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FACULTY OF HUMANITIES SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES PHILOSOPHY COURSE UNIT OUTLINE 2012-13 PHIL20232 Ethics Semester: 2 Credits: 20

Lecturer(s): Office: Telephone: Email: Office Hours: Dr. Thomas Smith Arthur Lewis 4.028 0161 275 7886 thomas.smith@manchester.ac.uk Mondays 9.30-10.30, Wednesdays 12.00-13.00 Please email to arrange an appointment outside of these hours. Tutorials will be taken by Teaching Assistants: Dr. Tom Connor & Dr Terence Edward Dr. Tom Connor: Fridays 1-2pm. Arthur Lewis 4th floor reception Dr. Terence Edward: Fridays 3-4pm Arthur Lewis 3rd Floor reception Joseph Barrett, UG Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building Tel: 0161 275 3204, Email: joseph.barrett@manchester.ac.uk Mondays 4-6pm in Coupland 3 Theatre A Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays. Allocate yourself to a tutorial group using the Student System (this is compulsory and on a first come, first served basis) 2 hour exam 67% 2,500 word essay 33% Monday 25th March to Friday 12th April 2013 ***IMPORTANT INFORMATION PLEASE READ***

Tutors:

Office Hours:

Administrator:

Lectures: Tutorials:

Assessment:

Easter Vacation:

Pre-requisite(s):

20 PHIL credits at Level 1

Communication:

Students must read their University e-mails regularly, as important information will be communicated in this way. Monday 13th May 2013 Friday 7th June 2013 Monday 19th August 2013 Friday 31st August 2013

Examination period: Re-sit Examination period:

Please read this course outline through very carefully as it provides essential information needed by all students attending this course

This course guide should be read in conjunction with the Philosophy Study Guide. Copies may be obtained from the Undergraduate Office, G.001 Arthur Lewis Building or from the SoSS intranet at: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/handbooks/

2. ABOUT THE COURSE Summary This course will focus on four questions of ethics: (i) which sorts of things are of ethical value and disvalue? (people? their actions? their intentions? their characters? the situations that they get themselves into?), (ii) what does their possessing this value demand of us? (e.g. that we bring about the greatest happiness of the greatest number? that we treat others as ends, not means? that we do unto others as we would have them do unto us?), (iii) how do these demands motivate our actions (e.g. by arousing our passions, or our reason?), and (iv) why does it matter to us that these demands are met (i.e. why do we care about the demands that are made by morality)? Aims The course aims to: Guide students development in thinking philosophically about ethics. Familiarise students with some important writings in contemporary philosophical ethics. Enhance students ability to present and discuss philosophical issues orally, and their ability to present philosophical ideas and arguments in written work. Learning Outcomes On successful completion of this course unit, students will be able to demonstrate: Knowledge and understanding of some of the main texts and ideas in contemporary ethics. The ability to critically engage with these texts and ideas. The ability to present and discuss orally the examined ideas. The ability to present in writing clear, cogent, sustained philosophical arguments, based on relevant background research. 3. COURSE ORGANISATION Lectures: Mondays 4-6pm in Coupland 3 Theatre A Tutorials: DAY & TIME Tuesday 1-2pm Tuesday 2-3pm Tuesday 3-4pm Thursday 10-11am Friday 10-11am Friday 11-12pm Friday 12-1pm LOCATION Coupland 3 LG13 Coupland 3 LG 9 Coupland 3 LG9 Alan Turing G.114 Dover St BS3 Roscoe 2.8 University Place 3.214 TEACHING ASSISTANT Tom Connor Tom Connor Tom Connor Tom Connor Tom Connor Terence Edward Terence Edward

Tutorials are weekly, starting in week 2. Attendance at tutorials is compulsory. It is students responsibility to ensure that they have been allocated to a tutorial group. Students may not change group without permission. Work and attendance The work and attendance requirements for this course are that you:

Attend all tutorials If you are absent from a tutorial through illness you should inform your tutor and fill in a Certification of Student Ill Health (available from your department or from the SoSS UG Office; see you degree programme handbook for further details). If you are absent for another reason you should tell your tutor or the Philosophy Administrator, Joseph Barrett as soon as possible if possible, before the tutorial. Prepare adequately for tutorials You will be set preparatory work for tutorials; see the study budget below for a guide to roughly how long you should spend on this. Complete written work on time Failure to complete assessed work by the due date constitutes a violation of the work and attendance requirement.

Violations of work and attendance requirements will be reported to your Programme Director. If you have difficulties (e.g. personal, financial or family problems) that result in persistent failure to meet the work and attendance requirements, you should talk to your Programme Director or Academic Advisor. Texts recommended for purchase: It is not essential that you buy any text. Tutorial readings will be made available on Blackboard, and the reading lists at the end of this guide list many additional texts available from the library, and in many cases online. However, to students who do wish to purchase a text, I recommend, Ethical theory: an anthology (2nd edition) ed. R. Shafer-Landau, Wiley-Blackwell. This doesnt cover every aspect of the course (and it covers some topics that we do not cover) but it is excellent value 22.99 at the University branch of Blackwells, 23.74 on Amazon for 82 classic essays, with useful section introductions. The University branch of Blackwells should already have copies if they run out, they can order further copies at short notice. Tom Jenkins, the philosophy buyer at Blackwells, is contactable at science.manchester@blackwell.co.uk. Course materials: Further materials will be made available on the courses Blackboard site. Log-in to Blackboard at: https://login.manchester.ac.uk/cas/login

Study budget The Universitys Academic Standards Code of Practice specifies that a 20 credit course is expected to require about 200 hours work by students. For this course, you are recommended to break this down roughly as follows: Lectures Tutorials Tutorial preparation Essay preparation Exam preparation TOTAL: 10 x 2 = 20 hours 10 hours 10 x 5 hours = 50 hours 40 hours 80 hours 200 hours

Prompt arrival at classes Students should note that all lectures and tutorials start on the hour and should end at 50 minutes past the hour. Late arrival for tutorials may result in your being marked absent; if you arrive late it is your responsibility to ensure that your tutor has marked you as present. 4. ASSESSMENT Assessment Criteria For the assessment criteria for PHIL course units, see the Philosophy Study Guide (available online at: http://www.socialsciences.manchester.ac.uk/intranet/ug/handbooks/ which also provides further guidance concerning the assessment criteria. EXAMINATION One two-hour exam will be set at the end of semester one, in which you must answer two questions. This provides two thirds of your assessment for the course. You will not be able to reproduce material from your assessed essay in your exam. Past Exam Papers can be found on the Blackboard site for this course. ASSESSED ESSAYS One essay of 2,500 words (titles listed below) which provides one third of your assessment for this course. The word limit includes footnotes but excludes the bibliography. Students must state the word count at the end of the essay failure to do so will result in a deduction of 2 marks. If an essay goes over the word limit by 10% or more, 5 marks will be deducted. The marker is not obliged to read anymore than the number of words specified above and may ignore any additional material if they choose. You are also required to keep an electronic version of your essay in case we would like to doublecheck your word count. Presentation Essays must be typed in at least 12 point in a readable font, and should be double spaced. They should include proper bibliography and references. Include your word count at the end of the essay. Bibliography and Referencing The lack of a proper bibliography and appropriate reference will potentially greatly affect the mark for the work and may be considered plagiarism, which is a serious offence. Students should consult the Universitys statement on plagiarism which can be obtained from the School of Social Sciences student intranet. There are a number of referencing systems available. One that is both simple and widely used is the Harvard system of referencing. On this system, the bibliography would be set out as follows: Putnam, Hilary (1975) The Meaning of Meaning in his Philosophical Papers volume II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), pp.105-219. Quine, W.V.O. (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press).

Ryle, Gilbert (1948) It Was to Be Mind 47 pp.23-38. The system of referencing, then, has this pattern: Surname, first name, date, title of book, location of publisher, name of publisher. Or: Surname, first name, date, title of article, title of journal or collection, journal volume number, page numbers for the beginning and end of the article. Note that the title of the book or the journal should be italicised (or underlined.) The title of an article should be in quote-marks. (See the examples of Putnam and Ryle above.) If the bibliography contains more than one item by an author published in the same year, the convention is to write the date followed by a small case letter. For example, (1948a), (1948b), etc. Whenever you make a claim about what a philosopher says or believes whether in direct or indirect speech you must back it up with a reference. When giving a reference in your essay, simply write the authors name, followed by the date, followed by the relevant page(s). The convention is to put the reference at the end of a sentence. For example: Ryle thought that the word exists is ambiguous (Ryle (1949) pp.23-24). Quine argued against Ryles view (Quine (1960) p.61). Note that page numbers are given. Not including page references is very poor page referencing. The point of giving page references is to support your claim that Ryle or Quine say what you claim they said. The reader can check for him or herself that these philosophers said what you claimed they said without having to thumb through every page of the relevant books. For further details please see the referencing guide included in the Philosophy Study Guide. Handing in your essay Two copies of your essay should be handed to the SoSS Undergraduate Office, G.001, in the Arthur Lewis Building. You must also submit your essay electronically to Turnitin via Blackboard. Further instructions on this will be made available on the Blackboard site for the course, see: https://login.manchester.ac.uk/cas/login Failure to submit both a hard copy and an electronic copy of your essay will result in a mark of zero. The hard copy and online submission (submitted through Blackboard) must be exactly the same. Deadline The submission date for the assessed essay March 19th 2013. All essays will be submitted to the Undergraduate Office, G.001, in the Arthur Lewis building and must be submitted by 2pm on the hand in day. The standard essay submission form will be provided by the UG office. See the Philosophy Study Guide for information about the granting of extensions and penalties for unexcused late submission and for overlong essays. Penalties for late submission of essays Essays submitted after 2.00pm carry the following days date. The penalties for late submission of essays is -10 marks for up to 24 hours late and -10 marks for each subsequent day (including weekends) for up to 10 days. Students who have a valid reason (i.e. mitigating circumstances with the necessary documentation) for not being able to submit their assessed essay on time should collect a mitigating circumstances form from the SoSS Undergraduate Office (Lewis, G.001), which should be completed and returned to G.001.

Return of assessed essays A report on your assessed essay will be available on the Student System no later than 15 working days after the essay deadline date (provided the essay is submitted on time). Please note that all essay marks are provisional until confirmed by the external examiner and the final examinations boards in June. Students are welcome to discuss their essay with their tutor or the course convenor during their office hour. Feedback The School of Social Sciences (SoSS) is committed to providing timely and appropriate feedback to students on their academic progress and achievement, thereby enabling students to reflect on their progress and plan their academic and skills development effectively. Students are reminded that feedback is necessarily responsive: only when a student has done a certain amount of work and approaches us with it at the appropriate fora is it possible for us to feed back on the student's work. The main forms of feedback on this course are written feedback responses to assessed essays and exam answers. You can also request feedback on your exam by meeting the course convenor. We also draw your attention to the variety of generic forms of feedback available to you on this as on all SOSS courses. These include: meeting the lecturer/tutor during their office hours; e-mailing questions to the lecturer/tutor; asking questions from the lecturer (before and after lecture); and obtaining feedback from your peers during tutorials, and through discussion boards. Assessed Essay Titles 1. What sort of mistake, if any, does an amoralist make? [see reading list below for lecture 2 morality and self-interest] 2. Can you have reason to do something if no amount of deliberation will motivate you to do it? [see reading list below for lectures 3 and 4 reasons, and reasons and values] 3. What is Scanlons contractualism? Critically assess one objection to it. [see reading list below for lecture 5 contractualism] As you will see, the assessed essay questions cover topics studied in weeks 1 to 5. To ensure that there is no overlap between essays and exam answers, *only* topics studied in weeks 6 to 11 will be covered in the exam. (There is no guarantee, however, that *every* topic studied in weeks 6 to 11 will feature in the exam). 5. COURSE OUTLINE Week 1 (beginning 28th Jan): Introduction. Week 2 (beginning 4th Feb): Morality and self-interest. Week 3 (beginning 11th Feb): Reasons. Week 4 (beginning 18th Feb): Reasons and Values. Week 5 (beginning 25th Feb): Contractualism. Week 6 (beginning 4th Mar): Kants formula of universal law. Week 7 (beginning 11th Mar): Kants formula of humanity. Week 8 (beginning 18th Mar): Virtue ethics. EASTER VACATION Week 9 (beginning 15th Apr): The ethics of promising. Week 10 (beginning 22nd Apr): The ethics of groups. Week 11 (beginning 29th Apr): The ethics of blame and guilt.

Weekly tutorials (starting in Week 2) will address issues raised in each lecture. There will be no lecture or tutorial in week 12 (as the Monday is a bank holiday). 6. READING LISTS All tutorial readings will be placed on Blackboard. It is mandatory that you read these texts. Below are listed additional texts, listed according to their relevance to the lecture topics. Many (but by no means all) are available on-line. To access many of these, you will need either to be on-site, or to log-in in using either Shibboleth or Athens. It is also very easy to download VPN software to an off-campus computer, which then gives you access to resources available on-site for details see http://www.itservices.manchester.ac.uk/vpn). The lists are not exhaustive: you are encouraged to find your own texts to read by following up footnotes, browsing real and virtual libraries etc. Useful on-line browsing resources include: The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (especially Part II: Normative ethics) Accessible at http://www.blackwellreference.com The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (especially Part II: Normative ethical theory) Accessible at: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com//oso/public/index.html Philosophy Compass http://philosophy-compass.com/sections/ethics/ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/ PhilPapers http://philpapers.org/ Google scholar http://scholar.google.co.uk/ * means especially recommended. ! means will be hard to understand, if you have not read some of the other material first. Lecture 1: Introduction No reading specific to this lecture. Lecture 2: Morality and self-interest Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Foot P. (1972) Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives Philosophical Review Vol. 81(3) pp. 305-316. Also in several collections. Other readings: Plato Republic Bks I and II (various editions and translations). * Williams B. (1972) The amoralist in his Morality: An introduction to ethics Cambridge: CUP. Lenman J. (1999) The Externalist and the Amoralist Philosophia Vol. 27 pp. 44157. ! Raz J. (1997) The Amoralist in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.) Ethics and Practical Reasoning Oxford: OUP, also in Engaging Reason Oxford: OUP (a collection of Razs papers). Raz J. (1999) The central conflict: morality and self-interest in R. Crisp and B. Hooker (eds.) Well Being and Morality: Essays in honour of James Griffin Oxford: OUP, also in Engaging Reason OUP (a collection of Razs papers). * Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 6 Morality. If you search for this via the JRUL catalogue, youll find an e-book version viewable online. ! Parfit D. (1984) Reasons and Persons Oxford: OUP ch. 2.

Gauthier D. (1991) Why contractarianism? in P. Vallentyne (ed.) Contractarianism and Rational Choice Cambridge CUP; also in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP (and in the double-volume edition called simply Ethical Theory). Railton P. (1984) Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 13 pp. 134-171 See secs. VIII and IX Reprinted in various collections. Nagel T. (1997) From The Possibility of Altruism in S. L. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton (eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches New York: OUP pp. 323339 (If you want to look at the book from which these selections are taken, Nagels The Possibility of Altruism was published by Princeton University Press in 1970). Smith M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell ch. 3. ! McDowell J. (1978) Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 52 pp.13-29. Also in Mind, Value and Reality Cambridge, Mass.: HUP (a collection of McDowells papers). ! Pink T. (2004). Moral obligation Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Vol. 54 pp. 159-185. Lecture 3: Reasons Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Williams B. (1981) Internal and external reasons in his Moral Luck Cambridge: CUP pp. 101-113. Also in several collections. Other readings: Hooker B. (1987) Williams Argument against External Reasons Analysis 47 no. 1 pp. 42-4. ! Parfit D. (1997) Reasons and Motivation Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 71 pp. 99130. Smith M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell pp. 155-161, pp. 164-174. Darwall S. L. (1997) Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction. In S. L. Darwall, A. Gibbard and P. Railton (eds.), Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches New York: Oxford University Press pp. 30512. * Scanlon T. M. (1998) Appendix: William on Internal and External Reasons in his What We Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. * Hurley S. (2001) Reason and motivation: the wrong distinction? Analysis Vol. 61.2 pp. 15155. Dancy J. (2000) Practical Reality Oxford: OUP Ch. 1 especially pp. 15-19, ch. 2 pp. 26-31. Lecture 4: Reasons and values Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Quinn W. (1993) Putting rationality in its place in his Morality and Action (ed. P. Foot) Cambridge: CUP pp. 228-255. Other readings: * Millgram E. (1997) Practical Induction Cambridge, Mass.: HUP. Chs. 1 and 2. (See also ch. 6). Nagel T. (1998) Value in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity Oxford: OUP (and in the double-volume edition called simply Ethical Theory). Scanlon T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass.: HUP Ch. 1 (see also ch. 2).

Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 chs. 1, 2 and 3. If you search for this via the JRUL catalogue, youll find an e-book version viewable online. ! Raz J. (1999) Engaging Reason Oxford: OUP. Chapter 3. See also chapter 2. Korsgaard C. (1983) Two Distinctions in Goodness Philosophical Review Vol. 92 No. 2 and in her Creating the kingdom of ends Cambridge: CUP. * Dancy J. (2000) Practical Reality Oxford: OUP Chapter 2 (See also chapter 1). Velleman J. D. (1992) The Guise of the Good Nos Vol. 26 No. 1 pp. 3-26. It is also collected in Self to Self Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (a collection of Vellemans papers). Smith M. (1994) The Moral Problem. Oxford: Basil Blackwell ch. 5. See also ch. 6. Lecture 5: Contractualism Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Scanlon T. (1982) Contractualism and Utilitarianism in A. Sen, B. Williams (eds.) Utilitarianism and Beyond Cambridge: CUP. Also in several collections. Other readings: * Scanlon T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other Cambridge, Mass.: HUP. Ch. 5. See also ch. 4. Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 15 Contractualism. If you search for this via the JRUL catalogue, youll find an e-book version viewable online. * Pettit P. (2006) Can Contract Theory Ground Morality? in J. Drier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory Oxford: Blackwell pp. 77-96. Rawls J. (1971) A Theory of Justice various editions. Secs. 3, 4, 11, 20, 24, 26. These sections are collected in S. Darwall (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell. Darwall S. (2002) Introduction S. Darwall (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell. Watson G. (1998) Some considerations in favor of contractualism in C. Morris, J. Coleman (eds.) Rational commitment and morality Cambridge CUP, also in S. Darwall (ed.) Contractarianism/Contractualism Oxford: Blackwell. Matravers M. (ed.) (2003) Scanlon and Contractualism London: Frank Cass. Stratton-Lake P. (ed.) (2004) On What We Owe to Each Other Oxford: Blackwell. ! Wallace R. J. (2002) Scanlon's Contractualism Ethics Vol. 112 pp. 429-70. See especially pp. 449 onwards: sec. III Moral Reasons and sec. IV The Unity of Morality. Stratton-Lake P. (2003) Scanlons contractualism and the redundancy objection Analysis 63 No. 1 pp. 7076. Ridge M. (2003) Contractualism and the new and improved redundancy objection Analysis 63 No. 4 pp. 337-42. Frei T. (2008) The Redundancy Objection, and Why Scanlon is Not a Contractualist pp. 47-65 Journal of Political PhilosophyVol. 17 pp. 47-65.

Lecture 6: Kants formula of universal law Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 12 Universal Laws. Other readings: * Kant I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (sometimes translated as Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, not to be confused with his Metaphysics of Morals). Esp. sec. II. * Korsgaard C. (1985) Kants formula of universal law Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 66. pp. 24-47. Also in her (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends Cambridge: CUP. Korsgaard C. (1986) The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 15 No. 4. Also in her (1996) Creating the Kingdom of Ends Cambridge: CUP. Dietrichson P. (1964) When is a Maxim Fully Universalisable? Kant-Studien Vol. 55 pp. 143-70. Herman B. (1993) The Practice of Moral Judgment Cambridge, Mass.: HUP ch. 3. Nell O. (1975) Acting on Principle: an Essay on Kantian Ethics New York: Columbia University Press. ONeill O. (1989) Consistency in Action in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy Cambridge: CUP. (In various other places too). (By the way, O. Nell and O. ONeill are the same person) Wood A. (1999) Kant's Ethical Thought Cambridge: CUP ch. 3. Sullivan R. (1994) An Introduction to Kant's Ethics. Cambridge: CUP. Ch. 3. Sullivan R. (1989) Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory Cambridge: CUP Chs. 11-13. Lecture 7: Kants formula of humanity Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Thompson J. (1985) The Trolley Problem Yale Law Journal Vol. 94 pp. 1395-1415. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) Deontology Oxford: Blackwell. Other readings: Kant I. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (sometimes translated as the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, not to be confused with his Metaphysics of Morals). Esp. sec. II. * Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch. 9. See also chs. 8 and 10. If you search for this via the JRUL catalogue, youll find an e-book version viewable online. Foot P. (1978) The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect in her Virtues and Vices and other essays in moral philosophy Oxford: Blackwell. ! Kamm F. (1989) Harming some to save others Philosophical Studies Vol. 57 pp. 227-60. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) Deontology Oxford: Blackwell. ! Kamm F. (2000) The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent need not Intend the Means to his End Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 74 pp. 21-. Quinn W. (1989) Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 18 pp. 334-51. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) Deontology Oxford: Blackwell.

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Bratman M. (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason Cambridge, Mass.: HUP ch. 10. Wood A. (1999) Kant's Ethical Thought Cambridge: CUP ch. 4. Wood A. (1998) Humanity as an end in itself in P. Guyer, (ed.) Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Sullivan, R. (1989) Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory Cambridge: CUP Ch. 14. * Thomson, J. (2008) Turning the Trolley Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 36 pp. 359-374. (Thomson here changes her view from the one she expressed in the 1985 paper!) Lecture 8: Virtue ethics Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Harman G. (1999) Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the fundamental attribution Error Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. CXIX pp. 316-31. Other readings: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (various editions and translations). Doris J. (1998) Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics Nous Vol. 32:4 pp. 504-30. * Sreenivasan G. (2002) Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution Mind Vol. 111 pp. 47-68. McDowell J. (1979) Virtue and Reason Monist Vol. 62, pp. 33150. Also in Mind, Value and Reality Cambridge, Mass.: HUP (a collection of McDowells papers). * Annas J. (2006) Virtue Ethics D. Copp (ed.) Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory Oxford: OUP Driver J. (1996) The Virtues and Human Nature in R. Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live? Oxford: Clarendon Press. * Hursthouse R. (2006) Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for Morality?, and Driver J. (2006) Virtue Theory, both in J. Drier (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory Oxford: Blackwell. * Hursthouse R. (1996) Normative Virtue Ethics in R. Crisp (ed.) How Should One Live? Oxford: Clarendon Press. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell. Hursthouse R. (1999) On Virtue Ethics Oxford: OUP. Slote M. (1995) Agent-Based Virtue Ethics Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. 20. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell, and in various other collections too. ! Watson G. (1990) On the Primacy of Character, in A. O. Rorty et al (eds.) Identity, Character and Morality Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Also in D. Statman (ed.) (1997) Virtue Ethics Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Also in S. Darwall (ed.) (2003) Virtue Ethics Oxford: Blackwell. Pincoffs E. (1971) Quandary Ethics Mind Vol. 80 pp. 552-71. Also in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP (and in the double-volume edition called simply Ethical Theory). Trianosky G. (1986) Supererogation, Wrongdoing, and Vice Journal of Philosophy Vol. 83. Also in Rachels J. (ed.) Ethical Theory 2: Theories about How We Should Live Oxford: OUP

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(and in the double-volume edition called simply Ethical Theory). Solomon D. (1988) Internal Objections to Virtue Ethics Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII pp. 428-41. Also in D. Statman (ed.) (1997) Virtue Ethics Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Foot P. (1978) Virtues and Vices in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Reprinted in various collections. Swanton C. (2001) A virtue ethical account of right action Ethics Vol. 112 pp. 32-52. Swanton C. (2003) Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View Oxford: OUP. Lecture 9: The ethics of promising Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Warnock J.G. (1971) The Object of Morality London: Metheun; Ch. 7 Obligations. Other readings: Austin J. L. (1975/1955) How To Do Things With Words. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbis. London: Oxford University Press, 2nd edition. Cupit G. (1994) How Requests (and Promises) Create Obligation Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 44 pp. 439-455. Downie R. S. (1985) Three Accounts of Promising Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 35 pp. 259-271. Gilbert M. (2004) Scanlon on Promissory Obligation Journal of Philosophy Vol. 101 pp. 83-109. Hare R. M. (1979) The Promising Game in Theories of Ethics, Philippa Foot (ed), Oxford: OUP. Hume D. A Treatise on Human Nature (various editions) Bk. 3 Pt. II sec. v Of the obligation of promises. ! Kolodny N. and Wallace R.J. (2003) Promises and Practices Revisited Philosophy & Public Affairs Vol. 31 pp. 119-154. MacCormick N. (1972) Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (with a reply by Joseph Raz) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 46 pp. 59-78. * Owens D. (2006) A Simple Theory of Promising Philosophical Review Vol. 115 pp. 5177. Peetz V. Promises and Threats Mind Vo. 86 pp. 578-581. Pratt M. (2001) Scanlon on Promising Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol 14 pp. 143154. Pratt M. (2002) 'Promises and perlocutions', Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Vol 5 pp. 93 - 119 Prichard H. A. (2002/1940) The Obligation to Keep a Promise in his Moral Writings, J. MacAdam (ed), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 257266. Rawls J. A Theory of Justice (various editions) Ch. 6 sec. 52 The arguments for the principle of fairness.

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Raz J. (1977) Promises and Obligations in Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart. P.M.S. Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 210228. Raz J. (1982) Promises in Morality and Law Harvard Law Review Vol. 95 pp. 916-. Robins M. (1976) The Primacy of Promising Mind Vol. 85 pp. 321-340. * Scanlon T.M. (1990) Promises and Practices Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 19 pp. 199226. This is reprinted (in a revised form) as ch. 7 of Scanlon T.M. (1999) What We Owe To Each Other Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Searle J. R. (1969) Speech Acts, Cambridge: CUP. chs. 3 and 8 Searle J. R. (1964) How to Derive Ought from Is Philosophical Review Vol. 73 pp. 43-58. Thomson J. J. (1990) The Realm of Rights Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Ch. 12 Giving ones word. Vitek W. (1993) Promising Philadelphia: Temple University Press. ! Vallentyne P. (2006) Natural Rights and Two Conceptions of Promising Chicago-Kent law review Vol 81 p. 9-. * Rivera-Lopez E. (2006) Promises, expectations, and rights Chicago-Kent law review Vol 81 pp. 21* Pink T. (2009) Promising and Obligation Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 23 pp. 389Lecture 10: The ethics of groups Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Jackson F. (1987) Group Morality, in P. Pettit, R. Sylvan, and J. Norman (eds.) Metaphysics & Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart Oxford: Basil Blackwell pp. 92-110. Other readings: ! Parfit D. (1984) Reasons and Persons Oxford: OUP. Ch. 3. See also ch. 4. * Parfit D. (2011) On What Matters Oxford: OUP Vol. 1 ch.13 sec. 43 Each-we dilemmas. If you search for this via the JRUL catalogue, youll find an e-book version viewable online. * Parfit D. What we together do (1988). Never published but available in draft form at: http://individual.utoronto.ca/stafforini/parfit/parfit_-_what_we_together_do.pdf Held V. (1970) Can a random collection of individuals be morally responsible? Journal of Philosophy Vol. 67 No. 14 pp. 471-481. Feinberg J. (1968) Collective responsibility Journal of Philosophy Vol. 65 No. 21 pp. 674-688. Also in his (1970) Doing and Deserving Princeton NJ: University Press. Tannssjo T. (1989) The Morality of Collective Actions Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 39, No. 155 pp. 221-228. Pettit P. (2007) Responsibility Incorporated Ethics Vol. 117 No. 2 pp. 117-201. Petersson B. Collective omissions and responsibility at http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek/site/papper/PeterssonBjorn.pdf Petersson B. (2004) The Second Mistake in Moral Mathematics is not about the Worth of Mere Participation Utilitas Vol. 16 pp. 288-315

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Lecture 11: The ethics of blame and guilt Tutorial Reading (on Blackboard): Smart J. J. C. (1961) Free will, praise and blame Mind Vol. 70, pp. 291-306. Other readings: Entry on Moral Responsibility in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ * Scanlon T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other ch. 6 secs. 4, 5 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Scanlon T. M. (2008) Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ch.4 Blame. Mason M. (2011) Blame: Taking it Seriously Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 83 pp. 472-81. Hieronymi P. (2004) The force and fairness of blame Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 18(1) pp. 115148. Velleman J. D. (2003) Dont Worry, Feel Guilty in A. Hatzimoysis (ed.) Philosophy and the Emotions (Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement No. 52) pp. 23548. It is also collected in Self to Self Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (a collection of Vellemans papers). ! Strawson P. F. (1974) Freedom and resentment in his Freedom and resentment and other essays London: Methuen (Methuen, London). Collected in various other places too. Watson G. (1996) Two faces of responsibility Philosophical Topics, Vol. 24(2) pp. 227248. Also in his Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays Oxford: OUP. Kennett J. (2001) Agency and Responsibility Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch. 7 Feinberg J. (1970) Doing and deserving Princeton NJ: University Press. Chs. 4 and 8. ! Korsgaard C. (1992) Creating the Kingdom of Ends Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 6 and in her Creating the kingdom of ends Cambridge: CUP. Gibbard A. (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: a theory of normative judgement Cambridge, Mass.: HUP (check the index for references to blame, blameworthiness and guilt).

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