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ɨe Journal of Politics and

International Anairs
Volume V, Issue II
Spring 2013
e Journal of Politics
and International Aairs
Volume V, Issue II
Spring 2013
e Ohio State University
Chelsea Hagan
Editor-in-Chief
Phillip Allen
Senior Editor
Professor Paul Beck
Advisor
Todd Ives
Senior Editor
Taylor Humphrey
Design
JPIA Editorial Sta:
John Friess
Allison Gorman
Grace Herbener
Cassidy Horton
Rebecca Izzi
Merissa Jones
Emily Noble
Eric Parris
Charles Trefney
Holly Yanai
Ben Presson
Alumni Advisor
Cameron DeHart
Alumni Advisor
Contents
China’s Population: Changes and Challenges 09
Brian Yeh, e Ohio State University
Waste Not, Want Not: Civil Society Actors and International Environmental
Agreements 21
Pearce Edwards, Texas Christain University
Nuclear Arms Control & the New START Treaty 51
Jonathan White, e University of California- Davis
Florida V. Jardines 63
Kayla Polonsky, e University of Virginia
Turkmenistan 77
Paul Filippelli, e Ohio State University
Factors of Trade Imbalance 93
Charlotte Jung, e University of Virginia
Democratization in the Phillippines 111
Amanda Van Glider & Patrick Mahoney, Baldwin-Wallace College
An Examination of the Scottish Independence Debate 121
James Mckeon, Northeastern University
A Comparative Analysis of European Extreme Right Party Success 151
Michael Koslen, Ohio University
Volume V · Issue II · Spring 2013 · Print Edition
Journal of Politics and
JPIA
International Aairs
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COPYRIGHT © 2013 THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.
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Welcome,
It is my pleasure to present the Spring 2013 edition of e Journal of Politics & International Aairs.
is issue features several exciting and relevant papers that speak to the strength of the undergradu-
ates at e Ohio State University. Our editorial team has been working diligently over the past several
months to put this project together, and hopefully the end result is both informative and enjoyable.
is is my rst ocial Journal as editor-in-chief and I have to say I am glad with the outcome. We
started a new website which can be viewed at www.osujpia.webs.com, which includes blog posts from
the editors. Also, we received the most amount of paper submissions ever in history!
Not only that, but we also have published papers written by students representing 7 dierent universi-
ties. We hope to continue to make the Journal not only a household name, but also a name the entire
nation will recognize.
is issue would not have been possible without the support of the Political Science department. I
would like to thank Dr. Richard Herrmann for his support and condence in our team, Alicia An-
zivine for her assistance at every stage of this project, Dr. Paul Beck for his guidance and administra-
tive support, and Ben Presson for his continuing insights as our alumni adviser.
Lastly, I would like to thank all those who read the Journal. Your feedback and supports keeps this
project going. ank you.
Chelsea Hagan
Editor-in-Chief

Editorial Foreword
Chelsea Hagan
Editor-in-Chief
China’s Population: Changes and Challenges
Brian Yeh
Labeled by one scholar as a “demographic overachiever” in terms of both the scale and speed of its demographic
changes, China is by far the world’s most populous country. is status, however, belies numerous and often
painful reverses in population policy the country has experienced as the government has sought to transform
China from a largely agrarian society to a developed economy. Although China’s large population has served it
well in recent years by contributing to rapid and sustained economic growth, it must undertake a comprehen-
sive set of reforms to upgrade education and training programs and expand pension coverage and nancing to
compensate for the expected aging and shrinking of the population.
9
S
ince the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s demographic prole has
reected rapid uctuations due to extensive state intervention, a phenomenon that has lead
one scholar to label China a “demographic overachiever” (Feng 2011) in terms of the scale
and speed of demographic change. China’s modern history of population control is unprecedented.
From approximately 550 million in 1950, China’s population grew to 1.3 billion in 2010 (United
Nations 2011), a 19.5% share of the world total. However, China’s status as the world’s most popu-
lous country belies numerous and often painful reverses in population policy as the government has
sought to transform China from a largely agrarian society to a developed economy. Fluctuations in
population policy can be traced to diering views of optimal population size in the Mao- and post-
Mao eras.
Mao-era views about population reected several factors: strict adherence to Marxist ideol-
ogy, a Chinese tradition of large families, limited awareness of population issues (Shapiro 2001, 29),
and a stiing intellectual environment. However, the critical inuence was Mao Zedong’s personal
views on China’s optimal population size. As a political leader Mao had to make use of China’s natural
endowment of assets, but his faith in the Communist Party’s ability to mobilize the population also
inuenced his views regarding appropriate population policies. As prominent China scholar Andrew
Scobell (2002) notes, Mao’s perception that China was surrounded on all sides by hostile neighbors
was also a major factor in his strategic thinking. is view became linked to Mao’s broader objective
of harnessing the energy of the nation’s population to build a strong and powerful state. His view of
China’s large population as a national asset propelled him to mobilize the population in great num-
bers and at great human suering for economic development and national defense. It also provided
the impetus for policies that greatly increased the population.
By contrast, Deng Xiaoping cast o the ideological blinders inuencing policy during the
Maoist era and placed a greater policy emphasis on increasing the population’s education and skill lev-
els, in reaction to the Cultural Revolution and its negative impact on the nation’s education system.
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In prioritizing the development of science, technology, and the nation’s intellectual resources, Deng
launched a wide-ranging set of reforms, including the devolution of educational management to the
local level and eorts to improve and universalize elementary and junior middle school education
(Worden, 1987).
Deng-era views regarding population also revealed a growing concern with the economic
and environmental pressures caused by China’s burgeoning population (State Council Information
Oce, 1995). Experts argued that continued population growth would seriously harm China’s lakes,
forests, and other natural resources and threaten economic progress at a time when Deng sought to
open China’s economy to the world. One major inuence from the Mao era, however, remained: the
belief that an urgent, top-down “big-push” strategy was necessary to achieve desired policy goals. is
ultimately led to the creation of the policy limiting most Chinese families to one child (Greenhalgh
2005, 253-276).
e one-child policy has been successful in arresting fertility rates, but serious population-
related problems remain and have even been exacerbated by the slowdown in population growth.
Additionally, the Chinese government’s continued strict interpretation of the one-child policy has led
to an increasing human cost for China’s population, including the increasingly common use of forced
abortions. As China transitions from a largely rural to a majority urban society, policymakers must
focus on increasing the education and productivity of the workforce in order to continue reaping the
benets of a large, still relatively youthful population. One consequence of government eorts to slow
population growth is a rapidly aging population, which will soon pose critical challenges to providing
post-retirement and old-age income security and medical care as well.
A major challenge for the central government will be reforming the nation’s patchwork
pension system, which does not currently cover most Chinese reaching retirement age. Furthermore,
as fewer working-age individuals support a disproportionately large older population, slower eco-
nomic growth and rising societal demands will have important implications for internal stability.
China must also increase investment in human capital and reduce regional inequalities in educational
investment, while simultaneously seeking to mitigate damage to the environment resulting from
increased energy consumption.
e following sections present an overview of China’s demographic history and then
examine contemporary population trends, followed by a discussion of the issues confronting the
Chinese pension system. e paper concludes by identifying key economic and social implications
of China’s demographic transformation.
Yeh China’s Population
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Population Trends in China
Figure 1 below displays total fertility rates (TFR) from 1950-2010 for a selected group of
countries. e most notable feature of this graph is China’s abrupt transition from a generally increas-
ing fertility rate beginning in 1955 to a rapidly decreasing one from 1970 to 1980. Despite Mao’s
view of China’s large population as an asset, population growth was interrupted by the Great Leap
Forward of 1958-1961 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976. Eorts to promote population
growth resumed in 1969, but this policy was superseded in 1980 by the one-child policy (Greenhalgh
2005). Rapid and sustained decline in fertility rates in the past two decades reects this ocial em-
phasis on smaller families. Despite the central government’s pledges in recent years to continue the
controversial one-child policy, government eorts to reduce population growth have created some
long-term demographic challenges. China’s fertility rate has fallen below replacement level (2.0, the
level necessary to sustain population growth) since 1991 (Wolf Jr. 2011, 11), which has accelerated
China’s transition from a relatively youthful society to an old one.
Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for selected countries, 1950-2010.

Source: United Nations
China’s population policies have intensied the demographic transition that would have
occurred anyway as a natural outcome of economic development. In the second half of the twentieth
century, China has experienced unprecedented declines in mortality rates that by themselves would
have contributed to its rapid population growth. Between 1950 and 2000, life expectancy increased
from less than 50 years to more than 70 years. China thus achieved a population growth rate sug-
gesting a doubling every 25 years, while also halving its fertility rate in a single decade (Feng 2011,
173-175). roughout this period, the Chinese government has intervened repeatedly in an eort to
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
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inuence such trends.
An Aging Population
As this demographic transition proceeds, the rapid aging of the population has become
a concern for China’s leaders. In March 2012, for instance, the head of China’s National Bureau of
Statistics publicly expressed concern that China’s aging population would constrain future economic
growth and adversely impact the environment (Xinhua 2012). China’s development has benetted
from the “demographic dividend,” an increase in per capita income due to a higher proportion of
working-age individuals in the total population (Feng and Mason 2005, 4). However, large declines
in the fertility rate have led to changes in China’s demographic composition that portend long-term
economic and social challenges.
A major concern is that China may in fact grow old before it gets rich. As Figure 2 below
demonstrates, China’s overall population remains relatively young, but its old-age dependency ratio
is expected to increase dramatically, meaning that fewer and fewer young people of working age will
be forced to support a burgeoning elderly population. As the “one-child” generation matures, families
are assuming a “4-2-1” inverted pyramid structure whereby a single child is supporting two parents
and four grandparents. As a 2010 People’s Daily article notes, this trend has increasingly come into
conict with the traditional Chinese expectation that children take care of their aging parents: indi-
viduals at the bottom of this pyramid are experiencing great diculty nding the time and nancial
resources to support their families (People’s Daily 2010). When China was a predominantly agricul-
tural society, more children were seen as benecial to helping out on the farm and for supporting
parents and grandparents later in life. Now, however, as China becomes increasingly urbanized and
having at most one child is both the law and a smart economic investment, the situation has reversed
and grandparents must sometimes look after children as the single child struggles to support the fam-
ily.
Figure 2. Chinese Old-age Dependency Ratio, 1950-2100
Source: United Nations
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13
e graphs below are population pyramids displaying China’s changing age-sex distribu-
tion. For nations with high fertility rates, the graphs have large bases representing a greater population
of young people. ese graphs emphasize two features of China’s population. e rst is that over
time, the majority of China’s population will be composed of older individuals. As can be seen from
this series of graphs, the center of gravity shifts from the younger age groups at the bottom toward
the top. By 2050, China’s age-sex distribution is projected to be top-heavy, with the largest age group
being 60-64 year olds. e second noticeable feature is the two population bulges for ages 35-49 and
15-24 in 2010. ese bulges represent increases in the fertility rate after the Great Leap Forward of
1958 as couples conceived children that had been postponed during this period (Heise 1988) and
possible changes to the legal marriage age that led to earlier marriages and childbirth, respectively. e
smaller population bands towards the bottom reect demographic changes after China’s one-child
policy was implemented.


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One consequence of this demographic shift is the pressing need to upgrade the skills of
China’s workforce. As globalization hastens economic integration and international competitiveness,
countries have increasingly begun to enhance the quality of education and skills of their workforces
in order to maintain competitiveness. However, China still remains overly reliant on capital, labor,
and environment intensive growth rather than knowledge intensive growth. Coupled with the chal-
lenges of rising unemployment, a lack of arable land, and increasing inequality, China now faces the
challenge of upgrading the skills of at least 770 million workers who remain outside of the formal
education sector. Importantly, China must also increase access and the quality of education for those
within the formal education sector (Dahlman et al. 2007).
A Broken System
In the past, Chinese families coped with the nancial consequences of changing family size
by high savings rates and managing family assets for the collective good. is traditional method will
not be sustainable given smaller families and social changes. e Chinese government must play a
greater role in supporting the elderly through the pension system. Yet this will be a considerable chal-
lenge due to China’s articial demographic transition, which has accelerated aging and increased the
dependency ratio, the relative poverty of most Chinese citizens, and the fragmented pension system.
As of 2008, only 40 percent of China’s 775-million-worker labor force was covered by
one of three government-sponsored pension systems (Impavido et al. 2009, 6). is phenomenon is
largely the result of a lack of incentives for participation. e pension system is biased toward urban
workers, most of whom are employees of state- and collectively-owned enterprises. ese individuals
were previously provided lifetime employment and benets by work units and communes until the
central government began to aggressively enforce “hard budget constraints” for most state-owned
enterprises in the mid-1990s. e situation for rural workers is even worse, since they are not covered
Yeh China’s Population
15
by the pension system (although a voluntary rural pension system with extremely few benets does
exist) (Jackson et al. 2009, 11). Rural migrant workers - China’s “oating population” – are also left
out of the system. Employers are not obligated to extend unemployment insurance to them and, as a
result, most must return to their impoverished hometowns if they lose their jobs, where land (which
they do not ocially own) is their only form of social security.
Partly as a result of its fragmented and incomplete pension system, China has an esti-
mated ocial unfunded pension liability of approximately 150 percent of GDP (Economist, 2012).
Although eorts to expand coverage, particularly to non-state enterprise and migrant workers, have
been instituted, a lack of incentives and high levels of noncompliance and evasion remain major
roadblocks to pension reform and serve to exacerbate the fragmented nature of the pension system
(Zhao and Xu 2002, 400-404). Prohibitively high contribution rates for workers and rms, extremely
low rates of return on personal retirement accounts, and a lack of pension portability are signicant
disincentives for participation (Jackson et al. 2009).
Figure 3. Percent of Total Chinese Workforce Covered by Pension System, 2008

Source: International Monetary Fund
According to a 2005 World Bank report, the current pension system is nancially unsus-
tainable. Although China created the National Pension Fund in 2000 to meet the expected increase
in benet claims from an aging population, its assets still amount to a tiny fraction of liabilities and
it does not address the fundamental underlying issues of lack of participation and coverage (Jackson
et al. 2009, 23). A number of contributing factors including (and most importantly) a rapidly aging
population, the fragmented and decentralized nature of the pension system, and an increasing ten-
dency toward early retirement serve to exacerbate this situation (Sin 2005).
Implications
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Major swings in population policy from Maoist China to the contemporary era highlight
that China’s leaders have sometimes viewed its large population as a tremendous asset and sometimes
viewed it as an obstacle to achieving a modern and prosperous society. Chinese leaders must think
critically about what population policies will best serve the country over the long-term. Rapid eco-
nomic growth has already absorbed much of the low-productivity, low-wage population (adding to
pressures created by the aging population) that created China’s comparative advantage in low-skilled
manufacturing, and wage rates are accelerating. Policies to encourage increased investment in hu-
man capital while also reducing regional inequalities in educational funding must be implemented
to maintain growth momentum. e government has taken steps to increase post-secondary educa-
tional opportunities, but research has shown that funding disparities between urban and rural regions
and an imbalance in human and physical capital investment have led to growing productivity gaps
between regions (Fleisher and Chen 1996, 1), and that more higher-skilled workers are required to
complement new technologies in the modern economy (Heckman 2005). Policies that both increase
and equalize educational opportunities - particularly in higher education - as well as increase incen-
tives for greater educational attainment, will be crucial for avoiding the middle income trap whereby a
country that has successfully modernized nevertheless fails to achieve advanced economy-level growth
(Kharas and Kohli 2011, 281).
As noted above, the pension system is central to the government’s ability to manage de-
mographic pressures. Although the current system has allowed China to delay addressing the social
and economic implications of a quickly aging population head-on, current reform proposals do not
go deep enough to address underlying structural problems de-incentivizing participation in the social
security system.
e challenge for China is twofold: if the central government continues to drag its feet in
implementing reforms, it will be compelled to channel more and more money into institutional sup-
ports, placing enormous strains on government nances. At the same time, the ability and willingness
of Chinese families (especially rural families and those of migrant workers) not covered by the system
to shoulder the economic burden may directly aect domestic stability. e government places a pre-
mium on maintaining domestic peace and stability, as evidenced by the fact that Chinese spending on
internal security has outpaced defense spending for three consecutive years. Yet if China is unable to
meet its unfunded liabilities and provide a suitable safety net for these families, widespread discontent
could arise as a result of glaring economic and social disparities.
Similarly, a lack of social security and economic opportunities at home may compel rural
Chinese workers to move to urban areas, accelerating a trend that has already begun as China transi-
17
Yeh China’s Population
tions from an agricultural society to a majority urban one. Although China’s hukou system means
that rural Chinese who move to urban areas are not entitled to the same benets accorded to urban
Chinese, better opportunities on China’s eastern coast may be seen as a means to compensate for a
lack of a formal social safety net. Unfortunately many of these urban centers to which migrant Chi-
nese ock are already overcrowded. Population increases in these urban centers may thus cause strains
on public services while also increasing the possibility of large concentrations of disaected Chinese
- a situation that Chinese leaders are keen to avoid.
China’s large population has undoubtedly contributed to the nation’s growing political and
economic inuence. Rapid and sustained economic growth has served China well in recent years by
allowing it to increase its prestige and presence on the world stage as a major world power. Yet China
is perilously close to the threshold whereby the sheer size of the population will begin to hinder the
government’s attempt to create a prosperous and well-o society. Population growth has highlighted
the need for a modern workforce equipped with the skills necessary to compete at a global level, as
well as the imperative of a well-functioning, inclusive social security system. In order to achieve these
goals, China must promptly undertake a comprehensive set of reforms that recognizes the multifac-
eted nature of China’s economic, social, and political population issues and takes steps to upgrade
education and training programs and expand pension coverage and nancing.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
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Competitiveness through Life Long Learning.” September 17. http://www.ctc-health.org.cn/
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e Economist. 2012. “China’s Achilles heel: A comparison with America reveals a deep
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wp09246.pdf (Accessed June 20, 2012).
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Kharas, Homi and Harinde Kohli. 2011. “What is the Middle Income Trap, Why do
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Countries Fall into It, and How Can It Be Avoided?” Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies
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Brian Yeh is a rising senior pursuing a major in Economics and a minor in Chinese. is past year, he
attended an intensive Chinese study and immersion program in Beijing, China. His interests include
Chinese foreign and security policy and LGBT rights. After graduation, he plans to work for a few
years before attending law school.
Waste Not, Want Not: Civil Society Actors and
International Environmental Agreements
Pearce Edwards
is research addresses the increased presence of civil society groups and NGOs in the foreign policy processes of the
state, especially in relation to recent environmental agreements. A strand of theory on the functions and processes of
civil society combines with a rational-choice framework for state decision-makers to describe the types of state-civil
society sectors most likely to produce compliance with international agreements. To split the analysis, four categories
of compliance ranging from soft nominal compliance to strong institutional compliance are created and tested using
the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste as well as through comparative case
studies in Chile and Bulgaria. In the quantitative results, positive correlations are shown between a cooperative civil
society and two types of compliance, while the case studies better describe state-civil society relations. e ndings
invite new consideration of the determinants of foreign policymaking.
21
P
reparing for the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, commonly
known as Rio+20, a cross-section of the international community gathered to levy proposals,
debate and produce tangible outcomes and objectives for the future of environmental man-
agement policy. Key players in the Rio+20 arena were the representatives of Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs), trained and consolidated into working groups divided by the issues areas they
addressed, including women, indigenous peoples and trade unions (Dodds 2012). e Stakeholder
Forum which took leadership in coordinating NGOs at the conference commissioned its partici-
pants into the halls and chambers of international negotiations. Equipped with laptops, cell phones,
memory sticks and digital cameras, NGO representatives were to “use coee bar diplomacy,” drink
and dance with the appropriate national delegations while committing faces and personal details to
memory – all targeted for persuasive agenda-setting.
In reaching an accord on environmental issues in 2012, the picture of international and
interstate relations becomes much more complex than individuals or small groups of leaders harmo-
nizing and bargaining mutual interests, as might have been the casejust three decades ago during the
Cold War. NGOs at Rio+20 arepart of this complexity, taking part in the formation of “relationships
of which political actors are to varying degrees conscious” (Harbeson 1994). By operating outside
of state and private sector mechanisms in conventions and negotiations, these groups constitute the
most visible face of global civil society. ese actors, and more importantly the strategies and mecha-
nisms by which they engage in decision-making and increase political consciousness, are essential
conditions in what Amoore and Langley (2004) have called the global “redistribution of political
power.”Civil society inuences extend to the evolution of agreements into matters of state policy and
implementation, prompting the question: what is the eect of civil society activity on state compli-
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
22
ance with international agreements?
e construction of popular expression is a distinct and necessary piece of explaining state
behavior in the expansion of participatory democracy, critical new questions about models of eco-
nomic development, attention to cultural dierences, conict studies and the formation of inter-
national institutions,. Civil society, the vehicle of such expression outside ocial channels such as
elections and disconnected from the accumulative nancial interest of the private sector, is a volun-
tary, self-generating realm of organized social life existing between the family and the state (Mercer
2002). Internationally, Youngs (2004) asserts that the stability and consistency of democracy increas-
ingly derive from a “triangular approach” which includes governments, multinational corporations
(MNCs) and global civil society, not unlike the Kantian peace tripod. Yet the theoretical perspectives
with which civil society ought to be analyzed is a matter of debate in the literature, ranging from cri-
tiques of being too limited (Amoore, Langley 2004) to misplaced, as when Keck and Sikkink (1998)
contend against the “ction of the unitary state” in favor of transnational citizen mobilization. is
researchrst addresses these critiques through amediated extension of the literature and clarication
of civil society and its relevant behavioral patterns to make more valid inferences about its eects.
Yet the structure, purposes and behavior of mobilized citizen groups or networksdo not
produce tangible eects for the governance of a state unless they possess leverage and information
about the issues for which they advocate (Dai 2005). Compliance as a measure of abiding by targets
of international agreements is a cornerstone of problem solving, and depends heavily on the political
calculations of leaders. erefore, this research synthesizes a rational-choice modelof state decisions
with dierent types of group behaviorderived from constructivist literature. By pluralizing and order-
ing public discourse, governments can more eectively forge consensus and justly distribute rights
and protections to individuals or groups – in the case of human rights, or to an entire society – in
the case of environmental protection. An eective civil society focused on values of commitment and
trust can improve tolerance, economicperformance, more eective institutions and social equality
(Persell 1997). e ndings are more qualitative and suggestive than conclusive, in that civil society
is found to have a multi-step and conditional eect across varying components of compliance. Most
importantly, the research makes a systematic eort to use a valid measure of group activity across two
testing instruments, ndingstrong statistical signicance in nominal, or framework commitment-
based compliance.
Condoned and Constrained: State Decisions and Civil Society
Under what conditions do states comply with international agreements? A realist approach
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
23
assumes compliance to be antithetical to a state that does not wish to be constrained and would pre-
fer to establish its own policies and political agenda to resolve an issue such as a more equitable and
transparent legal system or monetary policy. Yet state ratication of and participation in international
agreements can be used strategically to reduce barriers to economic growth, interstate cooperation
and mutual stability (Simmons 2002). In other words, states make decisions to comply based on their
capacity to act and out of the fear of consequences if they were to violate an international standard
which could lead to punitive action or isolation while giving relative gains to other states who did
comply.
Simmons (2002) also oers a nuanced perspective of compliance with domestic constitu-
encies as drivers of political choices, in which disagreement with a state policy leads to a preference of
a third party over protracted internal negotiation.is alternative conception of state decision-making
in the arena of conict resolution matches with the game-theoretic approach of Dai (2005), who cre-
ates a utility function to depict the greater eects on compliance of groups with more information
and leverage. Dai (2006) alsoexamines the cohesion and anticipatory ability of an NGO or interest
group to pressure based on knowledge of a government’s past and present compliance eorts. Further-
more, a more vulnerable leadership with a lower probability of reelection also favorably changes the
compliance calculus to accommodate for pressure groups. NGOs are a boon to elected governments
for minimizing expenditures, providing additional policy options via informational advantage and ul-
timately providing win sets favorable to a greater number of actors (Raustiala 1997). ese outcomes,
however, vary by regime type. Autocrats and authoritarian states will be more likely to consider only
the reciprocal benets of compliance, which leads to increased free riding, refusal to abide by asym-
metric agreements and the stability of the regime, in the case of North Korea bargaining for food aid
to meet Western conditions on its nuclear program.
Given that a key strand of compliance is the behavior and leverage of groups, this study examines
the composition and function of citizen groups and NGOs as they push for a specic international
agenda or agreement vis-à-vis dierent postures of the host state. e rst section reviews the origins
and critiques of civil society groups as important players in the public sphere to rene which attributes
to study, while the second places them in context with the state in order to theorize about their con-
nections to policy outcomes, especially compliance with the international environmental agreements
studied below.
Citizen groups are most basically a derivative of collective action, in which members ratio-
nally assess the costs and benets of participation, while providing political prots to leaders which in
turn provide collective goods such as law and order or services (Frohlich et al. 1971). McCarthy and
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
24
Zald (1978) move this strand of rational choice theory into seeing social movements as responsive
to citizen demand and the potential for change in the Social Movement Industry (SMI), with lead-
ers, sponsors, beneciaries, constituents and sources of funding. More tight-knit, collaborative and
egalitarian groups will enhance the quality of democracy, as in the case of post-Franco Spain. But
the resources with which the groups operate must originate in rising national income, a product of
economic liberalization and its strong connection with the “successful consolidation of democracy”
(Callaghy 1994). Yet economic growth is not sucient cause for political reform and organization,
as a key intervening factor is the social structure of the state which can encourage economic actors
to be more exible, adaptive and therefore more socially connected (Fukuyama 1995). Economic
growth must be coupled with a strong civil society to approach suciency for political glasnost; just
as collaborative civil society must anchor political reform to avoid destabilizing conditions placed on
change, seen in the example of Ugandan human rights reforms (Youngs 2004).
Civil society groups are an independent and important factor in democratic decisions, but
are fraught with concerns over internal validity and the suciency of mobilized activity to produce a
specied outcome such as compliance. e conditional factors of trust, post-colonial dynamics and
state-civil society relations signicantly threaten the ability of advocacy and service systems to carry
out their objectives. Putnam (1993) found trust in the form of social capital to be an antecedent fac-
tor and necessary condition for the formation of citizen associations, rooted in the civic traditions
of a given region. However, there are four problems with this relationship. First, trust is an invariant
feature of a society, and is determined by equally constant identities such as religious composition,
monarchism and post-Communist status (Bjørnskov 2007). Second, trust and social capital do not
adequately explain civil society activity, as the reverse relationship is often the case (Berman 2001).
Fukuyama (1995) foundin the study of group sociability that “social virtues are prerequisites for the
development of individual virtues,” making group behavior the necessary condition for instilling and
providing for demand for social change and normative critiques of government.
ird, the strength of social ties is a spurious cause of the democratic framework of civil
society, as Berman (2001) notes the formation of radical right-wing groups and militias from a mo-
bilized citizenry alongside social movements which ultimately conict in their goals, as in Weimar
Germany. Democracy and social ties are both eects of an antecedent causal system, being the activity
of citizen groups. Fourth, group formation as an eect is determined not by social ties, but by eco-
nomic variationin operating costs, wages, management and market conditions for the private sector.
For example, the American Midwest witnessed a steep decline in manufacturing jobs, gutting local
associations, eroding trust and deconstructing family bonds through higher divorce rates (Persell
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
25
1997). A similar phenomenon occurred in China’s northeast, in which the dissolution of state-owned
manufacturing enterprises led to social unrest. us, it is not trust and social ties which produce
democratic outcomes, but the means and tactics groups employ to become a part of a political system
through the process of institutionalization which determines state compliance.
e endogenous eects of mobilized group activitywith democratization issues lays the
foundation for tracing the role of civil society in aecting policy decisions and outcomes in the state.
On a local level, Putnam (1993) revealed the connections between civic community and institutional
performance over time, attributing membership in associations to be the primary factor in determin-
ing behavior in a political setting. Fishman (2004) addressed the depth, nature and objectives of those
organizational bonds which were not products of Putnam’s Italian study by studying the relationship
between cross-class social ties and the resulting reduction of inter-group conict and increased sup-
port for democratic values. Collections of domestic interests therefore connect and expand the range
of issues articulated in the public sphere vis-à-vis the “political implications of biophysical trends,”
(Princen &Finger 1994) as opposed to a “harder” cost-benet calculation without human implica-
tions.ese groups strategize as pressure groups and service providers, calling attention to violations
of rights or social harms while interacting on a daily basis with citizens (Colvin 2007). Yet groups vary
immensely between apolitical welfare providers with strong donor connections to active, deliberative
organizations closely aliated with the state (Mercer 2002).
Mobilized groups and NGOs take important roles in international issues by addressing the
dilemmas which force states to mutually distrust and consider the relative gains of other states. Global
civil society furnishes additional options for governments and raises the political cost of rejecting
norms and agreements while providing social movements the impetus and resources to continue the
forms of domestic activity outlined above (Smith 2001). Addressing post-conict issues, civil society
groups have been prominent stakeholders in at least 140 peace agreements, providing relief, monitor-
ing and functioning with “democratic praxis” (Bell & O’Rourke 2007). In environmental issues,a
more connected international civil society organization readily alerts and reports the successes and
failures of a host country to other states, thereby providing a check on state authority and improv-
ing the rule of law (Raustiala 1997). Pressure groups can also synergize with a willing state through
regulatory assistance and contribution to the ratication of treaties, such as emissions regulations.
Civil society groups ultimately mediate between the competing needs for civil liberties and
representative democracy in a state by stimulating ordered, normative discussion, thus “setting broad
ranges of legitimate action” and sustaining respect for and pluralizing beneciaries of rights (Youngs
2004). International civil society transcends domestic policy and leverageby engaging in powerful
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
26
contact networks, uses the power of “information, ideas and strategies” and leverages dening issues
in creative ways (Keck & Sikkink 1998). In Central American free trade agreements, groups con-
verted their oppositional behavior into direct activism, advocating for “global social justice” carried
out through diuse structures (Spalding 2007). is form of activism reects compliance theory in
the decisions of groups to push states to an international context to address their demands.
Intrinsic limitations confront the operations of NGOs and civil society groups in a demo-
cratic context, leading to their need to be legally managed rather than politically leveraged. Asso-
ciations can enter in competition with the state for support, legitimacy and prestige (Whittington
2001). Even in the inverse case in which a state is undemocratic and civil society provides a means
of resistance, incivilities and class conict become expected behaviors in the public sphere (Mercer
2002). e result is a diverse and contested collection of groups, creating mutual interference and
complicating the ability of a government to accurately assess the distributed benets of choosing a
policy course, which is an essential piece of compliance theory (Frohlich et al. 1971, Dai 2006). e
perils of amoral familism, which is the reduction of social involvement to the immediate interests
of the family, include making associations and groups simply “agents of parochial interests” as with
ethnic cleavages and conict in Africa (Azarya 1994). Absolutism, ritualism and mystication can
represent the cultural authenticity of NGOs in the developing world, but strain ties between domestic
and international resources and relationships with donors and leaders. ese cultural limitations have
led to a “perestroika without glasnost,” or an economic liberalization lacking strong corroborating
political democratization (Dorraj 1995). Consideration of these limitations is essential in viewing
how states interface with civil society, for a weaker, archaic and fractious public sphere reduces the
likelihood of cooperation.
Beyond what Bratton (1994) calls the “material, organizational and ideological dimen-
sions” of civil society formation and expression, a state’s perception and interaction with citizen
groups and NGOs can either strain or facilitate dialogue and even alter the standards and philosophi-
cal approaches to government. A dominating or hegemonic state replaced opportunity for liberty
with disinterest and a “symbolic system,” which sought to remake civil society in its own image
(Young 1994). e repurposing of public interests to the goals of a single leader would have no politi-
cal eect, just as the aid and development agendas of the West projected a form of “liberal power”
and subsumed civil society in a form of neocolonialism (Youngs 2004). In becoming dependent on
a donor state through contracts and nding the inux of public resources to be more useful than
the costs of obtaining them by normative advocacy, civil society organizations permit the absolute
autonomy of the state and became co-opted by it. Typical in rentier states and monarchies, absolute
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
27
autonomy is more democratically replaced by relative autonomy, in which Albo and Jensen (1989)
use Miliband’s work in e State in Capitalist Society to explore the “instrumentalist” role played
by the state in meeting the demands of social and economic elite. Co-opted civil society stymies the
distribution of political goods from the state targeted for citizen and group interests.
A political economy which depends on state decisions and zones of competition is thus
more open to the “moral proselytism” of creating norms and standards of behavior (Finnemore &Sik-
kink 1998). In constructivist theory, civil society actors convert material and political advantage into
a window of discourse centered on ideas and identity focused on “collective problem solving” in lieu
of the traditional conception of risk, gains and security in international relations (Brown & Timmer
2006).Having this kind of “organizational platform” and iterative internationalization of norms can
change state motivations to derive benet from the new prominence, legitimacy and inherency of
meeting targets (Finnemore, Sikkink 1998).
With the validity and mechanisms which draw civil society into discourse with the state
in place, this study evaluates the diering strategies of civil society groups in producing successful
compliance outcomes across multiple states for international agreements on the protection of the
environment. e diverse and conicting civil society literature is broadly triangulated into categories
of cooperative and disconnected civil society groups, each matching with either a receptive or dis-
missive state, and the studytests three of the four resulting “pairs” of state-civil society relationships.
First, cooperative civil society groups will not only mobilize resources more eectively due to greater
group cohesion, but will have a more consistent message and vision they present to their participants
and constituents, and more eectively identify the needs and niche which they ought to ll in a
society. Given this informational advantage, groups will specialize and form coalitions and networks
within and across borders to deepen their knowledge and broadcasting of normative issues to popula-
tions and governments. e costs of sacricing interests and the diminishing returns of individual
member-contributions are oset by the rapport and distinct donor bases of groups which form across
traditional boundaries of civil society, such as private sector and associational divides (Spalding 2007).
Larger and more emboldened groups make specic strides toward advocacy, using informational ad-
vantage to form preferences and priorities which articulate an “ideal” standard for the given issue area
or policy prescription.
After constructing a cooperative issue area and organizational platform for their interests,
civil society groups draw in more constituents and improve their electoral and operational capacity.
Being better able to monitor, regulate and provide administrative or discursive services makes the
groups more potent and useful in the eyes of the state. Yet without robust transnational connections,
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
28
coalitions and donors bases, the state would quickly co-opt the groups, just as weak connections
would fragment and present mixed messages to state policymakers. With a more consensus-democ-
racy approach to expressing interests, these groups raise costs and lower protability to a leadership
in the case of noncompliance and damage international prestige if a state were to suppress expressed
interests. Absent civil society, the connection between public opinion, electoral leverage and key issue
areas would be lost, and the decision to comply would be much more dependent on benets to alli-
ances, economic growth and security while prioritizing only a veneer of compliance through nominal
statements in legislation. By consolidating norms and social conditions, the domestic and specically
network-based approach to compliance has much more explanatory power than simply the interna-
tional environment and expectations of governments for electoral survival. In it, state recognition of
costs of noncompliance and NGO articulation of those same costs forms a synergistic relationship
and a positive feedback loop toward increasing compliance.
Hypothesis 1:e more synergistic civil society activity, the more likely a state will be to comply
with an international agreement
Two corollaries derive from the central statement that cooperative civil society and a receptive state
aid in compliance. In the converse case, if the state acknowledges its need for policy action on an
issue but encounters a divided and fractious civil society, then competition results. Exclusive interest
groups, vocal but disproportionate international inuences, ideological divides and jockeying for the
same government funds, donations and inuences in the public sphere prevents the state from iden-
tifying the issue at hand as a collective good it is called to provide. In the inverse case of a dismissive
state, compliance will also not result because eorts by groups to convey interests and advocate are
exceeded by the desire of the state to enforce its own position on an issue or to be answerable to other
constituencies on the terms of its political system, such as a ruling party, addressing high-level policy
issues such as diplomacy, security and the economy. Funds, contracts and discursive forums oered
by a dismissive government are therefore not detractions from their political prot and force NGOs
into accepting severe limitations in order to gain any inuence.
When the dynamic is most synergistic, it culminates in a greater degree of compliance due to norma-
tive pressure and the conversion of security and reciprocity concerns into the domestic “game”. I thus
present the two sub-hypotheses, summarized with the main hypothesis in Table 1.
Hypothesis 1A: e more co-opted civil society activity, the less likely a state will be to comply with
an international agreement.
Hypothesis 1B: e more competitive or divided civil society interests and preferences are, the less
likely a state will be to comply with agreements
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
29
Table 1 Cooperative Civil Society Divided Civil Society
Receptive State Synergistic Competitive
(1) More compliance (1B) Less compliance
Dismissive State Co-opted Amoral Familistic
(1A) Less compliance (Not tested)
Research Design
To test this argument and hypotheses, this study examines long-term responses of states to the Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Wastes and eir Disposal to explain the construction
of compliance outcomes. e Basel Convention is a multilateral treaty drafted in the late 1980s which
broadly aims to monitor, regulate and hold accountable states in the generation, import, export and
storage of hazardous waste products. To minimize validity concerns, the study restricts itself to states
which (1) have acceded to the treaty, and (2) have consistent documentation with the United Na-
tions, which is a necessary precondition for international compliance. In this context, compliance is
examined rst in a preliminary fashion in a single large-n cross-sectional analysis, and secondin Chile
and Bulgaria in a comparative case study from 2001-2011. e former approach looks for general
trends and the extension of civil society inuence on compliance while the latter allows the observa-
tion time and process-based intervention eects of civil society groups within and between cases
during the decade.Consequently, the time window controls foran increase in treaty regime strength
masking changes in state behavior by beginning at the same time as the 2002 introduction of a key
compliance mechanism in the Basel Convention.
For richness and robustness in the design, the unit of analysis is a “country-agreement,” tracking the
domestic behavior of civil society over time as it specically relates to the Basel Convention. Simply
measuring state behavior would not provide sucient variance over time to detect civil society activ-
ity, while analyzing only the broad context of an international agreement would not detect domestic
intervention eects. Furthermore, this study builds on the “need for more reliable and valid data”
(Hyden etal.2003) in the civil society arena, and will therefore present organized citizen groups and
NGOs as a more quantiable phenomenon to avoid what Mercer (2002) saw as axiomatic assump-
tions about their usefulness. With a more dynamic and exibleinstrument, the design can better
capture the complexity of civil society activity.
e dependent variable in the study is compliance with international agreements, already understood
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
30
as referring specically to the Basel Convention. To operationalize compliance, the study follows
the approach taken by the stipulations of the convention itself, focusing on a (1) national denition
of hazardous waste, (2) the quantity of relevant policies, (3) the presence of restrictions and regula-
tions on the movement of transboundary waste and (4) regular reporting of national initiatives to
the Implementation and Compliance Committee of the Basel Convention. Making a preliminary
ordinal scale for compliance can be generalized to the larger context of treaties in human rights and
the depth of reporting requirements for international institutions. Second, an ordinal measure oers
more description and nuance than a binary zero-or-one approach to compliance while distinguish-
ing betweenpositively skewed state rhetoric and concrete, comprehensive action. ird, a more rigid
scale compensates for the Basel Reporting Database - from which the data will be drawn - which
provides a diluted“simple, exible, non-binding” assessment of compliance (Peiry 2011). Statistically,
the scale is not placed in a connected hierarchy, per se, but is tested across four independent catego-
ries which signify increasingly “deeper” levels of compliance and capture its functional dimensions
mentioned above: (1) nominal – written commitments, (2) regulatory – movement restrictions, (3)
practical– change in the quantity of generated waste and (4) institutional – creating centers, facilities
and mechanisms to alter the process of waste creation, movement and monitoring.
e data collection employed document analysis to generate a coding system for each piece of the
compliance dependent variable: nominal, regulatory, practical and institutional drawn from the Basel
Convention Country Fact Sheets. For nominal, 0 indicates a named domestic Focal Point to address
hazardous waste issues, 1 indicates a simple, denotative denition of waste, 2 shows a connotative
denition naming specic types of waste, such as toxic, corrosive, carcinogenic, radioactive, indus-
trial, household etc. and 3 shows specic domestic policy or international treaty citations within the
denition to reach a high level of codication. In the regulatory dimension, 0 indicates no accom-
modation for the regulation of transboundary waste, 1 indicates the presence of export and import
restrictions, 2 indicates the linkage of specic policies, licensing and certication to the movement
of waste and 3 shows the use of international bodies, blocs and agreements to create additional layers
of regulation. For practical or practice-based compliance, 0 indicates a lack of national strategies and
plans for waste reduction or elimination, 1 indicates the presence of policies or legislation to alter the
waste “market,” 2 demonstrates the employment of economic mechanisms such as taxes, subsidies,
grants, awards or civil/criminal liability relating to the generation of waste, while 3 shows comprehen-
sive national programs drawing on multiple stakeholders and the general public to abide by waste-use
standards. Institutionally, 0 indicates a mention of established waste disposal or recovery facilities, 1
demonstrates a descriptive and broad base of such facilities, 2 signies bilateral or multilateral agree-
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
31
ments to manage waste by the respective governments, and 3 shows international technical and nan-
cial assistance frameworks for waste use. Meanwhile, the Civicus civil society indicators are aggregated
into the 0-12 scale and then divided into a 0-3 ordinal scale to allow for the tests.
By nuancing compliance, inferences about state decision-making processes are possible and the pres-
ence of new factors and behaviors aecting those same processes are visible. us the design accounts
for the central independent variable of civil society activity. In the theoretical discussion, civil society
was separated from social trust and conditionally connected to the state. To avoid collinearity issues,
however, the independent variable will not include state permissiveness of civil society activity and
will focus on the opposite ow of political inuence and information from organized groups to a
government. e most important operational aspects of civil society activity divide into strength of
internal organization and interconnection with the state, which must be split and viewed at a high
level of measurement, requiring evidence that can place them as interval or continuous-level variables.
Using continuous andsubstantive variables captures far more meaning and context than the quantity
or categorical focus of organized NGOs and groups. A key problem in the eld remains the denition
and explanation of civil society by standard indicators such as those codied for democracy and hu-
man rights. Hyden, Court and Mease (2003) developed two dimensions of state linkage (connected
and separate) and who expressed interest through groups (private economic and associational inter-
ests). Yet these measures take a too singularly institutional approach to civil society, which demands
the more rigorous rational and behavioral standards in this study. e indicators of civil society activ-
ity derive from the Civicus World Alliance for Citizen Participation database, focusing most recently
on the 2011 State of Civil Society report but drawing on the broader databases of the previous ve
years. A primary obstacle to validity in this data, however, is the quantity and diversity of indepen-
dent variables it proposes – a problem which the methodology will address. e independent variable
isconsolidated and specically measured through (1) structure, (2) practice of values, (3) perception
of impact, and (4) political environment, all measured on a 0-3 scale and aggregated to form a 0-12
score which can be evaluated continuously.
e analysis rst utilizes a mixed methods approach beginning with a basic cross-tabulation and
chi-square test between civil society scores and compliance performance across the four dependent
variable dimensions mentioned above. Second, a comparative case study approach using Chile and
Bulgaria between 2001 and 2011 will analyze their compliance eorts with the Basel Convention.
A general law of proportions stipulates the number of observations to be greater than the number of
independent variables examined. Given the number of Civicus indicators and the theoretical diver-
sity of civil society, the study will take two methodological approaches to account for the volume of
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
32
unsorted information. First, a more exploratory approach will be taken to concretize the variables and
test their plausibility for measuring compliance, an approach which Lijphart (1971) calls “an attempt
to formulate denite hypotheses to be tested subsequently among a larger number of cases.” Second,
Mill’s Method of Disagreement will be used to examine two similar cases which yet produce dierent
outcomes.
Chile and Bulgaria are both states with dictatorial legacies which ended in 1990-1991 and are still
considered in transition by the World Governance Assessment. Both states have democratic govern-
ments, but are considered awed democracies by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index,
while ranking in the middle quartiles in the world in most categories of development, transparency
and corruption. e relative similarity of the states makes for greater causal comparability, while being
geographically and economically distinct enough to prevent endogenous eects with waste transport
agreements or confounding variables such as membership in the same regional bloc. After the preced-
ing controlling factors, the analysis will proceed from a comparison of the context and dynamics of
each state’s response to the Basel Convention to highlighting the examples of NGOs and civil society
groups ineach for illustrative purposes.
Statistical Analysis of State Compliance Behavior
e rst component of hypothesis testing centers ononly the proposed positive relationship between
synergistic state-civil society interaction and compliance with the reporting guidelines of the Basel
Convention, as the controlling factors necessary to distinguish the sub-hypotheses of state attitudes
and approaches are too nuanced for a preliminary analysis. ese are addressed in the case studies
to follow.Furthermore, the data does not permit an evaluation of compliance over time, observed
through the quality, frequency and consistency of reporting domestic-level activity on hazardous
waste. e objective, therefore, is to utilize cross-sections of Basel Convention documents, creating a
factor-based assessment of the most eective civil society processes in determining compliance.
Of the 179 parties to the Basel Convention, only 51 constitute the sample size for the subsequent
tests, due to deciencies in data from Civicus and the Basel database itself. ere are at least ten states
which had Civicus data and not treaty compliance data. e methodology of the state civil society
scores is worth noting for its potential structural weakness and response bias which aect the results of
the study. e scoring techniques changed over the course of the Civicus data gathering from 2001-
2010, while groups of NGO leaders’ opinions formed the crux of scores in each state, and are only
weakly comparable between cases. Unintuitive outliers, such as Rwanda having a higher civil society
score than all states except Germany, reveal these deciencies. Table 2 and Figure 1 show the variance
concerns resulting from these biases, with most observations narrowly clustered on a 0-12 scale, mak-
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
33
ing results less reliable for the low variance which reduces the explanatory capacity of civil society.
Table 2: Summary Staistics of Civicus Score Variable
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Civicus Score 51 6.392157 .9576729 3.9 8.6
Making inferences from the data, however, remains promising with its roughly normal dis-
tribution. Converting Civicus scores to an ordinal scale allows for a chi-square test of each compliance
factor, to split the eects of civil society across them and make initial observations on the acceptance
or rejection of the hypothesis. To conduct the test, the two ordinal scales are cross-tabulated to show
increasing compliance score (on the left-hand side for the rows) and increasing civil society strength
(across the top for the columns). e chi-square test generates expected values and the relation of
the data to them in each cell, and then produces basic statistical signicance gures. Substantive
signicance, such as R² and coecients to explain variance, is not tested here. e objective remains
to uncover the marginal eects of civil society in an exploratory fashion. Table 3 shows each factor of
compliance tabulated sequentially.
Table 3: Comparing Compliance Factors
Ordinal Civicus Score
NOMINAL 1 2 3 Total
0 0 2 0 2
1 3 2 0 5
2 0 6 0 6
3 1 33 4 38
Total 4 43 4 51
Pearson chi2 (6) =22.0808 Pr = 0.001***
Ordinal Civicus Score
REGULATORY 1 2 3 Total
0 1 7 0 8
1 3 10 0 13
2 0 18 2 20
3 0 8 2 10
Total 4 43 4 51
Pearson chi2 (6) =10.2633 Pr = 0.114
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
Ordinal Civicus Score
PRACTICAL 1 2 3 Total
0 0 6 0 6
1 3 8 0 11
2 1 17 1 19
3 0 12 3 15
Total 4 43 4 51
Pearson chi2 (6) =11.8673 Pr = 0.065*
Ordinal Civicus Score
INSTITUTION 1 2 3 Total
0 2 9 0 11
1 2 19 1 22
2 0 15 3 18
Total 4 43 4 51
Pearson chi2 (4) =5.9302 Pr = 0.204
While the most statistically signicant result of the four was with nominal compliance
(p=0.001), a general pattern emerges of weakening strength of association between civil society and
compliance as the measure becomes more dynamic and interconnected with the executive behavior
of a state, such as creating and monitoring a waste disposal or recovery facility (institutional) as op-
posed to gaining political capital from making promises and passing legislation favorable to activists
and NGO coalitions (nominal). Another nding is the statistically signicant association in practice-
based compliance (p=0.065)and the near-miss on regulatory compliance (p=0.114). High domestic
and international costs of being perceived as lax on trade restrictions and not reducing provocative
public health risks by shipping waste over borders can explain the regulatory gure, especially as deliv-
ered by strong transnational networks and advocacy groups. Regulatory compliance depends heavily
on the conduct and practice of the private sector, which often pushes for a deregulatory relationship
with a state and could preclude greater signicance. When the externalities of improper waste use
are not borne by its perpetrators, such as polluters, regulation is dicult and causally dependent on
government practice-based compliance. is near-miss could be explained by the mechanism of do-
nor and constituent concentration in the host state which together push for more attention to waste
generation and storage issues which occur within rather than between states. ose experiencing the
physical and economic impacts of environmental degradation are most apt to call for systematic ef-
34
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
forts to eliminate them.
What emerges from the preliminary tests resembles what Bell and O’Rourke (2007) call
a “functional spectrum” of civil society involvement in peace negotiations, but here in relation to
international environmental agreements. As the exigencies and complexity of meeting compliance
standards increases, the more dicult it becomes for a given NGO, association or popular movement
to express interests and nd common utility. Lacking the size, resources and mandate of a national
government, a synergistic relationship with civil society can devolve quickly into reactive, haphaz-
ard and ineective tactics on issues about which there is little information or implications for any
individual member. e brief quantitative ndings welcome further investigation via case studies to
determine requirements for causality between the variables by controlling for potential intervening
variables and demonstrating time order. Key in the cases is the potential spuriousness of NGO and
group-based activity, suggested especially in the high frequency of nominal compliance regardless of
civil society strength. In other words, the cases address process tracing across the measures of compli-
ance and distinguish civil society activity from democratic governance, economic development and
social trust.
Chill and Bulge: e Basel Convention in Chile and Bulgaria, 2001-2011
e rst decade of the 21st century was a momentous one for the management of trans-
boundary waste controlled under the Basel Convention. Under the 2002 Sixth Conference of the
Parties (COP) in Geneva state parties to the convention promulgated a strategic plan for implementa-
tion of the treaty for the remainder of the decade while creating a committee to bring transparent and
cost-eective assistance to the compliance eorts of parties. With a regulatory system requiring prior
consent, notication and documentation of the movement of waste between states, and the adoption
of the Ban Amendment to reduce unjust North-South hazardous waste transfers, the Basel Conven-
tion gained increasing strength and solubility during the period of study, 2001-2011. Despite having
179 parties indicate a will to meet Basel standards, the foregoing evidence shows compliance to be
a piecemeal and lengthy process, requiring consistent and comprehensive reporting. To understand
the role of civil society in the convention’s implementation, the case studies of Chile and Bulgaria
compare the contexts of each state’s public sphere, the typographic attitudes of civil society toward the
state and the eects on each dimension of compliance, viewed in part through the lens of government
actions and specic environmental initiatives: Chile Sustentable in Chile and organizational response
to the creation of a National Hazardous Waste Treatment Center (NHWTC) in Bulgaria.
Chile became a party to the Basel Convention in 1992, shortly after the peaceful power
35
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
36
transfer from the Augusto Pinochet regime in 1990. Yet theallowance of political parties in 1987,
popular mobilization for plebiscites and constitutional reforms did not manifest in strong connec-
tions between ocials and the active public, as a new need for political and economic stability took
root (Posner 2004). What resulted were directive and clientelistic links in electoral politics, which
channeled interests through the narrow prescriptions of local institutions and thereby prevented the
access of citizen groups to nancial resources and national-level policymaking. In other words, the po-
litical value of following the electoral leverage of citizen interests were exceeded by the costs of parties
becoming too ideological and provoking collapse of democracy as occurred under the left-wing leader
Salvador Allende in the 1970s. Posner (2004) described the mechanism which held the elite consen-
sus in place as a “bipolar” electoral system which gave a disproportionate number of seats to losing
parties, forcinggoverning coalitions to be formed across wide issue divisions – making consensus a
higher preference than progressive causes such as the environment or political rights. Combined with
the decline inemployee unionization and the adoption of neoliberal economic policies, membership
and ecacy in civil society organizations faltered in the rst decades of democracy.
e Chilean government furthered its abeyance of civil society with a competitive bidding
system for organizations, and contracting with groups which garnered resources under the system
(Civicus 2011). With conictive state-market relations, a gap between privileged, groups and a dense
collection of poorer social associations in which members focus the majority of their time, civil society
is denitively co-opted by the state and divided in its interests and aims. Most organizations remain
in what a national civil society survey described as a “permanent nancial crisis.” Furthermore, a
Democracy Audit report found that only 1% of Chileans believe being active in associations charac-
terized a good citizen.
Bulgaria presents a contrasting model of civil society behavior, despite scoring similarly to
Chile on the Civicus measure: 6.2 versus 6.4. With a direct presidential election held in 1992, the
post-communist transition morphed into a series of power exchanges between the Bulgarian Social-
ist Party (BSP) and an amalgam of center-right, pro-reform groups. Yet Snavely and Desai (1995)
pointed out that “antipathy toward institutions” and abuse of the legal system remained, discouraging
the formation and legitimacy of NGOs and advocacy groups. Citizens remained profoundly distrust-
ful of authority, while the legacy of state control precluded donations and increased corruption, in
turn reducing the costs of avoiding the preferences and pressure brought by civil society groups. Yet
the new millennium brought the 2001 Non-prot Legal Entities Act (Civicus 2011), which created
a legal environment more favorable than the previous denition of civil society groups as simply
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
37
“juridical persons.” e growth of foreign nancial assistance and accession to the European Union
in 2007 brought Bulgaria more transnational networks and a highly collaborative private sector seek-
ing to share the benets of lowered trade barriers and more stable investment potential in a rapidly-
opening market.
In a permissive and collaborative legal context, the Bulgarian environmental movement
became a“graphic illustration” of civil society growth in the post-communist era (Snavely & Desai
1995), responding to the damages and failures of decades of pollution, emissions and mismanage-
ment behind the Iron Curtain. Blogs, networks and petitions are common means of environmental
mobilization in the 21st century (Civicus 2011), using information politics to increase the value
and salience of quality-of-life and human health issues to Bulgarian citizens who would otherwise
be politically inactive. e context of civil society behavior in Bulgaria demonstrates the minimal
eectsof per-capita GDP, poverty rates, political environment on the ability of groups to disseminate
information and gather resources through private foundations and grants without dependency on
government contracts and favoritism. A neutral and enabling government thus creates a synergistic
framework for civil society. Figure 2 shows several of these key dierences in the Chilean and Bulgar-
ian context from the Civicus data.


In specic compliance targets required by the Basel Convention, Bulgaria consistently
outperformed Chile through the functions of network membership and strength in the face of an
adverse political context and lower civic engagement in citizen groups. e mechanisms for these or-
ganizational functions are eects on policy outcomes, participation in governmental decision-making
processes, interfacing with uninvolved citizens and lobbying for the creation and/or accountability of
environmental ministries and regimes in each state. e civil society sectors of both cases engaged in
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013
38
these tactics – Bulgaria’s sector achieved objectives while Chile encountered bureaucratic inertia and
disunity.
Highly mobilized and ecacious NGOs in Chile are limited, but Chile Sustenable, mean-
ing “Sustainable Chile,” has been a leader in the environmental advocacy eld since its founding in
1997. With an assembly of directors ranging from academics to former presidential candidates, the
organization’s mission involves the prioritization of sustainability and equality with the deepening of
democracy through the twin instruments of the focus of intellectuals’ attention on environmental
discourse and the increase in citizen participation in relevant issues. Yet in establishing a denition
of waste under the Sanitary Regulation of Hazardous Waste Management, passed in 2005, Chile
Sustentable makes no mention or citation of its role in the waste legislation despite having acted in
numerous other cases on issues such as water management and biodiversity. Soon after the passage of
the 2005 law, a manufacturing industry group, SOFOFA, lamented in an ocial opinion that “the
authorities have not acted with the vigor and clarity that was hoped for.” e industry issued criti-
cism of the Chilean government’s denition of waste and asserted its own criteria, claiming wastewas
unfairly conated with the concept of residue and should not be viewed in terms of its impact on
human health, but rather economic eects. e scope and eectiveness of even the denition of waste
was inconsistent and confounding to those to which it should have most applied.
Another policy approach which did not produce nominal compliance was an established
Environment Ministry, which did not exist until 2009. President Michelle Bachelet createda frame-
work for environmental controls only whenthe legislative Coalition for Change lobbied her for a
ministry, evaluation service and superintendence. Furthermore, the Environment Ministry attributed
its creation to the need to abide by standards of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), which Chile joined in 2010.Prominent and progressive NGOs had pushed for
the creation of a ministry in 2005in a pact to support Bachelet, but were denied policy leverage in the
bipolar, ideologically conicted Chilean system. Even this concerted civil society eort was divided, as
one NGO leader called the 2005 platform for a Ministry “suicide” for organizations which supported
it.Civil society in Chile thus failed to create nominal compliance with the Basel Convention through
waste management legislation and requisite authorities, lacking the level of organization, advocacy
network strength and government receptivity to do so.
Bulgaria, which accessed to the Basel Convention in 1996, possessed a distinct model of
environmental civil society advocacy, one which Radovanova and Samardjieva (2000) found after
stakeholder interviews to be characterized by “very good” relationships with local administration, and
Mereminsky Caring for the Constitution
39
one that became, in their words, more cooperative than competitive in the years leading up to the new
millennium. e Bulgarian Ministry of Environment and Water (MOEW) reinforced this synergy
of information exchange and input at the local level as early as 2003, as municipal authorities are
required to invite NGOs and the public to special hearings and feedback on municipal programs for
waste management. On a national level, the mechanisms of the Access to Public Information Act and
Statistics Act allowed a free dissemination of information on the scope of hazardous waste and robust
dialogue through a standard Environmental Impact Assessment procedure available to the public.
Bulgaria reported a comprehensive, codied denition of hazardous waste to the Basel database predi-
cated on its Waste Management Act of 2003, which framed waste as a human health question and
was found to be in full compliance with the Basel Convention by a regional review panel. e open
information sharing and use of cooperative municipal authorities contributed to the development of
a concrete and ecologically sounddenition of waste in Bulgaria by 2003 which wasreported consis-
tently to the Basel database through the close of the case time window in 2011.
Regulatory compliance through restricting the import and export of transboundary waste
is virtually nonexistent in Chile, as it reports that only a draft law remains in the National Congress
to prohibit the entry of hazardous waste. Meanwhile, no controls exist on the regulation of export
to other states, suggesting serious potential externalities for industry and the credibility of the state.
A small global watchdog agency, the NGO Platform on Shipbreaking, could only lament without
domestic constituents that the Chilean Navy did not know about the Basel Convention as it prepared
to dispose of two veteran frigates full of asbestos and other dangerous materials in 2007. By December
2010, one frigate, the retiredAdmiral Cochrane,had been sent to China for scrap, a move constitut-
ing “illegal trac in hazardous waste under international law” with the potential to kill and maim
scrapyard workers.As an incipient OECD member, this compounded Chile’s transgression, because
the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention forbids the trac of hazardous waste from OECD to
non-OECD states.While Chile has not ratied the Ban Amendment, the lack of notable domestic
pressure to stop the scrapping of the frigate kept the cost of violating the standards of aprestigiousin-
tergovernmental organization lower than the convenience and value of cheap waste disposal.
Isolated civil society activity and a nonresponsive government multiplied with a divided
NGO eld to prevent an eective regulatory compliance system in Chile. Pragmatists on trade and
export issues, such as those who sought to make a pact with President Bachelet, sought after “lucid
businesspeople” which would see and comply with the ner details in Chile’s free trade agreements.
is push for increased accountability through dialogue foundered, with successes only in theforestry
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
40
subsector, while receiving criticism from more radical NGO leaders as “cutting a deal” in the interest
of self-preservation. Distrust continued to prevail between the private and non-prot sectors, and an
inert government did not respond to reect or mediate expressed interests of civil society.
Bulgaria, in signicant contrast to Chile, has ratied the Ban Amendment on waste trans-
fers and laid out explicit regulations on the import and export of hazardous materials – delineated by
type of waste and whether or not the exporter/importer state is a Party to the Basel Convention, or
has specic agreements in concordance with the waste restrictions of the European Community.e
government’s proposed creation of a National Hazardous Waste Treatment Center (NHWTC) which
would require the transit and import of hazardous materials across Bulgaria to a central location,
met with vociferous opposition in 2005 from an NGO support group opposed to the proliferation
of organic pollutants. e nominal compliance system of municipal consultation with the public
was, according to the NGO group, conducted in a “perfunctory” way, leading to a civil-society based
public awareness campaign involving leaets, protests in front of the environment ministry, television
programs and contacts with the European IGOs responsible for the potential funding of the project.
Policy demands were made which included the avoidance of hazardous waste transport over long
distance and collaboration with waste importers in developing solutions.e decisive and focused
response by environmental groups appeared to pay o. In a December 2009 summit on waste man-
agement in Bulgaria, the planned NHWTC was not documented as among the domestic facilities
used for waste disposal, while regional facilities requiring less transit were specically on the agenda
for future policy.A compliance review panel congratulated Bulgaria on maintaining “staunch political
will” to abide by environmental agreements on a regional and international level even encountering
political transition and economic diculties, which is the central hurdle in placing regulations on
protable enterprises which import and export waste.
In practice-based compliance, Chileconducts only minimal reporting to the Basel Con-
vention, making vague references in the database to “clean production in some production sectors,”
and guidelines “under preparation” for recycling. Mirroring the vague and noncommittal responses
is the taciturnity of the Chilean government in establishing national plans for the reduction and
elimination of hazardous waste coupled with incentivizing the private sector through taxes, subsidies
or liability for the unlawful disposal of waste.e NGO Chile Sustentable continued as of 2011 to
advocate for a management policy for e-waste, attempting to use the example of Argentinian policy
of consumer electronics guides and recycling quotas to provoke a Chilean dialogue via transnational
advocacy. Waste reduction appeared even less feasible during the 2001-2011 period as the only codi-
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
41
cations of policy were a sanitary law and a Regulation of Dangerous Industrial Wastes, neither of
which imposed nes on wasteful companies or made any regulation on waste generation. By 2011,
the OECDhad mandated a solid waste policy with a 2014 deadline, supplanting civil society lobbying
eorts and inviting comments from companies such as Michelin about the potentialharm to Chile’s
tire industry.
National Waste Management Programs are common practice in Bulgaria, however,having
occurred in three stages during the studied case time window from 1999-2003, 2003-2007 and
2009-2013. Key in these policy guidelines is the intentional involvement of civil society groups.
From 2000-2005 the Bulgarian government made a concerted eort to collect, repackage and store
old organic pollutants, monitored via photographic evidence and publication by a relevant environ-
mental NGO. Next,the 2003-2007 plan set out a specic goal to reduce hazardous waste generation
in the medium and long term while making environmental management plans for the large industries
dominating waste production and constraining the hazardous contents of the waste itself. A stake-
holder forum for the 2009-2013 plan detailed the increase in recycling eorts, citizen involvement,
economic mechanisms to regulate landll dumping and recovery facilities. Most importantly, EU, re-
gional, national and municipal authorities at the forum were joined by an NGO participant from the
Environmental Association For the Earth, headquartered in the capital, Soa. Beyond bureaucratic
cooperation, important Bulgarian donor organizations and funds for environmental protection invite
the participation of civil society in the form of independent scientists and NGO representatives. e
government, in turn, welcomes domestic, bilateral and international donor groups to review meetings
of specic projects into which they invest. e consistent methodologies and best practices of these
consultative groups deriving from civil society participation make each National Waste Management
Programreported to the Basel Convention more concrete, precise and compliant with international
standards.
e quantitative analysis portion found civil society activity to not have explanatory force
for institutional compliance, which signies the presence of waste disposal and reuse facilities, waste
agreements under Article 11 of the Basel Convention and technical assistance for waste management
personnel. On this factor of compliance, Chile and Bulgaria demonstrate strikingly similar results,
evoking institutional-support and capacity-building mantras common to non-prot groups across
the globe.Yet the results are also not meaningful, in the sense that a negative correlation between in-
stitutional capacity of NGOs and institutional capacity of a state has little theoretical and potentially
causal connection.Chilean civil society is experiencing a funding crisis derived from lack of state sup-
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
42 42
port and from its own reticence to disclose donors, many of whom are highly-politicized international
gures and organizations. e Institute of Political Ecology (IEP), for example, is experiencing a
resource shortage to the degree that it must rely on the theses and research projects of college students
to furnish its research agenda, a serious inhibition to the capacity and technical training necessary
for partnered NGOs. In Bulgaria, as early as 2000, environmental NGO ocials requested more
continuing education and professional training or retraining to improve the quality of their services
and mission. A regional review found the training of relevant customs ocials for waste products to
be lacking and the municipal costs of waste management to exceed budget allotments. Consequently,
neither state meets strong institutional compliance standards measured in this research.
Table 4 summarizes the comparative case study through example civil society measures
isolated in the theoretical discussion throughout the paper – the collaborative nature of civil society
measured by proxy as network strength and the posture of the host government toward civil society-
and the four factors of compliance. A nal comparison is the amount of hazardous waste exported
in the 2008/2011 reporting cycle to the Basel Convention: Chile exported 6,091 metric tons, being
100% of its hazardous waste, while Bulgaria exported 362 metric tons, being 0.04% of its hazardous
waste.
Table 3: Summary of Case Studies
State Networks Government Nominal Regulatory Practical Institutional
Chile 44.3 Dismissive Low Low Low Low
Bulgaria 54.9 Receptive High High High Low
Taken together, the quantitative and qualitative analyses support in part Hypothesis 1,
that synergistic civil society activity has a positive relationship with compliance with international
agreements. is association is limited and correlative rather than distinctly causal, showing support
for compliance under the condition that it is nominal, descriptive and codied in a series of national
policies which address the issue area of a treaty. Secondarily, there is no support for the relationship
between type of civil society behavior and institutional compliance, with no established mechanisms
in either the statistical tests or case studies linking the two phenomena theoretically. Regulatory and
practice-based compliance nd mixed support in the research, with a signicant relationship found in
the chi-square test found for only the regulatory measure and noticeable variation between the cases
of Chile and Bulgaria. Hypotheses 1A and 1B, the negative eects of competition and co-option on
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
43 43
state compliance, are preliminarily supported in a suggestive way through the case studies. Inter alia,
the traits which prevented NGO eectiveness in Chile were competitiveness and divergence between
groups and the fracturing of the sector between favored, politically connected groups and a landscape
of underfunded, distrusted organizations.Information exchange between civil society leaders, the ar-
ticulation of specic hazardous waste risks and healthy relationships based on these exchanges leads
to greater nominal compliance, while sectorial disagreement and elected ocials bound by the need
for consensus and stability reduce it. Group mobilization and strong aect for resolving collective
environmental problems coalesces into inclusion in policy forums over time, forging action plans
and compliant practices for all sectors. Civil society activity most reliably and consistently produces a
normative agenda and framework for compliance, but falls short of guaranteeing or controlling state
decisions to abide by international agreements.
Implications and Future Research
is paper opened with the puzzle of the burgeoning role of NGOs and civil society rep-
resentatives in the formation, consolidation and enforcement of international treaty regimes and
pointed out the relatively state-centric perspective in the literature on the same processes. e rise
in research documenting the actions of civil society groups in negotiations, monitoring and norm
creation is thorough and critical, but had not been synthesized with the specic leadership and bu-
reaucracy-driven decisions on compliance over time, which is the most authentic proxy for measuring
the commitment and political will of a state for abiding a normative and diplomatic international
arena. e paper also probes how and under what conditions civil society groups explain state policy
behavior and calculations of utility, assuming that the dynamics between groups and the state, as well
as within them, will determine in part their ability to deliver information and create credible electoral
leverage. e paper nally eschews sociological mechanisms for normative politics, framing issue ad-
vocacy justin terms of power and authority as opposed to social ties, interpersonal trust and cultural
characteristics. Evidence of successes in anomie-ridden post-Communist Bulgaria is illustrativeof this
objective.
Finding a statistically signicant relationship between strongly cooperative group activity
and nominal compliance rst invites new discussion about a domestic “Kantian tripod” of economic
interdependence, democratic political activity and membership in issue-based advocacy groups. e
nal category is formally and functionally distinct from the rst two, and can exist with or without
either as a variable of analysis.Second, outcomes of groups on treaty-based processes counters many
concerns about the ability of civil society to produce collectively favorable outcomes and harmonize
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
44 44
interests, as opposed to disaggregating them and leading to conict.ird, additional theoretical clar-
ity comes from the research, marking how philosophical perspectives on civil society, such as Putnam
and Gramsci, correspond to empirical, testable and falsiable attributes of groups.Fourth, the tactics,
strategies and acumen of groups revealed in the case studies concretizes the literature on norm cre-
ation within a state by showing the campaigns, debates and problems which galvanized citizens in
each example. With dened impacts of civil societyon interactions with treaty requirements, the re-
search implies a relationship between norms and other state-dened principles or policies such as the
rule of law, security and the relationship between market and government through scal or monetary
policy.
Supplementary gains from this research include dening the processes and limitations of
dierent sectorial activities in a given state, from Chilean groups encountering the electoral mech-
anisms which prioritized ideological spectrum-wide agreement over the mature development and
expression of an issue to the involvement of the Chilean manufacturing industry in lambasting haz-
ardous waste legislation. is holistic view furnishes a more internally valid analysis by controlling
for or recognizing the competing interest expression and interaction with the state found in other
dimensions. Second, the context of strong and collaborative civil society networks outlined specic
antecedent factors, such as legal frameworks and transparent nancial legislation and documenta-
tion, which allow for the development and mobilization of these groups. ird, the care with which
the theoretical discussion wove with literature to mark the shape and place of civil society in a state
preempts further concerns about validity. However, the study does not make outright claims on
substantive signicance of its ndings, having neither necessary nor sucient cause for treaty com-
pliance. Omitted intervening variables emerged as consistent themes throughout the case studies, as
participation in focused regional or issue area intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and
OECD drove many outcomes. e unique nature and evolution of the Basel Convention also pres-
ents a challenge to external validity when testing the hypotheses across controversial agreements on
weapons, for example.
Future research could strengthen the quantitative design of the paper by nding more
observations over time to form panel data, or conduct tests to control for time eects or trends of
compliance over time within cases. A more rigorous quantitative study could also examine the poten-
tial threshold eect of civil society activity for each phase of compliance, another implied outcome
of the ndings. e principle of diminishing returns, meanwhile, could also present limitations on
high-functioning civil society groups which have found their inuence over state decisions to be
Edwards Waste Not, Want Not
45 45
divided out byeconomic, governmental and international concerns. More reliable proxy measures for
groups such as funding, endorsements and issue elasticity could be used to give a more integrated
study of their operation instead of how they interact together. e broad trajectory of the research
agenda in this area would lead to a comparison and syncretizing of what Fukuyama (1995) described
as modern democratic practices, e.g. law, contracts and economic stability, and pre-modern practices
such as trust, responsibility and reciprocity to form a more dynamic picture of the phases and causes
of a more discursive, free and functional state.
In a 21st-century environment beset by nancial and scal disruption, rising income in-
equality, insurrections, military interventions, transnational terrorist groups and other “intermestic”
issues blurring the lines between international and domestic politics, knowing the mechanisms which
transform freedom into order, order into liberty, liberty into justice and justice into equality provides
a template and pattern for sustaining democracy in its biggest global test since the Cold War.A strong,
communicative, responsive and well-connected sector of non-state, non-private activity is a forge
of new democratic practice and the teaching ground for leadership, management and distribution
of resources among citizens of a state. In turn, the need for a government to be accountable to its
contracts with constituents and provide collective goods to them amplies when the costs of ignoring
them or the long-term benets of listening to them become evident.Eective policies toward NGOs
and citizen groups and the extant inuences of these groups on political processes populate current
events: citizen mobilization in China pressured and publicized the environmental harms of a copper
alloy plant, forcing quiescence from the Communist Party ocials, the Russian Duma passed legis-
lation essentially taxing certain NGO activity to suppress opposition movements and international
networks forced Syria into nominal compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
all in July 2012. Civil society actors ever more frequently walk halls of power, take over “coee bar
diplomacy” and dance the night away with partner states to the tune of international norms and
compliance.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
46
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position Movements in El Salvador.”Latin American Politics and Society 49: 85-114
Support for Acceptance of Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements
(MEAs) in South Eastern Europe. 2003. Country Assessment: Bulgaria
Whittington, Keith. 2001. “Revisiting Tocqueville’s America: Society, Politics and Associa-
tion in the Nineteenth Century.” In Edwards, Bob, Michael W. Foley and Mario Diani, eds. Beyond
Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in the Comparative Perspective. Lebanon:
Tufts University Press.
Youngs, Richard. 2004. International Democracy and the West: e Role of Governments,
Civil Society, and Multinational Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mereminsky Caring for the Constitution
49
A member of the TCU Class of 2013, Pearce developed a passion over the course of collegiate study
for critical social and political questions and the challenges of their solutions. He has particularly ben-
eted from the guidance and mentoring of professors, employers in the non-prot sector and fellow
students which emphasize an active and applied role in the learning process. He plans to continue
serving others and exploring democratic institutions through teaching, graduate school, research and
advocacy.
50

51
Nuclear Arms Control and the New START Treaty: e
Neo-Liberal Institutionalist Explanation for
Nuclear Disarmament between the U.S. and Russia in
the 21st Century
Jonathan White
Game theory has frequently been applied to political issues to better understand the intricacies of international
relations. Game theory can be applied to the case of nuclear arms control between the United States and the
Russian Federation in the 21st century and the New START Treaty. e theory of Realism would likely predict
that two nations would mutually defect over nuclear arms control eorts to maintain strategic military power.
e theory of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism would likely predict mutual cooperation due to the assistance of
international institutions, which create common interests by expanding the shadow of the future, providing
valuable information, monitoring states, and creating issue-linkages. e success of the New START Treaty
illustrates that the theory of Neo-Liberal Institutionalism can better predict the outcomes of certain modern,
international interactions. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism’s emphasis on international institutions provides a
signicant understanding of the future of international relations in the 21st century.
E
ver since the rst testing of the atomic bomb on July 16, 1945 at Los Alamos, New
Mexico, the world has been ushered into a Nuclear Age (International Campaign to
Abolish Nuclear Weapons 2012; hereafter ICANW).With the display of the absolute
power of an atomic bomb on Japan in August of 1945, international states have come to greatly
desire the massively destructive and militarily powerful capabilities of nuclear weaponry(ICANW
2012). e Cold War, between the United States and the Soviet Union, led to an enormous
escalation of nuclear arms due to the belief that having the largest nuclear capabilities would bring
one the most security. us, this security dilemma led to a highly competitive nuclear arms race,
resulting ina high of approximately seventy thousand active nuclear warheads in the world in
1986 (Norris and Kristensen 2006, 64). Since 1968, with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, the idea of international arms control has increasingly been discussed and often
successfully negotiated. More recently, in 2010, the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction) Treaty,
with the ocial name of “Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Oensive
Arms,”was signed between the Russian Federation and the United States of America, depicting
52
that successful nuclear non-proliferation is still occurring. In applying the prisoner’s dilemma to
the case of nuclear arms control with the New START Treaty, I nd that the predictionof mutual
defection, based onprisoner’s dilemma logic, does not accurately t reality, where instead mutual
cooperation and nuclear arms reductions have occurred, which can be explained by the Neo-Liberal
Institutionalist eory.
After a year of lengthy and numerous negotiations, U.S. President Barack Obama
met with the Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, on April 8 of 2010 tosign the New START
Treaty, for nuclear arms control (Baker and Bilefsky 2010).is treaty entails signicant nuclear
weapons reductions and, according to President Obama, was “the most comprehensive arms
control agreement in nearly two decades” (Obama 2010). As stated in the actual text of the treaty,
the United States and the Russian Federation reached a cooperative agreement and a mutual
understanding that nuclear non-proliferation is absolutely necessary to ensure the future safety
of all human beings (U.S. Department of State 2010, 1). Interestingly, the United States and
Russia discussed the need to “forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness,
predictability, and cooperation” and therefore bring their own nuclear stances into conguration
with this new relationship (U.S. Department of State 2010, 1). e various creations and
limitations of the New START Treaty are important to understand.
e bulk of the treaty regards the actual limitations set on nuclear weaponry, with an
allowance of no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, 800 deployed and non-deployed
strategic launchers, like missile tubes, silos, and bombers, and 700 deployed ICBMS, SLBMS, and
bombers equipped with nuclear arms (Phillips 2010).Both states have until 2018 to reach these new
limitations. In addition, the treaty set up a verication regime, which engages in “on-site inspections
and exhibitions [as well as] data exchanges and notications related to strategic oensive arms and
facilities” (Phillips 2010).e treaty will expire in ten years and was initiated to replace the Treaty of
Moscow. Signicantly, as stated by Macon Phillips, the White House’s Director of Digital Strategy,
this treaty will “enhance U.S. national security by stabilizing the strategic balance between the…
[U.S. and Russia] at lower levels of nuclear forces” (Phillips 2010).Even though the U.S. and Russia
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
53
signed the New START Treaty, they do not have to comply with the agreements and the possible
outcomes can be viewed using the prisoner’s dilemma and game theory.
e situation of nuclear arms control between two states is inherently a prisoner’s
dilemma, as seen from the inuence of conicting interests, the incentive to defect, and the
existence of a more benecial outcome with mutual cooperation. Firstly, it involves two players, in
this case, the United States and Russia. Secondly, both states have the same two key interests when
dealing with nuclear arms control. eir major interest is maintaining the ability to be militarily
competitive, meaning that they desire to have an equal or higher number of nuclear weapons than
the other state. is interest is an absolute priority because having the largest nuclear arsenal best
ensuresone’s own security and future survival. If one state became signicantly less competitive, they
could risk a nuclear attack and potential absolute destruction from the other state. eir secondary
interest is to achieve an overall reduction in the number of nuclear arms in the world, in order to
create a less dangerous international setting. Importantly, conicting interests outweigh common
interests in this case. A state has a much greater desire to be more militarily competitive via a larger
nuclear arsenal than to reduce the total number of nuclear weapons in the world, which would
benet everyone. irdly, each state has two strategies they could pursue. A state could reduce its
number of nuclear arms, thus complying with the treaty, denoted as “C” for cooperation. Also, a
state could choose to not reduce its number of nuclear arms, going against the treaty, denoted as
“D” for defection. With this information, one can further understand nuclear arms control via the
prisoner’s dilemma.
Fourthly, with two strategies for each state, there are four possible outcomes. If both
states choose to reduce their nuclear arsenals, denoted as outcome (C,C), they could obtain both
of their goals. In this scenario, both states would reduce their nuclear arsenal by the same amount,
maintaining the balance of nuclear power, allowing them to remain competitive while reducing
the overall number of nuclear arms in the world. Conversely, if both states choose to not reduce
their nuclear arsenals, signied as outcome (D, D), they would only be able to attain one of their
desires. e states would remain at the same level of competitiveness, since they did not remove
White Nuclear Arms Control
54
any nuclear arms, but their interest of reducing the number of nuclear weapons worldwide would
not be met. If player one, the United States, chooses to cooperate and player two, Russia, chooses
to defect, represented as (C, D), the U.S. would reduce its nuclear arsenal while Russia would not.
In this scenario, Russia would gain the most utility because both of its interests would be met,
where it gained an advantage militarily over the U.S.,due to its larger nuclear arsenal, and achieved
a reduction in the total number of nuclear arms in the world, due to the U.S.’s choice. Lastly, if
the U.S. chooses to defect and Russia chooses to cooperate, seen as (D, C), the outcome would be
reversed. e U.S. would gain more utility, where it would remain a competitive military state and
reduce the overall level of nuclear arms due to Russia’s choice.With these four possible outcomes,
denite preference orderings are established.
A unique preference ordering for each stateis set, which determines the strategies they
nd most and least advantageous. e United States would gain the most value from outcome (D,
C), with a utility of “4,” since it attained both of its desires of gainingmilitary competitiveness and
reducing nuclear weaponry in the world. Even though the U.S. greatly reduced the total number of
nuclear arms, it only remained equally competitive with Russia in outcome (C, C), thus awarding it
a utility of “3.”e U.S. would gain a utility of “2” from outcome (D, D) because both the U.S. and
Russia would remain equally competitive, but areduction of nuclear weaponry in the world would
not be attained. Lastly, the U.S. would gain a utility “1” from outcome (C, D), being its worst
scenario because it would greatly lose its competitiveness, even though it reduces the total number
of nuclear arms in the world.Russia has its own preference ordering, where it would gain the
same level of utility from outcomes (C, C) and (D, D) due to the same reasons that the U.S. did.
However, Russia greatly prefers outcome (C, D) because in this scenario it gains competitiveness
and reduces the number of nuclear arms. Conversely, it most disfavors outcome (D, C), which
would decrease its competitiveness against the U.S., its major interest, despite its reduction of total
nuclear weaponry. us, since the highest utility of “4” can only be acquired by defecting, or not
reducing one’s nuclear arsenal, and there is a great fear of cooperating, or decreasing one’s nuclear
weaponry, there is a built-in incentive to defect. Both states cannot risk cooperating because that
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
55
could lead to becoming less competitive militarily and less secure, which could stimulate a nuclear
attack andcause one’s owntotal annihilation.
In addition, it is evident that both the United States and Russia would be better o if
neither defected and rather both cooperated. is scenario can be seen as (C, C), which would
require both the U.S. and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals. A utility value of “3” would be
given to both states, which is greater than the utility gained from (D, D). Mutual defection would
require both the U.S. and Russia to not reduce their nuclear arsenals, resulting in both states
gaining a utility value of “2.” Clearly then, a mutual reduction of nuclear arms (C, C) is a more
favorable choice than a mutual non-reduction and noncompliance with the New START Treaty (D,
D). Such an inference allows for the construction of outcome preference sets for both states. For the
U.S., outcome (D, C), would have the most utility, followed by outcome (C, C), with outcome (D,
D) next, and outcome (C, D) last. Russia’s outcome preference would be in the order of (C, D), (C,
C), (D, D), and then (D, C). ese outcome preference sets accurately align with the requirements
of a prisoner’s dilemma, which can also be seen through the use of a table.
One can better understand the situation of nuclear arms control after understanding
the two interests of states and constructing preference orderings for the United States and Russia.
Combining the four possible outcomes, the preference orderings, and utility amounts, one can
imagine a prisoner’s dilemma table. While visualizing this table, one can understand that a player
will always seek its highest potential utility and can map out possible outcomes and infer which
ones will be more and less favorable. Most importantly, utilizing the prisoner’s dilemma scenario
and table will allow for one to make an educated prediction regarding the outcome of the specic
situation, in this case nuclear arms control.
According to game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma, for the case of nuclear arms
reductions with the New START Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, I predict that the outcome
will be (D, D), where both states will choose to not reduce their nuclear arms and not comply with
the treaty. As previously stated, this case is an example of a prisoner’s dilemma because conicting
interests for increased military competitiveness via maintained nuclear arsenals outweigh common
White Nuclear Arms Control
56
interests for an overall reduction in nuclear arms. In addition, both the U.S. and Russia have
an incentive to not comply with the treaty and not reduce their nuclear arms, due to the risk of
cooperation and the potential benets of defection. Lastly, both states would be better o with
mutual cooperation, where both of their interests would be attained. However, according to the
prisoner’s dilemma, both states will choose to defect. No matter what the U.S. chooses to do, Russia
can gain the higher utility value by defecting, and the same goes for the U.S. if Russia is choosing.
is will result in the outcome of mutual defection, where both states will go against the New
START Treaty and maintain their nuclear arsenals. us, the prisoner’s dilemma can help one to
understand the case of nuclear arms control between two states.
However, this prediction does not t reality because both the U.S. and Russia have
complied with the New START Treaty. On September 1, 2011, Russia and the United States
complied with the portion of the treaty requiring biannual updates and data exchanges of
information regarding their nuclear arsenals (Kimball, Crail, and Collina 2011).is data exchange
illustrates the success of the New START Treaty, showing that the numbers of nuclear arms for
both the U.S. and Russia have dropped. As of September 1, 2011, the United States had 1,790
deployed strategic warheads, 1,042 deployed and non-deployed strategic launchers, and 822
deployed ICBMS, SLBMS, and heavy bombers, compared with Russia’s gures of 1,566, 871, and
516, respectively (U.S. Department of State 2011). ese guresgreatly contrast the global high of
approximately seventy thousand nuclear arms in 1986 (Norris and Kristensen 2006, 64). us, a
signicant nuclear arms reduction has occurred, where Russia “has already met two of the treaty’s
three limits eight years early,” a great achievement (Reif 2011).
February 5, 2012 marked the New START Treaty’s rst birthday, where continued
progress and success were seen. As stated by the U.S. Department of State, their department is “in
constant communication with the Russians,” where both states have “kept pace with each other
on inspections all year” (U.S. Department of State 2012). In addition, the data exchanges have
provided a precise measurement of Russian and U.S. nuclear arms, where both states have updated
each other regarding any movement or technical aspects of weaponry via “over 1,800 New START
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
57
notications through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers”(U.S. Department of State 2012).
Although the actual data exchange for February 2012 is currently unavailable, the U.S. government
seems condent and optimistic, noting that the treaty still “represents a signicant step forward in
building a more stable, cooperative relationship with Russia”(U.S. Department of State 2012).us,
it can be seen that the prediction based on game theory logic and the prisoner’s dilemma set-up was
very inaccurate because mutual cooperation, with a reduction in nuclear armaments by both states,
occurred.
Nevertheless, others argue that the New START Treaty is ineective and allows for
substantial levels of nuclear arms. A group of professors, political scientists, and former military
personnel argue that “under the New START Treaty, the United States and Russia remain ready
to inict apocalyptic devastation in a nuclear exchange,” resulting in millions of deaths and
inconceivable environmental destruction (Blair, Esin, McKinzie, Yarynich, and Zolotarev 2010,
10). ey claim that the treaty does not go far enough and should instead place greater limits on
the number of nuclear arms (Blair, Esin, McKinzie, Yarynich, and Zolotarev 2010, 16). Despite this
argument, I believe that the New START Treaty is extremely benecial in guiding the two largest
nuclear arms holders in a direction of great arms reductions, communication, and cooperation.
Regardless, this treaty is lowering the number of nuclear weaponry via mutual cooperation, which
dees the basic beliefs in the theory of Realism.
e Realist eory dictates that states, the dominant actors in world politics, act in their
self-interest to acquire relative gains of power in a self-help system, which is created by the existence
of anarchy in the world system. Anarchy, meaning the lack of a centralized authority, causes states
to be unable to trust one another, because no greater authority can come to their aid. is theory
declares that military power and force, especially in security issues, are the most meaningful
aspects for states to focus on. us, a Realist, like John Mearsheimer, nds it highly unlikely for
cooperation to exist between states and would nd the results of the New START Treaty to be
puzzling. Realist eory, like the prediction based on the prisoner’s dilemma, believes that mutual
defection, or a non-reduction in nuclear arms and noncompliance with the treaty would result,
White Nuclear Arms Control
58
especially in matters of security like nuclear arms control. However, the Neo-Liberal Institutionalist
eory can explain the actual outcome of this situation.
Neo-Liberal Institutionalists, like Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, also believe
in an anarchic international system, however, they declare that international institutions can be
meaningful actors in world politics and promote cooperation between states. is theory explains
that states are becoming increasingly interdependent, causing the use of military force to become
very costly. Importantly, institutions create common interests because they allow repeated play,
increase the shadow of the future, provide information, monitor states, and create issue-linkages,
which can explain the success of the New START Treaty. e verication regime that was
established by the treaty monitors the U.S. and Russia, through scheduled inspections, and provides
crucial information about the ongoing reductions in nuclear arms by both states (Phillips 2010).
e shadow of the future, due to repeated play, is greatly increased because data exchanges are
mandatory every six months and constant communication is maintained due to the New START
notications and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (U.S. Department of State 2012). Similar, the
U.S. and Russia’s large involvement in other major international institutions, like the U.N., creates
a massive shadow of the future and links many issues. Russia and the U.S. have a huge incentive to
cooperate because they will have to deal with each other in the future and depend on one another’s
votes as veto players in the U.N. Security Council. us, cooperation can occur because common
interests, for nuclear nonproliferation, are created and solidied with communication and reliable
information. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism eectively explains the mutual cooperation outcome in
the case of nuclear arms control with the New START Treaty.
e situation of nuclear arms control between the U.S. and Russia with the New
START Treaty can have a predicted outcome of mutual defection, or mutualnoncompliance
and non-reduction, when using game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma logic, and the theory of
Realism. However, the actual outcome of the treaty has been that of mutual cooperation, with
a reduction of nuclear arms by both states. is outcome can be explained by the Neo-Liberal
Institutionalist eory. International institutions, like the New START’s verication regime and
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
59
the U.N., create common interests by increasing the shadow of the future with repeated play,
providing valuable information, monitoring states, and creating issue-linkages. By being able to
explain the actual outcome of the New START Treaty and the nuclear arms control situation, the
Neo-Liberal Institutionalist eory holds great inuence in its belief that international institutions
can cause common interests to outweigh self-interests and thus promote cooperation in the
anarchicinternational system.
White Nuclear Arms Control
60
References
Baker, Peter, and Dan Bilefsky. 2010. “Russia and U.S. Sign Nuclear Arms Reduction.” e New
York Times, April 8. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/09/world/europe/09prexy.html
(February 5, 2012).
Blair, Bruce, Victor Esin, Matthew McKinzie, Valery Yarynich, and PavelZolotarev. 2010. “Smaller
and Safer.” Foreign Aairs. 89 (5): 9-16.
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. 2012. “Nuclear Weapons Timeline.” http://
www.icanw.org/the-facts/the-nuclear-age/#.UWL4ZZOG0y4 (February 5, 2012).
Kimball, Daryl, Peter Crail, and Tom Collina. 2011. “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a
Glance.” http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat (February
6, 2012).
Norris, Robert S., and Hans M. Kristensen.2006. “Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2006.”Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists62 (4): 64-66.
Obama, Barack.2010. “Announcement of the New START Treaty.” March 26. http://www.state.
gov/secretary/rm/2010/03/139147.htm (February 5, 2012).
Phillips, Macon. 2010. “e New START Treaty and Protocol.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2010/04/08/new-start-treaty-and-protocol (February 5, 2012).
Reif, Kingston. 2011. “Breaking Down the First New START Data Exchange.” http://
armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/breaking_down_the_rst_new_
start_data_exchange/ (February 5, 2012).
U.S. Department of State. 2010. Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Oensive
Arms (New START),April 8. TIAS no. 11-205. U.S. Treaties and Other International
Acts, pg. 1.
U.S. Department of State. 2011. “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Oensive
Arms.” October 25. http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/176096.htm (February 5, 2012).
U.S. Department of State. 2012. “New START Treaty Implementation Update.” May 17. http://m.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue I Winter 2013
61
state.gov/md183335.htm (February 7, 2012).
Jonathan is a fourth year at the University of California, Davis triple majoring in political science,
history, and international relations. He is interested in American politics, U.S. history, and domestic
and international environmental issues. At UC Davis, he has been greatly involved in student gov-
ernment organizations, such as the Environmental Policy and Planning Commission and the City
and County Aairs Oce. In the fall of 2013, he will be attending law school and plans to special-
ize in environmental law.
Polivka Preventing the Loss of Life in Syria
62
63
Florida V. Jardines
Kayla Polonsky
is paper evaluates whether or not the sni of a drug dog around the perimeter or a person’s house consti-
tutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. e Supreme Court has gradually carved out
numerous exceptions to the interpretation of the Amendment, and this case has tremendous implications for
its scope. In the past, the Court has favored the usage of drug detection snis by trained dogs in order to ght
the country’s ongoing battle against drug abuse. Specically, the Court’s precedent holds that dog snis do not
constitute a search and that illegal contraband deserves no privacy protection. us, this paper argues that
the sni of a drug dog around the outside of someone’s home does not constitute a search under the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
T
he case before us today has serious implications for the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. Specically, this case entails the usage of trained police dogs to detect the
presence of illegal drugs. In this specic situation, Drug Enforcement Agency ocers
in the state of Florida received an anonymous tip alerting them to the presence of marijuana in the
home of a one Joelis Jardines. Based on this anonymous tip, they brought a trained drug detection
dog to Jardines’ home and instructed it to sni the exterior of the home. e dog stopped at the
front door, thus alerting the cops to the presence of marijuana within the home. Based solely on
this alert, the police then obtained a search warrant and, upon their resulting search, conrmed
that Jardines’ house was serving as a marijuana grow house. After Jardines was charged with drug
tracking, he moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that it was obtained unconstitutionally
in an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has endorsed the usage of drug detection snis by
trained dogs in the interest of controlling the ever-prevalent drug production and distribution issue
that the country faces. However, the Court must now evaluate the constitutionality of such a tactic
at an individual’s home, an entity that has historically been accorded the highest protection under
the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause. Among similar protections, the Amendment
guarantees an individual freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures in their homes without
64
probable cause. However, over the course of its history, the Court has carved out several exceptions
to this rule. ese changes have been necessary, as technological development has made privacy
invasion much more common and feasible and thus presents us with issues that were unforeseen at
the time when the Framers wrote the Fourth Amendment. Based on the notion that dogs cannot
be considered sense-enhancing technology, previous holdings that dog snis do not constitute a
search, and precedent stating that illegal contraband deserves no privacy protection, the Court must
conclude that the application of this investigative technique does not constitute a search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
II. Argument
a. e Court should not consider a dog sni to be a search because a dog cannot be considered “sense-
enhancing technology.”
Perhaps one of the most dicult issues we must address is the issue of whether or not a
dog sni should be considered a sense-enhancing technology, a specication that has been highly
controversial in previous Court opinions. As society has advanced, technological development has
proliferated at an exponential rate, particularly in law enforcement. Police have found increasingly
advanced ways to do investigative work, generating debates about possible intrusions on personal
privacy and the permissibility of these tactics. is issue came to the national forefront when the
Court addressed the constitutionality of the use of a thermal imaging device from a public vantage
point to monitor the radiation of heat coming from a person’s home. In its opinion, the Court held
that, “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area constitutes a search- at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use.” Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington, in State v. Young,

held that
infrared detection surveillance equipment was an impermissible way to obtain information from an
individual’s home without probable cause. us, if the police use a technology not readily available
to the public to detect information inside one’s house that would be imperceptible without the
technology, the Court has deemed this to be a search. is then triggers the Fourth Amendment
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
65
requirements of a warrant and probable cause.
While these cases would seem to indicate that the police activity in Jardines was a search,
the dierence lies in the classication of a “sense-enhancing technology”. Oxford Dictionary denes
technology as “the application of scientic knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry.”
A sense-enhancing technology is usually identied as something that is not easily accessible to the
public and reveals information that could not ever be detected by the normal range of the human
senses. e thermal imager that was rejected in Kyllo was able to detect infrared radio waves, a form
of heat that is undetectable to the human eye. By virtue of its ability to detect heat, the imager was
capable of detecting lawful and intimate activity within the home, such as “at what hour each night
the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath,” and thus constituted a denite invasion of
the resident’s legitimate privacy interests. Further, these imagers are not commonly available to the
public; if they were, and if many people had them, then the average individual would be forced to
have a lessened expectation of privacy from the usage of these technologies and its usage in Kyllo
would likely have been permissible with a showing of probable cause.
However, based on these standards, it is dicult to argue that drug dogs can fall under the scope
of a sense-enhancing technology. e Maryland Court of Special Appeals asserted that fact, stating
that,
“e investigative use of the animal sense of smell, human or canine, cannot even
be dened as a technology. It is, a fortiori, not an unfamiliar or rapidly advancing
technology that is ‘not in general use’….e use of the sense of smell generally is a
familiar tool of perception much older than the common law or the Bill of Rights….e
use of a dog’s sense of smell is not an arcane science known only to the police….”
While trained dogs do have a greater ability to detect the presence of drugs than humans,
the smell of marijuana does not fall outside the range of human senses entirely. In contrast to Kyllo,
in which the imagers revealed the presence of something that the human senses could not have
otherwise detected, drug dogs merely indicate the presence of something that human senses can
often detect on their own. us, because the dog sni itself is not capable of revealing any intimate
Polonsky Florida V. Jardines
66
information, a dog sni should not be considered a sense-enhancing technology and its application
should not be restricted on a home as an unreasonable search.
Even if the Court were to rule that a dog sni is a sense-enhancing technology, which
it should not here, it has previously condoned certain uses of sense-enhancing technology that do
not violate society’s expectations of privacy. In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States the Court held
that Dow’s expectation of privacy only applied to its indoor property, and thus the Environmental
Protection Agency’s actions in conducting an unannounced aerial inspection were constitutional.
Further, the Court ruled that police do not need a search warrant to observe an individual’s property
from public airspace; specically, ocers used a helicopter to y 400 feet above an individual’s
backyard in order to conrm the presence of marijuana plants in the fenced-in backyard.While
none of these cases entailed the physical breaching of private property by police ocers, they all
ruled permissible the obtaining of information in the external area of a house or building based on
the notion that this area includes public air and a lessened expectation of privacy.
Similarly here, although the marijuana was being held inside Jardines’ home, the dog
was able to detect its smell from the external porch, meaning that its smell was in the public air
outside of his home. In such an investigative technique, “the dog’s nose never intrudes into a
constitutionally protected area….the sensory receptor remains outside where it has a right to be
and the stimuli come out to meet it there.”
5
One cannot expect to have complete privacy of the
air surrounding one’s home, so obtaining evidence in this manner should not be considered an
unreasonable search and should instead be ruled permissible. Police should not have to obtain
a warrant to search public air, even if the air lies within the space immediately surrounding an
individual’s home.
b. e Court should not nd the dog sni to be a search because previous holdings have held that it is not.
e Fourth Amendment explicitly guarantees “[the] right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and eects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
armation….” e Court struggled to clarify what exactly constituted a search for many years.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
67
e Court has established certain benchmarks in Fourth Amendment, law, however, such as that in
U.S. v. Jacobsen, when it held that “A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.”
e Court has limited what it considers to be a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in
several recent cases. In U.S. v. Place the Court asserted that allowing a trained drug dog to sni the
luggage of passengers awaiting departure at the airport does not constitute a search. In justifying
this holding, the Court stated that,
“A ‘canine sni’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog…does not require opening
the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain
hidden from public view, as does, for example, an ocer’s rummaging through the
contents of the luggage. us, the manner in which information is obtained through this
investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the sni
discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. us, despite the
fact that the sni tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the
information obtained is limited. is limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of
the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods. In these respects, the canine sni
is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in
the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information
revealed by the procedure.”
Similarly, this precedent was extended to automobiles in Illinois v. Caballes.
While these rulings seem to conict with the Fourth Amendment’s general provision
against invasions of an individual’s personal eects, invocation of the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard is used to justify their holdings. As was noted in both of these cases, the sni of
these trained drug dogs is only capable of revealing evidence of the presence of illegal contraband;
thus, it cannot reveal any intimate information that a person has a valid expectation or right to keep
private. Further, the Court has repeatedly ruled that there is no right to privacy when it comes to
Polonsky Florida V. Jardines
68
possessing contraband.
Although the Court has routinely held that dog snis are not searches within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Respondent Jardines argues that such a tactic should be
considered a search when it occurs on private property at an individual’s home. It is indeed true
that individuals are entitled to an enhanced expectation of privacy within the connes of their own
home, but such an investigative technique still cannot be considered a search. Nothing changes
about a dog’s abilities in a public versus private area; just like at the airport or outside of a car, even
the best trained dogs are still only capable of detecting the presence of illegal drugs, and nothing
more. us, because the dog sni does not impinge on any personal information within the house
that an individual has a justiable right to keep private, the precedent established in Place and
Caballes should be extended to the issue of dog snis around the exterior of a person’s home.
Opposition to this extension may argue that even highly trained dogs aren’t infallible in
their drug detection abilities, a risk that could lead to unjustied searches within the home and thus
unnecessary invasions of privacy. However, the Court has previously argued that law enforcement’s
interests in limiting crime outweigh minor privacy interests. For the unique issue of contraband
possession, the Court asserts that “the risk of the item’s disappearance or use for its intended
purpose before a warrant may be obtained outweighs the interest in possession.”
c. e Court should not invalidate such a technique at one’s home because it has previously ruled that
possession of contraband entails no right to privacy.
As stated, the Court has previously established the notion that drug possession deserves
no right to privacy, even within one’s home. e Court has similarly ruled that other illegal
substances inherently entail a reduced expectation of privacy, by virtue of the fact that individuals
have no right to possess them. In Carroll v. U.S., which was decided during a time when the
National Prohibition Act still outlawed the imbibing and distribution of alcohol, the Court
held that police could make warrantless searches of vehicles, boats, and airplanes when they had
reason to believe that alcohol was being transported. While this decision primarily established the
automobile exception to the search and seizure clause, it was based on the premise that people have
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
69
no right to the possession of illegal substances and thus deserve a lessened expectation of privacy in
regards to this possession, even when under the realm of the privacy of one’s car.
While the Fourth Amendment has traditionally accorded the utmost protection to the
privacy of one’s home, the possession and distribution of illegal contraband overrides that sanctity.
As observed by Justice White, “Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized
whenever it occurs in the home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal drugs,
do not escape the law where they are committed at home. Stanley itself recognized that its holding
oered no protection for the possession in the home of drugs, rearms, or stolen goods.”
is determination was made based on Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, in which he advocated a two-prong test for determining the existence of privacy.
is test was subsequently adopted by the majority in Smith v. Maryland, and stated that a given
circumstance entails a right of privacy
“If (1) the individual ‘has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,’ and (2)
society is prepared to recognize that this expectation is (objectively) reasonable.” Justice
Stevens dierentiated between the two in stating that “the expectation ‘that certain facts
will not come to the attention of the authorities’ is not the same as a interest in ‘privacy
that society is prepared to consider reasonable.”
us, because our society has objectively established that drug possession deserves no
expectation of privacy, simply one’s subjective expectations of privacy are not enough. As we stated
earlier, for an investigative technique to be considered a search, it must infringe on a reasonable
expectation of privacy. erefore, we cannot deem the sni of a drug dog outside of someone’s
home to be a search because to identify the presence of illegal contraband does not infringe upon
any expectation of privacy society deems reasonable.
III. Conclusion
While the Fourth Amendment continues to stand as one of the benchmarks of the
constitutional rights inherently aorded to every citizen of the country, the Court has carved out
several exceptions over time in the interest of maintaining law and order. e Court has especially
Polonsky Florida V. Jardines
70
condoned the use of trained drug dogs as a means by which to combat the prevalent issue of drug
possession and distribution. In this specic case, we addressed the constitutionality of a drug dog
sni at the exterior of the private home of the Respondent, Mr. Jardines. Based on precedent that
dog snis do not constitute a search and that illegal contraband does not deserve privacy protection,
and based on the inability to classify dogs as sense-enhancing technology, we must hold today
that this investigative technique does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
While the issue we are faced with today seems to debate merely the classication
and constitutionality of a dog sni at someone’s door, its ruling has grave implications for the
signicance of the Fourth Amendment. Even though the Amendment ensures individuals the right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, various holdings have established exceptions
to this clause that have gradually limited an individual’s right to proclaim that a search violated
personal privacy. Florida, the federal government, and many states argue that allowing dog snis
at individual’s homes would enable our society to greatly curb the illegal contraband issue that
has recently proliferated. However, it is in the best interest of our society to classify a sni by
a trained drug dog outside of someone’s home as a search that requires a warrant and probable
cause. is is because the Supreme Court has always emphasized the sanctity of the home, this
type of investigation constitutes a physical trespass on an individual’s property, and not doing so
would entail a virtual elimination of privacy rights and begin a slippery slope for further Fourth
Amendment limitations.
Consistently throughout its existence, in countless rulings, the Court has emphasized
the sanctity of the home. In fact, the Fourth Amendment has been construed to aord the utmost
privacy protection to the house itself and the area immediately surrounding it. Justice Powell
observed in Oliver v. U.S. that, “e Amendment reects the recognition of the Framers that
certain enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference. For example, the Court
since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed ‘the overriding respect for the sanctity
of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.” e right
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
71
of a man to retreat into the privacy of his home and be free from governmental intrusion constitutes
the core of the Fourth Amendment, as argued by Justice Stewart in Silverman v. U.S.Without this
protection, the text of the Fourth Amendment carries no weight.
While dogs do possess an innate ability to detect the smell of drugs when trained, their
abilities are not infallible and should be restricted on private personal property. A study conducted
in Chicago recently revealed that a trained dog’s positive “alert” to the presence of narcotics during
trac stops is only accurate about 44% of the time. is is not a very reassuring probability. It
means that over half of the time that a police ocer invades the sanctity of a person’s home as a
result of the dog’s alert, such an invasion is unwarranted and unjustiably fractures an individual’s
constitutional right to privacy within their own home. If this technique is to be used on the exterior
of someone’s home, it must be considered a search. Absent exigent circumstances then, police
ocers must ensure that they obtain reliable probable cause and a warrant before the search is
carried out. e anonymous tip given as the justication of the sni in this particular case does not
seem to be reliable enough. Although the Court has held in the past that anonymous tips can be
used to justify a search, a heightened standard of evaluation should be applied to these tips when in
relation to someone’s home.
Further, the tactic of using a dog sni to determine the presence of illegal contraband
should be considered a search, which requires probable cause and a warrant to be constitutional,
because it constitutes physically trespassing on a person’s property, in contrast to similar tactics in
public settings. While the Court has repeatedly ruled that a dog sni in and of itself in a public
setting is not a search, the same technique conducted on private property must be deemed a search
due to the dierence in reasonable expectations of privacy in the two settings. A person may
subjectively believe that their person and belongings deserve the same privacy when in public, but
the Court disagrees, arguing that anything one chooses to bring into the public sphere reects a
lessened expectation of privacy. On the other hand, in addition to having a subjective expectation of
privacy towards one’s behaviors and belongings within the realm of one’s own house, the Court has
ruled that this expectation is objectively justied.
Polonsky Florida V. Jardines
72
Most recently, the Court seemingly limited the argument that there is a reduced
expectation of privacy in one’s public movements, asserting that using a GPS tracker to track a
target’s vehicular movements constitutes a search. is holding merely strengthens the argument
for an absolute expectation of privacy within one’s home. If the Court is willing to assert that using
a GPS device on someone’s property (Jones’s car) to physically track their movements is a search,
then it is inherent that a search is also invoked when a police ocer uses the dog sni technique to
obtain information on one’s private property.
ose who believe that this technique should not be classied as a search would
likely reference several past cases in which the Court has deemed constitutional the obtaining of
information in the area immediately surrounding an individual’s home. is was the case in both
Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986), and Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989),
both involving police ocers ying in an airplane or helicopter over the house in order to obtain
pictures of an individual’s property that they could not otherwise capture. However, the dierence
between these rulings and our current case is the location from which the evidence was obtained.
In these previous cases, the evidence was obtained from public airspace, and the police never set
foot on the individual’s property. On the other hand, in this case, the police physically stepped foot
on Jardines’ property to conduct the dog sni because there was no other way for them to obtain
the incriminating information without doing so. e moment that a police ocer steps on an
individual’s property with the sole purpose and capabilities to obtain evidence, the invasion should
be deemed a search justied by reliable probable cause.
Finally, the Court needs to rule the conduction of a dog sni at a private home a search
because not doing so would entail a virtual elimination of privacy rights and begin a slippery slope
for further Fourth Amendment limitations. is risk was brought to life in a memo that Justice
Brennan wrote to Chief Justice Warren in the Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), case. In this case,
the Court held that police do not have to have a warrant or probable cause in order to stop and frisk
individuals that they have reasonable suspicion to believe were, are, or will be engaged in criminal
activity. Before the ruling was announced, Brennan expressed his concerns that, “from here on
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
73
out, it becomes entirely necessary for the police to establish ‘probable cause to arrest’ to support
weapons charges; an ocer can move against anyone he suspects has a weapon and get a conviction
if he ‘frisks’ him and nds one. In this lies the terrible risk that police will conjure up ‘suspicious
circumstances….’”
Essentially, Justice Brennan worried that the reduced need to show probable cause
would allow police to virtually make up a reason to invade someone’s privacy. Similarly, if the
Court does not rule this practice a search and does not require probable cause and a warrant before
its conduction, there is no telling what police will be able to do to further their crime-stopping
capacities. It would likely be considered acceptable to take these drug dogs into low-income and/or
violent neighborhoods and conduct “mass snis” of all houses without any individualized suspicion.
While it is important that police ocers be able to do their job in limiting crime,
especially when it comes to the prevention of drug possession and distribution, this duty cannot
override an individual’s inherent right to personal privacy protection. ere must be a limit
clarifying the dierence between dog snis in public versus private locations and the enhanced
justication that is required in order to invade the sanctity of one’s home. If we choose not to
deem this practice a search and thus allow police to bring drug dogs to sni the exterior of private
property without rst obtaining probable cause and a warrant, the scope of the Fourth Amendment
will have been so far limited as to be rendered virtually meaningless. We must return to a more
literal interpretation of the text of the Fourth Amendment in order to secure arguably the most
important protection the Constitution aords us in arguably the most personal aspects of our lives.
Polonsky Florida V. Jardines
74
References:
1 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2 Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
3 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
4 Dow Chemical Co. v. U.S., 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
5 Fitzgerald v. State, 837 A.2d 989 (2003).
6 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
7 Hinkel, D., & Mahr , J. (2011, Jan 06). Tribute analysis: drug-sning dogs in trac stops often
wrong. Chicago Tribune . Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-01-06/news/ct-
met-canine-ocers-20110105_1_drug-sning-dogs-alex-rothacker-drug-dog.
8 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
9 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
10 Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
11 Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
12 Silverman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
14 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
15 State v. Young, 123 Wn.2d 173 (1994).
16 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17 U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
18 U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).

Kayla is a third year student studying government and psychology at the University of Virginia. She
is interested in civil rights and civil liberties, and hopes to go on to law school to study in this eld.
She is a chartering member of UVA’s rst pre-law fraternity, serves as a student ambassador, and is
a member of the school’s club soccer team. Outside of school, she enjoys to volunteer, travel, and
spend time with friends and family.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
75
Polonsky Florida V. Jardines
76
77
Turkmenistan
Paul Filippelli
Turkmenistan has been one of the most oppressive totalitarian states in the world for the last two decades,
stiing political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of the press. Anyone belonging to a mosque or church,
which is not expressly approved by the state can be imprisoned, and all state-approved mosques preach a
theology which deies the rst post-Soviet Turkmen president, SaparmuratNiyazov. Presidents serve for
life, and the current president, GurbangulyBerdymukhammedov, was hand-picked by his predecessor. e
systematic incorporation of all religious and cultural institutions into the state has made it nearly impossible
for dissidents to organize in opposition to the government. Because of the actions of the Turkmen leaders
over the last two decades, it is unlikely that Turkmenistan will transition to democracy at any point in the
foreseeable future.
F
reedom House publishes an annual report entitled “Worst of the Worst,” naming and
explaining the state of government in the countries which it considers to be least free. e
former Soviet republic of Turkmenistan has been perennially on the “Worst of the Worst”
list; it has received the worst possible score of 7 both in civil liberties and in political rights every
year since 2002. Turkmenistan’s current freedom of the press score is 96, giving it the second-most
restrictive press environment in the world, second only to North Korea, which garnered a score of
97.
Political Rights
Turkmenistan holds presidential elections at arbitrary intervals and legislative elections
every four to ve years. Elections are rigged, with the board of elections controlled by supporters
of the president. e ruling Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, which was the successor party to
the Communist Party of Turkmenistan after the fall of the Soviet Union is the only political party
registered as a legal party. All 125 of the seats in the unicameral legislature (known as the Mejlis)
are controlled by the Democratic Party. Voters have reported being pressured by the government to
vote for the Democratic Party, and as a consequence the party receives over 90% of the votes in all
elections.
78
Government corruption is a serious problem in Turkmenistan; people bribe their way
into public oces, with little or no transparency. e government controls oil and gas revenues,
and it is not clear what happens to the money once it reaches the hands of the president. Addition-
ally, the lack of transparency has aected the distribution of medical care; Doctors Without Borders
have reported that medical data have been suppressed and that the government denies the existence
of infectious diseases, resulting in “a dangerous public health situation” (Freedom House 2011).
Civil Liberties
Religious congregations are compelled to register with the government that have restric-
tive and capricious membership requirements to receive a permit to open a church or mosque.
Starting an unregistered religious organization carries heavy penalties, including years of jail time,
so Turkmenistan has eectively banned all religious associations other than the Russian Orthodox
Church and the government-sponsored form of Islam. All Islamic mosques in Turkmenistan have
ties to the government, which teach the religious principles laid out by the rst president Saparmu-
rat Niyazov.
e educational system of Turkmenistan is based on the Ruhnama, which Freedom
House describes as “a rambling collection of quasi-historical and philosophical writings attributed to
Niyazov.” Educational freedom is further restricted through the revocation of exit visas to students
who seek to study at foreign universities. Banning all non-governmental organizations and outlaw-
ing labor unions, excluding the one controlled by the government, inhibit freedom of association.
Anti-government activists are not permitted to leave the country and are often jailed on trumped-up
charges (Ibid.).
Freedom of the Press
e government has an absolute monopoly on media, controlling all broadcast and print
facilities, as well as the infrastructure of communication. Internet access is restricted and censored
for the 2.2% of the Turkmen population, which has access to the Internet. Broadcast executives are
reprimanded or red if they do not disseminate the president’s propaganda enthusiastically enough.
Foreign media, including newspapers, are not allowed to be brought into Turkmenistan; satellite
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
79
dishes have been banned in order to prevent Turkmens from accessing foreign television stations.
Foreign reporters are routinely arrested in Turkmenistan, and there has been recent
international outrage when foreign journalists have been denied medical care in prison. Turkmen
nationals who leave the country to become reporters have received death threats. Libel laws prevent
people from speaking out against the government, but they are rarely invoked because reporters
usually censor themselves in order to avoid getting on the wrong side of the government (Freedom
House 2011).
Conceptualizing the Political Process
Islamist Movements
President Niyazov eectively integrated Islamic teachings into the state after the fall of the
Soviet Union. President Niyazov was the rst post-Soviet leader to make the hajj to Mecca in 1992,
and he organized the leaders of Islam in Turkmenistan into the Islamic Council under the auspices
of his government. He provided religious leaders with state salaries and authored the theologi-
cal writings, which have thenceforth been taught in the education system and the mosques. is
complete integration of the machinery of Islam into the state has provided very little opportunity
for Islamists to organize against the state. ere was one example of anti-government demonstra-
tions led from a mosque in 1995, but this was an isolated incident in response to food shortages,
and there has not been such resistance since then (Zelkina 1999, 367-368).
Islamic orthodoxy is not very popular in Turkmenistan because the majority of the
population is from formerly nomadic tribes with heavy historical Su mystic inuence. erefore,
fundamentalism does not have much of a foothold among the Turkmen people, lacking the leaders
and infrastructure necessary to gain many followers. ere is a certain amount of foreign inu-
ence – including Iranian and Saudi Arabian – in Turkmenistan; Saudi clerics have been permitted to
teach Islam in orphanages, and the government of Turkmenistan has a relatively friendly relation-
ship with the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, Saudi Islam is still under the supervision of the
government, and the Turkmen government has made the Iranians uncomfortable by being friendly
to Israel. Overall, Wahhabi and extreme Shi’ite inuences have been weak in Turkmenistan, and
Filippelli Turkmenistan
80
the natives have been much more receptive to traditional tribal interpretations of Islam (Eisenhower,
Sagdeev, and Safronov 2000, 83-85).
Proselytizing in Turkmenistan has been made illegal both for Muslims and for Christians,
and this has made it logistically impossible for Islamist sects to gain followers. e members of the
Russian minority are expected to be Russian Orthodox Christians while the ethnic Turkmen major-
ity is expected to be aliated with a state-sponsored Islamic mosque, and it is against the law to
convert a member of either group to any religion outside those parameters. is policy was pursued
by President Niyazov in order to minimize the tribal dierences within central Asian peoples and to
unite them under a nationalist religious ideology (Akbarzadeh 2001, 453-455). As a result, Chris-
tian Protestants, Baha’i, and Hare Krishna followers have been arrested and sentenced to up to two
years in labor camps for seeking followers (Kehl-Bodrigi and Hann 2006).
ere has been some Wahhabi resistance to Turkmen Islam because it does not conform
to the strictures of “true Islam,” but these groups are weak and poorly organized. Turkmen Islam,
for example, includes prayers to local saints, and orthodox Wahhabists do not consider this to be an
acceptable practice. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, an anthropology researcher at the Max Planck Institute
of Social Anthropology, held an interview in 2004 with a traditionalist Wahhabi who criticized
numerous elements of President Niyazov’s theological teachings, including long mourning periods
for dead relatives, traditional marriage ceremonies, and the prevalence of shrines. However, this
critic, by the name of Atamyrat, disappeared shortly after Kehl-Bodrogi published the interview;
she speculates that he was secretly imprisoned for speaking out against the government (Ibid.).
is process of secret imprisonment of fundamentalist Muslims has resulted in a near-complete
elimination of the inuence of Islamist movements in the political process of Turkmenistan and has
cemented the president’s hold on the entirety of the culture and politics of Turkmenistan.
e Ruling Establishment and the Secular Party
“e ruling establishment” and “the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan” are essentially
synonymous. e Democratic Party is the only legal party in the country, and it is thoroughly
under the control of the president and his allies. e president’s party in the Mejlis wields little
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
81
power and mostly exists to rubber-stamp the president’s agenda. Presidential power includes rule
by decree, and he appoints nearly all of the important ocers in the government – including judges
– with little or no input from the legislature (Freitag-Wirminghaus, Atabaki, and O’Kane 1998,
157-176). Eligibility for legislative elections is determined by the president’s hand-picked govern-
ment agents. erefore, the Democratic Party is more of a tool of President Berdymukhammedov –
and President Niyazov before him – than an independent political power in its own right (Freedom
House 2012).
All power in Turkmenistan is centrally located in the presidency. Judges and other sup-
posedly neutral government gures serve at the pleasure of the president. Supporters, even in the
press, who show insuciently enthusiastic support of the president, can be red or punished (Ibid.,
136-142). Additionally, there is no strong military to challenge the supremacy of the president be-
cause of the ocial policy of neutrality, which President Niyazov announced at the beginning of his
rule. Turkmenistan and Russia signed a “joint-security agreement” in 1993, which gives the Russian
military much of the responsibility for protecting Turkmenistan’s borders in exchange for payment
from Turkmenistan’s treasury (Freitag-Wirminghaus, 164-165). erefore, the Turkmen military
has little authority or size and cannot wield any major political inuence or orchestrate coups like
the militaries of many other Muslim-majority countries.
e cult of personality of President Niyazov – and his handpicked successor Berdymuk-
hammedov by extension – has further subordinated all of the ruling elite to the presidency. Niyazov
has eectively been deied by ocial propaganda: public buildings are adorned with banners prais-
ing him as Turkmenbashi (“the leader of the Turkmen”), (Safronov, 81-82) he named days of the
week and months of the year after members of his family, and erected monuments to his leadership
around the country (Freedom House 2007). He was elected “President for Life” by a unanimous
parliament in 1999, then appointed now-president Berdymukhammedov as his prime minister
and successor before he died (Ibid.). By transferring his power and clout to his successor, Niyazov
ensured that there could be no question of the legitimate leadership of the new president.
Conclusion
Filippelli Turkmenistan
82
ere are no groups in Turkmenistan, which have the numbers, the legal ability, or the
political clout required to challenge the president. e weak religious leaders, party leaders, parlia-
ment, and military are all puppets of the president.
Explaining the Current State of Democracy in Turkmenistan
ere Is No Democracy
Democracy does not exist in Turkmenistan. It is one of the closest states in the world to
the ideal type of totalitarianism. e president is deied, and all government ocials are subordi-
nate to him. ere is no freedom of association in any context – including participation in religion,
unions, or charitable non-governmental organizations – and the few associations permitted by
the government are those institutions which are under the direct control of the president and his
supporters. Religious teachings solidify and aggrandize the leader and are closely aliated with the
government.
Why is this state of public aairs the way it is? It is not sucient to assert that freedom
and democracy do not exist in Turkmenistan because it was formerly a member of the Soviet bloc:
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Moldova, Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herze-
govina are classied by Freedom House as “partly free”; and Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria are all classi-
ed as “free” (Freedom House 2012). It sounds like a tautology, but the simple explanation of the
lack of freedom and democracy in Turkmenistan is that the government of Turkmenistan has not
allowed freedom or democracy to exist.
Not Allowing Liberal Democracy to Take Hold
Of the Muslim-majority countries which toppled dictatorial leaders in the so-called “Arab
Spring” in 2011 – Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen – Tunisia had a civil liberties score of 5 and a
political rights score of 7 from Freedom House in 2010, Libya had a civil liberties score of 7 and a
political rights score of 7, Egypt had a civil liberties score of 5 and a political rights score of 6, and
Yemen had a civil liberties score of 5 and a political rights score of 6. It immediately jumps out that
all three of the Muslim-majority countries with successful nonviolent popular overthrows of their
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
83
governments in 2011 had civil liberties scores of 5. e only one of these four countries with a civil
liberties score of 7 – Libya – was the country which had a bloody revolution which was successful
only after the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intervened on the side of
the revolutionaries. Additionally, of the two countries with major uprisings which were unsuc-
cessful in 2011 – Bahrain and Syria – Bahrain had a civil liberties score of 5 and a political rights
score of 6 in 2010, and Syria had a civil liberties score of 6 and a political rights score of 7 in 2010.
Subsequently, in suppressing their revolutionary citizens, they increased their civil liberties scores by
one point each – Bahrain to 6 and Syria to 7 in 2012 (Idem 2010 and 2012).
ese examples from the so-called “Arab Spring” indicate that governments’ relative sup-
pression or tolerance of civil liberties may be an explanatory variable for the likelihood of successful
overthrowing of the government during periods of upheaval. If this is true, this serves as one expla-
nation for Turkmenistan’s failure to liberalize in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed
and many formerly dictatorial communist states embraced democratic reforms. During this period
of upheaval, President Niyazov pursued hard-line crackdowns on dissent, including the govern-
ment takeover of the machinery of religion and the imprisonment of dissenters. e crackdown
on dissent on prevented opposition from gaining a foothold in Turkmenistan. e stability of these
measures has kept the government stable since the fall of the Soviet Union, and the suppression of
civil liberties and maintained.
Charismatic and Strategic Leadership
President Saparmurat Niyazov was a powerful and charismatic leader, and his presidency
at the beginning of Turkmenistan’s independence promoted a centralization of power in the hands
of the president. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, President Niyazov had the political
acumen required to realize that it was strategically advantageous to make the hajj to Mecca in order
to endear himself to the most pious Islamic segments of the Turkmen population. He also took the
time to write the theological works and the Ruhnama , which have been wildly popular in Turkmen-
istan and which have become part of the cultural and religious traditions of the Turkmen people
(Zelkina 1999, 367-368). While other Communist parties were collapsing in the Soviet states,
Filippelli Turkmenistan
84
Niyazov successfully transformed the Communist Party of Turkmenistan into the Democratic Party
of Turkmenistan without relinquishing any of the power, which had been held by the Communist
Party.
Niyazov eectively combined the principles and practices of communist rule with the
nationalism prevalent in post-communist states, demonstrating a great amount of political wisdom
in his creation of a new autocratic ideology to succeed Soviet communism. e religious policies of
Niyazov’s government were deliberately designed to form nationalist unity within the ethnic group
of Turkmens by compelling “traditional” Islamic practices upon the Turkmen majority while allow-
ing the Russian minority to practice its traditions of Russian Orthodox beliefs. As a mark of this
nationalist bent, sanctions against ethnic Turkmens who participate in religious practices contrary to
the “traditional” Turkmen Islam have been tougher than the sanctions against ethnic minorities – a
fact which Alex Norman notes is “unsettlingly similar to Nazi policies” (Norman 2007, 19-35).
e government takeover of the Islamic leadership in Turkmenistan was an ingenious
move to deify President Niyazov and to consolidate the power of the presidency through the control
of the religious leadership. After the state-sponsored atheism of the Soviet Union, the Islamic lead-
ers of Turkmenistan were desirous of supportive leadership from the government, and Niyazov’s im-
mediate signals of support for Islam were welcome (Zelkina 1999, 367-368). By gaining the loyalty
of pious Muslims, he discredited and de-legitimized the extreme fundamentalist elements of Islam.
By doing so, he blunted the inuence of the one group which has historically provided resistance
to dictatorial governments in Muslim-majority countries and secured his ability to rule with little
resistance from any sectors of society.
Oil
Turkmenistan’s proximity to the large oil elds of central Asia is a signicant factor in
the economy of the country. Turkmenistan’s land is necessary for oil pipelines from Russia to the
Persian Gulf, and this is a great source of national income and international clout. e issue of oil
pipelines has dominated Iranian-Turkmen relations, and this has caused Turkmenistan to avoid its
favored policies of isolationism in favor of oil-based interaction with its neighbors (Freitag-Wirm-
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
85
inghaus, 166-167). e oil supply has provided a source of domestic revenue, which the govern-
ment has been able to monopolize by delivering contracts to foreign countries for building pipelines
through the country. Oil revenues have provided the government with a reliable source of money
to fund its operations without having to tax the population much directly.
Oil also discourages foreign powers from intervening with the stability of Turkmenistan;
interference would disrupt the ow of the valuable good from central Asia to the markets in Europe
and North America. is has allowed the Turkmen government to persist as a totalitarian regime
without the interference of foreign regimes. Stability and reliable government revenue have pro-
vided the government with the ability to enact restrictive policies toward civil liberties and political
rights without having to worry about domestic pushback or foreign interference.
No Freedom of the Press
e government maintains absolute control over the press in Turkmenistan, so it is able
to disseminate propaganda, which promotes the perpetuation of the regime of the Democratic Party
of Turkmenistan. Presidents Niyazov and Berdymukhammedov have maintained absolute control
over all aspects of the press in Turkmenistan, and have thereby squashed all dissenting voices and
promoted enthusiastic support for the regime of the two post-communist presidents. e absolute
monopolization of all of the broadcast and print media, along with the infrastructure of informa-
tion distribution and the nation’s access to the Internet, has given the government the ability to
censor all voices of opposition. is has prevented the people of Turkmenistan from receiving infor-
mation about the government’s corruption and the way of life in other countries with less oppressive
governance.
Prospects for Democratization
Bottom-Up or Top-Down Democratization?
It is important to dierentiate between disparate paths to liberal democracy in order
to assess the prospects for each path individually. ere is a signicant distinction between “Arab
Spring”-style bottom-up democratization, in which the people protest and overthrow the govern-
ment, versus a top-down democratization process, in which the sitting government makes gradual
Filippelli Turkmenistan
86
reforms to liberalize its policies regarding civil liberties and to give the people more political rights.
ere are societies in which the former form of government liberalization is more likely and societ-
ies in which the latter is more likely.
Governments with oppressive civil liberties violations, according to the experience of the
“Arab Spring” countries, are unlikely to be toppled by popular rebellions without foreign interven-
tion. Citizens with greater levels of freedom of association and rights of free expression are more
likely to rise up against their governments than those who fear for their lives and freedom. Muslim-
majority countries with strong Islamist movements are also likely to see revolutions to overthrow
oppressive governments, which do not match the Islamic values of the majority of the population.
Conversely, countries most likely to have top-down democratization are those with
powerful rulers whose populations are too oppressed to rise up against their governments. Top-
down reforms are also likely to happen in the case of coups, which often occur when a country has a
strong military or a ruling party, which is independent from the chief executive.
Neither of these forms of democratization is at all likely in Turkmenistan at the current
time. Bottom-up revolution is out of the question with the harsh punishments for dissent and for
associations outside the government’s approval. e near-complete lack of Islamist movements in
Turkmenistan and the institutional support for the government among the religious elite would
prevent an Islamic revolution from occurring. On the other hand, there is little chance for factions
within the government to overthrow President Berdymukhammedov due to the weakness of both
the military and the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan in comparison to the strength of the presi-
dency.
e Death of the President
e best chance for democratization of Turkmenistan would come in the power vacuum
following the death of the president. Freitag-Wirminghaus speculated that this would happen after
the death of President Niyazov: “When Niyazov’s reign one day comes to an end, power struggles
will inevitably arise within the ranks of the numerically small political elite and the present image of
stability may give way to an eruption of clan rivalries” (Freitag-Wirminghaus, 174). However, this
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
87
prediction did not come true when Niyazov died in late 2006 and left the presidency to his prime
minister, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov. e clear line of succession allowed Berdymukhamme-
dov to rise to the presidency without destabilizing the regime. However, the succession after Berdy-
mukhammedov may not be as clear, and the next leader’s distance from the charismatic persona of
Niyazov could make the next president’s rule less stable and enable a liberalization of government
policies. is instability, if it occurs, could lead to the top-down reforms, which are currently not
feasible due to the complete dominance of a president who has no interest in increasing the level of
freedom in Turkmenistan.
Necessary Reforms Before Democratization Can Readily Take Hold
If Turkmenistan were to undergo democratization, there would be necessary prerequisites
to the transition to the status of a “Free” country by Freedom House’s standards. Barring the death
of the president, President Berdymukhammedov would have to institute a voluntary loosening
his grip on power before his dictatorship could be threatened. e easiest way for this to happen
would be for him to relinquish some of his power to the Mejlis, allowing it to serve as a check on
presidential power instead of being a rubber-stamp legislature. A parliament with real power could
result in intra-party splits, which could give rise to the overthrow of the president from inside the
ruling Democratic Party. Top-down democratization could also be achieved if the Democratic Party
- instead of the president - gained the authority to select candidates for the Mejlis and for govern-
ment positions. is could create institutional independence of the ruling political party from the
president, allowing the party to push against and weaken the presidency further.
Bottom-up reform would require more loosening of the grip of the president than top-down
reform. Freedom of association would be an important prerequisite to bottom-up democratization;
this could come in the form of weakened restrictions on religious participation. If dissident Islamic
sects were permitted to exist without threat of arrest or nes, mosques could serve as a source of fu-
ture unrest. Legalization of alternate political parties could also allow opposition to organize freely
to challenge the authority of the government and to raise questions about its legitimacy. Similarly,
freedom of the press could raise public awareness of the corruption and bad practices of the cur-
Filippelli Turkmenistan
88
rent government, spurring public outcries for reform. If President Berdymukhammedov does not
provide for some improvement of the civil liberties of Turkmens, there seems to be no hope for any
movement toward democracy in the near future without the sudden death of the president before
he is able to name a successor.
Conclusion
Presidents Niyazov and Berdymukhammedov have entrenched themselves in power
since the fall of the Soviet Union by promoting a cult of personality around the presidency, deny-
ing citizens civil liberties, and cracking down on all potential forces of opposition. As a result of
the iron-sted stand against democratization, the rst two post-Soviet presidents of Turkmenistan
have managed to maintain a stable authoritarian state. Oil revenue has provided the government
with a source of revenue and has prevented neighboring states from interfering in Turkmenistan’s
aairs. ese factors have contributed to the repression of the Turkmen people, going unabated and
showing no sign of weakening in the near future. e only feasible ways in which democracy could
come to this central Asian country would be if the president voluntarily rolled back his restrictions
on civil liberties or if he allowed his party to have more independence from the presidency. How-
ever, in the absence of these seless sacrices of power by the chief executive, authoritarianism will
remain in Turkmenistan for the foreseeable future.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
89
Works Cited
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Survey. 20(4): 451–465.
Barker, Victoria, Frances di Lauro, and Alex Norman,eds. 2007. “Of Golden Statues and Spiri-
tual Guidebooks: A Report on Freedom of Religion and the Cult of the President in
Turkmenistan.” On a Panegyrical Note: Studies in Honour of Garry W. Trompf, Sydney:
Department of Studies in Religion, University of Syndey: 19-35.
Eisenhower, Susan, Roald Sagdeev, and Roustem Safronov, eds. 2000. “Islam in Turkmenistan:
the Niyazov Calculation.” Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or an Evolving
reat?, Washington: Center for Political and Strategic Studies: 83-85.
Freedom House. 2012 “Central and Eastern Europe/Eurasia.” http://www.freedomhouse.org/re-
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Freedom House. 2007 “Turkmenistan: Freedom in the World.” http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2007/turkmenistan.
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Freitag-Wirminghaus, Rainer, Tourai Atabaki and John O’Kane, eds. 1998. “Turkmenistan’s Place
in Central Asia and the World.” Post-Soviet Central Asia. London: Tauris Academic Stud-
ies:157-176.
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freedom-world/2012/bahrain-0.
Idem. 2010 “Egypt: Freedom in the World.” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-world/2010/egypt.
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Idem.2010 “Tunisia: Freedom in the World.” http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/2010/tunisia.
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freedom-world/2010/yemen.
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Central Asia and East-Central Europe. Berlin: Lit: 125-146.
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Guidebooks: A Report on Freedom of Religion and the Cult of the President in Turk-
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Studies in Religion, University of Sydney: 19-35.
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Paul Filippelli is in his fourth year at Ohio State and graduated this spring. He is majoring in
political science, history, and Latin and will be going to law school next year.
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Filippelli Turkmenistan
92 92

93 93
Can the Current Global Economic Imbalance Be
Solved?: A Brief Analysis of the Factors of Trade
Imbalance
Charlotte Jung
e past 50 years of globalization has brought the discourse of trade to a whole new paradigm. We can no longer
speak about the economic vitality of a country without a discussing the balance of trade. Many OECD countries
face an imbalance- either a lack of exports or imports-that put an enormous burden on future economic forecasts.
When speaking about trade, it is important to understand that a decit on trade is in tandem with a decit on
wealth, which subjects many individuals and families to vulnerability to the economic conditions of the market.
e current discourse on the global trade imbalance faces severe limitations. Limiting the conversation to global
institutions like the World Bank or the World Trade Organization rather than viewing countries as unique ra-
tional actors proves unproductive. is paper discusses trade disparities in a both theoretical and human context.
Introduction & Denitions:
A
s the world struggles to restructure after the most recent economic crisis in 2008,
imbalance sits at the center of discussion. One of the largest contributors of the current
global economic imbalance is the imbalance of trade. is essay aims to analyze
the issues surrounding the trade imbalance: domestic interest, matters of foreign currency, and
institutional fallacies. Doing so will require discussion of: (a) the actors engaged in global trade,
(b) the currently perceived problem, (c) theoretical principles of trade, (d) empirically relevant case
studies and (e) policy suggestions. e paper concludes that, despite eorts of international agents
to foster economic balance, politicians must ultimately act in a myopic domestic paradigm, which
hinders long-term ability to correct the balance of trade. eoretical observation and empirical
evidence also suggests that globalization has historically never been a purveyor of equality or
balance and continues to be unequal and imbalanced today. Continued discourse on inequality and
imbalance is essential. For the purpose of the paper, we will use the European Central Bank’s (ECB)
specied criteria of the denition. e ECB denes global imbalance as: “External positions of
94
systematically important economies that reect distortions or entail risks for the global economy
(ECB 2008, 12).(Bracke, 2010) “As found in John Ravenhill’sGlobal Political Economy, ird Edi-
tion (2011).
eories:
e founding theoretical basis for aggressive trade liberalization after 1940 was classic
liberalism. Classical liberalism provided the grounds to produce the liberal international economic
order (LIEO), which created the Washington Consensus. e Consensus was set up as the “devel-
oped” countries way of aiding the development of “developing” countries and recommended that
they [the less developed countries] reform their existing trade policies with their provided guideline.
(Gore, 2000)John Williamson, the primary economist behind the Consensus, argued that this ap-
proach was a “common core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists (Gore 2000, Williamson
1993, p.1334).” e Consensus was followed up with a propagated set of arguments: rst was with
arguments about the intrinsic ethical superiority of economic liberalism; second, theoretical and
empirical analyses which demonstrated that conformity to the norms of a LIEO would lead to bet-
ter outcomes for both the world community but also for the individual nation-states (Gore 2000,
p.793). ese theoretical guidelines were then “propagated through the stabilization and structural
adjustment policies of the IMF and World Bank (Gore 2000)” e decline of the Washington
Consensus is not the focal point of the paper, it is a backdrop on the theoretical forces that resist
economic balance.
eories surrounding trade often involve addressing two major questions: Why do
nations trade and why nations should trade. All theories discussed assume that trading (when
countries exchange goods and services) is mutually benecial to participating countries and that we
operate on a relatively liberalized trade order (with the exception of some closed markets). We will
briey discuss some of the central ideas behind domestic sources of foreign trade policies: Ricard-
ian, Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson, specic factors model, international competitiveness
and two-level game as central theories of trade. (Hiscox, 2008) e Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin,
Stolper-Samuelson is the basis for the development of the Ricardo-Viner specic factors (SF) model.
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
95
Most economists would agree that these theories only serve as a basic model and practical applica-
tion would involve consideration of two or more theories.
Developed by David Ricardo, the theory of comparative advantage is the principle that
each country possesses the ability to produce at least one product more eciently than others,
even though it may lack absolute advantage in producing that good or service. Trading, according
to comparative advantage then enables specialization of a product thereby increasing welfare. e
Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, derived o of Ricardo, theorizes that each nation’s comparative
advantage is traced to its particular endowments of dierent factors of production: basic inputs such
as land, labor, and capital that are used in dierent proportions in the production of dierent goods
and services. Since each country holds unique comparative advantages and factor endowments, each
country will tend to export items whose production requires use of their abundant factor endow-
ment (Hiscox, 2008 pp. 99).
Stolper and Samuelson (1941) forwarded the H-O model and suggested that trade ben-
eted domestic actors dierently depending on which factor they owned or worked in. According
to the Stoler-Samuelson (S-S) theory, those who own the well-endowed resource factor benet but
hurt owners of scarce factors. Hiscox summarized that, by encouraging specialization of export-
oriented types of production, trade demands for the abundant factors while reducing demand for
scarce factors. is would raise income for the owners of the abundant factor while lowering owners
of scarce factors (Hiscox, 2008 pp. 99). e theory then predicted that this would be at the cost
of real wage to workers in factor-endowed countries and an inverse rise in real come for workers in
labor-intensive countries. Both the S-S and the H-O argue a basic premise for trade theories, but
the Ricardo-Viner specic-factors (S-F) model claries domestic causes for the current imbalance
the best.
e S-F model basically argues that real incomes of those who work in or own export-oriented pro-
duction are closely tied (income likely rises). Likewise, people who work or own import-competing
industries face economic harm. is explains the political coalition between owners and workers of
certain industries in domestic politics. Motivated by the constituents on either side (import-
Jung Factors of Trade Imbalance
96
competing/export-oriented), politicians are pushed into two-level games, in which they try to please
both the domestic interest as well as satisfy international trade agreements. e “two level-game” is
an eloquent metaphor described by Robert Putnam (1988) to clarify the “entangled” and “fruit-
less” debate on “when” and “how” domestic politics aects international relations (Putnam 1988).
Putnam describes situations in which domestic policy makers agree on a position that favors their
constituents and works to promote both the domestic agenda while participating in an international
policy arena. e metaphor is especially potent on analysis that are “neither a purely domestic nor a
purely international analysis” could account for (Putnam 1988, pp.430).
International competitiveness (IC) is the view that it refers to the ability of a country
to realize central economic policy goals, especially growth in income and employment, without
running into balance of payments diculties. Excela-Harrison writes that there is several ways a
country can improve or maintain their IC (i.e. lowering the currency exchange rate). Doing so,
would incur several benets in the international trade arena. Excela-Harrison writes that despite the
views of classical trade theories like comparative or absolute advantage, the world market does not
produce a win-win situation. Many times, trade transactions are quite clearly “zero-sum” games.
erefore, it is good to maintain competitiveness. A term of trade is the relationship between the
average price of a country’s exports and the average price of its imports (Exela-Harrison 1999).
Maintenance of IC is necessary for a country to be able to inuence its terms of trade (TOT) levels
and balance of trade (BOT) (Exealea, 1999)Likewise, Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm, theorizes on
foreign direct investments (FDI), a crucial source of foreign capital, and what factors make a coun-
try a good investment. e theory suggests that FDI investments occur when there is (a) ownership
advantage, (b) location advantage and (c) internalization advantage (Dunning, 1998).
e problem (eoretical and Empirical):
According to Deepak Nayyar, even the word, “globalization” is a source of confusion that
can be used in two ways; a positive sense in which it is used to describe a process of integration into
the world economy and a normative sense to prescribe a strategy of development based on rapid
integration with the world economy.(Nayyar, 2006)Nayyar writes that despite incongruence, there
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
97
are three economic “manifestations of this phenomenon [globalization causes] international trade,
international investment and international nance (Nayyar 2006).”Immanuel Wallerstein begins
his World System Analysis with the derision that social scientists push two major things punctuate
the last decades of the twentieth century: globalization and terrorism. Wallerstein discounts either
of events as a new occurrence and retorts that globalization isn’t a new occurrence. is is true.
ere was a huge phase of globalization about a century earlier in 1870, which exemplied steadfast
growth till it came to a halt in 1914 with the outbreak of the Great War (Nayyar 2006). In the more
recent century of trade, the world economy economically begun to progressively re-integrate in
1950’s and accelerated in the last quarter of the 20th century until the Great Recession. Unlike the
past, we’ve experienced new types of connections by nancial and regulatory institutions and wide-
spread commodity chains. However, the reason economic integration stalled after 1914 and also the
theme of the current economic fragility is the same: globalization begets imbalance.
Liberalization of trade promised prosperity upon cooperation in both phases of global-
ization, before and after war. ose who liberalized, according to Samuelson (1948), should have
experienced overall growth due to factor-price convergence (prices of identical factors if production
(return on capital or wage equalize [between trading countries] trade) as well as a commodity-price
convergence (price matches commodity). e reality was that in the commodity-price convergence
did happen in some areas such as, the Atlantic Economy, Latin America, Middle East and Asia- not
because of trade liberalization but mainly because of a transport revolution. Factor-price conver-
gence, which would theoretically equalize wage between two trading countries producing the same
goods, also happened, but was also limited to Atlantic economies (Nayyar 2006 pp. 150, William-
son 2002). Furthermore, commodity-price convergence should have improved the terms of trade
for countries to promote balance over time. However, the terms improved in a prejudiced pattern.
Terms-of- trade improvement was only apparent for land-abundant countries and was modest for
land-scarce countries, which agrees with our earlier statement that the system of globalization is not
a purveyor of balance.
We will discuss three cases that epitomize behaviors that impede economic and trade bal-
Jung Factors of Trade Imbalance
98
-ance. e rst will be the examination of South Korea’s bind with trade protectionism. e second
case will be the case of eect of Germany’s surplus on regional imbalance. e last case will be the
major Sino-American trade imbalance dilemma. ese three cases prove to exemplify the domestic
causes to trade that impede economic balance.
Empirical Case Studies:
In South Korea and in Germany, there is a nationwide consensus on foreign trade
policy: export. e domestic preferences of these countries project onto foreign policies that result
in a global consequence. e South Korean case looks at an example of the country’s stubborn
reluctance to open their markets. In 2001, the “Big 3” American automotive companies, General
Motors, Ford Motor Co. and DaimlerChrysler petitioned Congress to “condemn” South Korean
automotive trade practices. e petition was met by support as lawmakers in both the Senate and
the House proposed a “strongly worded resolution calling on the Korean government to live up to
the terms of a 1998 agreement aimed at opening South Korea’s automotive market.” e Automo-
tive Trade Policy Council, who speaks on behalf of the “Big 3” reported that Korean companies sell
more than 500,000 vehicles to the US (3% of market) but imports into Korean markets were just
4,414 vehicles, or less than 0.5% of the market. e emphasis, an anonymous lawmaker stated, was
on Korean trade practices because “e US industry is trying to prevent South Korea from becom-
ing another Japan” (US-Korea automotive trade decit of about $5 billion is less than 1/8 of decit
between US-Japan). 10
Since 2000, the real numbers of exports and imports have changed but the ratios remain
relatively similar. South Korea still exports vehicles at extremely disparate rates than it imports.
e Ford Motor Co. has been very vocal in the recent eorts to open up South Korean markets. In
2009, Ford released a sheet of “Myths and Facts” of the US-Korea FTA on the Automotive Sector.
Ford writes, “In an eort to push through a awed US-Korea FTA, some advocates have made
claims that are factually inaccurate or misleading. e following addresses these claims and provide
the facts.” e sheet reported that Korea, in the last decade, has been stubborn in opening up their
markets. Korea ranks “dead last” as the most closed auto market among Organization for Economic
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
99
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Between the EU and South Korea, 17% of all
Korean exports to the EU consisted of vehicles as compared to the EU’s 4%. (ACEA) e domestic
brand, Hyundai/Kia has a stark 80% market share in the Korean market. Despite great interna-
tional products, the total sales in imported vehicles (of all sources Europe, Asia, and Japan) in Korea
in 2009 were meager with 61,000 out of 1.4 million aggregate domestic sales. Korea is currently the
world’s 5th largest exporter of automobiles. (CIA)
e impact of such an aggressive export policy is at the cost as well as a result of domestic
political calamity. e country potentially could benet from more open trade but the domestic
Chaebol interests like Hyundai/Kia Group are set on industry protection and rejection of foreign
goods. Chaebols or business conglomerates, usually associated with a dozen or so families in Korea
were historically credited with leading Korea into modernization. (Kim, 2012) eir businesses are
generally the very recognized global national corporations (i.e. Samsung, Hyundai, and LG). How-
ever, the continued dominance of the Chaebols has become a paradox of policies that is promoting
a backwards development in South Korea. In this small country, where literacy is 99% and most of
the population has attended university, the skilled and educated populace is in a rigged competition
with the rich and elite with ties to the Chaebol for a job with the Chaebol. (Kim, 2004)One of the
owners of the small stores that have been facing heavy competition with recent inltration of Chae-
bol run “hypermarkets” criticized, “ e government repeatedly told us that if Chaebolgrow[sic], so
will employment, exports, and our country’s credit ratings, and the benet would trickle down to
us. at’s a lie. Instead of innovation and going abroad for tough[er] competition, they make easy
money by taking rice bowls from smaller people”(Choe)
e historical position that placed the Chaebol in power is nearly crippling with inequal-
ity. In 2010, the ve biggest Chaebol companies (Samsung, Hyundai Motor, SK, LG and Lotte)
generated 55.7% of South Korea’s GDP. is inuence gives them unprecedented legal, social, and
political leeway. For example, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) was able to sink the even
a moderate reform to “share” the wealth suggested by President Lee Myung-bak (a former Chaebol
chief executive). Promises that were made to have these companies “trickle down” the growth has
Jung Factors of Trade Imbalance
100
long faded as well. Samsung Electronics, producer and manufacturer of everything from computer
chips to ships, had a prot of $4.70 billion in just the 4th quarter alone, but employed less than 5%
of the population (Kim, Park 2012).
Germany also assumes the position of high export and low import into their domestic
markets. As a result of their frugality, the German budget will be balanced for 2013 and 2014 with
even a little surplus for each level of government. However, many economists point to this surplus
as a burden to the region for creating heavy trade imbalances. Germany, a country composed of
savers, “exported more than it consumed, proting neighbors but not reciprocating by buying equal
amounts of imports (Ewing 2010).” Neighboring countries are struggling to knit austerity measures
to recover from heavy debt and overspending. Ewing writes, “ e so-called peripheral countries
have incurred crushing debts in part because they bought too many Mercedes cars…without pro-
ducing enough of their own exports.”
is presents an interesting domestic position. Mercedes cars, like many German goods
are of superior quality. Glasbau Hahn is a family owned glass manufacturer specializing in mu-
seum display glasses. e highly specialized business, “miniature multinational company” of 140
employees or so is the epitome of why Germany is prospering. Glasbau Hahn generates more than
60% of it’s sales abroad. His business, which produces the highest quality of glass and is entrusted
by the museums around the world to hold priceless artifacts, like King Tut’s mummy or the copies
of the Declaration of Independence at the New York Public Library (Ewing 2010). Mr. Hahn,
the owner of the company states that, “ price is secondary to a museum curated entrusted with a
Gutenberg Bible…in 20 years, no one will as what the vitrine cost, what matters is the preserva-
tion of the object.” is exemplies the German stance. Even though German products (and highly
skilled labor) are more expensive, reputation and quality surpasses cost. People are willing to pay
more for well-manufactured and quality products. Inversely, Germany is simply unwilling to import
uncompetitive goods from the Eurozone, eectively causing a regional trade imbalance as well as
policy struggles to x it.
In contrast to Germany’s position as the number one exporter in the world (Rank: 1/194
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
101
CIA 2011), the United States places as the biggest decit country in the world (Rank: 194/194 CIA
2011). e US is currently juggling a massive external trade decit ($-465,900,000,000 est. 2011)
and trade in favor of the country; American politicians have placed emphasis outwardly. One of the
centrally blamed “source” of the trade imbalance is China’s undervalued renminbi (RMB).China
holds the largest portion of US trade decits. When China devalued the currency in 1994, it was
expected that future growth from selling manufactured goods would lead to an eventual oating of
the currency. To Americans’ dismay, the Chinese have not done so and continue to peg their cur-
rency to the US dollar and keep exchange rates low. Keeping currency rates at low rates, combined
with low wage has made China the “manufacturer of the world.” is allows the US to purchase
Chinese goods at consumer-friendly prices at the cost of workers’ wages and purchasing power (of
imported goods). Problematically for the US, these domestic monetary policies cannot be inu-
enced by institutional retaliation (i.e. WTO).
As a result, American politicians have made a bigger domestic push to inuence Chinese
monetary policy. In 2010, President Obama was pressured by 130 members of congress to label
China as a “currency manipulator” to be able to antagonize China as an arbitrager of free trade then
to be able to impose retaliatory trade barriers against Chinese goods. ough many economists did
agree that the Chinese currency was undervalued, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rejected the claim
and said that it was a “kind of protectionism” and had no plans for reform. At the same time, the
consensus is clear that currency is only a part of the problem for the US. Dan Greenhouse, the chief
economic strategist for Tabak and Co writes, “[the only way to reduce the US trade decit is if ] US
consumers shift their consumption to US-produced goods…you need to increase the appeal of US
based goods (Hauser, Barboza 2010)” (Hauser, 2010)
Policy Remedies:
By examining the actors of current dilemmas, we aim to nd areas of policy remedy. Congruent
with the idea that imbalance comes from domestic policy myopia; remedies toward balance must
come from long-term domestic policies. ere are several recommended policies that could help
balance the trade for those who are incurring decits as well as surpluses. e rst remedy is based
Jung Factors of Trade Imbalance
102
on the implications of the specic factors model. Korean citizens, for instance, appear to contribute
to the success of the Chaebol inadvertently due to the linkage between owners of the factors and the
workers. Policy action to lessen the economic power of the Chaebol is most crucial. e most recent
one was by the left-wing Democrat United Party that would limit the ability of Chaebol compa-
nies to hold cross shareholdings, which is a complex web of holdings that allow Chaebol families
to retain control of their empires (Kim and Park 2012). Policies like this would be the rst step to
stabilize internal divide between Chaebols and the working class.
Korea may also benet from decreasing of protectionist measures, not to succumb to
foreign FTA demands, but also in order to consider the general populace. is would ease global
pressures to open up markets, especially in automotive sector, but also increase purchasing power of
the population. Of course, this would be at the cost of prot margins for the Chaebol companies,
but the unproportional gain toward Chaebol families to the Korean populace justies the need for
heavier foreign competition by opening up markets. When companies compete, the consumers win.
is type of counter-intuitive motion to unprotect markets would do well in other countries like
Korea there is: government protected industry, few opportunities for an educated populace, and a
once thriving small-business sector.
e second remedy comes from increasing international competitiveness of decit
countries. To aid with the imbalance in the Eurozone, there have been pressure by the region to
Germany to either increase spending by lowering taxes or decrease their international competitive-
ness by exporting less. However, TommasoPadoa-Schioppa, a former member of the European Cen-
tral Bank’s executive board is correct in saying, “ It hardly makes sense for Germany to export less…
How can you tell Germany they shouldn’t be winners?” e real problem is that decit countries
like Greece and the US enjoyed increased social welfare and wages unmet by equal productivity.
Padoa-Schioppa insists, the gap [between pay and production] has to be closed just as Germany did
in the past decade.”
A similar remedy applies to the US-China relationship. e Sino-American relationship
to Germany and the Eurozone bear similarities (Ewing 2006). e Chinese government has been
Journal of Politics and International Aairs Volume V Issue II Spring 2013
103
similarly pressured by the US to increase currency rates and increase domestic spending. Inter-
national diplomacy to promote “fair” trade is important. However, it is more important to raise
competitiveness using the basis of Dunning’s Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning 1988). Domestic gov-
ernments, rms and investors should increase investments in their home countries in order to make
domestic products more attractive for consumers at home and abroad (Hauser and Barboza 2010).
Also, the government themselves should make broad eorts to encourage sound spending habits to
limit decit inducing consumerism. Lastly, the trade imbalance, though it started as one, does not
have to play by consumerist rules. Highly specialized goods, though it requires higher wages, have
higher prots, which can create a more stable advancement into the future. us, skill and capital
endowed countries like the US should pursue a strategy based on increasing competitiveness, rather
than external two-level games. Suggestions to lower the competitiveness of other countries by pres-
suring them to lower interest rates are regressive to the surplus countries and mostly unhelpful in
the long run to the decit countries.
Conclusion:
Even in three very dierent areas of trade imbalance, the culprit to the global trade imbal-
ance – and perhaps the global economic imbalance- is domestically incurred. We also supported
those problems of international cooperation, like the trade imbalance is ineective with a narrow
discussion on the institutions themselves. All politicians come with a scope of bias to please those
in political power- whether it is the Chaebols or the labor unions. When we consider the problem
of a trade, most people instinctively criticize global governance, like the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO) or the United Nations (UN).. As a
result, the rhetoric is limited to, “X organization does not…therefore we can take A, B, C options to
change X.” is overly simplied discourse leads to continued dissonance between the cooperation
and division. Using any international platform to discuss any specic region or country’s policy is
fundamentally ineective- one size does not t all.
Finally, the discussions of trade and imbalance are only the rst steps to the discussion of
inequality. At the center of all imbalances either in global trade or domestically, are individual
Jung Factors of Trade Imbalance
104
citizens who are unfairly compensated by those who tilt the balance. Kemal Dervis, the former
Head of the United Nations Development Programme writes, “ [ese] imbalances are linked, and
both threaten sustainable rapid growth. Global imbalances and rising domestic inequality need to be
analyzed and debated together. Only then can they be addressed eectively.” Global economic balance
will be preceded by stronger domestic policies to gain international competitiveness and led by a
government that acknowledges the need for equality in benets for their policies.
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
105
References
- ACEA. European Automobile Manufacturer’s Association. [www.acea.be/news/news_detail]
-Bracke, ierry, MattheiuBussiere, Michael Fidora, and Roland Straub. 2008. A Framework for
Assessing Global Imbalances.ECB:Germany
-Choe, Sang Hun. October 3, 2012. S. Koreans Resist Hypermarket’s Intrusion on Small Businesses.
e New York Times.
-CIA World Factbook, World Bank, IMF: Economy Watch Compilation
-Dunning, H John. 1988. e Eclectic Paradigm of Intl. Enterprise. Journal of International Business
Studies
-Exeala-Harrison, Fidelis.1999. eory and Politics of International Competitiveness.USA
-Gore, Charles.2000.e Rise and Fall of the Washington Consensus as a Paradigm for Developing
Countries. World Development Vol. 28, No.5.Elsevier Science Ltd;
-Hauser,Christine and Bardoza, David. US Trade Decit With China Widens. New York Times.
October 15, 2010.
-Hiscox, Michael.2008. e Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies.pp. 96-131 Global
Political Economy ird Edition. Ravenhill.Oxford University Press.
-Kim, Jack and Park, Ju-Min. April 05, 2012. Analysis: South Korea’s Unloved Chaebol. Reuters
Online.
-Kim, Sunwoong. 2004. Changing Facets of Korean Higher Education.University of Wisconson-
Milwaukee:
-Nayyar,Deepak.2006.Globalisation, History and Development: A Tale of Two Centuries. Cambridge
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Journal of Economics.
-Putnam, D Robert.1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: e Logic of Two-Level Games.
International Organization Vol. 42 No. 3, pp. 427-460.
-Ravenhill, John. Global Political Economy. 2011. Oxford University Press. New York.
-Stoer, Harry. 2001. Big ree Seek Trade Help. June 4, 2001. Automotive News Vol.75 Issue 5933
-Williamson, John. 1993. Democracy and the Washington Consensus. World Development Vol. 28,
No.8, pp.1329-1336
Charlotte Jung is a current 4th year at the University of Virginia, anticipating graduation in May
2013.She will be completing her B.A in Foreign Aairs with a concentration in Political Economics.
Charlotte has plans to start her career in government project management after graduation in the
Washington D.C. area. ough she is fascinated by global politics, she is also passionate about
contemporary issues in American politics. She hopes to be able to pursue a career in international
relations but also have time to plant trees in the weekends.
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
107
Jung Factors of Trade Imbalance
108 108

109 109
Democratization in the Philippines
Amanda Van Glider & Patrick Mahoney
e Freedom House Organization, founded in 1941, rates and evaluates the democratic merit of all countries
throughout the world. Over the years, the Philippines’ ratings have uctuated signicantly, currently assigning
them a “Partly Free” status. is status is a reection on the country’s advocacy on democracy, political free-
dom, and human rights. An examination of past ratings reveals a pattern of alterations congruent with regime
and leader changes. e most dramatic of these transitions occurred after the end of the dictatorial regime of
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, which paved the way for Philippine Democratization. is essay will outline the
underlying factors that have contributed to the Philippines’ ongoing struggle to fully democratize, and recieve
a “Free” status.
Introduction
E
ver since the Philippines gained its independence from the United States in 1946, the
country has struggled to retain a completely free democratic status. According to the
Freedom House data, the Philippines currently ranks as a Partly Free country, with an
average 3 rating on the 1 to 7 freedom continuum scale (“Philippines”). roughout its history of
independence, the Philippines has continuously uctuated between not free, partly free, and free
ratings. ere is, however, a noticeable correlation between these rating uctuations in congruence
with the change of chief executives. e most noticeable of such changes was in 1986 after the
overthrow of autocratic leader Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos governed from 1965-1986 without
any form of democratic elections or emancipative civil liberties. During his reign, the Philippines
had an average low freedom rating of 5, putting them on the lower spectrum as a partly free
nation. However, the end of the Marcos regime marked the rst higher Partly Free 3 rating in
the Philippine’s recorded history (“Philippines”). Since this time, the Philippines has remained a
democratic state, although they still face grave problems that challenge both the minimalist and
110
maximalist denition of democracy. Because it broke away from autocratic rule while still struggling
with democracy, the Philippines is dened as a tenuous democratizer. According to Fish and
Wittenberg, a tenuous democratizer is a state that has failed to achieve a FHI score better than 2.5
between 2005 and 2007, while still avoiding autocracy and scoring better than a 4 from 2005-2007
(Haerpfer 250). As a tenuous democratizer, the Philippines then exhibits itself as an “intermediate
case,” in its ability to obtain and retain democracy as exhibited through its past FHI scores.
One of the problems inhibiting democratization lies within the electoral process of the
Philippines. e current Filipino electoral system is a parallel system consisting of a First Past the
Post (FPTP) single-district alongside a List Proportional Representation (List PR) component. e
President and Vice President are separately elected by direct vote through simple plurality and can
serve up to one six year-term (Teehankee 162). e Philippine legislature consists of an upper chamber
Senate and lower chamber House of Representatives. Half of the 24 senators are elected every six years
through simple plurality, with a 2% threshold, while House members are elected through single-
member districts every four years (Teehankee 162). In addition, the Philippine political system is
worn down by weak political parties and internal factionalism. is weakness and factionalism stems
from the fact that political parties are more so based on personalities and regional and ethnic identities
rather than ideologies, weak political parties, and the domination of traditional elites in using their
socioeconomic inuence. All three of these main factors contribute to the shaky electoral process
in the Philippines. is has then led to electoral leaders without a majority vote, who rule with
corruption and cater to identities rather than ideologies.
Parties Based on Personalities and Regional and Ethnic Identities rather than Political Ideologies
Having undergone two signicant colonization periods, by both Spain and the United
States, while simultaneously being located in Southeast Asia, the Philippines has a fairly ethnically
diverse population. is ethnic fractionalization often leads to ethnic clashes and, therefore, political
factionalism. In the case of the Philippines, these social separations as they apply politically are known
as cleavages, which “are generally understood to be social divisions—often having to do with dierences
of class, religion, ethnicity, or region— that social movements and political parties actively politicize
in order to win supporters and voters” (ompson 162). e most prevalent of such fractionalization
occurs within the dierent religious sects. e Philippines currently has a population that is roughly
83% Catholic, 3% evangelical, 4.5% other Christian, and 5% Islamic (“e Philippines”). In
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
111
addition to the dierent religious sects, many dierent ethnic groups, such as the Taglogs, Cebuanos,
Ilocanos, Bisayas/Binisayas, Hiligayons, Ilonggs, Bikols, and Warays, contribute to the ethnically
divided political parties that thwart the success of democracy in the Philippines (“e Philippines”).
According to Fish and Wittenberg, two main stymies to the attainment of democracy are the presence
of Islam and ethnic fractionalization (Haerpfer 252-253). Although ethnic heterogeneity does not
prove to be directly inclusive, Fish and Wittenberg point out that it still holds importance nonetheless.
In addition to factors that hinder democracy, Fish and Wittenberg also argue that insurgent groups
derail democracy (Haerpfer 258).
In the case of the Philippines, all three factors of ethnic heterogeneity, Islam, and insurgency
are present. e relatively high presence of Islam among a mostly Christian population and widely
segregated ethnic groups gives way to ethnic heterogeneity. is makes way for the presence of
extremist insurgent groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) (Handelman and
Tessler 195). e main goal of MILF is to establish their own autonomous Bangsamoro region in
the southern Philippines using both diplomatic and militant means (San Juan 1-2). In terms of the
electoral process, MILF has inltrated the democratic process several times. For instance, during the
1998 election, in which Joseph Estrada assumed the presidency, MILF ordered all of its supporters
not to vote in protest of both the government and the constitution on which it is based as a whole
(Handleman and Tessler 197). On October 12, 2012, however, MILF head ocers and Philippine
President Aqunio IIIsigned ocial Peace Agreements that will hopefully pave the way towards a more
stable democracy (Carlos 175).
It is extremely dicult to have an eective democracy—one that is based on voters making
informed decisions—when the people are more united by ethnic ties than national ties. In his novel
“Patterns of Democracy,” Alexander Lijphart supports the connection between ethnic fractionalization
and democratic stability, stating that under the conditions of a democracy in a pluralistic society
“majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous, because minorities that are continually
denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and may lose their allegiance
to the regime” (Lijphart 31-32). is is the situation for many ethnic groups in the Philippines,
especially of the Muslim population, who have resorted to insurgency groups to gain governmental
inuence.
In this way, Fish and Wittenberg are correct in tying ethnic heterogeneity with stymied
democratization. Insurgency aside, severe ethnic divides make it dicult to unite the country under
one legitimate, political force. e presence of Islam amongst several competing, fractionalized ethnic
Van Glider & Mahoney Democratization in the Philippines
112
groups and the added complication of Islamic insurgency have impeded the electoral process in the
Philippines, thus hindering its ability to develop as a free-rated democracy, and making it a tenuous
democratizer.
Weak Political Parties
Since the Philippines operates under a parallel electoral system, it elects ocials using a
majoritarian model, while simultaneously catering to its pluralistic society by means of a List PR
system (Reynolds 104). eir nine parties, as marked by recent leaders, include the National Party
and New Society Movement (Marcos), the Filipino Democratic Party-Peoples’ Power (Aquino),
People’s Power-National Union of Christian Democrats (Ramos), Struggle of the Filipino Masses
(Estrada), People’s Power-Partner of the Free Filipino-Christian Muslim Democrats (Arroyo), and
the Liberal Party (Aquino III) (“Philippine Presidents”). Although there are several political parties,
many of them share common goals, especially those based within the same ethnic and religious sects.
erefore, as seen in many coalition settings, instead of there ever being one majority, votes are often
spread across several dierent parties and never grant any one party the majority. For example, in the
May 1992 election in the Philippines, “Fidel Ramos was elected from a seven-candidate eld with
only 24% of the popular vote” (Reynolds 133). Without a clear majority winner, those of the losing
minority party in fact become the majority in disagreement with the elected party.
In addition to a widespread party system that oers minimal support, those parties that
do have success provide very limited benets to their members and candidates. Parties themselves
are typically merely representative, as previously mentioned, as ethnic and regional ties, but do not
provide any ideological political support (ompson 162). Due to this fact, and that “parties provide
few campaign resources, candidates have limited incentives to ‘toe the party line,’” thus weakening
the vigor and competition of elections. Knowing they have a weak support base, many candidates
do not have bold political platforms. is then hinders any audacious action or eectiveness in
their potential administration (Handleman and Tessler 189). Essentially, in the Philippine electoral
system, “democratic consolidation is impeded by the personalism, lack of accountability, and electoral
volatility which characterize polities where political parties are weak” (Handleman and Tessler 189).
In addition to the lack of a strong candidate support base, frequent party-switching among politicians
undermines party signicance and eectiveness (Lande 99). Party switching also tends to complicate
and muddle executive-legislative relations (Handleman and Tessler 189-190). Witha single-member
district majoritarian system layered against a List PR, multi-party system, there is often political
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
113
gridlock, making it dicult for the government to pass any eective legislation. is issue then leads
to political corruption as the executive tries to purchase the cooperation of the legislative body. For
example, under the 1995 Ramos administration, Ramos’s party purchased the allegiance of 20 out
of 24 Senators using “sizable amounts of the national budget to individual legislators” (Handleman
and Tessler 190). is sort of electoral corruption causes extreme democratic instability, as it fails
to adequately represent the will of the people. Overall, weak political parties violate one of Robert
Dahl’s six criteria for polyarchy in that it provides inadequate associational autonomy (Dahl 189).
Although the Filipino people possess the right to associational autonomy, it is not fully expressed,
thus leading to less legitimate political involvement by the masses. is then enables the problem of
ethnic fractionalization and governance by traditional elites, whose exclusive power further stymies
the Philippines as a tenuous democratizer.
Domination by Traditional Elites
In addition to ethnic fractionalization, lack of accountability and personalism of parties
is also rooted in the domination by political elites (Handelman&Tesseler 189). Within the Filipino
society, the elites, or those of higher socioeconomic standing, dominate Philippine politics. Because
politicians take advantage of this wealth, “corruption pervades all levels of government and has crippled
the government’s attempts to achieve scal stability. e Philippine government operates on a budget
of approximately US$14 billion annually. Revenues reach only about $10.5 billion, leaving a $3.5
billion decit” (Rogers 117). For this reason, the high socioeconomic gap among the Filipino people
causes problems in the electoral process of Philippine politics. For example, in addition to creating
economic instability and a decit, in many electoral circumstances elites have used their wealth
and power to manipulate the rural voting blocs. ese blocs consist of people who are desperately
impoverished, and thus easily inuenced (Handlemann and Tessler 184). is socioeconomic
stronghold of the elite is congruent with the issue of weak political parties in that “the uncertainty of
electoral outcomes is compromised in a sense not by dominant political parties but by the continuing
inuence of the traditional elite, regardless of party aliation” (Handleman and Tessler 184). Both
Samuel Huntington and Adam Przeworski can support this socioeconomic stratication in terms of
democratic struggle. Huntington, who categorizes the Philippines as a later democratizing, “third
wave” country, would point out that although it is not essential to the development of democracy,
with a higher level of economic developmentthe Philippines would be more likely to democratically
succeed (Huntington 59). Considering that such economic development would put the rural voting
Van Glider & Mahoney Democratization in the Philippines
114
blocs in a position less persuaded by the elites, Huntington’s argument proves relevant. In accordance,
Przeworski points out the correlation between economic development and the maintenance of
democracy. Specically, he states that “above $6,000, [in per capita GNI] democracies are impregnable
and can be expected to live forever; no democratic system has ever fallen in a country where per-
capita income exceeds $6,055” (Przewroski 2). Considering that the Philippines’s current GNI per
capita is $4,100, and 26.5% of the population lives below the poverty line, under Huntington and
Przeworski’s theories, relatively low economic development helps explain the Philippine’s struggle as
a tenuous democracy (“e Philippines”). Also, this corrupt domination of the elite supports Lipset’s
modernization theory, which states as economic development increases, the masses gain more access
to political mobility, giving them a greater motivation and means to take action in their government
(Lipset). If the rural votershad the proper economic means, they would not be as susceptible to the
manipulation by the elite and could instead take more initiative in establishing their own stake in the
government. Overall, the dominance of the traditional elites in the electoral system of the Philippines
takes root in the large socioeconomic gap in the state and in the Philippine’s status as a developing
country.e relative poverty in the Philippines under the governance of traditional elites has led to its
struggle to maintain democracy.
Strategies to Improve Quality of Democracy
e Philippines currently runs under a mixed FPTP and List PR electoral system. Typically,
this system succeeds in those countries that operate primarily under two party systems. However, the
Philippines has a pluralistic society that operates with nineprominent, yet weak, parties. is FPTP
electoral system therefore hinders democratic development in the Philippines, as it suppresses the vast
number of minority parties. In fact, during his 1986-1992 administration, former President Corazon
Aquino attempted to redraft the constitution favoring a more multi-party system under a presidential
government. However, the plethora of parties that emerged after the Marcos era failed to “transcend
traditional modes of political contestation” (Teehankee163). Instead, the Philippines should focus
more on having a consociational electoral system in which the government is more inclusive towards
and representative of minorities. is is important considering that no one political party constitutes
the majority within the current electoral system and that these parties are essentially founded on
ethnic and regional ties.
In addition, a principally consociational model would allow the executive branch to share its power
through a coalition, as opposed to concentrating it in just one party. is would suit the Philippines
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
115
well, considering that a lot of the political parties share similarities. For example, the People’s Power-
National Union of Christian Democrats and the Peoples Power-Partner of the Free Filipino-Christian
Muslim Democrats undoubtedly share many of the same objectives, save the presence of the emphasis
on Muslim representation in the latter. If these parties were to put aside their minute dierences
and form coalitions, not only could they form a majority party within the electoral system, but they
could also mend currently fringed ethnic relations. A fully consociational electoral model would
both address and accommodate the ethnic pluralism within the Philippines, as well as the weak
political parties it causes. In addition, minorities having greater input in the government may strip
the existing inuence and corruption of the traditional elites. is would also allow a more cohesive
relationship between the executive and legislative bodies. In addition to establishing a consociational
electoral system, the Philippines needs to focus on further developing economically. With a more
enabled populationas a result of increased economic development, the masses are less likely to be
manipulated by the elites. Overall, in order to fully consolidate democracy as a partly free-rated,
tenuous democracy, the Philippines should direct its attention towards a fully consociational electoral
system.
Conclusion
e Philippines currently struggles to consolidate its democracy primarily due to its
awed and discordant electoral process. A result of the Philippines’ deeply pluralistic society, one
of the greatest stymies to democracy is ethnic fractionalization, which causes the dierent religious,
regional, and ethnic groups only to unite under cultural solidarity, as opposed to political ideologies.
is idea is especially evident in the presence of both Islam and Islamic insurgent groups within
the heterogeneous society, which has led to electoral disruption, violence at the poles, and radically
dierent cultural ideologies.is internal domestic political tension has also contributed to the
weakness of political parties. Such weakness further inhibits democratic consolidation within the
Philippines because weak parties fail in producing a majority party and do not provide a solid political
support system for candidates. is weakness then leads to political corruption through a hindered
elective-legislative relationship and enables the rule of traditional elites.
All three of these electoral issues lead to a partly free rating that has plagued the Philippines
tenuously throughout the past several decades. e best approach to consolidating these problems
resides in reforming the current FPTP component of the parallel electoral system towards a more
consociational model, in which all of the minority political parties are able to coalesce and share
Van Glider & Mahoney Democratization in the Philippines
116
power. is will not only allow for greater representation among several dierent parties of a pluralistic
society, but it will also help bridge the relationship between the executive and legislative bodies,
due to the reduced need to party switch. In addition, to switching their main electoral process, the
Philippines should focus on further economically developing. In order to fully consolidate democracy,
the Philippines must rely on the implementation of a fully consociational electoral process to overcome
the current electoral aws that lie in the fractionalization of ethnic groups, weak political parties, and
the domination by traditional elites.
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
117
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Web. 2 Nov. 2012.<http://journals.ohiolink.edu:6873/journals/journal_of_democracy/
v007/7.1przewor ski.html>.
Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. “Electoral System Design: e New
International IDEA Handbook.” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance. (2008): 130-135. Web. 12 Nov. 2012. <http://www.idea.int/publications/
esd/upload/ESD_Handb_low.pdf>.
Rogers, Steven. “Philippine Politics and the Rule of Law.” Journal of Democracy. 15.4 (2004):
111-125. Web. 2 Nov. 2012. <http://muse.jhu.edu>.
San Juan, E. Jr. “e National-Democratic Struggle in the Philippines.” University of Victoria. n.
page. Web. 2 Nov. 2012. <web.uvic.ca/~anp/Public/posish_pap/San_Juan.pdf>.
Selochan, Viberto. “e Military and the Fragile Democracy in the Philippines.”Australian
University E-Press. (2004): 58-68. Web. 10 Nov. 2012. <http://epress.anu.edu.au/
mdap/ch04.pdf>.
Teehankee, Julio. “Electoral Politics in the Philippines.” Electoral Politics in Southeast and East
Asia. (2009): 149-202. Web. 10 Nov. 2012. <http://library.fes.de/pdf- les/
iez/01361006.pdf>.
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ompson, Mark R. “Reformism vs Populism in the Philippines.” Journal of Democracy. 21.4
(2010): 154-168. Web. 2 Nov. 2012. <http://muse.jhu.edu>.
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
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Amanda Van Gilder
Amanda is a second year honor student at Baldwin Wallace University, with a duel major in
International Studies and Spanish. While on campus, she has participated in Spanish Club and
Student Government. Originally from Akron, Ohio, she spent the summer of 2010 in Germany, and
the spring of 2013 studying in Spain. In the future, she plans on attending graduate school to study
International Development.
Patrick Mahoney
Patrick is a third-year student at Baldwin Wallace University who has a double major in Political
Science and International Studies with a minor in Spanish Language. Patrick serves as Student Body
President for the university for the 2013 - 2014 academic year.
Van Glider & Mahoney Democratization in the Philippines
120 120

121 121
An Examination of the Scottish Independence Debate:
North Sea Oil, the Currency Union, the European
Union, and Trident
James McKeon
On September 18, 2014 the Scottish public will have the opportunity to vote in a referendum to either become
an independent country or remain within the United Kingdom of Great Britain of Northern Ireland. Amidst
the vociferous rhetoric between both sides of the Scottish independence debate, this academic work impartially
examines the most important issues surrounding the discussion of the referendum without the political spin of
either side campaigning for a “yes” or “no” vote. e contentious debate over the economic benets of North Sea
oil, the proposal for a currency union between Scotland and the remaining United Kingdom, the possibility of
an independent Scotland remaining within the European Union, and the removal of Trident Nuclear Weapons
are all thoroughly examined. Ultimately, the people of Scotland will make their own judgement about the future
of their beloved country with the rest of the world eagerly awaiting the result.
Introduction
T
he world will have its eyes on Scotland during the autumn of 2014 as the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has the potential to shrink from a
union of four countries to only three. With the agreed timetable complete between
the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government for a referendum on Scottish
independence, it is now up to the citizens and residents of Scotland to determine the fate of their
beloved country. Should Scotland stay or should Scotland go? e answer varies depending on
who is asked. e First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, has argued that voting for Scottish
independence would be the best decision that the people of Scotland could make to ensure
a prosperous time ahead. During a speech to the Scottish Parliament on 25 January 2012,
Mr.Salmond stated:
Independence will give us the opportunity to take dierent decisions – to implement policies
designed for Scotland’s needs. And that means we will be able to make Scotland the country we all
know it can be – a wealthier and fairer nation. A country that speaks with its own voice, stands
122
stands taller in the world, and takes responsibility for its own future (2012).
Yet the former Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, Alistair Darling, has
argued that voting for independence creates a doubtful proposition that will only hurt the people of
Scotland in the long run. On 25 June 2012, Mr. Darling launched the anti-independence campaign
known as ‘Better Together’ with a speech that stated in part:
e last things we need are the new areas of uncertainty, instability and division that
separation will involve. e choice we make will be irrevocable. If we decide to leave the
United Kingdom there is no way back. We can’t give our children a one-way ticket to a deeply
uncertain destination (2012).
Which side is correct in the debate over Scottish independence? e key areas of discussion
for both pro-independence campaigners and loyal unionists centre on the issues of economics,
defence, and politics. ere is an extensive amount of literature and studies that both sides have
used to varying degrees thus far in their respective campaigns. In fact, each side has even used the
same reports to their advantage, focusing on specic conclusions that benet their argumentation.
e existing literature and studies are very reliable, providing more than enough information to fully
address the questions surrounding Scottish independence.
is academic work will therefore examine the arguments from both signs of the
independence debate in a literature review and analysis-based format. Although the information is
abundant, there is still a clear gap in the current academic literature of a very focused examination of
the main arguments for and against Scottish independence. e research provided will bring all of
the currently scattered information together by conducting a thorough examination using detailed
literature, studies, and expert witness testimony. It will conclude with an analysis of the merits of
Scottish independence based on the ndings. e end goal will be an in-depth discussion of Scottish
independence without the political spin of either side campaigning for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote during the
2014 referendum.
Chapter one will rst explain the international legality behind the independence of a
nation and the right to self-determination. Next, the domestic legality of the upcoming referendum
and independence will be explored by explaining the 2011 election victory by the Scottish National
Party (SNP) and the signing of the historic Edinburgh Agreement.
Chapter two will thoroughly examine the four main economic, political, and defence
arguments that dene the debate between both sides of the independence movement. e specic
issues discussed will be the eect of North Sea oil, the proposed currency union between an
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123
independent Scotland and the remaining United Kingdom, European Union (EU) membership, and
the Trident nuclear weapons issue.
Chapter three will focus on a personal analysis of Scottish independence based on the
evidence examined. By giving weight to both sides of the argumentation, the analysis will convey an
impartial look into the eects of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote.
e last section will be a conclusion that summarizes what has been discussed with
a reiteration of the results of the research as well as the main conclusions and ndings. Further,
the conclusion will close the dissertation by discussing the probable future of Scotland whether the
referendum is won or defeated and the future of the independence debate as 2014 nears.
e importance of a detailed discussion of Scottish independence cannot be stated enough.
e people of Scotland will be casting a very historic and monumental vote in 2014 and the major
issues must be examined before the votes are cast. Although it will ultimately be up to the Scottish
voters, they must be guided by competent academic literature that will aid in making the best decision.
As an extensive academic work, this dissertation will be able to further that process and ultimately
help the people of Scotland to make an informed and educated judgment on Scottish independence.
Chapter One
e right to self-determination has been recognized in international law for decades.
Chapter I, Article I of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (UN) unequivocally grants the right
for a nation to determine its own future. e Charter states that the purpose of the UN is ‘To
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’
(United Nations 1945). Other international documents also legitimize the right to self-determination.
Both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights state that ‘All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development’(United Nations 1976).
e Kingdom of Scotland joined with the Kingdom of England to create Great Britain
(now known as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) in 1707 (e National
Archives 1707). is act of union created a unied Kingdom, dissolving the former Scottish
Parliament and moving all legislative activity to London (e National Archives 1707). Although it
is part of a political union, Scotland is still considered to be a country, albeit not an autonomous or
independent entity (ISO 2007). However, with the international legal realm clearly recognizing the
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
124
inherent right for self-determination and considering Scotland’s status as a country, arguments have
persisted for years that the Scottish people can choose to become a truly independent state if popular
will demands this course of action.
e SNP has been the main political party in recent times that has consistently argued for
an independent Scotland. After winning a majority in the devolved Scottish Parliamentary election
of 2011, the SNP campaigned for a Scotland-wide referendum to determine whether to remain in
the United Kingdom or become an independent state (Johns et. al. 2012). After long negotiations, an
agreement was reached between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government to
hold a referendum during the autumn of 2014. Colloquially known as the ‘Edinburgh Agreement’,
this document gave a full legal transfer from Westminster (United Kingdom Goverment) to Holyrood
(Scottish Government) to hold the referendum election however it would like, as long as there is only
one question being asked (Johns et. al. 2012).
e Edinburgh agreement proved to be very important for the right of Scottish self-
determination because it gave legal legitimacy for the Scottish Government to hold the referendum
and thus to determine its country’s future. Since international law already accounted for this issue,
the approval by the Parliament of the United Kingdom sealed the deal for the legal right to self-
determination. With the legal status certain, it is now up to the people of Scotland to determine its
own will. e remaining dissertation will thus shy away from the legality of the referendum and focus
on the debate between independence supporters and those who favour the current union.
Chapter Two
e arguments for and against Scottish independence are generally based on economic,
political, and defence issues. ere are many intricate and precise arguments made by both sides of
the debate that tend to utilize expert testimony and empirical studies that support their arguments.
As will be seen, there are times when the pro-independence and anti-independence movements use
the same documents to justify the reasoning behind their philosophies.
is chapter will be broken into subsections for each major argument that will be
discussed, which will be the eect of North Sea oil, the proposed currency union, European Union
(EU) membership, and the Trident nuclear weapons issue. Each subsection is consistent in formatting
by starting with pro-independence argumentation and ending with anti-independence counter-
argumentation.
A. North Sea Oil
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e most recent gures on North Sea oil estimate that 40 billion barrels of oil have been recovered to
date, while about 12-24 billion barrels of recoverable reserves remain. It has been estimated that these
reserves could be worth up to £1.5 trillion. In fact, a study by the University of Aberdeen concluded
that the oil from the West of Shetland area alone could produce £370 billion in new revenues over
the next 40 years (O&G ILG 2012) (Kemp and Stephen L. 2009).
e SNP argues that this oil revenue, if controlled by an independent Scotland, could be
used to benet the people of Scotland through the increased control of revenue assets. Further, the
SNP proposes the creation of an oil fund similar to that of Norway that could potentially be used
as an additional spending resource for an independent Scottish government. In 2007, the Scottish
Executive (now known as the Scottish Government), stated in a report:
Scotland could also assume responsibility for oil and gas reserves in Scotland and
Scottish waters, regulating these with a view to maximising economic production of oil and gas and
the overall benet to Scotland. e people of Scotland could be given an eective say on how this
money should be used, perhaps following the example of Norway by investing in a fund designed
to provide benets, not only for today, but for decades, and generations, to come (e Scottish
Executive 2007).
e Norwegian Petroleum Fund, now known as e Government Pension Fund – Global,
was created in 1990 and required nancial resources to be allocated to the fund in the event of a
budget surplus. Since there were consistent budget decits for the rst half of the decade, the money
did not actually transfer to the Petroleum Fund for the rst time until 1996. After that point, the
Fund saw increasing growth, totalling US$80 billion by 2001 or about 45% of its annual gross
domestic product(GDP) at the time (Davis 2003). As of September of 2012, the size of the Fund
is more than US$654 billion, compared to a current GDP of US$485.8 billion, or 135% of GDP
(Norges Bank Investment Management 2012) (e World Bank 2012).
e main goals of the Fund included evening out the spending of oil revenues in a volatile
scal market and serving as an extended savings account to increase assets while preparing for
increased expenditures in the future (Davis 2003). Considering the success of these goals as well as
the enormous size in nancial assets of the Fund, there is no question for why the SNP has used the
Norwegian model as a hypothetical example for an independent Scotland.
e SNP also has plenty of support for the merits of independently controlled oil revenues.
e Steel Commission, a report created by the Scottish Liberal Democrats, a political party that is
diametrically opposed to Scottish independence, actually came to conclusions that the SNP would
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
126
agree with on North Sea oil. e irony of the Steel Commission is that it was created to envision
a federalist United Kingdom in a structure similar to that of the United States, but certainly not
anything near independence. Nevertheless, the Commission reported that if Scotland had complete
control over North Sea oil revenues, the decit in Scottish public nances would be reduced, although
not completely erased (Scottish Liberal Democrats 2006) (Kasakova 2009).
e Steel Commission’s ndings support the arguments from the SNP that control of
North Sea oil revenues would improve the economy of Scotland. In addition, according to the SNP,
the creation of the oil fund on top of the general gains from revenue increases would alleviate decit
issues in the future for an independent Scotland and be further used to cut down on the debt that
would need to be negotiated between the United Kingdom Government and Scottish Government.
e Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) produced a report entitled, ‘Scottish Independence:
e Fiscal Context’ that did not specically cover the proposed oil fund, but did examine North Sea
oil revenues in an independent Scotland, coming to a very similar conclusion as the Steel Commission.
is report is a perfect example of a document that is cited by both sides of the independence debate
for dierent reasons.
e IFS found that if North Sea oil revenue was allocated on a geographical basis in
Scotland, meaning control of 90% of the total North Sea oil revenue, it would more than pay for the
additional public spending per capita of the people of Scotland compared to the rest of the United
Kingdom. Currently, the numbers stand at Scotland having higher public spending per pupil by
about £1,200 a year, or £11,800 against £10,600 in 2010-11 (Johnson and Phillips 2013).
e notion that Scottish residents have a higher cost to United Kingdom taxpayers is
highly contested by the SNP and the Scottish Government, since Scotland produces 9.6% of the
United Kingdom tax revenue (including North Sea oil revenue) and is returned with 9.3% of overall
UK public expenditures (e Scottish Government 2012) . With that being said, the IFS report
indicates that at current revenue rates, an independent Scotland could maintain the levels of public
spending that it currently sustains within the United Kingdom. e SNP therefore augments this
point and argues that even if oil revenues fall in the future, the creation of the proposed oil fund
would counter the revenue loss and keep public spending expenditures at a sustainably high level,
while still combating the expected debt with the assets that are remaining.
Although this sounds like an ideal situation, there is not a unanimous opinion on the
merits of a Scottish oil fund or the long-term assets of North Sea oil revenue in general. Many
analysts have concluded that a reliance on North Sea oil could prove costly to an independent
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Scotland. Additionally, it has been pointed out that the proposed oil fund might not necessarily be
desirable or even realistic considering the current economic situation of Scotland.
e Centre for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR) at the University of Glasgow issued a
report in February 2012 that examined the prospects of the proposed Scottish oil fund. Alex Salmond,
the First Minister of Scotland and the leader of the SNP, spoke in a lecture at the London School
of Economics (LSE) and outlined his proposal for a Scottish oil fund that invests about £1 billion
over a twenty-year period, creating a fund with about £30 billion when investments and ination are
taken into account (Salmond 2012). Using this specic proposal as the base for the report, the CPPR
explored the mathematics needed to reach such an amount, concluding that the fund would need to
achieve an annual yield of 4% per year and save all of its funds over the twenty-year period to achieve
the £30 billion goal (Centre For Public Policy for Regions pg. 1 2012).
With the necessary calculations completed, the CPPR next examined whether this oil fund
is actually a realistic proposal. Analyzing the Scottish budget over recent years, the report found that,
‘over the recent past, the current budget surplus was never at, or above, £1 billion surplus in any
year; and in only 3 out of 8 years was there a surplus that could have been available to invest’ (CPPR
pg. 4 2012). e proposed oil fund would model the Norwegian example, meaning that a surplus is
absolutely necessary for the plan to come to fruition. Since a budget surplus seems highly unlikely
in the near future, the report explained that a realistic Scottish oil fund would depend on higher oil
prices, increased taxes, lower expenditures, or a combination of all three.
At this particular moment in time, the CPPR found that ‘there is no immediately obvious
workable explanation of how such a fund would arise’ (CPPR pg. 4 2012). e report concluded
by stating that the idea of an oil fund is highly desirable on moral and even possibly economic
grounds; however, creating a Scottish oil fund with current expenditures and oil prices would force
decisions to be made by the Scottish Government that would slash expenditures and increase revenue.
Since consistent budget surpluses seem unrealistic for the future, the CPPR suggested that it seems
improbable for an oil fund to be created, especially at the level that Alex Salmond suggested in his
lecture at the LSE (CPPR pg. 6 2012).
e IFS report previously cited for support of Scottish independence also suggests that
North Sea oil revenues may not be that advantageous for an independent Scotland. is is where
the anti-independence campaigns have cited the report. e IFS predicted that oil revenues will
not increase over time and will most likely fall at a signicant level. In this context, an independent
Scotland would be forced to make even more dicult decisions than what remains of the United
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
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Kingdom, as the reliance on North Sea oil would be more pivotal for the Scottish economy (Johnson
and Phillips 2012).
Further, the IFS concluded that current expenditure levels in an independent Scotland may
be sustainable for the short term with North Sea oil revenues, but the medium to long-term prospects
are not as bright. In fact, present expenditure levels ‘may not be sustainable in the face of volatile
and, over the long run, probably diminishing North Sea revenues’ (Johnson and Phillips 2012). If
this occurs, the independent Scottish Government would be forced to make decisions to combat the
loss in revenue from falling oil prices. Predicting what those decisions would be was too much of a
hypothetical scenario for the IFS and this dissertation will not attempt to discern future policymaking
decisions in such a way either.
A. e Currency Union
An independent Scottish state would need to make a denitive decision on the currency
that it will use. ere are three major options that the Scottish government could take in this situation.
First, the new independent state could join the euro zone, either as an acceded member-state since it
was already in the European Union (EU) for as long as the United Kingdom, or by applying as a new
member. Whether Scotland would automatically accede to the European Union is a very controversial
subject that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter. Regardless, there is clearly an option
for Scotland to take the Euro as its currency, assuming that the EU would allow it to remain or
reapply as a member. Although formerly the position of the SNP, this option is not currently the
rst choice among independence advocates, presumably due to the recent misfortunes of the euro
zone. Second, an independent Scotland could create its own currency that is either scally based on
the pound sterling or is completely independent. e ability to peg an independent currency to an
internationally traded standard or currency is not only allowed on the international market, but it also
has precedent in the past (Kocherlakota and Krueger). ird, the Scottish Government could decide
to keep the pound sterling as its national currency, whether the United Kingdom is supportive or not.
e current Scottish Government controlled by the Scottish National Party (SNP) has
in recent times argued for the third option, that an independent Scotland will maintain the pound
sterling and start a monetary union with the remaining United Kingdom, possibly naming it the
‘sterling zone’ (e Scottish Government pg. 31 2007). John Swinney, the Cabinet Secretary for
Finance, Employment and Sustainable Growth in the Scottish Government, has argued that it is not
only in the best interest of Scotland to retain the pound sterling, but it is also advantageous for what
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would remain of the United Kingdom. Mr.Swinney stated on 11 June 2012:
Regardless of what may be said in the heat of constitutional debate it would simply not
make sense for anyone to resist the creation of a formal Sterling zone and the mutual benet it would
bring. Our on-shore economy is approximately 8% of the UK’s – broadly equivalent to the size of the
entire UK nancial sector – while many of our key sectors such as oil and gas, nancial services and
whisky make a signicant contribution to the UK’s Balance of Payments. Oil and Gas UK estimate
that oil and gas production in the UK boosted the UK’s balance of payments by £32 billion in 2010,
almost halving the UK’s decit. Our economies share broadly the same structures with a free-ow
of goods, services, labour and capital across the border which is in contrast to many in the Euro
Area. erefore we display all the characteristics of an optimal currency area (2012).
Mr.Swinney’s statements are crucial for the debate on the currency of an independent
Scotland as they argue that since Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom are currently strongly
economically tied, it would only hurt both countries if Scotland does not keep the pound sterling.
In essence, he argues that the United Kingdom Government would only be hurting itself by not
supporting the Scottish Government’s proposal to keep the pound sterling. Even without the
support of the United Kingdom Government, an independent Scotland could still retain the pound,
according to Mr.Swinney, because it is a publicly traded currency. He stated in the same speech, ‘As
an internationally tradable currency Sterling is as much Scotland’s currency as it is the currency of
England and Wales’ (2012).
However, the anti-independence campaign has suggested that a currency union is
completely undesirable for an independent Scottish state. George Osborne, the current Chancellor
of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, has suggested that a currency union would resemble the
recent problems of the euro zone. During a speech in September of 2012, Mr. Osborne stated:
After flirting with the Euro and floating other possible arrangements, the Scottish
Government’s latest position is that an independent Scotland would seek to enter a formal monetary
union within a sterling zone. But the conundrum of the Eurozone crisis is how dicult it is to
combine currency union with full scal and political independence (2012).
Mr. Osborne’s statements strongly suggest that an independent Scotland would not
actually be nancially independent at all if a currency union is created with the remaining United
Kingdom. is notion was tested strongly by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research
(NIESR). In a report covering Scotland’s currency and scal choices in the event of independence,
NIESR examined the merits of the proposed scal union. e report states, in part:
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
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When a state uses the currency of another state and issues government debt
denominated in that currency, it loses the ultimate response of printing money to repay creditors.
is creates the possibility of default. As the Euro Area crisis shows, this risk is no longer limited to
developing countries (Armstrong 2012).
In a sense, this is simply pointing out basic economics. An independent Scotland that
enters a currency union with the remaining United Kingdom, yet remains on the UK’s currency, will
not be able to print money and could potentially default on payments to creditors. Further, NIESR
points out that an independent Scotland on the pound sterling also could not issue any bonds at
all, making the risk of default completely plausible, as a few countries in the euro zone have already
found out themselves. However, the conclusion of the report indicates that if Scotland does vote for
independence, the best currency to take would be the pound sterling as it ‘is appropriate from an
optimal currency perspective’ (Armstrong 2012). Even so, NIESR concludes that an independent
Scotland would actually have more restraints on economic policy than what it faces as a current state
in the United Kingdom (Armstrong 2012).
C. European Union
What if an independent Scotland has to join the euro zone? e entire debate on the
sterling zone in the previous section would be irrelevant if this was indeed the case. e SNP has
argued that Scotland would automatically be a member state immediately upon independence and
would not be forced to join the euro zone, since only newly accepted states have to do so with the
recent rules change (Johnson 2008) (European Commission 2012). e Scottish Government states
that an independent Scotland, ‘would assume all the responsibilities and rights of a normal European
state, including membership of the European Union and other international bodies’(e Scottish
Government pg. 5 2007) and ‘As a full member of the European Union, Scotland would continue to
have access to its markets’ (e Scottish Government pg. 44 2007).
e SNP has had considerable support for their points on this issue. Graham Avery, the Senior
Member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, as well as a Senior Adviser at the European Policy
Centre, and an Honorary Director-General of the European Commission, gave written testimony to
the House of Commons that gave weight to the notion that an independent Scotland would gain
automatic admission to the European Union. Mr. Avery points out that the EU has no precedent
for a situation such as Scottish independence. With that being said, he explained in his testimony
that the diculties of joining the EU upon independence are exaggerated, claiming, ‘Scotland’s ve
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131
million people, having been members of the EU for 40 years; have acquired rights as European
citizens. For practical and political reasons they could not be asked to leave the EU and apply for
readmission’(Avery 2012). erefore, according to Mr. Avery, it would be illegal for the EU to force
an independent Scotland to leave and reapply because of its previous status as a member within the
United Kingdom.
e SNP has also argued that it would be incredibly dicult to leave the European Union,
even if an independent Scotland wanted to. Greenland had fought for years to leave the European
Communities, one of the predecessors to the European Union. Mr. Avery cited this example in his
testimony when he wrote, ‘Greenland joined the EU in 1973 as part of Denmark. Later it obtained
home rule and voted to leave the EU. is led to a decision of the EU in 1989 removing Greenland
from the EU’s customs territory and legal framework’ (Avery 2012).. Greenland faced very dicult
negotiations to ocially exit the European Union and did not leave until years after the citizens of
the country voted in a referendum to exit (orp and ompson 2011). Since Greenland had to
negotiate its way out of the European Union, the SNP considers it inconceivable that the EU would
force an independent Scotland to leave and reapply.
Yet automatic EU membership has been highly contested by anti-independence
campaigners. Ann McKechin, a Labour MP and anti-independence advocate, strongly challenged the
SNP notion that an independent Scotland will automatically maintain its EU membership during a
debate on the issue in the House of Commons. Ms.McKechin stated:
e First Minister and his colleagues may argue that … they are speaking about evidence
from a variety experts when they make contentions on EU membership … but that is not the same
as legal advice. ey know the dierence. Some of the people quoted are not lawyers; some have
died; and most of the statements seem to have been made prior to the Lisbon treaty, which made
fundamental changes to the European Union’s constitution. None of those represent a legal opinion,
and just as many eminent people disagree with those expert opinions, including no less a person than
the current EU President (2012).
Ms.McKechin’s strong words show the heated opposition to the SNP’s claim that an
independent Scotland will automatically join the European Union and its justication of reasoning.
is opposition also has backing from multiple analysts. Business for New Europe (BNE), a non-
partisan yet pro-European think-tank, produced a report in March 2012 that examined the prospects
of an independent Scotland joining the European Union. e stated goal of the report was to avoid
the scaremongering tactics used by both sides in the independence debate and impartially explore the
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
132
issue (Furby 2012). e BNE concluded that, no matter the scenario, an independent Scotland would
need unanimous approval from all EU member states to ocially accede to the European Union.
However, there are major questions about how the process of accession would occur for a newly
independent Scotland. ere is potential for a clash between the EU and Scotland over its candidacy,
according to the BNE, especially if it plans to bargain for exemptions from certain European Union
rules like the United Kingdom. Another major concern for the European Union would be the
precedent that an independent Scotland could set for other secessionist minded movements that are
currently part of states already included in the EU. e report concludes by stating that the prospects
are ‘currently uncertain’ and need to be ‘treated with caution’ (Furby 2012).
More recently, Jose Manuel Barroso, the current President of the European Commission,
gave written testimony to the House of Lords Economic Aairs Committee on the prospect of a state
becoming independent from an already existing EU state. e Committee released Mr.Barroso’s
statements on 10 December 2012. In his written testimony, he stated:
If part of the territory of a Member State would cease to be part of that state because it
were to become a new independent state, the Treaties would no longer apply to that territory. In other
words, a new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with
respect to the EU and the Treaties would no longer apply on its territory (Barrosa 2012).
As the President of the European Commission, Mr.Barroso’s comments are very signicant.
He rmly believes that an independent Scotland would be forced to reapply for EU membership.
is stands in stark contrast to the arguments made by the SNP and supporters of the independence
campaign.

D. Trident Nuclear Weapons
e Trident Weapons System is the latest nuclear deterrent used by the United Kingdom.
Designed during the last decade of the twentieth century as the Cold War neared its end, Trident is
a naval-based deterrent that utilizes Vanguard-class submarines from the Royal Navy. It is the only
nuclear deterrent operated by the United Kingdom Government (CM Select 2006). Trident has been
central to the debate over Scottish independence for two reasons. First, a vast majority of the Scottish
public is against the Trident Programme. Second, the Trident submarine force is based in Scotland at
the Naval Base at Faslane, Strathclyde and the Scottish National Party (SNP) has consistently been
opposed to its placement there, stating for years that the Scottish Government would remove Trident
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
133
as soon as possible upon independence (Scottish National Party pg. 29 2011).
On 18 June 2012, e Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom, Philip
Hammond, announced that £1.1 billion is due to be invested into the Trident programme for a
revamp over the next eleven years (House of Commons Hansard 2012). Angus Robertson, the leader
of the Scottish National Party Westminster Group and the entire party’s spokesman on defence,
showed the distaste for the trident program by not only the SNP, but also the Scottish public. In his
reply to Mr. Hammond in the chamber of the House of Commons, Mr. Robertson stated:
is announcement paves the way for Trident renewal and it does so in the face of
opposition in Scotland. e majority of MPs from Scotland and the majority of Members of the
Scottish Parliament have voted against Trident renewal. e Scottish Government are opposed
to Trident, the Scottish Trades Union Congress is opposed to Trident, the Church of Scotland is
opposed, the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland is opposed, the Episcopal Church of Scotland is
opposed, the Muslim Council of Scotland is opposed, and, most important, the public of Scotland
are overwhelmingly opposed to the renewal of Trident. A YouGov poll in 2010 showed 67% opposed,
as against only 13%. ere was majority opposition among the voters of all four mainstream parties in
Scotland, including Conservative voters and Liberal Democrat voters. e Westminster Government
are aware of the objections but are ploughing on regardless. en, at the end, they plan to dump this
next generation of weapons of mass destruction on the Clyde. It is an aront to democracy and an
obscene waste of money (2012).
Mr. Robertson’s assault on the unpopularity and cost of the programme certainly has merit
within Scotland. e current cost of the Vanguard submarine eet is estimated to be 5-6% of the
entire Ministry of Defence (MoD) budget (Government of the UK 2012). According to the most
recent estimates, the maximum ocial gure for the total MoD budget is £39 billion in 2012-2013
(HM Treasury 2012). Using the higher estimate, the annual running cost of the current Trident
nuclear deterrent is £2.34 billion per year. Based on the Scottish population share, the cost to the
people of Scotland is about £196 million for the most recent scal year.
e revamp of the Trident Programme is also quite expensive. e successor submarines
that have been proposed by the United Kingdom Government have been estimated to cost £431
million in 2012-2013, and that nancial allocation is only on the concept phase. Additionally, £1.9
billion will be spent between 2010 and 2015 to total about £3 billion (House of Commons Hansard
2012). is is a cost to the Scottish taxpayers of £36 million per year.
Even with the SNP’s pledge to remove Trident amid its cost unpopularity, is it realistic for
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
134
an independent Scotland to simply remove the complex nuclear programme? According to a
detailed report issued by the House of Commons Scottish Aairs Committee, the answer is yes.
Entitled, ‘e Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident-Days or Decades?’,
the report examined the prospects of the proposed Trident removal in an independent Scotland.
After interviewing multiple experts on the issue, the Committee concluded that the Trident nuclear
weapons could be completely ‘disarmed within days and removed within months’(HOC Scottish
Aairs Committee 2012). Further, not only can it be very quick, but it can also be done safely as long
as there is cooperation between the Royal Navy and United Kingdom Government (HOC Scottish
Aairs Committee pg. 12 2012). In this sense, the Committee agreed with a former analysis by the
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament that also concluded that Trident removal could be completed
quickly and in a safe manner (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2012).
e SNP has also argued that this quick and safe removal of the Trident Programme would
not equate to many job losses either, as some have feared. Although many opponents of Scottish
independence, including the Secretary of Defence, Philip Hammond, have suggested that thousands
of jobs would be lost in the event of Trident removal, the numbers from the MoD seem to tell a
dierent story. e MoD responded to a Freedom of Information (FOI) request from the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament that stated, ‘e information we hold on record conrms that there are
520 civilian jobs at the Her Majesty’s Naval Base (HMNB) Clyde, including Coulport and Faslane,
that directly rely upon the Trident programme’ (Ministry of Defence 2012). Although a loss of 520
jobs will not be benecial for the local economy, it is quite the contrast from the job losses that were
estimated by the anti-independence campaigns.
However, anti-independence campaigners have consistently argued that the removal of the
Trident Programme would not only hurt Scotland, but it would hurt the entire United Kingdom.
In a speech delivered on 16 February 2012 in Scotland, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom,
David Cameron, stated:
We are stronger, because through our shared Union, we count for more together in the
world than we would ever count apart. We have a permanent place on the UN Security Council. We
have real clout in NATO and in Europe. We have unique inuence with key allies the world over
(Cameron 2012).
Mr. Cameron’s point about the United Nationals Security Council (UNSC) is quite an interesting
one. If Scotland became independent and removed the Trident Programme from its waters, a
probable scenario would entail complete nuclear disarmament of the remaining United Kingdom for
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
135
years until a new deterrent is created. According to the same Scottish Aairs Committee Report, the
removal of Trident would automatically make the remaining United Kingdom disarmed of nuclear
weapons. e Report claimed, ‘We recognise that such speedy action would inevitably create the
prospect of unilateral nuclear disarmament being imposed upon the Royal Navy and UK, since the
construction of facilities elsewhere could take upwards of 20 years.’ 20 years would be a very long time
to be without nuclear weapons for the United Kingdom; especially since the other four permanent
countries on the UNSC (e United States of America, France, China, and Russia) all have nuclear
weapons that are capable of being used (Federation of American Scientists 2011). is opens up
the possibility for the remaining United Kingdom to be thrown o of the UNSC due to its lack of
deterrent capabilities.
e 20-year timetable, however, is not a gure that is unanimously agreed upon by experts
and analysts. In his testimony to the House of Lords Economic Aairs Committee, Francis Tusa,
the Editor of Defence Analysis, claimed that it is entirely untrue that it would take up to 20 year to
replace the nuclear deterrent, blaming that timetable on the lack of a backup plan by the Royal Navy
and Ministry of Defence. Mr.Tusa argued that all of the Trident submarines could simply move to
the southwest English coast. Mr.Tusa stated:
All the Trident submarines are maintained in Devonport, which means that they have to be
able to go into the port. It is dredged to allow them to do that. In terms of physically nding a berth
which has got nuclear regulations and all those safety things in place, Devonport ts the bill. ere
is no reason why any of those submarines could not move to Devonport as soon as they could raise
steam in their boilers (Tusa 2012).
If Mr.Tusa is correct, there would not be a chance for the United Kingdom to be eliminated
from the UNSC because its nuclear deterrent will still exist, just in a dierent location. Either way,
even if the United Kingdom was forced to unilaterally withdraw from nuclear weapons for quite some
time, there is no denitive indication that it would be ejected from the UNSC.
Mr.Tusa also seriously questioned the MoD gures that stated that only 520 jobs would
be lost upon Trident removal. In response to a question asked about this issue during his testimony
to the Committee, he argued that the FOI request answer excluded crews from other submarines
that engage with the Trident submarines. Even though these jobs would simply be moved to the
remaining United Kingdom and not lost per se, Mr.Tusa commented that the surrounding economy
would be hurt by the loss of personnel in the community, a point that anti-independence advocates
have consistently argued (Tusa 2012).
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
136
Chapter ree
Chapter two covered four of the major arguments surrounding the independence debate
with key points being shown by both sides. is chapter will independently analyse the points of
each debate by again creating subsections for each specic segment of discussion. Both sides make
compelling arguments on every issue discussed, forcing the analysis to be moderated while giving each
side weight.
A. North Sea Oil
Increased control of the revenue of North Sea oil would clearly be benecial for Scotland,
whether inside or outside of the United Kingdom. e estimated oil amounts and projected revenue
will only prove to be advantageous, especially with nancial amounts over £1 trillion.
e SNP’s argument about the creation of an oil fund is fascinating in the sense that if it
could come to fruition, it would be able to account for the projected revenue loss of oil in the distant
future. Norway’s oil fund cannot be ignored for this debate, especially considering that its nancial
amount is signicantly more than the entire country’s annual gross domestic product. Although that
possibility is most likely not plausible because Scotland would be investing at a date signicantly later
than when Norway started, there is still clearly potential to create a fund somewhat similar to the
Norwegian’s.
e issue, however, is practicality. is analysis cannot overlook the work done by Centre
for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR) at the University of Glasgow. e CPPR’s conclusions that it
would be possible, yet very dicult, to create an oil fund similar to the £30 billion proposal made
by Alex Salmond, are crucial for understanding this issue. It seems highly unlikely that the Scottish
Government would make the necessary decisions to have a consistent budget surplus that could be
invested into the proposed fund in the early years of independence, especially considering the large
debt that will most likely be inherited that will have to be paid o at some point. e level of tax
increases and expenditure cuts needed for a budget surplus that is so massive that it could be used to
pay o the debt and invest in the fund seems quite improbable. erefore, it seems quite unlikely
that the proposed oil fund in an independent Scotland could ever come to fruition.
e IFS report is also very important for this analysis. e IFS report concluded that the current
expenditure level in Scotland, which is higher than the rest of the United Kingdom, could stay at
present levels after independence due to North Sea oil revenue. However, this conclusion only dealt
with the short-term future, while the long-term scenario is much more dubious. ere is no doubt
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
Chapter ree
Chapter two covered four of the major arguments surrounding the independence debate
with key points being shown by both sides. is chapter will independently analyse the points of
each debate by again creating subsections for each specic segment of discussion. Both sides make
compelling arguments on every issue discussed, forcing the analysis to be moderated while giving each
side weight.
A. North Sea Oil
Increased control of the revenue of North Sea oil would clearly be benecial for Scotland,
whether inside or outside of the United Kingdom. e estimated oil amounts and projected revenue
will only prove to be advantageous, especially with nancial amounts over £1 trillion.
e SNP’s argument about the creation of an oil fund is fascinating in the sense that if it
could come to fruition, it would be able to account for the projected revenue loss of oil in the distant
future. Norway’s oil fund cannot be ignored for this debate, especially considering that its nancial
amount is signicantly more than the entire country’s annual gross domestic product. Although that
possibility is most likely not plausible because Scotland would be investing at a date signicantly later
than when Norway started, there is still clearly potential to create a fund somewhat similar to the
Norwegian’s.
e issue, however, is practicality. is analysis cannot overlook the work done by Centre
for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR) at the University of Glasgow. e CPPR’s conclusions that it
would be possible, yet very dicult, to create an oil fund similar to the £30 billion proposal made
by Alex Salmond, are crucial for understanding this issue. It seems highly unlikely that the Scottish
Government would make the necessary decisions to have a consistent budget surplus that could be
invested into the proposed fund in the early years of independence, especially considering the large
debt that will most likely be inherited that will have to be paid o at some point. e level of tax
increases and expenditure cuts needed for a budget surplus that is so massive that it could be used to
pay o the debt and invest in the fund seems quite improbable. erefore, it seems quite unlikely
that the proposed oil fund in an independent Scotland could ever come to fruition.
e IFS report is also very important for this analysis. e IFS report concluded that the current
expenditure level in Scotland, which is higher than the rest of the United Kingdom, could stay at
present levels after independence due to North Sea oil revenue. However, this conclusion only dealt
with the short-term future, while the long-term scenario is much more dubious. ere is no doubt
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
Chapter ree
Chapter two covered four of the major arguments surrounding the independence debate
with key points being shown by both sides. is chapter will independently analyse the points of
each debate by again creating subsections for each specic segment of discussion. Both sides make
compelling arguments on every issue discussed, forcing the analysis to be moderated while giving each
side weight.
A. North Sea Oil
Increased control of the revenue of North Sea oil would clearly be benecial for Scotland,
whether inside or outside of the United Kingdom. e estimated oil amounts and projected revenue
will only prove to be advantageous, especially with nancial amounts over £1 trillion.
e SNP’s argument about the creation of an oil fund is fascinating in the sense that if it
could come to fruition, it would be able to account for the projected revenue loss of oil in the distant
future. Norway’s oil fund cannot be ignored for this debate, especially considering that its nancial
amount is signicantly more than the entire country’s annual gross domestic product. Although that
possibility is most likely not plausible because Scotland would be investing at a date signicantly later
than when Norway started, there is still clearly potential to create a fund somewhat similar to the
Norwegian’s.
e issue, however, is practicality. is analysis cannot overlook the work done by Centre
for Public Policy for Regions (CPPR) at the University of Glasgow. e CPPR’s conclusions that it
would be possible, yet very dicult, to create an oil fund similar to the £30 billion proposal made
by Alex Salmond, are crucial for understanding this issue. It seems highly unlikely that the Scottish
Government would make the necessary decisions to have a consistent budget surplus that could be
invested into the proposed fund in the early years of independence, especially considering the large
debt that will most likely be inherited that will have to be paid o at some point. e level of tax
increases and expenditure cuts needed for a budget surplus that is so massive that it could be used to
pay o the debt and invest in the fund seems quite improbable. erefore, it seems quite unlikely
that the proposed oil fund in an independent Scotland could ever come to fruition.
e IFS report is also very important for this analysis. e IFS report concluded that the current
expenditure level in Scotland, which is higher than the rest of the United Kingdom, could stay at
present levels after independence due to North Sea oil revenue. However, this conclusion only dealt
with the short-term future, while the long-term scenario is much more dubious. ere is no doubt
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
137
that oil will not be around indenitely, and as the years go by, the oil revenue for an independent
Scotland will fall dramatically. Even though anti-independence campaigners portray a nightmarish
scenario for this future situation, the real likelihood is that the Scottish Government will have to
make decisions that alter the economy of Scotland. ese decisions were concluded to be choices that
virtually every other country will also have to face in the future. e IFS concluded, ‘Like the UK
as a whole, and most other developed nations, an independent Scotland would face some tough long
term choices’(Johnson and Phillips 2012). Nevertheless, the decisions are predicted to be even more
dicult than the choices that will be made in United Kingdom and most other developed nations.
As the IFS put it, ‘If, as is likely, oil and gas revenues fall over the long run then the scal challenge
facing Scotland will be greater than facing the UK’ (Johnson and Phillips 2012).
With that being said, this analysis does not conclude that the long-term forecast of North
Sea oil revenue takes away from the pro-independence campaign. e decisions will certainly be
dicult in the distant future, but there will be plenty of time for an independent Scottish Government
to make necessary decisions that alter the economy to the point of shifting it away from the reliance
on North Sea oil. Whether Scotland becomes independent or not, dicult decisions will be forced
to be made in the long run. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a doomsday scenario will
exist for an independent Scotland when the oil revenues start to fall. is analysis rmly believes that
an independent Scottish Government will be able to handle the long-term economic choices just
as well as any other government, including the United Kingdom Government. Indeed, having an
independent government that is more localized to the people of Scotland might actually prove to be
benecial for Scottish citizens when the economic decisions are forced to be made.
B. Currency Union
A currency will be vital to an independent Scotland, just as it is a vital function to the
economy of any independent state. e claim by the SNP that a currency union will be created with
the remaining United Kingdom that will allow for the pound sterling to be retained is very interesting.
It is denitely a compelling argument that it would be in the best interest of the remaining United
Kingdom Government to create the currency union with an independent Scotland, considering the
vast economic and nancial ties between the two. e statistics cited by Mr.Swinney are important
for this analysis as they show the interconnectedness of both economies currently and in the future,
whether Scotland votes for independence or not. Based on this economic and nancial connection,
it seems to be in the best interest of both countries to create a new currency union, especially since
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
that oil will not be around indenitely, and as the years go by, the oil revenue for an independent
Scotland will fall dramatically. Even though anti-independence campaigners portray a nightmarish
scenario for this future situation, the real likelihood is that the Scottish Government will have to
make decisions that alter the economy of Scotland. ese decisions were concluded to be choices that
virtually every other country will also have to face in the future. e IFS concluded, ‘Like the UK
as a whole, and most other developed nations, an independent Scotland would face some tough long
term choices’(Johnson and Phillips 2012). Nevertheless, the decisions are predicted to be even more
dicult than the choices that will be made in United Kingdom and most other developed nations.
As the IFS put it, ‘If, as is likely, oil and gas revenues fall over the long run then the scal challenge
facing Scotland will be greater than facing the UK’ (Johnson and Phillips 2012).
With that being said, this analysis does not conclude that the long-term forecast of North
Sea oil revenue takes away from the pro-independence campaign. e decisions will certainly be
dicult in the distant future, but there will be plenty of time for an independent Scottish Government
to make necessary decisions that alter the economy to the point of shifting it away from the reliance
on North Sea oil. Whether Scotland becomes independent or not, dicult decisions will be forced
to be made in the long run. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a doomsday scenario will
exist for an independent Scotland when the oil revenues start to fall. is analysis rmly believes that
an independent Scottish Government will be able to handle the long-term economic choices just
as well as any other government, including the United Kingdom Government. Indeed, having an
independent government that is more localized to the people of Scotland might actually prove to be
benecial for Scottish citizens when the economic decisions are forced to be made.
B. Currency Union
A currency will be vital to an independent Scotland, just as it is a vital function to the
economy of any independent state. e claim by the SNP that a currency union will be created with
the remaining United Kingdom that will allow for the pound sterling to be retained is very interesting.
It is denitely a compelling argument that it would be in the best interest of the remaining United
Kingdom Government to create the currency union with an independent Scotland, considering the
vast economic and nancial ties between the two. e statistics cited by Mr.Swinney are important
for this analysis as they show the interconnectedness of both economies currently and in the future,
whether Scotland votes for independence or not. Based on this economic and nancial connection,
it seems to be in the best interest of both countries to create a new currency union, especially since
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
that oil will not be around indenitely, and as the years go by, the oil revenue for an independent
Scotland will fall dramatically. Even though anti-independence campaigners portray a nightmarish
scenario for this future situation, the real likelihood is that the Scottish Government will have to
make decisions that alter the economy of Scotland. ese decisions were concluded to be choices that
virtually every other country will also have to face in the future. e IFS concluded, ‘Like the UK
as a whole, and most other developed nations, an independent Scotland would face some tough long
term choices’(Johnson and Phillips 2012). Nevertheless, the decisions are predicted to be even more
dicult than the choices that will be made in United Kingdom and most other developed nations.
As the IFS put it, ‘If, as is likely, oil and gas revenues fall over the long run then the scal challenge
facing Scotland will be greater than facing the UK’ (Johnson and Phillips 2012).
With that being said, this analysis does not conclude that the long-term forecast of North
Sea oil revenue takes away from the pro-independence campaign. e decisions will certainly be
dicult in the distant future, but there will be plenty of time for an independent Scottish Government
to make necessary decisions that alter the economy to the point of shifting it away from the reliance
on North Sea oil. Whether Scotland becomes independent or not, dicult decisions will be forced
to be made in the long run. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a doomsday scenario will
exist for an independent Scotland when the oil revenues start to fall. is analysis rmly believes that
an independent Scottish Government will be able to handle the long-term economic choices just
as well as any other government, including the United Kingdom Government. Indeed, having an
independent government that is more localized to the people of Scotland might actually prove to be
benecial for Scottish citizens when the economic decisions are forced to be made.
B. Currency Union
A currency will be vital to an independent Scotland, just as it is a vital function to the
economy of any independent state. e claim by the SNP that a currency union will be created with
the remaining United Kingdom that will allow for the pound sterling to be retained is very interesting.
It is denitely a compelling argument that it would be in the best interest of the remaining United
Kingdom Government to create the currency union with an independent Scotland, considering the
vast economic and nancial ties between the two. e statistics cited by Mr.Swinney are important
for this analysis as they show the interconnectedness of both economies currently and in the future,
whether Scotland votes for independence or not. Based on this economic and nancial connection,
it seems to be in the best interest of both countries to create a new currency union, especially since
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
138
both are currently using the pound sterling.
However, this analysis sides with the argumentation given by the anti-independence
campaign. Mr.Swinney’s argumentation fails to account for the possibility of a situation similar to the
euro zone, where the control of currency and interest rates are not made by the central authority of
a country. e inability for Scotland to print money and repay creditors in a currency union will be
a major setback for the independent state. As the NIESR points out, an independent Scotland will
have even more nancial restrains if a currency union is created than when it was part of the United
Kingdom. Further, a currency union could force the remaining United Kingdom to bail out an
independent Scotland in the event of a default. Although the likelihood of an independent Scottish
state running its debt so high that it cannot repay its creditors is unlikely, the possibility would still be
present. It would seem that this would be highly disadvantageous for the remaining United Kingdom.
Danny Alexander, the current Chief Secretary to the Treasury, sums up this point:
e argument that we are considering here that an independent Scotland can none the
less share a common currency but not have any scal arrangements—the danger is that you would
end up with a position where, just as we have seen in the eurozone, some countries run up excessive
borrowings and have to call on other countries (Alexander 2012).
Either way, an independent Scotland can trade the pound sterling if it so chooses, whether
the United Kingdom supports the decision or not. e economic ramications of such a choice could
prove costly to the Scottish economy, however, considering that every decision about the currency will
be made in a separate country. A currency union nonetheless seems advantageous for an independent
Scotland, but not for the remaining United Kingdom. A dierent route will need to be proposed by
the SNP as the prospects of such a currency union do not seem realistic. When it comes to currency,
this analysis concludes that staying within the United Kingdom and having no uncertainty about the
issue is the better option.
C. European Union
Whether Scotland will automatically retain its membership within the (EU) could be the
most contentious issue within the debate over independence. e (SNP) does seem to have a bit of
support for their view that Scotland will retain its membership from experts and analysts. Further,
the argument that Greenland had to negotiate its way of the EU cannot be ignored because it shows
that leaving the European Union is not easy by any stretch.
e uncertainty by anti-independence campaigners about the automatic EU retention
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
both are currently using the pound sterling.
However, this analysis sides with the argumentation given by the anti-independence
campaign. Mr.Swinney’s argumentation fails to account for the possibility of a situation similar to the
euro zone, where the control of currency and interest rates are not made by the central authority of
a country. e inability for Scotland to print money and repay creditors in a currency union will be
a major setback for the independent state. As the NIESR points out, an independent Scotland will
have even more nancial restrains if a currency union is created than when it was part of the United
Kingdom. Further, a currency union could force the remaining United Kingdom to bail out an
independent Scotland in the event of a default. Although the likelihood of an independent Scottish
state running its debt so high that it cannot repay its creditors is unlikely, the possibility would still be
present. It would seem that this would be highly disadvantageous for the remaining United Kingdom.
Danny Alexander, the current Chief Secretary to the Treasury, sums up this point:
e argument that we are considering here that an independent Scotland can none the
less share a common currency but not have any scal arrangements—the danger is that you would
end up with a position where, just as we have seen in the eurozone, some countries run up excessive
borrowings and have to call on other countries (Alexander 2012).
Either way, an independent Scotland can trade the pound sterling if it so chooses, whether
the United Kingdom supports the decision or not. e economic ramications of such a choice could
prove costly to the Scottish economy, however, considering that every decision about the currency will
be made in a separate country. A currency union nonetheless seems advantageous for an independent
Scotland, but not for the remaining United Kingdom. A dierent route will need to be proposed by
the SNP as the prospects of such a currency union do not seem realistic. When it comes to currency,
this analysis concludes that staying within the United Kingdom and having no uncertainty about the
issue is the better option.
C. European Union
Whether Scotland will automatically retain its membership within the (EU) could be the
most contentious issue within the debate over independence. e (SNP) does seem to have a bit of
support for their view that Scotland will retain its membership from experts and analysts. Further,
the argument that Greenland had to negotiate its way of the EU cannot be ignored because it shows
that leaving the European Union is not easy by any stretch.
e uncertainty by anti-independence campaigners about the automatic EU retention
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
139
issue is also of the utmost importance. As with many of the issues discussed in this dissertation,
it is almost impossible to make a true prediction about what will occur if Scotland does vote to
become independent. e BNE report casts a bit of doubt upon the SNP’s claim about automatic
membership and that cannot be ignored either.
is analysis has diculty making a conclusion on this issue, however, due to the
contradicting statements about EU membership from dierent experts and analysts. e most
recent statements that were made by the President of the European Commission heavily counter the
arguments made by Mr. Avery, a man who is considered a premier expert on issues of this nature. is
analysis has further diculty making a conclusion on EU membership because this is a very unique
scenario that has absolutely no precedent. Amid the lack of precedent, contradicting statements, and
compelling arguments made by both sides, this analysis can merely conclude that only time will tell
if an independent Scotland will automatically retain its membership or not.
Yet even if the SNP is correct that Scotland can automatically retain its EU membership,
there would be many issues that would need to be negotiated, not the least of which would be
representation in the European Union Parliament. Currently, Scotland has 6 Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) within the United Kingdom’s 72 seats (BBC 2009). However, if
Scotland became an independent country, there would be a major discrepancy between countries of
similar size, such as Denmark and Finland. Both of these countries have 13 MEP seats each; more
than double the amount that is currently allocated to Scotland (European Parliament 2012). Since
there is a current 751 seat maximum from the Lisbon Treaty, the only way that an independent
Scotland could gain analogous representation would be by taking away seats from another member
state. Although there is a theoretical possibility that this could occur, it seems more than likely that
the number of seats will have to stay the same, meaning that Scotland’s inuence in the European
Parliament will not be as strong as it should be based on population. is does not necessarily take
away from the arguments for independence, but it does show that questions will remain within EU
membership should Scotland become independent.
D. Trident Nuclear Weapons
ere is no controversy when the SNP states that the Trident Nuclear Weapons Programme
is nancially costly and highly unpopular among the residents of Scotland. e numbers that were
examined in chapter two show that the costs to maintain and now revamp the programme are well
into the billions of pounds (£). Amid the unpopularity of the programme within Scotland, it only
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
issue is also of the utmost importance. As with many of the issues discussed in this dissertation,
it is almost impossible to make a true prediction about what will occur if Scotland does vote to
become independent. e BNE report casts a bit of doubt upon the SNP’s claim about automatic
membership and that cannot be ignored either.
is analysis has diculty making a conclusion on this issue, however, due to the
contradicting statements about EU membership from dierent experts and analysts. e most
recent statements that were made by the President of the European Commission heavily counter the
arguments made by Mr. Avery, a man who is considered a premier expert on issues of this nature. is
analysis has further diculty making a conclusion on EU membership because this is a very unique
scenario that has absolutely no precedent. Amid the lack of precedent, contradicting statements, and
compelling arguments made by both sides, this analysis can merely conclude that only time will tell
if an independent Scotland will automatically retain its membership or not.
Yet even if the SNP is correct that Scotland can automatically retain its EU membership,
there would be many issues that would need to be negotiated, not the least of which would be
representation in the European Union Parliament. Currently, Scotland has 6 Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) within the United Kingdom’s 72 seats (BBC 2009). However, if
Scotland became an independent country, there would be a major discrepancy between countries of
similar size, such as Denmark and Finland. Both of these countries have 13 MEP seats each; more
than double the amount that is currently allocated to Scotland (European Parliament 2012). Since
there is a current 751 seat maximum from the Lisbon Treaty, the only way that an independent
Scotland could gain analogous representation would be by taking away seats from another member
state. Although there is a theoretical possibility that this could occur, it seems more than likely that
the number of seats will have to stay the same, meaning that Scotland’s inuence in the European
Parliament will not be as strong as it should be based on population. is does not necessarily take
away from the arguments for independence, but it does show that questions will remain within EU
membership should Scotland become independent.
D. Trident Nuclear Weapons
ere is no controversy when the SNP states that the Trident Nuclear Weapons Programme
is nancially costly and highly unpopular among the residents of Scotland. e numbers that were
examined in chapter two show that the costs to maintain and now revamp the programme are well
into the billions of pounds (£). Amid the unpopularity of the programme within Scotland, it only
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
140
seems logical for an independent Scotland to remove Trident and let the remaining United Kingdom
make the subsequent decisions with the nuclear deterrent. ere used to be questions about how
quickly Trident could be removed, but the recent Scottish Aairs Committee Report made it clear
that the programme could be eliminated relatively quickly and in a safe manner.
e main anti-independence arguments on this issue deal with the job losses that will
ensue, the lack of a nuclear deterrent, and the possibility of the removal from the UNSC for the
remaining United Kingdom if the Trident Programme is removed. is analysis does not believe that
the nuclear deterrent argumentation has any weight within the debate over independence. e right
to self-determination is clearly a central concept of a modern democratic state, as covered in chapter
one. If the Scottish people choose to become independent, it is the duty of the remaining United
Kingdom to respect the popular will, remove the programme, and create a new deterrent.
On job losses, this analysis concludes that there will undoubtedly be unemployment
vacancies due to the removal of the Trident Programme. e predicted number of job losses is highly
contested, depending on which side’s argumentation is being heard. It seems, however, that many
of the jobs will not be necessarily lost, but simply moved. Of course, this would have a detrimental
eect on the local economies due to a loss of cash inux. e overall eect of the employment change
will not be fully known until after the independence vote, assuming it will be a ‘yes’ vote, but this
analysis does not believe that it will be truly devastating to the Scottish economy considering the
numbers that have been examined.
ere is no denitive evidence that exists for the removal of the remaining United Kingdom
from the UNSC if Scotland becomes independent and removes the Trident Programme. However,
there is certainly merit to the argument that it would be dicult for the remaining United Kingdom
to have such a prestigious position in the international community without the ability to utilize a
nuclear deterrent. Yet it needs be noted once again that there is considerable doubt that the nuclear
deterrent will be completely eliminated if Trident is removed. Even if it was completely eliminated,
there needs to be more evidence for the removal from the UNSC for the argument to have weight in
this analysis.
erefore, the arguments against Scottish independence based on Trident removal do not
hold considerable weight. e job loss predictions turn out to be the most important argument and
it simply does not outweigh the popular will and democratic value of the removal of the Trident
Programme from Scottish waters. Trident removal has been and will continue to be a major argument
for independence. is analysis thus concludes that removing Trident will only be possible in the
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
141
foreseeable future within an independent Scotland, meaning that independence is the better option
to reect the popular will on this issue for the Scottish people.
Conclusion
With the analysis complete on each major point of contention, it is now time to make an
overall conclusion of the Scottish independence movement. Should Scotland remain in the union of
the United Kingdom or should it become a newly independent state? Based on the analysis that was
conducted in chapter three, it seems that there are advantages and disadvantages to either situation.
Independence is clearly the best way to follow popular will and remove the Trident Weapons System,
a programme that is highly unpopular in Scotland. Independence will also be largely advantageous
for the Scottish people in the short-term with increased control over North Sea oil revenues that will
more than make-up for the current levels of public expenditure in the country.
Yet independence also creates huge uncertainties about which route the new Scottish
Government would take with a currency. As has been shown, creating a currency union seems not
only unlikely, but also detrimental to an independent Scotland due to a lack of control of interest
rates and the inability to repay creditors. Further, there are certainly major questions surrounding
how an independent Scotland would be able to combat the loss of revenue from North Sea Oil in the
long-run and whether it would automatically retain its EU membership.
With clear advantages and disadvantages, it is hard to come to a conclusion that denitively
supports either side over the other. is dissertation only analysed four of the major issues, while
other points of contention, including the eect of the change in general defence policy and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, were not discussed in detail or even at all in this
academic work due to limitations in length. ose issues will have be left for other academics to
consider. Nevertheless, the four points of debate that were discussed are of great importance to the
overall Scottish independence debate and have proven to be some of the most contentious issues.
Whether the Scottish people decide to become independent or not, it must be noted that
Scotland will be able to thrive and ourish regardless of its political situation. Paul Johnson, the
Director of the IFS, made it clear that an independent Scotland would be just ne, even though his
IFS report about the situation cast some doubt about the long-term proposition of North Sea oil
revenue. Mr. Johnson stated:
A country in Scotland’s position can clearly economically and scally survive perfectly well
inside or outside the United Kingdom, but as someone who works on scal economics, it would not
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
142
seem to me that that is the fundamental basis for any choice. In that sense, it is somewhat of a surprise
that this appears to be such a central part of the debate (2012).
is point is very crucial to the conclusion of this dissertation. Pro-independence and
anti-independence campaigners make arguments that suggest Scotland will either perish or thrive
if it chooses the route that they are pushing for. is form of rhetoric does not seem to have a basis
in reality, as Scotland will certainly be able to maintain its international stature within the United
Kingdom or as an independent nation.
e goal of this academic work was to examine four main contentions in the Scottish
independence debate from an unbiased and impartial perspective, utilizing evidence from academics,
think tanks, and experts. While more analysis will be needed as the time moves forward to the autumn
of 2014, this dissertation lled the current void in academic literature of a focused examination of the
Scottish independence debate. e next analysis will need to be made following the release of the very
important white paper by the Scottish Government in November 2013. is white paper will answer
the specic questions that anti-independence campaigners have, including many questions that were
analysed in this dissertation (e Scottish Government 2012). Once the white paper is produced, the
nal debates on Scottish independence can be had. Only time will tell how the debate will continue
to unfold to that point and into the 2014 referendum.
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
143
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149
James is a fourth-year undergraduate student at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts
majoring in Political Science and minoring in International Aairs and Urban Studies. During his
time at Northeastern, he has participated as a research student on a delegation to the United Nations
Oce at Geneva (UNOG) in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR). Further to this, he studied as a Hansard Scholar in conjunction with the
London School of Economics and is currently a Parliamentary Researcher with the Scottish National
Party (SNP) Westminster Group at the Parliament of the United Kingdom as part of a six-month co-
op. He plans to enter the political arena as a policy adviser and political researcher after graduation.
McKeon Scottish Independence Debate
150 150

151 151
A Comparative Analysis of European Extreme Right
Party Success
Michael Koslen
roughout the past decade, extreme-right parties have experienced relative success on the national stage around
the globe. Why are we seeing these upwards trends in extreme-right support and are they signicant to the po-
litical structure and stability of Europe? e purpose of this study is to nd out what historical, statistical and
theoretical factors are leading to this rise, and what can be done to stem it. e study specically analyzes three
countries with extreme-right parties that have had dierent levels of success: e Czech Republic, e United
Kingdom, and France. e conclusion this study makes is that party structure and leadership are the most signif-
icant elements of extreme-right party success, and thus strong parties will continue to grow in elections to come.
I
n November of 2012, a match in Rome between Tottenham and Lazio resulted in a 0-0 tie.
Yet, with all of the excitement of an ending season, the contest was overshadowed by an attack
on Tottenham fans at a local pub the night before. According to reports from local witnesses,
over twenty men entered the bar wearing helmets and armed with baseball bats and knives.
Tottenham derives much of its fan base from the Jewish community of northern London and “the
president of the Italian Football Association has no doubt that anti-Semitism was the motive behind
the attack” (Abete 2012). Luckily the attack yielded no deaths, but many were injured and one man
was stabbed into critical condition. e violence was initially attributed to the Lazio fans known
as Ultras. ough they declined any involvement, the Ultras have been involved in racist and anti-
Semitic altercations, which lead to their accusation. However, when arrests were made after the
investigation, the rst two men prosecuted were fans of another Italian soccer team, Roma. More
importantly, another connection was ascribed to the attack. e Roma fans have had previous
incidents in the name of their far-right politics, including a stabbing in 2001 and a brawl in 2007.
e sport of soccer in Europe carries more than civil competition, but also pride and politics. e
152
November anti-Semitic attack against the Tottenham fans is an illustration of the extreme right taking
a rm stance in everyday European society.
e described event exemplies a movement that is currently growing throughout Europe.
Although violence is not always the dening factor of the extreme right, it can be seen how their
passionate political ideology has a direct eect on others. ere are many examples of extreme-right
party (ERP) success in Europe and it has been increasing in recent years. In Italy, the Northern League
has nine members in the European Parliament, 26 in the Italian Senate and 59 in the Chamber of
Deputies. In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s party is the largest party in government. Other countries,
such as Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands, have also experienced extreme right growth in each of
their past few elections with their parties attaining more seats. Why are we seeing these upward trends
in extreme right support and are they signicant to the political structure and stability of Europe? e
purpose of this study is to nd out what historical, statistical and theoretical factors are leading to this
rise and, based on this knowledge, what can be done to stem it.
To answer these questions, it is important to look at multiple countries throughout Europe
in order to establish what is allowing their extreme right success or, if applicable, is preventing it.
Studying a country like Switzerland or Greece with substantially high extreme right support risks
selection bias in a comparative study; therefore, three countries have been chosen whose extreme
right-parties (ERP) are at dierent levels of success. e three countries focused on in this study are
the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and France. After an analysis of each country’s ERP and
the country itself, it will be recognized that an extreme party’s success hinges on its own structural
organization, its ability to blend into the mainstream, and the institutional structures in place by the
government that can either enable or hinder their success.
ere are two ways to categorize the extreme right (Jackman and Volpert 1996). An older
view includes all parties that have an explicit fascist mark through their historical connections with
“issues, values and attitudes” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). A second, newer denition involves
those parties with “no direct fascist associations but with a right-wing populist anti-system attitude”
(Jackman and Volpert 1996). One specic stance of the extreme right that gives them their historical
connections to fascism is xenophobic nationalism. A major tenant of the extreme right economic
policy is support of rmer immigration reform including the deportation of non-nationals. e
National Front party in France has the mantra “two million immigrants are the cause of two million
French people out of work” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). Taking on an issue like unemployment
gives the foundation of xenophobic stances much like that taken by the National Front. ese parties
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
November anti-Semitic attack against the Tottenham fans is an illustration of the extreme right taking
a rm stance in everyday European society.
e described event exemplies a movement that is currently growing throughout Europe.
Although violence is not always the dening factor of the extreme right, it can be seen how their
passionate political ideology has a direct eect on others. ere are many examples of extreme-right
party (ERP) success in Europe and it has been increasing in recent years. In Italy, the Northern League
has nine members in the European Parliament, 26 in the Italian Senate and 59 in the Chamber of
Deputies. In Switzerland, the Swiss People’s party is the largest party in government. Other countries,
such as Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands, have also experienced extreme right growth in each of
their past few elections with their parties attaining more seats. Why are we seeing these upward trends
in extreme right support and are they signicant to the political structure and stability of Europe? e
purpose of this study is to nd out what historical, statistical and theoretical factors are leading to this
rise and, based on this knowledge, what can be done to stem it.
To answer these questions, it is important to look at multiple countries throughout Europe
in order to establish what is allowing their extreme right success or, if applicable, is preventing it.
Studying a country like Switzerland or Greece with substantially high extreme right support risks
selection bias in a comparative study; therefore, three countries have been chosen whose extreme
right-parties (ERP) are at dierent levels of success. e three countries focused on in this study are
the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and France. After an analysis of each country’s ERP and
the country itself, it will be recognized that an extreme party’s success hinges on its own structural
organization, its ability to blend into the mainstream, and the institutional structures in place by the
government that can either enable or hinder their success.
ere are two ways to categorize the extreme right (Jackman and Volpert 1996). An older
view includes all parties that have an explicit fascist mark through their historical connections with
“issues, values and attitudes” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). A second, newer denition involves
those parties with “no direct fascist associations but with a right-wing populist anti-system attitude”
(Jackman and Volpert 1996). One specic stance of the extreme right that gives them their historical
connections to fascism is xenophobic nationalism. A major tenant of the extreme right economic
policy is support of rmer immigration reform including the deportation of non-nationals. e
National Front party in France has the mantra “two million immigrants are the cause of two million
French people out of work” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). Taking on an issue like unemployment
gives the foundation of xenophobic stances much like that taken by the National Front. ese parties
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
153
also tend to support stricter law enforcement, stronger military, and signicantly lessened social
independence. e parties can also represent economic interdependence rather than an authoritarian
type model; still, this results in economic extremism, as we have seen through examples such as the
Nazi party in Germany prior to and during WWII. Using the name social worker’s party does not
necessarily mean a socialistic approach or, moreover, a less extreme one.
Besides the discernible threats that can come with extreme right success, there is a much
more real threat due to the political systems in which these parties succeed. In a parliamentary
system, policies are advanced by majority votes which are obtained through party coalitions. us, if
ERPs gain seats “there is reason to believe that this revival has signicant indirect political eects by
which ERPs inuence the behavior of larger, more established parties” (Jackman and Volpert 1996).
Additionally, obtaining seats in a legislature gives parties a legitimate voice to aect a country’s political
agenda (Jackman and Volpert 1996). For an ideal, healthy democracy to take place, conceivably all
voices from far-left to far-right should have an equal opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, if some
voices threaten the democratic ideals that protect our political freedoms, how should they be handled?
is question will be further explored when addressing the Czech Republic’s extreme right parties.
ere are several contextual explanations for the rise of the extreme right parties. ese are
typically derived from statistical studies of either a single country over time, multiple countries over
time, or just multiple countries in one year. is variation between cross-sectional and time-series
data gives dierent results because each country is unique and the context of dierent generations
varies greatly throughout the time-series approach. Each study deserves its own share of credit and
the theories each hold their own share of truth; though, because of the variation in available reasons
for ERP success, none can be fully attributed to a broad, concrete reason for it. Nonetheless, the
theories are important to address and help further explain ERP support.
Jackman and Volpert summarize their conditions favoring ERP support as a function of a
country’s eective threshold, the eective number of political parties and unemployment (1996). e
rst factor, eective threshold, is resultant of Duverger’s theory that disproportionality increasingly
constrains multi-partism and Lijphart’s theory that disproportionality and multi-partism “are loosely
inter-dependent” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). An eective electoral threshold is the necessary
percentage of votes to gain legislative representation. It is expected then that with an increased electoral
threshold, disproportionality should also increase (Lijphart 1994). Disproportionality would favor
major parties and increasingly exclude smaller parties, such as ERPs. Although Lijphart found the
statistical link between electoral thresholds and multi-partism to be negative, as expected, the
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
also tend to support stricter law enforcement, stronger military, and signicantly lessened social
independence. e parties can also represent economic interdependence rather than an authoritarian
type model; still, this results in economic extremism, as we have seen through examples such as the
Nazi party in Germany prior to and during WWII. Using the name social worker’s party does not
necessarily mean a socialistic approach or, moreover, a less extreme one.
Besides the discernible threats that can come with extreme right success, there is a much
more real threat due to the political systems in which these parties succeed. In a parliamentary
system, policies are advanced by majority votes which are obtained through party coalitions. us, if
ERPs gain seats “there is reason to believe that this revival has signicant indirect political eects by
which ERPs inuence the behavior of larger, more established parties” (Jackman and Volpert 1996).
Additionally, obtaining seats in a legislature gives parties a legitimate voice to aect a country’s political
agenda (Jackman and Volpert 1996). For an ideal, healthy democracy to take place, conceivably all
voices from far-left to far-right should have an equal opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, if some
voices threaten the democratic ideals that protect our political freedoms, how should they be handled?
is question will be further explored when addressing the Czech Republic’s extreme right parties.
ere are several contextual explanations for the rise of the extreme right parties. ese are
typically derived from statistical studies of either a single country over time, multiple countries over
time, or just multiple countries in one year. is variation between cross-sectional and time-series
data gives dierent results because each country is unique and the context of dierent generations
varies greatly throughout the time-series approach. Each study deserves its own share of credit and
the theories each hold their own share of truth; though, because of the variation in available reasons
for ERP success, none can be fully attributed to a broad, concrete reason for it. Nonetheless, the
theories are important to address and help further explain ERP support.
Jackman and Volpert summarize their conditions favoring ERP support as a function of a
country’s eective threshold, the eective number of political parties and unemployment (1996). e
rst factor, eective threshold, is resultant of Duverger’s theory that disproportionality increasingly
constrains multi-partism and Lijphart’s theory that disproportionality and multi-partism “are loosely
inter-dependent” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). An eective electoral threshold is the necessary
percentage of votes to gain legislative representation. It is expected then that with an increased electoral
threshold, disproportionality should also increase (Lijphart 1994). Disproportionality would favor
major parties and increasingly exclude smaller parties, such as ERPs. Although Lijphart found the
statistical link between electoral thresholds and multi-partism to be negative, as expected, the
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
154
connection was not statistically strong enough to explain a signicant, direct correlation (1994).
erefore, Jackman and Volpert hypothesized that disproportionality is indirectly linked to multi-
partism when combined with the eective number of political parties in the legislature, using the
measure designed by Laakso and Taagepera (1996). Jackman and Volpert found that “electoral
disproportionality (through the mechanism of thresholds) increasingly dampens support for the
extreme right as the number of parliamentary parties expands. At the same time, multi-partism
increasingly fosters parties of the extreme right with rising electoral proportionality” (Jackman and
Volpert 1996). erefore, disproportionality does hinder ERP support and more so when there are a
greater number of parties represented. is is signicant because electoral thresholds are one ecient
and direct preventative method a government can use to change the makeup of their legislature. If
the goal is to prevent extreme parties from entering the political environment, a proper balance of
threshold and multi-partism should be used.
eir study also suggests that higher rates of unemployment have a signicant relationship
with ERP support. However, “the unemployment eect does not imply that protest movements of
the extreme right have drawn the bulk of their support from economically marginalized individuals…
e unemployment eect is instead most protably seen as reecting the inuence of broad economic
conditions…higher rates of unemployment epitomize uneven economic performance that fosters
support for the extreme right by providing a pretext for mounting xenophobic political appeals that
characterize these political movements” (Jackman and Volpert 1996). is furthers the previously
mentioned dening characteristics of the extreme right. When economic conditions are strong, we
should expect lower levels of ERP support because anti-system protests are not as relevant when the
system is working, at least economically. One problem with this conclusion is that the economy
is not always the most salient issue. In elections where economic conditions were not the most
important campaign issues, the economic relationship with ERP support would be lessened.
ere are other theories that help further explain the resurgence of the extreme right. By
looking at the populist vote in Flanders-Belgium from 1987-2007, Poznyak and Swyngedouw looked
to statistically test dierent prevailing theories for ERP support. ey describe the many conicting
theories that they want to test. First is the eect of immigration on ERP support. e group threat
theory assumes that citizens and immigrants are all ghting for the same scarce resources and the
insecurity this protectionism instills labels the migrants as a threat (Poznyak and Swyngedouw 2011).
Another theory to explain the relationship between immigration and ERP support is the social identity
theory; this suggests that actual competition for resources is not the issue, but that people tend to
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155
identify with the majority which in turn creates minority dissension. Whereas the group threat
theory shows a more direct confrontational view of this immigration link, the social identity theory
is more indirectly xenophobic and nationalistic. In opposition to these views is contact theory which
actually reverses the previous theories so that there is actually a negative response of ERP support to
immigration. According to the contact theory, “a region with a higher proportion of immigrants
decreases intergroup hostility, prejudice and competition” (McLaren 2003, Schneider 2007). is
would advocate that to decrease ERP support, a government should allow more immigration to create
further understanding and diversity amongst the population. is could exasperate the problem if
the group threat theory is more correct.
On the factor of immigration, Poznyak and Swyngedouw found that, while immigrants
from other European countries do not show a signicant relationship to the extreme-right vote,
immigrants from Turkey and Maghreb, as well as asylum seekers, do exhibit a strong correlation.
is lends itself to the more physical, racial explanation of the specic extreme-right vote in
Belgium. Rather than forming ideologies based on facts and statistics, ERP support can be from
visible xenophobia, blaming individual problems on those that are visibly dierent. If consistent,
subscribing to the contact theory in policy decisions would increase ERP support.
Economic factors also had an impact on ERP support. Poznyak and Swyngedouw conclude
that unemployment does show a signicant relationship; however, it is inconsistent over time. is
aligns with the earlier judgment of Jackman and Volpert’s ndings that economic identiers are only
as signicant as the economy is to the election. is idea that “that the role of unemployment may
be conditional on the ‘ups and downs’ of the domestic economy and salience of the issue in each
particular election” is supported by Knigge (1998) and Eatwell (2003). Poznyak and Swyngedouw
also found that “average per capita income in a municipality has a signicant positive and large eect
on the ER vote” (2011). In other words, as per capita income increases, so does extreme-right vote.
is may sound like it is contradictory to any notion that unemployment leads to higher extreme-
right vote, but voting comes from those at the bottom and the top. is subscribes to the welfare
chauvinism hypothesis: as those at the economic peak become even wealthier, they have more to lose
and to protect (Poznyak and Swyngedouw 2011). e far-right political economic scale tends to be
less focused on welfare, and externalities from the economic left, such as ination, can aect the
rich more negatively than the poor. ese economic justications explain why some of the wealthy
support the extreme right and “this would lead us to conclude that the welfare chauvinism hypothesis
(Betz 1994, Kitschelt 1995, Swank and Betz 2003) does in fact hold true” (Poznyak and
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
156
Swyngedouw 2011).
ese theories hold in many situations, but are not denite enough to make extensive
implications about ERP support; nevertheless, they do provide a solid foundation to analyze specic
cases. ey also tend to focus on the voters to evaluate the rise of the extreme right, which is why
much of the studies reect ERP support rather than success. However, if ERP success is voter-based,
we would see more consistency amongst all countries with concurring issues such as unemployment
and immigration. For this reason, ERPs’ overarching success is less based on the issues and voters,
but more on party structure, legitimacy and their interaction with governmental institutions. Next,
the three selected countries, the details of their extreme right parties, and actions taken by their
government to withhold an extreme right resurgence will be examined.
e Czech Republic
e extreme right in the Czech Republic has not been successful and is the least so amongst
the countries evaluated in this paper. In Western Europe, there is a large focus on xenophobic tensions
towards the growing Muslim population; however, the Czech extreme right is less attentive to this
and more so on “law and order” (Mares 2011). e Czech extreme right “strongly opposes eorts to
legalize drugs, demands capital punishment and rejects enlargement of the concept of human rights”
(Mares 2011). ey are anti-liberal, anti-capitalist and especially anti-communist (Mares 2011).
Although these issues and others are important to the electorate, “the public either does not consider
these topics to be dominant or does not believe the extreme right competent to solve them” (Mares
2011).
Europe’s complex political history gives life to varying ideologies and the Czech Republic
does not waver from it. Within a span of just forty years, they along with much of Europe saw a
transition from a Republic, to fascism, to communism, and now back to a republic. And to further
complicate matters, in 1992 the country which was formerly Czechoslovakia split into the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, now two sovereign countries. is velvet revolution was a result of a national
identity crisis paired with dierent views on how the economy should continue to be run (Sima
2012). Included in this was the birth of extreme-right parties on both sides, each wanting their
republics to be independent based on national identity.
e issue of identity was not isolated just between the two nationalities, but also divided
the extreme parties within each new state as well. is confusion about party lines and structure has
had the greatest negative eect on the Czech extreme right. Just before the split of the nation, the
Association for the Republic Republican Party became the signicant right party, and “it quickly
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gained an unambiguous identity of an extreme right” (Mares 2011). Many of their positions
were against the new system that arose after communism, as well as xenophobic pressures against
Vietnamese workers brought over during the communist era and the Roma population (Mares 2011).
Interestingly enough, the party leader, Miroslav Sladek, was against the annexation of Czechoslovakia
because of his solid relationship with the Slovak National Party (Mares 2011). In 1990, the party
obtained no legislative seats with only 1% of the vote and a 5% threshold. Nevertheless, in 1992
they continued to campaign and received over 6% of the vote in each of the Czech chambers and
council, therefore gaining representation. In 1996, they received over 8% of the vote, but this
would be the most success they would see. In 1998 they only polled 3.9% of the vote and lost all
representation. e party’s extreme alternatives lost some of their credibility, and it was not eective
in picking up rst-time voters (Mares 2011). e party failed again in 2000 and bankrupted due to
mismanagement (Mares 2011). is mismanagement would carry through the Czech extreme right
and be a signicant part of its perennial failure.
Sladek created a new ERP under his own name, but his authoritarian style of leadership
within the party caused many members to split o into new parties. In 2000, the National Party
was created and with it came the rst glimpse of institutional powers trying to control extremist
groups. Although the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic overturned the decision in 2002, the
Ministry of the Interior initially rejected the National Party’s registration (Mares 2011). In 2000,
the Ministry of the Interior also banned the National Alliance, another extreme right group (Mares
2011). e National Alliance joined with another ERP, the National Resistance, yet saw no success.
is coalition wanted their name to be the National Social Bloc, but when the Ministry of the
Interior declined the name, they chose the Right Alternative (Mares 2011). is new coalition, like
its predecessors, was mismanaged and could not nd the organizational ability to even reach the
ballot in the 2006 election. Some of the party separated and became militant while others joined the
National-Democratic Party (Mares 2011). Once again, this change of parties yielded no success for
the extreme right.
At that point, the Czech system contained multiple extreme-right parties each containing
just a few dozen members, and still new ERPs were being formed (Mares 2011). For example, in
2002, New Force and the Czech National Social Party were founded, though New Force changed its
name to the Workers’ Party in 2003. In the 2005 election, a group of ve extreme-right parties tried
forming one large coalition called the National Five, which was made up of the National Party, the
Workers’ Party, National Unity, Czech Movement for National Unity, and Miroslav Sladek’s
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
158
Republicans (Mares 2011). In a struggle for leadership between Sladek and others, along with
further negligence internally, the coalition failed. “e overall result of the extreme right in the 2006
parliamentary election was nothing short of catastrophic, in sharp contrast with the contemporary
successes of this end of the political spectrum in Slovakia and Poland” (Mares 2011).
e Czech Republic’s ERPs are quintessential displays of one of the most basic explanations
for ERP success, or, in this case, failure. e support for an ERP was obviously present within
the country with there being many dierent parties; however, it was their own mishandling and
divisiveness that led to their failure. First, the voting population did not have condence in the
parties or their agendas. Instead of one large, sophisticated group, the extreme right represented
themselves as small groups of extremists with little ecacy. Second, in every election each ERP was
competing for votes, and when they tried to correct this with the National Five it fell apart. eir
failure does not fall on a good economy or low immigration as theories suggest, but of their own
accord. Even since 2006, things have not improved for the extreme right in the Czech Republic.
From the failure of the National Five, the Workers’ Party remained the central ERP of the
Czech Republic. is centralization allowed them to slowly accrue dierent members of the extreme
right, including neo-Nazi organizations. In 2008, some of the Workers’ Party formed a revolutionary
group called the Protective Corps for the Workers’ Party to show their strength and play the game of
fear (Mares 2011). is new militia was used for demonstrations against the system and parts of the
population, especially Roma. e political aspect of the party detached itself from any violence, but
still used it as a mode for their message. ough on the rise, the Workers’ Party, still competing with
the National Party for ER votes, only gained 0.99% of the vote in 2008 and 1.07% in 2009. e
National Party only received 0.09% and 0.26% respectively.
In February 2010, the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic disbanded the Workers’
Party, claiming them to be a threat to democracy. After searching several documents, including the
actual court’s ruling, the threat to democracy to which they refer was based upon the party’s radical
and racist ideologies and rumors of their direct involvement with the Protective Corps. However,
some members of the Workers’ Party were already involved in the Democratic Party of Social Justice,
and after the disbandment renamed it the Workers’ Party for Social Justice. As recently as 2010, this
new party still only received 1.14% of the vote (Mares 2011). It seems contradictory that a court
would disband one party and allow another, but it is plausible that the desired eect of institutional
intervention was dierent from just disbanding the party. By continually dividing the parties, the
government provokes the divisiveness that challenges the ERP platforms, and thus has kept them at
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bay.
According to Freedom House Reports, the Czech Republic is a free country which respects
the freedom of expression (Freedom House). e governmental action of disbanding a party seems
to be a major restriction on the freedom of speech. Even so, should a party that is known to have
extreme ideology, has taken violent acts against the people and wants to overhaul the system be
allowed to participate? Although the Czech Republic has proven that governmental intervention can
be a strong device for creating instability in the extreme right, the previous example opens up debate
for establishing the proper amount of government intervention. A discussion with Professor Sima,
President of the Cevro Institute in Prague, helped shed some light on this question.
When asked about disbanding a political party, Sima seemed wavering. On one hand, he
said the extreme right misused the freedom of speech given to them by using sensitive social issues
and playing the game of fear. e extreme right blamed problems on the Roma and immigrants, and
for some time locals did not see another solution and so they supported the ER throughout the early
1990s (Sima 2012). “After the fall of communism there was wide room for freedom of speech and
political expression, and sometimes it goes quite far” (Sima 2012). He also mentioned that they seem
extreme because, rather than being one larger party, the extreme right are small groups of radicals
(Sima 2012). is furthers the argument that ERP failure is largely due to its own inability to unify
and stabilize. However, Professor Sima also took another point of view.
He discussed a recent story involving a man being arrested and harassed for years by
the police for publishing a copy of Hitler’s “Mein Kampf ”. is man also published copies of the
“Communist Manifesto” and other political books, but publishing Hitler’s seemed to go too far and
the country seized his books while accusing him of spreading propaganda. is man just wanted to
share these books because he believed that by knowing exactly what ideologies inuenced history, it
would not be repeated. is presents a problem with government intervention. A government with
the power to prevent speech can misuse it to shut down reasonable people (Sima 2012). Professor
Sima said “these people (the ER) are here, so it’s good to know who is who so society can protect itself
and allow social responses to it. It is important not to have government prohibitions on government
involvement” (2012).
Professor Sima’s arguments are strong and signicant. It can be dangerous for the
government to intervene with the political process. e Czech Republic has shown us that
governmental intervention is useful, especially through thresholds. Even before the Supreme Court
took steps to divide the extreme right, the parties were not successful because of their own instability,
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
160
lack of leadership and the thresholds in place. When asked what would happen if an extreme party
won representation, Professor Sima’s response reected the general attitude toward an unsuccessful
extreme right: “ey will give really strange speeches and be ostracized as before.”
By next looking at the United Kingdom, it will be seen if these basic principles of party
stability and governmental involvement have as large of an impact on the extreme right.
e United Kingdom
“e ability to mobilize individuals politically via representatives who perhaps don’t
correlate to the dominant image of ‘racists’ can enable parties like the BNP to achieve a greater degree
of local legitimacy, despite often continuing to be viewed at the same time as illegitimate political
actors nationally” (Rhodes 2009). And in the 2009 European Parliamentary Election, the British
National Party won its rst two seats (Freedom House).
e extreme right in the United Kingdom has seen moderate success throughout the past
century, receiving national representation in groups of consecutive years and remaining fairly stable
in comparison to the Czech Republic. Whereas the Czech extremists have remained much unchanged
since the founding of the new Republic over 20 years ago, the extreme right of the United Kingdom
has undergone a modernization period that has changed its image, strategy and given it a new level of
success.
e United Kingdom has a long history from which its extreme right developed. In
1801, Britain and Ireland unionized and formed the United Kingdom, with most of the support
coming from Northern Ireland and dissent from the South (Durham 2012). In 1921, tensions drove
secession and Southern Ireland became independent while the North, known as Ulster, remained
a part of the U.K. (Durham 2012). Out of this, two main factions in Irish politics were born, the
Ulster Unionist Party, who was against the separation, and the militant Irish Nationalists who were
for it. e nationalists then formed the Irish Republican Army, but due to ideological dierences split
again into two groups, the Ocials and the Provisionals (Durham 2012). e Ocials were Marxist
and thought that the only way to move forward was to democratize the North. e Provisionals
were more revolutionary and believed the only way forward was a military operation against Britain
(Durham 2012). Out of reaction to this military threat from the Provisionals, the National Front in
Britain, a new extreme right party, formed.
Although being strong as the United Kingdom’s main extreme right party, the late 1970s
brought some of the same fate that cursed the Czech’s extreme right. Disputes over the amount of
power party chairman John Tyndall had led to the party splitting into factions, mainly the New
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
161
National Front and the British National Party (Durham 2012). is split, as might be predicted,
caused instability and for some time the extreme right lost its legislative representation.
In the 1980s, the British National Party failed and the singularity of the National Front
allowed it to gain over 50 council seats and 2 seats in the European Parliament (Durham 2012). is
exemplies a strong correlation between party unication and party success. Small parties may seem
more radical and less legitimate, hurting their chances at electoral success. Moreover, a smaller party
may not have the resources to spread their platform, forcing them to take more extreme measures,
which makes themselves less legitimate. us, when corrected, a group of ideologues can unify and
gain representation.
After this new resurgence, the National Front took a new turn in their agenda that would
set course for a new modernization era within the extreme right. Martin Durham in his piece “e
British Extreme Right and Northern Ireland” describes the new position beginning in 1998:
Where it had initially believed Ulster should be a part of the British State, it [the National
Front] had come to understand that Ulster could become a politically independent part of the British
Family of Nations, and a way forward could be oered to not only loyalists but the many ‘non-aligned
people’ who supported neither Unionism nor Republicanism. Perhaps by adopting Switzerland’s
cantonal system, it suggested, the religious bigotry of both sides could be quelled. Old viewpoints
could not be blindly accepted. ‘We are not Unionist. We are not Republican. We are the ird
Position.’
is is of enormous signicance because, for the rst time, the extreme right is seen
dividing from its “right” roots and establish itself as its own. Instead of focusing on the Irish and
internal tensions, this ‘ird Position’ took stances on main issues, such as terrorism and the world’s
lack of response to Libyan President Gadda’s connection to it (Rhodes 2009). While the issues
taken on before by the extreme right were more isolated and outwardly xenophobic driven, this was
an initial attempt to become mainstream.
As per usual in extreme-right parties, the National Front was disbanded due to what their
leader described as media distortions and party mistakes (Rhodes 2009). However, they reunied,
this time under the name British National Party, as it is still called today. e British National
Party has seen little national electoral success, but their goals have changed and seem to be greatly
improving their legitimacy along with it.
Rather than approaching elections at the national level, the British National Party, or BNP,
has been very successful in winning local elections across the country. ey hope that by gaining
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
162
support from locals at an individual level, it will help them eventually gain success on the national
scale. is “localized emphasis” has allowed the BNP to tap “into everyday concerns and by selecting
local residents as candidates, [and] it appears that the BNP has been able to deect charges of
racism and extremism” (Rhodes 2009). e party can also choose which communities best t their
demographic and target them for support.
is “banal nationalism”, as coined by Michael Billings, has been a signicant turning
point for the extreme right. At least at the local level, the party does not seem extreme, nor do
its followers. James Rhodes studied this important transition in “e Banal National Party” and
interviewed many supporters of the British National party to see if they reected the racist and
extreme ideologies the party nationally supports. What he found was that by campaigning at the local
level, “there appears to have been a recognition that it is the familiar and everyday articulations and
representations of white racism that seem able to escape the label of extremism and appear instead
as more ‘legitimate forms of expression’” (Rhodes 2009). Even the party’s leader at the time, Nick
Grin, was said to be “unremarkable” and that there was “nothing to signal” that he was on a far end
of the political spectrum (Back 2002). However, it must be noted that Grin has now been charged
three times for inciting racial hatred (Rhodes 2009).
Earlier, the two types of extreme-right parties were discussed. e older view consists
of strong connections to the fascist and nationalist design that history has provided. e British
National Party, following the lead of the Front National in France, is a part of the newer view of the
extreme right. An integral part of this transition has been a change from biological to dierentialist
racism (Rhodes 2009). Dierentialist racism is the idea that all people are created equal, but prefer
to stay within their own groups, and that racial mixing is the real problem in society today. Although
still radical, this approach “has certainly enabled the party to secure a greater share of the vote at the
national level than ever before in its history” (Rhodes 2009). is form of racism, while more popular
in Europe than the U.S., allows the BNP to keep its nationalistic message with a more egalitarian
approach (PRRAC).
e British National Party has been stable for the most part, and has been able to achieve
some success, even if it is mostly at the local level. It is unclear what their future success may be,
especially after recently winning its international representation in 2009. However, this study’s earlier
hypothesis still holds true because historically, when the party is unied and stable, they have seen
great success. Additionally, their ability to become mainstream by altering their appearance and
ideology had the desired eect of seeming less extreme and more legitimate. Lastly, thresholds used
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
support from locals at an individual level, it will help them eventually gain success on the national
scale. is “localized emphasis” has allowed the BNP to tap “into everyday concerns and by selecting
local residents as candidates, [and] it appears that the BNP has been able to deect charges of
racism and extremism” (Rhodes 2009). e party can also choose which communities best t their
demographic and target them for support.
is “banal nationalism”, as coined by Michael Billings, has been a signicant turning
point for the extreme right. At least at the local level, the party does not seem extreme, nor do
its followers. James Rhodes studied this important transition in “e Banal National Party” and
interviewed many supporters of the British National party to see if they reected the racist and
extreme ideologies the party nationally supports. What he found was that by campaigning at the local
level, “there appears to have been a recognition that it is the familiar and everyday articulations and
representations of white racism that seem able to escape the label of extremism and appear instead
as more ‘legitimate forms of expression’” (Rhodes 2009). Even the party’s leader at the time, Nick
Grin, was said to be “unremarkable” and that there was “nothing to signal” that he was on a far end
of the political spectrum (Back 2002). However, it must be noted that Grin has now been charged
three times for inciting racial hatred (Rhodes 2009).
Earlier, the two types of extreme-right parties were discussed. e older view consists
of strong connections to the fascist and nationalist design that history has provided. e British
National Party, following the lead of the Front National in France, is a part of the newer view of the
extreme right. An integral part of this transition has been a change from biological to dierentialist
racism (Rhodes 2009). Dierentialist racism is the idea that all people are created equal, but prefer
to stay within their own groups, and that racial mixing is the real problem in society today. Although
still radical, this approach “has certainly enabled the party to secure a greater share of the vote at the
national level than ever before in its history” (Rhodes 2009). is form of racism, while more popular
in Europe than the U.S., allows the BNP to keep its nationalistic message with a more egalitarian
approach (PRRAC).
e British National Party has been stable for the most part, and has been able to achieve
some success, even if it is mostly at the local level. It is unclear what their future success may be,
especially after recently winning its international representation in 2009. However, this study’s earlier
hypothesis still holds true because historically, when the party is unied and stable, they have seen
great success. Additionally, their ability to become mainstream by altering their appearance and
ideology had the desired eect of seeming less extreme and more legitimate. Lastly, thresholds used
Volume V Issue II Spring 2013 Journal of Politics and International Aairs
163
as government intervention, as predicted by Lijphart and Jackman, have kept their representation
isolated to only those times when the party is stable and representative of a larger percentage of the
electorate. Next, the Front National, the extreme-right party of France, will be evaluated. ey have
long been the model for the consistent success within far-right politics.
France
In the most recent French Presidential election, Front National leader Marine Le Pen won
17.9% of the vote. Although missing the second-round cuto, as her father Jean-Marie Le Pen did
in 2002, this is very signicant. From everything that has been shown so far, having a leader that can
run at the presidential level with this level of success is crucial for the stability and longevity of an
extreme-right party. e Front National has been a trend setter for ERP success, and by looking into
their measures, the hypotheses in place can be further established.
e Front National, or FN, was founded in 1972, mainly to establish a political group in
opposition to the French Communist Party (Shields 2011). At this point, the viewpoints of the FN
were not as radical as we would expect from an ERP. ey focused less on European immigration
and instead on African immigration. is corresponds with Poznyak and Swyngedouw’s hypothesis
that non-European immigration shows a positive signicant relationship with ERP support. e
connection between immigration and unemployment that would later come also was not part of their
original platform. On the contrary, Le Pen saw the importance of immigrants to the economy (Shields
2011). eir xenophobic stances were not distinguished until a couple years after their formation.
Until then, there was little separating them from the mainstream right. Le Pen mentioned in 1974
that he feared French Algerians were forming an army to mobilize against France. In the later 1970s,
their stances became more apparent. In 1978, Le Pen was quoted on the radio saying that France had
a “demographic crisis”. Even at the time, anti-immigration notions in France were not unheard of
throughout other parts of the political spectrum (Shields 2011).
In 1981, Francois Mitterrand of the Socialist Party won the Presidential election. “With
the emphasis shifting from repatriation to integration, random identity checks were halted, and
the assisted repatriation scheme was abolished. Some procedural obstacles to family reunion were
removed, and full rights of association were granted” (Shields 2011). Like at their formation, the FN
had a new political adversary to target its message. A harsh stance on immigration as well as focus on
law and order became their foundation. French Nationalism was threatened.
By 1981, over 132,000 illegal immigrants legalized their status (Shields 2011). Whereas in
the 1970s there were just a handful of Muslim places of worship, the 1980s saw these numbers reach
Koslen Extreme Right Party Success
as government intervention, as predicted by Lijphart and Jackman, have kept their representation
isolated to only those times when the party is stable and representative of a larger percentage of the
electorate. Next, the Front National, the extreme-right party of France, will be evaluated. ey have
long been the model for the consistent success within far-right politics.
France
In the most recent French Presidential election, Front National leader Marine Le Pen won
17.9% of the vote. Although missing the second-round cuto, as her father Jean-Marie Le Pen did
in 2002, this is very signicant. From everything that has been shown so far, having a leader that can
run at the presidential level with this level of success is crucial for the stability and longevity of an
extreme-right party. e Front National has been a trend setter for ERP success, and by looking into
their measures, the hypotheses in place can be further established.
e Front National, or FN, was founded in 1972, mainly to establish a political group in
opposition to the French Communist Party (Shields 2011). At this point, the viewpoints of the FN
were not as radical as we would expect from an ERP. ey focused less on European immigration
and instead on African immigration. is corresponds with Poznyak and Swyngedouw’s hypothesis
that non-European immigration shows a positive signicant relationship with ERP support. e
connection between immigration and unemployment that would later come also was not part of their
original platform. On the contrary, Le Pen saw the importance of immigrants to the economy (Shields
2011). eir xenophobic stances were not distinguished until a couple years after their formation.
Until then, there was little separating them from the mainstream right. Le Pen mentioned in 1974
that he feared French Algerians were forming an army to mobilize against France. In the later 1970s,
their stances became more apparent. In 1978, Le Pen was quoted on the radio saying that France had
a “demographic crisis”. Even at the time, anti-immigration notions in France were not unheard of
throughout other parts of the political spectrum (Shields 2011).
In 1981, Francois Mitterrand of the Socialist Party won the Presidential election. “With
the emphasis shifting from repatriation to integration, random identity checks were halted, and
the assisted repatriation scheme was abolished. Some procedural obstacles to family reunion were
removed, and full rights of association were granted” (Shields 2011). Like at their formation, the FN
had a new political adversary to target its message. A harsh stance on immigration as well as focus on
law and order became their foundation. French Nationalism was threatened.
By 1981, over 132,000 illegal immigrants legalized their status (Shields 2011). Whereas in
the 1970s there were just a handful of Muslim places of worship, the 1980s saw these numbers reach
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into the thousands. Public opinion polls showed a majority of the country to be against the new
immigration policies, and by 1983 some of the immigration restrictions were reinstated (Shields
2011). With the political right leading the political environment back to its stricter immigration
policies, FN gained its representation in the 1984 European elections with almost 11% of the vote.
By 1986, the FN had 35 National Assembly Seats. Policies regarding law and order throughout
the late 1980s and 1990s were put into place, especially after the 1995 Paris Metro Bombings.
roughout all of this, public opinion did not show to resist. Le Pen won 14.4% in the 1988
Presidential election. Front National success was clear, and leaders of right and center-right parties
wanted their support (Shields 2011).
With party support at an all-time high, the FN proposed a “50 Point Plan” to deal with the
issue of immigration, their most extreme stance to date (Shields 2011). In this, they described the
problem of dierentialism, claiming that racial mixing was the true problem in French society. is
form of racism gave them a more biological egalitarian approach which allowed them to seem less
racially extreme but still anti-immigration and nationalistic. As previously discussed, this technique
was the key for the British National Party platform modernization. roughout the 1990s Front
National obtained consistent national, regional and local success; since their formation in 1972, there
was one most signicant aspect that kept the Front National driving: Le Pen.
is is most meaningfully shown in his 2002 Presidential campaign. Running against
another extreme right candidate, Le Pen recognized he had to distinguish himself from his close
opponent. Rather than sticking to the platform that garnered them support since the 1970s, he
modernized his approach. He backed down on key immigration issues, such as large repatriations of
immigrants, and actually advocated for French Muslim acceptance. Le Pen’s recognition of a need
to deradicalize is immensely signicant. His electoral runo in 2002 showed that by moderating on
issues and maintaining local and regional success, an ERP today can succeed. is strongly supports
the hypothesis that the fundamental traits of extreme right success are party stability and mainstream
capacity.
After the 2002 election, factions of right and center-right politicians formed. Some reveled
at the FN success and wanted to hinge o its platform while others did not appreciate the party’s
attempt at moderation. Front National saw decreasing success in Presidential elections and lost some
its support in regional and local elections. In order to gain back votes, the FN platform again became
more radical to campaign on more familiar ground. Election success was now due mainly to far-right
sympathizers. Front National also has had strong competition throughout the 2000s from the center-
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right Union for a Popular Movement which has won two Presidential elections with Jacques Chirac
and Nicolas Sarkozy.
Overall, the Front National has t this study’s model for a successful ERP. ey have been
stable and have had much success in changing their appearance from less radical to more mainstream.
Rather than direct government intervention as we saw in the U.K. and the Czech Republic, France
allowed the party to continue. It was due the unity within the extreme right as well as their electoral
successes that allowed the party to seem legitimate enough to maintain.
Regardless of their historical success, how is the party improving to revitalize the
prominence and legitimacy they once had? e party passed down its leadership position to Jean-
Marie’s daughter, Marine, in 2011. Is she the leader the FN needs to again become the third party
in the French political forum? Not only is she a female leader of an extreme right party, but she is
also twice divorced and pro-choice, which are noteworthy factors in relating to the electorate, as well
as a moderate political approach, for the extreme-right group. In 2011, Marine talked to Newsweek
about her initial attempt at modernization:
“I think submitting to demonization, or trying to provoke it, is a mistake,” Marine tells
NEWSWEEK over blanched asparagus in the council cafeteria in Lille. She says the shaved-head and
bomber-jacket types who hung around the party are unwelcome. She has shown the door to “anti-
Semites, extremists, and extreme-right guys.” “I said I didn’t want them, and the 68 percent of folks
at the Front [who voted for me] said they didn’t want them, either. So at least that problem’s solved,”
she claims.
Her attempts at change could lead down some dierent paths. If sincere, she could lose
much of the condence in the voting population that has supported the Front National and its stance
throughout the past four decades. By compromising towards the middle, she could make the party
seem unstable and illegitimate, as politicians sometimes do when changing their positions. On the
contrary, her move towards the center could also garner support from new voters who have been
aligned with Front National policies on immigration or the economy, but not on other issues.
e leading sign for future success of the Front National is that the current President of
France represents the Socialist Party. In looking at French history, the 1980s brought much success
for the FN as a consequence of a socialist president. If the new president follows the European trend
of austerity and bailouts, which resulted in high unemployment and high ination in other European
countries, France could experience a signicant economic descent, which no doubt would increase
the success of Marine Le Pen and the Front National.
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Conclusion
rough these specic case studies, it can be seen that the fundamental principles of
party stability, mainstream capacity and the role of government are the comprehensive explanations
of extreme-right success. e Czech Republic has shown little ability to structure its party and
government intervention has kept the status quo. e British National Party has followed the
precedent of the Front National, modernizing their xenophobic bearings to a less radical form. e
Front National has witnessed long-term success, much due to their incredible party stability under Le
Pen, and could see a major resurgence under their new leader Marine Le Pen. With parliamentary
systems designed for proportional representation, thresholds have been used as an ecient strategy
to keep extreme radical sects out of government. roughout history, both in Europe and elsewhere,
governments have had a strong hand in party politics, disbanding parties that seem to threaten
democratic ideals; however, we must think hard about the role of government in the political process.
As Professor Sima argued, restrictions on party expression can impede the ideals they are meant to
protect.
Are extreme right parties set to be a signicant threat to European and democratic stability?
Subscribing to the theories of ERP support, we should be watchful of the next cycle of European
elections. Unemployment is high throughout the world while high ination fuels the economic
re throughout Europe. Most theories support poor economic times as predictors for extreme-right
support, and with the instability of the Euro currency we could see the situation quickly exasperated.
Furthermore, the formation of the European Union is having detrimental eects on nationalism
throughout Europe. Although nationalism in absolute terms can be extreme, the pride it provides
leads to stability and greater trust and support of government. e globalization that the European
Union is attempting is risking democratic and economic sovereignty and challenging nationalistic
principles. In a 2008 TNS/Sofres survey, 22% of French citizens polled considered globalization
to be the largest problem facing France. In another survey from 2005, 73% of French citizens ‘feel
and regret a decline of traditional values and cultures’, while 48% do not feel home in France and
33% agree with Le Pen’s ideas to protect French traditional values. If the European Union continues
to erode the economic structure of Europe, the sentiment of lost national identity will continue to
strengthen. e next few years in Europe will be increasingly crucial if conditions do not change, and
a large resurgence of the extreme right should be expected to follow.
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Michael Koslen is originally from Cleveland, Ohio and recently graduated from Ohio University with
degrees in Economics and Political Science, and a certicate in Jewish Studies. He will be attending
e Ohio State University Moritz College of Law beginning in Fall 2013. His international travels
have lent him unique insight into his areas of study, as displayed in his included essay.
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