doc Prezeworski, Adam The Games of Transition “The strategic problem of transition is how to get to democracy without either being starved by those who control productive resources or killed by those who have arms. As this very formulation suggests, the path to democracy is mined. And the final destination depends on the path.” (p. 105). The central question concerning transitions is whether they lead to self-sustaining democracy, that is, a system in which the politically relevant forces (1) subject their values and interests to the uncertain interplay of democratic transition and (2) comply with outcomes of the democratic process. (3) conflicts are processed through democratic institutions, when nobody can control the outcomes of the political process ex post, the results are not predetermined ex ante. IN less abstract terms, a transition to democracy is complete when: 1) there is a real possibility of partisan alternation of office. 2) Reversible policy changes can result from alternation in office; 3) Effective civilian has been established over the military. Breakdown: Some breakdowns of authoritarian regimes may be reversed as it was in Czecoslovakia in 1968, in Brazil in 1974, or in Poland in 1981, or it may lead to a new dictatorship, as in Iran. “Reversed” here means that the transition could not lead to the destruction of the authoritarian regimes. * If democracy is established, it need not be self sustaining: democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, self-sustaining democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdowns of authoritarian. (Przeworski 1992:106) Consolidation: “If democracy is to be consolidated, four problems must be resolved along the way: (1) An institutional framework for contestation, to use Dahl’s (1971) term, must be constructed. (2) A competitive representative regime must be established. (3) Economic conflicts must be channeled into the democratic transition. (4) The military must be tucked under civilian control. How transition starts? Liberalization: A common feature of all dictatorships… is that they cannot tolerate independent organizations. Some authoritarian regimes would ban parties and unions but the tolerate stamp collectors’ societies, churches… and any non-political associations. What is threatening to authoritarianism is not the breakdown of legitimacy but the organization of counter-hegemony: collective projects for alternative future. “As long as no collective alternatives are available, individual attitudes toward the regime matter little for its stability”[Przeworski, 1992 #121:107] You cannot explain breakdown by legitimacy? The explanations of regime breakdown in terms of legitimacy are either tautological (mere repetition) or false. If by “legitimacy” we understand the appearance of collectively organized alternatives, they are tautological since the fact that these

/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/149249360.doc alternatives are collectively organized means that the regime has broken down. If we see “legitimacy” in terms of individual attitudes, they are false. Some authoritarian regimes have been illegitimate since their inception and they have been around for forty years. When liberalization starts? Liberalization starts when the regime allows some autonomous organizations. Decisions to liberalize combine elements from above and from below. From Above (Top-Down) Model From below (Bottom-up) Model Hungary is generally viewed as an almost There were no indications of split within pure case of divisions within the the power bloc until hundreds of thousands authoritarian power bloc. of people occupied the streets of Lepzig. Przeworski believes that the decision to liberalize is a combination of both models (split within the regime and the popular mobilization. However, these two competing models lead us to two sets of theories: In the liberalization launched by forces In the popular mobilization model within the power, The main rhythm of events is usually The mobilization dictates the rhythm toward “controlled openings” of the (pattern) of transformations since it propels political space. This opening usually the regime to decide whether to (1) repress, emanates from signals of popular unrest. (2) coopt, or (3) devolve. The same The project of liberalizers is to relax the sequence of choices is there whether the social tension and to strengthen their liberalization takes years, months, or days. position within the power bloc by Ex. East Germany and Czechoslovakia. broadening the social base of the regime: to allow some autonomous organizations of the civil society and to incorporate the new groups[Przeworski, 1992 #121:109]. Ex. Sadat and Gorbechev. Yet liberalization is inherently unstable. It is easier to extend to be democratization (Ex. Soviet Union) or to diminish to be oppressive (China in 1987 Tianamen square). Why? As civil society organization tend to declare themselves indpednet. They proclaim their goals, interests, and projects. The Tiananmen Square events prove that liberalization does not always lead to democratization [Przeworski, 1992 #121:115]. The perplexing fact is that so many authoritarian politicians believe that they will succeed where others have failed and they go on to fail. In all cases, they had to accept to continue the democratization. That is why the game model will be necessary[Przeworski, 1992 #121:111]. The breakdown of the communist monopoly of power took 10 years in Poland, 10 moths in Hungary, ten weeks in East Germany and 10 days in Czechoslovakia. The events in Poland and Hungary demonstrated to East Germans the very possibility of this

/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/149249360.doc breakdown; the spectacle of the crumbling wall signaled to individuals Czechs the feasibility of regime transformation [Przeworski, 1992 #121:139].

The image that the campaign for democracy as a struggle of “the society” against the “state” is a useful fiction during the first period of transition, as a unifying slogan of all forces opposed to the current authoritarian regime. But societies are divided in many ways and the very essence of democracy is the competition among political forces with conflicting interests [Przeworski, 1992 #121:116]. This creates a dilemma: “to bring about democracy, anti-authoritarian forces must unite against authoritarianism, but to be victorious under democracy, they must compete with each other. That is why anti-authoritarian regimes have to go through two different aspects of democratization: the extrication (freeing) from the authoritarian regime and the “constitution” of a democratic one. Democracy results from negotiated extrication and negotiated constitution or negotiated constitution alone.

Extrication (disconnection):
O’Donnell distinguished four political actors: Within the authoritarian Bloc Hardliners Reformers They tend to be They tend to be recruited found among the among politicians of the repressive cores of regime and some groups the authoritarian outside the state bloc: police, the apparatus: sectors of the legal bureaucracy, bourgeoisie under censors, some capitalism, economic journalists, etc. managers under socialism. Within the authoritarian opposition Moderates Radicals Moderates and radicals do not represent different interests and the tactical positions tend to be fluid during transition. However they may be differentiated by risk aversion. Moderates fear hardliners, not necessarily who have less radical goals [Przeworski, 1992 #121:117].

According to Przeworski: extrication can result from understandings between Reformers and moderates. Extrication is possible only if: (1) an agreement can be reached between (2) Reformers can (3) Moderates Reformers to establish institutions under deliver the consent of can control which the social forces they represent would Hardliners or Radicals have a significant political presence. neutralize them, [Przeworski, 1992 #121:117]. When is this to happen?

/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/149249360.doc Reformers face a strategic choice of remaining within the authoritarian alliance with Hardliners or so of seeking democratic alliance with Moderates. If they have gurantees from Moderates that they will enjoy some benefits from democracy, they will all with moderates. With no guarantees from moderates, reformers will prefer the status quo (to ally themselves with Hardliners). [Przeworski, 1992 #121:121] Moderates can ally with radicals to destroy the authoritarian regime or they can seek accommodation by negotiating with reformers. When negotiated extrication is possible? Either of two conditions is sufficient: 1) The Moderates prefer 2) the Reformers are the ones who control the armed forces. If a democracy which reformers have some political strength of their own and if protects the interests of Moderates prefer an institutional arrangements in which the some forces allied with forces associated with the authoritarian regime remain as a the authoritarian regime counter-balance to the demands of Radicals, then reformers over one that promotes have nothing to fear from democracy (Ex. Swar Al-Dhab in interests or Radicals. Sudan). Alternatively, even if Moderates prefer a more radical from of democracy, Reformers need not fear extrication as long as they control the apparatus of repression. • The essential feature of democracy is that nothing is decided once and for all: if sovereignty resides with the people, the people can decide to undermine all the gurantees reached by politicians around a negotiating table.

Constitution Crafting:
* All transitions to democracy are negotiated: some with representatives of the old regime and some only among the pro-democratic forces seeking to form the new system. Negotiations are not always needed to extricate the society from the authoritarian regime but they are necessary to constitute democratic institutions. When you erect institutions, you will need to answer some questions such as: which decisions should be made by agreement and which should be subject to competition? Must some institutions, such as constitutional tribunals, armed forces or heads of state, stand as arbiters above the competitive process or should they all be subject to periodic electoral verdicts? To what extent and by what meansshould the society bind itslf to prevent some future transformations? * Among recent experience, the Spanish Constitution of 1977 came nearest to a classical liberal constitution that specifies only the rules of the game and says almost nothing about outcomes (except private property), while the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 went to the extreme, listing detailed social and economic rights [Przeworski, 1992 #121:123]. Following O’Donnel we need to make a distinction between:

/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/149249360.doc Democratization of Government To democratize the institutions. Democratization of Regime The relationship between state institutions and the civil society.

Each of the forces struggling against authoritarianism must also consider its future position under democracy. They must all stand united against dictatorship but they must divide against each other. If they divide too early, the outcome is If they do not divide at all, the new regime likely to repeat the experience of South will be a mirror image of the old one: not Korea, where the rivalry between two anti- representative, not competitive authoritarian presidential candidates [Przeworski, 1992 #121:124]. Przeworski permitted electoral victory of the candidate feared that this would be the future of some associated with the dictatorship. Eastern European countries that they will be only anti-communist but not democratic. One solution to this dilemma is political pacts: agreements among leaders of political parties (or proto-parties) to: 1) Divide government 2) fix basic policy 3) exclude (and if need be offices among themselves orientations, repress) outsiders. independently of election results, Such pacts have a long tradition of what used to be called trasformismo in Italy, Spain, and Uruguay. The Venezuelan 1958 pact of Punto Fijo is the model of such agreements. According to this pact, thre parties would divide government posts, pursuing policies commited to developmentalist goals under private property and excluding Communists from the political system. This pact had been highly successful in organizing democratic alternations in office, even if it cost Venezuela the largest guerilla movement in Latin Ameirca. Dilemmas to the social pact because of the outsiders: 1- Partners to such pacts extract private benefits from democracy and protect their rents by excluding outsiders from competition. It is a form of oligopoly. 2- The regime would facet he dilemma of how the outsiders would oppose and how. If the opposition does not oppose, does not present alternatives, then the representative power of institutions, their capacity to mobilize and to incorporate, is weak. 3- If the outsiders oppose too much and lauch their attacks during difficult economic conditions, the severe opposition may create an ungovernable situation. The solution to this dilemma is a Pacto Politico: Institutional pacts Substantive pacts They establish the rules of the game and They remove major policy issues from the leave the rest to competition. competitive process. These pacts are necessary to protect the democratic institutions from pressures to which they cannot respond, but the danger is that they become cartels of incumbents against contenders: cartels that restrict competition, bar access, and distribute benefits of political power among the insiders [Przeworski, 1992 #121:125].


Democracy is needed because we cannot agree not because we agree. Rousseau and Madison feared fractions but both looked at democracy as a mechanism to reveal the common good. “Democracy is a system of processing conflicts without killing one another: it is a system in which there are differences, conflicts, winners and losers. Conflicts are absent only in authoritarian systems: no country in which a party wins 60 percent of the vote twice is a democracy” [Przeworski, 1992 #121:126]. Democracy is a compromise, a second best choice for all the political forces that are capable of subverting it, and for this very reason it must protect to some minimal degree each of the multiple and conflicting interests. To sum up, Democracy results from negotiated extrication and negotiated constitution or negotiated consititon alone. What to do with political forces that can subvert democracy? Either protect their interests and open Or close access and repress extrasufficient opportunities for promoting institutional manners through which they group specific interests through political may pursue their political struggle. participation. Whenever extrication is negotiated, guarantees must be given to forces associated with the ancient regime. Negotiated extrications are possible only if some sectors within the dictatorship expect to have a significant political presence under democratic conditions.

Institutionalization of Economic Conflicts:
Yet, if democracy is to be consolidated, distributive conflicts must be institutionalized: all major political forces must channel their economic demands through the democratic institutions and abjure other tactics. Regardless how pressing their needs may be, politically relevant groups must be willing to subject their interests to the interplay of democratic institutions. They must be willing to accept defeats and to wait, confident that the democratic institutions would continue to offer opportunities the next time around. Uneqaulity of income could be a good opportunity for democracy to function. In a country like Brazil, the top quintile of households gets 67% of incom, the U.S. and Spain 40%. Here emerging democracies have the chance to adopt redistributive policies that would gain them some support. With economic difficulties, there are two strategies: Control from Above Social pacts (the contrasting strategy) (Repeated shocks) Argentina and Brazil up to This strategy involves unions and employers’ associations 1992, used to freeze wages in economic policy making. Ex. Exchange of wage and prices and …etc. They restraint on the part of the unions for some welfare are adopted surprisingly. programs as well as for economic policies that control The policy could have been inflation and encourage investment and employment. successful only it did not However, such social pacts are not likely to succeed in involve broad participation. most new democracies because: * the major defect: 1- Not all workers or peasants members of these

/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_1/149249360.doc instability and illegitimacy. unions. 2- Unions should be very strong and have fairly good control over its members.

Imposition of civilian control over the Military:
Except for Poland, the Communist systems of Eastern Europe constituted civilian regimes. Most military officers wanted to abolish the Communist monopoly of power. In Latin America, the military have preserved the autonomy and have continued to exercise tutelage (guidance) over the political system [Przeworski, 1992 #121:131]. There are two possibilities before the new democracies: Either imposition of civilian control over Or Military autonomy the military Spain and Greece Argentine, Chile, Indonesia, Turkey. These countries fear imposing the military under the civilian control may lead to military intervention. Look at the following table: The Probability that a Coup would occur [Przeworski, 1992 #121:132] Immediately Eventually Math. With Military .2 .6 P + (1-P)* T = .2+ autonomy Let us call this P Let us call this T (.8*.6)= 68% With Civilian control .8 .01 Q + (1-Q)*C = .8+ Let us call this Q Let us call this C (.2*.01)=80.2% Thus, it is more feasible for the new democratic regimes not to try to impose the civilian control over the military. Besides most countries with a history of military intervention lack stable institutional structure that would allow them to control the military without evoking it to intervene.

Przeworski, Adam. 1992. “The Games of Transition.” in Issues in Democratic Consolidation: the New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, edited by S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell and J. S. Valenzuela. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dam Press.

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