Facts: The petitioners in both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by thepublic school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem andrecite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and by DepartmentOrder No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All EducationalInstitutions) dated July 21, 1955 of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag,sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image or idol representing the State. They think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control. Issue: Whether or not school children who are members or a religious sect may be expelled from school for disobedience of R.A. No. 1265 and Department Order No. 8 Held: No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highestpriority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves therelationship of man to his Creator The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religiousfreedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave andimminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any otherlegitimate public interest, that the State has a right (and duty) to prevent." Absent such athreat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified.(Teehankee) The petitioners further contend that while they do not take part in the compulsoryflag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend theircountrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of theflag ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show theirrespect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. Sincethey do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo (G.R. No. 180906 07 October 2008) PARTIES: PETITIONERS: SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES RESPONDENTS: RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO NATURE: Petition for Review on Certiorari PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: Supreme Court: Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order Supreme Court: Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to treat their Existing Petition as Amparo Petition 1. Court of Appeals: Upon order of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals summarily heard the Petition of Amparo. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a judgment which is the subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. FACTS: On 14 February 2006, at past noon, Raymond Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Raymond”) and Reynaldo Manalo (hereafter referred to as “Reynaldo”) were abducted by military men belonging to the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the New People’s Army (NPA). After eighteen (18) months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on 13 August 2007. On 23 August 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order before the Supreme Court to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. In a Resolution dated 24 August 2007, the Supreme Court ordered the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, and further enjoined them from causing the arrest of Raymond and Reynaldo. Forthwith, they filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. While the aforementioned case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007. Raymond and Reynaldo subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing peti tion as amparo petition. On 25 October 2007, the Supreme Court resolved to treat the 23 August 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule. The Supreme Court likewise granted the Writ of Amparo and remanded the petition to the Court of Appeals to conduct the summary hearing and decide the petition. On 26 December 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The Court of Appeals ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the custody of Raymond and Reynaldo, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of Raymond and Reynaldo while under military custody. Aggrieved, the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

PERTINENT ISSUES: Whether or not statements from the victims themselves is sufficient for amparo petitions. Whether or not actual deprivation of liberty is necessary for the right to security of a person may be invoked. ANSWER: It depends on the credibility and candidness of the victims in their statements. No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: 1. ON EVIDENCE REQUIRED ON AMPARO PETITIONS Effect of the nature of enforced disappearance and torture to the quantum of evidence required – With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise. 2. ON RIGHT TO SECURITY AS A GROUND FOR AMPARO PETITION Permutations of the Right to Security – A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right. First, the right to security of person is “freedom from fear.” In its “whereas” clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that “a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.” Some scholars postulate that “freedom from fear” is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself means “freedom from fear.” Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. xxx Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person. xxx Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State “guarantees full respect for human rights” under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. Freedom from fear as a right – In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, “freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is actually the “freedom from threat.” Viewed in this light, the “threatened with violation” Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. Deprivation of liberty is not necessary before the right to security may be invoked –While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. DISPOSITIVE: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 December 2007.

CO vs. HRET (199 SCRA 692) Facts: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. RespondentOng was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. Issue: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. Held: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondent’s grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines fromChina and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed withthe court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen.In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections.Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with analien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens. Besides, privatere sp on d en t d id mo re t ha n me re ly exe rcise h is rig h t of su ff ra ge . He h as e sta b lishe d h is lif e he re in th e Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish hisresidence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of afriend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamountto a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, votingand residence requirements RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR. VICENTE D CHING Bar Matter. No. 914, October 1, 1999 (Constitutional Law – Citizenship) FACTS: Petitioner, who resided in the Philippines since his birth during the 1935 Constitution, is a legitimate son of a Filipina married to a Chinese citizen. Subsequently, petitioner elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority. OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable period” and the allowance of the petitioner to elect Philippine citizenship due to circumstances like petitioner having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino. ISSUE: Whether or not a legitimate child under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he has reached the age of majority. HELD: No, despite the special circumstances, Petitioner failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement “upon reaching the age of majority.” In addition, there was no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. Bengson v HRET G.R. No 142840, May 7, 2001 Facts: The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being questioned on the ground that he is not a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. Issue: WON Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: YES. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification. Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship Mercado V. Manzano 307 SCRA 630 Certiorari Ponente: Mendoza, Date of Promulgation: May 26, 1999

Facts: Edu Manzano ran for the position of vice mayor in 1998 and got the most number of votes. His co-candidate filed a petition to disqualify Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen (US and PH). Petition was dismissed. There is no doubt that Manzano is a dual citizen upon birth being born to both Filipino parents in California. Court held that the disqualification of dual citizens contemplates dual allegiance and by merely registering as a voter, filing CoC and electing in the said certificate Philippine citizenship, Manzano has effectively renounced his US citizenship. On May 7 1998, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of the CoC of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position Manzano was born to his Filipino parents in San Francisco California on September 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws. In August 31 the COMELEC en banc reversed decision of the Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor stating that Manzano is also a Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 constitution and he has effectively renounced his US citizenship when he registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. In view of this, Manzano was proclaimed as vice-mayor of Makati. Ernesto Mercado who ranked next to Manzano in the elections filed this petition Issue/s: (1) Whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit. 2. Whether respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City Ruling: Petition DISMISSED. Ratio: YES. Failure of COMELEC en banc to address the petitioner’s Motion to Intervene justifies petitioner to file this case. (2) DUAL CITIZENSHIP VS DUAL ALLEGIANCE. DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states; result of an individual’s own volition. Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their country of origin. Disqualification based on “dual citizenship” contemplates dual allegiance For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect Philippine citizenship upon filing their CoC to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship