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The interpretation of the court controls. It is better to predict what the Supreme Court would do than what they should do. Article VIII majority vote needed to declare unconstitutionality. Without this majority, the government will win because there is a presumption of constitutionality. Ratio decidendi rule coming out of the case A rule that states how a word will be interpreted Not a constitutional provision but an interpretation of the rule x should be read as y / x shall under the conditions of y be read as z / under conditions of xy, the conditions should be z / x shall mean/shall not mean Can endow someone with power A standard of behavior Normative than descriptive When repeated, becomes doctrine Canonical ratio decidendi repeated among the community many times Can be about a method of interpretation on (a) what the text means or (b) how to go about interpreting it >> procedural Reasoning what leads to the ratio decidendi There is a community that thinks in a particular way (community of lawyers) and judges will think within those bounds. Because of ambiguity, laws should be interpreted according to a set of methods. A text has no meaning. Meaning of the text depends on the context. Legal realism know not only the methods, interpretations, and facts, but also decision-makers As opposed to Langdels method researching all cases on how they are interpreted (law as science)

KMU v. ERMITA (2006) Held: Executive Order 420, which directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing ID systems, does not establish a national ID system, and is within the constitutional power of control of the President. Significance: Categorically states that Ople v. Torres is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly draw and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. In other words, the ratio decidendi in Ople is merely with regard to the Presidents capacity in that issuance and was declared inapplicable. Penned by Justice Carpio who would be the most senior Justice of the SC once Chief Justice Puno retires.
Note: Dean highlights the faulty logic of Justice Carpio in justifying the unification of the ID system. Justice Carpio concludes that the right to privacy is not violated because were used to IDs. Again, Dean mentions that there was no satisfactory examination of the possible infringement to the right of privacy.

IN RE: PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ALEJANO (2005) Issue: WON the opening of a folded letter by a detainee through counsel (as mere courier) to another individual violates Article III, Sec. 3 of the Constitution? Court: Article III, Sec. 3 is not violated by the opening of a folded envelope by a detainee through counsel (RD) BUT may not open SEALED envelope (obiter but may be persuasive) That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizens privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are detained or imprisonedby the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy. Rule: Under different circumstances, the expectation of privacy is different. reasonable expectation of privacy
Note: habeas corpus was a wrong remedy, since they were under lawful custody

THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY OPLE v. TORRES (1998) Held: Administrative Order No. 308 entitled Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System is declared unconstitutional for involving a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. There was a need for an appropriate legislation. Significance: Recognized the concept of a right to privacy as being the right to be left alone. Through the ponencia of Justice Puno, there is a presumption of unconstitutionality when the right to privacy is infringed as against the usual presumption of constitutionality for any act of a Constitutional organ.. As a result, the burden to prove a compelling state interest for such infringement is shifted to the government.
Note: From the text of the case, it was in Morfe v. Mutuc where the constitutional right to privacy was adopted or recognized in our jurisdiction. Further, Dean mentions that none of the cases really problematized the right to privacy, but merely imported its recognition from US cases.

MERCADO v. SECURITY BANK CORPORATION (2006) * not discussed in class about letter to Chief Justice Davide Jr. invokes freedom of speech and privacy of communication

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Significance: Letters addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their judicial functions become part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court. SILAHIS Intl Hotel v. SOLUTA (2006) * not discussed in class alleged drugs in the office occupied by the hotel employees union searched without search warrant civil case for damages Significance: Not only public officers but also private individuals are civilly liable for violation of ones constitutional right (against unlawful search and seizure in this case) as enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS (1989) RD: The grant of executive power under Article VII, Sec. 1 shall include residual powers of the President to address current situations absent legal prohibitions. to prevent the return of a former President in her discretion believing such return according to the information given to her shall be inimical to national security or public safety. PRIVACY: RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES PEOPLE v. MARTI (1991) RD: The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures in Article III, Section 2 only applies to searches done by the State and/or its agents. Article III, Section 2 applies as a restraint only against government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of law, and cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals. As a CONSEQUENCE: The inadmissibility of evidence in Article III, Section 3(2) (otherwise known as the exclusionary rule) therefore will only apply when such evidence was obtained through actions taken by government. GUAZON v. DE VILLA (1990) * not discussed in class saturation drives on areas where alleged subversives were hiding alleged human rights abuses absence of clear facts, no permanent relief

Significance: Despite the court believing it is highly probable that some violations were committed, the majority declared that the remedy is not to stop all police actions. There was a brief discussion on the importance of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
What is sought to be guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access...his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life.

DISSENTS: Cruz Saturation drives not among accepted instances where search or arrest may be made without a warrant. Thus, such drives are per se unconstitutional. Sarmiento Saturation drives were not lawful and legitimate because arrests were not accompanied by judicial warrant despite planning by the police officers. Moreover, such activities are conducted to fish for evidence and therefore a warrant is necessary. VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS (1920) RD: The right against self-incrimination embodied in Article III, Section 17 is limited to be against testimonial compulsion. Rationale: With a premise that the purpose of criminal proceedings is to arrive at the truth, coerced confessions are often not truthful. STONEHILL v. DIOKNO (1967) violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, International Revenue Code, and the Revised Penal Code RD1: Probable cause can only be determined when there is one specific offense. determination of probable cause for a particular offense is dependent on the evidence or proof presented if probable cause could not be determined, therefore the judge could not issue the warrant RD2: The description of the objects to be seized ought to be specific enough for a judge to believe that it was used in the commission of an offense. main intention is to ensure against the infringement of the State in the implied right of privacy/autonomy
NOTE: Although not discussed as ratio decidendi, this case overturned the ruling in Moncado, and adopted the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio. Currently, we all know that this rule has been constitutionalized in Article III, Section 3(2).

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BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF (We Forum) 1. When the address contained in the search warrant is different from that applied for and the search is done in the place of the application, it does not make such warrant invalid. The warrant is not invalid simply because there is inconsistency. 2. In determining whether personal property can be constitutionally seized, the rules to be followed are the Civil Code provisions. 3. Description of the objects to be seized would be such that it would curtail the discretion of law officers, so that they cannot seize anything besides those used in the commission of the crime. 4. Probable cause shall not be found absent personal knowledge.
Probable cause facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense was committed, demanding personal knowledge of facts upon which the issuance of warrant may be justified Evidences: testimonial, documentary, objects Reasonable person - a person with a judicial mind Things to look for in a search warrant: 1. Issued by a judge (Art III Sec 2) 2. One offense only (Stonehill vs. Diokno) 3. Address corresponds to the address being raided presumption overturned by showing the application (Burgos vs. Chief of Staff) 4. Determine probable cause. Even if there was, the execution must be reasonable.

POSADAS VS. CA (buri bag with firearm) Stop and frisk is a reasonable search and seizure, in which the reasonableness is determined by the police officers through the reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed.
Rationale: Necessity of law enforcement Problem: It is a figment of the imagination, only based on the minds of the policemen. Furthermore, the man could have ran away at the sight of the policemen approaching him.

NOLASCO VS. PANO (not discussed) A search can be made incident to arrest. PEOPLE VS. TABAR (white pants) Consensual search is an exception to the procurement of a search warrant.
The conviction was because of the incompetence of the counsel. Try to establish the circumstances surrounding the event. In this case, having armed men raid ones home couldnt have been voluntary. Consent required: 1. Personal (Aniag) 2. Knowing and intelligent waiver (Aruta)

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA (travelling bag with marijuana) For a search to be consensual, the waiver must be intelligently made. PEOPLE VS. YATAR (killer rapist) The right against self-incrimination is limited only to testimonial evidence and excludes DNA samples obtained from the accused. AGUSTIN VS. CA (support pendente lite) For the Court to compel DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-incrimination, unless it is shown that such test is irrelevant or oppressive.

VILLANUEVA VS. QUERUBIN (gambling paraphernalia) (not discussed) The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures shall include the immunity of ones person from interference by the government and the recognition of a constitutionally-protected area particularly ones own home. MHP GARMENTS VS. CA (girl scout uniforms) The inadmissibility of evidence shall apply to those searches and seizures wherein there was sufficient time to obtain a warrant.
Problem: MHP instigated the raid (a private entity). The action was civil in nature, for damages.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PURPOSES Arrive at truth and debate on public issues ORFANEL V. PEOPLE Fact-opinion dichotomy o Fact: can be proven or disproven o For an opinion to be protected and within the ambit of Art 3, Sec 4, it must not be made without factual basis; it should be shown that it can be inferred from the facts. In order to escape criminal responsibility for libel or slander, it is not enough for the party who writes a defamatory communication to another to say that the writer expresses therein no more than his opinion or belief. IN RE: EMIL (EMILIANO) JURADO Art 3, Sec 4 of the 1987 Constitution is not violated when the judiciary cites a newspaperman in contempt if article is baseless and he does not verify the truth of his allegations.

UY KHEYTIN VS. VILLAREAL (opium inside the table) (not discussed) An irregularity in the search warrant does not justify the inadmissibility of the seized items as evidence. 20th CENTURY FOX VS. CA (pirated VHS) In the search and seizure of illegal copies of movies, the master copy should be presented as evidence for comparison, so that the evidence would not be held as inadmissible. - The warrants should also be specific and not general. VALMONTE VS. DE VILLA (checkpoints) The right against unreasonable searches and seizures can only be invoked by those whose rights have been infringed. ANIAG VS. COMELEC (gun ban) Evidences obtained through checkpoints which were installed without sufficient time for a person to know that a law had been passed banning firearms shall be held as inadmissible.

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Dissent: It is not falsity that brings speech outside the ambit of freedom of speech and expression but MALICE. Malice: o Baseless o Reckless disregard for the truth

ADIONG V. COMELEC (decals and stickers) When faced with borderline situations where freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials, and COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom of speech. Regulation of communicative content must be specific enough so as not to affect speech unrelated to the interest of the State. Preserve Public Institutions US V. BUSTOS The scalpel metaphor: The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
In LIBEL, subsequent punishment is taken into consideration, and not the Clear and Present Danger rule. For a libel suit to prosper, it must be proven that the statements were made with malice. Why malice and not falsity? False speech is within the ambit of freedom of expression. o Theres meaning to it. Ex.: metaphor, parody Theres no such thing as absolute proof. Even those that have been said to be true, at one point in time, can be disproven. Under different contexts, there is no way of distinguishing what is true and what is false different meanings are involved. FALSITYNO ONE CAN BE SURE. Hence, the test should be MALICE. o Baseless o Reckless disregard for the truth o Journalist Code of Ethics (for journalists: verified by at least 2 sources)

PLANAS V. GIL Art 3, Sec 4 cannot be used as a defense against an investigation to elicit the truth or falsity of criticisms directed against the Government, its administration, its policies and officials. Art 3, Sec 4 is not an unbridled license that would render the Government powerless to act. SANTIAGO V. FAR EASTERN BROADCASTING Broadcasting Stations have a right to require previous submission of manuscript of a speech to be broadcasted when there are laws and regulations that expressly authorize them to make such requirement.
Additional notes: The petitioners should have attacked the law and regulations since the law and regulations are considered to be a prior restraint on the freedom of speech. Compelling state interest for the requirement: to protect the public namely the listeners and the viewers. Broadcasting stations are considered to be an educative body. Clear and present danger: broadcasters can say that there is an event when in fact there is none still, they would affect the way the public thinks.

PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where the licensing authorities are strictly limited to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license.
Why is there a need to discuss restrictions? Expression affects several interests Theories in approaching Art 3, Sec 4: 1. Purpose 2. Tests used 2 KINDS OF RESTRICTION on Communication tests developed are different Communicative conduct: incidentally, every conduct has an expressive content Communicative content: punished for the meaning of the content; restricted because of its grave effect that shatters the very foundation by which the freedom is exercised. o How to know if this cause will have this grave effect? o Earliest test: DANGEROUS TENDENCY look at the cause and effect only depends on the subjective notion of whoever is making the judgment o CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER Requires something more from whoever makes the judgment Clarity and imminence of the evil: substantive evil Other distinction (concerning time): look at the restriction on the speech being madewhen is the restriction made? Prior restraint: regulation prior to speech o All prior restraints have a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality

US V. PERFECTO Art 3, Sec 4 of the 1987 Constitution protects opinions on the maladministration of public affairs that are based on facts, made with good motives and for justifiable ends. ESPUELAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Art 3, Sec 4 does not protect seditious libel that has an immediate tendency to stir up general discontent or disaffection among the people and induce them to resort to illegal methods in order to redress the evils which press upon their minds.
The attack on the President has passed the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. The Court used the DANGEROUS TENDENCY test. Freedom of Speech is not applied since the speech in this case had a tendency to incite sedition (Art 142 Revised Penal Code).

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General rule: Challenger carries the burden of proving unconstitutionality; but for prior restraint: government carries the burden of proving constitutionality Subsequent Punishment: ex. Libel o Burden does not shift; it is still with the plaintiff o Re: content There is a regulation on CONDUCT even if it seems that it regulates content. Test is OBrien test: o Within the constitutional power o Regulation is unrelated to speech o Regulation on speech is just a tangential effect o Restriction is not greater than what is required in the governmental interest Other dimensions: Fact-opinion dichotomy (ie Jurado and Bustos) Doctrine of overbreadth restriction must be so precise that it will not affect others who make the speech but dont cause the same effect o Broader than what it wants to prohibit o This doesnt need an actual case exception to the general rule of the presence of actual case o So long as its patently clear that others will be affectedcalled the facial challenge as used in Adiong and Gonzales cases o

the most corrupt Customs official and the worst Iglesia ni Kristo member. Borjal cannot be applied in this case because the prosecution produced evidence that Atty. Carlos So is the only employee known as Ding So in the Bureau of Customs. The Court held that an opinion should be based on factual matters for it to fall within the ambit of protected speech. The facts must be true (proven by empirical basis) and that there must be no reckless disregard of the truth. ARREZA v. GREGORIO ARANETA UNIVERSITY (GAUF) The demonstration conducted by the students inside a university campus falls within the freedom of speech contemplated in Article III Section 4 of our Constitution. According to the Court in Non vs. Dames, the students freedom of speech should not be left at the school gates and that the students are entitled to exercise such freedom through rallies and other forms of demonstrations. The cases of Arreza and Non are similar in the sense that both facts narrate that some students who joined the rallies were denied admission in the subsequent semester. The Court affirmed the doctrine of implied academic contract which states that the contract between the student and the university expires until the student finishes his course and not on a per semester basis. FILIPINAS BROADCASTING VS. AGO MEDICAL (liabilities to society) (not discussed) The doctrine of fair comment is not applicable to broadcasts which are made in reckless disregard for the truth. Individual Enhancement PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION V.PHIL. BLOOMING MILLS F: PBMEO decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacanang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the morning shifts. Petitioners were found guilty of violation of CBA. RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 should be read to mean that the rights to freedom of speech and peaceably assemble are more primordial than the right to property. To Equalize Opportunities NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V. COMELEC F: Representatives of mass media challenged the constitutionality of RA 6646 which made it unlawful for publishers to sell or give free of charge for political purposes except that Comelec shall be the one to provide for free spaces and airtime. Court held that the challenged restrictions on freedom of speech bear a reasonable connection with the constitutional objective set in Art. IX (C) (4). Equality of opportunity was also held as an important consideration. Constitutionality upheld. RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 has to be taken in conjunction with Art. IX (C) (4) during election periods. This produces the technical effect of non presumption of invalidity of Comelec regulations

GONZALES v. COMELEC An amendment to the Omnibus Election Code, RA 4880 (1) prohibits the nomination of candidates outside the election period and (2) regulates or limits the campaign period. The government argued that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil: that of (1) too much election expenditures and (2) rise of election-related violence. The court held that this statute is unconstitutional as some of its provisions are vague. Freedom of association as a form of free speech is impaired. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD v. CAPULONG The movie production company wants to make a docu-drama miniseries that depicts the events that transpired in the 1986 People Power Revolution. Enrile opposes the filming of the series because it violates his right to privacy. The Court held by using the balancing-of-interest test citing that the filmmakers freedom of speech must have greater value over Enriles privacy as he is a public figure whose involvement in the aforesaid revolution constitutes to a legitimate public interest. The clear and present danger fails for not specifying the substantive evil sought t be prevented as the movie series is still unfinished. BORJAL v. CA Borjal, a columnist in the Philippine Star, wrote an article about an unidentified self-proclaimed EDSA hero who is involved in malicious financial solicitations of a convention involving land transportation. Although every defamatory remark is presumed to be malicious, libel requires that the remark must point to a specific person and not to a generic thing. Wenceslao, although a private individual, is deemed a public figure if he works for an office which is imbued with public interest. TULFO v. PEOPLE Four counts of libel were filed by Atty. Carlos Ding so against Erwin Tulfo for the defamatory remarks that the latter said against the former in his Remate column. Tulfo called so

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exercised for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC F: PPI assailed the validity of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 for it violates the Constitutional prohibition on taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Violation on freedom of speech also raised (provision on undue reference to candidates/political parties). Court held that Sec. 2 (donation of ad spaces) amounted to taking of property. Sec. 8, on the other hand, does not violate the freedom of speech citing NPC v.Comelec. RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 is not violated where a prohibition on undue reference to candidate (Comments favoring a candidate and repeated reference to a candidate) does not absolutely prohibit other means of reporting about a political candidate. In seeking to equalize opportunities, the government ends up making content based choices which result in unintended consequences which are worse than the evil it seeks to prevent.

RD: same with Bayan; gave guidelines on applying for a permit to rally; Eventually adopted by BP 880 GONZALES V. KATIGBAK (Kapit sa patalim) RD: Obscenity is outside the ambit of Art. 3 Sec. 4.
Notes: Hicklin test: Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest. Roth test (prior to Hicklin): Test is the effect of an isolated exerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. Hicklin standard: 1) to the average person 2) dominant effect (taken as whole) Average person difficult to determine; largely based on the judges discretion; takes into consideration the context of population;

Classification scheme- form of prior restraint; heavy presumption of unconstitutionality Reason why obscenity is not protected speech: Justice Brenan in Roth v. US: All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance- unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion- have the full protection of guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interest. But implicit in the history of the 1st Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. Criticism: ex cathedra

Notes: Clear and present danger rule and Equalizing of Opportunities Distinguished CPD: designed to prevent the government to do positive acts which amount prohibition absence showing of CPD. Equalizing Opportunities: Designed for the government to do affirmative actions.


- RA 1265 purpose: to inculcate patriotism and nationalism - neutral regulation was tangentially affecting religion - overturned the Gerona doctrine which dichotomized faith act, where faith (belief) is absolutely protected while any act which violates the regulation is prohibited Court simply weighed the two interests, and didnt explain further than: Symbolism is not as important as freedom of religion 2 Aspects of AIII Sec. 5: 1. Free Exercise 2. Non-establishment the State cannot support a religion, no religious test for exercise of civil and political rights

BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP) VS. ERMITA F: KMU, Bayan, del Prado assailed the constitutionality of BP 880 (The Public Assembly Act) and the CPR. BP 880 makes it unlawful for an organization to rally without permit. CPR, on the other hand, allowed the govt to take action even before the rallyists perform their act. Court held the validity of BP 880. CPR was struck down. RD: Art. 3 Sec. 4 is not violated by a law which does not absolutely ban public assemblies and merely restricts by regulating the time, place and manner of assembly. CPR must be struck down as it serves no purpose in lieu of maximum tolerance standard already provided for by BP 880.
Notes: Court emphasized in this case that the government could only modify the time, place and manner of assembly only upon showing CPD.

ESTRADA V ESCRITOR (2003) RD: I. Strict scrutiny test 1) whether there is sincerity to the religious belief? OR whether there is a real burden on religious belief? 2) whether there is a compelling state interest? 3) whether the regulation is the least intrusive means? II. Religion 1. Belief in God/Maker/anything parallel to it 2. Belief in moral code based on #1 3. Sincerity of belief, effort to comply 4. Associative relationship

REYES V. BAGATSING F: JBL Reyes sought permit from the City of Manila to hold a public assembly from Luneta to US Embassy.

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Notes on Strict Scrutiny: 1. Secular purpose when applied, will tangentially affect free exercise 2. Compelling interest if its covered by a provision in the Constitution, thats where you find the interest; or something suggested or implied by the police power or any inherent power (eminent domain, taxation) 3. Least intrusive means can it correct the evil? Fundamental purpose of religious clause: to protect the minority Evolution of Free Exercise Clause (thanks Eva) 1. Belief-action test o The state was absolutely prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause from regulating individual religious beliefs, but placed no restriction on the ability of the state to regulate religiously motivated conduct. o As long as the Court found that regulation address action rather than belief, the Free Exercise Clause did not pose any problem. o The Free Exercise Clause thus gave no protection against the proscription of actions even if considered central to a religion unless the legislature formally outlawed the belief itself. o Proved unsatisfactory since regulation of religiously dictated conduct would be upheld no matter how central the conduct was to the exercise of religion and no matter how insignificant was the government's non-religious regulatory interest so long as the government is proscribing action and not belief. 2. Deliberate-Inadvertent distinction o Distinction is made between deliberate state interference of religious exercise for religious reasons which was plainly unconstitutional and government's inadvertent interference with religion in pursuing some secular objective. o Introduced in Minersville School District v. Gobitis (1940) o Free Exercise Clause presented no problem to interference with religion that was inadvertent no matter how serious the interference, no matter how trivial the state's non-religious objectives, and no matter how many alternative approaches were available to the state to pursue its objectives with less impact on religion, so long as government was acting in pursuit of a secular objective. o Gobitis was overturned in West Virginia v Barnette (1943) which held that even inadvertent interference with religion must pass judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause with only grave and immediate danger sufficing to override religious liberty. 3. Two-part balancing test o Established in Braunfeld v. Brown (1961). o Since the burden was the indirect effect of a law with a secular purpose, it would violate the Free Exercise Clause only if there were alternative ways of achieving the state's interest o The two-part balancing test of validity: 1. plaintiff to show that the regulation placed a real burden on his religious exercise 2. burden will only be upheld if state showed that it was pursuing an overriding secular goal by the means which imposed the least burden on religious practices 4. Strict Scrutiny and Compelling State Interest Test o First applied in Sherbert v. Verner (1963). o This test was similar to the two-part balancing test but this latter test stressed that the state interest was not merely any colorable state interest, but must be paramount and compelling to override the free exercise claim. o Sherbert also firmly established the exemption doctrine. o Significantly increased the degree of protection afforded to religiously motivated conduct; established a strong presumption in favor of the free exercise of religion. o Upheld in Wisconsin v. Yoder. B. Establishment Clause Everson v. Board of Education (1947)

o o o

The US Supreme Court's first encounter with the Establishment Clause. Court adopted Jefferson's metaphor of "a wall of separation between church and state" as encapsulating the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Recall: phrase "separation of church and state" does not appear in the U.S. Constitution. It became part of U.S. jurisprudence when the Court in the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States.

Lemon test o Laid down in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971). o The Lemon test requires a challenged policy to meet the following criteria to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. 1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose. 2. Its primary or principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 3. The statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.' McGowan v. Maryland (1961) o Illustrated that in the area of government displays or affirmations of belief, the Court has given leeway to religious beliefs and practices which have acquired a secular meaning and have become deeply entrenched in history. Marsh v. Chambers (1983) o The majority opinion did not rely on the Lemon test and instead drew heavily from history and the need for accommodation of popular religious beliefs Deans Exercises: Putting up a Catholic Church inside UP o Start with: UP is the national university, by nature a governmental instrumentality. What it does, the State does. o Establishing a church can violate AII Sec 5 and AIII Sec 5 (Non-establishment clause). Also using government resources. o Benevolent neutrality (Estrada v Escritor): There is a wall of separation, religion is accepted as a reality o Lemon Test: Legislative purpose (No) Effect on religious practice (Actual effect: Does not favor a religion. There are other lease agreements. It will only be violative if theres a special lease for religion only.) No excessive entanglement (If there are no existing standards for choosing one religion over the other, there can be an excessive entanglement) o How to structure policy: provide zoning, guidelines, list of members Adultery case for BLaans (1st level: It did not happen, 2nd level: interpret what is in the RPC, 3 rd level: procedure, 4th level: constitutional arguments) o 3 parts of a constitutional argument: justiceability, WON the governmental organ has the power to try the case, transcending limitations provided by the Constitution A 7th Day Adventist refuses to take an exam on Saturday (1 ST test: No action for mandamus, 2nd test: Burden? Yes. Least restrictive? No. ) Male priesthood (Ans: It will infringe on Free Exercise if State will compel Catholic Church to admit females as priests.) Display of religious icons in the office of a public officer: violative of non-establishment Teaching of religion: can be allowed up to secondary level (Constitutionally-protected) A moment of silence: non-violative Deans advice: Clauses do not float. To operate them, you have to ask a series of questions 1. Equal protection classification or discrimination 2. Due process procedural or substantive (purpose, measure, method is rational)

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3. 4.

Freedom of expression conduct, content Religion special content, quite related to free expression

In the case of Escritor, it is a facially-neutral law and the petitioner wants to carve out an exception based on religion. A full rationalization of the doctrine on exemption.

Hicklin Test (1) WON the tendency of the matter charged to be obscene is to deprave or corrupt the minds of those whose minds are open to such immoral influences (2) That which shocks the ordinary and reasonable man
Obscene something offensive to chastity, decency, and delicacy

DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO RD: Overbreadth doctrine (chilling effect) only applies to free speech cases, and used sparingly.
Theory behind the President being sued: President in clear violation of the Constitution. An attempt to create a doctrine. Commander-in-chief powers: 1. Calling-out contemplated in PP1017 2. Suspend the writ of habeas corpus - WHC: order to produce the body; a provisional remedy 3. Declare martial law

PITA V CA (1989) RD: Law enforcement officers cannot confiscate obscene materials without a warrant wherein the court must determine whether or not the materials to be confiscated is indeed obscene. Miller v California Test (1) WON the average person, applying community standards, would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest (2) WON the work depicts / describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct (3) WON the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Guidelines for A201 RPC to apply: 1. Search warrant from the judge if obscenity rap is in order 2. Authorities must convince the court that the materials indeed are obscene to warrant state interference 3. Judge determines #2 4. Upon finding probable cause, warrant can be issued 5. Suit based on A201 RPC 6. Conviction is subject to appeal

BABST V NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD RD: None. Case was rendered moot and academic because investigation proceedings involving reporters have ended. Re libel claims: Injuction will not lie if there are other alternatives available for the defendants.
An example of the abuse of the judiciary of its power. Exercise: Freedom of the press is not curtailed if a letter of invitation is sent by a military officer in relation to a failed coup d etat. There is no infringement yet.

PHCAP V DUQUE III RD: Public international law

Whats relevant? Punos concurring opinion on commercial speech. Test for evaluating validity of regulations of commercial speech (Central Hudson Case) 1. Commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading (Dean: There are certain types which are misleading) 2. Asserted governmental interest must be substantial 3. Whether state regulation directly advances governmental interest asserted 4. Whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest Applied in the case: 1. Not unlawful, RIRR and Milk Code concedes that there are instances when breastmilk substitutes (IFs) may be necessary 2. Substantial interest of state in taking care of the young, preserving and promoting health of its citizens 3. Rationale of absolute ban: prevent mother from succumbing to suggestive and misleading marketing and propaganda 4. Absolute ban is unduly restrictive, cuts deep on free speech. Sec. 4 can refer even to speech of juridical persons. Ponencia: 2nd level of constitutional argument (ultra vires / beyond power) Problem: WON the existing laws allow DOH to go beyond its power (EO51, Admin Code, Constitution) Test for passing due process: (1) legitimate purpose (2) means meet such a purpose. Total ban is unconstitutional because it goes beyond the powers given to DOH. However, DOH can regulate.

OSMENA V COMELEC (RA 6646/COMELEC Time, Space) RD: OBrien Test (test for content-neutral regulations) (1) WON the governmental regulation is within the constitutional power of the government (2) WON the regulation furthers a substantial government interest (3) WON the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech (4) WON the incident restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the interest
Applied: 1. 2. 3. 4. Power to regulate communication and information Ensuring equal opportunity, time, and space Unrelated interest to free speech Yes.

MTRCB V ABS-CBN (Prostituition) RD: MTRCB did not approve or ban the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel ABS-CBN's permit. They were merely penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner "The Inside Story" for its review and approval. The imposition of a fine as a penalty is not a prior restraint. It

PEOPLE V KOTTINGER (1923) RD: Pictures depicting how natives dress and live in real life are not obscene, using the Hicklin Test.

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is a subsequent punishment. Hence, the heavy presumption of unconstitutionality does not operate in this case. ABS-CBN V COMELEC (Exit polls) RD: There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed. In order to justify a restriction of the people's freedom of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them. SWS V COMELEC RD: INC V CA RD: MTRCB cannot arbitrarily rate shows because it becomes prior restraint to religious speech (they labelled the speech as an "attack" when it was a mere "criticism). Instead, use Clear and Present Danger standard (while usually applies to subversive speech), as it is now applicable to speech that provokes hostile audience reaction.
Factual Background: An INC show was rated X by the MTRCB for being offensive to other religions (while they were silent about this, mostly offensive to Catholicism) . Ruling: (1) MTRCB has the power to regulate all shows for television broadcast, including religious programmes. (2) MTRCB cannot arbitrarily rate shows because it becomes prior restraint to religious speech (they labelled the speech as an "attack" when it was a mere "criticism). Instead, use Clear and Present Danger standard (while usually applies to subversive speech), as it is now applicable to speech that provokes hostile audience reaction.

attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and generosity with which the DOJ Panel accomodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness.


Freedom of information cognate of freedom of expression The publics right to know is different from the power of Congress to summon officials in aid of legislation

NERI V SENATE RD: I. 1. 2. 3. Laid down the three elements of presidential communications privilege: protected communication must be quintessential and non-delegable presidential power communication must be authored or solicited and received by an advisor in operational proximity with the president presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and unavailability of the information elsewhere Claim of executive privilege is properly invoked by Neri applying the three elements in the case authority of the President to enter into executive agreement is recognized in Phil. Jurisprudence Neri is considered a close advisor, being a member of the Presidents cabinet No adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of information

II. 1. 2. 3.

TOLENTINO V SEC OF FINANCE RD: 1. A registration fee is a mere administrative fee, and does not constitute as a prior restraint to freedom of the press or religious freedom. 2. Differential treatment of the press creates risks of suppression of expression. 3. Free exercise of religion clause does not prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization. WEBB V DE LEON RD: A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. Martelino, et al v Alejandro, et al: To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be an allegation and proof that judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
Nothing in the records prove that the tone and content of the publicity that

PUNZAL V ITCSI RD: Making false or malicious statements against a company, its officers and employees or its products and services is not considered as mere opinion and therefore not covered by the guarantee of free expression if accompanied by improper conduct or acts of discourtesy or disrespect to fellow employees, visitors, guests, clients, at any time. Right to be informed of the right to be represented by counsel also applies to investigations before administrative bodies. CHAVEZ V GONZALES (Garci tapes) RD: An announcement of a public figure to prohibit the media to issue a specific kind of statement amounts to prior restraint, which is violative of the right to free press.


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No person implies a power inherent in the State since it is stated in the negative due process substantive (reasonability/absence of arbitrariness) or procedural (fairness) If the purpose is stated in the Constitution, due process is met. (?) Police Power Restriction of rights Prevented from doing liberties Deprivation suffered by the citizen Expropriation Juridical physical possession Prevented from using property for the benefit of the public

7. The court must promulgate a decision in a manner wherein the parties can determine the issues involved and the reasons for the conclusion.
Due process requires procedural fairness; a case concerning administrative proceedings before a quasi-judicial agency. Seven cardinal principles

NON V DAMES II RD: The imposition of disciplinary sanctions of schools requires the observance of procedural due process: a. Students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them b. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel if desired c. They shall be informed of the evidence against them d. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf e. Evidence must be duly considered by their investigating committee Moreover, penalty must be proportionate to the offense committed.
Due process with respect to academic institutions

Modern trend: expropriation as a tool of police power Police power inherent power of the State to provide for the general welfare Why need expropriation? The instrumentalities of the State cannot operate without resources Just compensation fair market value (canonical) Eminent domain can also be used for police power purposes (only test is whether there is a legitimate purpose and the rationality of means) Arguments in ASL: 1. Public land first before private land not a legal argument. Cite the text. 2. Who decides what is just compensation? Court. Full payment = transfer of title 3. Mode of payment cash, unless there is revolutionary taking (can be bonds or other forms of security)

RUBI V PROVINCIAL BOARD RD: 1. 2. The term Non-Christian shall mean lack or low degree of civilization, and does not have a religious connotation. The right to liberty shall not be available to individuals who are uncivilized.

ROXAS & CO V CA RD: Procedural due process must also mean that whenever there is an administrative order prescribing mechanisms for deprivation of property, the regulator must subscribe to that process.
Roxas No case Procedure of administrative regulation Ang Tibay 2 private parties Procedure of hearing

CARINO V INSULAR GOVERNMENT RD: The right to property can pertain to undocumented property which was acquired since time immemorial.
Definition of property for purposes of due process

ANG TIBAY V CIR RD: There are 7 primary rights that Administrative Bodies must adhere to in complaints presented before them. These are: 1. That the right to a hearing involves the right to present a case and adduce evidence thereof. 2. That the court must consider the evidence presented. 3. That the duty to deliberate includes the duty to determine which of the presented evidences supports a conclusion. 4. That the evidence relied upon by the court is substantial. Substantial evidence is the relative evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate in support of a conclusion. 5. That the evidence relied upon by the court was presented at the hearing or at least in the records thereof and made available to the parties. 6. The court and its judges must rely upon their own consideration of the law and facts and not depend upon the conclusion of its subordinates.

How can procedural rules violate substantive due process? Rules may require something substantive. Do all acts of authorities amount to deprivation of life, liberty, and property? No. People vs. Marti Sec. 2 is invoked against the State and not private individuals Non vs. Dames Due process clause can be applied as to its effect on the individual, government was empowered to decide on constitutional implications of acts of a private individual (same with ISAE) Deans Exercise: Student given a 5.0 arbitrarily 1. No person WON a person was involved student is a person 2. What is involved (life, liberty, or property) 3. WON there was deprivation - No 4. Due process 2 levels (reasonability/procedural)

TANADA V TUVERA RD: Publication in a newspaper of general circulation is an additional requirement for a law to meet procedural due process.
There may be laws which do not have any effect because of the requirements of the due process clause. Need to publish: As notice to the entire public, to find law whenever it is necessary.

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ERMITA MALATE V CITY OF MANILA RD: Regulation requiring the registration of name and age is not unconstitutional and passes the requirements of substantive due process.
See White Light for test.

1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute 2. must not be unfair or oppressive 3. must not be partial or discriminatory 4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade 5. must be general and consistent with public policy 6. must not be unreasonable REQUISITES FOR THE PROPER EXERCISE OF LGU's POLICE POWER: 1. interests of the public generally require its exercise 2. means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals **Basically, lawful subject + lawful method** REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID AND REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION: 1. it must rest on substantial distinctions 2. it must be germane to the purpose of the law 3. it must not be limited to existing conditions only 4. it must apply equally to all members of the same class
Comparison: exercise of police power vs. eminent domain In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the state's power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious forbidden purpose and, consequently is NOT COMPENSABLE. (NOTE: noxious means harmful to health or morals; unwholesome) The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right of property. Life is irreplaceable, property is not.

MAGTAJAS V PRYCE PROPERTIES RD: CARLOS SUPERDRUG V DSWD RD: A reduction of income by giving discounts to senior citizens does not amount to taking of private property without due process of law because such reduction is merely speculative and passes the test for substantive due process.
Limits of taking private property: 1. Public use 2. Just compensation Substantive due process test: 1. Legitimate purpose welfare of senior citizens constitutionally provided 2. Method reasonable

MMDA V VIRUN TRANSPORT RD: The test to follow whether there is valid police power is if (1) it is firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and (2) a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.
Factual Background: Part of MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando's plan to decongest traffic in Metro Manila is to remove private bus terminals along EDSA. The president issued E.O. No. 179, precisely to that effect. Two declaratory relief petitions coming from two bus companies, Viron and Mencorp, questioned the E.O. and asked... 1. Is it part of MMDA's power to regulate traffic? 2. Is it consistent with the Public Service Act which requires common carriers to maintain their terminals as public utilities? 3. Is it a deprivation of the bus operators' property without due process of law? Ruling: MMDA does not have the police power to close down bus companies and the test to follow whether there is valid police power is if (1) it is firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and (2) a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means.

WHITE LIGHT V CITY OF MANILA RD: A city ordinance prohibiting short-time and wash-up time in motels does not meet the rational relationship required to pass the test of substantive due process.
Levels of Analysis employed in substantive due process: 1. Rational relationship test relationship of ends to means; more liberal, in favor of the regulator, least protective of rights 2. Strict scrutiny colorable interest compelling enough 3. Heightened scrutiny stricter analysis of means, allows the Court to dictate on matters of wisdom In this case, the relationship is not even rational (prohibition also applies to married couples, travelers, who may have legitimate purposes to stay in motels)

SJS V ATIENZA RD: (Note: there are two cases for SJS. One was decided March 7, 2007 and the other Feb 13, 2008) March 7, 2007: As Chief Executive of the City, he has the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. Feb 13, 2008: REQUIREMENTS FOR ORDINANCE TO BE VALID:


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RD: Equal Protection is not violated by a legislation/regulation based on reasonable classification 1) must rest on substantial distinctions 2) must be germane to the purpose of the law 3) must not be limited to existing conditions only 4) must apply equally to all members of the same class ICHONG V HERNANDEZ RD: The equal protection clause is not infringed by legisation which (1) applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and (2) reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (almost same with People v Cayat, 3rd requisite was not mentioned in this case which is that the regulation should not be limited to existing conditions) The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitute a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. Reasonable Classification - NOT arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result of product of racial antagonism and hostility - Public interest is involved or pursued which in this case is economic independence. TATAD V SECRETARY OF DOE RD: Equal protection does not compel the government to equalize situations which are already existing, but works on laws produced by the State.
Equal Protection Clause 1. Valid classification see P v Cayat 2. Discrimination Court in this case did not rule on EP but brought the argument on Sec. 19 of AXII (anti-trust)

o o o

Under warrant (color of legal authority) Devoting it to public use Substantially oust the owner and deprive him off all beneficial enjoyment of the same

ISAE V QUISUMBING (2000) RD: People who work with substantially equal qualification, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. equal pay for equal work
Notes: As a general rule, private sector could be discriminatory, subject only to their Board. However, this case was a labor dispute where the Department of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction which eventually reached the Supreme Court on Certiorari (Rule 65).

FIRST: ENTRY o By virtue of the lease agreement SECOND: MORE THAN A MOMENTARY PERIOD o Period of 1 year, renewable from year to year o The entry was merely temporary and transitory Over the intent inferred from the stipulation that RP should return land in the same condition BUT still allowed permanent structures to be erected thereon o Contemporaneous and subsequent acts If RP really intended to take the land in 1947, it shouldve expropriated it thenit didnt need to enter into lease contract o Mere notice (much less implied notice) of intention to expropriate the lands in the future does not bind the landowner, nor bind the land itself. Expropriation must be commenced in court THIRD: WARRANT OR COLOR OF LEGAL AUTHORITY FOURTH: DEVOTED TO PUBLIC USE o Used by the AFPconsidered public use FIFTH: OUST AND DEPRIVE OWNER OF BENEFITS o Castellvi remained the owner of the property Occupation was provisionalhad to be renewed yearly o Castellvi received monthly rentals CONCLULSION: Taking did NOT commence in 1947 o A lease on a year to year basis cannot give rise to a permanent right to occupy o The right of eminent domain may NOT be exercise simply by leasing the premises to be expropriated o Republic did not need to enter into a simulated contract of leaseIt already had the power of expropriation Real purpose: to get a cheaper price o Sec 4, Rule 67 [RoC]. just compensation it to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint o when the expropriation coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint just compensation must be determined as of the date of the filing Compensation must be determined as of 1959 NOT 1947 Same with Gozun property

EMINENT DOMAIN REPUBLIC V VDA. DE CASTELLVI Taking (Elements) o Entering upon private property o For more than a momentary period

Other issue: WoN the recommended price of P10/sqm is just compensation The lands in question are residentialsteps taken to develop the same prior to the filing The provisional value is DIFFERENT from the fair value o Tentativeonly serves as basis for the immediate occupancy HOWEVER Commissioners recommendation value was too high o Report not binding; merely advisory o Fair value reduced to P5/sqm Held: Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Lands declared expropriated for public use Fair market value is P5/sqm RP must pay Castellvi and Gozun o Respective value of the land o Minus provisional value already received o With 6% interest from the day of the deposit of the provisional value until full payment Attorneys lien is enforced Costs to RP

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DE KNECTH V CA RD: REPUBLIC V TAGLE (1998) RD: Expropriation of real property is not the mere physical entry, occupation, or possession of land but also includes the bundle of legal rights of ownership to completely own the property.
Relevant Law: E.O. 1035, Sec. 7 states that is the ministerial duty of courts to issue a writ of possession within 5 days from deposit of 10% of just compensation payable. Brief Background: CMDC (govt) rented land of Benitez. After expiration of Lease Contract, negotiations were held for sale. Benitez agreed and agreed that payment of rentals would cease, but when CMDC prepared Deed of Absolute, Benitez did not sign. After 5 years, Benitez demanded arrears in rentals and for CMDC to vacate the property within 30 days. She also filed an unlawful detainer suit. As a result, CMDC had to file a suit for Eminent Domain after depositing the provisional value of the land. The Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was initially issued but Judge Tagle subsequently reversed himself upon Benitez motion for reconsideration. His reason for quashing the issued writ was because CMDC was already occupying said land. Disposition: SC reversed the ruling of Judge Tagle; quashing the writ is void for being with grave abuse of discretion.

re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." 1. Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes 2. Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as heinous 3. Congress, in enacting the death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." RA 7659 (Mandatory Death Penalty Law) defines heinous crimes as grievous, odious and hateful offenses and by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. RA 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. RA 7659 (in pari materia with the RPC), death penalty may be imposed when: 1. aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime. 2. other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which characterize the same as heinous Infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime -> legislative need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient that RA7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

ECHEGARAY V SECRETARY RD: Standards for cruelty: (1) Punishment for an offense (2) Ordinary perception of the community
Dissents: Implementing mechanism of Lethal Injection Law is extraordinary, mother law is unconstitutional

NPC V HENSON RD: Indirect expropriation amounts to removing an ownership right which partakes some expectation on the property.
Court to determine public use: 1. WON it can expropriate 2. WON property to be taken is for public use 3. WON there is just compensation Public use net benefit to the entire public Public necessity no other means for the government

By: A2012 (Compiled by Constitutional Law 2 Digest Group) raibantol.edsiebuado.judithbunyideleon.jessacedeno.angelafelicia. angelasandalo.rongarcia.loumacabodbod.kristoffermadrid.

DIDIPIO RD: Taking by means of mining concessions entered into by the government can be ruled upon by the court upon showing of an actual case.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT PEOPLE V ECHEGARAY RD: RA 7659 (Mandatory Death Penalty Law) defines heinous crimes as grievous, odious and hateful offenses and by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
(1951 case of Climaco) As long as the penalty remains in the statute books and as long as our own criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. (reiterated in People v. Veneracion) Art. III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution vests in Congress the power to