Rommel Silverio v. Republic G.R. No.

174689, October 22, 2007 FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC Branch 8 of Manila. Petitioner alleged that he was born in the City of Manila on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in hi s certificate of live birth and his sex was registered as “male.” Petitioner asserts that he is a transsexual, and had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He feels like a woman trapped in a man’s body. On January 27, 2001, petitioner underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. On June 4, 2003, the trial court granted petitioner’s prayer to have his name and sex entered in his certificate of live birth to conform with his present sex. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, ruling that there is no law allowing change of name or sex in the birth certificate on the basis of sex reassignment. ISSUE: Can one’s name or sex as it appears on the certificate of live birth be changed on the ground of sex reassignment? RULING: No, the Court ruled that the primary law governing change of name is now RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) and Section 1 hereof gives the authority to change name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Such offices are given primary jurisdiction for name change and the courts can only be sought when such actions are denied therefrom. This was not followed in the case at bar. In addition, no law allows the change of sex in the birth certificate on the basis of sex reassignment, Sec. 2 (c) of RA 9048states that no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of petitioner. Furthermore, change of name or sex on the ground of equity is not tenable in case at bar since it would have far ranging implications and policy consequences such as provisions in the penal and civil code that deals specifically for women such as marriage, family relations and survivorship in calamities among others. Petition is denied. Evelyn Chua-Qua v. Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and Tay Tung High School G.R. No. 49549, August 30, 1990 FACTS: Petitioner worked as a teacher in Tay Tung High School in Bacolod City since 1963. In 1976, petitioner was a Grade VI class adviser where one Bobby Qua, 16 years old, was enrolled. Petitioner was giving remedial lessons to Bobby Qua as per policy of the school when petitioner and Bobby became very close. On December 24, 1975, they were married in a civil ceremony in Iloilo City, petitioner was then 30 years old. Bobby, only 16 years old, received the consent and advice of the latter’s mother, Mrs. Concepcion Ong. Evelyn and Bobby were married in a church wedding on January 10, 1976. On February 4, 1976, Tay Tung High School filed with the Department of Labor in Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate petitioner’s employment on the ground of “abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher….” Petitioner was suspended without pay on March 12, 1976. Labor Arbiter Jose Aguirre, without conducting any formal hearing, awarded in favor of Tay Tung High School. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC claiming denial of due process for not receiving copies of affidavits relied by labor arbiter. On December 27, 1976, NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s decision. This was in turn reversed by the Minister of Labor, but awarding 6 months salary to petitioner as financial assistance. Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines, and through Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, reversed the decision of the Minister of Labor and ordered petitioner to be reinstated. Public respondent reversed his earlier decision however and supported petitioner’s dismissal from work. ISSUE: Did petitioner commit an immoral act as a teacher warranting dismissal from work? RULING: No, petitioner was never proved to have abused nor taken advantage, or abused or committed immoral acts with any student in any circumstance. The petitioner’s dismissal was based solely on her marriage to Bobby Qua and the imputed charges of abuse, immorality and unethical conduct were unsubstantiated, hence unwarranted and illegal. Petition for certiorari granted, private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner back wages equivalent to three years without deduction and separation pay of one month for every year of service. Hilario Moncado v. People’s Court G.R. No. L-824, January 14, 1948 FACTS: In an ejectment case filed before the justice of the peace court of Guijulngan, Negros Oriental, after trial in the absence of the defendants, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. The Court of First Instance then sent notice by registered mail posted on September 8, 1939 the notice of receipt of appealed case and the period for pleading. Defendants were informed of such mail by the postmaster but the same was not claimed, CFI of Negros Oriental, upon motion of plaintiff, ordered defendants to vacate the land and to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiff the sum of PHP 18 as damages, plus costs. Defendant’s appealed the decision claiming that their failure to get notice from post office was due to ignorance and that they were not served with copy of plaintiff’s motion for default. CFI denied defendant’s motion on June 19, 1940. ISSUE: Was defendant’s failure to get notice valid and excusable? RULING: No, the Court ruled that in the first place, defendant’s are not entitled to a service of copy of the motion that they are in default except when they file a motion to set aside the order of default, in which event they are entitled to notice of all further proceedings (Rule 27, Section 9, Rules of Court). Second, failure to get notice was not excusable neglect as claimed by defendants. Indeed, a notice, is deemed served if delivered by registered mail and claimed within 5 days from first notice of postmaster (Rule 27, Section 8, Rules of Court). Appealed order affirmed.

Jose S. Santos v. NLRC et al. G.R. No. 115795, March 6, 1998 FACTS: Petitioner is a married man and employed as a teacher by private respondent Hagonoy Institute Inc. from June 1980 until his dismissal on June 1, 1991. Petitioner and Mrs. Arlene T. Martin, also a teacher employed at Hagonoy Institute, fell in love and had an affair. Private respondent, upon hearing of circulating rumors among faculty and school officials, of the illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs. Martin, advised the latter to take a leave of absence, Mrs. Martin ignored such notice and was henceforth prevented from entering the campus of private respondent, effectively dismissing her from work. Private respondent set-up a committee to investigate the veracity of the rumors, after two weeks of investigation, the illicit relationship of petitioner and Mrs. Martin was confirmed. Petitioner was charged administratively for immorality and asked to present his side, on May 1991, petitioner was dismissed effective June 1, 1991. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga and petitioner’s complaint was dismiss ed but awarded financial assistance of PHP 13,750. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. ISSUE: Can the illicit relationship between the petitioner and Mrs. Martin be considered immoral as to constitute a cause for termination under Art. 282 of the Labor Code? RULING: Court reiterates that to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must concur: (a) it must be for any offense expressed in Art. 282 of the Labor Code, (b) employee must be accorded due process, that is, the opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself. Art. 282 of the Labor Code lists the following just causes to terminate an employee: (1) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by employee of lawful orders of the employer or his representative in connection with his work, (2) gross and habitual neglect by employee of his duties; (3) fraud or willful breach, (4) commission of crime or offense of the person of his employer or his family or his authorized representative, (5) other courses analogous to the foregoing. In addition, Section 94, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, paragraph E, lists “disgraceful or immoral conduct” as ground for termination. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Art. 68 of the Family Code enjoins the husband and wife to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.” As a teacher, one stands in loco parentis to his students and must therefore act with a high standard of integrity and honesty. It is settled therefore that a teacher who engages in extra marital affairs, when both are married, amounts to gross immorality justifying termination from employment. Petition is dismissed, NLRC decision is affirmed with modification, deleting financial assistance. Republic v. Jennifer B. Cagandahan G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981, registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up developed secondary male characteristics and eventually diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. Respondent alleges that she had clitoral hypertrophy in her early years, at age six, after an ultrasound, it was discovered that she had small ovaries but at 13 years old, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had diminished, stopped growing and had no breast or menses. For al intents and purposes, as well as in disposition, considered herself male. To prove her claim, respondent presented Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, who issued a medical certificate stating that respondent is genetically female but her body secretes male hormones, has two sex organs of which the female part is undeveloped. RTC granted respondent’s petition. ISSUE: Can a genetically female but predominantly male person request for change of name and sex? RULING: The Court ruled that the governing law with respect to change of name and sex is RA 9048. Respondent, indisputably, has CAH, as such, is characterized by inappropriate manifestations of male characteristics, although are genetically female. CAH people also have ambiguous genitalia, appearing more male than female but have internal female reproductive organs which may become undeveloped. These individual’s are commonly referred to as intersex, and respondent, having reached the age of majority, and having decided to be male, considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones is a preponderant biological support for considering him male. Republic’s petition is denied. RTC Branch 33 decision is affirmed.

IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora et al. G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 FACTS: President Joseph Estrada ordered the deployment of the Philippine Marines to join the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols around Metro Manila to stem the tide of rising violence and crime. In response to such order, the PNP through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay issued Letter of Intent (LOI) dated 02/2000 which detailed the joint visibility patrols called Task Force Tulungan. This was confirmed by a memorandum Pres. Estrada issued dated 24 January 2000. On January 17, 2000, the IBP filed a petition to annul LOI 02/2000 arguing that the deployment of the Marines is unconstitutional and is an incursion by the military on the civilian functions of government as embodied in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. XVI, Sec. 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: (1) Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar? (2) Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces subject to judicial review? (3) Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP? RULING: In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the case at bar in that it has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in any way. It’s contention that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague. As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General that the president’s act is a political question beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of power is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the prescribed qualifications have been met, then it becomes a question of legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third issue, the Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself provides for this. In fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of such patrols and in no way places the over-all authority in the Marines. Petition is dismissed.

Stonehill et al. v. Diokno et al. 20 SCRA 383, June 19, 1967 FACTS: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of a ccounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code. Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them. On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers. ISSUE: (1) Were the search warrants and the search and seizures valid and issued in accordance with law? and (2) If not, can said documents, papers and things be used against petitioners? RULING: a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court based on the exclusionary rule as stated in Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances. c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the corporation.