Zulueta vs.

Court of Appeals Case Digest
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martin’s secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin’s passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable” is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.” Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible “for any purpose in any proceeding.” The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Kyllo v. United States
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1986. that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard from a low-flying airplane. Holding: A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he puts up a fence around his yard. The police used the device to gather evidence to support issuance of a search warrant for the home. The ? tried to keep his actions private. They also signed affidavits about what they saw.View this case and other resources at: Citation. by using a thermal imaging device from outside the home. The use of a device by the government. Facts: Cops received an anonymous tip that ? was growing weed in his backyard. 27. with the naked eye. This was used to get a search warrant and found 73 weed plants. BUT REGARDLESS. 2038. but obtained the proof needed for probable cause from flying a plane over his backyard to see the marijuana growing without a search warrant. Ed. The police obtained evidence of a marijuana growing operation inside the defendant. Issue: Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when he puts up a fence around his yard. which is not generally used by the public. 121 S. police used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat radiating from the defendant’s home. Ciraolo United States Supreme Court. Cops flew a plane in public airspace over his house and photographed his weed. 533 U. . with the naked eye. but it is disputable whether this included from the sky. 150 L. but police observe. 8 ILRD 37 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. With this information. 2d 94. since his fence did not have a roof. police obtained a search warrant for the home. Issue. Procedure: Lower courts ruled that this was an unreasonable search and seizure for the ?. that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard from a low-flying airplane. Statement of the Case: The State is prosecuting marijuana-grower. Ciraolo. Does the use of a device by the government to obtain evidence from a constitutionally protected area without physical intrusion constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution? Summary of California v. but police observe.S. Upon suspicion that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Ct. to obtain evidence from inside a home is a presumptively unreasonable search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (”Constitution”). He had a 10 foot fence surrounding his yard. for growing marijuana. Facts. 1. Procedural Result: Judgment reversed for State. Kyllo’s (the “defendant”) home. Reasoning: The 2 part test from Katz is tested in this case.

35. The State petitioned for review.  The reasonable risk to privacy from a commercial or recreational aircraft is almost nonexistent. 108 S. 2d 30 (1988) Brief Fact Summary. 2. 2.” 1. The California Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of charges on the ground that the California Constitution declared such searches as unconstitutional. 4.  Physical trespass did not occur. 100 L. the nature of the use to which the area is put. Even if he has taken some kind of measure to stop vision of the property. but the line between the two is minimal. In this case. 4. Dissent:  The majority depends on the idea that airspace is public property.  Common law distinguishes curtilage from open fields. Therefore. who glanced down. with the naked eye. California v. it is not off limits if it is freely visible. Ct. the precautions taken to exclude others from the area. any member of the public flying in the airspace. 3.  Curtilage has been considered part of the home itself. that is fair game. area’s proximity to the home. Area within the property of the ? is not automatically barred from police observation. 2. but it was still a search without a warrant. 3. Curtilage (land considered part of the home) is defined by: 1. Additional Points:  No reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to open fields.S. was arrested for narcotics trafficking based upon evidence obtained as a result of a police search of his trash. this observation would not have been made. The respondent. and thus should be considered so as to be protected more carefully than other pieces of property. Greenwood (the “respondent”). so since you can see the drugs from public property. Greenwood Share on facebookShare on emailShare on print|More Sharing ServicesMore View this case and other resources at: Citation.Part 2 of the test is “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the 4th Amendment. could have seen everything the officers observed BY THE NAKED EYE. the existence of an enclosure around the area. 1625. . 486 U. Ed. and but for the actions of police trying to observe. his expectation of privacy is unreasonable.

Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. HELD: NO An extension tel. People vs. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Respondent posted bail.Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). the mere act of listening . The Superior Court dismissed the charges stating that warrantless searches of trash violated the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. This demand was heard by Atty. in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. users. An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment constitutional protection unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable. intercepting. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage. on WON an extension tel.000 from him. persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate. 120515 April 13. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. Atty. and a search warrant was issued to search the respondent’s house based upon that evidence. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. through punishment. Aruta 288 SCRA 626 G. dictagraph.R. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. The police asked the regular trash collector to gather the respondent’s trash and keep it separate from the other trash in the neighborhood. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8. and the California Supreme Court denied the State’s petition for review. by their very nature. A second search of the respondent’s trash was conducted and again a search warrant was issued in which more narcotics were found in the house. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because. so that it might be examined for evidence of narcotics trafficking. T he Court of Appeals affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The police continued to receive reports of narcotics trafficking at the respondent’s house. complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti. they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping. conversation. Issue. Police with the Laguna Beach Police Department received information that the respondent might be trafficking narcotics. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone. The tel. Facts. No. Aruta Case Digest People vs. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. 1998 . 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case. Furthermore. The respondent was again arrested. Consequently. IAC. Whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable? Gaanan v. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent. Evidence was found in the garbage.Synopsis of Rule of Law. or other devices enumerated in Sec. Since Atty. or recording a tel. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Police searched the respondent’s house and arrested him after discovering narcotics.

Seizure of evidence in "plain view. when she was later on arrested by the police. The next day. when the informer pointed out who “Aling Rosa” was.Facts: On Dec. no search warrant was presented. 4. the latter handed it out to the police. Highly regulated by the government. 6. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash katutak”. the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items." the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag. Instead of presenting its evidence. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972 Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. 13. 1988. P/Lt. Customs search. 3. the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie “Balweg”. Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence 2. Also. Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law: 1. 5. In her testimony. the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity. (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are. at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12. Stop and Frisk. Consented warrantless search. When Abello asked “aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag. . The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. 7. Search of a moving vehicle.

there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested. Cabanlas. The pertinent facts of the present case are as follows: > Atty. the present petition. The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. the application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village. Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence. ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuza’s motion to quash Search Warrant 958. Cebu . Hence. during the search.The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime. the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5. 1995.who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the same applicant) >Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27. > On August 22. she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. People vs Estrada (296 SCRA 383) PEOPLE VS ESTRADA FACTS: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products. 1995 which was served the next day. Respondent judge granted Lanyza’s motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. . The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag. However. The present petition stated that. Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the search warrant is illegal and null and void. Chief of the Legal. Talisay.000-meter compound containing at least 15 structures. Mabolo.

No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured.. the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. The said warehouse is . 516 San Jose de la Montana St.Held: There are. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. as in the present case — and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged — for instance. the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In the case at bar. however. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application. two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Mabolo. Secondly. Cebu City. 41. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities. we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs. We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant. Firstly. the absence of a license required by law. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant. considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 38 within the same compound.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. 76 L. the police obtained a search warrant. With this sketch as the guide. 462 U. 2317. 103 S. wherever and whenever it is feasible. Facts. offices. 213. weapons and other contraband in the defendants’ home and automobile.. Where an anonymous tip is corroborated with actual police findings. workshops. 410 (1969). Cebu City. The police. which is violative of the constitutional requirement. it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound.S. 2d 527 (1983) Brief Fact Summary. Cebu City. Ct. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. The police received an anonymous letter outlining specific details about the Defendants. weapons and other contraband in the defendants’ automobile and home. following up on the tip. Within the same compound are residences of other people. the police found drugs. When the details were corroborated by the defendants’ actions. plans to traffic drugs from Florida to Illinois. Gates and others (the “defendants”). Ed. Illinois v. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Mabolo. The police received a highly detailed anonymous tip that the defendants were trafficking drugs. 393 U.owned by a different person. Gates Share on facebookShare on emailShare on print|More Sharing ServicesMore View this case and other resources at: Citation. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (”Constitution”) requires no more than a finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a “substantial basis” that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing. a “totality of the circumstances” approach is an appropriate way of determining probable cause instead of using the twopronged test of “veracity/reliability” and “basis of knowledge” from Spinelli v. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St. the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant. May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of the informer’s “basis of knowledge” if the information contained in the tip is corroborated with police findings? . factories and warehouse. Thus. it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St. Mabolo. United States. observed the defendants conducting specific activities which were outlined in the tip.. On the basis of the tip and the defendants’ corroborating activities.S. police obtained a search warrant and found drugs. Upon execution of the warrant. 28 In the present case. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Issue.

The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes. FEB. by means of a note. When a court decides whether or not to issue a search warrant. Police cannot use findings of an illegal search to substantiate a previously issued warrant. Since some of the anonymous tips were not corroborated and actually proved false. and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge Ruiz. he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. -The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. After the session had adjourned. BACHE & CO. So long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Dissent. and thereafter. “Basis of knowledge” cannot fully be supported solely on the basis that some factual assertions corroborate with actual police findings. an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon. To sufficiently uphold Fourth Amendment rights. a valid warrant could still have been issued because the defendants’ actions were suspicious. and Frederick E. . Even if the factual findings by police were only corroborated by innocuous behavior. -In the afternoon of the following day. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s letter -request. Concurrence. RUIZ (GR 32409. De Leon and his witness.Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vera wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. the Fourth Amendment is not violated. an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon. that the informant is credible and the information was obtained in a reliable manner. (Phil.“Credibility/reliability” and “basis of knowledge” of an informant are very relevant in determining the value of a tip.). magistrates must look at both the “credibility/reliability” and “basis of knowledge” of the informant. went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. HELD: . Discussion. Judge Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis. Aguilar and the elaboration in Spinelli sets forth the analysis magistrates should follow on determinations of probable cause.Held. the elements of the informant’s “credibility/reliability” and “basis of knowledge” are to be used as guides when considering the “totality of the circumstances” and are not to be exclusive requirements applied in every case. a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed. ISSUE: WON the search warrant is valid. VS. so. These elements alone do not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether probable cause exists. Search Warrant was then signed by the judge and accordingly issued. 27. Seggerman for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. based upon the suspects’ actions. the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation. 1971) Digest FACTS: . The main focus should be whether there is an inference. he could be charged for perjury. Arturo Logronio. 3 days later (a Saturday). Inc. Judge Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. the informant’s “credibility/reliability” was undermined and therefore the warrant should not have been issued. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co.At that time Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case.

therefore. in the full view of the witnesses. RATIO: There was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The participation of the judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the search was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes. Instead. Sec. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated." and only bec. standing alone. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. (Mata v. the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. In any case. to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury. by their own personal info.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. This cannot be considered a personal examination. or why his presence was not noticed at all. Lastly. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the record. and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness.’ Not satisfied with this qualification. who both claimed to be "intelligence informers. necessary for the witnesses themselves. that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific of fense. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. if he knew and understood the same. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself. he did not ask his own searching questions. By his own accounts. personally known to him. Gonzales. the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. His application. The judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. 145 SCRA 687 (1986) F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. and Seggerman. to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. It was. except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. Next. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND . together w/ the affidavit presented to him. or if the acts related were really done openly. all that resp.Search warrant is invalid. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. or whether it was on the first floor or second floor. but this is not entirely true. to establish the applicant''s claims. judge did was question Capt. judge on 5/10/84. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp.." shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits. was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be searched Roan v. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. As ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants. that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. or how far he was from the window. Depositions were taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. judge. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida. however." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. Bayona. RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. It is correct to say. the Court added thereto a paragraph. 4 of the ROC. considering that these acts were against the law. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered.

to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNAEvidence (DNA Rules). and Umanito. had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a childhereinafter identified as "BBB. We do not agree. AAA.By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant. the Courtdeemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB.Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990. The [NBI] is. it can now be determined with reasonablecertainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted andovercome by other evidence (Rule 131.The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did notobject to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) norpresented evidence to rebut the same. Section 3). and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50. andthat no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed tothe parties in Court.Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts. RUFINO UMANITO G.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB. ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB]. That based on the above findings.R. showed that there is a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]. 2009 FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. RULING: Court resolved. the Court sees no reason to denyUmanito s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. for the very first time. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. and that as testified to by AAA. todetermine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED . Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape. No.The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA]. nine months after the day she said she wasraped by Umanito. The defense admitted that if thevalue of the Probability of Paternity is 99.MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito. there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA testresults.9% or higher. [BBB]. 172607 April 16. who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaran PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. there is a99. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities.With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology." In view of that fact. therefore.The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other informationobtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused hasbeen acquitted or served his sentence.00.000.

CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. Anent the first defense. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure —a peace officer or a private person may. in accordance with settled jurisprudence. and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Issues: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently. He had no papers. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) ? Search of moving vehicle ? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12. On Dec. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner. 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. 2010 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Furthermore. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. is actually committing. The court begs to disagree. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm. 2. (c) evidence immediately apparent. 4 months. 3.380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 4. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)] November 10. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: ? Seizure of evidence in “plain view. 1992. . without a warrant. the pieces of evidence are admissible. or is attempting to commit an offense. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. two requisites must be established. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms.38 caliber revolver Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. viz. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized. the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule No. arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed. the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo 3. Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. to carry the subject firearms No. any objection. 1994. petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the .” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and.357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition 2. petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt. Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26. defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there. . 5. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. Because arrest was legal. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. 6 live double action ammo of . He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City.

38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. Moreover. Lastly. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law. Nolasco vs Hon. the Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. On this score. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. the constitutionality of P. petitioner’s purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. Indeed. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden. not a doubtful and argumentative implication. The contentions do not merit serious consideration.corresponding license or permit to possess. to 18 yrs. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom. it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context” and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P. respondent court can not be faulted for applying P. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. 3. Case Digest Nolasco vs Pano By maechmedina Cynthia P. we note. hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession via a valid warrantless search.D. To justify nullification of the law. Ernani Cruz Pano . In fact. efficacy or morality of laws. the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported b y a certification as required by the March 5. is to interpret and apply the laws Held: WHEREFORE. petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D. the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0. As to the second element. 1866 no longer exists. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution Anent his third defense. ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous averment. which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). 8 months & 1 day. 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. as maximum. Furthermore. People v. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. it should be stressed.D. as min. The penalty for simple possession of firearm. we reiterate. we lift from respondent court’s incisive observation. was not convincingly discharged. premises considered. And until its repeal. every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. identified and offered in evidence during trial. as in this case. the decision of the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT t hat petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to “10 yrs & 1 day.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently. the penalties therein were taken from the RPC.

taken also were a portable typewriter.CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID. Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularly the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness. DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D.. RATIONALE: The Search Warrant does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are. POLLO. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal? HELD: The search warrant is of General. Ernani Cruz Pano. Col. particularly connected to MV Karagatan / Pena Andrea cases. applied for search warrant from the respondent Hon. 2011BRICCIO "Ricky" A. papers and other records of the communist party of the Philippines / New People’s Army and or the National Democratic Front. . There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as. 33. it was hereby annulled by set aside. Virgilio Saldajeno. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION. G. Respondents.vs. a searched was conducted. The City Fiscal information for violation of PD No. DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA. CASTILLO. what are the manuals not otherwise available to the public certain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. Petitioner. DIRECTOR IVLYDIA A. Mere generalization will not suffice and odes not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.R. No. such as Minutes of the Party Philippines. 181881 October 18. thus. Quezon City On the same day. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials. and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. Ct. in fact.FACTS: Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street. after a month of “round the clock” surveillance of the premises as a “suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA”. Disputed Search Warrant: Documents.

FactsThis case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. and certainly against commonhuman experience.Issuelegality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge andconsent. and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity. That thesedraft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the oneresponsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control anddisposition. papers. alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy. the CSC-NCR. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shallissue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Thenumber of pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on behalves of parties. the CSC-Central Office or othertribunals.Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with administrativecases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. houses. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly.RulingThe right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guaranteeagainst unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2. 28 . who are facing charges asrespondents in administrative cases. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the personsor things to be seized. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any consideration. one of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. IV. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons.The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches andseizures.deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the centralpersonnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. and in fact. 27 which provides:Sec.

and (3) whether theemployee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item. and hardly had anytimefor himself alone. and the persons or things to be seized." These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objectiveprongs of the reasonableness inquiry. did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked. where the employee used apassword on his computer. drafting cases on appeals. and we consider the two questions together. worded as follows:"The right of the people to be secure in their persons.unknown people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD. houses. that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer. He described his office as "full of people. and particularly describingthe place to be searched. his friends. 44 Thus. in charge of accomplishment report. Mart i 29 :Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935Charter which. he is "personallyassisting incoming clients. Correction of name.But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand. 45 We answer the first in the negative. to be determined by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent otheremployees from accessing his computer files. accreditation of service. associates and even unknown people. it isessential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. Article III) In this inquiry. Petitioner did not allege that hehad a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone. the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employee’s relationship to the item seized. Public Sector Unionism. As the Court declared inPeople v. he submits that being in the public assistance office of theCSC-ROIV. whom he evenallowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request.Mamamayan Muna Program. or that his office was always locked and not open toother employees or visitors." (Sec. papers and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures shall not be violated. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacyeither in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. receiving documents. and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause. he had a legitimateexpectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment . 1[3]. he normally would have visitors in his office like friends. (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized." 46 . On the contrary.

08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by NationalPower Corporation (NAOCOR). Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggledgoods. Laguna. of 28 June 1989. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which wereturned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan. The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued atP55. . With Caballes’ consent.45. On 27 April 1993. he did not answer.Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan PoliceStation. 6713. Victorino Noceja and Pat.m. Sgt. Caballes vs.A. 15 January 2002] First Division. but he appeared pale andnervous. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an informationdated 16 October 1989. In fine. a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter. Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence. spotted a passenger jeepunusually covered with “kakawati” leaves. Caballes appealed thedecision by certiorari. it can hardly be deducedthat petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. In a resolutiondated 9 November 1998. finding Caballes. the trial court denied Caballes’ motion for reconsideration. no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSC’s ruling that petitioner is guilt yof grave misconduct. Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. dishonesty. the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.244. Court of Appeals [GR 136292. and violation of R. Issue: Whether Caballes’ passive submission to the statement of Sgt. When asked what was loaded on the jeep. Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: About 9:15 p. Laguna rendered judgment. No. Pagsanjan. Noceja that the latter “willlook at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive” be considered as waiver onCaballes’ part on warrantless search and seizure. Thegravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessorypenalties. trial onthe merits ensued. the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. Caballes was incarceratedfor 7 days in the Municipal jail. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes yTaiño.Under this scenario. Alex de Castro. whileon a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that theycame from Cavinti. During the arraignment. pursuant to existing rules and regulations. Laguna.

namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12. For all intents and purposes. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2). whatconstitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question. WhenCaballes’ vehicle was flagged down. It is notcontroverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by asearch warrant. according tothem. none exists in the present case. nay. Unfortunately. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. was unusual and uncommon. Further. (4) consented warrantless search. the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtainedthe consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. Also.determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved.Article III thereof. it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed tosearch the vehicle of Caballes. as defined under Section 2. and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a validsearch or seizure. they were informing. including the purpose of thesearch or seizure. the police authorities donot claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner wascarrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion. The constitutional proscriptionagainst warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions. or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant. the presence or absence of probable cause. lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see thecable wires. the manner in which the search andseizure was made.(3) search of moving vehicles. They had to reach insidethe vehicle. The mere mobility of these vehicles. Herein. (6) stop andfrisk situations (Terry search). Rule126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence. In addition. the police officers did notmerely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes’ vehicle.” By uttering those words. does not give the police officersunlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within theinterior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because itis not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable cause”as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. imposingupon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches. Article III of the Constitution barsthe admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right.Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures. Noceja approached Caballes and “told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive. In cases wherewarrant is necessary. (2) seizure of evidence in plain view. The “consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of . Sgt. the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Courtmust be complied with. however. Caballes’ vehicle wasflagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious whenthey saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which. (5) customs search.

the constitutional guaranty. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence. Inaddition. for the consent of the accused to besearched. the remaining evidence on record are insufficient to sustain Caballes’ conviction. His guilt can only be established without violatingthe constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure . in no uncertain terms. Neither can Caballes’ passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantlesssearch. in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search. it will be noted thatthe police authorities expressly asked.

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