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Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring

Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring
Terrence Smith, Richard Hunt GE Digital Energy - Multilin
Abstract-Each wired termination in a substation represents a cost associated with engineering, installing and testing that wired point. These costs include the obvious financial labor costs, but also include intangible costs such as installation and commissioning time, potential for human error, panel space, increased resistive burden in circuits, and larger raceways. Additionally, each wired termination represents stranded engineering time that is used to design these terminations rather than allowing the engineering staff to solve problems. This paper seeks to expose some of the hidden financial costs and reliability costs associated with copper process wiring. Additionally this paper will discuss ways in which modern IEDs can be fully implemented to further reduce wiring. The cost and reliability benefits associated with the reduced wiring will be discussed and quantified. Some of the solutions to be addressed include the use of breaker IEDs as an interface for breaker control, IED to SCADA communications, IED to IED communications, internal lockout Relays, IED pushbutton control, and process bus. Each of these solutions are currently available in today’s market place and have varying degrees of acceptance within the industry. The benefits and liabilities of each solution using traditional IED implementation versus maximized IED implementation shall be discussed.

environment of the electrical industry. The current electrical industry environment will see a loss of qualified engineers and construction personnel at a time when the electrical infrastructure needs a major overhaul. Funding for future projects as well as time to implement those projects, will continue to be condensed. The decisions engineers make in design affect the cost and the time to implement protection and control projects. In the quest to lower costs and time to implement, most of the “low hanging fruit” (SCADA to IED communications, IED to IED communications and IED as breaker control) is well documented and has varying degrees of acceptance within the industry.

A-Phase TOC

B-Phase TOC

C-Phase TOC

Neutral TOC

A-Phase IOC

B-Phase IOC

C-Phase IOC

I. Introduction The benefits of reducing wiring are so great that reduction of wiring is not a new concept. As protection and control designs have evolved, several methods of reducing wiring have also evolved. The most notable example is the use of trip functions developed in logic inside a microprocessor based IED verses a wired trip bus with discrete electromechanical relays as shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the wired trip bus on the bottom represents traditional wiring where protection and control logic was performed discretely by wiring components. Parallel components represent “OR” gates and series components representing “AND” gates. The logical trip bus on the top of figure 1 accomplishes the same functionality in digital logic as the wired trip bus performs using wiring. The title of this paper might draw the reader to conclude that the industry has a problem with wiring. There is in fact, no problem with wiring. Protection and control wiring has been successfully used for about one hundred years. The problem actually lies with the labor and the time needed to design and install the wiring and the business

Figure 1: Trip Logic verses wired Trip Bus

Newer designs, which eliminate wiring, must be evaluated to insure that the solution is reliable, secure, and cost effective. In evaluating the cost effectiveness of a solution the true costs of the solution must be quantifiably measured against the true costs of the current design. Additionally, several questions must be considered, included among those questions are: How and why is this saving cost? Does this solution save cost in one category, but cause other cost to increase? Does this solution trade one problem for another and cause hidden costs? Is the cost savings solution based on open standards and protocols, which will continue to be supported at the end of life of the IEDs? In order to answer the questions above, a thorough knowledge of the true costs of wired terminations must be understood. The majority of the costs associated with wired terminations center around the labor needed to install the termination rather than the material being installed. Based on

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. As each individual “hands-off” his work package. block size representing approximate time for each process Figure 3: Typical Point-to-Point Wiring Diagram Page 2 of 14 . These wiring diagrams must show how equipment is physically wired internal to a piece of equipment or panel and must also show all of the wired interface cables that piece of equipment has with the outside world. The more time spent with a particular drawing and the higher the information density on the drawing. Each step in the process requires design. Each point on each schematic must in some way communicate to the installing wireman how this “point” will physically connect terminations with wires. The actual labor to implement the project centers around three categories: engineering. and check process. The quest to reduce error introduces a check or peer review process.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring this cost breakdown. and check process is carried out by different individuals. in which an individual. Wiring is typically shown in a pointto-point method where one terminal end shows the opposite terminal end device and terminal designation as shown in figure 3. In the design-build process. then go back to the designer and the design goes back through the design. draft. A significant amount of time is spent designing and then drafting each termination. the more costly the consequences of and correction for the error. This is typically done with wiring diagrams that are developed from the elementary diagrams. and checking as shown in the process chart of figure 4. and then verify the correctness of each letter and line on the drawing. The design process is further complicated because the design. untainted with the design process to date. draft. which slows down the flow of the process. below. and commissioning. Terminal Block. The checker must review each point of the elementary diagrams. it is easy to understand that the greatest potential for cost savings on protection and control projects come from reducing the labor necessary to implement the project. with the block size representing the approximate time for each of the steps in the process with the wiring design occupying the most time. it must go into the next individuals work queue. installation. the more likely the drawing will have errors. This results in the designer developing drawings for the equipment that have hundreds if not thousands of terminations. each wired termination starts its life as a “point” on a schematic or elementary drawing as shown on figure 2. Errors discovered by the checker. This causes the designer to insure every precaution is taken to reduce human error. Engineer Prepares/ R ecieves W ork Scope S ingle Line Diagram Engineer Prepares Elem entary D iagram s H an do ffs Three Line Diagram D rafter Creates/ M odifies Drawing H as E rro rs Engineer C hecks D ra fte rs w o rk Elem entary D iagram s Error Free W iring D iagram s C able Schedules Bill of M aterials Engineer Issues Com pleted Package Figure 4: Engineering Process. each termination on the wiring diagrams. Point on a Schematic Diagram Figure 2 Typical Points on a Schematic Diagram During the engineering phase of a traditional protection and control project. The complete design process is shown in figure 4. drafting. the earlier an error is made and the longer it persists through the process. checks the complete design.

This necessitates a commissioning process for the wired protection and control system. This causes the commissioning process to be the most likely to incur premium costs associated with overtime. Additionally. This estimate would not include administrative costs such as scoping the project. incorrectly landing a wire. but also because fewer terminations simplifies the design. Typical estimation numbers are shown in table 1 below. Wires must then be labeled. A simpler design makes resolution of errors quicker. The typical high voltage breaker would have eight wiring diagrams associated with it that include: Breaker CT terminations. The majority of the wireman’s labor is consumed not in actually performing the termination. the more complex his task and the longer it takes him to complete each termination. and up to five sheets of panel wiring to describe the sections of the relay panel located in the control house. Costs for an average termination can easily be obtained by dividing the number of terminations Page 3 of 14 . each wired termination is a possible point of failure. If the wireman has a constant percentage of errors. Breaker mechanism internal wiring. Energization of the completed project is usually tied to a fixed date. This estimate shows a total for design hours of five hundred and fifty two hours to create the drawings necessary to implement a breaker addition. the protection and control system must be functionally commissioned to ensure that each component of the system performs it proper functions. a termination must be identified from the wiring diagrams. These possible failures may not manifest themselves immediately. draft and check these drawing can vary widely due to several diverse factors that range from information density on the drawing to ability and experience of personnel creating or modifying the drawings. Table 1 Engineering Estimate Hours-High Voltage Breaker Drawing Name Three Line Diagra Schematics Panel Wiring Breaker Wiring Extended Extended Engineer Draft Hours Hours 8 8 72 80 40 208 8 8 96 100 40 252 Extended Check Hours 4 4 24 40 20 92 Single Line Diagra Once a design is completed. faulty materials or incorrect design. and breaker failure. terminated. This commissioning process requires that each termination be evaluated to ensure that is correct and properly performed. but in preparing for the termination by reading drawings and locating the correct wire. Each wire identified in the wiring diagrams is housed in a multi-conductor cable. breaker close and IED control. and that the system is dependable and secure. CT connections. The time necessary to create. but lay dormant for years. the installation process. breaker and IED alarms. and landed on the device. and installation support. The consequences of these failures have the potential to create nuisance outages or failure to properly clear a fault. The more wires the wireman has to “deal” with. and then split out from the cable that it is housed in. it is issued to the construction workforce for installation. The wireman must identify each cable and its route from drawings and install those cables by pulling them from one destination to another. project management. The combination of expensive labor rates and overtime premium cause the commissioning process to have a very high cost. This results in a need for a highly skilled commissioning workforce resulting in high labor rates. the engineer would create up to six schematic diagrams that would include: Breaker AC/DC motor control. each eliminated wiring termination simplifies the wireman’s task and pays an exponential return on reducing the necessary labor to complete the entire project. Each wired termination that can be eliminated reduces the commissioning time not only because there are less terminations to commission. breaker mechanism external wiring. Since the commissioning process occurs at the end of the design/installation process it carries a large risk factor for project completion. each eliminated termination also reduces the total number of errors the wireman will make. breaker trips. Since such a large portion of the wireman’s time is spent deciphering the drawings.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring For a typical high voltage breaker. The failure point may arise from faulty workmanship. At this point. Any schedule overruns throughout the project effect the start of the commissioning process. procurement support. and trained into a neat and uniform manner to facilitate future revision or maintenance. The personnel who perform the commissioning process must be capable of understanding the engineering design. These types of failures cannot be tolerated on the electrical system so every precaution must be taken to find these points of failures and eliminate them prior to energization of the system. For a single high voltage breaker this equates to as many as fifteen drawings for one breaker. and protection and control principles. Additionally. the physical wire located in its multi-conductor cable.

installation.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring for a project by the total time to design and install. In this case. Non-volatile latches provide a permanent logical flag inside the IED that is safely stored and will not reset upon reboot of the IED. reduced panel space. The IED actual trips a lockout relay that then trips the switchgear and there are six lock-out relays. Figure 5: Switchgear Trip Circuit Most IEDs can now be optioned with control pushbuttons on the IED. These pushbuttons allow the elimination of discrete control switches on the relay panel that gives a cost benefit from not purchasing discrete components. ignores several intangible benefits associated with reducing wiring and wiring time. The non-volatile latch may be used inside of IED logic such that devices that would normally trip a lock-out relay set the latch. This gives a loaded labor cost. When comparing a solution to reduce wiring. IEDs can be optioned with nonvolatile latches and mechanically latching output contacts that allow these lockout relays to be created inside relay logic. trained humans available to perform work on the power system. and SCADA communications are used to simplify the trip and close circuits. a transformer alarm circuit where a control IED is used as an alarm aggregator. Page 4 of 14 . communications and pushbuttons. Mechanically latching output contacts are output contacts that are mechanically bi-stable and controlled by two separate coils (open and close). Five case studies will be analyzed: a medium voltage switchgear where relay pushbuttons. reduced engineering time. These benefits include: reduced installation and commissioning time. a breaker and a half scheme where IED to SCADA communications. One of the unqualifiable benefits that is ignored is the true benefit of “freeing” the labor to do other tasks. and a process bus solution used to eliminate copper process wiring between the IEDs and primary substation equipment II. and then multiplying by the loaded labor rate. Freeing labor has the obvious benefit of increasing productivity. as the same personnel can complete projects faster. a control IED. which is beneficial to “fast-track” projects. reduced raceway requirements. the trip circuit can be simplified if IED pushbutton control is used with internal lockout relays. The IED associated with this switchgear is underutilized and there are several areas where the trip circuit can be simplified by using IED logic and communications. In the case of the trip circuit of Figure 5. there is the less obvious benefit of freeing labor from the mundane and routine tasks of developing wiring diagrams and terminating wires. internal lockouts. to allow humans to do the things that humans are good at: solving problems. Beyond the obvious labor costs of reduced wiring there are other intangible benefits to eliminating wired terminations in the protection and control design. and IED pushbuttons are used to optimize the design. Electric utilities operate in a business environment where the limiting factor is the number of qualified. from not having to wire the components. The latch set operand can then be paralleled with other trip functions to create a common logical trip bus. this loaded labor cost is used to compare time and cost savings. which equates to a smaller control house. The control switch and the lockout relays can be eliminated with the use of IED logic. from not having to install the components. The following discussion describes typical protection and control wiring practices and how those practices can be optimized to reduce the number of wired terminations in the design. and commissioning time reduces the overall project schedule from conception to energization. Reducing the installation and commissioning time bring the obvious benefit of reducing the outage time necessary to install and commission the project. and from freeing panel space so it gives a “real estate” benefit. Reducing the panel space necessary for the protection and control design provides the obvious benefit of needing fewer panels. however. a DCS (SCADA) contact. The labor cost of a wired termination. Reducing the combined engineering. and a control switch that trip the breaker. and lower life cycle cost of the project. Medium Voltage Switchgear The trip circuit of a typical medium voltage switchgear is shown in Figure 5. IED replacement is also greatly simplified when fewer wiring terminations are involved. Reducing the raceway requirements shortens installation time and in retrofit situations where raceway is limited have the potential to make a project feasible that otherwise would not be. Life cycle costs can also be affected by fewer wired terminations.

The wired contacts string requires forty-two wired terminations to build the circuit while the single contact required for figure 9 requires two Figure 7: Switchgear Trip Logic Page 5 of 14 . a breaker failure lockout. but also prevent re-energization of the equipment until the relay is reset. Since the protective functions for these lockouts are in adjacent IEDs it becomes necessary for those IEDs to communicate to the switchgear IEDs that those protective functions have operated and the associated latches should be set. Several vendor specific communications protocols exist that can perform this type of messaging. such as the transformer lockout 86-TA and the unit lockout 86U. a tie lockout. When the protective zones interlock with several other protective zones the lockout contacts in the close string can become cumbersome as seen in the medium voltage metal-clad switchgear circuit of Figure 8. The IED contact has to be driven by the control pushbutton and the latches that create the internal lock-out relays. This close circuit has been recreated with relay logic in figure 9. Several of the lock-out relays used in this trip circuit are not tripped by the switchgear IED but are tripped by protective elements in adjacent protective zones. Figure 6: Simplified Switchgear Trip Circuit III. Figure 8: Close Circuit with multiple lock-out relays Consider the close circuit of Figure 8 where contacts from five lockout relays are wired in series with an IED contact that is closed when the sources on either side of the switchgear meet synchronous conditions. Switchgear Close Circuit Lockout relays are used to not only trip equipment. The protocol that most easily meets this requirement in IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging. and a unit lockout are wired in series to prevent close until each of these lockouts is reset. Nonvolatile latches are used for each of the lockout functions and the negative logic of the latch (not) is “and-ed” with the IED synchronism operand and the close functions to create the close supervision.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring Mechanically latching output contacts retain their state even when the IED is not powered. The logic of figure 9 replaces the wired contacts of Figure 8 with one output contact. In this logic diagram. The combinations of the control pushbutton and the internal lockout relays can reduce the trip circuit from eight parallel contacts to the one IED contact output and one DCS contact as shown in Figure 6. In the IED logic of figure 7. a switchgear main lockout. but since this information is required by multiple IEDs from multiple vendors the message must be an open protocol. This permissive string of contacts is then wired to a parallel string of close contacts that actually serve to close the breaker. multi-cast message. the logical trip circuit has been designed to receive GOOSE messages from adjacent IEDs and to latch elements to create logical trip functions. In Figure 8 a transformer lockout. each of the discrete contacts that cause close have been replaced with relay operands and “or-ed” together in the upper left corner of the diagram.

There are also several operational considerations that must be addressed when using IED pushbuttons and internal lockout relays. These costs must be weighed against any costs saved by using the communications. Optimization Benefits and Detriments The optimizations techniques discussed above are not without detriments. a communications infrastructure is necessary. and installed. If SCADA communications are used to control the switchgear. The SCADA group will have to be organized such that it can accommodate those changes and the efforts to organize the group must be weighted against the benefits perceived from the changes. implementation. CONTROL PUSHBUTTON 2 ON Auto Close On (VO7) Rem ote Close On (VI2) Cont Ip 1 On(H5a) Latch 1 TRIPBUS 1 OP CONTROL PUSHBUTTON 3 ON Set Reset On Off 86A(VO1) 20 OR OR 22 21 A ND A Close BRKR (VO2) Operate Seal-In Cont Op 2 (H2) I on I off V on V off Latch 2 R R 86TATripped On (RI1) 86T Reset On (RI4) Set Reset On Off 86TA(VO3) 23 Latch 3 BKR FAIL 1 TRIPOP PUSHBUTTON 4 ON Set Reset On Off 86BF (VO4) 24 Latch 4 R R 86T Tripped On (RI3) 86T Reset On (RI4) Set Reset On Off 86Tie (VO5) 25 Latch 5 R R 86U Tripped On (RI5) 86U Reset On (RI6) Set Reset On Off 86U (VO6) 26 SYNC 1 CLSOP Figure 9: Internal Lockout Relays used to block close IV. This has the benefit of simplifying the control circuit design and wiring which can reduce engineering and installation time. VI. but this configuration also has the ability to reduce the engineering labor because the relay logic can be documented by the relay setup software and eliminate the need to document this information on schematic diagrams as well as wiring diagrams. it only requires logical changes rather than wiring changes. Typically the protection and control design groups and the SCADA groups have operated independent of one another with different procedures and practices. Commissioning the simplified circuit can be optimized also because the IED can be commissioned by bench testing the IED logic and communications. V. Most operations personnel are accustomed to operating with discreet devices and the operational procedures associated with these devices are well understood and accepted. Process control to the breaker would include Trip and Close from the Page 6 of 14 . The installation cost savings are obvious due to the reduced number of wires. Breaker and a Half Scheme Before methods of reducing wiring for the breaker and a half scheme can be analyzed.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring terminations. The original trip circuit had eight parallel contacts and has now been reduced to one contact with the use of communications. and alarms to the Relays. resulting in additional costs. Consider the single line diagram for a breaker and a half scheme shown in Figure 10 below. Switchgear DCS/SCADA Communications The simplified trip circuit of Figure 6 has the ability for further simplification with IED communications to the DCS control. Utilization of IED logic to accomplish these functions will require thoroughly retraining operations personnel in the correct use of the functions and may require rewriting operational procedures based on the use the functions. Additionally the control circuit can be identical for all applications. This reduces the amount of commissioning time required in the field after installation. it is necessary to understand what must be wired for this scheme and how it is typically wired. with only the logic needing to be changed for different applications and if future revision is necessary. the process information necessary for one of the two breakers would be AC currents. The use of SCADA communications also has operational and organizational detriments. Most IED are capable of being configured with graphical based logic diagrams like figure 9 once the relay is configured the logic can be printed to serve as the document of record of the configuration. In the case of the communications between IEDs and IEDs and the control system. If the line is protected by redundant protective relaying. This will require additional equipment to be purchased. This means that protection and control practices that deal with design review. The effort necessary to retrain and rewrite must be weighed against the benefits associated with the simplified control circuit. SCADA and DFR as shown on the right of Figure 10. designed. This further reduces the trip circuit to only one IED contact output. and configuration control will now apply to SCADA changes which historically has not been the case. breaker status. The DCS output contact can be incorporated into relay logic and is shown as the second input element “remote open” in figure 9. any changes to SCADA are now changes to the protection and control design and must be managed as changes to the design. and IED Logic. IED pushbuttons.

SCADA. SCADA To SCADA To SCADA To IED1. and automatic transfer. Consider the breaker status contact 52a. SCADA To IED1. -b) G aspressurealarm Springalarm M aintenancealarm Tripcoil m onitor C losecoil m onitor C T 2 C T 1 Figure 10: Typical Breaker and a Half Single Line Diagram & Breaker Process Values Close Breaker 52a Breaker 52b Breaker Gas Alarm Spring Alarm Breaker Maintenance Trip Coil Monitor Close Coil Monitor Most process inputs have multiple process destinations where the information is needed. SCADA. IED 2. DFR NA Breaker TR/CL supply 1 NA Breaker TR/CL supply 2 NA Breaker AC supply From IED 1. the need for current transformer inputs was accomplished by wiring SCADA transducers in series with the IEDs. IED 2. This contact needs to pass information to each IED. to Hardwire Alarms Wired Process and Input/Output Process Destination Control IED 1. IED 2. to DFR To IED1. These process inputs can be seen in table 1 below which shows a total of sixty-two wires for one breaker of the two-breaker scheme. This communication has historically been performed with contact closures in one IED asserting discrete contact inputs in a second IED. and SCADA for a total of six wires for this one contact. This same method can be applied to the digital inputs and digital output of the process information to reduce the total number of wires as tabulated in column four of table 1 below. IED 2. to DFR From IED 1. CT 2 DFR 4 CT 3 CT 4 Adjacent Zone IED 1. Beyond IED to SCADA communications. Since each wire has a termination on each end. 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 48 96 52-2 C T 3 ToA djacent Zone C T 4 3phasecurrents IE D -1 IE D -2 C T 4 ToA djacent Zone C T 3 o Breaker Trip(2) o Breaker Close DC1 DC2 AC1 Trip 52-1 o o o o o o Breaker statuspoints(-a. Table 1: Typical Process Inputs/Outputs and Destinations Wires Req. SCADA. IEDs may also need to communicate with other IEDs for functions such as: zone interlocking schemes. Historically. When discrete digital process values are needed by multiple devices. the value of wiring those signals once and communicating them to the rest of the devices increases as the number of devices increases. SCADA. Using communications messaging has the ability to save two terminations on the sending IED and two terminations on the receiving IED for a total of four wired terminations Page 7 of 14 . SCADA. this reduces the number of terminations per breaker from one hundred twenty four to ninety-six. SCADA. reclose initiation. and to the DFR (status only). for SCADA Comm. CT 1 DFR 4 IED 2. DFR Adjacent Zone IED 1. breaker failure initiation.SCADA SCADA SCADA Total Wires Total Terminations 4 4 2 2 4 6 6 6 6 2 2 6 2 2 62 124 C T 1 C T 2 3Y 3Y CB1 52 3Y 3Y 3Y Wires Req. IED 2. The SCADA master can read the breaker status and alarms from the IEDs and can write control points for trip and close to the IED using the same communications cables that the IED uses to read analog values from the IED. Utilizing the communications between SCADA and the IED has reduced the number of wires from sixty-two wires per breaker to fortyeight wires per breaker. It has become well accepted within the utility industry to eliminate the current transducers and allow the SCADA master to poll the relay for these analog process values. from SCADA. This type of messaging is easily encapsulated into messages that can be communicated between relays via communications networks and communications protocols such as IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging or vendor proprietary protocols.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring Relays.

is tasked with control functions of the breaker as well as passing status and alarm indication from the breaker to the protective IEDs or the SCADA Master. The more immediate cost benefit of IED to IED communications can be realized within the IED because the IED may be procured with less input and output hardware. If this scheme is applied to the breaker and a half arrangement that was previously analyzed. An IED with less hardware is less expensive than a fully optioned IED. maintenance mode alarm. SCADA. and close coil monitor. This must be balanced. to Req. which can reduce the amount of cable that is routed from the control house to the switchgear. SCADA. A typical Page 8 of 14 . for House SCADA with IED Wired Process Process and Input/Output Destination Control Comm. This scheme allows the protective IEDs to pass protection and control outputs to the control IED via communications. SCADA. Alarm TCM CCM Control IED Figure 11: Control IED used for Breaker Controller In a breaker and a half scheme. SCADA. except the trip circuits which will still be hardwired. A cost benefit is derived from routing less cable due to the obvious cost of the cable. The protective IED may be placed in relay panels inside the control house while the control IED is mounted either inside the switchgear or in close proximity to the switchgear. SCADA. SCADA 6 4 0 Communication Message passes Switchgear status. CT 4 4 4 4 DFR NA Breaker TR/CL supply DC1 2 2 2 1 NA Breaker TR/CL supply DC2 2 2 2 2 NA Breaker AC1 AC supply 4 2 2 From IED 1. located at the switchgear. against any cost increase associated with the communications equipment. Additionally. additional wires and wired terminations can be eliminated as shown in Table 3 makes the assumption that all discrete inputs and outputs will be passed to the protective IEDs via communications. meaning that the breaker and controller will arrive to the job-site pre-wired and tested. to Trip 6 4 4 DFR From IED 1. IED 2. Breaker Controller IED IED to IED communications protection schemes enable IED controller schemes where one IED or set of IEDs act as a protective IEDs and a separate IED acts as a controller. breaker gas alarm. alarms and control from the Control House to the Switchgear Switchgear 52 Trip Close 52b 52a Gas Alarm Spring Alarm Maint. at Hardwire Wires Control Alarms Req. the control IED. This reduces the number of field-installed wires from forty-eight to twenty-six. IED Breaker 52a 2. IED Breaker 52b 2.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring per message bit. to Close 6 4 0 DFR To IED1. saving the time it would normally take to wire and test these function on-site. CT 1 4 4 4 DFR IED 2. CT 3 4 4 4 DFR Adjacent Zone IED 1. SCADA 6 4 0 To IED1. the control IED may be mounted and wired by the breaker manufacture. trip coil monitor. SCADA. spring alarm. but also because the cable raceway may be reduced in size. however. Table 3: Process Inputs/Outputs and Destinations Showing IED Controller Wires Wires Req. CT 2 4 4 4 DFR Adjacent Zone IED 1. Controller IED 1. The total wired reduction using communications for discrete inputs and outputs to SCADA and the Control IED has reduced the total number of terminations to be performed on-site from one hundred twenty four per breaker to fifty-two per breaker. If several messages are to be sent between relays this can add up to several wired terminations. IED 2. SCADA Protective IED Ethernet Switch Control House breaker will be required to have control functions of trip control and close control and will be required to send status for breaker status. VII.

local/remote. If each of these alarms requires two wires. breaker trip. In essence the only work required when the controller arrives with the Page 9 of 14 . oil temperature trip. Since there are two breakers in the breaker and a half scheme. low oil level alarm. In Table 5. labor. This means that incorporating the control switches into the relay allows twice as many relays to be accommodated onto the same panel. For the breaker and a half scheme of Figure 10. fourteen wires have been eliminated which eliminates twenty-eight wired terminations. twenty-seven wires can be eliminated causing fifty-four wired terminations to be eliminated. discrete alarms for a transformer are: winding high temperature alarm. The real estate benefit of IED pushbuttons is realized by comparing the number of relays that can be accommodated onto a relay panel. meaning that half as many panels are needed and also meaning the physical size of the control building must accommodate half as many panels. Table 4 below shows the potential savings associated with utilizing the control pushbuttons of the IED. with to Hardwire pushbutton control 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IX. and transportation and creates a smaller footprint on the site. with alarms or analog inputs wired to the control IED rather than running cables back to the control house. and ambient temperature. this has the potential to eliminate an eighteen-conductor cable that would normally be routed from the control house to the transformer. it eliminates the need to commission these functions in the field. Control IEDs are not limited to breaker control. Typically. breaker maintenance. the combination of SCADA communications. IED Pushbuttons Typical control functions that would normally control the IED are: reclose enabled/disabled. oil temperature alarm. winding temperature trip. Transformer Alarm Aggregator VIII. and breaker close. an IED controller and pushbuttons on the IED have eliminated eighty-six wired terminations per breaker. loss of cooling. oil temperature. the IED is placed at the primary equipment and communicates messages back to protective IEDs or the SCADA master.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring Breaker Gas Alarm Spring Alarm Breaker Maintenance Trip Coil Monitor Close Coil Monitor Table 4: Control Wiring To SCADA To SCADA To IED1. Total wired savings by using a control IED as an alarm aggregator is shown in Table 5. This eliminates the construction time necessary for wireman to wire these functions in the field. The control IED could also serve as an aggregator to other transformer IEDs such as on-line dissolved gas monitors. sudden pressure alarm. low oil level trip. They may also be used as alarm and data aggregators for primary equipment such as transformers. In Table 4. and Buckholtz alarm. this eliminates one hundred and seventy-two wired terminations. A smaller control building is cheaper because it lowers cost of material. The SCADA master poll these temperatures from the IED. Typical temperature inputs that are measured by SCADA are: winding temperature. The control IED could also be optioned with RTD inputs that could be wired to transformer RTDs. The IED controller scheme also adds benefit in that the controller can be mounted by either the transformer manufacturer or switchgear manufacturer and wired by that manufacturer. In this scenario. External discrete control switches can take as much panel space as the relay itself. IED 2. Since it can be commissioned at the manufacturer’s facility. Wires Req. Each of these control functions have the ability to reduce two wired terminations at the control switch and two more at either a terminal block for the trip and close functions or at the IED in the case of the IED control functions.SCADA SCADA SCADA Total Wires Total Terminations 2 2 6 2 2 62 124 2 2 2 2 2 48 96 0 Control Function 0 0 0 0 26 52 Trip Close Reclose Enabled Reclose Disabled Local Mode Remote Mode Breaker 1 Maintenance Total Wires Req.

and commissioning time. especially if a redundant Ethernet topology is used with central switches located in the control house. thereby speeding up overall design. including Ethernet switches and routers. a complete ring topology can be created by simply connected each IED to the IED below it in the panel and IEDs at the top and bottom of the panels can be connected to the IEDs in adjacent panels. Copper wiring is replaced with communications equipment. Like all wiring. The major challenge to implementing this scheme is in the utilities interpretation of NERC CIP critical cyber asset identification. use of this scheme will be either limited or unavailable. This topology along with the traditional communication topology is shown in Figure 12 below. but since the cables are routed to switch modules in adjacent IEDs the cable runs are much shorter. Process Destination Process Point Winding High Temperature SCADA Alarm Winding High Temperature SCADA Trip Alarm Oil Temperature Alarm SCADA Oil Temperature Trip Alarm SCADA Low Oil Level Alarm SCADA Low Oil Level SCADA Trip Alarm Supped Pressure SCADA Trip Alarm Buckholtz Trip Alarm SCADA Loss of Cooiling AC SCADA Windind Temperature (RTD) SCADA Oil Temperatue SCADA (RTD) Ambient Temperature SCADA (RTD) Total 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 3 27 0 0 The IED controller scheme is not without challenges. This paper has proposed that communication from control IEDs be carried out via IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging. if the utility has taken a more Page 10 of 14 . the communications wiring may become congested. An optimization method must be addressed which simplifies the communications design of the control schemes. The switch module communications still requires two Ethernet cables per IED. As seen in Figure 12 the traditional communications scheme requires two Ethernet cables be routed from each IED to the Ethernet switches. Replacing contact logic with communications does not necessarily lead to a reduction in material costs. This has the potential to create a large labor savings and outagetime savings. IED with Ethernet Modules This paper makes the recommendation that communications. X.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring primary equipment is to connect the communications cables to the controller and functionally test the communications. Using IEDs that are optioned with Ethernet switches inside the IED can eliminate a large portion of the communications cabling and simplify the routing of communication cables. The length of each of these cables must reach from the IED to the Ethernet switch. If the IEDs house Ethernet switches. the communications network between devices can use the same communications network as SCADA or DCS systems. at Control House with IED Controller conservative interpretation of NERC CIP. The logic behind this recommendation is to simplify the physical design of the protection and control system. However. As communications is fully utilized inside a utility protection and control design. which would limit the IEDs ability to be located at the primary equipment. IED communicating with this protocol would not be classified as a critical cyber asset. and internal relay logic. which by definition is a layer two protocol and is non-routable. installation. Currently NERC CIP identifies critical cyber assets as a device that communicates via a routable protocol and as a critical cyber asset must be maintained inside a six-walled physical security perimeter. such as IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging. be used to replace control logic performed with copper wiring and auxiliary devices. However. to Hardwire Alarms and Control Sets of Wires Req. This topology reduces the communications cabling because external Ethernet switches are no longer necessary and the cable routing to these switches is also not necessary. careful design of the communications network is necessary to ensure operational reliability in a cost-effective manner. Table 5: Transformer Process Inputs/Outputs Showing IED Controller Sets of Wires Req.

There are 67 copper wiring terminations to make. and contact inputs and outputs to provide equipment status and equipment control. A PIU consists of merging units to acquire currents and voltages. and all necessary status and control points.8M H te rm in a tio n s 2M H te rm in a tio n s Figure 13: Process bus savings With process bus. The process measurement system includes all the wiring between primary equipment in the switchyard and protective relays (and other IEDs) in the control house. IEC 61850-9-2 describes the data formats necessary to send analog sampled values between an interface device in the substation (known as a “merging unit”) and protective relays in the control house. The installation process on site then becomes connecting fiber optic cable to the PIUs. once the circuit breaker arrives on site. However. and voltage.[4] Functionally. Process measurements such as equipment status. Protective relays analyze these quantities. process bus provides a 60% reduction in design.1M H e n g in e e rin g Š 4M H c o m m is s io n in g C o p p e rc a b le s b e tw e e nP IU a n db re a k e r 5 2 5 2 4 C# 1 0fo rC T 1 2 C# 1 0fo rC o n tro l 1 2 C# 1 6fo rS C A D A 7 C# 1 6fo rS C A D A 2 C# 6fo rD C 4 C# 1 0fo rA C 4 C# 1 0fo rC T 4 4M H p u llin g c a b le s C o p p e rc a b le s b e tw e e nP IU a n db re a k e r P ro c e s s In te rfa c eU n it (P IU ) F ib e rO p ticC a b le 2 0M H p u llin g c a b le s 2 C# 6fo rD C 4 C# 1 0fo rA C 1 6 . and take control actions. With process bus. Each PIU is wired to acquire signals from 2 sets of CTs. and resulting copper terminations. and commissioning of the copper wiring across the switchyard. by hand. In this specific example. This results in great savings in design and installation time.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring T ra d itio n a lC o m m u n ica tio ns Sw itchM o d u leC o m m u n ica tio ns Statio nTopolo gy StationTop olo gy Sta tio nLayou t Sta tio nLayou t Figure 12: Traditional Communications verses IED Switch Module Communications XI. to transmit data across the switchyard. The solutions described in this paper focus on improving the design of the protection and control system by fully utilizing the power of microprocessor-based relays and communications. such as opening circuit breakers to isolate faulted pieces of the power system. this moves analog-to-digital conversion. The reductions in design and installation time for protection and control systems can therefore be immense. 1 6 . installation. Consider the high voltage circuit breaker of figure 13. Process bus is nothing more than the concept of using a digital communications architecture to replace the copper wiring between primary station equipment and the control house.8M H te rm in a tio n s B re a k e r Š 7 7 . the physical interface for protective relays is always the same: a PIU connected to a fiber optic cable. The only field terminations necessary for the breaker are then those for DC and AC power.5M H Š 1 3 4te rm in a tio n s Š 3 1M H e n g in e e rin g Š 1 6M H c o m m is s io n in g 7 . The IEC 61850 communications standard provides the framework for actual. and analog data sampling. it is possible to have the circuit breaker manufacturer install Process Interface Units (PIUs) during their manufacturing process. These same copper wires must be terminated in the control house as well.8M H te rm in a tio n s B re a k e r Š 2 9 . and increases the reliability of the system. Process Bus The protection and control system is actually a process control system. It is typical to pull 11 multi-conductor copper cables between the control house and the circuit breaker. current. are connected to process controllers. IEC 61850 GOOSE messages can be transmitted between relays and contact I/O devices in the switchyard for control and status information.8M H Š 1 6fie ldte rm in a tio n s Š 1 1 6O E M te rm in a tio n s Š 1 1 . from protective relays to the merging unit. specifically protective relays. Page 11 of 14 . Communications and programmable logic replace contact logic and auxiliary devices. these solutions do not address the large number of copper wires. in the field. with some additional equipment cost. practical process bus solutions.

have chosen to use a star (point-to-point) topology. IED Maintenance 2. SCADA 6 To IED1. supports zones of protection as the industry understands them. SCADA 6 Wires Req. Future directions Microprocessor relaying and digital communications have lowered total installation costs and operational costs for protection and control systems. SCADA. due to physical wiring challenges. The practical limit to further convergence has been the physical limitations of connecting copper wiring to each protective relaying. including protection. to Close 6 DFR To IED1. IED Breaker 52a 2. CT 1 4 DFR IED 2. SCADA. The communications network architecture is an especial Page 12 of 14 .Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring Table 6: Process Inputs/Outputs and Destinations With Process Bus Wires Req. Most importantly. However. and operate. There are commercially available process bus solutions available in the marketplace. to date. Breaker Gas Alarm To SCADA Spring Alarm To SCADA Breaker To IED1. very similar to today’s copper wiring. CT 2 DFR 4 Adjacent Zone IED 1. and oscillography have been converged in to the microprocessor relays. as in figure 15. such as topology is very flexible and scalable. SCADA. 4 0 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 0 Figure 14: Process bus architecture 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 48 96 8 16 XII. control. CT 3 4 DFR Adjacent Zone IED 1. IED 2. and operational reasons. including analog sampled values. Also. and scalable. SCADA. metering. to Hardwire Alarms Wired Process Process and Input/Output Destination Control IED 1. Controller 4 0 4 0 4 0 challenge for process bus. IED 2. install. One future direction that protective relaying can take is that of providing multiple zones of protection inside of one microprocessor device. communication. SCADA. CT 4 4 DFR NA Breaker TR/CL supply DC1 1 2 NA Breaker TR/CL supply DC2 2 2 NA Breaker AC1 AC supply 4 From IED 1. with process bus the installation becomes simple and cost effective.SCADA Trip Coil Monitor SCADA Close Coil Monitor SCADA Total Wires Total Terminations 2 2 6 2 2 62 124 The IEC 61850 standard describes data message formats for transmitting data in the substation. similar to Figure 14. Their practical application with copper wiring is limited. Process bus allows protective relays to be divorced from the physical limitations of copper wiring. This allows for a simple. Multiple input feeder protection and transformer protection relays already exist. while increasing the overall reliability. to Trip 6 DFR From IED 1. maintenance. it must be intuitive to design. However. is straightforward to install. These systems. reliable. flexible. for House SCADA with IED Comm. IED Breaker 52b 2. intuitive design. IEC 61850 does not describe architectures for communications networks. at Wires Control Req. and allows simple isolation of equipment for testing. SCADA. Multiple functions. The architecture should be such that the system is robust.

and process bus. T. May 1-3. The second rule of thumb is: “if a function does not have to be wired. The challenges facing the utility industry are well known: increasing load. and an aging technical workforce. Do these solutions really require less time to design and install? What will it take to implement them? Are they really cost effective? It is. Every application described in this paper is possible today. and configuration. vital to ensure any solution will maintain or increase the reliability of the system. [4] IEC International Standard “Communication networks and systems in substations . of course. Standard CIP-002-1 XV. Conclusion Each step in the processes discussed above has sought to further reduce wiring to as few locations as possible. Feeder Protection Relay IED 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 5 2 technically proven. and to at these solutions from a business perspective. Presented to the 62 Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relay conference. and XIV. Design then becomes a matter of selecting the right pieces. available. Geneva. The “if a function does not have to be wired. Kasztenny. GE Publication GEK-113519. This will speed engineering. Switzerland.Critical Cyber Asset Identification”. construction. “The Myth of Complexity Configuration Mechanisms of Modern Microprocessor-Based Relays”. Presented to the 56th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relay Conference. Physical design then becomes the matter of designing the process bus system. References [1] B. [3] D60 Line Distance Relay Instruction Manual. “Comparison of IEC 61850 GOOSE messages and control wiring between protection relays”. this is only the first step. Spend your time designing the protection and control system to meet specific application requirements. 2008. all other locations that need the process value for protection or reporting purposes can receive the information from IED communications. [5] North American Electric Reliability Corporation. Dufaure. commercially. He received his Bachelor of Science in Page 13 of 14 . 2002.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring However. Biographies Terrence Smith has been an Application Engineer with GE Digital Energy Multilin since 2008. [2] J. then don’t” rule leads to the use of pushbuttons for control. For your specific utility. aging facilities. But the goal is to break system design to the most basic level. Prior to joining GE. Terrence has been with the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Principal Engineer and MESA Associates as Program Manager. not designing wiring schedules and copper terminations. Holbach. “Cyber Security . IEC. it would be impossible to totally eliminate the copper wire for process signals from a substation. The solutions recommended here are non-proprietary. Since some contacts must be wired. it is important to look past the tradition of designing protection and control system. May 21-23. The important message to take away from this paper is this: there is no better time to leverage the power of microprocessor relays and digital communications than right now. internal lockout relays. It does leads to a protection and control rule of thumb of: “wire a process value once and only once”. All control functions are carried out inside this “substation in a box”. It is simple to envision a device that provides all zones of protection and control necessary for a complete distribution substation or small transmission substation. then don’t”. PIU Figure 15: Multiple feeder protection with process bus XII.Part 92: Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM) – Sampled values over ISO/IEC 88023”. When this rule is obeyed. and commissioning. The solutions recommended here are all simple suggestions that can increase the productivity of the technical workforce at little or no cost. IEC Reference number IEC/TR 61850-92:2004(E). In the case of alarm and status points these rules cause the status and alarm points to be wired to the IED and passed via communication to the other devices that need these process values.

Rich Hunt is a Market Development Leader with GE Digital Energy Multilin.Fully Utilizing the IED Capability to Reduce Wiring Engineering majoring in Electrical Engineering from the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga and is a professional Engineer registered in the state of Tennessee. Page 14 of 14 . He is a Senior Member of IEEE. Rich has over 20 years experience in protective relaying applications. Rich earned the BSEE and MSEE degrees from Virginia Tech. Chair of the Systems Protection Subcommittee of the IEEE PES PSRC. and a licensed Professional Engineer. responsible for IEC 61850 communications strategy.