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CCFD1SafetyCulture 1 AssessmentoftheOrganizationSafetyCulture Of ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1 KennethHorn PortlandStateUniversity Submittedto: MasamiNishishiba,PhD MatthewJones,PhD June8,2010

CCFD1SafetyCulture 2 Abstract TheresearchproblemwastheClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1hadtaken significantactionstoaddressthereductionoffirefighterinjuries.Thisefforthas includedthecreationofawellnessandfitnessgroupandafulltimeSafetyOfficer; however,therehasneverbeenanassessmentoftheorganizationalsafetyculture withintheClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1(CCFD1).SafetyCultureisconsidered fundamentalwithinthefirecommunityinregardstofirefightersafety.Thisconcept isreflectiveinthe16FirefighterLifeSafetyInitiatives.ThePurposeofthisstudyis toreducetheinjuryratewithintheFireDistrict.Threehypothesesweretestedto helpidentifysafetyculturerelatedconcepts.Thethreehypothesesincluded:(1)In ClackamasFire,therearedistinct,identifiablesubculturesthatarerelatedtosafety. (2)FirefightersatClackamasFiretendtovalueefficiencyandeffectivenessover safety.(3)FirefightersatClackamasFirewilltendtovalueindividualaccountability oversafety.Descriptiveresearchmethodsincludedasurveymadeavailabletoall membersofClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1.Theresultsindicatedapositive safetyculturewithinCCFD1.Theresultssuggestedthereareidentifiablesubgroups relatedtosafetywithintheorganization,firefighters,undervaryingsituationswill tendtovalueefficiencyandeffectivenessoversafetyandlastly,theresultsdidnot supportthatfirefighterswillvalueindividualaccountabilityoversafety.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 3 TABLEOFCONTENTS Abstract.2 TableofContents3 Introduction...7 BackgroundandSignificance......8 LiteratureReview..19 Method......28 Results...32 Discussion...55 Recommendations.61 ReferenceList...69 Tables Table1(ResearchKeyQuestions)....29 Table2(ResponsebyDivision)..33 Table3(ComparisonofScoresbyDivision)...34 Table4(MeanScoresbyYearsofService)..35 Table5(03YearsofServicescoresbyDimension)..35

CCFD1SafetyCulture 4 Table6(48YearsofServicescoresbyDimension).....36 Table7(915YearsofServicescoresbyDimension)...36 Table8(16+YearsofServicescoresbyDimension)....37 Table9(ComparisonofResponsestoMeanScores,NorthBattalion)...39 Table10(ComparisonofResponsestoMeanScores,SouthBattalion)....40 Table11(TotalMeanScoreofallStations).41 Table12(Station1DimensionScores)..41 Table13(Station2DimensionScores)..41 Table14(Station3DimensionScores)..42 Table15(Station4DimensionScore)42 Table16(Station5DimensionScores)..42 Table17(Station6DimensionScores)..42 Table18(Station8DimensionScores)..43 Table19(Station9DimensionScores)..43 Table20(Station10DimensionScores)...43 Table21(Station11DimensionScores)...43 Table22(Station15DimensionScores)...44

CCFD1SafetyCulture 5 Table23(Station16DimensionScores)...44 Table24(Station17DimensionScores)...44 Table25(VolunteerStations12&13DimensionScores).44 Table26(Hypotheses2Scores).49 Table27(Hypotheses3Scores).50 Table28(ResultsofOpenendedQuestions).....52 Table29(ComparisonofStudyResults)...56 Table30(H3MeanScoreComparison).60 Figures Figure1(ModelofReciprocalDeterminism).16 Figure2(MeanScoresbyStation)38 Figure3(MeanScoresbyDivision)..46 Appendixes AppendixA(SurveyQuestions)..72 AppendixB(InterviewQuestions)...75 AppendixC(RadarGraphsofMeanScorebyDivision)...76

CCFD1SafetyCulture 6 Appendix AppendixD(RadarGraphsofMeanScorebyStation).....79 AppendixE(RadarGraphsofMeanScoresbyYearsofService)...85 AppendixF(ResponsestoOpenEndedSurveyQuestions)......87 AppendixG(GraphofOpenEndedQuestions).96 AppendixH(GraphofInterviewQuestions)..97

CCFD1SafetyCulture 7 Introduction ClackamasCountyFireDistrict(CCFD)#1hasbeenmakingeffortsto

constantlyidentifyproblemsanddevelopsolutionsthroughorganizationalpolicy formationtoassuresafety.Understandingtheorganizationalcultureandemployee responsestosafetypolicychangesiscriticalforeffectiveimplementationofsuch policiesandprocedures.Itisimperativetounderstandhowsafetyisvaluedwithin theorganizationandhowindividualbehaviorinfluencestheadherencetosafety policiesandprocedures. Thepurposeofthisstudyistoidentifyanddefinetheorganizationalsafety

cultureinCCFD#1andunderstandhowitinfluencestheimplementationofsafety policiesandproceduresthroughouttheorganization.Furthermore,thestudy intendstoidentifythedegreeinwhichfirefightersvaluesafetywhileperforming theirduties.TheresponsesfromaculturalsafetysurveyadministeredtoallFire Districtemployeeswereusedtoaddressthreeresearchquestionsrelatedtosafety. Inaddition,aseriesofinterviewswithemployeesrepresentingacrosssectionofthe organizationwasconductedtoobtainadditionalqualitativeinformationtohelp interprettheresultsofthesurvey.Byexaminingbothquantitativeandqualitative data,thisstudyattemptedtoexplicatetheintricaciesoftheorganizationalculture relatedtotheimplementationofsafetypolicies,procedures,andpractices.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 8 BackgroundandSignificanceoftheStudy EachyearintheUnitedStates,approximately100firefightersdieintheline

ofdutyandthousandsmoreareinjured.Thistrendhasdeclinedsincethe1970s, yetfirefighterfatalitiesper100,000fireincidentshaveactuallybeenonthe increase.Since2005,thenumberoffirefighterfatalitieshasrisenfrom2.81to3.86 per100,000incidentsin2008,a37%increase(U.S.FireAdministration,2009).In 2008,therateofinjuriesper1000firesis25.2,upfrom23.3in1981.(Karter,Molis, 2009)Thisincreaseisdespitemanyadvancesinfirefightingsafetyequipment, trainingandearlydetection. Firefighterinjuriesanddeathshaveasignificantimpactonorganizations,

families,andthecommunity.Thepriceispaidwiththelivesofthefirefighters,their families,andthedollarsandresourcesofthetaxpayers.Theactualcostisdifficultto determinesincetherearemanyvariables,howevertheNationalInstituteof StandardsandTechnology(NIST)producedareportin2005attemptingtoputa costtofirefighterdeathsandinjuries.Dataforthis2005studywasnot comprehensiveandmanyofthesourceswereunqualified,howevertheestimates arestillconsideredcrediblebytheauthors.Theestimateswerebasedon:costs associatedwithovertime,investigations,physicalfitnessprograms,losttimefrom work,preventionrelatedcosts(NIST,2005).Accordingtothe2001data,inOregon, theaverageclaimforanonthejobinjurywas$8,389.00.Duringtheyear2009, ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1had16casesinvolvingfirefighterinjuriesthat resultedindaysawayfromwork.Thisresultedinapproximately114shifts

CCFD1SafetyCulture 9 (24hourshifts)missedfromwork,whichalsoresultedinapproximately $114,000.00inovertime,notincludingrollups,rehabtime,investigations,and administrativetime(OSHA300recordsfromCCFD12009). InMarchof2004,theleadershipoftheAmericanFireServiceassembledin

Tampa,Floridaanddiscussedtheissueoffirefightersafety,specifically,howto preventlineofdutydeaths.Asaresultofthismeeting,the16FirefighterSafety Initiativesweredeveloped.Thegoaloftheseinitiativeswastoreducethenumberof firefighterdeathsby25%withinthefirstfiveyearsand50%within10years.These 16safetyinitiativesprovidedthefireserviceablueprintforchangeinsafetyculture andpractices.Thefirstoftheseinitiativeswasto:Defineandadvocatetheneedfor aculturalchangewithinthefireservicerelatingtosafety;incorporatingleadership, management,supervision,accountability,andpersonalresponsibility(Everyone GoesHomeInitiativeProgram,2004). SincetheintroductionoftheFirefighterSafetyInitiativesin2004,Clackamas

CountyFireDistrict#1hasimplementedseveralsafetyrelatedactionsthathavehad significant,positiveimpactsonsafetywithintheorganization.In1998,thefire districtcontractedthroughOregonHealth&ScienceUniversityforaWellness Coordinator.In2005,thedistrictbudgetedforafulltimeWellnessCoordinator.In 2005,atemporarylaborassistantwashiredandin2008,thatpositionwasmade fulltime.Lastly,in2007,afulltimesafetyofficerforthedistrictwashired.The SafetyOfficerpositionisoneofthefirstintheareaandwasconsideredasignificant commitmenttowardssafety.Despitealltheeffortstocreatesafetyrelatedpositions

CCFD1SafetyCulture 10 withintheorganizationandintroducingimprovementsinfiresafetyequipment,the injuryrateatCCFD#1sisstillcomparabletothenationalaverageof25injuriesper 1000fires.Theliteratureemphasizestheneedfororganizationstoassesstheir cultureintermsofsafetyandCCFD#1hasnotdonethis.Therearesomeanecdotes thatseemtosuggestthatthereisadisassociationbetweensafetyrelated policies/proceduresandtheactualpractice.Astheliteratureonorganizational culturesuggest,theresistancetoadoptorcloselyfollowsafetypoliciesand proceduresmaybeduetohowanorganizationanditssubgroupsvaluesafety.On thesurface,CCFD#1appearstobemovingtowardsenhancingsafety,however,at thedeeperlevel,CCFD#1mayneedtofurtherunderstandanddefineitscultureand howitrelatestosafety.Muchofthereviewedliteraturesuggeststhefireservice mustaddresstheorganizationalcultureiftheyaretobesuccessfulinimplementing newsafetyrelatedpoliciesandprocedures.IndustriessuchasNuclearPower, Chemical,andOilandGasoperateinahighriskenvironment,andtheyhavemade somesignificantimprovementsinsafetyperformancebyutilizingtheconceptof organizationalculture(Pessemier,2008).TheFireServicemustlooktothese industriesandthescienceofsafetyinordertoaddresssafetycultureandcultural changewithinourownhighriskorganization.Muchoftheresearchassociatedwith highriskindustriesshowsapositiverelationshipbetweenthesafetyperformance andthesafetycultureofanorganization. Jones(2000)suggeststhatitisourdeepconnectiontoourhistoryasa

professionthatmakessafetyculturewithinthefireservicesodifficulttochange.We havebenefitedfromtheprestigethatiscloselyrelatedtothesacrificesofourfellow

CCFD1SafetyCulture 11 firefightersandperhapsstillvalueprestigeoversafety.Itmaybeourpropensity towardsunsafeactsthatisexacerbatedbyourhistoryasrisktakers.Ifweasan organizationattempttomakechangesthatarenotcongruentwithorganizational values,itwillbemetwithsignificantresistance.Pessemier,(2008)Wiegmann, Douglas,Zhang,VonThaden,Sharma,andGibbins(2004)alsopointoutthatto changeorganizationalculture,onemustalsochangetheimageofthatorganization asviewedbyitsmembersbothinternallyandexternally. Harvey,Erdos,Bolan,Cox,andGregory(2002)suggestthattherearesub

culturesrelatedtosafetywithinanorganizationandthatthesesubculturesmay differfromtheoverallorganizationalculture.TheresultsofastudybyHarvey,etal (2002),alsosuggestthatsubgroupsorculturesrelatedtosafetycouldbeidentified withintheorganization.Wong,Desai,Madsen,Roberts,andCiavarelli(2005)state thatmanymanagersarelikelytobeawareofsafetyriskswithintheirorganization however,theyarelesslikelytounderstandtheinfluenceofthesafetycultureover individualbehaviorsanddifferencesintermsofsafetypractices. ItisreasonabletoassumethatwithinClackamasCountyFireDistrict,there

willbeseveralidentifiablesubculturesdefinedasgroupswithdifferingvaluesor perceptionsrelatedtosafety.Withinthesesubcultures,safetymaybevalued differentlythantheoverallorganization.Ifthisisthecase,thenitisimportantto identifythesesubculturesinordertodeterminemeasuresthatspecificallyaddress differentvaluesystemsinthesesubculturesandtoreducetherateofinjuries. Furthermore,howanorganizationdevelopsandimplementsitssafetypoliciesand

CCFD1SafetyCulture 12 procedureswillhaveanaffectonhowwelltheyarefollowed.Ifthisprocessis disconnectedfromsafetyvalues,thenitislikelytobeineffectiveincreatingasafe environment.Manning(2007,P.1)suggeststhedisconnectbetweensafetypolicies andpracticesoccursatfivelevels.Theselevelsinclude: 1. Culturalchangebeingviewedasathreat. 2. Unsafebehaviorsandattitudesallowedbecausetheyareviewedas tradition. 3. Safetyandmissionwithinorganizationalculturesareunbalanced. 4. Thevoicesofsafetyleadershiphavebeeneithersubconsciouslymuffledor consciouslysubdued. 5. Thelessonsfrombehavioralsafetysciencehavenotbeenembracedbyfire serviceleaders,muchlessblendedintoeverydayoperations. Iftheorganizationdoesnotattempttounderstandanddefineitsown

organizationalsafetyculture,thentheupwardtrendofincreasedinjurieswilllikely continue.Understandingorganizationalculturewillhelpprepareforexternal influencesthatmayaffecttheworkplaceculture.Forexample,thenextgeneration toentertheworkforcemayhaveahigherpropensitytowardsrisktaking(Manning, 2002).Thosewillingtotakeriskswithoutregardtopersonalsafetycould dramaticallyinfluencethesafetyclimateofanorganizationandovertime,affectthe culture.Ifthistypeofbehaviorispermittedtoseepintotheexistingsafetyculture, thefireserviceandperhapsthedistrictcanexpectasignificantriseinfirefighter

CCFD1SafetyCulture 13 deathsandinjuries.Ifthedistricthowever,managestoinstillastrongcultureof safety,theymayindeedbeabletoreachthegoalssetoutbytheEveryoneGoes HomeFireSafetyInitiatives. ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1hasaddressedmanyoftheissuesrelated

tosafetyandtheadherenceofsafetypoliciesandprocedures.Ithasmade advancementsinsafetyrelatedequipmentandtrainingrelatedtotechnicalissues routinelyencountered.Theorganizationhasalsoaddressedsafetyfromahealth andwellnessperspective.However,ithasnotattemptedtomeasurethecurrent safetyculture,andtherefore,hasnobaselinetodeterminewhetherthechanges madehaveapositiveaffectonthesafetycultureandinjuryreduction.Itistimefor thefireservicetomoveawayfromlaggingindicatorssuchastimelostdataand injuryratesandstartusingleadingindicatorssuchasthemeasurementofthe organizationalsafetyclimate(Yule&Flin,2007).Intermsofleadership,Reuchlin (2004)recommendsthatanorganizationfocusonthemacroissueofsafety, particularlywiththelevelofleadershiprequiredtocreateandchangeculture. Lastly,(Wongetal,2005,p.60)findthatunitswiththelowestsafetyclimateratings havenearlydoublethenumberofseriousaccidentsasthosethatscoreonthehigh endofthesafetyclimate.Researchrelatedtoorganizationsafetycultureisquite broadandresearchspecificallyrelatedtothefireserviceislimited.Thefoundation ofthisresearchprojectisbasedonworkcompletedbyWilliams(2006,2007)ofthe ArundelCountyFireDepartment(ret.)andWindham(2005)withtheWoodlands FireDepartmentinWoodlands,Texas.Otherrelatedfieldsincludethenuclear powerindustry,offshoredrilling,aviation,andotherhighriskindustries.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 14 Theneedfortheunderstandingandmeasuringoforganizationalsafety

cultureisillustratedwellbytheworkofWilliams(2007).Init,hedescribesthe effortsmadebytheUniversityofMaryland,CenterforFirefighterSafetyResearch andDevelopmenttoimplementvigoroussafetystandards,policiesandpractices andyet,ariseininjuryratescontinued.Whattheliteraturesuggestsisthatthe Universitymaynothavehadanunderstandingofthesafetycultureandtherefore mayhaveimplementedtheabovesafetystandards,polices,andpracticesinaway thatwasnoteffectivelyacceptedbythemembers.Thismayhelpexplainwhytheir effortshadlittleimpactoninjuryrates. TheproblemofaninadequateunderstandingoftheSafetyCulturewithin

ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1mayhaveanaffectonhowtheorganizationis abletomeetthethreeoperationalobjectivesestablishedbytheUnitedStatesFire Administration(U.S.FireAdministration,2009).Thoseobjectivesinclude:1) enhancingfirefightersafetyandreducingthelossoflifefromfirebyfirefighters,2) Promotewithinthefireservicecommunityacomprehensive,multihazardrisk reductionplantoreducethenumberofinjuriesanddeathstofirefightersand;3)to addresstheemergingissueasidentifiedbytheFirefighterLifeSafetySummitto reducethenumberoffirefighterdeathsbyestablishingamechanismtomeasure andactuponfiredepartmentsafetyculture. ThemissionstatementofClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1states:Tosafely

protectandpreservelifeandproperty(CCFD1,2009).Itispossiblethatthismission putsfirefightersatoddswithtwocompetingvalues,gettingthejobdoneasa

CCFD1SafetyCulture 15 firefighter,whichincludestakingrisks,butyetdoingitsafely.Thisinsightmay explainwhyinanorganizationthatispromotingsafetypracticesstillfailstomake significantstridesinpreventingaccidentsandinjuries. BygainingabetterunderstandingoftheorganizationalSafetyCulturewithin

ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1,wewillhavetheinformationneededtomake safetyrelateddecisionsbasedonleadingIndicatorssuchasthesafetyculture withinanorganization.LeadingIndicatorshelpgiveanorganizationan understandingofhowwellsafetyrelatedpolicesmaybeacceptedwithinthe departmentandprobabilitythatthepoliceswillhaveapositiveeffectoninjury reduction.AnOrganizationsrelianceonlaggingindicatorssuchasinjuryrates meanstheyhavetowaittodetermineifthepoliciesareeffectiveinenhancingsafety relatedpracticeswithintheorganization.Anunderstandingoftheconstructofour safetycultureandhowitinfluencesourdecisionmakingprocesswillgiveusthe abilitytoimplementsafetypoliciesandproceduresthatarenotinconflictwith currentorganizationalsafetyvalues. Safetyperformancealsodependsonothervariablessuchas:psychological,

behavioral,andsituation.InFigure1,wecanuseamodelbasedonAlbertBanduras (1977)modelofReciprocalDeterminismtoillustratetherelationshipbetweenthe threefactors.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 16

Figure1

Thepsychologicalvariablesareconsideredthebasisofculture(values,

beliefs,andattitudestowardssafety).Thebehavioralvariablesarethe competenciesoftheindividualandthepatternsofactionandbehaviors.Situational variablesincludetheorganizationalstructure,processesandsystems,aswellas externalvariablessuchasthecomplexity,context,andnatureofthework performed.Tools,Equipment,andmachinesusedinthetaskshouldalsobeincluded sinceemployeesmayconsiderthemdirectlyrelatedtosafety.(PessemierW., DevelopingaSafetyCultureintheFireService,2008).Thesethreefactorsthe psychological,behavioral,andsituationalfactorsaretheindependentvariables thatinfluencethedependantvariable,whichissafetyperformance. WhatthetheoryofReciprocalDeterminismsuggestsisthatallthreefactors

haveanequalimpactonthepersonandtheirsafetyperformance.Apersoncanhave animpactontheirsafetyenvironmentbyhowtheyimplementsafetypractices;in turn,theenvironmentcanhaveanimpactontheirbehaviorrelatedtosafety

CCFD1SafetyCulture 17 practices.Lastly,thesafetyenvironmentcanhaveanimpactonsafetyrelated policiesandprocedures.Thisunderstandingcanhelpleadersoftheorganization determineifsafetypracticesarehavinganeffectonthesafetyenvironment(fewer injuries)orthelackofinjuriesishavinganegativeeffectonsafetypractices(not followingsafetyproceduresorpractices). Pessemier(2008)andotherstendtousefirefightingactivitiesasthepointof

referencewhenrelatingtoinjuries,however,whenassessingthesafetyculture,itis importanttoincludeallworkrelatedactivitiessuchasEmergencyMedicalServices, stationactivities,andtraining.Itisquitepossiblethatanorganizationcouldvalue safetydifferentlyand,dependingontheactivity,placeadifferentvalueonthat activity. Anotherrelevantconceptthatneedstobeexploredasitrelatesto

organizationalcultureistheconceptoforganizationalidentity.Organizational identityreferstohowanorganizationseesitself,anditisthoughttobeapossible determinantofhowtheemployeesrespondtochangewithintheorganization.The organizationalidentityconsistsoftheculture(internal)andtheimage(external). Thetraditions,beliefs,norms,andassumptionsthatmakeuptheculturehelp individualsgivemeaningtotheidentityoftheorganization.Theexternalimageis howtheorganizationisviewedfromthestakeholdersorconstituents(Hatch& Shultz,2002).Ahealthyorganizationalimagemeansthatthereisprobablybalance betweentheinternalandexternalconstructsandthereforetheimageofthe organizationisseenthesamewayfromtheemployeesandtheexternal

CCFD1SafetyCulture 18 stakeholders.HatchandSchultz(2002)discussdysfunctionalaspectsofidentity, whichincludeswhentheorganizationfallsintoorganizationalnarcissism.When lookingforanexplanationastowhythefireservicehasbeenreluctanttomake neededchanges,weneedtoevaluatetheorganizationalcultureandexamineifthe organizationsuffersfromnarcissisticbehavior.Narcissisticorganizationstendto focusinwardonhowtheywishtoprojecttheirimage.Theneedsofthestakeholders areignoredandtheorganizationalidentityisplacedatriskofbeinginfluenced solelyfromtheorganizationalcultureandinternalstakeholders.Inthecontextof thefireserviceorganization,iffirefightersaremoreconcernedabouttheimagethey portray,nothowiteffectstheorganizationalstakeholders,thenpositivesafety changes,andattitudesarelikelytoremainunchanged.Asmentionedbefore,thefire servicehasbenefittedfromaheroicimage,onethatisbasedonthesacrificesof others.Thefireserviceisstilloneofthefewindustriesthatexceptinjuriesand deathaspartofthejob,whereasmanyotherhighriskindustrieshaveembraced safetyasabasicconstructoftheirculture. Ithasbecomeobviousthataddressingsafetythewaywehavedoneinthe

pastisnotworkingintermsofreducinginjuryratesinthefireservice.Fireservice culturehasbeenidentifiedasamajorinfluencetosafetyandtheadherencetosafety policiesandprocedures.Alongwithunderstandingtheorganizationalsafety culture,wemustalsoaddressconceptssuchasorganizationalidentity,andsafety relatedbehaviors.Thefireservicemusttakeacuefromotherhighriskindustries andbegintotakeascientificapproachtosafetyrelatedpractices.Thisconceptis consideredaleadingindicatorapproachandhelpsdeterminethereceptivenessan

CCFD1SafetyCulture 19 organizationistosafetyrelatedchange.Thisisachangefromthepracticeofusing laggingindicatorssuchasinjuryratestatisticstodetermineifsafetypoliciesand proceduresareworking.Itistimetomovepastthefearoflosingourfireservice identityandbegintochangeourculturetoamoresafetycentricone. LiteratureReview AdetailedliteraturereviewofmaterialrelatedtoOrganizationalSafety

Culturewasconducted.TheauthorperformedakeywordsearchoftheInternet usingtheterms:Safety,SafetyCulture,SafetyBehavior,andIndustrialSafety.The majorityoftheliteraturewasobtainedthroughtheNationalFireAcademyand PortlandStateUniversityelectroniclibraries.Asubstantialamountofliteraturewas reviewedfromotherhighriskindustriesincluding:Aviation,OffShoreDrilling, Mining,andNuclearPower.Disciplineswithintheseindustriesincludedindustrial safetyandhumanbehaviorrelatedtosafety.Therewerethreeprimarysources usedasreferencestothisproject,theyinclude:theSafetyCulturewithintheAnne ArundelCountyFireDepartment(2006),theSafetyCultureinMarylandsFireand RescueServices(2007)byAlanWilliams,andDevelopingaSafetyCultureintheFire Service(2008)byWilliamPessemier. Definitionsofsafetyculture Theliteraturereviewrevealedthatthereisnocommonoraccepted definitionoforganizationalsafetyculture.However,theliteratureemphasizedthe importanceofdevelopingagoodunderstandingoftheconceptbeforemeasuringit. TheInternationalNuclearSafetyAdvisoryGroupofInternationalAtomicenergy

CCFD1SafetyCulture 20 (IAEA)forexample,definesthesafetycultureofanorganizationastheproductof individualandgroupvalues,attitudes,competencies,andpatternsofbehavior. Anothercloselyrelateddefinitionis:thesetofvalues,beliefs,traditions,norms, attitudesandsocialpracticesetouttoreduceorminimizetheexposuretoinjuries ordangerousconditions(Ahmad&Alistair,2003).Lastly,Mearn,Flin,Gordon,& Fleming(1998)definesafetycultureasentrenchedattitudesandopinionsthata groupofpeoplesharewithrespecttosafety. Whatfactorsconstituteahighqualitysafetycultureisupfordebate.Many

organizationshaveattemptedtodefinethefactorsthatmakeupanexcellentsafety culture.TheseincludetheAdvisoryCommitteeforSafetyofNuclearInstallations (ACSNI)andtheInstitutionforOccupationalSafetyandHealth(IOSH)andtheyboth implythatthesafetydependsasmuchonthegeneralorganizationalcultureasit doesspecificallytosafetypractices.Aconsiderableamountoftheresearchhasbeen focusedonoverallorganizationalcultureandthefactorsthatcontributetoit,such as:jobsatisfaction,individualresponsibility,managementresponsibility,leadership style,communication,commitment,riskawareness,andrisktaking(Cameron& Quinn,2006).Thesestudiesalsohavepertinencetotheexplorationof organizationalsafetyculture. Someliteratureiscarefultopointoutthedifferencebetweencultureand

climate.Oftenthetwoareusedinterchangeably,yettheyarebydefinition,different. Climateshouldbethoughtofasreflectingattitudes,perceptions,andbeliefs whereascultureinvolvesvalues,traditions,andnorms(Harvey,Bolem,Cox,&

CCFD1SafetyCulture 21 Gregory,2002).Anorganizationsclimatemaychangedependingoneventsor changeswithintheorganization.Forexample,duringunioncontractnegotiations theclimatemaymodifydependingonhowwelltheprocessisadvancing.A significantinjurytoamembermayalsohaveadetectableeffectontheclimateofthe organization,yetneitheroftheseeventswouldlikelyhaveanimmediateeffecton thesafetyculture.Itispossiblethatovertimeclimatewillhaveaninfluenceover culturalchange. SafetyCultureismorestablethansafetyclimateandisresistanttochange. (Cooper2001)pointsoutthatsafetyisavalueandthatvaluesareconsideredasa constantsetofcorebeliefsheldbyanindividualconcerninghows/heshould behaveoverabroadrangeofsituations(p.17).Thisisparticularlyimportantsince itisinthestationswheremanyofthesevaluesaredevelopedandpassedon.Jones (2000),suggeststhattheattitudestowardssafetymayberelatedtoourpastandthe prestigeweasfirefightersexperienceduetothesacrificesofourbothersand sisters.Thepersonathatthisisariskybusinessandthatinjuryanddeatharepart ofthejobmaybeconsideredanunderliningvalueupheldbyfirefighterstoday.The focusofthisstudyissafetyculturebasedonthemeasurementoftheattitudeand perceptionofthemembersofClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1. Subculture Importanttothestudyisthereferencetogroups,sincetheauthorexpectsto

identifysubcultureswithintheorganization.Mycontentionisthatgroupswithin theorganizationwillsharevaluesoftheoverallorganizationaswellashavetheir

CCFD1SafetyCulture 22 ownestablishedsafetyrelatedculture.Thisissupportedbyworkcompletedby Harvey(2002)thatsuggeststhatitispossibleforgroupstoholdmanydifferent valuescomparedtotheoverallorganization.Theinfluenceonthesubculturecan bederivedfrommanysources,butislikelyinfluencedbystationresponsibilities, (i.e.,specialtyrescueorfromwhatpreviousdepartment,cityordistrictthestation mergedfrom)(Harvey2002).Whatevertheinfluence,itisimportantunderstand thatsafetycultureisastableconstructnoteasilychangedoralteredinashort period. TheworksofHofstede(1994),Means(1999),andPidgeon(1991)have

shownthatsubculturesexistatthegrouplevelwithinanorganization. Furthermore,Harvey,Bolem,Cox,andGregory(2002)suggestthatcultureisthe keyfactorindistinguishingonegroupfromanother.Theysuggestthatthereare fourtypesofculturewithinanorganization.Thesemaybeimpliedas(basedon power,role,task,orperson).Subculturesthataffectsafetybehaviorareindentified inotherhighriskindustries.Forexample,Kao,Lai,andLee(2008)studiedthe safetycultureofpetrochemicalplantsinChina.Theirfindingsshowedasignificant relationshipbetweenjobpositions,workexperience,worksafetyandhealth environmentsatisfaction,andinjuryriskperception.AnotherstudybyLeeand Harrison(2000)lookedatthesafetyculturewithinnuclearpowerstationslocated intheUnitedKingdom.Theyanalyzedvariouscomponentsincluding:jobtype,age, gender,andshift.Theirresearchshowedawidevariancebetweenjobtypes.They alsofoundthat,inregardstoage,olderworkershadamoresafetyconscious attitudethanyoungerworkersdid.Itshouldbenotedthatwithinmanyofthe

CCFD1SafetyCulture 23 definitionsrelatedtosafetyculture,groupsareoftenhighlightedandtheevidence suggeststhatitmaybemoreaccuratetotalkintermsofgroupculturevs. organizationalculture.Manyhavesuggestedthatitiswithintheseidentifiedgroups thattheculturerelatedtosafetyispassedonanditistheattitudetowardsdanger, safetycompliance,andproperconductofhazardousoperationsthatmakesupthat culture(Beck,1999;Chute,1995;Clark,1999;Wong,2005).AtClackamasCounty FireDistrict#1,thecorrespondingcategoriesthatformthebasisofcultureare: rank,stationassignment,ordivision.Subcultureformedbasedonthesecategories couldexplaindifferencesinsafetyrelatedbehavioratdifferentstationsand divisionsandatdifferentrankswithinthedepartment.Therefore,itishypothesized thattheClackamasFirealsohasidentifiablesubculturethataffectssafety. H1:InClackamasFire,therearedistinct,identifiablesubculturesthatare relatedtosafety. Valueonefficiencyandeffectivenessoversafety InresearchbyOmodei,Mclennan,andReynolds(2005,)theyfoundthat

[d]espitethegeneralawarenessof,andconcernwith,theeffectsoffatigueand dehydrationinsummerfiresindifficultterrain,theprimaryfocusongettingthejob doneappearstooverrideanysuchconcerns(p10)amongthefirefighters.Thisis congruentwiththegeneralobservationthatfirefighterstendtovalueefficiencyand effectivenessoversafety.AccordingtoCooper(2001),ifsafetyisnotclearlyvalued amongthefirefighters,theywilllikelystrugglewithwhattheyvaluemore.This dichotomyisaccentuatedwhenotherbehaviorsarevaluedequally.Firefightersmay

CCFD1SafetyCulture 24 alsofindthemselvesconflictedbetweenthetwocompetinggoalsofproviding effectiveservicedeliveryinordertorescueandsavecivilianlivesandprovidingfor firefightersafety(Pessemier,2008). Therefore,itisimportanttoexaminethebehavioroffirefighters,specifically

relatedtotheadherencetosafetyprocedures.Thisstudyattemptedtoexplorewhy firefightersmakethedecisionstheydowheninterpretingandmanaginghighrisk situationsduringdailyactivities. H2:FirefightersatClackamasFirevalueefficiencyandeffectivenessover safety. Notmuchstudyhasbeendoneexaminingwhyanindividualinthe

firefightingcontext(supervisororcoworker)willchoosetoignoretheomissionof asafetyprocedurebyanothercrewmemberandyetwouldrisktheirlifetosave them.Someliteratureshowthatinahierarchicalorganization,thepositionwithina chainofcommandisthemostsalientfactorthatinfluencesanindividualsdecision (BehavioralScienceTechnology,2004).Thismayhelpexplainwhyonefirefighter (rank)wouldnotremindanotherfirefighterofgreaterrankorexperienceabouta safetyprocedureortheuseofrelatedsafetyequipment.Anotherpossibilitytobe exploredisthetheoryofindividualaccountability.Celinska(2007)suggestthat utilitarianindividualism,avaluedeeplyrootedinAmericanhistoryisassociated withlimitedresponsibilitytowardsthecollective.Thiscouldplayarolein determiningthelevelinwhichanotherfirefightermightinterveneinregardsto safety.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 25 Therefore,thethirdhypothesistestedinthisstudyaddressesthe relationshipbetweenindividualaccountabilityandsafety. H3:Firefighterswilltendtovalueindividualaccountabilityoversafety. Reportedpromisingpracticesinpromotingsafetyculture Theresultsofsimilarsafetypromotionstudieswerereviewedfortheir

recommendations.Sincenoneoftherelatedstudieslookedspecificallyatthesame researchquestions,itislikelytherecommendationsmightnotmatchdirectlywith myconclusions.However,itislikelythattherewillbesimilaritiessufficientforthis project.Intwoofthestudiesreviewed,theoverallOrganizationalSafetyCulture wasassessedandthiswasconsideredacoredimensionofthestudy.Williams (2006)concludedthefollowinginhisassessmentofthesafetycultureoftheAnne ArundelCountyFireDepartment,Maryland. 1. Theleadershipmustsendaclearmessageregardingtheimportanceof safety. 2. Clearcommunicationisneededtoinstillandenhancetrustwithinthe organization. 3. Asafetycodeofconductmustmeestablishedgivingalltherightand obligationtoreportsafetyproblemsandtocontributeideasrelatedtosafety totheirsupervisors. 4. Enhanceleadershipandfollowershipskillsinallpersonnel. 5. EnhancethemarketingofHealth/Safetydivisionofanorganization.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 26 6. Completeananalysisofknowledge,skills,andabilitiestoensurethat appropriatetrainingisbeingconductedforallpersonnel. 7. Regularfollowupandthedevelopmentofsurveystouseonaregularbasis toassesstheimpactofanyimprovementplans. Windham(2005)hadthefollowingrecommendationsafterstudyingthe

organizationalsafetycultureoftheWoodlandsFireDepartment,Woodlands,Texas: (a)exceptionsshouldbecommunicatedwithregardtosafetyandallpersonnel shouldbeheldaccountable,(b)policiesandpracticesshouldbeexamined,(c)risk managementshouldbeexaminedandallpersonnelbeheldaccountabletothe specificsoftheriskmanagementprocess,(d)thepeerfitnesstrainerprogram shouldcontinue,(e)unionofficialsshouldbeconsultedtoimplementafitness evaluationprocessand,(f)workshouldcontinuetomakeaculturalchangewithin thefiredepartment.ItisimportanttopointoutthatCCFD1currentlyhasapeer fitnesstrainerprogramandtheorganizationdoesincludetheunionwhensetting fitnessstandards.Theaboverecommendationshowever,helpvalidatetherelevance ofthecurrentprograms.Pendergast(2007)providestwelverecommendationsto improvesafetyaftercompletingasafetyculturesurveyoftheLaconiaFire Department,Laconia,NewHampshire.Thesetwelverecommendationsincluded:(a) identifyproblemsthatexist,(b)gainleadershipsupport,(c)treatsafetyasamission andestablishresourcesneeded,(d)createownershipofhealthandsafety throughoutalllevelsoftheorganization,(e)createcontrolmeasuresandestablish safetystandards,(f)measuresafetyrelatedperformance,(g)ensureallaccidents andnearmissesarethoroughlyinvestigated,(h)ensureattendanceatsafety

CCFD1SafetyCulture 27 meetings,thiscouldincludeinternalandexternalmeetings,(i)ensuresafetyaudits arecarriedout,(j)includesafetytrainingduringrecruittraining,(k)makegood safetybehavioraconditionofemployment,(l)providefeedbacktostakeholders regardingtheeffectivenessandoutcomesofsafetyinitiatives.Acommonthemeof theaboverecommendationsisoftentheneedtocommunicateeffectivelythe messageofsafety.Culturalchangeisnotaneasyendeavorandrequiresnotonlya clearsafetymessage,butalsoaconsistentandcontinualone.AstudybyCarroll (2002)ofthenuclearpowerindustryprovidesthesomeinsighttotheissueofboth communicationandinterpretationofcollecteddata.AfewexamplesofCarrolls recommendationsregardingtheenhancementofcommunicationinclude:(a)Senior managementaddressingissues,communicatingdecisions,results,andexpectations, (b)individualdepartmentsmustbeinvolvedinsafetyrelateddecisionmaking meetings,(c)resultanttaskswereassignedandtracked,and(d)communications highlightingtheworkaccomplishedisusedtoreinforceawillingnesstoraise concerns. Otherpertinentrecommendationsrelatedtochangingorganizationalsafety

cultureincludestudiesbytheBerkleyLabCommunicationsDepartment(2005)and byNASA.Specifically,NASArecognizedthattochangebehaviormeantchanging attitudestowardssafetyandthiswassomethingthatcouldnotbeaccomplished simplybycreatingrulesforeverysituation.AnassessmentforNASAbyBehavioral ScienceTechnology(2004)madethefollowingrecommendationsfororganizational change:(a)planningmeetingswithleadershiptoreaffirmagencyvalues,etc,(b) confidentialcoachingdesignedtohelpeachleaderunderstandtheirstrengthsand

CCFD1SafetyCulture 28 developmentalneeds,(c)integrateplansintoexistingactivities,(d)developteam effectivenesstrainingandadvancedsafetyleadershipassessmentcenters,and(e) implementafeedbacksystemwherekeyleadershipbehaviorspromoteopenand honestcommunicationthatpromotesdissentingopinions. Method Inordertotestthethreehypothesesthataimtoexaminethepresenceof

subculture,relationshipbetweensafetyandefficiency,andtherelationshipbetween safetyandindividualaccountability,asurveywasdeveloped.Thesurveyinstrument wasdevelopedusingquestionsfromtheSafetyClimateMeasurementToolKit (HealthandSafetyExecutiveProject)andSafetyCultureSurveyusedtoassessthe safetycultureoftheAnneArundelFireDepartment(WilliamsA.S.,2006).Contact wasmadewithMr.Williams,AnneArundelFireDepartment(Ret.)andpermission wasobtainedtousesurveyquestionshehaddeveloped.Healsoadvisedmethat manyofhissurveyquestionscamefromtwoothersourcesandprovidedmewith contactinformationforoneofthosesources.ContactwasattemptedwithWilliam Pessemierbutwasunsuccessful.TheSafetyCultureAssessmentToolKitcreatedby theHealthandSafetyExecutiveProjectwasdevelopedforpublicuseandmanyof

CCFD1SafetyCulture 29

ResearchQuestion H1:Withintheorganization,thereexist distinct,identifiablesubcultures relatedtosafety

SurveyQuestions Thiswillbedeterminedby relationshipbetween demographicsandsurvey questions

H2:Firefighterswilltendtovalue efficiencyandeffectivenessoversafety

12,16,20,23,41,46,

Citations (Harvey,Bolem,Cox,& Gregory,2002) (WilliamsA.S.,2006) (HarveyJ.E.,2002) (Guldenmund,2000) (Wiegmann,Zhang,von Thaden,&Sharma,2004) (Wong,2005) (Yule,2007)(Pessemier B.,2007) (PessemierB.,2007) (Omodei,2005) (Cooper,SurfacingYour

Table1ResearchKeyQuestions

thequestionsweremodifiedfromthatsurveytool.Itisalsoimportanttonotethat allthequestionsusedwerevalidatedfortheiroriginalpurpose;timewasnot allottedforthevalidationinthisstudy.Thesurveyitselfconsistedof40questions usingaLikerttypescalewitharangefrom15with5beingpositiveand1beinga negativeresponse.Severalquestionswerestatedinthenegativeandwereadjusted duringtheanalysis.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 30
SafetyCulture,2002) (Jones,2000) (PessemierB.,2007) (Cooper,SurfacingYour SafetyCulture,2002)

H3:Firefighterswilltendtovalue individualaccountabilityoversafety

9,13,14,17,19,21,27,35, 40,42,43,44,45,47,48

Keyquestionitemsthatwerepertinenttothepresentedhypothesiswere identified.ThisbreakdownshowninTable1above.Thestudywasdistributedto thepopulationviaemailusinganonlinesurveytoolSurveyMonkey,inwhichthe firedistricthasanaccount.Thefirstemailrelatedtothestudywassentouttothe studypopulationconsistingofallmembersoftheorganization.Themessage explainedthepurposeofthesurvey,theanonymityoftheresults,andwhowas performingit.Instructionsweregivenonhowtocompletethesurvey,whoshould participateinthestudy,andalinkattachedtothebodyofthemessage.Lastly,two additionalremindersweresentout. Threedimensionswereidentifiedtohelpbetterunderstandandcategorize

thesafetycultureoftheorganization.Thesethreedimensionsare:Organizational Policy,Organizationalleadership,andSafetyProcedures.ThesewerelabeledI,II,III onthesurveyform.Thepurposeofthethreedimensionsistohelpunderstandthe overallsafetycultureoftheorganization.Ifthereareidentifiedareasofsafety relatedweaknesseswithintheorganization,itisimportanttoknowwherethose weaknessesare.Furthermore,thedimensionsofLeadershipandProceduredirectly relatetoquestionusedtodefendthesecondandthirdhypothesis.Additionally,the surveyisbrokendownintothefollowingcategories:Administration,Operations, Training,FirePrevention,andVolunteers.TheOperationsgroupwasfurtherbroken downintoseventeenstations,twoofwhichwereremovedsincetheyarevolunteer stationsandnotstaffedfulltime.Thelastcategoryinthissectionisyearsofservice;

CCFD1SafetyCulture 31 thiswasusedinlieuofrankinordertoprovidegreateranonymityduringthe survey.TheVolunteergroupwasconsideredaDivisionandnotbrokendownto thestationassignmentlevel.Thestudywasorganizedinawaytohelpidentifyifany subculturesrelatedtosafetyatthestationleveloryearsofserviceexists.Though thecategoryofrankshowsupontheoriginalsurveyform,itwasremovedfromthe onlinesurveytohelpensureanonymity. Therangeofagreementinthesurveyincludedthefollowingchoices:

StronglyAgree,Agree,Neutral,Disagree,andStronglyDisagree.Questionsforthe surveywerederivedfromseveralsources,includingarelatedstudyontheAnne ArundelCountyFireDepartment(Williams,2006)andtheSafetyClimateToolkit developedbytheHealthandSafetyExecutiveoftheUnitedKingdom.Thequestions aredesignedtoassessthesafetycultureoftheorganizationbyaskingtherecipients toratesafetyrelatedvaluestatements.Attheendofthesurvey,twoopenended questionsdesignedtoelicittheresponsesonhowtheemployeefelttheyorthe organizationcouldimprovesafetywithinthedepartment. Intervieweeswereselectedusingclustersamplingtechnique.First,arandom

listingofthestationsandshiftswerecreatedusingarandomizationformulain Excel.NinefirestationsrepresentingtheOperationsdivisionandthreeother divisionswereselectedforinterviews.Thepurposeoftheinterviewswastocollect relevantqualitativeinformationnotobtainablethroughstandardsurveyquestions. Theinterviewsincludedallmembersoftheshiftandtookplaceinsmallgroup

CCFD1SafetyCulture 32 settings.Theinterviewswereconductedbytheauthor,andduetothesensitivityof issues,werenotaudiorecorded.ThequestionscanbefoundinAppendixB. Results Theresultsofsurveydatawereanalyzedusingdescriptivestatistics1suchas

mean,median,andstandarddeviation.DatawasfilteredusingtheSurveyMonkey filteringtooltoassistinaggregatingtheresults.Thiswasorganizedintothe followingvariables:OrganizationalDivisionsincluding:(a)Operations,(b) Administration(LogisticsandInformationTechnology),(c)Training(wellness), (d)FirePrevention,and(e)theVolunteergroup(Table1). Respondentsprofile TheOperationsDivisionmadeup75%oftheresponsesor119outof159

organizationalpersonnelsurveyed.Thisrepresentsapproximately79%ofthe personnelassignedtotheOperationsdivision.Therearesomesmallvariationsin thenumberassignedtooperationsduetoTemporaryDutyAssignments(TDY). 1Itisrecognizedbytheauthor,thattheresearchcouldbenefitfrommoreadvance analyticalmethodsneededtodeterminesignificanceoftheresultsandtovalidate thesurveyquestionsforreliability.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 33 Thesearegenerallyassignmentsoutsideofthenormaloperationsassignmentssuch astrainingofficers,PublicInformationOfficers,orEMSOfficerpositions. Administrationrepresented10%oftherespondentsor84%(16of19)ofthe personnelassignedtoAdministration.TheTrainingdivisionrepresented5%ofthe respondentsor89%(8/9)oftheassignedpersonnel,preventionrepresented4.4% ofrespondentsor58%(7/12)ofassignedpersonnel,andthevolunteerrankhada responserateof5.7%.Itshouldbenotedthatduringthissurvey,thevolunteer programwasinthemiddleofsubstantialchangesandthelargestvolunteerrecruit academywasnearlycompleted.Thismayhaveleadtothelimitedresponsetothe surveybythevolunteergroup.
Table2ResponsesbyDivision

Division

ResponsePercent

ResponseCount/total numberofpersonnelin thedivision 119/150 16/19 8/9 7/12 9/59

Operations Administration Training Prevention Volunteer

74.8% 10.1% 5% 4.4% 5.7%

Thefollowingscoresrepresentthedegreeofpositiveornegativeresponseto

thesurveyquestions.Ascoregreaterthan2.50representsapositiveresponseto thesafetyrelatedquestion.Ascorebelow2.50representsanegativeresponseto thesafetyrelatedquestion.Forthepurposeofthisstudy,DimensionISafetyPolicy referstoorganizationalpolicespertainingtosafetyrelatedtopractices.Policiesare

CCFD1SafetyCulture 34 generallyfoundintheformofStandardOperatingGuidelines(SOGs). OrganizationalLeadershipreferstothedecisionmakersoftheorganization;this wouldincludeCompanyOfficers,ChiefOfficers,andProgramManagers.Examplesof SafetyProcedureswouldincludetheuseofsafetyequipmentorpracticesdetailedin theFireRescueProtocols,aguidethatdescribeshowtomitigateincidents.Thetotal mean,median,andstandarddeviationscoresrepresentingallthreesurveyed dimensionsfortheDivisionsandareasfollows:Operationshadameanscoreof 3.66,medianscoreof3.49andstandarddeviationof.318.TheTrainingdivisionhad ameanscoreof3.59,medianscoreof3.62andstandarddeviationof.232.TheFire PreventionDivisionhadameanscore3.82,medianscoreof3.62andastandard deviationof.246.Administrationhadascoreof3.64,medianscoreof3.62and standarddeviationof.186.Thevolunteergrouphadameanscoreof3.92,median scoreof3.83andstandarddeviationof.354.Thevolunteerrankrepresentsthe highestcombinedmeanscorewiththelargeststandarddeviationscore.(Table3)
Table3ComparisonofscoresbyDivision(AllDimensions)

Division Operations Training Prevention Administration Volunteers

Mean 3.66 3.59 3.82 3.64 3.92

Median 3.49 3.62 3.79 3.62 3.83

StandardDeviation .318 .232 .246 .186 .354

CCFD1SafetyCulture 35 Thevolunteergrouphadthehighestcombined(OrganizationalPolicy,

OrganizationalLeadership,andSafetyProcedures)meanscoreof3.92.TheTraining divisionscoredlowestindimensionIandIIIwith3.8and3.34respectively.The OperationsDivisionscoredlowestindimensionII(Leadership)withascoreof3.49. Ifthevolunteergroupisbackedout,theFirePreventionDivisionhasthenext highestmeanscoreof3.82. Theyearsofservicegroupisdividedintothefollowingcategories:(a)zeroto

threeyears,(b)fourtoeightyears,(c)ninetofifteenyears,and(d)16yearsor more.Foreachoftheyearcategories,thecombinedDimensionsscorewas calculatedinordertocomparethesafetyattitudesoftheyearsofservicegroups. (Table3).Thetablebelowshowsthatthe48yeargrouphadthehighestsafety perception/attitudeandthe915grouphadthelowest.The915yeargroupalso hadthehigheststandarddeviation.


Table4ScoresbyYearsofService

Yearsof Service 03Years 48Years 915Years 16+years

Numberof respondents 31 29 41 58

Mean 3.63 3.70 3.51 3.68

Median 3.56 3.58 3.40 3.54

Standard Deviation .127 .262 .291 .299

Thefollowingtablesshowthebreakdownofscoresbyyearsofserviceandby dimension.Thisallowsthereadertocompareresponsesbydimensionandshows

CCFD1SafetyCulture 36 howyearsofservicechangesperceptionwithinthosedimensions.Thezeroto threeyeargrouphad31respondentsandrepresented20%ofthetotalsurveyed.


Table503YearsofServicescoresbydimension

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 3.56 3.78

Median 3.58 3.87 3.58

StandardDeviation .436 .347 .436

SafetyProceduresIII 3.56

The48yeargrouphad29responsesor18%,915yearshad41respondentsor 26%,andthelargestgroupwasthe16+yearswith56respondentsor36%ofthe totalgroup.


Table648YearsofService

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 4.00 3.58

Median 3.96 3.66 3.50

StandardDeviation .198 .379 .472

SafetyProceduresIII 3.52

The16+yearshadthehighestDimensionI(Policy)scoreof4.02whichshowsthat thosewiththemostexperiencewithintheorganizationandthosethatarelikelyto beinleadershiproles,feelstronglythatoursafetyrelatedpoliciesareappropriate. The03yeargrouphadthelowestdimensionIscoreof3.56,howeverthisgroup alsohadthehighestscoresindimensionIIandIIIof3.78and3.56respectively.The

CCFD1SafetyCulture 37 915yeargrouphadthelowestscoresindimensionIIandIIIof3.29and3.40 respectively.


Table7915YearsofService

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 3.84 3.29 3.40

Median 3.78 3.41 3.26

StandardDeviation .219 .318 .452

The915yeargroupalsohadthelowesttotalmeanscoreof3.51.The48year grouphadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.70withthe16+yearsgroupscoringa 3.68.


Table816+YearsofService

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 4.02 3.54

Median 3.99 3.66 3.38

StandardDeviation .233 .337 .591

SafetyProceduresIII 3.47

Thereviewedliteraturesuggeststhatthemoreyearsofserviceanemployees

hasorthegreatertheirpositioniswithintheorganizationthegreatertheir perceptionorattitudetowardssafetywithinthatorganization.Inthisstudy,a higherormorepositivescorewouldrepresenttheelevatedperception/attitudeof safety.Theresultsinthisstudyshowthatthereisnotalinearprogressionofthe scoresinstead,itshowsthatthe48yearand16+groupssharenearlythesame

CCFD1SafetyCulture 38 positivescore.Inthiscase,itisthe915yeargroupthathasthelowestcombined meanscoreaswellasthelowestscoreintheLeadershipDimension.Overall,the resultsdonotshowacleardivisionbetweenyearsofservice,howeveritdoesshow thatwithintheyeargroups,thedimensionsareperceiveddifferently.Further researchisrequiredtodeterminewhythe915yeargrouphasalesspositive combinedscore. Next,theauthoranalyzedtheresultsbasedonstationassignment,this

includedstationsonethrough17,excludingstations12,13,14.Thesefirestations arestaffedwithvolunteersandweregroupedinthevolunteercategoryonly.All careerstationswiththeexceptionofstation7wereusedforthestudy.Thiswasdue totheinadequateresponsefromthestation7.Forthepurposeofthestudy,the authormovedtheoneresponsefromstation7tostation6.Itshouldbenotedthat station7hasonlythreepeopleassignedtoitandtheworkscheduleissignificantly differentfromtherestoftheorganization.Intotal,therewere159respondentsto thesurvey.Thisrepresents80%oftheorganization.Figure7isagraph representingthetotalcombinedmeanscoresformallthreedimensionsbystation.


Figure2MeanscoresbyStations

CCFD1SafetyCulture 39

Station17hadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.86withastandarddeviationof .396.Station15hadthelowesttotalmeanscoreof3.41withastandarddeviationof .391.TheSouthBattalionhadthehighesttotalmeanscoreof3.71;thisisdespitethe loweststationscorefromStation15.TheNorthBattalionhadatotalmeanscoreof 3.69.Thoughitisdifficulttodeterminethesignificance,itisnotedthattheNorth Battalionhasasignificantlyhighercallvolume.Inthiscase,callvolumewas comparedtohelpdetermineifriskexposurehadaneffectonsafety perception/attitudes.Inthiscase,itappearsthegreatertheexposuretorisk (representedascallvolume),thelowerthesafetyperception/attitudescore.This suggeststhatsubgroupsmaybeidentifiedbystationasitrelatestocallvolume, riskexposure,andrisktolerance.Table8showsacomparisonofcombinedmean safetyscoreswithcallvolumebetweenstationsintheNorthBattalionwhiletable9 showsthecomparisonintheSouthBattalion.
Table9ComparisonsofResponsestoMeanScores,NorthBattalion

Station Engine1

NumberofAlarm 2,252

MeanScore 3.59

CCFD1SafetyCulture 40 Engine2 Engine3/Rescue3 Truck4 Engine5 Engine6 Engine8


Table10ComparisonsofResponsestoMeanScores,SouthBattalion

1,800 3,194 1,586 1,693 1,011 1,358

3.77 3.64 3.64 3.70 3.77 3.67

Station Engine9 Engine10 Engine11 Truck15 Engine16 Squad17

NumberofAlarms 889 625 488 1,486 1,811 816

MeanScore 3.75 3.83 3.69 3.41 3.70 3.86

Abreakdownofthedimensionscoresshowsstation6and2(North

Battalion)withthehighestcombinedscoreof3.77.Station6alsohasthehighscore of4.31indimensionI(Policy)whileStation15hasthelowestcombinedscoreof

CCFD1SafetyCulture 41 3,41andthelowestPolicyscoreof3.81.Station17hadthehighestscorein dimensionIIandstation15hadthelowestscoreof3.03.Station10hadthehighest scoreindimensionIIIwith3.59andstations15and16hadthelowestscoresof 3.38.Thefollowingtable(Table11)showsthetotalmeanscoresofthecombined stationsforeachdimension.Thehighscoreinthepolicydimensionshowsthatthe employeesinthefirestationsperceiveOrganizationalSafetyPolicytobeatan appropriatelevel.Incomparison,theSafetyProceduredimensionhasthelowest score.Inthisstudy,thelowertheDimensionIIIscoressuggestsahigherthe toleranceforriskisacceptedbythegroup.
Table11TotalMeanScoresofallStations

Dimension DimensionIPolicy DimensionIILeadership DimensionIIISafetyProcedures

Score 4.08 3.54 3.46

Thenextseriesoftablesshowthebreakdownofscoresforeachdimensionin

eachofthecareerstations.Thepurposeofthiscomparisonistoshowhoweach stationdiffersintheirperception/attitudetowardssafetyasitrelatestothethree dimensions.Thisunderstandingofattitudesandperceptionsisimportantwhen

CCFD1SafetyCulture 42 consideringwhereandhowsafetyrelatedchangeswithintheorganizationshould beimplemented.


Table12Station1Dimensionscores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 3.95 3.42 3.41

Median 3.86 3.50 3.50

StandardDeviation .245 .312 .590

Table13Station2DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII


Mean 4.18 3.61 3.53

Median 4.20 3.63 3.31

StandardDeviation .297 .383 .763

Table14Station3DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 3.93 3.55 3.43

Median 3.92 3.58 3.25

StandardDeviation .259 .273 .553

Table15Station4DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.00 3.53 3.40

Median 4.00 3.64 3.68

StandardDeviation .269 .397 .683

CCFD1SafetyCulture 43
Table16Station5DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.06 3.64 3.56

Median 4.00 3.80 3.70

StandardDeviation .372 .455 .731

Table17Station6Dimensionscores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII


Mean 4.31 3.56 3.44

Median 4.33 3.67 3.50

StandardDeviation .372 .349 .547

Table18Station8DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.07 3.45 3.49

Median 4.05 3.55 3.32

StandardDeviation .270 .450 .510

Table19Station9DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII

Mean 4.11 3.61

Median 4.06 3.67

StandardDeviation .323 .450

CCFD1SafetyCulture 44 SafetyProceduresIII
Table20Station10DimensionScores

3.54

3.44

.617

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.21 3.69 3.59

Median 4.13 3.88 3.69

StandardDeviation .247 .395 .555

Table21Station11DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII


Mean 3.97 3.59 3.50

Median 4.00 3.60 3.60

StandardDeviation .341 .342 .709

Table22Station15DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 3.81 3.03 3.38

Median 3.82 3.10 3.40

StandardDeviation .353 .411 .431

Table23Station16DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI

Mean 4.09

Median 4.06

StandardDeviation .348

CCFD1SafetyCulture 45 LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII


Table24Station17DimensionScores

3.63 3.38

3.75 3.40

.317 .431

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.30 3.73 3.54

Median 4.25 4.00 3.63

StandardDeviation .328 .059 .630

Table25Volunteers(stations12&13)DimensionScores

Dimension PolicyI LeadershipII SafetyProceduresIII

Mean 4.31 3.83 3.62

Median 4.22 4.00 3.44

StandardDeviation .276 .498 .472

FurtheranalysisofthedatacanbefoundinappendixDthroughF.Each

stationisrepresentedinaradargraphshowingthestationsscoreineachofthe threedimensions.ClearlyallofthestationsintheOperationsDivisionscorehigher inthePolicyDimension,followedbyLeadership,withthelowestscoresbeinginthe SafetyProceduralDimension.Allscoreshowever,arewellabovethe2.50mean scoreforascaleof15.ThissuggeststhatClackamasFireDistrict#1hasthe perception/attitudeofapositive,overallsafetyculture.Theaboveresultsarethe

CCFD1SafetyCulture 46 firststepinunderstandingthesafetycultureoftheorganizationandsuggestthat subgroupsmaybeidentifiedbyDivision,Battalion,andStationassignment. Next,thequestionsrelatedtothehypotheseswereanalyzed.Thefirst

hypothesisstatedthattherewouldbeidentifiablesubgroupsrelatedtosafety culture.Comparisonsofmeancombinedscorestoyearsofserviceshowsarange from3.51(915years)to3.70(48years).The915yearrangerepresentsa combinationofCompanyofficers,Firefighters,andApparatusOperatorsassignedto Operationsdivision.Thiswouldalsotendtoexcludemanyofthechiefofficersand currentadministrativestaffthatwouldtendtoberepresentedinthe16+year group.The48yeargrouprepresentsmostlyFirefightersandApparatusOperators, personnelnotusuallyconsideredinleadershippositions.Sincerankwasnot identifiedinthisstudy,itwouldbedifficulttodetermineifthedifferenceinscoresis duetoyearsofservice,experience,orpositionwithintheorganization.The literaturewouldsuggestithastodowithexperience(yearsofservice)ratherthan position,thoughsomeliteraturesuggeststheremaybeaconnectionbetween positioninanorganizationandsafetyperception.Kao,Lai,andLee(2008) AreviewofthecombinedmeanscoresbyDivisionsshowsanotable

differencebetweentheVolunteergroupandtheOperations,Training,and Administrationgroups.(Figure3)
Figure3MeanScoresbyDivision

CCFD1SafetyCulture 47

TheTrainingDivisionhasthelowestcombined(allthreedimensions)scoreof3.59 andtheVolunteergrouphasthehighestat3.92.Apossibleexplanationforthis variancemaylieintherelationshipbetweenpersonnelwithasignificantexposure tothefireservicecultureandthoseoperatingonthefringes.Volunteersare generallymadeupofthoseeitherlookingforemploymentinthefireserviceor thosewantingtogivebacktothecommunity.Volunteerfirefightersusuallyhave employmentoutsideofthefireserviceandhavelimitedexposuretocareer employeesandtheirculture,andtheriskassociatedwithincreasedcallvolume. ManyofthefirePreventionpersonnelhavesomefirefighting(Operational) experience,buthavenothadsignificantexposuretothefirefighterandstation culture.Thisalsoseemstobecongruentwiththerelationshipbetweenslower stationswithhighercombinedmeansafetyperception/attitudescores,aconceptto beexploredfurtherinthispaper.Regardless,theredoesseemtobeanidentifiable differencebetweentheVolunteer/Preventiongroupsandtheremainingthree divisionsasidentifiedbytheirhighersafetyperception/attitudescores.Ananalysis

CCFD1SafetyCulture 48 oftheOperationalscoresshowsnotabledifferencesrelatedtocallvolume(Table9). Stationswithhighercallvolumesappeartotrendtowardslower,combinedmean surveyscoresthanstationswithlowercallvolumes.IntheNorthBattalion,Station6 sharesthehighestmeanscoreof3.77withstation2.TheSouthBattalionhassimilar resultswithitslowercallvolumeandhighercombinedmeansafety perception/attitudescore. Station15hasthesecondhighestcallvolumeintheSouthBattalion,yetit

hasasignificantlylowerscorethanstation16whichhasthehighestcallvolumein theSouthBattalion.Station16doessharethelowestscoreinDimensionIIIwith station15however.Thetypesofcallsstation15respondstoversesstation16and thatstation15isaspecialtyrescuestationcouldexplainthisdiscrepancy,but furtherresearchwouldberequiredtomakethisdetermination.Withthissaid,there stillappearstobeadirectcorrelationbetweencallvolumeandsafetyperception scores. Theresultssuggestthatsafetyperception/attitudeisrelatedtocallvolume,

whichinturnisrelatedtoincreasedriskexposureandthisexposureleadsto greatertoleranceofrisk.ThisisspecificallynotableinDimensionIII,Safety procedureswheremeanscoreareconsistentlylower.Theresultsalsoshowthat busierstationsintheNorthandSouthBattalionshavecombinedscoresconsistently lowerthanslowerstationsintherespectiveBattalions.Thisrelationshipbetween callvolumeandlowersafetyperception/attitudesupportsthatthefirsthypothesis holdstrue,thatthereareidentifiablesubgroupswithintheorganization.The

CCFD1SafetyCulture 49 researchalsosuggeststhatthesesubgroupsarerelatedtoriskexposureas demonstratedbythedifferenceinscoresbyStationandBattalion.Theresultsalso suggestthattherearesubgroupsidentifiedbyDivision.Thisissupportedbythe significantdifferencesinsafetyperceptionscoresbyDivision. Thesecondhypothesisstatesthatfirefighterswillvalueefficiencyoversafety.

ThefirststepwastoreviewthedatacomparingtheoverallOrganizationtothe OperationsgroupusingthequestionsspecifictoH2ofthestudy(Table2,Table25). Ahigher,morepositivescoreshowsthatemployeesvaluessafetymorethan efficiency,whereasalowerscoreshowstheemployeevaluesefficiencyoversafety. Inthisstudy,thequestionspertainingtothehypothesiswerecomparedtoone anotherinordertodeterminewhatwasvaluedmorepositively.TheOperations groupwascomparedtotheoverallorganizationsinceitistherewefindthe majorityoftheonline2firefightersandwherethegreatestexposuretoriskis found.Inquestion1.,weseeasignificantdifferenceinscoresbetweentheoverall organizationandtheoperationsgroup.Inquestionfourandsix,weseeasimilar scoredifferenceatalesserdegree.Eachindicatingavalueshifttowardsefficiency oversafety.
Table26Hypotheses2

Question 1.Safetyequipmenthasthepotential toadverselyaffectefficiency.

Organization Operations 3.41 2.58

2OnLinedescribescareerfirefightersregularlyassignedtofirestations throughoutthedistrict.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 50 2.Minorsafetyviolationsare acceptableiftheriskisminimal. 3.Supervisorspermitcuttingcorners togetthejobdone. 4.Gettingthejobdoneefficientlyis mostimportant. 5.Thedepartmentprovidesadequate safetyequipmentformyassigned duties. 6.SometimesIamnotgivenenough timetogetmyjobdonesafely. Meanscore Again,weseealowercombinedmeanscoreinthegroupwiththemost 3.05 3.79 3.14 4.09 2.90 3.78 3.19 4.06

3.21 3.45

3.17 3.28

exposuretorisk.Theoperationsgroupisalsothegroupmosteffectivebysafety relatedpoliciesandprocedures.Thisalongwithdataobtainedbytheinterviews suggeststhatfirefightersdooratleastsometimesdovalueefficiencyoversafety. ThisconceptisdiscussedfurtherintheDiscussionsectionofthereport. Thethirdhypothesisstatesfirefighterswillvalueindividualaccountability

oversafety.Hereagain,themorepositiveascoreis,thegreaterthevalueistowards safety,whereaslesserscoresindicatesavaluetowardsindividualaccountability. Theresultshowever,showsimilarscoresbetweentheoverallorganizationandthe Operationsgroup(Table27).Severalofthescoresareidenticalandthemajorityare withinafewhundredthsofapoint.Thescoresshowthatthereisarelativelyhigh perceptionofsafetyoverindividualaccountabilityacrosstheorganizationandthat theexposuretoriskdoesnotappeartohaveadirectimpactontheperceptionof

CCFD1SafetyCulture 51 safetyvs.individualaccountability.Thisdoesnotexplainthewitnessedreluctance tointervenewhensafetypolicesandproceduresareignored,buttheinterview resultssuggestitcouldbethattheactivityisnotperceivedasriskytherefore,there islittleneedforintervention.


Table27Hypotheses3

Question Irelyonmysupervisortokeepmesafe. Coworkersarewilingtoreportsafetyviolations, unsafebehaviors,orhazardousconditions.

Organization Operations 2.75 3.45 2.83 3.41 3.76

Peerinfluencesareeffectiveatdiscouraging 3.75 violationsofstandardoperatingproceduresorsafety rules. Iammoreresponsiblewhenitcomestofollowing safetyproceduresthanmycoworkers. Mysupervisorscloselymonitorsafetyprocedures andcorrectanydeviationsfromestablishedsafety standards. Icansafelydeterminetheproperlevelofsafety equipmentneededtoperformmyassignedduties. Coworkerswillremindmetousepropersafety equipment. Iamadequatelytrainedtosafelyconductallmy assignedduties. Iutilizemysafetyequipmentmoreoftenthanmy coworkersdo. Usingpropersafetyequipmentisprimarilythe individuals'responsibility. Iamcomfortablewithremindingmycoworkersto usesafetyequipment. IamsureitisamatteroftimebeforeIaminvolved inanaccident. 3.10 3.74

3.09 3.71

4.21 3.33 4.07 3.02 3.99 4.12 3.39

4.26 3.32 4.09 2.98 3.99 4.19 3.35

CCFD1SafetyCulture 52 Iunderstandthesafetyrulesformyjob. TheSafetyofmycoworkersismyresponsibility. MeanScore ThesurveydatacollecteddoesnotappeartosupportH3intermsof 4.14 3.97 3.65 4.18 4.09 3.66

Firefightersvaluingindividualaccountabilityoversafety.However,theinformation collectedduringtheinterviewsdoessuggesttherearesomeincidentswherethis mightholdtrue.Forexample,23%oftheintervieweesstatedtheywouldviolatea safetypolicyorprocedureinordertogetthejobdonesooner.Furthermore,18% statedtheywouldnotremindacoworkerforconcernofbeinglabeledamicro manager.14%statedtheywouldnotremindsomeoneifthesafetyequipmentwere consideredinefficientorineffective.Lastly,36%statedtheywouldfeel uncomfortableremindingamoreexperiencedfirefighteroroneofhigherrankto usesafetyequipment.Again,moststatedtheywouldfirstperformarisk/benefit analysisbeforemakingthedecisionandwouldinterveneiftheydeemedthe circumstancehighlydangerous.Furtherinvestigationintothisbehavioris warrantedsincethewillingnesstointerveneinasafetyrelatedincidentis paramountifasafetycultureistobepositivelychanged. Thenextresultstobereviewedarethetwoopenendedquestionsasshown

inTable28below.
Table28ResultsofOpenendedquestions.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 53 1.Howcouldyouimprovesafetywithintheorganization? 2.Howdoyoufeeltheorganizationcouldimprovesafety? Section Percentageofresponses Question1Question2 ImproveCommunications SafetyCultureChange ImproveSafetyProcedures IncreaseTraining ImproveSafetyPolicies ImproveSafetyEquipment IncreaseEnforcement ImproveLeadership Whenthequestionisfocusedtowardstheindividual,leadershipisidentified 12% 9% 18% 16% 7% 10% 4% 22% 19% 10% 15% 18% 16% 9% 2% 2%

astheleadingresponseforimprovingsafetywithintheorganization.Acloserlook attheresponsesshowsthatleadingbyexampleandtakingpersonalownershipby wayofSafetyproceduresisthemostsuggestedmethodtoimprovesafety.Whenthe focusofthequestionsisturnedtowardtheorganization,theshiftleansto Communicationsastheprimarymethodtoimprovesafety.Thisisgenerallyinthe formofcommunicatinglessonslearnedfrompastincidentsandnearmissincidents. ThistranscendstotheTrainingcomponentsincemanyanswersmadereferencesto bothtrainingandcommunicationandtheneedtoaddressbothsimultaneously.A changeinPolicywasanotherfrequentanswer,eitheraloneorwithother suggestions.Theauthorattemptedtodifferentiatebetweenhowfirefightersdo

CCFD1SafetyCulture 54 something(Procedure)andwhatisrequired(Policy).Forexample,apersonmight suggestchanginguniformcolortoavoidresemblingalawenforcementofficer;this wouldbeconsideredaPolicychange,whereaswearingsafetygoggleswouldbea safetyprocedure.Somesuggestionsmightbeconsideredboth,suchaschangingthe locationinwhichequipmentiscarriedonfireandrescueapparatus.Theopen endedquestionsnonotspecificallyaddresstheresearchquestionsperse;however, theydohelptobetterunderstandwhyandhowfirefightersmakesafetyrelated decisionsandwhatinfluencesthosedecisions. Interviewresults Tofurtherunderstandandinterprettheresultsofthesurvey,theauthor

interviewedDepartmentpersonnelinsmallgroupsettings.Theinterviewswere accomplishedusingfourquestionsrelatedtothesafetyculturesurveyandcanbe foundinAppendixB.Thefindingsfromtheinterviewshelpilluminate,tosome extentthewhyandhowemployeesmakesafetyrelateddecisionsandhow employeesperceivehowtheorganizationvaluessafetyvs.performance. Universally,employeesthroughouttheDivisionsfeeltheOrganizationplacesvalue onbothsafetyandperformance.Thatistosay,employeesdonotbelievethe Organizationconsidersthetwomutuallyexclusive.Whenaskedwhatconditions wouldleadtoasafetyissuegoingunreportedorunderwhatconditionswouldan individualviolateasafetyprocedureorpolicy,thefollowingtworesponseswerein themajority(23%):Risk/Benefitanalysisandperceptionofriskwereusedto defendtheomissions.Thatistosay,ifthewitnessorindividualfelttheriskwas

CCFD1SafetyCulture 55 smallenoughorthebenefitgreatenough,theviolationswilllikelyoccur.Intermsof efficiencyorgettingthejobdoneinatimelymanner,only10%oftherespondents feltthatasafetyviolationwouldbeignoredorgounreportedjusttogetthejob faster.However,whenaskedwhentheywouldviolateasafetypolicyorprocedure, 23%oftherespondentssaidtheywoulddosotogetthejobdonesooner.This appearstosupporttheconceptofindividualaccountabilityhavinganinfluenceon safetyrelateddecisionmaking,thoughtheresultsarenotsignificanttoverifythe conclusion.Lastly,whenaskedwhyanindividualwouldnotremindacoworker aboutusingapieceofsafetyequipmentoraboutasafetyprocedure,36%stated thattheexperiencelevelorrankoftheoffenderwouldbeasignificantfactor.Other responsesincludednotwantingtonagsomeoneoveraperceivedminorissueor theythoughtthepersonknewwhattheyweredoing. Summaryofresults Itisapparentfromtheresultsofthisstudythattheorganizationhasahighly

positiveperception/attitudetowardssafetyandthatnodimensionhadascore belowthe2.50midpoint.Thisisalsoverifiedbythehigherscoresinthe dimensionsrelatedtobothorganizationalpolicyandleadership.Thetheoryofsub groupsrelatedtoorganizationalsafetycultureappearstobevalidwhencomparing Divisions,Battalions,andstations.Theexposuretoriskappearstohaveasignificant impactonsafetyattitudesthroughouttheorganization.Theresultsalsosuggestthat employeeswithhigherexposurestorisk(highercallvolumes)tendhavehigher tolerancesforriskoradiminishedriskperception.This,theninfluencesthe

CCFD1SafetyCulture 56 risk/benefitanalysisusedbytheemployeestomakesafetyrelateddecisions.Next, thecombineddatasupportsthetheorythatfirefighterstendtovalueefficiencyover safety,atleastinqualifiedcircumstances.Lastly,thesurveyresultsdidnotsupport thethirdhypothesiswellenoughtodefendthatfirefightersvalueindividual accountabilityoversafety,howevertheinterviewresultsdidsuggestthiscouldbe heldtruewhenhierarchalinfluencesareinplace. Discussion TheconceptofSafetyCultureiswidelydebatedintheSafetycommunity.The

literature,thoughplentiful,isfracturedandsomewhatcontroversial.Thereislittle agreementonthedefinitionofSafetyCultureandtheconceptscontainedtherein.In addition,theconceptofSafetyCulturereferstowhattheliteraturecallsa perceptionofsafetyrelateddimensions.Anemployeesperceptiondoesnotmean anorganizationisunsafeorthatpoliciesandproceduresarenotfollowed,itisa reflectionoftheemployeesattitudetowardstheissues.Forexample,intheissue relatedtoaccountabilityoversafety,individualsmaysimplyviewtheactivityas safethereforethereisnoneedtofollowanygivenpolicyorprocedure. Alternatively,insomecasesitmaybehowtheindividualviewsthemselvesand theirexperiencelevelinregardstosafety.Withthatsaid,theliteratureisclear abouttherelationshipbetweensafetycultureandaccidentrates.Theindustries researchedforthisstudyarerelatedtothefireserviceastheyareallconsidered highriskindustriesandthatsafetyrelatederrorshavesignificantimpactsonthe organization.LiteraturespecifictotheFireServiceislimitedandwhatisfoundis

CCFD1SafetyCulture 57 eitherspecifictothewildlandfirefightingorisresearchofquestionablevalidity. Thevalidityofthisstudyisdifficulttodetermineandfurtherstatistical

analysisisneededtohelprealizethesignificanceoftheresults.However,a comparisoncanbemadewiththeresultsoftheaforementionedstudies,atleastin thesimilardimensionsandtheoverallOrganizationalSafetyCulture(Table29).


Table29ComparisonsofStudyResults.

Department/Study ClackamasFireDistrict MarylandStudy

MeanScore 3.61 3.54

StandardDeviation .35726 .5292

Inthisstudy,thethreedimensionssurveyedwereSafetyrelatedPolicy,Leadership relatedtosafety,andSafetyrelatedprocedures.Thesecloselyresemblethe dimensionsusedintheAnneArundelandMarylandStudies:(a)Management,(b) SafetySystems,and(c)risk.Neitherstudyhowever,approachedtheissueofSafety Cultureinthewaytheauthordid.Theattemptwasmadetoaskquestionsthat wouldhelpdeterminethewhyandhowfirefightersmakesafetyrelateddecisions, notsimplymeasuretheoverallsafetycultureoftheorganization.BothWilliams (2007)studyandPessemiers(2008)studyattemptedtoaddresstheissueof validityandreliabilityaswellastheOrganizationalCulture.Bothusedfocusgroups tohelpestablishvalidityaswellasstatisticalanalysis.Forethisstudy,manyofthe questionsusedinthePessemier/Williamsstudieswereused,butnotvalidatedfor thisstudy. Next,furtherdiscussionoftheresultsrelatedtothethreehypotheses

isrequired.Thefirsthypothesesstatedtherewouldbeidentifiablesubgroups

CCFD1SafetyCulture 58 relatedtosafety.Theresultssuggestthatthereareatleasttwoidentifiablegroups, whichcanbefurtherdividedintosubgroups.ThesegroupsincludeOrganizational Divisions,Battalions,andFirestations.Yearsofservicedidnotshowenough varianceinscorestowarranttheconclusionthatYearsofServicegroupsare identifiedassubgroups.Inadditiontothescoresimilarities,thevarianceinscore byYearsofServiceappeartocontradictfindingsfromWilliams(2007),Leeand Harrison(2000),andCiavarelliandCrowson(2004)whichhavefindingsthat suggestmoreexperiencedmembersofanorganizationtendtobemoresafety consciousandhaveahigherperceptionofsafetywithinanorganization.The Clackamasstudyshowsmoreofarelationshipbetweenranksthansimpleyearsof service.Thoughthestudydidnotspecificallybreakdownrank,themajorityof officersandchiefofficerswithinourorganizationhavemorethan15yearsof experienceandthe16plusyeargroupdidscoresecondtothe48yeargroup.The resultsdoshowatreadtowardshigherscoresasyearsofexperienceincrease,with theexceptionofthe915yeargroupwhichhadthelowestscore..Italsohasoneof thegreateststandarddeviationscoresof.291,secondtothe16+group. TheRiskExposureGroup(Divisions&Stations)hasthemostnotable

differencesinscores.Slowerstationshaveatendencytowardshighercombined meanscoresthenbusierstationsandtheSouthBattalion(slower)haveahigher combinedmeanscorethantheNorthBattalion(busier).TheFirePrevention DivisionandtheVolunteergrouphavethehighestmeanscoreswhileOperations, Administration,andtheTrainingDivisionhavelowercombinedmeanscores.One mightexpecttheAdministrationDivisiontohavethehighestscoresincetheyhave

CCFD1SafetyCulture 59 moreyearsofserviceandarefurtherremovedfromtherisk;however,asignificant numberofadministrativepersonneladvancedthroughtheranksandmaystillbe influencedbytheOperationalCulture.VolunteersandthePreventionStafftendto havealesserdegreeofriskexposure,whichmightexplaintheirhighercombined meanscores.Inaddition,manyVolunteershaverecentlyfinishedtherecruit academyandmaybeinfluencedbyjobrelatedsafetytraining.Theseresultsare comparablewiththestudybyWilliams(2007),wheretheVolunteergroupscored higherthantheCareergroup.Hereagain,theliteraturesupportsthis,Pessemier (2008)suggeststhatpersonnelexposedtoriskonaregularbasistendtohavea highertolerancetorisk.Severalanswersfromtheopenendedquestionsshowthat somefirefightersfeelsafetycanbeoverdoneandthatinjuriesareinevitable.This attitudemightexplainwhygroupswithgreaterexposuretorisk,tendtohavelower scores. Next,isthediscussionofthesecondhypothesis:firefighterswilltendtovalue

efficiencyoversafety.Here,againweseealowercombinedmeanscorefromthe OperationsgroupincomparisontotheoverallOrganization(Table26),specifically inthedimensionwheresafetymayhaveanimpactontherequiredtasks.For example,thereisanotablelowerscoreforthequestion:Safetyequipmenthasthe potentialtoadverselyaffectefficiency.Here,responsesfromtheopenended questionshelpexplainwhythismightoccur.Severalanswerssuggestthat firefightersfeeltheycanbetoosafe,orthatsafetycangetinthewayofgettingthe jobdoneefficiently.Thisalsomayalludetothepracticeofomittingtheuseof certainsafetyequipmentinordertoperformmoreefficiently.Theimpactor

CCFD1SafetyCulture 60 perceivedimpactthatsafetyrelatedpoliciesorprocedureshaveonrequiredtasksis ofparticularimportancewhenitcomestopolicyorprocedureimplementation.If indeed,firefightershaveabiastowardsefficiency,thenwemustmakesurewe addresstheimpactthepolicyorprocedurehasonefficiency.Evenwhenfirefighters advocateforandagreetoasafetyrelatedpolicyorprocedure,ifitnegatively influencesefficiency,itwouldnotlikelybefollowed. Theliteratureonthisdimensionofsafetycultureisminimal.However,

researchbyOmodei,Mclennan,andReynolds(2005)showthatwildland firefighterstendedtoignoretheobvioussignsoffatigueanddehydrationinorderto completeatask.Thiscandoattitudecanbefoundthroughoutthefireservice regardlessofthetypeoffirefighting.Furtherresearchisneededtohelpdetermine howfirefightersassessrisksinceitisuncleariffirefighterssimplydevelopahigher toleranceforriskoruseadifferentsetofcriteriawhencompletingrisk/benefit analysis.Regardless,itisclearthatthesafetyisperceivedbyfirefighterstohavea negativeimpactonefficiencyandmustbeconsideredwhendevelopingnewsafety proceduresofpolicieswithinanorganization. Thelasthypothesisattemptstoexploretherelationshipbetweensafetyand

accountability.Thehypothesisstates:firefighterswilltendtovalueindividual accountabilityoversafety.Admittedly,thisisprimarilybasedonobservationwith verylittleliteraturetovalidateit.Again,theNASAstudy(2004)suggeststhatin hierarchicalorganizations,positionwithinthatorganizationwillhavesomeaffect ontheperceptionofsafety.Theresultsofthisstudydonotsuggestthereisa

CCFD1SafetyCulture 61 significantdifferencebetweenrankandyearsofservicewhenitcomestosafety perception;infact,thescoresareveryclosetothatoftheoverallorganization.Since rankwasnotidentifiedinthestudy,acomparisonofmeanscoresrelatedtotheH3 questionswasmadeusingYearsofService.3


Table30H3Meanscorecomparison

16+Years 3.67

915Years 3.53

48Years 3.65

03Years 3.74

Organization 3.65

Again,theseresultsaresimilartothefindingofWilliams(2007)and

Pessemier(2008)andmaysuggestthatanyreluctanceonthepartoftheobserver tointervenemaybebasedontheperceptionofrisk.Slovic,Fischhoff,and Lichtenstein(1980)suggestthatiftheobserverhasanequalorhighertolerancefor risk,theymaybelesslikelytointervene.Inotherwords,iftheobserverhasalower riskperception,theywillhaveahigherrisktoleranceandwillseenoneedto interveneintheaction.Theirresearchalsosuggeststhattheriskperceptionis basedonacombinationofseverityandtheprobabilityofinjury.RiskToleranceand RiskPerceptioninthefireservicewillneedtobestudiedfurtherifwearetofully understandhowandwhyfirefightersmakethedecisionsrelatedtosafety.This issuewillbediscussedfurtherintherecommendationsection. Recommendations

3ThereisadirectcorrelationbetweenyearsofserviceandrankwithinCCFD1.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 62 Theresultsofthisstudyhavehelpedtoidentifyareasforimprovement

withintheorganization.Further,theresultssuggestthatadditionalresearchis neededtohelpcomprehendtheassociationbetweenRiskPerception,Risk Tolerance,andAccountabilityintermsofsafetyrelateddecisionmaking.The resultsofthestudysuggestthatthereisarelationshipbetweenriskexposureand risktoleranceandanunderstandingofthisrelationshipwillbebeneficialinfurther improvingtheorganizationalsafetyculture.Fromtheresultsofthisstudy,the authorrecommendsthatthefollowingareasbeaddressedthroughtheeffortsofthe SafetyCommitteeandsubcommitteesunderthedirectionoftheSafetyOfficer:(a) Additionalresearchinsafetybehavior,(b)Improvedrecordkeepingdetailinginjury ratesandsubsequentcostsassociatedwiththoseinjuries,(c)Sustainabilityofsafety relatedprograms,(d)WellnessandFitness,(f)andaStakeholderanalysisrelatedto safetyissue.Inadditiontothesegeneralareas,thefollowingspecifictopicsneedto beaddressed:(a)The16FireFighterLifeSafetyInitiatives,(b)Communications,(c) SafetyCultureChange,(d)SafetyProcedures,(e)Training,SafetyrelatedPolicies,(f) SafetyRelatedEquipment,(g)Enforcement,and(h)Leadership. Thefirstfourrecommendationstranscendtheorganizationandshouldnot

bethesoleresponsibilityofthedistrictSafetyCommitteeoritssubcommittees. However,theauthorbelievestheseitemsmustbeaddressedtoensure sustainabilityofthesafetyprogramandtofurtherchangeandimprovethe organizationalsafetyculture.Inaddition,theremustbeanexuscreatedbetween thegroupswiththeabovementionedareasofresponsibilitytopreventthe individualgroupsfromworkinginanuncoordinatedeffort.Forexample,theFitness

CCFD1SafetyCulture 63 &WellnesscommitteeshouldworkcloselywiththeSafetycommitteeandthe Equipmentcommitteeshouldbeinvolvedaswell.Allareinterrelatedandshould notfunctionseparatefromoneanotherinordertopreventthesiloeffectcommon inorganizations. Thefirstofthesetopicsandthefoundationofthisstudybeginswiththefirst

ofthe16FireFighterLifeInitiatives.Itisalsothestartingpointforaddressingthe remaining15initiatives.ThefirstrecommendationisthatClackamasFireDistrict #1formallyadaptthe16LifeSafetyInitiativesandthroughtheSafetyCommittee formsubcommitteestospecificallyconcentrateonalloftheLifeSafetyInitiativesin aninclusive,sustainablemethod.Secondly,Communicationsinregardstosafety mustbeenhanced.Theresultsoftheopenendedquestionsshowthatlessons learnedfromothereventsneedtobedisseminatedthroughoutthedepartment. ThereviewedliteraturerecommendsthatlessonLearnedinformationbeshared throughoutanorganizationinaformalizedmanner.AtCCFD1,thiscouldbe accomplishedthroughseveralmethodsofcurrentlyestablishedformsof communication.Thesemethodsincludedusingthedistrictintranetasamethodto distributetimelyinformationandtoaddlinkstoothersafetyrelatedsightssuchas BillyGoldfedersTheSecretList@FirefightersCloseCalls.comand www.Everyonegoeshome.comwebsite,bothdedicatedtobringingclosecall/near missstoriestotheforefront.Secondly,thisinformationshouldbeformally communicatedtocompanyofficersduringdrillsandmandatorytrainingevents. Informal,nonscheduledtrainingthroughBattalionChiefswouldalsobeaneffective methodtopassoninformationandincorporateitintothenormaloperating

CCFD1SafetyCulture 64 procedures.Lastly,regularcommunicationsfromthedistrictSafetyOfficer regardingfindingsfrominjuriesandnearmissincidentswithinthedepartment mustbecommunicatedthroughformalchannelssuchatrainingandinformal forumssuchastheHotSheetortheD1net. Thenextrecommendationpresentedspecificallyaddresseesthe

OrganizationalSafetyCultureofCCFD1.Thisstudyisthefirststepinaddressingthe 16FirefighterLifeSafetyInitiativesandstartedwithageneral,Organizational CulturalSurveyin2008,andnowthecurrentOrganizationalSafetyCulturesurvey. Understandingtheorganizationalcultureintermsofsafetyisparamountbeforeany discussionofchangecanoccur.TheresultsofthesurveysuggestthatClackamas CountyFireDistrict#1hasahighlypositiveattitudeintermsofsafetyandis comparativetothestudiesbyWilliams(2007)andPessemier(2008).Itis recommendedthatfurtherresearchbecompletedonfirefightersafetyrelated behaviorandanindepthstudyontheoverallsafetycultureoftheorganization completed.Thisissuggestedsincethefocusofthecurrentstudyattemptedtoelicit specificsafetyrelatedperceptionsandattitudesanddidnotaddressothersafety relateddimensionspertinenttofullyunderstandingtheoverallorganizational culture. AddressingSafetyProceduresisthenextproposal.Itisrecommendedthat

theSafetyCommitteeformasubcommitteetospecificallyaddresssafetyrelated procedureswithintheorganization.Awebportalshouldbecreatedtoallow suggestionsandrecommendationstobecollectedandreviewedbythecommittee

CCFD1SafetyCulture 65 throughoutthemeetingcycle.Feedbackduringthisprocessisimportandshouldbe consideredaspartoftheprocess.SinceSafetyrelatedPolicyiscloselyrelatedtothis subject,theportalshouldhaveasectionforboth.Committeemembersmaythen needtofiltersubmittedsuggestionstoandforwardthemtotheappropriatesub committeeorDivision. Trainingrelatedresponsesaccountedforoneofthehighestresponseratesof

theopenendedquestionsat18%fortheorganizationand16%fortheindividual response.Often,theseresponseswerecorrelatedwithcommunicationsintermsof lessonslearned.ItisimportanttonotethatresearchbyLehmann,Haight,and Michael(2009)suggestthatonthejobsafetytrainingmaynotbeadequateenough tochangesafetyrelatedbehaviors,especiallyinregardstoriskperceptionand tolerance.Additionalpsychologicalandbehavioraltrainingmayberequiredto changesafetyrelatedattitudeswithintheorganization.Itisalsoimportanttonote, thattheTrainingDivisionhadoneofthelowestscoresinsafetyperceptionwhen comparedtootherdivisionswithintheorganization.Furtherunderstandingofthis responseisnecessarytohelpmakeneededchangeswhenappropriate.Lastly,the waywearetrainedshouldbereviewed.Forexample,timerequirementsareoften placedontrainingcompetencies.Theliteraturesuggeststhatthiscouldpossiblyput firefightersatoddswithwhatismostimportant,timeorsafety.Iftimeisperceived tobevaluedoversafety,itcouldhaveanegativeaffectonsafety. Safetyrelatedequipmentdidnothaveasmanyresponsesastheabove

sections,howeveritstillrequiresacloserlookastohowtheorganizationcan

CCFD1SafetyCulture 66 improvetheprocessinwhichsafetyequipmentisresearchedandimplemented withinthedepartment.Theresearchandliteraturereviewsuggestsacorrelation betweensafetyandefficiencyandshouldbeconsideredwhenintroducingnew safetyequipment.Forexample,ifsafetyequipmentreducestheefficiencyofa procedure,itislesslikelytobeutilizedduringsaidprocedure,particularlyifthe actionisoflowperceivedriskandconsequence.Again,acommonmethodtocollect suggestionsrelatedtosafetyequipmentshouldbeinplace.Thedistrictintranetis againagoodavenuetocollectrecommendationsandsuggestionsrelatedtosafety equipment. Enforcementofsafetyrelatedpracticeshadthefewestresponseoftheopen

endedquestions.Itisunknownifthisisrelatedtothelackofperceivedneedto enforcesafetypolicesandpracticesorifitrelatedtotheorganizationalculture. Whatissuggestedistheemployeesofthefiredistrictbelievefurtherenforcement methodsarenotrequiredtoimprovesafetywithintheorganization.Itshouldbe notedhowever,thatoneresponsecalledforgreaterenforcementofonscene safetypractices.Lastly,enforcementtendstohaveagreaterimpactonnewer,less senioremployeesandareducedimpactonmoreexperiencedemployees. Enforcementworkswelltoinitiallyestablishthesafetybehavior,butitisthe organizationalculturethatsustainsit. SafetyrelatedtoLeadershipisthelastofthenineidentifieddiscussion

topics.Fromanorganizationalperspective,itinvokedoneofthelowestresponses yetithasoneofthegreatestimpactsontheorganizationalculture.However,

CCFD1SafetyCulture 67 employeesdidnotfeeladdressingleadershipissuesfromanorganizational perspectivewasnecessarytodirectlyimprovesafety.Additionally,theindividual perspectiveinvokedthehighestresponserateof22%oftheanswers.Fromthe responses,itwasapparentthatemployeesfeltthattakingindividualaccountability towardssafetywasthemosteffectiveapproach.Inmostcases,itwassuggestedthat leadingbyexamplewouldbemosteffectiveandthemajorityoftherespondents statedtheyneededtodoso.Itisunclearifthisspecificallyrelatestothethird hypothesisintermsofindividualaccountabilityoversafety,butitdoesshowa willingnesstoberesponsibleforthesafetyofothers. Itisrecommendedthataccountabilityforothersintheorganizationbe

instilledinallemployeesfrominitialtrainingandthroughoutsubsequenttraining sessions.Itisalsoarecommendationthatsupervisorsandcompanyofficerbeheld accountableforinjuriesthattakeplaceontheirwatch.Itisnotsuggestedthatthis bedonethroughthedisciplinaryprocess,butthroughmeasuredperformance standardsrelatedtosafetyviolationsandaccidentrates.Informationrelatedto safetywouldbesharedthroughoutthedistrictthroughthecurrentlyestablished communicationmethods. Lastly,itisrecommendedthattheFireDistrictimprovetrackingofinjuries

andtheassociatedcosts.Asmentioned,thedistricthasbeenproactiveand progressiveinitspursuitofasaferorganizationandithashadapositiveimpacton theorganization.However,withoutadequatemeasurementtools,wehavenoway ofdeterminingoureffectivenessofouractions.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 68 Insummary,Ibelievethepresentedresearchhasofferedsomeinsightofthe

overallsafetyculturewithinClackamasFireDistrict#1.Thisprojectisasignificant steptowardsdefiningandadvocatingtheneedforculturalchangewithinthe organizationrelatedtosafety.Theauthorbelievesthatamorethorough understandingofhowfirefightersvaluesafetywillallowforimprovedeffectiveness whenintroducingandimplementingnewsafetyrelatedpolicesandprocedures.It alsooffersrecommendationsforimprovingandmaintainingsafetyrelatedpractices withintheorganization. Further,theauthorencouragesadditionalresearchinorganizationsafety

culture,particularlyusingasurveythataddressnotonlytheOrganizationalCulture, butSafetyRelatedBehaviorsandSafetyManagementSystems.Inall,ClackamasFire District#1scoredpositiveinalldimensionssurveyed,OrganizationalPolicy, OrganizationalLeadership,andSafetyProceduresandtheauthorfeelsthisisa refectionofanorganizationcommittedtothesafetyofitsemployees.Thisdoesnot meanwecanneglectthefutureeffortstoimproveuponourorganization.Each injuryhasarelatedcostassociatedwithit,bothfinanciallyandemotionallyandwe cannotacceptinjuriesaspartofthecostofdoingbusiness.Firefightersareheroes, notbecauseoftheirsacrifices,butbecauseoftheircommitmenttohelpandsave othersinneed.Thepurposeofthisresearchistobetterunderstandour organizationalsafetycultureandtohelpsavethelivesofthosewhosaveothers.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 69

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CCFD1SafetyCulture 70 BerkeleyLabCommunicationsDept.(2005).SafetyCultureSurveyResultsareIn. RetrievedApril5,2010,fromTodayatBerkeleyLab: http://lbl.gov/today/2005/Nov/09Web/safetypage.html Cameron,K.S.,&Quinn.(2006).DiagnosingandChangingOrganizationalCulture. SanFrancisco,CA:Jossey&Bass. Carroll,J.S.(202).Safetycultureasanongoingprocess:culturesurveysas opportunitiesforinquiryandchange.MITSloanSchoolofManagement. Celinska,K.(2007).IndividualismandCollectivismInAmerica:TheCaseofGun OwnershipandAttitudesTowardsGunControl.SocialPespectives,50(2),229247. Chute,R.W.(1995).Cockpitcabincommunicationsataleoftwocultures. InternationalJournalofAviationPsychology,5,257276. Ciavarelli,A.C.(2004).Organizationalfactorsinaccidentriskmanagement.Safety acrosshighconsequenceindustriesconference. ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1.(2009).ClackamasCountyFireDistrict#1. Retrieved200923MayfromAboutUs: http://www.clackamasfire.com/aboutus.html ClackamasFireDistrict#1.(2009).OSHA300Records. Clark,S.(1999).Perseptionsoforganizationalsafety:implicationsforthe developmentofsafetyculture.JournalofOrganizationalBehavior,20,185198. Cooper,D.(20011February).TreatingSafetyAsAValue.SafetyManagemetn, pp.1721. EveryoneGoesHomeInitiative.(2004).AbouttheEveryoneGoesHomeInitiative. RetrievedMarch2,2009,fromEveryoneGoesHomeFirefighterLifeSafety Initiative:www.everyonegoeshome.com Goldfeder,B.(2010).TheSecretList.RetrievedMay13,2010,fromFirefighterClose Calls:www.firefighterclosecalls.com Harvey,J.E.,Bolem,G.,Cox,H.,&Gregory,M.J.(2002).AnAnalysisofsafetyculture attitudesinahighlyregulatedenvironment.Work&Stress,16(1),1936. Hatch,M.J.(2002).TheDynamicsoforganizationalIdentity.HumanRelations,55, 9891018. HealthandSafetyExecutiveProject.(n.d.).SafetyClimateandMeasurementUser GuideandToolKit.RetrievedMarch26,2010,fromSafetyClimateandMeasurement UserGuideandToolKit: http://www.lut.ac.uk/department/bs/safety/document.pdf

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AppendixA
Whichoneofthefollowingbestdescribesyourposition?
1 Operations 2 Administration 3 Training 4 Prevention 5 Volunteer

YearsofService 03years 1

CCFD1SafetyCulture 73
48years 2 915years 3 4 16yearsormore

Rank FireFighter 1 2 CompanyOfficer ChiefOfficer 3 Administrative 4 Strongly


Strongly Agree

1.Thedepartmentisgenuinelyconcernedaboutsafety cdefg 2.LeadershipprovidesapositiveclimatethatpromotessafeFire/EMS operations cdefg 3.Theaccidentandinjuryrateinourdepartmentiswithinindustry standards.... cdefg 4.Firefightingactivitiesaremadeassafeastheycanbe cdefg 5.Thedepartmentdoesenoughtopromotesafety cdefg 6.Leadershipconductsadequatereviewsandupdatesofsafetystandardsand operatingprocedures...cdefg 7.Thedepartmenthasawelldefinedsafetyprogramcdefg 8.Leadershipcloselymonitorsproficiencystandardstoensurefirefightersare qualifiedtofunctionsafelycdefg 9.Irelyonmysupervisortokeepmycoworkersandmesafe.................cdefg 10.OurHealth/SafetyPoliciesandProceduresareadequatetoprovideasafe workingenvironment...cdefg 11.Supervisorsencouragereportingsafetydiscrepancieswithoutfearofnegative repercussions....cdefg 12.Safetyequipmenthasthepotentialtoadverselyaffectefficiencycdefg 13.Coworkersarewillingtoreportsafetyviolations,unsafebehaviors,orhazardous conditions......cdefg 14.Peerinfluencesareeffectiveatdiscouragingviolationsofstandardoperating proceduresorsafetyrules...cdefg 15.Violationsofsafetyrulesarerare..cdefg 16.Minorsafetyviolationsareacceptableiftheriskisminimal.cdefg
Disagree

CCFD1SafetyCulture 74 17.Iammoreresponsiblewhenitcomestofollowingsafetyproceduresthanmy coworkers..cdefg 18.Mydepartmenthasareputationforsafety..cdefg 19.Mysupervisorscloselymonitorsafetyproceduresandcorrectanydeviations fromestablishedsafetystandards.cdefg 20.Supervisorspermitcuttingcornerstogetthejobdone...cdefg 21.Icansafelydeterminetheproperlevelofsafetyequipmentneededtoperform myassignedduties...cdefg 22.Ihavesometimesfelttoofatiguedtodomyjobsafely..cdefg 23.Gettingthejobdoneefficientlyisimportant....cdefg 24.Thelackofexperiencedpersonnelhasadverselyaffectedthesafetyofmy job...cdefg 25.Safetydecisionsaremadeattheproperlevels,bythemostqualifiedpeoplein theorganization.....cdefg 26.Leadershiptakesthetimetoidentifyandassessrisksassociatedwithits Fire/EMSoperations...cdefg 27.Coworkerswillremindmetousepropersafetyequipment.....cdefg 28.OperationalRiskManagementprocessesareincorporatedintothedecision makingatalllevels...cdefg 29.Mydepartmentwouldratherloseabuildingthanunnecessarilyriskmy personalsafetycdefg 30.Leadershipissuccessfulincommunicatingitssafetygoalsto personnel...cdefg 31.Leadershipcommunicatesthelessonslearnedfromaccidents,injuries,andnear missreports.cdefg

32.Mistakeshaveleadtochangesinsafetyprocedures.cdefg 33.Leadershipsetstheexampleforcompliancewithsafetystandards..cdefg 34.Mysupervisordoesnothesitatetotemporarilyrestrictindividualstoofatigued tocontinuetoworksafely.......cdefg

CCFD1SafetyCulture 75 35.Iamadequatelytrainedtosafelyconductallmyassignedduties..cdefg 36.Leadershipprovidesadequatesafetybackupstocatchpossiblehumanerrors duringhighriskoperationscdefg 37.Ilooktomysupervisortodeterminetheproperlevelofsafetyequipmenttobe used...cdefg 38.Safetyeducationandtrainingareadequateinmyorganization.cdefg 39.Iamkeptinformedofimportantsafetyinformation..cdefg 40.CoworkersshareanequalresponsibilityinmakingsureIfollowsafetypolicies andprocedures...cdefg 41.Thedepartmentprovidesadequatesafetyequipmentformyassigned duties....cdefg 42.Iutilizemysafetyequipmentmoreoftenthanmycoworkers.....cdefg 43.Usingpropersafetyequipmentisprimarilytheindividuals responsibility....cdefg 44.Iamcomfortablewithremindingmycoworkerstousesafety equipment...cdefg 45.IamsureitisamatteroftimebeforeIaminvolvedinanaccidentcdefg 46.SometimesIamnotgivenenoughtimetogetthejobdonesafelycdefg 47.Iunderstandthesafetyrulesformyjob.cdefg 48.Thesafetyofcrewmembersismyresponsibility..cdefg

AppendixB
InterviewQuestions 1. Whatwouldyousayisthemostimportantinourdepartment,safety,or performance?

CCFD1SafetyCulture 76 2. Underwhatcircumstancesorconditionswouldanunsafeactbeignoredor hiddenandgounreported?Ifitdoeshappen,why? 3. Underwhatcircumstancesorconditionswouldyouviolateasafety procedure? 4. Aretherecircumstanceswhereyouwouldnotremindacoworkertouse properprotectiveequipmentofsafetyprocedure?

AppendixC
Figure4Operations

CCFD1SafetyCulture 77

Figure5Training

Figure6Prevention

CCFD1SafetyCulture 78

Figure7Administrations


Figure8Volunteer

CCFD1SafetyCulture 79

CCFD1SafetyCulture 80

AppendixD
Figure9Station1

Figure10Station2

CCFD1SafetyCulture 81
Figure11Station3

Figure12Station4

CCFD1SafetyCulture 82
Figure13Station5

Figure14Station6

CCFD1SafetyCulture 83
Figure15Station8

Figure16Station10

CCFD1SafetyCulture 84
Figure17Station11

Figure18Station15

CCFD1SafetyCulture 85
Figure19Station16

Figure20Station17

AppendixE

CCFD1SafetyCulture 86 YearsofService
Figure21

Figure22

Figure23915YearsofService

CCFD1SafetyCulture 87

Figure2416+YearsofService

AppendixF

CCFD1SafetyCulture 88

SafetyCultureSurvey2010 Howdoyoufeeltheorganizationcouldimprovesafety? ResponseCount64answeredquestion64skippedquestion95 ResponseText 1.communication 2.Lesspunitiveandmorecommittedtojustdoingtherightthings.Thisisanissue ofdepartmentcultureandnotjustsafety. 3.Furtherimbedsafetyinourorganizationalculture.Eachdrillshouldbeginwitha safetymessage. 4.Manyofourinjuriesarebackrelated.Wecanlookatbetterwaysofmoving people,deadweight.Training,equipment?Howdotheymovepts.inthehospital? 5.Bycontinuingtofosteraculturethatissafetyoriented. 6.Embedsafetycomponentsintoalltrainingandenforcesafetypoliciesthatarein place 7.Provide2setsofturnoutstoeveryone.Providethelatestequipmentandsafety geartooperationalpeople.Equipmentwouldbeabudgetpriorityandnot secondarytoinformationgathering. 8.Morelinepersonnelinput 9.Sharingthenearmissesdistrictwidewouldbegood.Idon'thearofmanythough Iknowtheyhappenmoreoften. 10.Fullyaddressthedieselexhaustproblem,addressproblemswitholder apparatus(seatbelts,emergencylighting),Continuethetrainingthatwecurrently haveandalwaysseekopportunitiestoimprove. 11.Specificallyaddresssafetyofinteriorfirefighting.Forinstance,newpeopleare beingtaughtnewtechniquesoffightingfireintheCFBTburnprop(whicharegood techniques)butsomecomeawaythinkingthatishowwearegoingtofightfire insteadofrealizingthatisatooltofightfireifyouareunfortunateenoughtofind yourselfinthattypeofhazardousatmosphere.Ibelieveweneedtodoabetterjob ofemphasizingcontrollingthefireenvironmentpriortoenteringastructure.Just oneexample. 12.Increasetrainingand/orresponsibilityforthosewhoperformhighrisklow

CCFD1SafetyCulture 89 frequencymissions(i.e.:rope,water,etc...).Limitthoseallowedintheworkingarea (akahotzones)ofsuchevents. 13.Notgooverboardwithsafety,itwillpushpeopleaway 14.Continuetolearnfrommistakesmadehereandinfireorganizationsaroundthe world. 15.Currentlydoingagoodjob.DistrictSafetyOfficerisabenefittoCFD#1.Share nearmissreportsconfidentially. 16.Ihavenocomplaintswiththesafetyconcernsinmydivision,welookaftereach otherandremindeachotherwhensafetyconcernsarenoticed 17.Bettercommunication 18.Ibelieveweneedtohavesometypeofsecuritycamerasorwindowtosee peoplewhoarecominginLogistics. 19.Askpeopletosubmitnewsafetyrulesforajobwhentheyfeelit'sneeded.then getbacktothemhowit'sgoing. 20.Doingagoodjobnow 21.Regardingthelastquestion,Ithinkwemitigatehazardswell,butinjuryismore orlessinevitable. 22.Newer,better,lighterequipment.TakingtheEMSequipmentoutofthecabs. 23.Sendingmoreresourcestoemergencies.Wearesometimesmoreconcerned withaneventthatmighthappenthantheeventthatiscurrentlyhappening.We needtospendconsiderablemoretimeinhandsontraining,workingtogetherand gettingoutintoourfirstdueareas. 24.continueonthepathofimprovingsafety 25.Nothaveuslooklikecopsinthecolorandappearanceofoureverydayuniform. Thisputsmeandmycrewinimmediatedangerwhendealingwithalteredmedical patients,andwedon'thaveaweapontoprotectourselves 26.Makeitateameffort. 27.IfeelthatkeepingourEMSkitsintheinsideofourApparatusisahealthhazard duetoallofthehousesthatwegointo.Ialsothinkthatkeepingthekitsinside contributestoshoulderinjuriesandstressonourshouldersingeneralbecauseof havingtoliftalargekitdownasyouareturningorsteppingoffastep.Itseemslike

CCFD1SafetyCulture 90 itwouldn'tbeveryhardtomovethekitstotheoutside. 28.Handsontraining(evenbriefinhousetraining)oneverynewpieceof equipmentforfireandEMS. 29.Keeptraining.AndlearnfromotherDept.mistakes,andourown. 30.Ithinkwe'redoinganadequatejob. 31.Bettercommunicationbetweenallranks. 32.Haveleadersleadbyexample.Greateronsceneenforcement. 33.Morestaffingalwaysaswellassparesetsofturnoutgear.Thereisnopossible waytoproperlycleangearwhichiscontaminatedduringashiftitmustbedone after.Atstationsthatrunnightcallsregularlypersonnelaretiredduetolongwork daysontopofrunningalarms. 34.HiringafulltimeDSO/ISOwasagreatstepintherightdirectionfortwo reasons:1)DSO/ISOrespondstoincidentsandhissolejobistoactinthatcapacity. 2)Hispositionsendsastrongandpowerfulmessagetoallemployeesthatsafetyis animportantvirtueatCCFD1.BudgeforpagerpayforbackuponcallISO'sto respondwhenCaptainPhillipsisoffduty(likeonweekends.) 35.Incorporatemorecommonsensepractices 36.Investmoremoneytogetequipmentthatwouldimprovesafety,suchasinmask crewcommunicationdevices,Arizonatruckbelts,andequipmentthatwouldaidin ourliftingofheavypt's 37.Continuetoresearchthenewestandlatestsafetyreports/findings. 38.Train,train,train.Firegroundhandsondrillswithanemphasisonpropersafety procedureswillimprovespeedefficiencyandoverallperformance.Additionallyit willreenforcesafetyprocedures,makingthemsecondnature. 39.Letsopenlydiscussandlearnfromeachothersmistakes/accidents.wecan shareexperienceswithoutmakingsomeonelookbad,usestoriesasawaytolearn frombadsituations.Nearmissstoriescouldchangebehaviorfortherestofus. Someoneinjuredornearmisscouldchangethewaywethinkandactoncalls.lets startanearmisstabontheD1netthatcouldkeepstorieswith"howtomakeit betterexplanations.Justathought...onthisnetsite,wecouldkeepothernearmiss storiesfromacrossthecountry.Letsorganizeaweblocationforallsafety messages/storiesforcrewstogotoandlearnfrom 40.Continuetobeattheforefrontofequipment/technologyadvancesandcontinue totrainandeducatesafepractices.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 91 41.Morehandsonfiregroundtraininginlieuofsomegeneralbusinesspractices.At timeswearemoreconcernedaboutmakingwidgetsthanreallyimprovingour efficacyandexperiencethatwillresultinourimprovedsafety. 42.Anonymousnearmissreportingandreview. 43.Whatdoesourdepartmentsafetyofficerdoallday?REALLY! 44.CommunicateandsharewhatshappeninginandaroundourDept.Learnfrom others 45.Moreofateamorientedapproachtosafety. 46.Obtainmoreinputfromlinepersonnelwhoareinvolvedinthehigherrisk activitiesandmorelikelytobeinjuredbyunsafeacts. 47.Iamnotanemergencyserviceemployee;Iworkintheofficeandamnotsure. 48.ImplementCrewResourceManagement(CRM)atalllevels. 49.Fourpersoncompanies. 50.Ifeelthatthedistrictiscurrentlyperusingnewwaystoimproveonthesafety programandIamconfidentthattheyhavemybestinterestinmind. 51.Ithinktheyaredoingagreatjobatit. 52.Ifeelwearedoingwell@it 53.DefinetheroleofthesafetyofficerwithintheDistrict...issendingoutfood recallsreallynecessary?Itseemsdistractingmorethenhelpful.Onsignificant incidentshavetheofficercompletingthereport,puttogetherabriefsummaryof lessonslearned/safetypoints.Havingtoputtogetheraquickemailreleasetothe organizationwillpromptmoremeaningfuldedebriefsattheincidentscene. HavetheSOputtogethergoalsfortheyearandalsopublishatyearsendwhere peoplearegettinghurt,typeofinjuriesandtimelossstats.Thiswouldaidin identifyingtotheorgwherewehavesafetyholesinourservicedelivery.Be cautiouswith"pushingdownwork"totheCompanylevel.Itdistractsfromtraining andfitnessbyovercommittingthecompanies.DoasurveyusingRMStoseehow muchtimecrewsactuallyparticipateinphysicaltrainingandsetperformancegoals. HavetheSOpresentattheannualCompanyOfficerstraining.Makeasafety discussionanintentionalpartofeverytrainingsessionincorporateitintothe lessonplanandobjectives. 54.Fourpersoncompanies.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 92 55.Putafourthoneveryrig. 56.Upgradeourresponsesystemtoambulanceonlycalls,somanyBScallswearus down.Backofftheuniformgarbage.Feelslikethatisthemostimportantthingis howwearedressedvs.howweperform.Leavepeoplestationedinthesamestation foraslongaspossible.Movingmeansnewhazardstofind,insteadofalready knowingthem. 57.Byspecificallyusingtheinputfromemployeesthatwearthegearanduseitto determinewhetherornotweasanorganizationshouldbuyit.OurSCBA'sSUCKare piecesofCRAPandarenotwhatthecommitteewantedtobuy.Butwearestuck wearingthesereallypatheticairpacksforyearsnow. 58.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 59.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 60.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 61.SometimesbeingtoomuchofasafetySusiegetsinthewayofsafelydoingyour job.Beingtoosafecansometimesbeunsafe.Learn,teachandlisten. 62.Continuedlearningfromothers'incidents.Notgetoverzealous,butcontinueto reassessprocedures. 63.Morefocusonsafety,lessfocusontimecriteriaduringpracticaltraining.Time limitscreateasenseofurgencyanddistractionduringpracticalevaluations, potentiallyimpairingsafety. 64.Communicateonregularbasis.Offerremindersonpolicyandreasoningbehind changes.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 93 SafetyCultureSurvey2010 Howcouldyouimprovesafetywithintheorganization? ResponseText ResponseCount61answeredquestion61skippedquestion98 1.Communications 2.Leadbyexample,takepersonalownershipinthesafetyofallemployees. 3.Continuetokeepmyeyesopenfordangeroussituationsandposs.hazards. Educatedthenewguysonsafetyissuesandwhatihaveseeninthepast. 4.BycontinuingtakingtheleadinperformingdaytodaytasksutilizingproperPPE inallsituationsandencouragingcoworkerstodothesame. 5.Enforceexistingruleswithsubordinates.Leadbyexample 6.Encourageotherstowearpropergear. 7.Followtheruleinplaceandusethesafetyequipmentwehavewhenit's necessary,andbeingabletotalktotheofficerinchargewheni'mdon'tfeelsafe doingsomething. 8.Bysettingtheexample 9.Payingmoreattentiontothelocationofmycoworkersonscene. 10.Communicationwithcoworkers,safetychecks 11.Continuetostresstheimportanceofsafetyandleadbyexample. 12.ProvidefeedbackupthechainofcommandifIseesomethingthatishazardous. 13.IcouldalwaysimproveonslowingdownandlookingbeforeIleap.Consider consequencesmorecautiously.Wheremysafetyglassesmore,especiallyonEMS calls.Thereisalwaysroomforimprovement. 14.Keeptrainingandenforcingexistingsafetyguidelines. 15.Leadingbyexample.Alwaysthinkingofsafetyfirst.Evenifitdelaysyouractions slightly.Allowotherstodothesame.Itisacultureshift. 16.PromotesafepracticespersonallyandasaSupervisorleadbyexample. Encouragecrewtoperformsafetasks.Training.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 94 17.BemoremindfulofsafetyproceduresandPPEuse 18.Geteveryonemoreinvolvedwiththeprocess. 19.Alwaysusesafetyequipmentprovided 21.Trainingandthensomemoretrainingfollowedupwithsomemoretraining. 20.MakingsurethatmycoworkersandIarewearingthecorrectPPEforeach situation. 22.Thereisalwayssomethingthatcanbeusedorgainedfromreviewingsafety issues,continuethis 23.Haveourdressattireincluderedpoloshirtswithlargewhitelettersontheback. 24.Makeitmygoalandresponsibility 25.Overall,Ithinksafetyisverygoodhereatthedistrict.Ibelievethereisavery goodbalancethatleadstotheFFbeingabletoperformandgiveagoodserviceto thepublic.Ibelievethatweareaggressiveenoughtobeveryeffective,butonthe samehand,wearesafeenoughthateveryonegoeshome. 26.Watchmybackandthebacksofothersonthejob. 27.TRAINING 28.Workonmymaster'sdegreeandaskeveryonetoparticipateinasillysurvey aboutsafetyintheworkplace. 30.Improvethesafetyculture 29.Doabetterjobofcommunicatingmyexperienceswithothers,topreventsimilar accidents. 31.Bewellrestedasmuchaspossible,goodnutritionandexerciseandutilizeall safetyequipment. 32.Byprojectingandpracticingsolidandpositivesafetypractices.Byleadinga safetyexampleandtheproperpositiveattitude.Byfollowingallsafetyandrisk assessmentpoliciesandprocedures. 33.Betheexample(positive) 34.Icouldusemyprovidedsafetyequipmentonamoreconsistentbasis.

CCFD1SafetyCulture 95 35.Continuetoresearchthenewestandlatestsafetyreports/findings. 36.Whenitcomestosafetyinthefireservicecommonsenseandproperlyapplied peerpressurecanhaveasignificantimpact. 37.Youareassafeasyourteamthatisworkingaroundyou.Ihavewitnessedunsafe actsbyAMRcrewsthathavethepotentialofcausingaccidents,injuriesor exposures.Examples:NotwearingproperPPE,Questionablesafedriving,improper lifting.Addressingthesecouldimprovesafetyintheworkplace. 38.MoveallEMSgearoutofthecabsoftheengines,intogroundlevel compartments.Doasurveymonkeyonthistopic.Youwillfindthatnoonelikesgear inthecabsoftherigs.ThenewPierceengines,thecomp't'saretoohightobelifting gearoutanddown.HeavyEMSequipmentshouldbekeptinacomp'tat"reachable" levelslikeE23.Thereasontheyhavebeenmovedtothecabsinthefirstplaceisthe medicationsandfluidswillgetcoldoutside.Heatedcompartments?Isthisreallya concern?Werun70%+ofourcallsareEMScallswherewehavetoliftthisgearin andoutofthecab.Notgood.Thisisamajorbattleandneedstobeaddressedifwe arebuyingandbuildingnewrigs.Pleasehelpwiththis!!!Wewouldlovetoseea change...movenonessentialitemsintothecabs,EMSgearouttoaccessible,waist levelheight. 39.Bemorecomfortableremindingcoworkerstousesafetyequipment. 40.Continuetofollowsafetyproceduresandpoliciesandtocontinuetrainingless experiencedpersonnelsotheyfullyunderstandtheinherentdangersofour responsibilities. 42.Notsureifthiswouldbedifferentthanabove. 41.Performtaskssafelyasindividuals.Promotegoodsafetytechniquestoco workers. 43.Moreinformationandprogramsatthecrewlevelenforcingincidentsafety practices. 44.Sharemoreinfo,learnwhatworksandwhatdoesn'twork! 45.Vehicleisstoppedandmaxibrakeissetbeforepeoplegetonorexitthefire vehicle. 46.SetthetoneforutilizingproperPPEandsafetyequipmentroutinely. 47.Iamnotanemergencyserviceemployee;Iworkintheofficeandamnotsure. 48.EducatemembersonCRM

CCFD1SafetyCulture 96 49.FinetuningthingssuchasdecreasingtheneedtoreachupwardforheavyEMS kits.Ifkitscouldbeloweredabit...thatwouldbenice. 50.Bynotcuttingcornersandhelpingtomakesureeveryoneelsedoesthingssafely 51.Promotewearingallsafetyequipmentonallcalls. 52.Trainmore.Belesshurrieduponarrivingonscenetomaintainahighlevelof situationalawareness.Participateinsafetyspecifictrainingonanannualbasis. 53.Alwayswearmysafetyequipment,andencouragethesamefromothers. 54.Pushformoretraining,voiceopinionwithpeers,doitrightthefirsttime,andif somethingisdumb,voiceit. 55.Wecouldthrowawayallofourairpacksandbuynewonesthataretestedand wantedbyourcrewsnotsomeonethatfliesadesk. 56.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 57.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 58.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 59.Goodtraining,andunderstandingacrossallareasoftheorganization,keeping upwithnewidea'sthatmakesense,improvedSOG's,TEAMWORK,review,good equipmentnotlowbudget.AGOODDISPATCHSYSTEM. 60.Takeresponsibilityforyourownsafetyandthesafetyofothers. 61.MaintainmypartinensuringIamalwaysproperlypreparedandequippedto performmyjobsafely. AppendixG

CCFD1SafetyCulture 97 OpenEndedQuestionResults
Graph1OpenEndedQuestion1

Graph2OpenEndedQuestion2

AppendixH

CCFD1SafetyCulture 98 InterviewQuestions
Graph3InterviewQuestion1


Graph4InterviewQuestion2

Graph5InterviewQuestion3

CCFD1SafetyCulture 99


Graph6InterviewQuestion4