives of unrelenting tragedy [where t]he trauma of shame.g. and domestic violence that plague Indian country. 238 See.S. and national origin. Natsu Taylor Saito. 1481 (2002). 1017. 191 (2012). Chew. these disparate results are a product of the same racialized adversarial criminal justice system that applies to counterterrorism. Rev.Q.A. Muslims’ belief that they are somehow immune from the subordination experienced by other minority communities assumes a fictional exceptionalism. L. 49 UCLA L. THE REVIEW OF FAITH AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 10:2. but they also have been relegated to the lower tier of America’s racial hierarchy. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11 . The Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement. Aziz.”240 The government uses community outreach and CCP to manipulate these intracommunity divisions. religion. 55 (1994). REV.J.g. Native American populations have been decimated and herded into impoverished reservations suffering from endemic alcoholism and drug abuse. 7 UCLA J. religion. J. Nagwa Ibrahim. Int’l & Comp. aggressive immigration enforcement targets Latino communities and devastates hundreds of thousands of families. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11. the consequence is a near impossibility “to separate who is likely to engage in terrorism from assumptions about that person’s race. drug abuse. 236 M. Leti Volpp. Law. the past eleven years since the 9/11 attacks show that Muslims in America are not only experiencing subordination in various settings. L. 233 Kevin Johnson. Rose Weston. annexation.. 261 (1997). 34 CONN. e. and anger [is] passed from one generation to the next. 34 CONN. 36 Wm. Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States . & Mary L.S. 235 See. From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: Muslim-American Women in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality. Rev. U. Muqtader Khan. It promotes Muslims seeking to return to their perceived pre-9/11 White privileged status and thus willing to support engagement with government to prove their loyalty. and race such that an Arab. and present at a Brooklyn mosque at time of INS sweep). Muslim. and exclusion from the United States. 1185 (2001-2002).235 To a large extent. Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship. 240 Leti Volpp. Thus.237 For example.233 As a result. 1 (2001). REV. L. 675.234 And perhaps most tragically.238 Their targeted status fuses national origin. The End of “Civil Rights” As We Know It?: Immigration and Civil Rights in the New Millenium. L. Middle Easterner. and manifests itself in the rampant alcoholism. Johnson. 1048 (2001) (quoting Kevin Gover.. See Sameer M. interrogation. 18 Ariz.

php (Muslim reported Times Square bombers to police). and at times concocting plots with mentally unstable young men with radical political views.huffingtonpost.latimes. TIMES (Nov. MONTHLY (May 5. 35 (2007). ACLU Blog of Rights (Feb. L. Mike German.I. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. 2007). Alexandra Natapoff. which occurs without CCP as Muslim communities have the same public safety interest in stopping terrorism as any other community. 244 See NYPD’s Muslim mapping project where police were tasked to “Identify and map ethnic residential concentrations within the Tri-State area.A. at 141-168. e.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. supra note XX. Informants Endanger Democracy. 10. STUD. available at http://www. at 186 (admitting that law enforcement has little incentive to keep promises to restrain its authorities because the law grants it the power to do as it pleases).246 But as it solicits information from Muslims.g.3960843. 2013. See also Gurpreet Mahajan. 2001-September 11. Calls Its Mosque Survey Part of Broad Security Plan.org/blog/national-security/fbis-communityoutreach-program-trojan-horse. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author efficacy. available at 2003 WL 2381527. is able to wield significant power. Teresa Watanabe and Greg Krikorian. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. High and Low Policing in Post-9/11 Times. New York University School of Law (2011) (reporting that in 2007 and 2009. in comparison to politically powerless Muslim communities. 245 See. 71% of terrorism cases involved an informant). 15. Center on Law and Security. 2003.A. Curt Anderson. 2013). http://www.g.go. http://abcnews. supra note XX. PUBLIC EYE (2009). Muslims who engage only on terms that protect the communities’ civil rights and produce tangible policy reforms are ostracized as trouble makers. Steve Benen. 325 (2007) (arguing that minorities must constitute a certain percentage of the population in order for their interests to be advance since only then will they be able to “tilt the balance in favour of or against a political party”). e.com/archives/individual/2010_05/023656.com/2013/02/13/racial-mapping-fbi-secret-program_n_2679367. therefore. 317. That laws prohibiting entrapment and internal investigative guidelines significantly favor the government make it easier to manipulate the Good Muslim/Bad Muslim paradigm. Multiculturalism in the Age of Terror: Confronting the Challenges.242 to persuade some Muslims that cooperation and sharing information is in their best interest. 5.pdf.. 2011 26. FBI: Informant Close to Entrapping Would-Be Bomber. community organizations. LAPD defends Muslim mapping effort. Jan. 2013) available at http://www. 1 Policing 25.com/US/wireStory/fbi-informant-close-entrapping-bomber-18405031 38 . 3:33 PM). 243 See. REV. available at http://wid. L. 649. 241 The government.story. Huffington Post Live.com/news/local/la-melapd10nov10. From Movements to Mosques. Harris. 2010).244 Thus. Is the FBI’s Community Outreach Program a Trojan Horse?.org/documents/nypd-demo.0. Richard Winton. Racial Mapping: The Secret Behind the FBI's Invasive Program (Feb.html. law enforcement still sends informants into communities in search of existing plots. See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. TIMES. 247 See Jean-Paul Brodeur. student organizations. 73 U. Meet Aliou Niasse. Meanwhile.” and “Monitor current events”..publiceye.B. WASH. 245 Rather. 5 POL. 29.washingtonmonthly. 246 Thomas Cincotta. 247 Cooperating 241 242 Harris.” “ Identify and map ethnic hot spots. CCP is about more than stopping terrorist plots. 13. CIN. available at http://www. Associated Press (Feb. at A16.aclu. L.ap. community policing offers law enforcement access to personal and detailed information about Muslim communities’ affairs without the political risk of untrained informants being discovered or going rogue. and leadership. law enforcement has proven that it also wants information about lawful activities that facilitate their mapping of Muslim mosques. REV. DEPUTIZING COMMUNITY LEADERS TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE ON MUSLIMS While law enforcement should seek information directly related to a known terrorist plot. F. http://www. 645.243 2.html (discussing Craig Monteih case).

III. Thomas Cincotta. 645. Informants Endanger Democracy. leadership and group affiliations" to mark fifty-three "mosques of concern. NJ FBI: NYPD monitoring damaged public trust. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. 251 Many of the informants are explicitly tasked to spy on and infiltrate American Arab and Muslim communities. 661.. Assoc. CIN. 4. see also Robert S.html. 254 Id.html. investigative reports indicate that there are now approximately 15. whose tasks are driven to a large extent by racial and religious profiling. 2013).fbi.250 Compared to 1. Public Eye (2009). 7.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. it should come as no surprise that some Muslim communities are distrustful of state and federal law enforcement agencies’ overtures to engage in community policing. Associated Press (Feb.ap. http://www. 13. 6.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/Documents-show-NY-policewatched-devout-Muslims. restaurants and social groups.pottsmerc.publiceye.. 252 Harris."253 The NYPD explicitly used "ethnic orientation. 255 Id. Mueller.256 Indeed. http://www.g. 251 Trevor Aaronson. 73 U. Press (Mar.publiceye. available at http://www.g. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. available at http://www. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. http://www. e. the documents "paint the clearest picture yet of how the past decade's hunt for terrorists also put huge numbers of innocent people under scrutiny as they went about their daily lives in mosques. some community (reporting that FBI concerned it's informant was entrapping the young Muslim male target who was mentally unstable). Larry Neumeister and Eileen Sullivan. restaurants. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. L.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants. CIN. drug dealing. 250 E.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (testifying that “With the expanded national security mission. 2011).000 FBI paid-informants.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NJ-FBI-NYPD-monitoring-damaged-public- 39 . Documents show NY police watched devout Muslims.252 For example. Mother Jones (Sept/Oct 2011). REV. and other Muslimowned businesses viewed as "security risks" for "endorsing conservative religious views or having devout customers.248 Although informants have been a critical tool for combating organized crime. 656 (noting that nearly every drug case involves an informant making informants a staple aspect of the War on Drugs). 249 Alexandra Natapoff. and gangs. supra note ___. Press (Sept. 2012).249 the use of informants in counterterrorism has increased at a troubling rate since 9/11.com/article/20130204/NEWS04/130209748/nypd-defends-spying-on-muslimsfor-terror-threats?mobredirect=true#full_story. 73 U. REV. From Movements to Mosques. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. 248 Thomas Cincotta. available at http://www. Samantha Henry."255 When coupled with multiple discoveries that informants have induced young Muslim men with diminished mental capacity or financial problems toward violence.ap.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. Informants Endanger Democracy. Assoc. 645.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author community leaders are then used to legitimize CCP and assist with crisis management when law enforcement is caught abusing rights caused by underlying counterterrorism strategies left unchanged. L. at 140.motherjones. the need for and value of [human intelligence] in understanding our adversaries and developing the threat picture has increased significantly”). Public Eye (2009). The Informants.800 in 1980. 253 Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman. 256 See. 2011).500 informants in 1975 and 2. But see Alexandra Natapoff. http://www. From Movements to Mosques. the New York Police Department ("NYPD") sent agents and informants to New York City mosques. NYPD defends spying on Muslims for terror threats."254 According to the Associated Press.

259 The information is added to intelligence databases. J. Melbourne (2001). 357 (September 2005) (noting that community policing works best when structured to encourage information sharing from the community). 2013). Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. Lininger. the community becomes its own victim. 15. Bjelopera. whether for pay or based on informal relationships. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 20 (Spring 2010). WASH. at A1.263 In 2007. John Murray. http://abcnews. Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council. 5.. 8. L. supra note ___. available at http://www. Kelly. executive director of Islamic Shura Council in southern California: “What these [informants] have done is create an environment where every person begins to suspect the other and with the infighting and inward suspicion. 73 U. Public Eye (2009). Under the guise of collaboration and relationship building in community policing. http://www. 2007. Innes.262 Such concerns came to light when the NYPD engaged in community outreach programs to purportedly build relationships of trust with Muslim communities while simultaneously engaging in mass surveillance of Muslim college students across the East Coast. and Muslim-owned businesses. Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences. 645 (2004). From Movements to Mosques. Deputy Director of the FBI’s National Security Branch.go. 263 See generally AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations.com/US/wireStory/fbi-informant-close-entrapping-bomber-18405031. Safeguarding Citizens and Civil Liberties. 260 “We’re spending more money on outreach… so we can say: ‘Please help us. used to map communities. agent in charge of the FBI’s Newark division. 262 Raymond W. or used for prosecutorial purposes without the community leaders’ knowledge. Informants Endanger Democracy. Associated Press (Feb. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities.”).258 As law enforcement officials develop personal relationships with community leaders. POST. community leaders are more likely to provide information about their communities’ lawful activities than would otherwise be available to law enforcement. they are able to exploit those relationships to solicit detailed information about Muslim communities. the NYPD had at least twenty employees liaising with Muslims communities to “make trust (“The monitoring of Muslims in Newark and across the state has damaged the public’s trust in New Jersey law enforcement and jeopardized some of the relationships agents had sought to build in the community since 9/11. see also Thomas Cincotta. The 2006 Paul Miller Distinguished Lecture. 258 See also McCulloch. Congressional Research Service 7 (2012). REV.ap.html (quoting Shakeel Syed. 259 See also Jerome P. available at http://www. see Alexandra Natapoff.fas. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. mosques in Tri-State area. 2006) (highlighting the importance of information sharing in a post-9/11 world). the community leader becomes an unwitting informant. said Michael Ward. at 1231 (highlighting FBI’s bad faith in claiming the mapping of mosques is to protect Muslims from hate crimes rather than set targets for surveillance and investigation). something more insidious may be occurring. 261 For a critique of the adverse impact of snitching on racial minority communities.” Philip Mudd . Policing Uncertainty. CIN. Feb. 40 .”).publiceye. Please look for people who are turning away from institutions of extremism.org/Index/AP -In-TheNews/NYPD.260 Thus.257 Even if such suspicions are misplaced. In effect. Rutgers School of Law (Nov.pdf (citing meetings with Muslim leaders just before arrest in terrorism plot as evidence of effectiveness of community outreach/policing). community policing normalizes and destigmatizes snitching261 by reframing it as benign “information sharing” between law enforcement and their constituents.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques. supra note ___. 257 FBI: Informant Close to Entrapping Would-Be Bomber.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author members suspect community policing is a means of recruiting Muslims as informants. BLUE ARMY. Karen DeYoung. Distrust Hinders FBI in Outreach to Muslims.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553. at 232 (noting that community engagement units are often established to develop a “community intelligence feed” about communities of interest to the police). Please be our eyes and ears.

available at http://www.kcby. Wash Post 2007 266 Chris Hawley.ap.000 officers assigned to NYPD counterterrorism duty.com/article/20130204/NEWS04/130209748/nypd-defendsspying-on-muslims-for-terror-threats?mobredirect=true#full_story. as suggested by a lawsuit filed by Muslims alleging that the NYPD’s selective and mass surveillance of mosques. http://www.pdf. NYPD monitored Muslim students all over Northeast.fbi. 4. NYPD defends spying on Muslims for terror threats. Larry Neumeister and Eileen Sullivan. many of them distrustful of the police. NYPD undercover unit key in terror arrests.nytimes.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author inroads and foster trust in the city’s kaleidoscopic and widening sea of immigrants.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd-msa-report.267 It produced weekly intelligence reports documenting conversations that confidential informants and undercover agents had with Muslim congregants at mosques and the contents of sermons. 18. 265 Karen DeYoung.pottsmerc. New York City Police Seek Trust Among Immigrants. City of New York. Wash. 25. Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence . and federal level has been created to store petabytes of information purportedly related to national security. Muslim-owned businesses. Since 9/11. 28. NYPD defends spying on Muslims for terror threats. 2:12-cv-03401-SDW-MCA (Oct.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-monitored-Muslim-students-all-overNortheast. 267 NYPD Weekly MSA Report (2006) available at http://hosted.268 These mass surveillance efforts were ongoing when the Associated Press published a series of investigative reports exposing the extent of the NYPD’s mass surveillance of Muslim communities. available at http://www. 2012).”265 Around the same time. Eric Velez-Villar Assistant Director. including a cadre of undercovers on assignments deep within Muslim communities). 2012). these activities continue until the present day. Hassan et.Y. 270 First Amended Complaint.269 Presumably. an elaborate network of intelligence databases at the local. 4. state. 2012). http://www.html (undercover Muslim officer one of 1. 3. (Feb.washingtonpost. Associated Press (Feb. http://www. Times (May 31. Associated Press (Feb.ap. (June 8. at 138 269 Associated Press. the NYPD reported weekly on activities of Muslim Student Association (“MSA”) activities at universities in the East Coast. cannot be ignored. N. 2007).pottsmerc. bookstores and mosques).com/article/20130204/NEWS04/130209748/nypd-defends-spying-on-muslimsfor-terror-threats?mobredirect=true#full_story (Civil rights lawyers ask judge to stop NYPD from routinely observing Muslims in restaurants.html.com/2007/05/31/nyregion/31outreach.pdf. 271 264 Cara Buckley. 2010). Larry Neumeister and Eileen Sullivan. Too many government secrets. 271 Editorial. 2013). 2013). biographies of Muslim speakers.muslimadvocates. Directorate of Intelligence Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement Before the House Homeland Security Committee. (Feb.org/documents/10_FIRST_AMENDED_COMPLAINT.html?pagewanted=print. http://www.pdf 268 Larry Neumeister and Eileen Sullivan. Associated Press (Feb.com/opinions/too-many-government-documents-are-keptsecret/2012/12/25/ee9a922c-449e-11e2-8e70-e1993528222d_story. 2012). and Muslim student associations violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Press.ap. http://hosted. http://www.”264 It also hired two Muslim civilians as liaisons “to do outreach and to train the department’s officers in matters of cultural sensitivity. Assoc. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering.com/news/national/95860709.gov/news/testimony/intelligence-sharing-with-federal-state-and-local-lawenforcement-10-years-after-9-11 (testifying “we also recognize that the violent extremism threat may 41 .pottsmerc. Post (Dec.com/article/20130204/NEWS04/130209748/nypd-defends-spying-onmuslims-for-terror-threats?mobredirect=true#full_story. Harris. 2013).266 The reports detailed events sponsored by MSAs. NYPD defends spying on Muslims for terror threats.270 The circumstances surrounding information sharing in CCP. http://www. al v. therefore. http://www. supra note XX.org/specials/interactives/documents/nypd/nypd_planecrash. and contents of presentations at the monitored events. 4.

S. Kelly. some of whom are cognizant of their intelligence role while many others are unwitting or naïvely oblivious. Snitching: Institutional and Communal Consequences. Jeffrey Smith. Center for Public Integrity (Oct. 59 RUTGERS L. ON INVESTIGATIONS. 7. 73 U.publicintegrity. CIN. R. Senate report says national intelligence fusion centers have been useless. supra note __.g. 277 See. 2012) (noting that the work of fusion centers appears to have violated the civil liberties of many U. Harris.ap. See Harris. 558 (2006). none of this would be privy to the public. and Muslim communities' affairs as part of the preventive counterterrorism strategy. state. REV.”) Raymond W. Against this highly secretive backdrop of pervasive intelligence gathering. mosques in New York City. Jerome P. has not produced successful counterterrorism results. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012). TH AND GOV’T AFF. replacing informants with community leaders only compounds the additional group harm by legitimizing subordinating counterterrorism strategies. http://www.g.276 So long as racialized counterterrorism practices remain unchanged. at 177 (admitting that the FBI. L. paid informants will simply be replaced with community members.S. Press (Mar. The Informants. 273 See AP’s Probe Into NYPD Intelligence Operations. http://www.com/politics/2011/08/fbi-terrorist-informants. U. at ___. Trevor Aaronson. citizens.pdf. mosques.. http://www. 275 Alexandra Natapoff. and cost between $289 million and $1. 272 See. ON HOMELAND SEC.S. Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. 645. at 20. STAFF OF S. The 2006 Paul Miller Distinguished Lecture. 555. Albany. 2012. 2:03PM).).ap. Will McCants & Clint Watts. Congressional Research Service 10-11 (2012). 112 CONG. NYPD and other law enforcement groups want Muslim communities’ cooperation for purposes of gathering intelligence). e. and tribal law enforcement partners. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. Safeguarding Citizens and Civil Liberties. and other locales have discovered they are under surveillance by undercover agents and paid informants. or tribal law enforcement..org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NJ-FBI-NYPD-monitoring-damaged-publictrust (discussing reports that NYPD spying made Muslims “more hesitant to reach out to law enforcement and less trusting”). As a result. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment.275 Though decreasing the use of shady informants may appear to benefit targeted communities.274 Thus. fusion centers in Texas and Missouri were discovered to be creating “suspicious activity reports” that concluded that Muslim civil rights organizations and civic activities pose a potential threat to national security.. 42 .273 But for investigative reports or inadvertent leaks. REV. Orange County. Assoc. e. Mother Jones (Sept/Oct 2011). 3.4 billion in federal funds from 2002-2011). we have taken numerous proactive steps in the past year to develop a more robust information sharing capacity with all federal. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. Bjelopera. it is reasonable to assume information shared with law enforcement in CCP will be used for intelligence and prosecutorial purposes.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Much of this information arises from heightened scrutiny of Muslim Individuals. Law Enforcement and Intelligence Gathering. e. supra note XX. FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 3-4 (Comm. NJ FBI: NYPD monitoring damaged public trust. local.277 be first identified within our communities by state.fas. COMM.motherjones.. Indeed.g..org/2012/10/03/11063/senate-report-says-national-intelligence-fusioncenters-have-been-useless (“warning” sent regarding a Muslim organization’s “lecture on positive parenting”). 651-54. http://www. Print. local.272 Similarly.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553. supra note ___. the extensive network of relationships built through community policing under the auspices of building relationships of trust is an alternative means of collecting such information that decreases the risks and costs of hiring ex-felon informants with questionable motives. Samantha Henry. 2012). available at http://www. 276 Beutel.org/Index/AP-In-TheNews/NYPD. 274 See.

To the contrary.pdf.278 They seek to empower communities to counter violent extremism using gentler tactics while leaving counterterrorism to law enforcement.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e071021293_buildingcommtrust_revision. and criminal prosecutions.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-ag-1207. notwithstanding the significant adverse consequences to Muslim communities’ rights.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author B. As discussed above in Section II. Press Release. 2010)..g. proponents make four key arguments in favor of CCP: 1) demystifies and de-vilifies Muslims to officers whose minimal knowledge of Islam is most likely negative. I argue that these proposals not only fail to stop government abuses. 29. Faiza Patel. I challenge the underlying assumption that countering violent extremism and counterterrorism are distinct practices. http://us1. available at http://www. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347. law enforcement has little incentive to change its current counterterrorism strategies.justice. 43 . 280 Harris.280 Whether analyzed under the nomenclature of counter-radicalization. investigations. John Murray. the counter-critiques in support of community policing warrant consideration. http://www. which are as integral to counterterrorism as surveillance. 2013). they actually worsen subordination of Muslims by creating a false sense of progress. at 181 (discussing the perceptions by Muslims that law enforcement does not play fair in pursuit of a conviction). community policing is the new. and more votes for law enforcement officers. Robert Wasserman.html.net/f737600b433d98d25e_6pm6beukt. community engagement. 359 (September 2005).usdoj. 281 Parents: Procrastinators Under Your Roof?. or community policing.281 and 4) empowers communities 278 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council. public recognition. Rethinking Radicalization. Moreover. Attorney General Holder Recognizes DOJ Employees and Others for Their Service at Annual Awards Ceremony. countering violent extremism. as if the two are separate and distinct.com/?u=5753262cf6639155beda2cc01&id=4d8cc56c90&e=cca3f27259. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. implementation of current “hard on terror” strategies has led to promotions.pdf 279 E. 2) de-securitizes relationships between government and Muslim communities.cops. While most supporters are well intentioned. GUIDANCE FOR BUILDING COMMUNITIES OF TRUST (July 2010).campaignarchive2. Islamic Leadership Institute of America (Jan. Brennan Center for Justice 26-27. the former is a preventive component that serves the latter. And absent the coercive power of the courts or political pressure. 27. Dep’t of Justice (Oct. COUNTER-CRITIQUES AND THE RHETORIC OF EMPOWERMENT Champions of community policing proffer the counter-critique that CCP can be leveraged to change government practices to protect communities’ rights and prevent intrusive “hard” counterterrorism tactics. Indeed. 3) allows communities to internally police its members from terrorist recruitment using “softer” methods that direct targeted youth to mental health and other social services. supra note XX.279 Nevertheless. http://brennan.3cdn. politically expedient term used to describe counter-radicalization and countering violent extremism. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group (Spring 2010).

L. they address the symptoms of. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 7. 7 UCLA J. 7 UCLA J. supra note XX. 288 Id. 285 Nagwa Ibrahim.289 The reification of these stereotypes in counterterrorism occurs through selective enforcement against Muslim individuals and communities. 1193 (2001-2002).290 And the cycle continues and expands as more resources are injected into the counterterrorism regime.291 For some Muslims. which serves to reinforce the stereotypes and calls for heightened scrutiny of Muslim communities. but also because Muslims’ loyalty to their religion is presumed to be irreconcilable to having any loyalty to the United States. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. Law. 121. 287 Id. at XX. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination: The Consequences of Racial Profiling After September 11. the answer to this quagmire lies in engaging with law enforcement to educate them that Muslims are in fact not as prone to terrorism or disloyalty as they are made out to be. Muslims will choose their religion. DHS officials. Law. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. III. numerous scholars have examined how Muslims have become racialized as the “Terrorist Other” in the minds of many Americans. 289 Id. Islamic & Near E.286 And the bad acts of a few are imputed to the millions of Muslims in America by virtue of their shared faith. at 144 (discussing performative cues of “terrorist other” include surnames). 286 Id. FBI agents. The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U. DE-MYSTIFY MUSLIMS AND COUNTER NEGATIVE STEREOTYPES Since the September 11th attacks. By initiating interactions at the individual level with US Attorneys. available at http://www.284 Their otherwise-American expressions of dissent or civil grievances are viewed through the lens of disloyalty or ingratitude.285 Foreign cultural practices are suspected as subversive and signals of their unwillingness to assimilate into a Western liberal democracy. and others with law enforcement authority. The Citizen and Terrorist. Mueller.288 If forced to choose.g. 1185. the FBI added almost 2. Ashar. counterterrorism strategies that disproportionately burden Muslim communities’ collective civil libertiees. Volpp. rather than offer solutions to. 125-29 (2008-2009). Muslim proponents of community policing hope to de-mystify Muslims and directly dispel negative 282 National Security Preparedness Group.282 Notwithstanding the plausibility of these arguments.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (noting that in the first year after 9/11. 283 See Sameer M. The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U. 34 CONN.fbi. 291 Robert S. Nagwa Ibrahim. L.283 1. 2011). 13. 290 Id.S.S. REV..000 agents to its national security programs). L.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author to push for incremental improvements in policies. 284 E. 44 . The prosecutions produce a list of Muslim-named defendants announced in media sources. 142 (2008-2009). 121.287 This is so not only because the tenets of Islam are misinterpreted by the public. Islamic & Near E. immigration prosecutors. at 143. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (discussing community empowerment and engagement without clear definitions of either).

supra note XX. and engaging in other civil liberties violations. According to them. On the one hand.296 But hiring competent trainers for law enforcement should not be mistaken as meaningful counterterrorism reform of selective enforcement of surveillance. Robert S.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author stereotypes.”). L. Muslim communities will eventually persuade law enforcement to stop sending informants into their community. in effect.S. 293 intelligence gathering. 295 See. Policing Terrorism: A Threat to Community Policing or Just a Shift in Priorities. e. 13. supra note XX. 45 . REV. fosters social divisions among Muslims themselves and between Muslims and others. more accurate sources of information to influence law enforcement trainings. 294 See. e. See. by building personal relationships with federal prosecutors. Mueller.295 But their optimism assumes that the government comes to the table in good faith willing to make systemic changes to its counterterrorism practices that may subject them to political censure as “soft on terror. 357 (September 2005) (community policing helps deflect rumors and reduce misinformation between police and the communities).gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (testifying that “FBI has developed an extensive outreach program to Muslim. http://usatoday30. Deborah A. rather than stereotype-perpetuating propaganda. and Sikh communities to develop trust.294 Thus. at 162. but rather to change the strategy to stop subordinating communities. stigmatizing group harm. DHS officials. USA Today (Feb.fbi. FBI agents. constructs the Muslim population as a ‘suspect community’. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan.292 They leverage the relationships to offer alternative. spying on Muslim student groups. Spooked. 20. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. South Asian. issuing secret National Security Letters. e. and dispel myths in those communities about the FBI and the U.. and local police. 40 AM. at 183-84 (recommending that Muslims educate law enforcement about social and religious customs and habits of language to avoid innocent behavior being mistaken as indicia of crime). spying on Muslims. The key issue is not to make law enforcement more friendly or polite as it enforces a subordinating counterterrorism strategy. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. they ultimately fail to change the counterterrorism strategy and tactics that cause the dignitary. encourages tokenism”).g. III. FBI ditches training materials criticized as anti-Muslim. if only law enforcement “gets to know” Muslim communities through community policing programs. at 940-41. and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. available at http://www. Hussain.” While these engagement efforts mitigate some harm. supra note 71. proponents believe they can change the very nature of the beast. 6 POLICE PRACTICE AND RESEARCH 347.. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 19 (Spring 2010) 293 Harris. Harris. supra note XX. CCP supporters believe engagement with law enforcement will free Muslims of their suspect community status. 10:41 AM). address concerns.com/news/nation/story/2012-02-20/fbi-anti-muslimtraining/53168966/1. Muslim communities were relatively successful in obtaining the US Justice Department’s commitment to restructure law enforcement to hire objectively qualified experts that provided accurate information. 2012. Defining Racial Profiling in a Post-September 11 World. 1195 (2003). at 8 (finding that “the Prevent programme. 2011). Ramirez.g. 296 E. CRIM. But see Kundnani. By going to the belly of the beast and making an offering of partnership and assistance.. investigation. government. then government officials will realize that their counterterrorism tactics against Muslims are misguided. when they discovered law enforcement was receiving training from anti-Muslim individuals without any expertise on Islam.g.. Niraj Warikoo.usatoday.g. and prosecution based on the 292 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council. See also John Murray.

http://www. 299 See Setty. 9. That’s disappointing. leaders of this campaign touted their pre-existing good relations with law enforcement as dispositive of their success thereby calling for increased engagement between Muslim communities and law enforcement. NY Times (June 6. Bjelopera.297 On the other hand. It may instead make it easier to co-opt Muslim communities into the existing counterterrorism strategy and further legitimize it. 9. Countering Violent Extremism in the United States. available at http://www. 2012. Securitization occurs when the motive for engagement or providing services is tied to preventing terrorism. at SR10.302 This led to a spike in indictments for 297 See.g. e. But see Adam Serwer. Times. 2011. 2011 24.com/dangerroom/2012/02/hundreds-fbidocuments-muslims/ (quoting Rev. 15.fas. 2010). at 17.html?_r=0 (reporting that NYPD considered being a religious Muslim an indicator of terrorism). even if in addition to serving other purposes. law enforcement can do as it chooses in counterterrorism with little regard for Muslim communities’ grievances.. available at http://www.publicradio. 302 Eric Schmitt. and other cities. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. 2010). coupled with little electoral power. Minnesota Public Radio News (Aug. Not Jihad . supra note ___.g. Editorial.nytimes.motherjones. Rupa Shenoy. Mother Jones (Sept.”).300 Somali communities in Minneapolis.299 2. New York University School of Law (2011) (showing high numbers of cases alleging material support to Al Shabab and focus on Minneapolis and California followed by other states where there are Somali communities).com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab. 300 Beutel. DE-SECURITIZE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES Critics of government engagement programs with Muslim communities rightfully point to an over-securitization of these communities. for example. Islamic Extremist Group Recruits Americans for Civil War. the case of the NYPD simultaneously engaging and spying tellingly exposes the minimal incentive law enforcement has to deliver on promises to change counterterrorism practices. 28. Spencer Ackerman. Muslim Groups: FBI Response to Islamophobia Scandal Not Good Enough. Welton Gaddy of Interfaith Alliance: “[FBI] Director Mueller acknowledged the seriousness of our concerns and expressed a commitment to maintaining contact with the inter-religious community”).org/display/web/2010/08/09/local-somalis-fear-donations-hampered. Spying on Law-Abiding Muslims. have been under intense government scrutiny301 for alleged ties to Al-Shabab. Wired (Feb. Some Minnesota Somalis fear indictments could hamper legitimate donations. Congressional Research Service 9 (2012).. 301 See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. This rebel movement in Somalia recruited approximately twenty Somali American young men in 2009 to fight in the Somali civil war. http://www.com/2013/02/10/opinion/sunday/spying-on-law-abiding-muslimcitizens. 6:30 AM).298 Most likely.nytimes. Feb. Jerome P.Y.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author religion and politics of the target. FBI Purges Hundreds of Terrorism Documents in Islamophobia Probe. http://minnesota. And yet. 298 See.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.wired.com/politics/2011/09/fbi-response-islamophobia-scandal (quoting Muslim community leader: “Why did [the FBI] not ask for the community’s advice on the [training material]? Why didn’t they use the resources at their disposal? There was no outreach done. Paul. C. Fully cognizant that Muslim communities are beholden to negative stereotypes among the public. N.pdf. Center on Law and Security. 46 . http://www. 2:00 AM). community policing will not change that reality. at 214 (arguing that quelling discontent among Muslim communities would encourage buy-in of US counterterrorism policies from Muslim communities and encourage Muslim communities to participate in government counterradicalization efforts). supra note XX.html?src=mv&_r=0. St. e. 2013. 2001-September 11.

308 CRCL’s engagement strategy implicitly assumes Somalis in Minneapolis are more prone to join terrorist groups based on the cases in 2008 and 2009 of young men traveling to Somalia to allegedly join Al-Shabab.nytimes.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11-confronting-the-terrorist-threat-to-the-u. 2010). Center on Law and Security.gov/news/testimony/nine-years-after-9-11confronting-the-terrorist-threat-to-the-u. New York University School of Law (2011) (noting that “since 2007. CRCL Engages with Somali-American Communities in the Twin Cities. 2001-September 11. Mueller. the government responds that it must preventively prosecute these Somali American young men because they may eventually be co-opted by Al Qaeda operatives to engage in homegrown terrorism. http://www. http://www.s 308 Robert S.s 309 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman. were found guilty of providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations). material support has gone from being charged in 11.fbi. 304 Eric Schmitt.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author material support to terrorism charges against individuals who provided humanitarian aid to Somalia303 as well as those allegedly seeking to participate in the fighting in Somalia among the various warlords. 22. Minnesota Public Radio News (Aug. New York University School of Law (2011). NY Times (June 6.6% of cases to 69.org/display/web/2010/08/09/local-somalis-fear-donations-hampered. 2011 19. http://minnesota. 306 Rupa Shenoy. even Somali American women who raised funds in the amounts of $1000 to $2000 allegedly for humanitarian aid purposes in Somalia have found themselves ensnared in the government’s aggressive material support prosecutions. 9. 2010) available at http://www. Mueller. 9. Rupa Shenoy. Islamic Extremist Group Recruits Americans for Civil War.fightbacknews. 2012. 2010). Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group 10. Center on Law and Security.publicradio.304 Indeed. 22. Some Minnesota Somalis fear indictments could hamper legitimate donations.dhs. http://minnesota.fbi.html?src=mv&_r=0 305 Setty. http://www.4% in 2010). Jan.org/2011/10/20/somali-women-humanitarian-workers-convictedterrorism-charges (Two Somali American women who raised money for charities assisting Somalia’s poor. 2010). BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (2010). Some Minnesota Somalis fear indictments could hamper legitimate donations . 2010) available at http://www. III Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. such as a civil war in Somalia.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.305 This scorched-earth strategy has had a severe chilling effect that deters many Somalis in the United States from having connections with Somalia notwithstanding the dire economic circumstances of their extended families caught in a devastating civil war. . 303 47 . 20. it does so for purposes of decreasing the number of potential terrorist recruits — not solely to provide social services. 2001-September 11. 307 Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. when the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and the FBI’s Specialized Community Outreach Team seeks to include the Department of Health and Human Services into its engagement outreach program in Minneapolis and Seattle where large Somali populations reside.gov/crclengages-somali-american-communities-twin-cities. Fight Back News (Oct.306 When confronted with criticism of expanding the scope of counterterrorism to conflicts that do not involve the United States. at XX (highlighting the Obama administration’s aggressive prosecution of Muslims in the United States on allegations of material support to terrorism). 2011). Robert S. III Director Federal Bureau of Investigation Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sept. supra note XX. Minnesota Public Radio News (Aug. See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. Not Jihad . 2011 4-5.publicradio.307 Thus.org/display/web/2010/08/09/local-somalis-fear-donationshampered.309 Somali women humanitarian workers convicted on ‘terrorism’ charges.

http://abclocal.aspx (reporting Muslims and members of other nonChristian faiths accounted for 7% of electorate in 2012 national election). Building community trust. 386 (2009) (noting there are approximately 730. ABC Local – Chicago (Jan.315 As such. FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 49 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl Ed. ABC Local – Chicago (Jan. at 17 (recommending that the government should “leave the counterradicalization to Muslim communities”). 2013). quality education. 313 Associated Press. http://m. 317. NAT’L SEC. the common interests will lie in general public safety. As a result. 7.312 In contrast. 314 See Gurpreet Mahajan. 2013). 312 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. STUD. supra note ___. in the 1990s in cities like Chicago. Instead.normantranscript.313 For instance. REV. traditional community policing is driven and implemented by local law enforcement who have political incentives to empower communities in ways not directly related to crime. Community policing.htm?contentguid=z4TNr3L1. 2004) (estimating there are approximately 13500 local police departments across the country). as they constitute less than 7% of the national electorate. 311 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL.310 The problem with this reasoning is twofold. 11. police chiefs reporting to mayors had powerful incentives to implement community policing in a way that better served communities as opposed to merely co-opt them into a pre-existing subordinating model. and other social services. Building 48 . local politicians were beholden to African American voters who demanded civil rights protections from historically abusive police.. Building Bridges to Strengthen America.000 full-time police officers compared to 13. quality health care. Houston. 5 POL. Proponents accept countering terrorism as one of the purposes of community policing to the extent gang prevention would be for African American or Latino communities participating in community policing.314 Those who ignored calls for community policing that reformed abusive police practices and increased public safety in predominantly minority communities risked their political careers. 2013). Waxman. but counterterrorism would not be the primary or sole purpose. Muslim communities will be treated like any other community in need of certain government services that may or may not impact counterterrorism. & POL’Y 377. employment training.pewforum. Multiculturalism in the Age of Terror: Confronting the Challenges.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=8946091. supporting new immigrants. How the Faithful Voted: 2012 Preliminary Analysis. the basis for interaction will not always be related to preventing terrorism or prosecuting terrorist suspects. 325 (2007) (arguing that minorities must constitute a certain percentage of the population in order for their interests to be advance since on ly then will they be able to “tilt the balance in favour of or against a political party”). Community policing.316 310 Beutel. The Norman Transcript (Jan.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Muslim leaders calling for a shift to community policing believe they can continue engagement while de-securitizing the relationship between Muslim communities and law enforcement. CAPS changes on the way for Chicago.go.org/Politics-and-Elections/How-the-FaithfulVoted-2012-Preliminary-Exit-Poll-Analysis. http://www. http://abclocal. First.000 FBI special agents).311 Muslims’ political power is weakest at the federal level. 8. 3 J. Pew Research Center (Nov. C. 315 Id. 8.com/normantrans/pm_112597/contentdetail.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=8946091. community policing in counterterrorism is driven by federal agencies that use local agencies’ advantage of having boots on the ground in their respective jurisdictions. CAPS changes on the way for Chicago. 316 Associated Press. and New York. They believe that by shifting the governmentcommunity interactions under the rubric of community policing. preventing youth delinquency. Police National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11. 2012). providing refugee’s needed assistance. L. Matthew.

And history has proven that law enforcement will use their authorities to the fullest in furtherance of an adversarial system that rewards high volumes of investigations and prosecutions.org/2007/05/22/muslim-americans-middle-class-and-mostlymainstream/ 319 Cathy Lynn Grossman. Dep’t of Justice (2008). 40 AM. The exclusive focus on Muslim communities. access to the media. 27. 321 Ronald Kessler. does not take away from its overarching objective. available at http://www. 320 Report of Homeland Security Advisory Council. USA Today (Jan. 318 Pew Research Center. DEP’T OF JUSTICE. community policing merely obscures from community trust. the little they have been able to accomplish is narrowly limited to symptomatic individual cases defending the most egregious civil rights violations without affecting counterterrorism strategy and tactics that collectively subordinate them. Ramirez. 1197 (2003). Muslims in America have little political power to influence federal policies and practices — the locus of counterterrorism strategy development. the advisory council assumes Muslim communities are a threat).justice. http://usatoday30. as shown in the case of the law enforcement trainings and prosecution of hate crimes. and racial profiling to name just a few. Office of Inspector General. Office of Inspector General. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL. reinforces that Muslims are a suspect community.318 The same does not apply to Muslims in the counterterrorism context.normantranscript. 2007).317 But at the local level.gov/oig/special/s0803b/final. The Norman Transcript (Jan. available at http://www.6 million of 350 million people in America and comprised disproportionately of first. 2013). which is de facto what community policing will become. as opposed to community policing in a particular geography where certain social services are most needed. Dep’t of Justice (2010). Defining Racial Profiling in a PostSeptember 11 World.com/news/religion/2011-01-27-1Amuslim27_ST_N. THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE FBI 97 (2002) (describing FBI’s covert targeting political groups).justice. http://www. An estimated 2. However.or second-generation immigrants. and access to local politicians to ensure community policing served many of their needs. REV. Muslims to double. racial disparities in the death penalty. THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATEMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003).usatoday. it accommodates it. A Review of the FBI’s Use of National Security Letters: Assessment of Corrective Actions and Examination of NSL Usage in 2006.320 Nor does community policing affect the federal laws that grant the government nearly unfettered discretion to spy on Muslim communities.gov/oig/special/s1009r. communities had sufficient voting power. 2011). A Review of the FBI’s Investigations of Certain Domestic Advocacy Groups. available at http://www.321 Including social services into the counter-radicalization component of counterterrorism. Second. Jennifer Hoopes & Tara Lai Quinlan. 317 Deborah A.S.pewresearch.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author That is not to say that these same minority communities were not harmed by broader criminal justice policies and practices that collectively subordinated their communities. 11.pdf 49 . Number of U. http://m. such as crack-cocaine sentencing disparities. CRIM. L. community policing does not challenge the counterterrorism paradigm.S.htm?contentguid=z4TNr3L1. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Working Group 14 (Spring 2010) (by recommending the roles and responsibilities associated with threat mitigation. 1195.319 That is not to say they are completely powerless or unable to advocate for their rights. Instead of desecuritizing the relationship.htm.gov/oig/special/0306/full. U.pdf.pdf. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream (May 22.com/normantrans/pm_112597/contentdetail.usdoj.

Domestic terrorism cases involving Muslims show that very few of the defendants were integrated within an American mosque. was asked to leave a Roxbury mosque last year because of his radical Islamic views and suspected support of Al Qaeda. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011) (calling for Muslim communities’ intervention as a more effective counterradicalization tactic). e.C.. a mosque official said yesterday. They prefer to delegate such efforts to Muslim communities because they believe Muslims are better at dealing with and resolving personal crises that may lead young men to be attracted to terrorist groups. id. at A26. Id. supra note ___. 2012. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 13. they are not troubled by this because they believe surveillance. they could be rehabilitated in the early stages of their radicalization. remote-controlled airplanes into federal buildings in Washington. investigation. or with an international 322 323 324 Beutel.323 However. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. D. at 8 (citing cases where individuals who went on to commit or support terrorism were not members of mosques or their congregants). most acted alone. supra note ___. 2011) (“The Ashland man who allegedly plotted to fly explosive-laden. they take issue with the government leading the charge on countering violent extremism programs.com/2012/11/14/nyregion/fbi-had-greater-rolein-jose-pimentel-terrorism-case-documents-show. First. Id.322 In fact. At Mosque. see also Beutel. Times. rather than end up in jail or dead as part of a terrorist attack. Muslim communities are presumed to have the capacity and information to know when young men are in the process of becoming terrorists. 30.boston. BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. with a government informant or undercover agent. N. personal crises. available at http://www. 3. Milton J.nytimes. Muslim community leaders should intervene into the lives of Muslims on the so-called path to radicalization that could lead to violence.g. e.Y. Nov. this strategy makes some presumptions that.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/09/30/mosque_ousted_ashland_man_c harged_in_terror_plot/) 50 .Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author plain view the counterterrorism objectives and delegates counterradicalization to Muslim communities. at 17 (recommending that Muslims should take the lead on counterradicalization because they are most qualified to do so)..326 Thus. Suspect’s Views Led to Ouster. at 17.324 Instead of law enforcement. Joseph Goldstein.”). 327 See.html. 325 National Security Preparedness Group. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. 326 See. DELEGATE COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM TO MUSLIM COMMUNITIES Some proponents of CCP acknowledge that the government will continue its hard counterterrorism tactics irrespective of community policing. Documents Show Extent of F. could prove devastating to Muslim communities’ collective liberty interests.B. While seemingly reasonable. Valencia. available at “http://www. and prosecution are necessary components of protecting national security.I.325 They believe intervention by community leaders and family members could prevent young men suffering from mental health illnesses. if false.g. or other sources of emotional vulnerability from being recruited by terrorists.’s Role in Terror Case . 14.327 To the contrary.

without which. and ethnic lines are exacerbated.329 Muslims are not privy.fpri. at A26.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author source. Consequently. supra note XX. Apr. 332 See.html?ref=najibullahzazi..nytimes. at A19. 2012. 137 (premises his argument on “if we believe that potential terrorists lurk in our Muslim communities. available at http://www.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/13/AR2010041304351. CCP incorrectly assumes that domestic terrorists who are Muslim are integrated into Muslim American communities. many cases of domestic terrorism both in the United States and Britain have revealed that parents had no knowledge of their sons’ alleged online criminal activities. and association rights of Muslims such that their constitutional rights are jeopardized by private actors and they are left with no legal recourse.org/articles/2012/12/us-strategy-countering-violent-extremism-assessment 51 . Nov.html. to the details of each other’s internet activities. Will McCants & Clint Watts. Wash.330 Thus.Y. Parents of alleged terrorists seek clues to sons’ disappearance to Pakistan .332 Domestic 328 See.I. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. Indeed. Spooked. Even if those individuals are community-policing partners with strong relationships with the government. 16. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 15. community intervention overlooks the serious risk of intra-community censorship of controversial speech. 2:39 PM). Rezwan Ferdaus of Ashland sentenced to 17 years in terror plot. to the extent that reports suggest increased terrorism recruitment via the internet. 14. 331 Kundnani.S. can further entrench their gatekeeper status wherein Muslim communities are essentialized as one entity and stereotyped based on a few individuals’ actions. plotted to blow up Pentagon.washingtonpost. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012). e. Second. Mosi Secret.g. nor should they be.com/2012/11/14/nyregion/fbi-had-greater-role-in-jose-pimentelterrorism-case-documents-show. 2012. imperialism.’s Role in Terror Case.B. Capitol. then it supports this Article’s thesis that community policing is a subordinating program. Brian Ballou. Post. Harris. http://www. N. racial. supra note 71. e. interlocutors. particularly youth and women. Joseph Goldstein. 330 See.nytimes. at 11 (highlighting the pressures to avoid radical criticisum enforced by community interlopers). available at http://www. Brigid Schulte.com (Nov. at 134. most of whom are men. expression. Man Convicted of a Terrorist Plot to Bomb Subways Is Sentenced to Prison for Life. we must have good communications with them” and “the danger posed by an exceptionally tiny number of radicalized Muslims can almost certainly come from only one source: Muslim communities themselves”). 329 National Security Preparedness Group. or intra-community inequities may find themselves silenced by interlocutors warning them of jeopardizing the entire Muslim community because of their trouble making. absent intra-community spying. or women complaining of unjust American foreign policies. Third. Times. 14. http://www. If community intervention implies self-spying. large segments of Muslim communities. Nov.g.g. pre-existing internal hierarchies along gender. there is little justification for community policing unless it is revamped to focus on protecting the interests of Muslim communities. Documents Show Extent of F.html. My thesis challenges this assumption. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011).html.328 Similarly. 2012. suffer intra-community subordinating effect of being voiceless and bereft of individual agency.. Muslim communities in the United States know very little about individual Muslims’ terrorist inclinations. leftists. e.boston. http://www. Through community policing..com/metrodesk/2012/11/01/rezwan-ferdaus-ashland-sentenced-years-terrorplot/KKvy6D6n2PfXfbEfA4iMwJ/story.Y. 2010. N. Boston. U. 1. Times.com/2012/11/17/nyregion/adismedunjanin-convicted-of-subway-bomb-plot-gets-life-sentence.331 Youth.

& POL’Y 301.http://www. supra note ___. 5. and detention in immigration).Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author terrorism cases. the shoe bomber Richard Reid were removed or voluntarily left mosques because their fringe views were not accepted among congregants). supra note XX. at 1195 (2001-2002) (noting that right after 9/11 DOJ co-opted local law enforcement to assist in race-based questioning.g. Building Bridges to Strengthen America. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment. 340 See SAshar. 335 Naomi Wolf.go.com/local/minneapolis/174834731. Raymond W. U. New York University School of Law (2011) (reporting that since 9/11 ten defendants have formally presented entrapment defenses and all were unsuccessful).html?refer=y. Beutel.. state. http://abcnews. 558 (Nov. at 130.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/may/09/spectacle-terror-vestedinterests (examples of NYPD and FBI coercing and paying mentally ill or slow individuals in supposed homegrown terrorist plots). prove otherwise. Safeguarding Citizens and Civil Liberties. 19.339 Indeed. 338 J. Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group 5. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Center on Law and Security. at A15. Star Tribune (Oct. one is hard pressed to determine what added value Muslim communities can contribute other than assisting law (highlighting the false assumption that American Muslims are actually susceptible to Al Qaeda’s propaganda in large numbers when in fact that has not proven the case). Muslim communities know much less than law enforcement about these terrorism cases because. Dan Browning & Allie Shah. 312 (2009). 307 (2009) (discussing the type of “homegrown terrorists” that are inspired by.335 Often. See Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11. 2012).. L. unlike community members. The Guardian (May 9. state.com/2012/02/11/us/underwear-bomb-plot-detailed-incourt-filings. and federal law enforcement agencies). 10.333 The majority of these “homegrown terrorism” cases since 9/11 involve “lone wolf” perpetrators who fall into one of three categories. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination. e. and federal level.co. 339 See. 2011 26. The spectacle of terror and its vested interests. Feb. these informants also play leading roles in concocting and implementing the fake terrorist plot.336 The second are foreign nationals who come to the United States in collaboration with international terrorists and without the assistance of American Muslim communities. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. 555. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (2010). at 8 (highlighting that “extremist ideologues like Abu Hamza. supra note ___. L. arrest. Minneapolis man found guilty of aiding Somali terrorist group. Muslim communities in the United States are apparently no more aware of these terrorism-related activities than law enforcement. 15. 2012. REV. Associated Press (Feb.340 Thus. FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (December 2012). 337 See. Times. 2013). 2001-September 11. & POL’Y 301. The 2006 Paul Miller Distinguished Lecture. FBI: Informant Close to Entrapping Would-Be Bomber. N.338 In all three types of cases.nytimes. 8:52 AM). http://www. Scott Carpenter. 2006) (praising the Patriot Act’s decreasing barriers between criminal and counterterrorism investigations allowing more information sharing across local.S. Kelly. J. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. law enforcement has information drawn from extensive surveillance networks and intelligence databases at the local. 336 Harris. Scott Carpenter. 59 RUTGERS L.guardian. e. NAT’L SEC. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson.337 The third are individuals acting alone or with a few other co-conspirators to commit a terrorist plot and are ultimately caught based on predicate acts in furtherance of their illicit plot. 334 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman. NAT’L SEC.com/US/wireStory/fbi-informant-close-entrapping-bomber18405031. vulnerable men with mental health and financial problems upon whom paid informants prey. Christmas Day Bomb Plot Detailed in Court Filings. but have no direct ties to Al Qaeda) and operate alone).startribune. 3 J.334 The first are young. as well as the responses of local Muslim communities.g. 181 (acknowledging government’s use of overly aggressive and possibly unfair tactics to pursue individuals who seem to pose no real threat). Charlie Savage. 52 . 2012.html. available at http://www. 333 Will McCants & Clint Watts.Y. 3 J.

16.345 Law enforcement did not respond by seeking mental health intervention. at 231 (“building a network of community intelligence contacts provides a comparatively effective way of maintaining surveillance over groups and communities” especially hard to penetrate). For them. L. In the end. angering politically powerless communities in exchange for retaining popularity among the majority of Americans who believe Muslims are inherently prone to 341 Letter from Jamie E. Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism. Jr. prosecuting. and convicting more — rather than fewer — cases as part of a prosecution driven counterterrorism regime. a preliminary review of community assessments of government engagement highlight the failure to produce substantive policy changes especially at the systemic level. 3 J.341 Without information about specific terrorist activity.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author enforcement in gathering more intelligence on innocent Muslim communities. CCP will not change the deeply entrenched adversarial system. and access government social services. e. The reality remains that prosecutors face significant political pressure to combat terrorism by indicting. Muslim participants believe their intervention will stop the government’s adversarial approach because their cooperation will give them political capital to persuade government such harsh tactics are neither necessary nor effective. 305 (2009). The Wrong Way to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism.ssf/2013/01/portland_terrorism_trial_fbi_a. as its supporters claim. supra note 71. Moreover. Brown.344 Indeed. Kundnani. NAT’L SEC. 2010) (critiquing Britain’s counterradicalization program.com/pacificnorthwest-news/index. Scott Carpenter. Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on the Judiciary 38-40 (May 13. supra note __. Matthew Levitt & Michael Jacobson. 342 See. is about empowering Muslim communities to defend their civil rights.342 One alternative explanation for the rise of such programs may be that CCP. In a forthcoming paper.g. available at http://www. making Muslim participants’ expectations unreasonable. unlike local police who are accountable directly to the communities. Arun Kundnani. when Seattle Christmas tree bomber’s father solicited the assistance of the FBI in connection with his concerns about his son’s mental health problems. Policing Uncertainty.html 53 .oregonlive. Acting Assistant Attorney General. 345 Bryan Denson. But the veracity of that claim can be easily measured through an assessment of services provided and policies reformed to protect civil liberties. Spooked. to Representative John Conyers. THE OREGONIAN (Jan. 2013).COM (Dec. at 11. law enforcement stands to benefit little from CCP. as being “used to establish one of the most elaborate system of surveillance ever seen in Britain). Innes. I will delve into more detail on how to measure and hold the government accountable for keeping its promises that community policing serves the interests of Muslim communities. Although beyond the scope of this article.343 Finally. 23. supra note 71. also known as Prevent. Spooked. the FBI initiated a sting operation led by an informant that led to his son’s prosecution for terrorism. Portland Terrorism Trial: FBI agents trace trail that led them to Mohamed Mohamud. federal agencies have little incentive to change their tactics to avoid alienating Muslim communities. & POL’Y 301. 344 Kundnani. 343 J.. integrate into American society. unless its objectives are really about mass surveillance of Muslim communities based on a presumption of collective guilt.. 2003) (admitting that the new surveillance and infiltration of mosques has not produced information relating to potential terrorism or criminal activity). CNN.

348 Implicit in this argument is an admission that sweeping.com/2011/oct/19/opinion/laoe-almarayati-fbi-20111019 (defending his twenty years of engagement with the U. Policing Uncertainty. INCREMENTALLY REFORM COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES THROUGH RELATIONSHIP BUILDING Empowering the community to incrementally reform counterterrorism policies and practices is another commonly invoked justification for community policing. 349 See. over the long run. 4. NOT A SUICIDE PACT 31-51 (2007) (using a cost-benefit analysis to argue in favor of violating civil liberties of Muslims to protect the American majority). 1. disloyal. To the contrary. Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. the latter nearly guarantees a perpetuation of the harshest tactics. government as a Muslim leader). Robert S. L. 2011) (testifying that a threat-based. Thus. e. 346 Setty.g. available at http://articles. good faith community intervention does not necessarily protect targeted Muslims (usually young males) from facing prosecution.S. are left to focus on incremental reforms that. intelligence led approach has “transformed the Bureau into a national security organization that fuses traditional law enforcement and intelligence missions.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author terrorism. at XX (arguing that interest convergence must exist in terms of political will to enable Congress and the President to support rights-protective limitations on national security policies).fbi.latimes. Salam Al-Maryati. leaving Muslim communities further disempowered. and the prosecution is not indicative of a larger assault on Muslim communities.A.347 Thus. and warrant suspicion is rational. available at http://www. The politics of terrorism in America. at 233. 2011). 347 FOI Documents Show FBI Illegally Collecting Intelligence Under Guise of “Community Outreach . Mueller. with all of the attendant risks. 2011). Richard Posner. Proponents of this reasoning are pragmatists willing to accept the “less bad” option of community policing. supra note ___. The Wrong Way to Fight Terrorism. TIMES (Oct.aclu. prosecutors are likely to exploit their relationships with Muslim community leaders to ask them to persuade their communities that the indictment was necessary based on classified information unavailable to them. available at http://www.org/nationalsecurity/foia-documents-show-fbi-illegally-collecting-intelligence-under-guise-community 348 Innes. 13. may produce the benefits of structural changes.gov/news/testimony/ten-years-after-9-11-are-we-safer (Sept. responsible community leaders have an obligation to support community policing with the purpose of incrementally reforming either the most egregious practices or those that the government is most willing to reform. that they should trust the prosecutor’s judgment and promises that the decision was not an abuse of discretion. rather than boycotting any engagement with the government.. therefore. supra note XX.” AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 19.346 Community policing merely serves structural incentives to be “hard on terrorism” by providing more opportunities to gather intelligence for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting more Muslims. nearly guarantees counterterrorism’s prioritization in the national strategy. To them. Director Federal Bureau of Investigation. structural changes in counterterrorism strategy is improbable.349 Muslim communities. coupled with entrenched bureaucratic interests in the vast counterterrorism budgets. III.”) 54 .

Admittedly. and the White House. and Secrecy. Fear. For example. RIGHTS WORKING GROUP (2012).org/PDF/nseerspaper. 353 See id. such marginal reforms do not protect travelers from being selected for secondary screening based on their perceived Muslim identity. Am. 357 See. 2013).g. leaving all Americans with diminished privacy. SALDEF.rightsworkinggroup. e.com/2013/01/18/travel/tsa-body-scanners (removing body scanners because manufacturers could not meet a congressional-ordered deadline to install privacy software on the machines). available at http://www. 352 See.356 After more than ten years of civil rights advocacy directed at DHS. after intensive lobbying at federal civil rights engagement meetings. http://www. Muslim. available at http://www. have to remove their headwear in public when selected for secondary screening. Muslim and Sikh communities were able to amend DHS’s screening process as it relates to religiously mandated headwear.saldef.adc. DOJ. ACLU Blog of Rights (May 6. available at http://www. and Muslim communities in particular. (2009).org/blog/immigrantsrights-racial-justice/homeland-security-suspends-ineffective-discriminatory. a coalition of Arab.g. though not the complete elimination. Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. the government admitted that its basis for suspending the program was not out of concern for Muslims’ civil liberties but rather their ability to attain the 350 TSA Changes Head Covering Screening Procedure in Response to Concerns of Religious Profiling . NSEERS: The Consequences of America’s Efforts to Secure Its Borders. a program that required all nonimmigrant males between the ages of 15 and 45 from Muslim-majority countries to register with the government and follow burdensome administrative procedures or face deportation. and civil rights and liberties organizations declared victory in the suspension. e. and it sent the most explicit message to the public.cnn. Oct. 55 . 16. 352 Moreover.pdf. 2007. CNN.354 Another oft-celebrated — but minimal — reform is the suspension of NSEERs (National Security Entry-Exit Registration System). 356 Id. 19. of the NSEERs program.COM (Jan. respectively. Chris Rickerd.pdf..355 NSEERs was passed shortly after September 11th.org/news/tsa-changes-head-covering-screening-procedurein-response-to-concerns-of-religious-profiling/. that the government was closely tracking Muslim men in the United States as part of its aggressive preventive counterterrorism strategy. 351 Id. these proponents of CCP point to small victories that have cumulatively improved the civil liberties of Muslims in America. this became a moot issue upon DHS’s adoption of body scanners through which all travelers must pass.aclu.. 354 But see. removing the headwear is the option of last resort for TSA screeners after they allow the traveler to self-frisk their heads and then have their hands tested for explosive materials. http://www. 2011. Mike Ahlers. Homeland Security Suspends Ineffective. Discriminatory Immigration Program. Religious and Cultural Needs. TSA.org/sites/default/files/RWGPenn_NSEERSReport_060412.357 Notwithstanding the protracted time frame for eliminating a clearly discriminatory program. TSA Removing ‘Virtual Strip Search’ Body Scanners. 355 The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling. http://www.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author When criticized as naïve or unduly optimistic.351 They now have the option of being screened in a private room.350 No longer do Muslim women or Sikh men donning headscarves or turbans.353 However.tsa. 11:23 AM).gov/traveler-information/religiousand-cultural-needs.

363 Moreover.orlandosentinel.Timothy Healy.com/michigan/california/news. and DHS has determined that recapturing this data manually when a nonimmigrant is seeking admission to the United States is redundant and no longer provides any increase in security.php?id=103. Department of Justice.pdf (reporting over 66. Spotlight on Surveillance.html. http://www. 358 56 .360 TRIP is tasked with receiving and resolving traveler complaints of misidentification or erroneous inclusion on terrorist watch lists and no fly lists. TRIP Complaint Statistics (Jan. and the absence of due process for complainants to meaningfully challenge their inclusion on a list. Bakalian & Mehdi Bozorgmehr.000 complaints between Feb.358 Thus. Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (Dec. e. 2007 and Aug. 361 See.. 28. 82.. 10 percent were similar names.359 Hence the underlying discriminatory motive of NSEERs may still exist but is executed through less-visible means. 359 Dep’t of Homeland Security.gov/news/testimony/the-terrorist-screening-center-and-its-role-incombating-terrorist-travel (stating “only 0. 2010). 2011) (“Overt the past six years. TRIPs became notorious for its late responses. . 21. 21. 82. Reg. 363 See.362 But soon after its inception. Of the 0.story (Muslim man harassed over lengthy period of time when traveling because on watch list). 6. 76 Fed. Reg. available at https://www. available at https://www. 360 E. the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has implemented several new automated systems that capture arrival and exit information on nonimmigrant travelers to the United States. 2009) (reporting that from 20072009. much less a plan to communicate to those harmed by NSEERS. Privacy Info. 15% in 181-360 days. most of whom were Muslim. 15% in 91 to 180 days. which at the time had minimal complaint adjudication capacity. and 15% in over than 1 year). 2012). 23830 (Apt.7 percent that have a connection to the watchlist. ADC Welcomes New TSA Aviation Security and Traveler Screening Enhancements . 76 Fed. 2010).000 complaints between Feb. Creation of the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) within DHS is also considered a triumph of community engagement and advocacy with federal agencies. from resolving the thousands of complaints by aggrieved travelers. sometimes years after a complaint was filed. . known as Glomar Dep’t of Homeland Security. 2009).g. Anny P.arabamerica. what appeared to be a testament to community engagement with the government was really a reflection of advancements in technology employed by DHS in immigration enforcement. see also Rickerd.4387436. supra note __ (“DHS’s suspension of the NSEERS program didn’t even merit a posting on DHS’s website.S. 28. and completely glossed over the program’s civil liberties costs. 22. Removing Designated Countries From the National Security EntryExit Registration System (NSEERS).com/news/local/breakingnews/os-muslim-sues-dhs-watch-list20121222.361 The program was created to relieve DHS’s Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.”).”). TRIPS’s opaque and terse responses.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1106/default.”). BACKLASH 9/11: MIDDLE EASTERN AND MUSLIM AMERICAN RESPOND 183 (2009). 23830 (Apt. 9.fbi. But see Letter to Electronic Freedom Foundation from Marcia Hoffman. 2009). Director of Terrorist Screening Center U. http://epic. and 15 percent were removed or downgraded due to the redress process.pdf (reporting over 66. Muslim businessman sues Homeland Security. http://www.eff. 20. 6.org/sites/default/files/filenode/trip_complaints/20100121_trip_complaints. Center (2006).0. ADC.7 percent of the DHS TRIP complaints actually have some connection to the Terrorist Watchlist. TRIP Complaint Statistics (Jan.g. 22 percent have been modified or reviewed prior to redress. Tellingly.eff. approximately 51 percent are appropriately watchlisted. says harassed while traveling. Amy Pavuk. 362 Letter to Electronic Freedom Foundation from Marcia Hoffman. Elec. Orlando Sentinel (Dec.g. Removing Designated Countries From the National Security EntryExit Registration System (NSEERS). available at http://www. 20. e.org/sites/default/files/filenode/trip_complaints/20100121_trip_complaints. Problem-Filled Traveler Redress Program Won’t Fly.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author same information through other means. 2007 and Aug. 2011). 54% of complaints were resolved in less than 90 days.. DHS justified NSSE RS’ suspension only on efficiency grounds .

Notably. TRIPS is still encumbered with a high volume of complaints. Dep’t of Justice.2d 724 (D.365 Other proclaimed victories involve individual civil rights violations by private actors. U..html. profiles Muslims in travel screening and terrorist watchlisting. available at http://www. and little power to affect the front end of the watch listing process to decrease the number of false positives or misidentification. and thus should not be mistaken for systemic policy reforms necessary to protect Muslim communities’ interests. Court Finds for EEOC in Religious Discrimination Suit Against Abercrombie and Fitch. CCP’s implementation occurs within a broader federal counterterrorism strategy and tactics that subordinate Muslim communities in various ways. http://epic. conflates political dissent and orthodox Islamic practices with unlawful terrorism. Enforcement and Outreach.S. Phillipi v. Six years after its inception.366 Institutional and political incentives directly contribute to their proactive enforcement of individual civil rights violations that are symptoms of the preventive counterterrorism strategy. Casey. these cases are handled by federal offices with an exclusively civil rights enforcement agenda such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Civil Rights Division at the U.C. 365 Spotlight on Surveillance.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate. 364 Military Audit Project v. PRIVACY INFO. Press Release.364 wherein the government refuses to either confirm or deny the existence of a violation left complainants convinced that the complaint process was a façade that allowed the government to claim it safeguarded civil liberties without meaningful challenge. short of staff. and targets impressionable young Muslim men with mental health problems for sting operations where informants play a leading role. http://www. CENTER (2006). current counterterrorism strategy. Cir.pdf 366 See. EEOC.S. selectively targets Muslims notwithstanding the rise of non-Muslim right wing groups that engage in violence. Problem-Filled Traveler Redress Program Won’t Fly. 57 .g. Cir. while important for the individual victim. do not cure the systemic subordination effect. July 15. these offices lack the legal authority to hold accountable other federal offices alleged to have violated Muslims’ civil liberties. 1976).gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/7-1511a.C. ELEC. Department of Justice. criminalizes humanitarian aid to conflict zones in Muslim majority countries.cfm.justice. Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash.eeoc. among other things.gov/recordsmgmt/rcs/schedules/departments/department-of-homeland-security/rg-0563/n1-563-09-008_sf115. These small successes. While significant to Muslims’ collective rights interests. 2011.archives.php. 1981). CIA.2d 1009 (D.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author responses. CONCLUSION As this Article demonstrates. The government has all of the information while the traveler is kept in the dark throughout the redress process. http://www. 546 F. IV. 656 F. Department of Homeland Security Memorandum on TRIPS (2006). Specifically. e. community policing in counterterrorism is fraught with adverse consequences that may be overlooked by Muslim proponents and local law enforcement.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1106/default.

SCI. BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (June 2011). Community engagement and outreach programs have only left Muslim communities frustrated with the government’s inability or refusal to adopt a systemic approach to resolving civil liberties grievances. 433. December 2011 (http://www. supra note ___.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final. Muslims must also seek the protection of law enforcement against private acts of violence and discrimination.nytimes. Preventing Violent Radicalization in America 10. investigation. Grievances are addressed.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author Unlike community policing employed in inner city communities and developed in response to ineffective paramilitary policing models. 58 . 1 (January 2012) (discussing the scapegoating of American Muslims).whitehouse. community policing will merely co-opt Muslim communities and local law enforcement into a highly flawed counterterrorism regime to the detriment of their otherwise good relations. says. if at all.B above. Vera Chinese and Simone Weichselbaum. 2012). August 2011 (http://www. 29. NY DAILY NEWS (Nov. Meanwhile.nydailynews. REV. Immigration Enforcement and Subordination supra note ___. and the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. FBI outreach meetings are used to gather intelligence on Muslim 367 Hussain. Even if an individual complaint is resolved. Defending the Faithful. 2012). 2 INT’L J.html?_r=0 (woman pushed man on tracks where he was fatally crushed by an oncoming train because he “looked Muslim or Hindu” and the woman “hate[d] Muslim and Hindus ever since 2001”). CCP’s predecessor programs prove otherwise. CCP keeps intact the preventive counterterrorism paradigm that adopts the military counterinsurgency tactics of counterradicalization and domestic criminal justice priorities of surveillance. attacker screamed anti-Muslim rant. Terrorizing Academia. And in contrast to traditional community policing where citizens seek the protection of local law enforcement from third-party drug dealers. see also Madalla A. Woman is Charged with Murder as a Hate Crime in a Fatal Subway Push. gangsters. While community policing programs could in theory benefit Muslim communities’ collective interests. Joseph Margulies & Hope Metcalf.368 Thus. 1575 (2002). The Citizen and the Terrorist.369 Without systemic reforms of the underlying strategy and overreaching tactics. on an individual level making the process analogous to scooping water out of an ocean with a spoon. Muslim communities engage with federal law enforcement to dissuade them from violating their collective rights. and prosecution. OF HUMANITIES & SOC. 60 J. the government may come across as more a foe than a friend. and other criminal elements. LEGAL EDUC. http://www.whitehouse. 436 (2010-2011). Man stabbed outside Queens mosque. Marc Santora. http://www.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners. And as they beseech their government to respect their civil liberties.pdf). at 1189. community attendees have discovered that some. Alibeli and Abdulfattah Yaghi. 49 UCLA L. 18. at 934. there are hundreds more arising from policies and practices that are fundamentally rights-infringing and selectively enforced. 369 Leti Volpp. Theories of Prejudice and Attitudes toward Muslims in the United States. and is merely another weapon in the federal government’s toolkit that perpetuates the “terrorist other” stereotype.com/2012/12/30/nyregion/woman-is-held-in-deathof-man-pushed-onto-subway-tracks-in-queens.1204122. as described in the counter critques in Part III. National Security Preparedness Group.com/news/crime/man-stabbed-queens-mosque-article-1. and possibly all. NY TIMES (Dec.367 For many Muslims. CCP as currently envisioned betrays its rhetoric of empowerment and mutual trust. Ashar.pdf). 368 See the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.

community policing should be rejected by both local law enforcement and Muslim communities alike. and federal agencies. Rather than focus on how to co-opt Muslim communities into existing paradigms. state. Until then.Do Not Cite Without Permission From the Author communities and input into intelligence databases accessible across local. 59 . For that to happen. the federal law enforcement agencies must undergo the same monumental cultural and political changes as local police departments did in order to make traditional community policing a relative success. local law enforcement’s and communities’ efforts are better spent shifting the paradigm away from the use of religious affiliation and ethnic origins as indicia of terrorism to focusing on individualized suspicion based on predicate acts of criminal activity and an assumption of the innocence of Muslim communities.

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