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7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 1994 and again on March 22, 1994, the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26 qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] t has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause [i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval] would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the
Fourth. After all. No. in which it is specifically referred to. VI. D. 7716. 11197 and S. Inc.necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. To insist that P. 11197 nor S. 1590 as among those which the statute amends. No. No. collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions. 11582. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic Act No. Section 26 which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. in addition to Section 103 of the NIRC." so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the members of Congress . namely. 1590 be mentioned in the title of the law. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. Under the Constitution. although no mention is made therein of P. would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of its content. The question is whether this amendment of Section 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in the title of Republic Act No. R. we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. No. Fifth. No. petitioner in G. this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. 1630. Our cases manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. No. That upon the certification of a bill by the President. that it violates Art. We think it is. But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared. since the title states that the purpose of the statute is to expand the VAT system. there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions.. 7716 is made by the Philippine Airlines. such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session. and one way of doing this is to widen its base by withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. D. Third. No. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis. the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No." It is contended that neither H. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No.
7716 is not any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P. Phase II-Automated Counting and Canvassing System. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Wherefore. 2004 Facts: On June 7. and (2) by eventually awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI. 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent national and local electoral exercises.A. 159139.. providing funds therefore and for other purposes).A. it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for the same reason other statutes. petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote a letter to the COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos. VS. 1590. D. 1997. Congress passed R. On October 29.and to inform the people of pending legislation so that. COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. On December 22. 2004 elections. They protested the award of the contract to respondent MPC. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. the COMELEC rejected the protest.5 billion to fund the AES for May 10. If. the title of Republic Act No. if they wish to. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases of its Automated Election System: namely. 6074. and yet no mention is made of its tax exemption INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. they can be heard regarding it. which allocated the sum of P 2. awarding the project to MPC. pass unnoticed until some event somehow calls attention to their existence. the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. No. the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Technical Proposals on Phase II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in technical evaluation. Both were referred to Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). However in a letter-reply. 8046 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). Congress enacted R. She authorized the release of an additional P 500 million. 172. There are 57 bidders who participated therein. No. COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS. and Phase III-Electronic Transmissions. Sr. ET AL. petitioner did not know before that its exemption had been withdrawn. Phase I-Voter Registration and Validation System. However. upon the request of COMELEC. Indeed. SR. in the case at bar. Notwithstanding these failures. although published. 1995. It is clear that the Commission further desecrated the law on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to alter the subject of the . 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system in the May 11.R. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the contract to MPC in violation of law and in disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure. January 13. Held: The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy on public biddings (1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so. The COMELEC issued an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid”. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS. 2002. ET AL. G.
the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. Echegaray vs. is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. the SC retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. modify or alter the same. what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend. the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function under Sec. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. in effect allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding. an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. VII of the Constitution. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 1999 Sunday. after the decision in the case becomes final and executory. In the same vein. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests.R. Issue: Whether or not the SC. 132601. whether civil or criminal. The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. still has jurisdiction over the case Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost all its powers or the case. It is because of these unforeseen. The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by granting the TRO.contract. In truth. it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. For instance. By the finality of the judgment. January 25. Secretary of Justice G. The important part of a litigation. No. January 19. Political Law Facts: On January 4. Even after the judgment has become final. supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them comform to law and justice. 19. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve. 1999. The effect of such an . Art. The suspension of such a death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial power. a death convict who becomes insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity.
For this purpose. until the present case was brought. the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. 1998 (289 SCRA 337) Facts: TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation." Indeed. G. not the right of the broadcasters. In truth.amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. 132922. COMELEC. All broadcasting. among other things. NO. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject. shall be subject to amendment. Even in the United States. radio and television broadcasting companies. . TELEBAP vs." 11 Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. But the exercise of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of conviction. and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period. particularly the voters. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of the government. such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public. (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. whether by radio or by television stations. Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit. so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners. The powers of the Executive. . there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. Art.R. which is paramount. is licensed by the government. XII. provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and. April 21. broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. which are given . §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good. to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted .
Since a franchise is a mere privilege. 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title one subject requirement of the Constitution (4) Whether or not Sec. 15 of RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power (5) Whether or not RA 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. The Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner’s locus standi where the . subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy. 1997 Sunday. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source. as guardians of the Constitution. No. do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition Held: As to the first issue. The courts. lease or own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own requirement.R.franchises. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act as unconstitutional and void. Issues: (1) Whether or not the petitions raise a justiciable controversy (2) Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to assail the validity of the law (3) Whether or not Sec. Secretary of the Department of Energy G. 124360. January 25.” Under the deregulated environment. November 5. Where a statute violates the Constitution. Tatad vs. Political Law Facts: The petitions assail the constitutionality of various provisions of RA 8180 entitiled the “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996. The effort of respondents to question the legal standing of petitioners also failed. have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. The discretion given to the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. As the dominant players. XII of the Constitution which cannot be violated by RA 8180. no matter how diverse they may be. they boast of existing refineries of various capacities. 5(b) of RA 8180 on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject. and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Petitioners also argued that some provisions of RA 8180 violate Sec. Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. Section 19. The Court did not concur with this contention. The Court held that Sec. Petitioners also assail Sec. petitioners pose issues which are significant to the people and which deserve the Court’s forthright resolution. 5 providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of RA 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. It is also contended that Sec. XII of the Constitution espouses competition. Under the sufficient standard test. XII of the Constitution. 19. the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. Art. regardless of the occurrence of any event. The desirability of competition is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade. and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. 19. Art. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions. Petron. Congress expressly provided in RA 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997. He is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. The tariff differential of 4% on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products . Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the President. The title need not mirror. Thus. fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. In the case. the reason for the interdiction of unfair competition. the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. 15 of RA 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry for being violative of the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power. Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Art. Competition is thus the underlying principle of Sec. Under the first test. there must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
may stand and be enforced. these provisions on tariff differential. G. inventory and predatory pricing are among the principal props of RA 8180. January 31. the Court held that the offending provisions of RA 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos. SEC. 29 DEC 1960] Saturday. Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of RA 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players.therefore works to their immense benefit. OF PUBLIC WORKS [110 PHIL 331. 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests. PASCUAL VS. the valid portion. inventory and predatory pricing inhibit fair competition. if separable from the invalid. as conditions. Petron. Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free interaction of market forces. The most important question is whether the offending provisions can be individually struck down without invalidating the entire RA 8180.R. NO. the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. Prospective competitors again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. contrary to their intent. while another part is valid. The separability clause notwithstanding. RA 8180 contains a separability clause. Political Law Facts: Petitioner. The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected. They will be competing on an uneven field. The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. Congress could not have regulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions. the governor of the Province of Rizal. Unfortunately. The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron. considerations. New players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron. filed an action for .L-10405. inducements or compensations for each other. The provisions on tariff differential.
the donation was not executed. on the other hand. void ab initio. Issue: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional. December 29. Pascual vs. In the case at bar. the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore. the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence. providing P85. repair. Jose Zulueta. reconstruction. The district engineer. subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However. therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council. derived from such . L-10405. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. The decision appealed from is reversed. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS 110 PHIL 331 GR No.declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920.000 for the construction. Petitioner. which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. a member of the Senate of the Philippines. The land which was owned by Zulueta. the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. Held: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent. Act appropriating funds for public works. 1960 "A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit. null and void. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Secretary of Public Works PASCUAL vs. prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional.
expenditure. were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads. and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community." FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief. as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals. however. Some of the feeder roads. which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. upon the ground that RA No. belonging to private respondent Zulueta. does not justify their aid by the use public money. Incidental to the public or to the state. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads. ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the government? HELD: No. is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise. although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax. situated at Pasig. and thus the public welfare. may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. with injunction. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest. which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision. 920. . Rizal. as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition. made by its owner to the government. and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets.
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