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CHAPTER 1 TORT
“A wrong a which has a remedy in common law.” – Salmond
Tort deﬁned and explained Tort in American law is equivalent to “quasi-delict and culpa aquiliana.”1 It is much broader in Anglo-American jurisprudence than the Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from contractual negligence but intentional criminal acts.2 Latin source of the word torts explained The word “torts” comes from the Latin tortus or twisted.3 Tort is a civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained usually in the form of damages, a breach of duty that the law imposes in the form of damages, a breach of duty that the law imposes on everyone in the same relation to one another involved in a given transaction. It is the branch of law dealing with such wrongs.4 According to Houston, “we may deﬁne a tort as a civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages,
Quintao v. Victorias Milling Co., 61 OC 5380. Sec Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 955. Barron’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, citing Prosser & Keeten, Torts, Section 1, 1981 Edition. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p. 196. Houston, Salmond on the Law on Torts, p. 13. 2 Sec Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, p. 955. 3 Barron’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, citing Prosser & Keeten, Torts, Section 1, 1981 Edition. 4 Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p. 196. 1
TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED
and which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust or other obligation.”5 The different kinds of tort enumerated and explained There are different kinds of tort, namely: (1) constitutional tort — A violation of one’s constitutional right by a government ofﬁcer, redressable by a civil action against the ofﬁcer. (2) government tort — A tort committed by the government through an agent, employee or instrumentality under its control. It may not be actionable because the State may not be sued without its consent. (3) mass tort — a civil wrong that injures many people like tort emissions from a factory. (4) intentional tort — a tort committed by someone acting with general or speciﬁc intent. (5) prenatal tort — a tort committed against a fetus. (6) prima facie tort — an unjustiﬁed inﬂiction of harm on another person resulting in damages. (7) personal tort — a tort involving injury to one’s person. (8) property tort — a tort involving damage to property. (9) quasi-tort — a tort for which a non-perpetrator is held responsible.6 Tortious interference with contractual relations explained A third party’s intentional inducement of a contracting party to break a contract, causing damage to the relationship between the contracting parties.7 Tortious interference with prospective advantage explained An intentional damaging intrusion into another’s potential business relationship, such as obtaining customers or employment. Tortfeasor deﬁned A tortfeasor is one who commits a tort, a wrongdoer. Tortious deﬁned Tortious means constituting a tort.8
Houston, Salmond on the Law on Torts, p. 13. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, pp. 1196-1197. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.
CHAPTER 1 TORT
Negotiorum gestio deﬁned and explained A Philippine authority correctly deﬁned negotiorum gestio as a quasi-contract whereby a person who voluntarily takes over the management of the business of the another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents, or require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so.9 Having its origin from the original Latin phrase which means “management of affairs,”10 the Supreme Court has called it in short as the “the management of another’s business.’’11 It is termed as negotium in Latin, or a matter concerning an absent person.12 Indeed, negotiorum gestion is a quasi-contractual situation in which an actor (called negoriorum gestor or oﬁcious manager) interferes in the business transaction of another person (dominus negotii) in that person’s absence, done without authority but out of concern or friendship.13 By such conduct, the actor was bound to conduct the matter to a conclusion and to deliver the transactions proceeds to the absent person, who likewise was bound to reimburse the actor for any expenses incurred.14 When negotiorum gestio shall not exist explained Negotiorum gestio shall not exist: (1) if the gestor acts selfinterestedly; or (2) if the owner forbids the gestor from acting on the owner’s behalf.15 Instances when the juridical relation of negotiorum shall not arise enumerated and explained The instances when the juridical relation of negotiorum gestio shall not arise are enumerated and partly explained in the latter part of Article 2144, Civil Code. Those instances are: (1) when the property is not neglected or abandoned. If the property is not neglected or abandoned, the owner thereof is still taking care
See Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, 2nd Edition, p. 4118. Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, p. 1060. 11 Rivera v. Rivera, 44 OG 3847. 12 Black, supra. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.
pp. The case Republic v. Reyes. SP No.R. .4 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED thereof. 16 Penned by Justice Perlita J. expressly or impliedly. 81-88. shall be unenforceable. Rollo. of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. pp. 200417 in CA-G. The circumstances of the case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine. (2) if in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner. Tria-Tirona (retired). Reyes and Jose C. 200416 and its amended decision of November 30. (jus imperii). or who has acted beyond his powers. “A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation. SP No. and that under the doctrine of “state immunity. 75366. Civil Code. Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility be shredded. we still hold that petitioner cannot escape liability. Moreover. unless it is ratiﬁed.” it cannot be held liable for governmental acts.” The decision follows: This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 30. namely: (1) To perform his duty as ofﬁcious manager in good faith with all the diligence of a good father of the family.” Duties of the gestor or ofﬁcious manager in negotiorum gestor enumerated The gestor or ofﬁcious manager in the quasi-contract of negotiorum gestio have a two-fold duty. with the concurrence of Justices Ruben T. 75359 and CA-G. by the person in whose behalf it is executed. “what is convenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. and (2) To pay the damages which through his fault or negligence shall be suffered by the owner of the property or business under management. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the government. 17 Id. before it is revoked by the other contracting party. 68-80. An agency would have arisen between the parties then. Under Article 1317..R. Unimex Micro Electronics GmBH In this case.
The decision read: “WHEREFORE. 1987. This case was docketed as CTA Case No. duplicators. Commissioner of Customs. taxes. 1987. on June 15. the CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the subject shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs duties.” Id. 1992. Respondent ﬁled a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of Customs (BOC Commissioner) in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). (Handyware). 1992. 1985.CHAPTER 1 TORT 5 The antecedent facts follows: Sometime in April 1985. Inc. the Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the description appearing on the cargo manifest. thus afﬁrming the goods’ forfeiture in favor of the government. . After the shipment arrived in the Port of Manila on July 9. remote controllers. fees and other 18 Entitled “Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH v. respondent Unimex (as shipper and owner of the goods) ﬁled a motion to intervene in the seizure proceedings. Don Tim Shipping Corporation transported the goods with Evergreen Marine Corporation as shipping agent. BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware and later issued a warrant of seizure and detention against the shipment. As a result. 1987 default order against Handyware as ﬁnal and executory. 19 Id. the Collector of Customs issued a default order against Handyware for failing to appear in the seizure proceedings. the Collector of Customs forfeited the goods in favor of the government. 124-128. The CTA decision became ﬁnal and executory on July 20.18 In a decision19 dated June 15.. respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and 171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges. pp.. On June 5. parts and accessories to Handyware Phils. expanders. the decree of forfeiture of [petitioner] Commissioner of Customs is hereby reversed and the subject shipment is hereby ordered released to [respondent] subject to the condition that the correct duties. 98-123. 4317. The Collector of Customs granted the motion but later on declared the June 5.. pp. After an ex parte hearing. Subsequently.
During the ex parte presentation of respondent’s evidence. fees and other charges thereon. It prayed for the immediate release by BOC of its shipment or. pp. 20 21 Id. 1992 decision could no longer be executed due to the loss of respondent’s shipment so it ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods based on the prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation.. duties. Supra at p. hence. The BOC Commissioner failed to ﬁle his answer. 23 Id. however. 1992 decision. 2001. BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its warehouses. p. the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. however. premises considered. 22 Rollo.”20 Unfortunately. The dispositive portion of the decision read: “WHEREFORE. he was declared in default. . to the payment of the proper taxes.675.22 the CTA declared that its June 15. payment of the shipment’s value plus damages. 129-144. [petitioner] is ORDERED to PAY [respondent] the amount of P8. 144. p. respondent ﬁled in the CTA a petition for the revival of its June 15. 2002.200. On September 5. 123. it ﬁled separate claims for damages against Don Tim Shipping Corporation and Evergreen Marine Corporation21 but both cases were dismissed. 1. in the alternative. The payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of the goods or properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs..22 representing the commercial value of the shipment at the time of importation subject.6 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED charges thereon be paid to the Bureau of Customs based on the actual quality and condition of the shipments at the time of the ﬁling of the corresponding import entry in compliance with this decision and further subject to the presentation of Central Bank Release Certiﬁcate. Accordingly.”23 The BOC Commissioner and respondent ﬁled their respective motions for reconsideration (MRs) of the above decision. In its decision of September 19. Instead. respondent’s counsel failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA decision.
75366. . the CA dismissed the BOC Commissioner’s appeal and granted respondent’s. . SP No. . 24 The June 15. respondent contended that the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment should apply.R. On the other hand. the BOC Commissioner argued that the CTA altered its June 15. The CA consolidated the two cases. xxx xxx xxx Finally. The BOC Commissioner and the respondent then ﬁled separate petitions in the CA. 1992 decision by converting it from an action for speciﬁc performance into a money judgment. Considering that the BOC was grossly negligent in handling the subject shipment. in as much as the interim period is equivalent to a forbearance of credit. SP No. The BOC Commissioner’s appeal was docketed as CA-G. the actual damages thus awarded shall be subject to 6% interest per annum. According to the CA: “.24 On the other hand.R. On August 30. The CTA denied both MRs. 25 An Act to Assure the Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency. 2002 directed the payment of the (sic) its value. 2004. . Unimex is likewise entitled to 12% interest per annum in lieu of 6% per annum from the time this Decision becomes ﬁnal and executory until fully paid.R. 4100. It also argued that the CTA erred in not imposing legal interest on BOC’s obligation.CHAPTER 1 TORT 7 In his MR. SP No. in CA-G. 1992 CTA Decision ordered the BOC Commissioner to release to respondent the goods while the CTA Amended Decision dated September 19. this Court ﬁnds Unimex entitled to legal interests. 75359. 75359 and respondent’s as CA-G.25 It added that respondent was also entitled to legal interest. SP No. such interest shall accrue only from the date of the CTA Decision on 19 September 2002 since it is from that the quantiﬁcation of Unimex’s damages have been reasonably ascertained. it ruled that the CTA erred in using as basis the prevailing peso-dollar exchange rate at the time of the importation instead of the prevailing rate at the time of actual payment pursuant to R. Accordingly.R. 75366. the CA held that the BOC Commissioner was liable for the value of the subject shipment as the same was lost while in its custody.A. In CA-G. Be that as it may. .
the appealed Decision. The Bureau of Customs’ liability may be paid in Philippine currency.885. 1987. pp. the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum until the value of the subject shipment is fully paid. is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the Bureau of Customs is adjudged liable to Unimex for the value of the subject shipment in the amount of Euro 669. Upon ﬁnality of this Decision.565. dated 19 September 2002. On November 30. 27 26 . dated 19 September 2002. Dietmar Wenger. computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment with legal interests thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from 15 June 1987 up to the ﬁnality of this Decision. now comes to us via this petition assailing the CTA decision on the following grounds: (1) the June 15. The shipment was paid initially in German Deutschmark.8 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE. The Commissioner insisted that the BOC was not liable to respondent.”28 The Republic of the Philippines. the Euro replaced Deutschmark on 01 January 1999 as common currency of eleven (11) European countries including Germany. Per certiﬁcation issued by the First Secretary of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Manila. 28 Rollo. the appealed Decision. represented by the BOC Commissioner. 1992 CTA judgment Supra note 1. not in US dollars.27 It also demanded that the 6% legal interest be reckoned from the date of its judicial demand on June 15. 81-88. Hon. Accordingly.54. On the other hand.”26 The BOC Commissioner and respondent again ﬁled their respective MRs of the above decision. respondent’s MR sought payment of the goods’ value in euros. computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from 19 September 2002 up to its ﬁnality. the decretal portion of its amended decision read: “WHEREFORE. The Bureau of Custom’s liability [may be] paid in the Philippine currency. In lieu of the 6% interest. is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the Bureau of Customs is adjudged liable to Unimex for the value of the subject shipment in the amount of $466. 2004. the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum upon ﬁnality of this Decision until the value of the subject shipment is fully paid.982. the CA denied the BOC Commissioner’s MR and granted respondent’s.
160109. Id. petitioner contends that once a judgment becomes ﬁnal and executory.CHAPTER 1 TORT 9 could not be altered after it became ﬁnal and executory.. we hold that it cannot impugn respondent’s claim on the basis of laches. Laches Did Not Set in to Frustrate Respondent’s Petition to Revive The June 15. 1. respondent’s case (reviving the June 15. Indeed. 475 SCRA 688. However. 393 SCRA 134 (2002).R.29 We disagree. respondent’s goods were inexplicably lost while under the BOC’s custody. Madriaga. (3) the legal interest imposed was erroneous. 2005. Even if the CTA had maintained its original decision. Inc. In some cases. hence. 1992 decision by ordering it to instead pay the value of the goods. 1992 CTA Decision Regarding petitioner’s second argument. 53. Court of Appeals. Laches is the failure or negligence to assert a right within a reasonable time.30 we held that where facts or events transpire after a decision has become executory. this rule is not absolute. which facts constitute a supervening cause rendering the ﬁnal judgment unenforceable. 30 29 . 1992 CTA judgment) should have been dismissed outright. Modiﬁcation of a Final And Executory Judgment In support of its ﬁrst argument. Also. v. it becomes immutable and unalterable. 440 Phil. still petitioner would have been unable to comply with it for the obvious reason that there was nothing more to deliver to respondent. 1992 CTA decision became ﬁnal and executory. parties do not dispute the fact that after the June 15. G. and (4) the government funds cannot be charged with respondent’s claim without a corresponding appropriation. a ﬁnal judgment may be altered when its execution becomes impossible or unjust. it cannot be altered or modiﬁed. Abalos v. 441 Phil. November 22. the general rule is that once a decision becomes ﬁnal and executory. giving Petition. (2) laches has already set in. Philex Mining Corporation. Natalia Realty. In the case at bar. 391 SCRA 370 (2002). Balanoba v. Certainly. No. said judgment may be modiﬁed. p. 386. thus the CTA erred in changing the tenor of its June 15. this fact presented a supervening event warranting the modiﬁcation of the CTA decision.
Inc.35 Absent any reason that compels us to deviate from the rule. We agree with the CTA (as later afﬁrmed by the CA) that: “There was never negligence or omission to assert its right within a reasonable period of time on the part of [respondent].31 It is not a mere question of lapse or passage of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be asserted. 401 SCRA 197 (2003). 2004. under the principle of equity. 36 Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. yet it does not mean that it was sleeping on its right for it ﬁled a case against the shipping agent and/or the sub-agent. there [was never] an occasion wherein petitioner had abandoned or declined to assert its right. 495 SCRA 308. 200 SCRA 178.36 Since it is an equitable doctrine. 189.37 31 Lopez v.. the CTA was elevated to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. National Labor Relations Commission. 33 Rollo. 398 SCRA 550 (2003). It is invoked to discourage stale claims but is entirely addressed to the sound discretion of the court.A. Thus. we shall not disturb such ﬁndings. 37 Imperial Victor Shipping Agency v. Cristobal. 407 SCRA 518 (2003).32 It is clear from the records that respondent was not guilty of negligence or omission. from the moment it intervened in the proceedings before the Bureau of Customs up to the present time. 84672. 2006. Therefore.34 if afﬁrmed by the CA. 2006. as in this case. the better rule is that courts. 148795.R. 455 Phil. Cruz v. 1059. 147. 140422.R. 9282 which took effect on March 30. [respondent] is diligently trying to ﬁght for what it believes is right. August 7. G. p. should not be bound by the doctrine of laches if wrong or injustice will result. In fact. its application is likewise controlled by reasonable considerations. Court of Appeals. July 17. v.R. Bacalso. 722. 1991. Court of Appeals. Roces. et al. 498 SCRA 37. Neither did it abandon its claim against petitioner. 453 Phil. the doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy and equity. Sandiganbayan. 35 Bulay-og. No. [Respondent] may have failed to secure a writ of execution with this court when the [CTA decision] became ﬁnal and executory due to wrong legal advice. 34 Pursuant to R. G. are conclusive on us. Moreover. No. G. 285. 446 Phil. 449 Phil. v.”33 The rule is that the ﬁndings of fact by the lower court. .10 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED rise to a presumption that a party has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 406 SCRA 190 (2003). No. Domingo v. 32 Republic v. August 5.
2001. the obligation to pay legal interest only arises by virtue of a contract or on account of damages due to delay or failure to pay the principal on which the interest is exacted. an action “upon a judgment” may be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues. and before it is barred by the statute of limitations.” Furthermore.a. Clearly. Article 1144 of the Civil Code. On the other hand. laches never set in because respondent ﬁled its petition for revival of judgment within the period set by the Rules. Rule 39. Section 6 states: “SEC. It added that since the June 15. — A ﬁnal and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within ﬁve (5) years from the date of its entry. In particular. 6. There is no denying that BOC exhibited gross carelessness and ineptitude in the performance of its duty as it could not even explain why or how the goods vanished while in its custody. otherwise. . laches cannot stall respondent’s right to recover what is due to it especially where BOC’s negligence in the safekeeping of the goods appears indubitable. the petition to revive said judgment was ﬁled on September 5. The CTA judgment sought to be revived became ﬁnal and executory on July 20. 199238 and was accordingly entered into the book of judgments on the same date. 1992 CTA decision did not involve a monetary award but merely the release of 38 Supra at p. According to petitioner. 3. the ﬁling of the petition for the revival of judgment was well within the reglementary period provided by law. legal interest. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within ﬁve (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. it is difﬁcult to exonerate petitioner from liability. More importantly. After the lapse of such time. a judgment may be enforced by action. we would countenance a wrong and exacerbate respondent’s loss which to this day has remained unrecompensed.CHAPTER 1 TORT 11 Given the attendant circumstances. With this. Execution by motion or by independent action. Legal Interest May Be Imposed for Use of Money or as Compensatory Damages Petitioner likewise argues that the CA erred in imposing the 6% p.
no demand can be made either judicially or extrajudicially. . In one case. This case does not involve a monetary obligation to be covered by Article 2209. the Supreme Court held: “In a comprehensive sense. Id. 2002: “Interest may be paid either as compensation for the use of money (monetary interest) referred to in Article 1956 of the New Civil Code or as damages (compensatory interest) under Article 2209 above cited. In fact. Our decision subject of this action for revival [of judgment] did not refer to any monetary obligation by [petitioner] towards the [respondent]. interest is demandable if: a) there is monetary obligation and b) debtor incurs delay. the term “debt” embraces not merely money due by contract.40 We quote in agreement the CTA’s disquisition in its decision dated September 19. . the government was never a debtor to the petitioner in order that [Article] 2209 could apply. As clearly provided in [Article 2209]. 139-140. pp. such as tax where the law imposes personal liability therefor. Parallel thereto. . if there was any monetary obligation mentioned.a.” Therefore. Nor was it in default for there was no monetary obligation to pay in the ﬁrst place. We agree with petitioner. but whatever one is bound to render to another. [petitioner] was never under monetary obligation to [respondent]. . there could be no default . . There is default when after demand is made either judicially or extrajudicially. it referred to the obligation of [respondent] to pay the correct taxes. fees and other charges before the release of the goods can be had. there was no basis for the computation and/ or imposition of the 6% p. In the instant case. There is no dispute that this case was originally ﬁled questioning the seizure of the shipment by the Bureau of Customs. duties. for interest to be demandable under Article 2209.”41 39 40 See Article 1956 of the Civil Code. 41 Rollo. either for contract or the requirement of the law. legal interest.12 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED the goods to respondent. there should be a monetary obligation and the debtor was in default. Interest may be paid only either as compensation for the use of money (monetary interest)39 or as damages (compensatory interest). In other words. See Article 2209.
. the present case does not fall within the ﬁrst situation. citing United States of America v.44 42 Cruz. . 39. 46.42 Consequently. 44 Id. We are not likewise unaware of its lackadaisical attitude in failing to provide a cogent explanation on the goods’ disappearance.a. interest is not chargeable against petitioner except when it has expressly stipulated to pay it or when interest is allowed by the legislature or in eminent domain cases where damages sustained by the owner take the form of interest at the legal rate. 35. citing Arasola v.43 we still hold that petitioner cannot escape its liability.. legal interest upon the ﬁnality of the decision of this case until the value of the goods is fully paid (as forbearance of credit) is likewise bereft of any legal anchor. considering that they were in its custody and that they were in fact the subject of litigation. 43 Id. Neither can it be considered as one involving interest based on damages under the second situation. 252). As previously discussed. The situation does not allow us to reject respondent’s claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state immunity.. p.” it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus imperii). under the political doctrine of “state immunity. Succinctly. petitioner argues that a money judgment or any charge against the government requires a corresponding appropriation and cannot be decreed by mere judicial order.CHAPTER 1 TORT 13 No doubt. Government Liability For Actual Damages Finally. Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondent’s demand will ultimately fall on the government. and that. The circumstances of this case warrant its exclusion from the purview of the state immunity doctrine. Trinidad (40 Phil. the CA’s imposition of the 12% p. 1995 Ed. More importantly. p. p. PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW. the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties that may have legitimate claims against it. the Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOC’s ineptitude and gross negligence in the safekeeping of respondent’s goods. Ruiz (136 SCRA 487).
Canchela & Associates. courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is inconvenient and contrary to reason is not allowed in law. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines. No. the latter does. petitioner’s “payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of goods or properties seized or forfeited by the Bureau of Customs.982.R. Petitioner’s liability may be paid in Philippine currency. the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. G. Court of Appeals. 475 SCRA 218. 1996. Accordingly.R. Over time. upon payment of the necessary customs duties by respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH. Rescission of lease contracts under Article 1650 different from resolution of reciprocal obligations under Article 1101. The former is not one that requires an independent action. 45 46 G.565. C. 47 Supra note 8.V. upon payment of the necessary customs duties by respondent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to a physician surgeon explained The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or a scientiﬁc treatment. as the staunch guardian of the people’s rights and welfare. 2005. . is hereby ordered to pay respondent the value of the subject shipment in the amount of Euro 669. July 12. Republic v. computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment. November 16.45 we enunciated that this Court. 258 SCRA 712. Nos. SO ORDERED. 151373-74. SP Nos.”47 WHEREFORE.14 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED In Department of Health v. 75359 and 75366 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Civil Code Rescision of lease contracts under Article 1650 is different from resolution of reciprocal obligations under Article 1101. cannot sanction an injustice so patent in its face. we agree with the lower courts’ directive that. and allow itself to be an instrument in the perpetration thereof. 108926.R. represented by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.46 Justice and equity now demand that the State’s cloak of invincibility against suit and liability be shredded. Civil Code.
which modiﬁed the April 14. at p. 63283. 89. Aquino and Amelita G. Del Rosario issued to petitioners as supporting document for the latter’s insurance claim.” id. 1994. 50 RTC Decision. p. Insp. CV No. Tolentino. 51 Exh.R. An October 20. “P-2. Belfranlt Development. Inc. Rollo.6 Origin of Fire: Store room occupied by CAP.CHAPTER 1 TORT 15 The case College Assurance Plan v. Inc. p. Cause of Fire: Accidental (overheated coffee percolator). bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory. Teodoro D. The amount thereof is usually left to the courts but the same should be reasonable. in the nature of the case. The antecedent facts are as summarized by the RTC. and concurred in by Associate Justices Hilarion L. assailing the February 28. 1994 ﬁeld investigation report by an unnamed arson investigator assigned to the case disclosed: 0. 1994 certiﬁcation which the BFP City Fire Marshal. 2002 Decision48 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. 52.51 These ﬁndings are reiterated in the October 21. Pampanga.5 0. located at the 3rd ﬂoor of the bldg. (CAP) and Comprehensive Annuity Plans and Pension Corporation (CAPP) several units on the second and third ﬂoors of the building.50 On October 8. ﬁre destroyed portions of the building. Belfranlt Development.” id. . The decision follows: Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. at p. 49 Rollo. 42. 52. 1999 Decision49 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 221). Quezon City (RTC) in Civil Case No.. It leased to petitioners College Assurance Plan Phil. “P-3. (538 SCRA 41) Temperate or moderate damages may be availed when the pecuniary less has been suffered but its amount cannot. including the third ﬂoor units being occupied by petitioners. Cruz. can be proved with certainty.52 48 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. (respondent) is the owner of Belfranlt Building in Angeles City.. p. Q-9523118. 52 Exh. 91.. Inc. Rollo.
at p.. their lease on said units is deemed still subsisting. petitioners explained that they could no longer reoccupy the units on the second ﬂoor of the building for they had already moved to a new location and entered into a binding contract with a new lessor.2 Million Pesos cost of rehabilitation (repairs. On November 11. 57 Id. respondent sent petitioners on November 3.55 In reply. at p. 1999. along with their obligation to pay for the rent. 1994 a notice to vacate the leased premises to make way for repairs. 53 54 Id. premises considered. at p.5 million. reiterating its claim for reparation. Respondent wrote petitioners another letter. 55 Rollo. petitioners had no reason to vacate the same.. 84. and to pay reparation estimated at P1.53 but they did not act on the demand for reparation. Id. including the units on the second ﬂoor.56 After its third demand57 went unheeded. pointing out that the ﬁre was a fortuitous event for which they could not be held responsible. hence. the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE. 2) P14. as the leased units on the second ﬂoor were not affected by the ﬁre. 81. The RTC rendered a Decision dated April 14. replacements and renovations) of the Belfranlt building by way of Actual and Compensatory damages. 1994.000. Petitioners also disclaimed liability for reparation.00 per month of unpaid rentals on the third ﬂoor of the Belfranlt building for the period from October 1994 until the end of the two year lease contract on May 10. . respondent ﬁled with the RTC a complaint against petitioners for damages. 1996 by way of Actual and Compensatory damages. 71.54 It also clariﬁed that. this time estimated by professionals to be no less than P2 million. 86. at p. 81.16 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Citing the foregoing ﬁndings.. Defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiff joint [sic] and severally the following amounts: 1) P2. petitioners vacated the leased premises. 56 Id. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [respondent] and against the herein defendants [petitioners]. p..
SO ORDERED.2 Million as cost of rehabilitation of Belfranlt Building and P8. 58 59 Id.CHAPTER 1 TORT 17 3) P18.00 per month of unpaid rentals on the second ﬂoor of the Belfanlt building for the period from October 1994 until the end of the two year lease contract on May 10.000.00 per month as reimbursement of unpaid rentals on the areas leased by other tenants. (ii) moral damages. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects. 49. while defendants-appellants are ordered to pay to plaintiffappellee.400. questioning the CA decision on the following grounds: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE FIRE THAT PARTIALLY BURNED RESPONDENT’S BUILDING WAS A FORTUITOUS EVENT. .00 as moral damages.00 as temperate damages. at pp.00 per month as reimbursement of unpaid rentals on the other leased areas occupied by other tenants for the period from October 1994 until the time the vacated leased areas were occupied by new tenants.60 Petitioners ﬁled the present petition. 2002 Decision. p. the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that the award of (i) actual and compensatory damages in the amounts of P2..000. 60 Id. in its February 28. 7) P50. 5) 6) P200. (iii) exemplary damages.000. thus: “WHEREFORE. and 8) Costs of suit. the amount of P500.”58 Petitioners appealed to the CA which. jointly and severally. Rollo. modiﬁed the RTC Decision.000. P200. 232-234.000. 1996 by way of Actual or Compensatory damages. at p.400. and (iv) attorney’s fees is DELETED.”59 Respondent did not appeal from the CA decision.00 as exemplary damages. 4) P8.00 plus 20% of Actual damages awarded as reasonable Attorney’s fees. 68.. SO ORDERED.
IV THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR TEMPERATE DAMAGES. Inc. No. which provides: “The lessee is responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased.18 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO OBSERVE THE DUE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY. No. G. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR CERTAIN ACTUAL DAMAGES DESPITE PLAINTIFFS’ FAILURE TO PROVE THE DAMAGE AS ALLEGED.64 to constitute a fortuitous event. was inevitable. 2006. Globe Telecom. v. 429 SCRA 153. ﬂood. 153 (2002). it must be shown that: a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the obligor Id. 379 SCRA 144. To overcome such legal presumption. 64 Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. 943. July 11.61 The petition lacks merit.. G. Article 1667 of the Civil Code. Mindex v. This burden of proof on the lessee does not apply when the destruction is due to earthquake. though foreseen. Philippine Lexus Amusement Corporation. unless he proves that it took place without his fault. Whether an act of God63 or an act of man. 428 Phil. 2004. the lessee must prove that the deterioration or loss was due to a fortuitous event which took place without his fault or negligence. Morillo. 63 Guevent Industrial Development Corporation v.. 159279. 558. 160.R. 934. 147324. at p. 17. 494 SCRA 555. 62 61 . May 25.” creates the presumption that the lessee is liable for the deterioration or loss of a thing leased.R. storm or other natural calamity.62 Article 1174 of the Civil Code deﬁnes a fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen. or which.
65 If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the fortuitous event. G. 513 SCRA 111. valid and issued in the proper exercise and regular performance of the issuing authority’s ofﬁcial duties. Petitioners insist. 54. 1994. and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof. No.66 In the present case. holding that the proximate cause of the ﬁre was the fault and negligence of petitioners in using a coffee percolator in the ofﬁce stockroom on the third ﬂoor of the building and in allowing the electrical device to overheat: “Plaintiff has presented credible and preponderant evidence that the ﬁre was not due to a fortuitous event but rather was due to an overheated coffee percolator found in the leased premises occupied by the defendants. to avoid it. This Court is convinced that the Certiﬁcation is genuine.CHAPTER 1 TORT 19 to comply with its obligations was independent of human will. p. authentic. The certiﬁcation issued by the Bureau of Fire Protection Region 3 dated October 21. No. 422 SCRA 603. 1994 clearly indicated that the cause of the ﬁre was an overheated coffee percolator. however. Ala Industries Corporation. The written certiﬁcation Real v. if it could have been foreseen. 2007. This documentary evidence is credible because it was issued by a government ofﬁce which conducted an investigation of the cause and circumstances surrounding the ﬁre of October 8.67 The RTC saw differently.R. 467 Phil. The legal presumption therefore is that petitioners were responsible for the damage. 66 65 . Sicam v. 159617. it was ﬁre that caused the damage to the units being occupied by petitioners. G. there is a legal presumption that ofﬁcial duty has been regularly performed. Rollo. the fortuitous event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence. and d) said obligor was free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. January 26. 124. MIAA v. Jorge. The defendants have failed to present countervailing evidence to rebut or dispute this presumption. 2007. Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. 146224. b) it was impossible to foresee the event or. 615 (2004). Belo. The defendants did not present any credible evidence to impute any wrongdoing or false motives on the part of Fire Department Ofﬁcials and Arson investigators in the preparation and ﬁnalization of this certiﬁcation. 229. 529 SCRA 443. 247. August 8. that they are exempt from liability for the ﬁre was a fortuitous event that took place without their fault or negligence.R. Under Section 4. 67 RTC Decision. c) the occurrence rendered it impossible for the obligor to fulﬁll its obligations in a normal manner.
particularly beside broken drinking glasses. 333-334. metal dish rack and utensils.20 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED cannot be considered self-serving to the plaintiff because as clearly indicated on its face the same was issued not to the plaintiff but to the defendant’s representative Mr. they did not present the airpot to disprove the existence of the coffee percolator..”68 (Citations omitted) The CA concurred with the RTC and noted additional evidence of the negligence of petitioners: ‘The records disclose that the metal base of a heating device which the lower court found to be the base of a coffee percolator. Even the stack of highly combustible paper on the third ﬂoor was not totally gutted by the ﬁre. Appellants assert that it had an airpot — not a coffee percolator — near the Administration Ofﬁce on the third ﬂoor. For unexplained reasons. . at pp. Defendants did not dispute the authenticity or veracity of these evidence. if any. Jesus V. was retrieved from the stockroom where the ﬁre originated. Defendants merely presented negative evidence in the form of denials that defendants maintained a coffee percolator in the premises testiﬁed to by employees of defendants who cannot be considered totally disinterested. Consequently. It is undisputed that the ﬁre originated from appellants’ 68 Id. xxxx The defense that the ﬁre was a fortuitous event is untenable. Its being an instrument for preparing coffee is demonstrated by its retrieval from the stockroom. Roig for purposes of ﬁling their insurance claim. The ﬁre did not raze the entire third ﬂoor and the objects therein. The metal base contains the inscription “CAUTION DO NOT OPERATE WHEN EMPTY.” which is a warning against the use of such electrical device when empty and an indication that it is a water-heating appliance. it is not farfetched that the burnt airpot. This certiﬁcation was issued by a government ofﬁce upon the request of the defendant’s authorized representative. The plaintiff also presented preponderant evidence that the ﬁre was caused by an overheated coffee percolator when plaintiff submitted in evidence not only photographs of the remnants of a coffee percolator found in the burned premises but the object evidence itself. could have been recovered by appellants from the area where it was supposedly being kept. Nescafe bottle. however.
Petitioners argue that. Rollo. 253. G. G. No. on that fateful day (a Saturday). surmises or conjectures. the established rule is that the factual ﬁndings of the CA afﬁrming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding on us. 18-19.R. with Exh.’69 Petitioners impugn both ﬁndings. Petition. who admitted to having no participation in the investigation of the ﬁre incident or personal knowledge about said incident. 46-47. November 2. Petitioners insist that they own no such percolator. 70 69 .74 We are not wont to review them. 161. 169891. at pp. Said stockroom was under the control of appellants which. June 15. 73 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. G. “P-3”) are hearsay evidence because these were presented during the testimony of Fireman Gerardo Sitchon (Fireman Sitchon) of the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP).71 We ﬁnd no cogent reason to disturb the ﬁnding of the RTC and CA. save under exceptional circumstances as: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken. “P2” and Exh. 72 Philippine National Railways v. 74 Quezon City Government v.70 making him incompetent to testify thereon. John Bordman Ltd. Angeles City. of Iloilo. They claim that the BFP ﬁeld investigation report (Exh. October 14. No.72 lest we overstep the restriction that review by certiorari under Rule 45 be limited to errors of law only. conducted a seminar in the training room which was adjoining the stockroom. 2006. 159831. No.. 473 SCRA 151. (3) when the ﬁndings are grounded entirely on speculations. 697. 460 SCRA 243.R.R. “P-3” and the testimony of Fireman Sitchon that are ﬂawed. The ﬁnding that the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the ﬁre that destroyed portions of the leased units is a purely factual matter which we cannot pass upon. 506 SCRA 685. 2005. 150304.73 Moreover. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Brunty. p. 2005. Dacara.CHAPTER 1 TORT 21 stockroom located on the third ﬂoor leased premises.. pp. Rollo. there is virtually no evidence left that the cause of the ﬁre was an overheated coffee percolator. Inc. 26. Absent an explanation from appellants on the cause of the ﬁre. (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion. absurd or impossible. 71 Id. “P-2”) and the BFP certiﬁcation (Exh. (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on CA Decision.
R.76 What Fireman Sitchon did not prepare were the documents which his investigation witnesses presented. 78 Id. “P-2” and Exh. before he prepared Exh.22 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED misapprehension of facts. and Dr. 425 Phil. if properly considered. Radio Mindanao Network... “P-3” because. (5) when the CA. pp. Zenaida Arcilla. February 27. Exh. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative.. Bernardo. (7) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which. his testimony on said documents are competent evidence of the contents thereof. 1996. No. 483 SCRA 222. at pp. Rollo. Contrary to petitioners’ claim. 158-159. 374 SCRA 653 (2002). G. 77 TSN. p. “P-3. “the aforesaid certiﬁcation was used by appellants [petitioners] in claiming insurance for their ofﬁce equipment which were destroyed by the ﬁre. he personally prepared the same. Fireman Sitchon is competent to identify and testify on Exh. and (8) when the ﬁndings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.75 The exceptions do not obtain in the present case. Rollo. pp. would justify a different conclusion. January 27. went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. March 19. 2006. 9. manager of CAPP. 480 SCRA 314. 10-11. 160-161. especially that of Ronald Estanislao whose ofﬁcial duty it was to report on the incident. 231-232. “P-3” because. 79 DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies v. 511.” which he prepared based on the statements of his investigation witnesses. are exceptions to the hearsay rule because these are entries in ofﬁcial records. as the CA correctly pointed out. “P-3. the security guard on duty at the time of ﬁre. 81 CA Decision.R. p. 521.”81 Estacion v.79 Consequently.”78 Hence. In fact. 80 Furthermore. 326. in making its ﬁndings. 147039. “P-2” and Exh. Rollo. 1996. Inc. although he did not sign the said documents. the petitioners are estopped from contesting the veracity of Exh. “P-2” and Exh. 75 .77 However. March 19. (6) when the ﬁndings of fact are conclusions without citation of speciﬁc evidence on which they are based. 2006. G. 157. 46-47. Fireman Sitchon emphasized that he interviewed said investigation witnesses namely. 144724. the ﬁndings of the RTC and CA are fully supported by the evidence. No. while Fireman Sitchon may have had no personal knowledge of the ﬁre incident. Inc. 76 TSN. pp. 80 Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Ronald Estanislao.
Tuvera. but their bare denial only left the matter unanswered. 152. 259. 2004.R. 357 SCRA 249. October 25.R. b) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge. February 16. The CA correctly applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under which expert testimony may be dispensed with82 to sustain an allegation of negligence if the following requisites obtain: a) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent.2 million which the RTC had granted respondent to cover costs of building repairs. The CA therefore correctly afﬁrmed the RTC in holding petitioners liable to respondent for actual damages consisting of unpaid rentals for the units they leased. Respondent had no hand in the incident.00 were awarded by the CA. from the nature of the case. 87. The CA deleted the award of actual damages of P2. Sarangaya III. and c) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. 96. No. it is sufﬁcient for the latter to merely allege that the cause of the ﬁre was the negligence of the former and to rely on the occurrence of the ﬁre as proof of such negligence. Sisters of Mercy Hospital. 2005. No.000. 148246. No. 83 82 .R. 147746. Court of Appeals. In lieu of actual damages. 444 SCRA 355. the ﬁnding of the RTC and CA on the negligence of petitioners cannot be overturned by petitioners’ bare denial.CHAPTER 1 TORT 23 Even without the testimony of Fireman Sitchon and the documents he prepared. 199. G.86 The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the courts but the same should Reyes v. Gammad. We ﬁnd this in order. G. 474 SCRA 191. 2007. 370. be proved with certainty. 771 (2000).85 Temperate or moderate damages may be availed when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot. 137873.83 The ﬁre that damaged Belfranlt Building was not a spontaneous natural occurrence but the outcome of a human act or omission. No. 84 Perla Compania de Seguros v. 516 SCRA 113.84 It was all up to petitioners to dispel such inference of negligence. 159636. November 25. Hence. 341 SCRA 760. 2001. G.R. 396 Phil. 85 Victory Liner v. April 20. G. the convergence of these facts and circumstances speaks for itself: petitioners alone having knowledge of the cause of the ﬁre or the best opportunity to ascertain it. DM Consunji v. temperate damages in the amount of P500. and respondent having no means to ﬁnd out for itself. 86 Republic v. It originated in the store room which petitioners had possession and control of.
SO ORDERED. it may only be entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P500. with Associate Justices Conrado M. G. concurring. Domingo (538 SCRA 733) In this case. 3-17.00. was inside her residence located at Block 17. 2004.00 as civil indemnity and another P50. However. Cavite. 7427-99 and 7428-99.. and Mariano C. CA Decision. Rollo.000 moral damages. 7427-99. 2006 which afﬁrmed the Decision90 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus.87 Without a doubt. “as we held in People v. as correctly pointed out by the CA.000. He told her to transfer to her bed which she did. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 1987. No. At 2:00 in the afternoon. 7428-99 but acquitted him in Criminal Case No.E. Dolor.00. 425 SCRA 315 (2005) this is not the ﬁrst time that a child has been snatched from the cradle of innocence by some beast to sate its deviant sexual appetite. Jr. she was asked to remove her shorts which she again did. 435 SCRA 668. AAA. 47-48.” Moreover. The case People v. the son of AAA’s maid. then ten years of age being born on July 17. while sleeping on the sofa in their living room. pp. AAA was awakened by the appellant. To curb this disturbing trend. then appellant subsequently inserted his Hernandez v. Vasquez. 02098 dated July 6.R. but failed to award exemplary damages. 25-31.C. Sometime in 1997. appellant should likewise be made to pay exemplary damages which is pegged at P25. While inside the room. 88 87 .24 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED be reasonable. 89 Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.R. 677-678. CA Rollo. Veloso. 160286. Rollo. The decision follows: For review is the Decision89 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. respondent suffered some form of pecuniary loss for the impairment of the structural integrity of its building as a result of the ﬁre. Del Castillo. pp. Quisumbing. Malones. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “On the civil aspect. because of respondent’s inability to present proof of the exact amount of such pecuniary loss. CR-H. Jr. No. Lot 29. bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than nominal but less than compensatory. Dasmariñas. Branch 21 in Criminal Cases Nos. Cavite. The trial court convicted Geronimo Domingo of rape in Criminal Case No. pp. WHEREFORE.88 which we ﬁnd reasonable and just. 90 Penned by Executive Judge Norberto J.000.000. July 30. the court rightly awarded P50.
to her damage and prejudice. to her damage and prejudice.”96 91 92 Rollo. with intent to have carnal knowledged (sic) of eleven (11) year old AAA. 93 CA Rollo. willfully. Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. willfully. something bad would happen to her.. an 11 year old girl. 11. She thus confronted AAA but she refused to answer. otherwise.CHAPTER 1 TORT 25 penis into her private organ until the satisfaction of his bestial act. The rape incident was repeated sometime in February 1998. 95 CA Rollo. without her consent and against her will. Later. with intent to have carnal knowledge of eleven (11) years old AAA and with threat and intimidation. the mother of AAA. p. thereafter. against the latter’s will and consent. in the Municipality of Dasmariñas. 96 Id. there and then. CONTRARY TO LAW. 27. p. at p. 5. pp.92 On June 20. 7428-99 “That on or about the month of February 1998. there and then. 1998. unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said AAA. unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with said eleven (11) year old AAA.”95 Criminal Case No. Province of Cavite. Province of Cavite. 12. did. p. the abovenamed accused. in the Municipality of Dasmariñas. He. 7427-99 “That on or about and sometime in the year 1997. BBB found out that there was a stain in AAA’s panty.93 AAA subsequently admitted to BBB that she was raped twice by the appellant. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. Id.91 BBB. the abovenamed accused. 5-6. and there were fresh lacerations at 12:00 and 6:00 positions. noticed that the latter was always crying and not happy. Philippines. warned her not to tell anybody about the incident. and with threat and intimidation. CONTRARY TO LAW. did. 94 Rollo. . The examination revealed that AAA’s vagina admitted a ﬁnger with ease.94 Appellant was separately charged with two counts of rape in the following Information: Criminal Case No. BBB thus brought AAA to the medicolegal ofﬁce for examination.
000.000. Assuming that there was consent on the part of AAA. 7427-99. July 7. Nos. he claimed to have received love letters from her. 7. The accused. however.R. thus.98 On November 11. The court further awarded P50.100 Appellant was.000. ﬁnding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of rape as charged in the information in criminal case no. . As to the second count of rape which was committed in February 1998. said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant the amount of P50.”99 The trial court acquitted appellant of the ﬁrst count of rape (in Criminal Case No. 100 Id. sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.. pp. 101 G. appellant denied the charges. 7427-99) because of the defect in the information as to the time of the commission of the offense—sometime in 1997. 7428-99 while acquitting him in Criminal Case No. 2003. SO ORDERED. 2004.97 Appellant’s mother testiﬁed that it was impossible for appellant to have raped AAA because she was with her son twenty-four hours a day.26 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED For his part. p.00 as moral damages and the costs of this suit. 147678-87. at p. 7428-99. is hereby acquitted of the felony of rape as charged in the information in criminal case no. The case was initially elevated to this Court but the same was transferred to the CA pursuant to the Court’s directive in People v. still. As evidence of his relationship with her. the act committed by the appellant constituted statutory rape.. Id. the RTC rendered a Decision convicting the appellant of rape in Criminal Case No. at p.00 as indemnity and another amount of P50.000. He instead claimed that AAA fell in love with him. 433 SCRA 640. 6-7.00 as moral damages.101 97 98 Rollo. considering the age of the victim.00 as civil indemnity and P50. 31. 99 CA Rollo. 7427-99. the court gave credence to the evidence of the prosecution and did not consider the sweetheart theory offered by the appellant. 30. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: “WHEREFORE. Mateo.
16. People v. 420 (2002). In fact.”102 On appeal before the Court. the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufﬁcient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus. in Criminal Case No. People v. the instant appeal is DISMISSED. the CA afﬁrmed the trial court’s decision. No. 502. 672. at p. August 7. The fallo reads: “WHEREFORE. Mangubat. Espejon. 2007. 377 SCRA 412. Espejon. p. SO ORDERED. Espejon. Cavite. supra note 15. instead of ﬁling their supplemental briefs. unless it is an essential element of the crime charged.CHAPTER 1 TORT 27 On July 6. supra. 427 Phil. As such.104 The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. p.103 The precise time or date of the commission of an offense need not be alleged in the complaint or information. We reiterate the ﬁndings of the CA in this wise: “We are convinced that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA in February 1998 when she was only 10 years old. 130 (2003). The only issue raised by the appellant is the alleged defect in the Information charging him with the second count of rape in Criminal Case No. 492. AAA’s birth certiﬁcate admittedly shows that she was Rollo. 7428-99 is AFFIRMED.R. 421. 172068.105 The Information clearly alleged and the prosecution sufﬁciently established the commission by the appellant of statutory rape. 2006. the parties opted to adopt their respective briefs ﬁled before the CA. Latag. 463 Phil. it is not. The assailed Decision dated November 11. In rape. 529 SCRA 377. G. 105 People v. 418 SCRA 122. 681. for failure to state therein the precise date and time when the offense was committed. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. the precise time when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. 104 People v. 7428-99. Branch 21. 103 102 . 680. People v. We ﬁnd no merit in the appeal.
301. SO ORDERED. WHEREFORE. 359 SCRA 283. 319 SCRA 112. she positively identiﬁed the accused-appellant as her rapist. As we held in People v. 377 Phil. 130 (1999). To curb this disturbing trend. 333. Appellant shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. she was only 10 years and ﬁve months old.000.”106 In view of the foregoing. No.000. 418. p. 108 469 Phil. the appellant was correctly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for statutory rape. CR-H.00 for moral damages. AAA is hereby awarded P25.000. 841-842. 2005. July 29.R. 02098 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Tan. 411 Phil. 137. as shown by her birth certiﬁcate was under twelve years old at the time. and People v.00 as civil indemnity and another P50. The gravamen of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years of age. 1987. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. the appeal is DENIED. At the time she had carnal knowledge of accused-appellant in February 1998. People v.00 for exemplary damages. Malones. Enriquez. The Court has consistently held that the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply to persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua (See: People v. 158797. the court rightly awarded P50. G.00. 119. be made to pay exemplary damages which is pegged at P25. 11. 107 106 .107 On the civil aspect. in this regard.R. 465 SCRA 407.000. but failed to award exemplary damages.108 this is not the ﬁrst time that a child has been snatched from the cradle of innocence by some beast to sate its deviant sexual appetite. Jr..28 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED born on July 17. 306-307 (2001). Lampaza. 425 SCRA 318. Rollo. Appellant Geronimo Domingo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole. and that she.C. 813. categorically testiﬁed that she in fact was raped. premises considered. In addition to the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. AAA. appellant should. likewise. No. 342 (2004). More importantly.
contractual transaction because: (1) the law makes it binding. 7th Edition. p.3 “Adventurous courts have turned into a contract implied in law.”1 CHAPTER I — QUASI-CONTRACTS Quasi-contract is a licit and purely voluntary act which creates an obligation on the part of the actor in favor of a third person concerned.29 CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS “A beneﬁt obtained from another not intended as a gift. for which the beneﬁciary must make restitution or recompense. a quasi-contract — not really a contract. Dictionary of the Law. Quasi deﬁned and explained Quasi is a word or preﬁx placed in front of a legal term to mean “resembling. 3 Black’s Law Dictionary. but instead a remedy that allows the plaintiff to recover a beneﬁt conferred on the defendant. Spanish Code. and not legally justiﬁable. a legal ﬁction necessary 1 2 Clapp. It comes from the Latin “as if.” – Henry Black Extra-contractual obligations deﬁned and explained Extra-contractual obligations are obligations incurred outside of a contract. 29 . or (2) it has been the usual practice in trade or business under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. They are obligations without a contract but are considered as legally binding between the parties to a non-unilateral. 322. p. Article 1587.2 It is also called an implied in law contract which is not actually a contract. 355.” but different from it in some legally insigniﬁcant respect.
5 It may also refer to a beneﬁt obtained from another. 6 Black’s Law Dictionary. citing Marsman & Co. The Death of Contract. p. 2143. See Moreno. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another. 1. 1403. pp. the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable.’”4 Art. 2144. v. First Coconut Central Co.6 Art. without any power from the latter. the provisions of Articles 1317. 1974. in particular to prevent ‘unjust enrichment. No.. and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances: (1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned. 42151-R. (n) Art. not intended as a gift and not legally justiﬁable for which the beneﬁciary must make restitution or recompense. 73-74. In the second case. (2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner. voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or beneﬁted at the expense of another. (1888a) Gilmore. 1536. Certain lawful. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article.30 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED to promote the ends of justice and. (n) Unjust enrichment deﬁned and explained Unjust enrichment is a principle which provides that every person who. or to require the person concerned to substitute him. 2142. through an act or performance by another. or any other means comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall return the same to him. Philippine Law Dictionary. is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents. p 640. 7th Edition. 5 4 . In the ﬁrst case. September 16. if the owner is in a position to do so.
443 SCRA 532. Inc. Dictionary of the Law. The courts may. while that sought against the individual respondents is based solely on tort does not negate the solidary nature of their liability for alleged tortious acts. 2145. 8 7 . Section 1 (5th ed.8 Constitutional tort deﬁned and explained A constitutional tort refers to an unconstitutional conduct by a public ofﬁcial causing injury to a private individual. p. and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by the owner of the property or business under management. increase or moderate the indemnity according to the circumstances of each case.11 Art. Ibid. breach of that duty. by their nature.10 Thus.. It has been held that under certain constitutional provisions – notably the ban on unreasonable searches and seizures – a person harmed by ofﬁcial conduct in violation of his constitutional rights may sue the ofﬁcial for damages. the fact that the liability sought against the corporation is for speciﬁc performance and tort. (1889a) Prosser & Keeton.9 Nature of obligations arising from tort explained Obligations arising from tort are.CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 31 Origin of the word “tort” and its essential elements explained The word “tort” as now known in the English language is derived from the Latin “tortus” which means “twisted. 10 Lafarge Cement Philippines. 431. and a causal relation between the defendant’s conduct and the resulting damage to plaintiff. The ofﬁcious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a good father of a family. 1984). v. 11 Ibid. always solidary. 9 See Clapp. however.”7 The essential elements of a tort are the existence of a legal duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff. Continental Cement Corporation.
. The responsibility of two or more ofﬁcious managers shall be solidary.” The only exception to this general rule is “if the management was assumed to save the thing or business from danger. Art. or (2) moderate indemnity to the owner for damages on the property or business of the owner taken over by the gestor or ofﬁcious manager. (2) owner. Article 2145. without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter toward the owner of the business. discretion is granted to the courts to: (1) increase. unless the management was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger.32 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Discretion granted the courts to increase or moderate indemnity to the owner explained Under the 2nd paragraph. If the ofﬁcious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties. At any rate. without prejudice to the direct obligation of the delegate to the owner of the business. “the responsibility of two or more ofﬁcious managers shall be solidary. 2146. Civil Code. 2146. (4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. (1891a) 12 Art. The ofﬁcious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event: (1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon. If he has preferred his own interest to that of the (3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner. (1890a) Responsibility for delegation of functions by ofﬁcious manager to another explained The responsibility for delegation of functions by the ofﬁcious manager to another person shall be shouldered by him. he shall be liable for the acts of the delegate. 2147. Civil Code.”12 Art.
even if the business may not have been successful.18 Absent an immediate threatened injury to the business. 16 Ibid. and. 2148. the ofﬁcious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events: (1) If he is manifestly unﬁt to carry on the management. 17 Black’s Law Dictionary. Civil Code. 2147. the ofﬁcious manager shall be liable for fortuitous event. 18 Ibid. and assent to be bound by. 2149.”16 Art. Except when the management was assumed to save property or business from imminent danger. were inevitable. the act of another. or which though foreseen.. 15 Art. Luzon Stevedoring. Republic v. 21 SCRA 279. Aldecoa & Co.20 In other words.15 The only exception to that general rule is “when the management was assumed to save the property or business from imminent danger.13 In a legal sense. consequently.17 It is the danger resulting from an immediate threatened injury sufﬁcient to cause a reasonable and prudent person to defend himself or herself. a caso fortuito is an event that cannot be forseen.CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 33 Liability of ofﬁcious manager for fortuitous events enumerated The liability of the ofﬁcious manager for any fortuitous event are enumerated in Article 2147. The ratiﬁcation of the management by the owner of the business produces the effects of an express agency.19 Art. Civil Code. Ibid. Civil Code. p. it is the recognition and adoption 13 14 Art. 7th Edition.14 As a general rule. 2148. (n) Imminent danger deﬁned and explained Imminent danger is an immediate real threat to one’s safety that justiﬁes the use of force in self-defense. 283. 20 Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v. 30 Phil. (2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the management. . (1892a) Ratiﬁcation deﬁned and explained Ratiﬁcation is the adoption of. in relation to contracts. any takeover by the ofﬁcious manager renders him liable even for any fortuitous event. 19 See 2nd Sentence. Art. 308. 2148.
2150. whether or not the business has been successful. 90.G. the act of his agent. the owner of the property or business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for obligations incurred in his interest. Even though the owner did not derive any beneﬁt and there has been no imminent and manifest danger to the property or business. 61 O. 2151. (n) 21 Catalina v. (2) Reimburse the ofﬁcious manager for necessary and useful expense. and shall reimburse the ofﬁcious manager for the necessary and useful expenses and for the damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties. provided: (1) The ofﬁcious manager has acted in good faith. Although the ofﬁcious management may not have been expressly ratiﬁed. provides for the effects of ratiﬁcation by the owner of the management of the business by the ofﬁcious manager. done beyond the latter’s authority or without any authority at all. Art. ready to be returned to the owner. The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the management had for its purpose the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss. and (4) Reimburse the ofﬁcious manager for the prevention of an imminent or manifest loss although no beneﬁt have been actually derived therefrom. and (2) The property or business is intact.34 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED by the principal. although no beneﬁt may have been derived. as his own. Espitero. Art. (1893) Obligations of the owner who enjoys the advantages of the management explained The owner who has enjoyed the advantages of the management has the following obligations: (1) Liability for the obligations incurred in his interest. . and (3) Reimburse the ofﬁcious manager for the damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties. Civil Code.21 Effect of ratiﬁcation by the owner explained Article 2149. This ratiﬁcation by the owner has the effect of an express agency. the owner is liable as under the ﬁrst paragraph of the preceding article.
22 An extinguishment may be a matter of right or a matter of law. without imminent danger to his property.CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 35 Liability of the owner who did not beneﬁt. or (2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the business. (n) Instances when the ofﬁcious manager is personally liable explained The ofﬁcious manager is personally liable for contracts which he entered into with third persons. 1167. 2153. . 2152. Art. even though he acted in the name of the owner. These provisions shall not apply: (1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratiﬁed the management. (2) When the ofﬁcious manager withdraws from the management. (3) By the death. The ofﬁcious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has entered into with third persons. civil interdiction. The management is extinguished: (1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an end thereto. (n) Extinguishment deﬁned and explained Extinguishment is the destruction of a right or contract.23 Article 22 23 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary. insanity or insolvency of the owner or the ofﬁcious manager. Ibid. and there shall be no right of action between the owner and third persons. and (2) The property or business if intact is ready to be returned to the owner. subject to the provisions of Article 2144. even if he acted in the name of the owner. the same as if he beneﬁted therefrom if the ofﬁcious manager has acted under the following circumstances (1) The ofﬁcious manager has acted in good faith. p. The exceptions are those provided in Article 2151(1) and 2151(2). Art.
(1895) Art. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due. Civil Code.”24 Thus. 24 25 Black’s Law Dictionary. — Solutio Indebiti Art. (n) Solutio indebiti deﬁned and explained Solutio indebiti is a Latin phrase which literally means “payment of what is not owing. (n) Art. enumerates how the management of the ofﬁcious manager is extinguished. 1399.25 Solutio indebiti has been accurately deﬁned in the Philippines as a quasi-contract whereby. 2154. 2155.” Art. and it was unduly delivered by mistake. It is consistent with the time-honored principle that “no one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. when there has been payment of what is not due. See Ibid. an obligation to return the thing or the payment arises. 2156. 2158. (n) Art. p. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment. 2157.36 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED 2153. 7th Edition. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. or shall be liable for fruits received or which should have been received if the thing produces fruits. Section 2. is solidary. he may recover if he proves that it was not due. shall pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difﬁcult question of law may come within the scope of the preceding article. or if payment is made by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difﬁcult question of law. the recipient has a duty to give the money back. When the property delivered or money paid belongs to a third person. the obligation to return it arises. if the payment was made by a mistake of fact. 2159. (n) Art. if something is received. . the payee shall comply with the provisions of Article 1984. If something is received when there is no right to demand it. The responsibility of two or more payees.
and is liable for the damage which. according to Article 2157. when the property delivered or money paid does not belong to them but to a third person. However.26 or honest lawful intent. As regards the reimbursement for improvements and expenses incurred by him who unduly received the thing. the provisions of Title V of Book II shall govern. 2160. If he has alienated it. aside from damages. It connotes freedom from knowledge and circumstances which ought 26 Leong Yee v. . Civil Code. (1896a) Effect of payment of what is not due by two or more persons explained When two or more persons pay another with what is not due. Civil Code. “shall pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved or shall be liable for the fruits received if the thing should produce fruits. Art.” But whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment. through his performance. Civil Code which provides that: “The agent is bound by his acceptance to carry out the agency. (1898) Good faith deﬁned and explained Good faith means honesty of intention. should delay entail any danger. the payee shall comply with the provisions of Article 1884. he shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum. Strong Machinery Co. the principal may suffer. The liability of the recipient shall extend to loss or improvement of the thing. 651.. there will be no liability. is solidary.” If no fruits are produced. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a thing certain and determinate shall only be responsible for the impairment or loss of the same or its accessories and accessions insofar as he has thereby been beneﬁted. the person paid. “He must also ﬁnish the business already begun on the death of his principal. under Article 2150. 2161. until it is recovered. 37 Phil. and for damages to the person who delivered the thing.CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 37 He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from any cause. (1897) Art. the responsibility of these persons.
Barron’s Law Dictionary. (2) the recipient 27 28 Fule v. p. in this instance. shall be liable for loss or impairment of the thing accepted or its accessions and accessories. if he has alienated it. 374. or cancelled the guaranties for his right.27 It involves a total absence of any intention to seek an unfair advantage or defraud another party. he is obliged (1) to return the price. . Art. there exists an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another. if he has been beneﬁted by them. However. He shall be exempt from the obligation to restore who. destroyed the document. He who paid unduly may proceed only against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard to whom the action is still effective. Civil Code. or (2) assign the action for collection. under Article 2160. namely: (1) the recipient must believe in good faith that the payment was bring made of a legitimate and subsisting claim. or gave up the pledges. Title V of Book II shall govern the reimbursement for improvements explained Reimbursement for improvements and expenses for the thing unduly received shall be governed by Title V of Book II of the Civil Code. or allowed the action to prescribe. However.28 Responsibilities of an accestor in good faith explained An accepter in good faith. in good faith. several requisites must concur. (1899) Instances when the recipient exempted from the obligation to restore what was received explained There is an instance when the recipient of what was unduly received is exempted from the obligation of restoring the thing received.38 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED to put a person in inquiry. 2162. believing in good faith that the payment was being made of a legitimate and subsisting claim. Moreover. 224. 117 Phil. Legaro. It includes an honest and sincere intention to fulﬁll one’s obligations.
CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
must have destroyed the document, or allowed the claim to prescribe or gave up the pledges or guarantee for his right.29 To whom may the creditor or payor by mistake proceed in case the recipient is exempted from his obligation to restore explained In the event that the recipient of the thing paid by mistake is exempted from the obligation to restore under Article 2162 of the Civil Code, the creditor or payor by mistake may still proceed against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard to whom the action is still effective.30 Art. 2163. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered; but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause. (1901) When there is a presumption “that there was a mistake in the payment” explained There is a presumption “that there was a mistake in the payment”; (1) if something which had never been due; or (2) if something which had already been paid was delivered.31 Things that may be proven by the person from whom the return is claimed explained The things that may be proven by the person from whom the return of something delivered by mistake may prove the following: (1) that the delivery was made out of liberality; or (2) that the delivery was made for any other just cause.32 An example of a just cause is a previous debt of the person who delivered the thing. SECTION 3. — Other Quasi-Contracts “Other quasi-contracts, in general, refers to the unilateral, non-contractual performance of the legal obliga-
See 1st sentence Art. 2162, Civil Code. See 2nd sentence, Ibid. 31 See 1st sentence, Art. 2163, Ibid. 32 See 2nd sentence, Ibid.
TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED
tion of another, which gives rise to a right to claim reimbursement of expenses incurred by the former from the latter.” – Anonymous Art. 2164. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being repaid. (1894a) Effect of support given by a stranger upon the person obliged to give support explained When support is given by a stranger, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give it, the stranger “shall have a right to claim the support given” from the person obliged by law to give support except: (1) that the support was given out of piety; and (2) without intention of the stranger of being repaid.33 Art. 2165. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person, without the knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give support to the deceased, said relatives shall reimburse the third person, should the latter claim reimbursement. (1894a) Effect of bearing funeral expenses by a third person, on relatives obliged to give support to the deceased explained Bearing funeral expenses for a person, without the knowledge of the person(s) obliged to give support to the deceased, gives rise to the obligation of the person(s) obliged by law to give support to the deceased to reimburse the third person the expenses incurred for the said funeral expenses if he decides to claim it.34 Art. 2166. When the person obliged to support an orphan, or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from
See Art. 2164, Civil Code. See Art. 2165, Ibid.
CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this article apply when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him.
Title V, Book II, Civil Code shall govern reimbursement for improvements and expenses for him who unduly received the thing explained Article 2161, Civil Code, provides that Title V, Book II, Civil Code shall govern reimbursement for improvements and expenses by him who unduly received the thing improved. Title V, Book II, Civil Code deals about Trusts. They are Articles 1440 to 1457, Civil Code and, therefore, quoted in toto hereunder, to wit: Title V. — TRUSTS (n) CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1440. A person who establishes a trust is called the trustor; one in whom conﬁdence is reposed as regards property for the beneﬁt of another person is known as the trustee; and the person for whose beneﬁt the trust has been created is referred to as the beneﬁciary. Art. 1441. Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law. Art. 1442. The principles of the general law of trusts, insofar as they are not in conﬂict with this Code, the Code of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws are hereby adopted. CHAPTER 2 EXPRESS TRUSTS Art. 1443. No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence. Art. 1444. No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufﬁcient that a trust is clearly intended.
a trust arises by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the money is loaned or for whom it is paid. When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another. Art. The enumeration of the following cases of implied trust does not exclude others established by the general law of trust. There is an implied trust when property is sold. 1447. 1449. unless the contrary should appear in the instrument constituting the trust. The former is the trustee. 1445. Art. a trust is established by implication of law for the beneﬁt of the true owner. The latter may redeem the property and compel a conveyance thereof to him. Acceptance by the beneﬁciary is necessary.42 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child. Nevertheless. However. Art. No trust shall fail because the trustee appointed declines the designation. his acceptance shall be presumed. and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneﬁcial interest of the property. he nevertheless is either to have no beneﬁcial interest or only a part thereof. There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee. 1448. CHAPTER 3 IMPLIED TRUSTS Art. no trust is implied by law. 1450. if the trust imposes no onerous condition upon the beneﬁciary. Art. 1446. of the one paying the price of the sale. if there is no proof to the contrary. Art. but the limitation laid down in Article 1442 shall be applicable. if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child. legitimate or illegitimate. 1451. while the latter is the beneﬁciary. . If the price of a sale of property is loaned or paid by one person for the beneﬁt of another and the conveyance is made to the lender or payor to secure the payment of the debt.
CHAPTER 2 EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 43 Art. Art. 1456. a trust by virtue of law is established. When any trustee. If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee. Art. 1457. 1454. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intention to hold it for. or transfer it to another or the grantor. 1452. he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him. Art. by force of law. 1455. there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose beneﬁt is contemplated. a trust is established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the funds belong. If two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the beneﬁt of all. If the fulﬁllment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due. Art. An implied trust may be proved by oral evidence. guardian or other person holding a ﬁduciary relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes the conveyance to be made to him or to a third person. a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each. 1453. considered a trustee of an implied trust for the beneﬁt of the person from whom the property comes. the person obtaining it is. Art. .
Obligation of person obliged to give support to the one who gives it without the former’s knowledge explained The person obliged to give support is bound to reimburse stranger who gives support to one entitled to receive it. (1894a) 44 . without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support. of the Civil Code on quasi-contracts are quasi-contracts other than named quasi-contracts.” – The Author Art. the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former. That is what the law seeks to avoid. the former shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of the latter. When. Art. said relatives shall reimburse the third person. without the knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give support to the deceased. Chapter 1. unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being repaid. Section 3. Civil Code. Because in this case. If the person obliged to give support will not be required to reimburse the stranger. the stranger voluntarily performed the obligation of the person obliged to give support anyway. 2165. should the latter claim reimbursement.44 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS “The other kinds of QUASI-CONTRACTS referred. (1894a) The provisions of law on other quasi-contracts enumerated The provisions of law on other quasi-contracts are stated from Article 2164 to Article 2175. it is given by a stranger. even without his knowledge. Title XVIII. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person. 2164.
ﬂood. any third person may furnish support to the needy individual. Art. property is saved from destruction by another person without the knowledge of the owner. Art. When through an accident or other cause a person is injured or becomes seriously ill. or indigent unjustly refuses to give the minor. 2168. . with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. the relatives will be unjustly enriched by the third person. said relatives must reimburse the expenses of the third person explained In this case. unless the service has been rendered out of pure generosity. 2167. When the person obliged to support an orphan. When during a ﬁre. Otherwise.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 45 Third persons who advances funeral expense of a dead person without the knowledge of relatives. or other calamity. The provisions of this article apply when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him. orphan or other indigent person such support. Consequences of unjust refusal to support a minor or an orphan to the person obliged to support them explained When a person obliged to support a minor orphan. and he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give consent to a contract. No reimbursement is due to any person who helped out of liberality. any person who furnishes such support to the needy individual has the right of reimbursement from the person obliged by law to give support. storm. 2166. Effect of aiding an accidentally injured or seriously ill person unable to contract explained The accidentally injured or seriously ill person aided is bound to pay physician’s and other persons aiding him. or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the latter. the latter is bound to pay the former just compensation. Art. except those services given out of pure generosity. the third person who spent for the funeral expenses must be reimbursed by the relatives. he shall be liable to pay for the services of the physician or other person aiding him.
When by accident or other fortuitous event. he shall be liable to pay the expenses. the delinquent person has to pay the expenses for the necessary work undertaken by the government. Civil Code. 2171.46 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Effect of saving property from destruction without the knowledge of the property owner explained The property owner is bound to pay the person. Effect of failure of any person to comply with government health or safety regulations concerning property. shall govern. explained Under Article 2169. With respect to hidden treasure. over the person’s objection. 720 and 439 are reproduced hereunder. and the government has to undertake the necessary work. Art. just compensation. to wit: . who saved the property from destruction. movables separately pertaining to two or more persons are commingled or confused. Art. upon the failure of any person to comply with health or safety regulations concerning property. 2169. The rights and obligations of the ﬁnder of lost personal property shall be governed by Articles 719 and 720. Civil Code. even over his objection. Civil Code. undertakes to do the necessary work. Civil Code. the rules on co-ownership shall be applicable. Civil Code. Article 439. 2170. Art. Articles 719. the ﬁnders of personal property which is not treasure shall be pertinently governed by Articles 719 and 720. When the government. Civil Code explained Under Article 2171. Thus. Effect of confusion or commingling of movables separately belonging to two or more persons accidentally or during a fortuitous event explained Under Article 2170. The same shall belong to both or all persons for whom the confused or commingled movables as co-owners. Finders of person property which is not treasure governed by Articles 719 and 720. the rules on co-ownership shall apply to the confused or commingled movables.
Art. Civil Code.” While the ﬁnder of personal property classiﬁed as “not treasure” is governed by Articles 719 and 720. (352) Distinction on rules governing ﬁnders of personal property. The right of every possessor in good faith to reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses is governed by Article 546. 2172. shall be awarded to the ﬁnder. the ﬁnder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or municipality where the ﬁnding has taken place. or other precious objects. to reimburse the expenses. Whoever ﬁnds a movable. Possessor in good faith deﬁned and explained A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there . 720. and (2) personal property classiﬁed as “hidden treasure. 719. the thing found. or its value. any hidden and unknown deposit of money. namely: (1) personal property not treasure. The ﬁnding shall be publicly announced by the mayor for two consecutive weeks in the way he deems best. jewelry. or without expenses which considerably diminish its value. If the owner should appear in time. it shall be sold at public auction eight days after the publication. the lawful ownership of which does not appear. (615a) Art. which is not treasure. for legal purposes. Civil Code. as the case may be. If the latter is unknown. the ﬁnder of hidden treasure is governed by Article 439.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 47 Art. Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having appeared. The ﬁnder and the owner shall be obliged. 439. (616a) Art. he shall be obliged to pay. By treasure is understood. as a reward to the ﬁnder. one-tenth of the sum or of the price of the thing found. If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration. must return it to its previous possessor. not belonging to the class of treasure and personal property which is considered as “hidden treasurer” explained It is important to classify personal property into two.
See Lopez. Civil Code explained Article 2172. Civil Code. . storm or other calamity. pays the debt. ﬂood. (453a) Art. Civil Code refers to Article 546. When a third person.2 Rights of every possessor in good faith to reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses governed by Article 546. a third person who pays the debt of another (the original debtor) shall be governd by Articles 1236 and 1237. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor. but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. Article 546 of the Civil Code pertinently provides that: Art. any one who objects to the plan and refuses to contribute to the expenses but is beneﬁted by the project as executed shall be liable to pay his share of said expenses. Rights of a third person who pays the debt of another explained Under Article 2173. Phil. Inc. When in a small community a nationality of the inhabitants of age decide upon a measure for protection against lawlessness. Civil Code. Civil Code. Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention. that he may not be the legal owner of the property. 546. 2173. ﬁre.1 In other words. 353-355. and Eastern Trading Co. Art.. the rights of the former are governed by Articles 1236 and 1237. the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. 348. 1 2 Art..48 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED exists in his title or mode of acquisition any ﬂaw which invalidates it. 2174. 526. without the knowledge of the debtor. Civil Code the rights of every possessor in good faith to reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses incurred for the thing possessed in good faith from any subsequent possessor in bad faith. v. 98 Phil. Inc.
its Asst. Garcia and Associate Justice Marina L.” Moreover. Vice President Ricardo Gella. Any person who is constrained to pay the taxes of another shall be entitled to reimbursement from the latter. the only purpose thereof being to harass.” The case follows in toto. storm or other calamity explained The principle under Article 2174 of the Civil Code is that everyone in the community should contribute to the measure. at the termination of such frivolous suit ﬁle a civil action for damages based on the provisions of the Civil Code on human relations. Effect of payment of taxes for another explained The rule is that taxes are the personal liability of a person. . 2175. And anyone who objects to contribute.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 49 Art. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. the person who is constrained to pay the taxes of another shall be entitled “re reimbursement from the latter” under Article 2175. 2002 Decision3 and August 12. ﬂood. “the party who is injured by such an abuse may. 2002 Resolu3 Penned by Associate Justice Alicia L. it amounts to malicious prosecution. However. By Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “when the institution and pursuit of a legal proceeding is without probable cause. Civil Code. Malicious prosecution deﬁned and explained Malicious prosecution means prosecution through the misuse or abuse of judicial processes or the institution and pursuit of legal proceedings for the purpose of harassing. annoy or injure an innocent person who is then compelled to defend himself in court. Buzon. or injuring an innocent person. The case Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. when one is constrained to pay for the taxes of another. Court of Appeals (508 SCRA 215) In this case. Santos with the concurrence of Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio C. Effect of a community measure for protection against lawlessness. but is beneﬁted thereby shall be liable to pay his share of the expenses. and Manager Teoﬁlo Fiesta (Fiesta) assail the March 13. annoying. (Metrobank).
Since the total CA Rollo. Entitled “Antonio Laiño.. Eduardo Tambis. 8 Sole proprietorship of Laiño. Jr.900. 5 4 . Thirty-years back.00 in the name of ACL Engine Consultant x x x.. 123 with Metro Bank.. as shown by Certiﬁcate of Registration. Antonio Laiño withdrew from Metro Bank the amount of P24. and a known dealer of spare parts with aforesaid Central x x x. Mr. Jr. thus: “xxx the facts borne on the records of the case show that the Bank has been misrepresented [sic] by Eduardo Tambis. it is clear that the P22.08 and out of this withdrawal was deducted the amount of P22. 1976. From all appearances.R. CV No. Inc. et al.551.900.900. Fiscal Ponteras issued a Resolution7 dated December 28.” 6 Records.” “N” and “O. 154. 393435 holding them liable for damages in favor of Antonio Laiño (Laiño).50 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED tion4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G..” “M-1.500. to open his personal account No.” Records. was paid in good faith to the creditor of ACL Engine Consultant. p.00 and 12450 for P10. Jr. Being the son of the Secretary of the Manager of San Carlos Milling Co. 9. from the Metro Bank. 214-218. 1910 for P24. Caspin Trading issued to Eduardo Tambis. ﬁnding probable cause to charge Laiño for estafa.. Jr. a receipt for the payment of P22. he was allowed by Metro Bank x x x to open his account and to have Checks Nos.00. in payment to Caspin Trading thru Mr.00. Antonio Laiño will be submitted later.8 with the instruction to secure the authority from ACL Consultant Engine. thereby inuring to the beneﬁt of the partnership. Jr. 7 Id. pp. to be deposited in his name in trust for ACL Engine Consultant. Below are the material facts. Jr. p. 209. After preliminary investigation.00 withdrawn by Eduardo Tambis. Delﬁn Castro from Manila for the spare parts purchased by Eduardo Tambis.900.00. because of his assurance that the supporting authority of Mr. in the name of ACL and thereafter sold to San Carlos Milling Co. for P25. agreed and promised to submit to Metro Bank. Inc.400. as an agent or sales representative of Mr. Exhibits “M. [sic] which Tambis. Fiesta ﬁled with City Fiscal Raymundo Ponteras (Fiscal Ponteras) a Letter-Complaint6 accusing Laiño of swindling Metrobank.. at p. Defendants-Appellants. Plaintiff-Appellant versus Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.
900. Hence. in depositing the two checks x x x and the withdrawals made for the reason that the same were without his authority. dated March 31. in an Order11 dated April 12. Jr. which constitutes a felony.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 51 withdrawal with the bank amounted to P24. Jr. charging Laiño and Eduardo Tambis (Tambis) with estafa.00.”9 Laiño did not appeal from the foregoing Resolution. Jr.08 and what was paid to Caspin Trading was only P22. 1976 by Eduardo Tambis. it resulting that Antonio Laiño withdrew the full amount of P35. It appearing that the present case arose from the unauthorized acts taken by Eduardo Tambis. but which Mr.400. 1989. Jr. at pp. docketed as Criminal Case No. 283. Jr. 33-35. on the said checks were without his (Laiño) authority. RTC-1015 but only as against him: 9 Records. and paid to Caspin Trading in the name of the partnership (ACL) x x x. dismissed Criminal Case No. Jr. 10 .00 was withdrawn by Eduardo Tambis. he had already known that the amount of P22. 25-31. 1973. upon Demurrer to Evidence ﬁled by Laiño. 26. 11 Id. the RTC (Br. is personally liable to ACL Engine Consultant.900. to Caspin Trading x x x. Antonio Laiño withdrew the full amount of P35. however. for Estafa. Mr.00 in utter disregard of the amount of P22. San Carlos City.. Id. Antonio Laiño x x x protested before Metro Bank the actuations of Mr.. and.. argued that the said amount was necessary for his operational expenses in Manila for the beneﬁt of the partnership. Eduardo Tambis. thereby defrauding Metro Bank in the amount of P24. Assuming arguendo as true that the deposit of Eduardo Tambis.08. at p.00 from the Metro Bank. 1976.275. 1976. xxxx On February 17.400. Branch 57. which Mr. RTC1015. an Information10 was ﬁled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). there is a difference of P1. Jr.00 validly paid to his creditor Delﬁn Castro on January 23. Eduardo Tambis. he cannot deny and ignore that on the day he protested to the bank.08 thru such a heinous strategy and scheme. Jr.900. in complete and absolute disregard of the payment of his partner Eduardo Tambis. However.551. pp. On January 26.651. 57). Eduardo Tambis. Mr. it is the considered view of the investigating Fiscal that both are liable for Violation of General Order No.
34.”19 12 13 Id.. 179. P25.00 as exemplary damages. and P500. SO ORDERED. Gella and Fiesta (Metrobank. and to pay the cost. 341.900.14 Meanwhile. 1. Id.00 as actual damages. at p. the RTC (Br. 57) rendered a Decision13 dated February 28. Jr. 1990 also dismissing Criminal Case No. this Court agrees with counsel of Antonio Laiño that the evidence of the prosecution against Antonio Laiño is lamentably inadequate even to establish a mere preponderance of guilt.900. The mere allegation of partnership in an extrajudicial confession will not sufﬁce considering that the extrajudicial confession is violative of the constitutional right of the accused and therefore has no probative value. defendants having proved the same. 14 Id.00 as attorney’s fees.16 Metrobank. 16 Id. Branch 45. .000. 1989. the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE.00 only. on April 27. 17 Id. plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the defendants the following amounts: P70. at p. at p.17 The RTC dismissed the Complaint in a Decision18 dated July 28. the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED. at pp. 18 Id.. 19 Id. et al.000. RTC-1015 as against Tambis. premises considered. at p. 15 Id. et al. Bacolod City a Complaint15 for Damages against Metrobank.. countered with a claim for damages.00 per appearance. 199-200. at p. xxxx From the evidence on record. However..52 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED “The evidence on record after the prosecution had presented their evidence does not show any document or proof of partnership between Tambis and Laiño. Laiño ﬁled with the RTC. 52. On the counterclaim. 1992. P10. at p. at p.... 48.) and Fiscal Ponteras on the ground of malicious prosecution.000.. and to return to defendant bank the amount of P24. 330.00 amount withdrawn by Eduardo Tambis. In their Answer. it held the latter civilly liable to Metrobank for P16..”12 (Emphasis ours) Thereafter.
21 20 .. However. 25 Yasoña v. the only purpose thereof being to harass. ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration22 but the CA denied the same in its August 12. De Ramos. 400.000. Art. 11. p. at p. SO ORDERED. No. liable for the following damages in favor of plaintiff-appellant Antonio Laiño: P200.00 as moral damages P100. This right is coupled with the responsibility to show that a suit is impelled by a legitimate cause of action.00 as attorney’s fees. Id.23 Petitioners Metrobank.000. 125. 409. 384 Phil. et al. Villanueva v.000. vex or injure an innocent person who is then compelled to defend himself in court. 23 See note 2. 344 SCRA 481.25 Denuncia falsa or malicious prosecution is misuse or abuse of judicial processes. 123. now question before this Court the foregoing CA Decision and Resolution on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding them liable for malicious prosecution. 1992 in Civil Case No. 22 Id. 2002 Resolution. thus: “WHEREFORE. the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated July 28.24 The exercise of such legal right with responsibility does no injury. 488 (2000). it amounts to malicious prosecution.” 21 Metrobank. Royo. 2004.. 116.00 as exemplary damages P 50.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 53 Laiño appealed to the CA which issued the March 13. 130. 327 SCRA 391. G. The petition has no merit. at the termination of the frivolous suit. at p. 24 Lucas v. et al. 5397 is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered holding defendant-appellant Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company. 398 Phil. The party who is injured by such abuse may. annoy. October 6. III of the Constitution guarantees right of access to the courts. 400 (2000). 156339. Sec. 157158. United Coconut Planters Bank.R. when the institution and pursuit of a legal proceeding is without probable cause. ﬁle a civil action for damages based on the provisions of the CA Rollo. et al. 440 SCRA 154. 2002 Decision20 awarding him damages. 140.
166 SCRA 734. Criminal Case No. L-72281. p. October 28. 705. 739. Intermediate Appellate Court. 28 27 . supra.27 He must also prove the damages he has suffered. Inc. RTC-1015 had already been ﬁnally terminated with the issuance by the RTC of its April 12. 17.54 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Civil Code on human relations. RTC-1015 was instituted based on a ﬁnding of probable cause by Fiscal Ponteras in his December 28. pp. 980. Martires v..30 Petitioners insist that the better view was that of the RTC (Br. 335-337. 386 Phil.. G. 2005. 29 Villanueva v. 14. 1989 Order dismissing the Information against respondent. 1976 Resolution. RTC-1015.31 that such ﬁnding of probable cause was not overturned by RTC (Br. the prosecutor acted without probable cause. (c) in bringing the action.28 Herein petitioners instigated the commencement of the prosecution of respondent for estafa. 451 SCRA 696. 1988. 30 Rollo. United Coconut Planters Bank. 5397 for damages on April 27. that such dismissal was only due to insufﬁciency of evidence which does not mean that the case was merely trumped up or fabricated. 608. The only issue to be resolved is whether the CA was correct in holding that the prosecution of respondent in Criminal Case No. No.29 It is also of record that when respondent ﬁled Civil Case No. RTC-1015 was not founded on probable cause but was carried out to harass him. 583. 31 Id. Court of Appeals. 32 Records. Panay Electric Co. 715 (2000). i. 986. and that the existence of probable cause rules out malice. 330 SCRA 759.26 But to merit an award of damages. he must prove that: (a) the defendant was himself the prosecutor or at least instigated the prosecution. It was their Letter-Complaint ﬁled with Fiscal Ponteras that led to the institution of Criminal Case No. 1989. 325 SCRA 694. and (d) the prosecutor was actuated by malice. Cokieng. 45) which held that Criminal Case No. (b) the prosecution ﬁnally terminated in the acquittal of plaintiff. 382 Phil.32 26 Bayani v. at p.e. by improper and sinister motives.R. No. 764-765 (2000). 57) even when it ordered the case dismissed upon Demurrer to Evidence. February 17. citing Lagman v... Lao v. 150192.
Court of Appeals. Jr. Villanueva v. 162187. 34 33 .R. Jr. however. pp. probable cause needs only to rest on evidence of the likelihood that a crime has been committed and that the person suspected is probably guilty thereof. Jr. Undoubtedly. 2002 Decision. was not a regular transaction of the bank with their client. While it requires more than bare suspicion or speculation. 35 Preferred Homes Specialties.34 It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence. thus: “In this case. November 18. 2005. the fault was with the ofﬁcers of defendant-appellee Bank and the ﬁling of the criminal case for estafa against plaintiffappellant was in fact malicious on their part. there was even no evidence shown to prove that plaintiff-appellant had in fact beneﬁted from the unauthorized release of the amount of the check to Tambis. the CA rejected such view. 121-122.R. the repeated request of defendant-appellee Bank for any form of authorization from Tambis. Jr. No. plaintiffappellant. 410. G. The fact that Tambis. v. Jr. The fact is there is nothing in the records to show that plaintiff-appellant had lifted a ﬁnger to convince the ofﬁcers of defendant-appellee to release the amount of the checks to Tambis. 511. December 16. Clearly. it was shown that his only basis for ﬁnding probable cause against herein plaintiff-appellant is the latter’s act of withdrawing the amount of the check. 2005. Yet. Without. thereby justifying plaintiff-appellant’s action of demanding from them a reimbursement of the amount of the checks. Secretary of Justice.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 55 In its March 13. 478 SCRA 387. despite Tambis’ failure to present any written authorization. Jr. Inc. 475 SCRA 495.”33 We sustain the CA. being able to link said act of withdrawal to the previous act of Tambis. No. Jr. 163593. to present his authorization from plaintiff-appellant before they could release the amount. in encashing the check without any authorization. may have the money to pay another client does not make herein plaintiff-appellant guilty of any form of Estafa against defendant Bank. defendant-appellee Bank still encashed the check and handed the money to Tambis. From the resolution of the City Fiscal. G. Jr. Probable cause implies mere reasonable belief of guilt.35 nor CA Rollo. only proves that the act of releasing the money to Tambis. it was shown that defendant-appellee Bank had repeatedly required Eduardo Tambis. Besides.
56 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED evidence sufﬁcient to procure a conviction. For one. 2006.36 Thus. 437 Phil. only because Tambis is the son of the secretary of the manager of San Carlos Milling Co. 153535. Bernabe. 38 SCRA 587. 301 SCRA 459 (1999). if only to decide a case of malicious prosecution. Solidbank Corporation v. the December 28. A closer examination of the December 28. 40 Records. No. 399. See also Saber v. August 31. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. United Coconut Planters Bank. 581 (2002). Villanueva v. G. April 30. No. acquittal is not to be equated with lack of probable cause. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation. 39 Cometa v. 1976 Resolution of Fiscal Ponteras states that Tambis was allowed by petitioner Metrobank to open Account No. L-26760. And rightly so. June 15. 1976 Resolution of Fiscal Ponteras reveals that his own ﬁndings tend to discount the probability that respondent committed estafa. 378 Phil. 2005. 169026.39 the determination of lack of probable cause as an element in malicious prosecution cannot be made to rely on the ﬁnding of the Department of Justice to ﬁle the criminal case for such practice will render obsolete the remedy of damages for malicious prosecution. Court of Appeals. July 28. 389. Court of Appeals. G. courts refrain from interfering with the assessment by the executive department of the existence of probable cause.R.. 1976 Resolution as to the existence of probable cause is conclusive. No. Respondent did not in any way lead them to believe that he authorized Tambis to open a personal account nor deposit there the checks of ACL. 464 SCRA 409.R. 38 First Women’s Credit Corporation v. petitioners on their own allowed Tambis to conduct said bank transactions. 1971. As we held in Cometa v. 25-26. as a general rule.37 Be that as it may.38 this does not preclude us from evaluating the facts and circumstances upon which the determination of probable cause may have been based. 437 SCRA 259. No. Inc. pp. 1910 and 12450. Fabia v. even when these were payable to ACL. While as a matter of policy. 388 SCRA 574.R. 123 and deposit therein Check Nos.40 Thus. G. G. 490 SCRA 774. 1187. 2004. the CA disregarded the ﬁnding of Fiscal Ponteras and declared that petitioners had absolutely no cause to drag respondent to court for estafa. it does not follow that the ﬁnding of Fiscal Ponteras in his December 28. 132981. In the present case. Perez. supra. 429.R. 37 36 . citing Ventura v.
00 from Tambis.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 57 Further. it likewise appears that petitioners themselves allowed Tambis to withdraw part of the value of the two ACL checks which he had deposited earlier into his account. Mr. 1976 that he was a partner of respondent. Jr.551.400. Eduardo Tambis. Jr.”43 41 42 Id. said checks mentioned herein was accepted for deposit. Delﬁn Castro of Caspin Trading. Delﬁn Castro of Caspin Trading is a spare parts dealer from Manila. Jr. .. thus: “It appears that at the time when the deposit was made. Before allowing Tambis to open Account No..08. it is bewildering that petitioners ﬁled the Letter-Complaint against respondent based merely on the bare claim of Tambis in his Afﬁdavit42 dated May 3. a certain Mr. Ernesto Qui for deposit with Metro Bank. 16-17. San Carlos City Branch x x x the total amount of P24. The Check No. Eduardo Tambis. Jr. in the name of ACL were presented to Mr.00. Jr..500. Jr. Moreover. 12454 for P10. Fiscal Ponteras’s Resolution..41 a requirement which they would not have demanded had they been certain that Tambis and respondent were partners. Eduardo Tambis. informed the bank that Mr. San Carlos City Branch. The amount of P16. and paid to Caspin Trading thru Delﬁn Castro.00 in a form of a bank draft was purchased by Eduardo Tambis. Manila. Thus. shows that petitioners did not believe that the business relationship of Tambis and respondent was anything close to a partnership. as the records show. based on the evaluation of Fiscal Ponteras of the testimony of Metrobank Cashier Ernesto Qui. 123 and deposit ACL checks. on the insistence of Mr. and with his assurance that the supporting papers from ACL will follow as the same will be submitted by him. for the account of ACL. at pp. However. 17-18. in payment for a certain spare-parts bought on credit by ACL. 1910 for P24. Id.900. Jr. Sr. 276. He is with him (Tambis) to receive payment for P16. at pp. at p. was in company with Mr.. xxxx Mr. It was at ﬁrst refused for deposit for the reason that they were payable to ACL and not to Eduardo Tambis. Tambis.400. [made] a withdrawal from Metro Bank. petitioners required Tambis to submit a written authorization. 43 Id.00 and Check No.
Instead. More important. no such document was presented to petitioners. of petitioners that Tambis managed to withdraw a portion of the value of the checks of ACL. it is obvious that petitioners allowed Tambis to make the withdrawal without the latter showing them any document to support his claim that the amount to be withdrawn was in payment of an account of ACL with Caspin Trading. the amount allegedly due to Caspin Trading. it succeeded in revealing that it was by the complacency. The Resolution does not cite any evidence to substantiate the assumption that the payment made to Caspin Trading was for an account of ACL. 1976 Resolution of Fiscal Ponteras failed to make out even the slightest probable cause to indict respondent for estafa.400. Thus. despite the assurance of Tambis. or that respondent or ACL beneﬁted from the payment made to Caspin Trading.551. . the December 28. was based purely on speculation. the December 28. if not negligence. The receipts cited in the said Resolution do not indicate that the transactions covered by the payments were between ACL and Caspin Trading. petitioners therefore tolerated Tambis to treat Account No. Evidently. however. then they should have limited the amount withdrawn to P16.. 123 and the funds therein as his own. if it were true that petitioners allowed Tambis to make the withdrawal only because they believed it was in payment of an account of ACL. By allowing Tambis to withdraw more than that amount.00 which they claimed was the amount ACL owed to Caspin Trading.400.08. This is certainly more than the P16. On the contrary. petitioners allowed Tambis to withdraw the amount of P24. Such perception. The only connection Fiscal Ponteras perceived respondent had to the transactions was that the latter purportedly insisted on being paid the value of the ACL checks even when he allegedly knew that petitioners allowed Tambis to withdraw the same to pay for an account of ACL with Caspin Trading.44 All told.00. In fact. at pp. said receipts all indicate that the sale was made by Caspin Trading to Tambis.58 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED From the foregoing evaluation of Fiscal Ponteras. The next question then is whether the CA erred in ﬁnding that petitioners were motivated by malice when they initiated the ﬁling 44 Id. 13-14. 1976 Resolution of Fiscal Ponteras failed to link respondent to the transactions of Tambis.
There is preponderant evidence that petitioners acted with malice when they included respondent in the criminal case. The CA is correct. the literal interpretation shall prevail. not even when he executed the Afﬁdavit. despite knowledge that they had no cause against him. WHEREFORE. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing. it is considered to be containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be. as basis for ﬁling of a complaint for estafa against respondent. coming as it did in the heels of petitioners’ insistence that Tambis furnish them written proof of partnership.45 In pressing charges against respondent. Pampanga III Electric Cooperative. the only reason petitioners had for ﬁling the Letter-Complaint against respondent was that Tambis purportedly issued an Afﬁdavit claiming that he was a partner of respondent. between the parties and their successors in interest. for a time. and this explains why they were.. petitioners acted with ill-intent and abused the processes of the court. who are presumably steeped in the rules of due diligence in banking practice. This was such a frivolous excuse. General rule on the award of damages in contacts explained The general rule is that when the terms of an agreement are clear and leaves no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties. No costs.. Petitioners had actually nothing to hold against respondent. 46 45 . Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. suddenly discarded the requirement of written proof of partnership and settled for the bare statement of Tambis. SO ORDERED. Inc. 430 SCRA 380. No such written proof was ever presented by Tambis. the same is AFFIRMED. ﬁnding no reversible error in the decision of the CA. RTC-1015 against respondent even without probable cause. 285-286. pressing Tambis alone for restoration of the amount withdrawn. As already discussed. at pp.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 59 of Criminal Case No. It is perplexing then that petitioners.46 Id. no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
on February 13. 36791 in the name of respondents. Q-92-11368. did not move out on April 30. the award of exemplary damages cannot be granted. however. 1991.” The decision follows: Petitioner and his wife and the spouses Manuel San Diego and Azucena Anselmo San Diego were the registered owners of a 712-square meter lot covered by Transfer Certiﬁcate of Title No. 1991 ordering them to vacate the premises. giving petitioner and his wife ﬁfteen (15) days from receipt to leave the property. Likewise. Petitioner and his wife. 1991. were allegedly sold by petitioner and his wife and the San Diegos to respondents for the sum of P2. The sale allegedly came with an understanding that petitioner and his wife. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “With regard to the award of damages. 1991. reckless or malevolent manner. attorney’s fees and litigation costs. 95064. the Court believes that the same is not warranted under the circumstances. while searching for a place to transfer. there being no stipulation to that effect and the case does not fall under any of the exceptions provided by law. 1992. where there is no showing that petitioner acted in a wanton. respondents ﬁled against petitioner and his wife a Complaint for Speciﬁc Performance and Damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City47 47 Docketed as Civil Case No. Despite the demands. Respondents sent a letter to them on May 13. fraudulent. according to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. will be permitted to stay on the property temporarily or until April 30. however. . they remained on the property. 1991. Finally. Another demand letter was sent on August 21.000 as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Respondents failed to show proof or actual basis of moral injury. the Register of Deeds issued Transfer Certiﬁcate of Title No. The sale was registered and on April 29. On April 24. located in San Francisco del Monte. be recovered in this case. namely. Quezon City where petitioner and his wife likewise maintained their residence and place of business.60 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED The case Anselmo v. 1991. Hernandez (533 SCRA 122) In this case. the parcel of land and the improvements erected thereon. Consequently. petitioner’s house and garments factory. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation cannot.500.
000 from respondents. and 7) that respondents use Boston Equity. . 6) that contrary to respondents’ assertion.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 61 praying that they deliver the physical possession of the property to them. Hernandez testiﬁed that the obligation of the defendant which he settled amounted to more than P2. 2) that the sale is void for want of consideration because their supposed transaction with respondents was for a loan of money in the amount of P2. . A simple scrutiny of defendant’s evidence will readily reveal that they have miserably failed to discharge or fulﬁll their burden of proof.2 Million.00 in cash and assumed and actually paid her obligation to a certain Mr. . [T]here is a disputable presumption that private transactions have been fair and regular. . It is not true. Mr. (hereafter. The fact that the latter state[d] [that] the consideration [was] P2. thus: “At the outset. . in her own testimony under cross-examination. . Choa. admitted that plaintiff William Hernandez paid her P350. Rule 131. and that there is sufﬁcient consideration for a contract (Sec.000. 5) that they paid the corresponding interest on the loan. . to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish their defense . Anselmo herself acknowledge[d] that Mr. in their dealings with unsuspecting borrowers. 3) that the house and lot served as collateral for the loan. In their Answer with Counterclaim. and that the deed of sale and other documents were obtained fraudulently. by preponderance of evidence. therefore.250. the RTC of Quezon City rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the sale and ordering petitioners to deliver the physical possession of the property to respondents. Mrs.00 in connection with the Deed of Absolute Sale. 3.000. On February 23. with intent to gain. that the ordinary course of business has been followed.000.5 Million is of little moment. The defendants insist that their indebtedness (which Mr. 4) that they have received P300. 1995.500. Boston Equity). Defendant Emerlinda Mercado-Anselmo. Besides. that the Deed of Absolute Sale was not supported by a sufﬁcient consideration. petitioner and his wife contended: 1) that they did not sell the subject property to respondents. Hernandez paid) was not to BOSTON but to a certain Mr. The difference is so minute as to command an overpowering importance. Hernandez paid a total of P2. they did not have any business transaction with or indebtedness to Boston Equity Resources. Rules of Court) . it must be pointed out that the defendants have the burden of proof . Inc.
In this case. Hernandez needed such instrument to obtain from his Chinese friends the money he was going to lend to them (the defendants). 1334 and 1390. Worse. . That the defendants were consequently relieved from their obligation is not denied by them. said Deed is valid until it is set aside. As such. In their “Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. . said claim is belied by the documents admittedly signed by defendant Emerlinda Anselmo . This is of course strongly controverted and denied by the plaintiffs.). . . the attack against its validity must be directly made in an action or in a counterclaim for that purpose . the fraud and false representation alleged by the defendants would not have rendered the questioned Deed . Hernandez assumed the obligation and paid it as part of the consideration for the Deed of Absolute Sale. However. which either refer to BOSTON or are written on its stationery. moral and exemplary damages. . In [the] light of the foregoing ﬁndings of fact. which shall be brought within four years from the time of the discovery of the fraud (Art. To emphasize. CFI of Cotabato. there is no way by which the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale can be categorized as void for want of consideration. Let us now examine if defendant’s contention that it is invalid for being simulated and having been secured through fraud and false representation has any factual and legal basis. 12 Phil. The fact remains that Mr. if at all. Muñoz. and its validity may be assailed only in action for that purpose (Llacer v. ibid. Civil Code of the Philippines).” the defendants patently failed to allege and pray for the annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale as a counterclaim. but is in effect admitted. But whether it was to Mr. pursuant to Article 1338 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 1591. As such. . 328). this court is more inclined to believe Mr. . said person was not presented to corroborate defendant’ bare assertion. Chua or to BOSTON that the defendants were indebted matters little. 116 SCRA 347). which thus renders the said Deed of Absolute Sale merely voidable at the most (Arts. the defendants claim that the real agreement between them and the plaintiffs was one of equitable mortgage but they were induced by the latter to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale instead over the property intended to secure the loan on the pretext (albeit false or fraudulent) that Mr.62 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Chua. . . In other words. Hernandez’ testimony that defendants’ creditor was BOSTON . but limited their allegations and prayer to actual. . the resulting contract would not be simulated or ﬁctitious but only fraudulent (Pangadil v. But granting arguendo that the said allegation of the defendants were true.
Hernandez. defendants’ version is simply incredible. so that they can fetch a higher price therefore. 1991 . she received P350. it [plaintiff’s declaration] is more importantly supported by the documentary evidence admittedly signed or executed by Mrs. Not only is the latter more consistent with human behavior and ordinary experience. Hernandez was only for a loan secured by a real estate mortgage. Hernandez. It is not uncommon for debtors in default to sell their mortgaged property. that is. which they actually have not. Anselmo. as clearly borne [out] by the documentary evidence admittedly signed and executed by the defendants. Anselmo. Anselmo’s case. Inc. On the other hand. The weak and puerile corroborative testimony of her sister-in-law miserably failed to bolster Mrs. proceeding as it was from a biased and polluted source. that the defendants had transacted with Boston Equity Resources. As regards the third issue. Anselmo’s stature and standing would willingly sign a document she fully knew to be an Absolute Deed of Sale if her real agreement with Mr. While defendant Emerlinda Anselmo testiﬁed on this matter. the latter’s version must perforce be rejected. sufﬁce it to state that plaintiffs’ version of the circumstances surrounding and leading to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale conforms to usual business practice much more than that of the defendants’. but only voidable.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 63 of Absolute Sale simulated and void. is too pat and transparent as to deceive and mislead even an ordinary [man]. As Mrs. the ﬁrst issue in this case is hereby resolved in favor of the validity and legality of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the parties herein on April 24. the cash she received represented an additional amount over and above what would have been realized [had the property been] foreclosed and sold at public auction. . In contrast. The ploy supposedly employed by Mr. .000 from Mr. Hernandez aside from the latter’s assumption of her obligation to a certain Mr. The second issue is likewise resolved in the afﬁrmative. Obviously. . we only have her naked assertion shot through and through with glaring inconsistencies. If only on this score. Because of the foregoing considerations and conclusions. that of using the instrument to obtain the money to be loaned to the defendants from his Chinese friends. and only if they had successfully proven the existence of the [said] fraud or false representation. Chua. much less an established businesswoman engaged in the manufacturing and export of garments like Mrs. Anselmo herself testiﬁed. rather than have it foreclosed. the probative value of her testimony does not outweigh the contrary declaration of plaintiff Mr. This Court cannot imagine how a businesswoman of Mrs.
000. with legal interest.000. . The ruling of the RTC was afﬁrmed by the CA in a Decision dated April 3. 116-125. and against the defendants. Q92-11368. . judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. thereby entitling the latter to reasonable compensation for the deprivation of their right to the use and enjoyment thereof. 2002. From all the above. Quezon City. It necessarily follows [therefore] that the defendants are bound to deliver the possession of said property to the plaintiffs . 1995 of the Regional Trial Court.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees.”48 P50.”49 48 49 Rollo. for the use and occupation of subject property. SO ORDERED. as follows: 1) Ordering the defendants to forthwith deliver the physical possession of the subject property to the plaintiffs.000. it becomes obvious that the plaintiffs are the ones entitled to the reliefs prayed for in their Complaint . The dispositive portion thereof reads: “WHEREFORE.64 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Accordingly. the Decision dated February 23. SO ORDERED. computed from 1 September 1991 until date of actual delivery thereof to the plaintiffs. .00 as moral damages. premises considered.00 a month. Branch 82. is hereby AFFIRMED.00 as exemplary damages. said third issue is resolved to the effect that the agreement between the parties was indeed a sale (of the property in question) and not merely an equitable mortgage. Costs against the appellants.. WHEREFORE. P30. premises considered. at p. Id.000. It goes without saying that the defendants wrongfully retained possession and use of subject property after the last demand of the plaintiffs. P30. Defendants’ counterclaims are DISMISSED. (ii) (iii) (iv) and (v) Costs of suit. 82. . 2) Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the following: (i) Compensation at the rate of P2. . in Civil Case No. . pp.
IN REALITY. were executed on November 16. 1990. 1991. the deed of sale was executed on April 24. as follows: One. IS A COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT. . this petition raising the following issues:50 I WHETHER THE LOWER COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE AS NULL AND VOID FOR BEING FICTITIOUS AND SIMULATED. The loan vouchers of Boston Equity in the sum of P2.500. at pp.. 50 Id. 14-15. the transaction between the parties was principally a loan with equitable mortgage.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 65 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. III WHETHER THE LOWER COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS AS A LOAN. II WHETHER THE LOWER COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE AS AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. This shows that the sale was a convenient scheme of respondents to circumvent the legal requirement of foreclosure. AND IV WHETHER THE LOWER COURT AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WHICH. Emerlinda. and that the sale was merely a ruse to circumvent the prohibition against pactum commissorium. Hence. Petitioner argues.000 evidencing the indebtedness of petitioner’s deceased wife. Two.
petitioner and his wife and respondent William.. Bonifacio Choa in whose favor the sum of P1. it is highly surprising that the lower court dismissed “as of little moment” the difference (P250.51 Four.250. according to respondent William.000 as loan granted by Boston Equity was applied. Choa. That the property was mortgaged to Boston Equity is further bolstered by the fact that respondent William testiﬁed that petitioner and his wife offered that he buy the subject property because they obtained a loan from Boston Equity and they were unable to pay the interest so the latter was going to foreclose the property.900. it would be easier for him to borrow money from his Chinese friends. Petitioner claims that he and his wife never received any amount from Boston Equity.500. Bonifacio Choa and Boston Equity.000) as against the consideration of the alleged sale (P2. Respondents’ Exhibits “J” and “K” show on their face that the obligation of petitioner and his wife was to a certain Mr.000 that they obtained from respondent William. This demonstrates that the property was not sold to respondents but was mortgaged to Boston Equity. They signed the documents in the name of Boston Equity under the instruction of respondent William who likewise serves as President of Boston Equity. if the title to the property were in his name. notwithstanding the deed of absolute sale. at pp. respondents averred that petitioner and his wife had to borrow money from Boston Equity in order to pay their obligation to Mr. along with the co-owners of the property. Their property was given as security for the loan of P2. During the trial.000) as “so minute as to command an overpowering importance. had a verbal agreement that the transaction was a loan.000) between what petitioner and his wife received (P2. respondents’ evidence made it appear that petitioner and his wife were indebted to two parties: Mr. 69-71. . on petitioner’s behalf.66 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Three. Five.500. Petitioner never had the intention of selling his property to respondents because the loan that he and his wife wanted to obtain from respondent William was to be used for the expansion of their garments business.” The lower court 51 Id. Petitioner and his wife agreed to sign the deed of sale because.
notwithstanding the lapse of four (4) months. .53 The ﬁndings of facts of the CA. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are reproduced as follows: “7. 53 52 . . .” Section 1. This Court is not a trier of facts.”52 The issue is whether the parties truly entered into a contract of sale. .00054 prepared by Boston Id. The complaint should have been treated as one for Unlawful Detainer. From the records. evidencing equitable mortgage rather than a contract of sale. defendants still failed and/or refused to deliver the subject property to plaintiffs. 54 Maturity date of the loan was December 16. are accorded respect and seldom disturbed. Only in instances when a miscarriage of justice could probably result from the trial court’s and/or the Court of Appeals’ oversight of signiﬁcant facts which could materially alter the determination of the case does this Court step in and evaluate evidentiary matters. . at pp. from receipt of the aforesaid demand letter (“to vacate the subject property and surrender possession thereof”) . a resolution of which requires an examination of the facts and the evidence presented in the case. more or less. . However.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 67 should have held the difference of P250. bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession . the appealed decisions should be nulliﬁed for want of jurisdiction. vendee . . and Six. such .500.. may. . provides: “. Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. for the restitution of such possession together with damages and costs. the Court considers the following: 1) the promissory note evidencing a loan of P2. at anytime within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. 1990 with an interest rate of 7%. the peculiar circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of sale give rise to a fair inference that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt. . .000 as evidence that respondents retained for themselves a part of the purchase price indicative of an equitable mortgage. Moreover. especially when these agree with those of the trial court. 16-29 (emphasis supplied).
2) a loan voucher issued by Boston Equity on November 16. Choa). The Court ﬁnds no reason. and when the purported contract of sale was executed. therefore. according to Article 1305 of the Civil Code.900. in which case. one of the parties may bring an action for reformation of an instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed . 1990 showed that petitioner and his wife received the total amount of P2. whether it is reduced to writing or not.000 (P1. ‘is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself. Once the minds of the contracting parties meet. it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be. did not receive anything from the proceeds of the sale.000 in cash from respondents. the following requisites must concur.000 of which was indicated to have been applied to petitioner and his wife’s indebtedness to Mr.250. 6) respondent William Hernandez was the President of Boston Equity at the time the alleged loan was extended by the latter to petitioner and his wife. 7) petitioner’s residence and garments business are situated in the lot covered by the deed of sale. While the circumstances of the case and the parties’ testimonies may appear to give various possibilities. 1991. addressed to Boston Equity. Pertinent portions of the CA decision read: “[A] contract. to give something or to render some service. 1991 and June 24. 1990. 1991 letters of extension for the payment of the loan. And. and entered into a contract of sale with respondents. to wit: (1) there must have been a meeting of the . 8) no real estate mortgage was shown to have been executed by petitioner in favor of Boston Equity to secure the loan. 4) Boston Equity issued a Statement of Account in the name of petitioner’s wife Emerlinda. when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing. with respect to the other. between the parties and their successors-ininterest. it is not the Court’s function to speculate. and 10) the San Diego spouses. . the co-owners of the property. a valid contract exists. Bonifacio M. to overturn the ﬁndings of the RTC and the CA. The evidence points to the fact that petitioner and his wife obtained a loan from Boston Equity.68 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Equity was signed by petitioner and his wife on November 16. 5) the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on April 24. except when it fails to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto. 3) petitioner’s wife Emerlinda wrote on March 12. For an action for reformation of an instrument as provided for in Article 1359 to prosper. 9) petitioner received P300. . no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
the claim of the appellants that their indebtedness was not to Boston Equity Resources. the subject deed of absolute sale was couched in clear terms and conditions. Villamor. where there is no showing that petitioner acted in a wanton. 284 SCRA 184). it cannot be said that the deed of absolute sale can be categorized as void for want of consideration. June 18.58 be Rollo. Choa . which either refer to Boston or written on its stationery. Anselmo herself testiﬁed that she received P350. Nos.000. (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties. written and unconditional acceptance of contractual commitments negated the theory of equitable mortgage. the voluntary. It bears stressing that said person was not presented to corroborate appellant’s bare assertion. Respondents failed to show proof or factual basis of the alleged moral injury. 291 SCRA 66. 80-82. however. 1998. No. 56 55 . it is essential that the claimant should satisfactorily provide factual basis for the alleged moral injury (People v. . In the case at bench. January 16. and (3) the failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake. v.56 Likewise. but limited their allegations and prayer to actual. and besides. . G. said claim is belied by the documents . Choa is unsubstantiated.CHAPTER 3 OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS 69 minds of the parties to the contract. fraud. 57 Xentrex Automobile. except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded. 58 In the absence of stipulation. appellants failed to allege and pray for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale as a counterclaim. pp. inequitable conduct or accident . In fact. Court of Appeals. the award of exemplary damages cannot be granted.00 from Mr.R. . admittedly signed by appellant Emerlinda Anselmo. other than judicial costs. .”55 With regard to the award of damages. 1988. cannot be recovered. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation cannot. Finally. as correctly pointed out by the court a quo. appellants [petitioners] had not shown or established the presence of the afore-stated requirements for the reformation of the deed in question. In light of the foregoing. Inc. . attorney’s fees and litigation costs.57 Finally. .R. As earlier stressed. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. fraudulent. moral and exemplary damages. the Court believes that the same is not warranted under the circumstances. reckless. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary. 121559. oppressive or malevolent manner. In addition. Hernandez aside from the latter’s assumption of her obligation to Mr. G. Inc. according to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Also. but to a certain Mr. 111313-14. Mrs.
. (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid. in CA-G.70 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED recovered in this case. dated April 3.. (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. SO ORDERED. respectively. the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. No costs. and attorney’s fees and litigation costs is DELETED.. and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. just and demandable claim. . (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. CV No. .R. 49437 are MODIFIED accordingly. 2002.. 2002 and July 11. The award of moral and exemplary damages. there being no stipulation to that effect and the case does not fall under any of the exceptions provided by law. WHEREFORE. .
” – Patrick Devlin Quasi-delict deﬁned and explained A quasi-delict is a tort or a wrong. Florido.1 Elements of a quasi-delict under Articles 2176-2194. 98 SCRA 728. Civil Code enumerated The elements of a quasi-delict under Articles 2176-2194 has been enumerated by the Supreme Court as follows: (1) act or omission by defendant.71 CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS “Negligence in law ranges from inadvertence that is hardly accidental to useful disregard of the rights of others. (2) presence of fault or negligence or lack of due care of defendant. Garcia v. It is the infringement of another’s interests that is wrongful. (3) physical injuries or other damages sustained by plaintiff. irrespective of any prior contractual undertaking. and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists between the liability arising from 1 2 Tawag v. and (5) the absence of a pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.2 Quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana as a separate legal institution explained A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantiality all its own. Alcantara. (4) existence of direct causal connection between the damage and prejudice and the fault or negligence of defendant. 71 . 52 SCRA 421.
or those where the injured party is granted a right to ﬁle an action or suit under the law to govern is to be determined. not the claim of the 3 4 Manliclic v. Tuazon. in one case.3 Requisites of a quasi-delictual action enumerated As held by the Supreme Court. 6 Santos v. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender. . 426 SCRA 307. and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.5 Thus. 465 SCRA 332. the offended party has the choice to enforce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under the Civil Code. Calauanan. the prescription of actions ex-quasi-delicto does not operate as a bar to enforce the civil action arising from the crime. does not carry with it extinction of civil liability based on quasi-delict. 5 Cereza v. for example: (1) civil liability ex-delicto under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. It is now settled that the acquittal of the accused based on a ﬁnding that he is not guilty. Heirs of Pedro Tayag v.72 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra contractual. and (2) independent civil liabilities. 512 SCRA 612.6 Moreover. and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. 98 SCRA 728. (3) intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34. Alcantara. 7 Ibid. namely: (1) an action ex-delicto under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (2) independent civil liabilities such as these arising from culpa contractual under Article. the requisites of a quasi-delictual action are the following essential elements: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence of respondent. Pizarro. (2) damage caused by said act or omission.4 An action based on a quasi-delict may be proceed independently of a criminal action explained An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. in case of negligence.7 Two separate civil liabilities for the same act or omission explained An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender. (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or omission.
is the statutory deﬁnition of a quasidelict. and (d) teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades over their pupils and students. The principles can avail of the defense “diligence of a good father of the family” to exculpate themselves from any responsibility under Article 2180. Civil Code. Inc. Civil Code. Extraordinary diligence explained That degree of extraordinary diligence: (1) in the selection of employees or subordinates. but rather by the complaint itself. if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Civil Code. v. It is governed by Chapter 2. Such fault or negligence. 7th Edition. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Title XVII.” It may also refer to any deviation from prudence or duty resulting from inattention. there being fault or negligence. made in his argument or brief.9 8 9 Safeguard Security Agency. Tangco. and that of another (respondent superior) usually. Fault deﬁned and explained Fault “is an error or defect of judgment or conduct. the requisites or essential elements thereof being as abovestated. and (2) supervision of their employees or agents in the performance of their duties. 511 SCRA 57.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 73 party ﬁling the action. perversion. is the statutory deﬁnition of quasi-delict explained Article 2176.8 Responsibility for personal acts or omission explained The responsibility for: (1) one’s personal acts or omission. . such as (a) parents or guardians over their minor children. is obliged to pay for the damage done. incapacity. (1902a) Art. See Black’s Law Dictionary. 2176. It is also called “diligentissimi paris familias” in Latin. bad faith or mismanagement. Art. (c) the State over special agents. (b) owners and managers over their employees and household helpers. the principal for the acts of his agent. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. 623. Civil Code. p. its allegations and prayer for relief.
74 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Negligence deﬁned and explained Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability. Art. not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. 100. the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person. shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control. imbecile. — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. in accordance with the civil law. Both provisions are quoted in toto hereunder.10 Articles 100 and 101. or minor shall respond with their own property. which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. It is a relation or comparative. 2. legal guardianship or control. 101. 2. 506 SCRA 685. 10 See Philippine National Railways v. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. and (2) the rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1. Should there be no person having such insane. imbecile or minor under his authority. unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. said insane. and by a person under nine years of age. In cases of subdivisions 1. Bunty. excepting property exempt from execution. to wit: Art. who has acted without discernment. . of the Revised Penal Code explained Articles 100 and 101 of the Revised Penal Code are about: (1) the civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. or by one over nine but under ﬁfteen years of age. or if such person be insolvent. 3. and 3 of Article 12.
a pecuniary recovery of an award of money from a quasi-delictual action is not a bar for a recovery from an award of money for civil liability. indemniﬁcation shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. if there be no such persons. which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action arising from a criminal violation of the Revised Penal Code. those doing the act shall be liable. in all events. 2177. Art. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 75 Second. Third. 2178. (n) Civil liability for fault or negligence separate and distinct from negligence under the Revised Penal Code By express provision of Article 2177. The courts shall determine. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. Art. (n) . whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents. even approximately. or when the liability also attaches to the Government. the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily. in sound discretion. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. Civil Code. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined. the fault or negligence under Article 2176. Civil Code. and. is entirely different from that “the civil liability for negligence’’ under the Penal Code. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. or. or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town. the persons for whose beneﬁt the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the beneﬁt which they may have received. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12. That being the case. saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
1174. Civil Code expressly bars any recovery by him. . of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith. he may partially recover from a quasi-delictual action against the defendant on the basis of the same legal provision. the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201. enumerated By express provision of Article 2178. Civil Code. (1105a) Art. Civil Code. however. or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation. according to the circumstances. no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen. he cannot recover damages. but such liability may be regulated by the courts. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury.76 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Articles 1172 to 1174. Art. Except in cases expressly speciﬁed by the law. (n) Consequence of plaintiff’s own negligence explained If plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence on his own. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care. paragraph 2. shall apply. these provisions on obligations being made by that provision to quasi-delicts. that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance. were inevitable. 1173. Article 2179. Articles 1172 to 1174 are reproduced hereunder. 1172. the plaintiff may recover damages. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons. or which. (1103) Art. though foreseen. as merely contributory with that of the defendant. (1104a) Art. But if his negligence was only contributory. 2179. If his negligence.
and that of another (respondeat superior) usually. the mother. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. but not when the damage has been caused by the ofﬁcial to whom the task done properly pertains. in case of his death or incapacity. (b) owners and managers over their employees and household helpers. The father and. (1903a) Responsibility for personal acts or omission and respondeat superior explained The responsibility for: (1) one’s personal acts or omission. such as (a) Parents or guardians over their minor children. Lastly. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 77 Art. in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. (c) the State over special agents. even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. and (d) teachers . The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. 2180. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. so long as they remain in their custody. the principal for the acts of his agent.
2181. 7th Edition. Art. such as an employer for an employee. Diligence of a good father of a family explained That degree of extraordinary diligence: (1) in the selection of employees or subordinates.11 Respondeat superior is a Latin term which means “Let the Superior answer. Civil Code. under the doctrine of respondeat superior reimbursement of one who pays for the damage caused by the employee from the employer. (n) Poblete v. It is also called “diligentissimi paris familias” in Latin. the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. Art. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian. it may refer to one who acts for another or acts as another’s security. The principals can avail of the defense “diligence of a good father of a family” to exculpate themselves from any responsibility under Article 2180. citing Keeton. 2182. Article 2181.” In other words. and (2) supervision of their employees or agents in the performance of their duties. Civil Code provides. p. 500. Civil Code provides for reimbursement from the employer of quasi-delictual liability of the employee Thus. 12 11 . The Law on Torts. p. See Black’s Law Dictionary. 93 SCRA 201. 1315. Fabros.78 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED or heads of establishments of arts and trades over their pupils and students. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.12 Article 2181. (1904) The doctrine of respondeat superior explained The doctrine of respondeat superior has its origin in American law whereby the negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer.
CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS
In case minors or insane persons has no parents or guardians, payor-of their quasi-delictual liability may reimburse themselves from the minors or insane persons’ shall be answerable from their own assets Minor or insane persons are subject to appointment of a guardian ad litem for them. After such appointment, the payor may proceed against their personal assets under Article 2183, Civil Code. Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating trafﬁc regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n) Liability of motor vehicle owner in case of accidents explained If the owner is in the vehicle solidary with the driver if by the use of due diligence he could have prevented the accident. If the owner is not in the vehicle joint with the driver if the latter is acting within the scope of the authority as an employee.13 Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any trafﬁc regulation. (n) When a driver is presumed negligent explained Unless there is proof to the contrary, a driver is presumed negligent: (1) If at the time of the accident he was violating a trafﬁc
See Article 2184, Civil Code.
TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED
regulation; (2) or found guilty of reckless driving;14 or (3) or found guilty at least twice of a trafﬁc regulation within two months after the accident.15 Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall ﬁle with the proper government ofﬁce a bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or ofﬁce, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be ﬁxed by the competent public ofﬁcial. (n) Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n) Bond deﬁned and explained A bond is a written instrument guarenteeing performance of acts or duties contemplated. The bond to answer for damages, as contemplated in Article 2186, Civil Code, is a third party liability insurance bond. The third party liability insurance bond is answerable to any damage sustained by a third party in case of a motor vehicle accident. However, manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs are liable under Article 2187, Civil Code, for any death or injury caused by any noxious or harmful substance used by them in its manufacturing and processing of foodstuffs. Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as ﬁrearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) When presumption of negligence of the defendant arises explained A presumption of negligence arises from defendant if the death or injuries arises from possession of dangerous weapons or substances.
See Article 2185, Ibid. See Article 2184, supra.
CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) Liability for damages of local government units explained Under Article 2180, Civil Code, local government units shall be liable for “the defective conditions of roads, streets or bridges, public buildings and other public works made under its supervision.” Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inﬂammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Responsibilities of a building owner/proprietor enumerated The responsibilities of a building owner/proprietor are enumerated in Articles 3100 to 2101, Civil Code. Such responsibilities range from partial or total collapse of the building or any harm caused by the structure to persons or property. Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering
7th Edition. pp. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. 462-63. 17 Article 403. is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.17 Effect of concurrence of two or more creditors in the same obligation explained In case of concurrence of two or more creditors and two or more debtors in one and the same obligation. cited in Black’s Law Dictionary. . in a single debt of P1. Rules of Court. in of it.16 Joint owner deﬁned and explained A joint owner is a co-owner to a part owner not really a “joint owner” within the meaning of Section 130. p. within the period therein ﬁxed. both are discharged from the obligation. 2194. But once the whole amount is paid by either of them. As stated. (1909) When engineers or architects liable for damages explained Engineers or archirects are liable for damages as a result of defects in the building construction. 2193. a co-owner is merely a part owner.000 owing by each of them. (1910) Liability for things thrown or falling from a building explained The head of family who lives in the building shall be the one liable. 1308. (n) Solidarity deﬁned and explained The status of being jointly and severally liable for a debt. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof. Jurisprudence. Art. Civil Code. It is a liability in obligation. and in the absence of express 16 See Salmond. Art. for emphasis. for instance. In this kind of liability.82 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article.
21 Unfortunately. Rollo.. then he is guilty of negligence.. De Dios). their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos’ Lot 69 by 87 square meters.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 83 and indubitable terms characterizing the obligation as solidary. pp. operating under the business name D. in the same or similar circumstances. Quezon City. located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision.. v. during and after the construction of the said house. Jr. As Geodetic Engineer Democrito De Dios (Engr. The decision follows: Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certiﬁcates of Title (TCT) No. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. at p. the test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case is: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not. . On the other hand. Corinthian referred Engr.. Inc. (C. at pp. 21 Id. which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association. Inc.B.” Moreover. 148-149. (Corinthian).B. the presumption is that the obligation is only joint. Inc. 119-139. Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65. Corinthian conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the perimeter 18 19 Escano v. Thus. 150. Tanjunco (558 SCRA 154) In this case the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position.18 The case Corinthian Gardens Association. Paraz & Construction Co. would force such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a mere awful manner.M. 20 Id. conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision’s developer. a relocation survey was necessary. Before. Paraz) as builder. after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C. 536 SCRA 36. De Dios Realty and Surveying. De Dios to the Cuasos. respondents-spouses Frank and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos’ lots. Ortigas. 24224519 and 28296120 respectively.
200-207. It. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. Thus.B. 1993. at pp. The third-party complaint against Corinthian and Engr. The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty. they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Paraz and Engr. 25 Id. thus. and gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the Cuasos the option to buy the encroaching portion of the land. In the event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said portion. at p. Paraz to pay moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees to the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos.. 24 Id. at pp.B. The Tanjangcos ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration24 of the said RTC Decision which the RTC. exposing them to litigation. ruled that the Cuasos were builders in good faith.22 Eventually. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper speciﬁcations of their house. the Cuasos ﬁled a Third-Party Complaint23 against Corinthian. De Dios’ integrity and competence. . 1993. thereby. The RTC likewise held that C. It ruled that the Cuasos’ perimeter wall encroached on the land of the Tanjangos by 87 square meters. prompting the Tanjangcos to ﬁle with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages..84 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED fence but the latter failed and refused. De Dios. the perimeter wall should be demolished at the latter’s expense. 143-147. denied in its Order25 dated June 28.B.000. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey. 22 23 Id. at a price to be agreed upon by the parties within sixty (60) days from receipt of the said Decision. The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.. It. On March 30. and to Engr. on the other hand. De Dios. 153-164. Id. however. Paraz was grossly negligent in not taking into account the correct boundaries of Cuasos’ lot when it constructed the house. at pp. however. the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the Tanjangcos. 208. was dismissed for lack of cause of action. the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such construction.00 commencing from the time of the ﬁling of the complaint. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals of P2. ordered C.B.. C.
on the other hand. the Tanjangcos. at pp. C. Corinthian.B. About six (6) months later. On the third-party complaints.B. It held that the Cuasos acted in bad faith in land-grabbing the 87 square meter-portion of Lot 69 as of April 5. 2003. ordered to pay the Tanjangcos P100. likewise. and impleading 26 27 Id.00 as attorney’s fees. at pp. 110-115. Hence. enjoyment and occupancy of the lot from 1989 up to the time they vacate the property considering the location and category of the same.B. Corinthian ﬁled the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution. which include the right to demand the demolition of the offending perimeter wall after reimbursing the Cuasos the necessary expenses for the preservation of the encroached area.000. as moral damages. 450. The Cuasos’ appeal against the Tanjangcos. Paraz and/or Engr. C. The Cuasos were ordered to pay monthly rentals of P10.00 for the use. Paraz all appealed to the CA.. They were. 451 and 549 of the New Civil Code. 28 Id. Paraz and Engr.00 as exemplary damages. Id. the CA allowed the Tanjangcos to exercise the rights granted under Articles 449. or on August 12.000. . No motion for reconsideration was ﬁled by the Cuasos.. also with interest of six percent (6%) per annum. Only Corinthian ﬁled a Motion for Reconsideration26 of the CA Decision within the 15-day reglementary period. 209-216. 2003. In its Resolution28 dated November 14.00. or a total of ﬁfteen percent (15%) to all judgment sums and amounts that the Cuasos shall eventually pay under the decision. P50. the Cuasos. Correlatively. 225-227. The CA also imposed six percent (6%) interest per annum on all the awards.. the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. and P150.000. at pp.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 85 Dissatisﬁed with the RTC ruling.000. and C. was dismissed for lack of merit. the CA denied Corinthian’s Motion for Reconsideration. De Dios. On appeal. 1989. the Cuasos ﬁled a Comment/Manifestation27 praying that they be allowed to adopt Corinthian’s Motion for Reconsideration. De Dios were all found negligent in performing their respective duties and so they were ordered to contribute ﬁve percent (5%) each.
Librea-Leagogo and Mariﬂor Punzalan-Castillo...35 which was also granted by the RTC in its Order36 dated December 18. This Court gave due course to Corinthian’s petition and required the parties to submit their respective memorandum. pp. directing the issuance of an Entry of Judgment and a Certiﬁcation that its Decision dated January 31 2003 has become ﬁnal and executory with respect to the Cuasos.. at pp. with Associate Justices Celia C. They claimed that no amount of money will compensate for the damage they stand to suffer should any demolition subsequently prove to be wrongful. 493-501. 457-460. because what is sought to be demolished is part of their residence.. 2006. 308.29 In compliance. 2004. the Cuasos prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction before this Court to enjoin the demolition of the perimeter fence. Rollo. 517-529. 2005. 32 Id. id. the Tanjangcos moved for partial entry of judgment of the CA Decision which was granted by the CA in its Resolution34 dated May 26.. the Cuasos submitted their Memorandum30 and Supplement to Memorandum.33 respectively... 35 Motion for Execution dated July 10. at pp. id. id. 34 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. at pp. 509-511. They argued that Resolution dated September 15. Dacudao (now retired). They averred that the premature demolition of the alleged encroaching perimeter wall and other improvements will cause grave and irreparable damage to them.B. concurring.86 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED the Cuasos as one of the respondents being the third-party plaintiffs in the RTC. at p. 2006.. 452. 33 Id. at pp. pp. Paraz and Engr. Other than the ﬁling of an Opposition37 and a Motion for Reconsideration38 before the RTC. at p. 37 Id.31 which were both noted by this Court in its Resolutions dated January 10. 2006. at pp. 502-508. 419-433. 36 Rollo. De Dios for their failure to ﬁle an appeal assailing the said Decision before this Court. 30 29 . 200532 and February 2. 38 Id. 31 Id. speciﬁcally the demolition of the perimeter fence. In the meantime. 450. The Tanjangcos then moved for the execution of the judgment against the Cuasos. C. at p. 310-325.
Finally. they possess no clear and unmistakable legal right that merits protection Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated May 4. there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and substantial. 2003 Decision of the CA against the Cuasos will not preempt the outcome of the said pending incidents.R. is personal to Corinthian. any action taken by this Court on Corinthian’s petition would not beneﬁt the Cuasos for they did not appeal the adverse decision against them. the implementation of the January 31. 2007. according to the Cuasos. 2005. it is necessary to ﬁrst determine whether or not Corinthian was negligent in approving the building plan and whether or not it acted in good faith in doing so.41 In the Cuasos’ case. Furthermore. Also. 556-574. which would demolish the Cuasos’ perimeter fence. 2007. They countered that the only pending matter with this Court is the appeal by Corinthian. and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to issue in order to prevent serious damage.40 In this Court’s Resolution dated July 18. the enforcement of the writ of execution. 159124. January 17. Accordingly. at pp.39 The Tanjangcos opposed the Cuasos’ application for TRO. 40 Opposition dated May 17. No. It is axiomatic that to be entitled to the injunctive writ. 39 . 465-491. is manifestly prejudicial to their interest. Indeed. 41 Almeida v. Court of Appeals. 448 SCRA 681. will in turn determine whether or not they were in good faith in constructing the house. hence. their right to injunctive relief had not been clearly and unmistakably demonstrated. one must show that there exists a right to be protected which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. we denied the Cuasos’ application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit. they argued that the Cuasos are now estopped from questioning the enforcement of the CA Decision since they issued a manager’s check to pay the money judgment. that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable. Such determination. they added. They failed to show proof that there is material and substantial invasion of their right to warrant the issuance of an injunctive writ. 694. G. However. they cannot obtain afﬁrmative relief from this Court by reason or on account of the appeal taken by Corinthian. id. The appeal. id.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 87 before any execution can be carried out. at pp. 2007.. The denial was based on sound legal principles..
2004. 395 SCRA 742. Tolentino-Genilo. 308 SCRA 559. The decision of the CA. Jr. 27 SCRA 418. 573 (1999). This Court cannot grant to the Cuasos any afﬁrmative relief as they did not ﬁle a petition questioning the CA ruling. 44 Philippine Sinter Corporation v.43 As a matter of fact. Court of Appeals. 159277. 381 SCRA 582.88 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED through the writ of preliminary injunction. 431 Phil. 324. Consequently. It had the effect of an admission that they indeed acted in bad faith.45 An appellee who is not 42 Philippine School of Business Administration-Quezon City v. citing Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. 752-753 (2003). Here. G. or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred.44 While it is true that this Court noted the Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum ﬁled by the Cuasos. 590 (2002). became binding and ﬁnal as to them. 447 SCRA 442.. It is a fundamental principle that a party who does not appeal. 45 Alauya. 43 In Government Service Insurance System v. Failure of any parties to appeal the judgment as against him makes such judgment ﬁnal and executory. An injunction to stay a ﬁnal and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable. This failure to contest the CA decision before this Court was fatal to their cause. v. 333. 443 Phil. as they accepted the CA ruling. such notation was made only insofar as Corinthian made them respondents in this petition. Tempongko. 243 SCRA 143. Inc. this Court held: The decision of the trial court as afﬁrmed by the Court of Appeals not having been appealed by the insurer (MIGC) of the Toyota Tamaraw. . and may not be modiﬁed by this Court. 148 (1995). December 21. is not entitled to any afﬁrmative relief. 368 Phil. the same is now ﬁnal as far as that entity is concerned. the Decision of the CA holding that the Cuasos acted in bad faith and that the perimeter fence may now be demolished cannot be put in issue by the Cuasos. 448. 36. the CA already issued a partial entry of judgment against the Cuasos. 907.. 424 (1969) and Singapore Airlines Limited v.R. 893. By the same token. an appeal by one party from such judgment does not inure to the beneﬁt of the other party who had not appealed nor can it be deemed to be an appeal of such other party from the judgment against him. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co. therefore. after the CA judgment had become ﬁnal and executory as to the Cuasos.42 Their right to maintain the said fence had been declared inferior to the Tanjangcos’ right to the demolition of the fence. Commission on Elections. 50. No. It bears stressing that the Cuasos failed to appeal the ruling of the CA. no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. Court of Appeals. or ﬁle a petition for certiorari.
Tanjangco on account of the encroachment made by Sps. 976. Paraz and Engr. that the survey relocation plan was never submitted for Corinthian’s approval.000. i. It. concludes that it cannot be held liable to pay ﬁve percent (5%) of the money judgment to the Tanjangcos on account of the encroachment made by the Cuasos. liable to pay 5% of the judgment money to Sps. at pp. 384-385. 956. Likewise.. 363-407.00 to P10.000. 329 SCRA 314.00.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 89 an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment. . De Dios who likewise failed to assail the aforementioned CA Decision. v.000. 385 Phil. and that Corinthian approved the building plan with the good faith and due diligence required under the circumstances. With this matter put to rest. to P10. the inspection and approval of the building plans are limited to “table inspection” only. thus. the sole petitioner in this case.00 which was not prayed for by the Tanjangcos in their complaint and in the absence of evidence adduced by the parties. Inc.. 334 (2000). but he cannot seek modiﬁcation or reversal of the judgment or claim afﬁrmative relief unless he has also appealed. Court of Appeals. pp. as reasonable compensation for the use and enjoyment of the portion of the lot encroached upon.e. 48 Id. we now go to the main issues raised by Corinthian. and] b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals has legal basis to increase unilaterally and without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint. Inc.”47 Corinthian claims that the approval of the building plan of the Cuasos was not tainted with negligence as it did not approve the survey relocation plan but merely the architectural.00. 2004.48 46 Acebedo Optical Company. that while Corinthian conducts actual site inspections. that the acceptance of the builder’s bond did not make Corinthian automatically liable for the encroachment and for damages. 47 Corinthian’s Memorandum dated December 6.B.000. P2.46 This applies to C. to wit: “a) Whether or not there is legal basis for the Court of Appeals to hold petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association. Cuaso[. it ﬁnds no legal basis for the CA to unilaterally increase the amount of the adjudged rent from P2. structural and sanitary plans for Cuasos’ house. Rollo. that the purpose of the said approval is not to ensure that the house to be erected on a particular lot is constructed within its boundaries but only to ensure compliance with the Manual of Rules and Regulations.
Inc.90 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED On the other hand. November 25. Lastly.49 The instant case is obviously one for tort. Child Learning Center.R. is obliged to pay for the damage done. Tagorio. plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff. They submit that Corinthian’s claim that it merely conducts “table inspections” of buildings further bolsters their argument that Corinthian was negligent in conveniently and unilaterally restricting and limiting the coverage of its approval. and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. 242. where the CA considered the value of their lot in the “posh-and-swank” Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the fact that they were deprived of it for almost two decades. id. No. as governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. the Tanjangcos contend that a court can take judicial notice of the general increase in the rentals of real estate. 2005. must be wary of its responsibility to protect the rights and interests of its members. there being fault or negligence. 2004. Such fault or negligence. contrary to its own Manual of Rules and Regulations. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. 150920. the Tanjangcos stand by the ruling of the CA and opine that Corinthian was negligent in approving the building plan of the Cuasos. by regularly demanding and accepting membership dues. v.. if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties. 2176. 476 SCRA 236.” In every tort case ﬁled under this provision. which provides: “ART. the perimeter fence of the Cuasos encroached on Lot 69 owned by the Tanjangcos by 87 square meters as duly found by both the RTC and the CA in accordance with the evidence on record. the Tanjangcos suffered damage in having been Tanjangcos’ Memorandum dated November 29. 331-361. G. The Tanjangcos pray that this Court sustain the ruling of the CA. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. that the acceptance of a builder’s bond does not automatically make Corinthian liable but the same afﬁrms the fact that a homeowner can hold it liable for the consequences of the approval of a building plan. as in this case. 50 49 . (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond. As a result. at pp. and that Corinthian.50 Undeniably.
The law considers what would be reckless. May 8. 749. G.R. 37 Phil. in the same or similar circumstances. blameworthy. the primordial issue to be resolved in this case is whether Corinthian was negligent under the circumstances and. it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other. The law. Smith. November 2. 53 Pestaño v. 208 SCRA 714. 462. citing 65 C. 361 SCRA 35. 92087. p. §1(14). 740.51 The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not. 809. 813 (1918). it is clear that Corinthian failed to exercise the requisite diligence in insuring that the Cuasos abide by its Manual of Rules 51 Capili v. 49-50 (2001). While the issue of Corinthian’s alleged negligence is factual in character.R. The CA’s ﬁndings and conclusions are substantiated by the evidence on record and are more in accord with law and reason. No. 1992. and determines liability according to that standard. 54 Manila Electric Company v. Sumayang. we hold that the CA committed no reversible error when it deviated from the ﬁndings of fact of the RTC.52 By this test. 157906. after a meticulous review of the evidence on record. Court of Appeals.J.S. a third person.53 a review by this Court is proper because the CA’s factual ﬁndings differ from those of the RTC’s. would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. 413 Phil. A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position. or a force of nature. adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. 575. A negligent act is an inadvertent act. Court of Appeals. No. G. an animal. in effect. if so. Cardaña. Indeed.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 91 deprived of the use of that portion of their lot encroached upon. 346 SCRA 870. . 2006. 338. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. 400 Phil. 506 SCRA 569. 718. we ﬁnd Corinthian negligent. then he is guilty of negligence. citing Picart v. 354. Thus.54 Thus. 52 Fernando v. whether such negligence contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. 878 (2000). or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence.
To accept some such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. Rules and Regulations No new construction can be started unless the building plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate Builder’s cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid. thus: A. Corinthian does not imply that while it may take the beneﬁts from the Builder’s cash bond. additions and improvements to a ﬁnished house except electrical wiring.” and not actual site measurement. thus. And since it is an approval tainted with negligence. its Manual of Rules and Regulations stipulates in Section 3 thereof (under the heading Construction). Likewise. thereby resulting in the encroachment on the Tanjangcos’ property. It is also the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos—and of all others who have their dwelling units or abodes therein. The Association will not allow the entry of construction materials and process identiﬁcation cards for workers if the above conditions are not complied with. will have to be approved by the Association. We agree with the CA when it aptly held: “Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos’ building plans was only limited to a so-called “table inspection. And then again third party defendant-appellee Corinthian Garden required the posting of a builder’s cash bond (Exh. the necessary and inevitable consequences which law and justice attach to such negligence must. wash its hands of any responsibility . it may.92 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED and Regulations. To borrow a popular expression. “5”-Corinthian) from the defendants-appellants Cuasos and the third-party defendant C. all renovations. repairs. its so-called “table inspection” approval of the Cuasos’ building plans is no less of an approval.B. as a matter of law and justice. what is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose — or ought to be. as approvals come and go. Paraz Construction to secure the performance of their undertaking. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants Cuasos. Surely. It goes without saying that this Manual of Rules and Regulations applies to all — or it does not apply at all. Water service connection of a homeowner who undertakes construction work without prior approval of the Association will be cut-off in addition to the sanctions previously mentioned. Pilate-like. To put it matter-of-factly and bluntly. Pertinently. also necessarily attach to Corinthian.
Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules.” Moreover. it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian.CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 93 or liability that would or might arise from the construction or building of the structure for which the cash bond was in the ﬁrst place posted. xxx . IV. It shall be considered a violation if the contractor/lot owner does not permit entry of the Association representative doing inspection works. That is the law of life — and that is the law of every civilized society. should exempt Corinthian from liability. 104-105 (Citations omitted). through its representative. For duties and responsibilities always go hand in hand with rights and privileges. pp. and in the conduct of periodic inspections of ongoing construction projects within the subdivision. if the supposed inspection is merely a “table inspection” and the approval granted to every 55 56 Rollo. which in this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. Thus. For original construction xxx 2.”55 By its Manual of Rules and Regulations. the payment by the appellants-Cuasos to the appellee Corinthian of pre-construction and membership fees in the Association must necessarily entail the creation of certain obligations on the part of Corinthian. Under the same parity of reasoning. inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls. Such violation will be subject to the sanctions available to the Association such as (a) denial of entry of construction materials (b) renovation of ID’s of construction workers and (c) cutting-off of water service. That is not only unjust and immoral. The schedule of inspection shall be as follows: A. therefore. but downright unchristian and iniquitous. is unacceptable. It is an axiom of equity that he who receives the beneﬁts must share the burdens. Art. Section 3(d) of Corinthian’s Manual of Rules and Regulations pro- vides: All on-going construction shall be subject to inspection of the Association’s representative for the purpose of determining compliance to the approved plans. the proposition that the inspection is merely a “table inspection” and. in the approval of building plans.56 It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when. After all. When the perimeter walls are being constructed. by its very own rules. it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that “no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid. is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans.
Clearly. this Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice. and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order to determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. Corinthian’s failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall into Tanjangcos’ property — despite the inspection conducted — constitutes negligence and. In sum. 2) the increase in realty taxes. As we have said earlier. but it must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties. not on mere judicial notice. the trial court relied. Reversing the RTC. No. courts may ﬁx the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed property. 507-508 (2003). could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence. . 2002. then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. In Herrera v. the trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry case. contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos. the RTC therein took account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the land. The court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge. or which are capable of unquestionable demonstration. Indeed. 606. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory. However. this Court relied on the CA’s factual ﬁndings.R. and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. a court may ﬁx the reasonable amount of rent.94 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED member is a mere formality. but by supporting evidence: x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. 400 SCRA 494. On the second issue. which were based on the evidence presented before the trial court. or ought to be known to judges because of their 57 448 Phil. 138258. at the very least. Tayag57 is instructive: “Citing Sia v. In determining reasonable rent. 623. 1997]. 374 SCRA 107]. In that case. May 5. but on the evidence presented before it. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141. our ruling in Spouses Badillo v. petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts. however. Corinthian’s imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos’ perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order. Bollos [G. January 18. in determining the amount of rent.
both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property. WHEREFORE. the CA committed no reversible error. in the instant case. there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without supporting evidence. All told. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners the beneﬁts. Thus. 355 SCRA 29. because evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental value. the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.” Truly. 42 (2001). in Spouses Catungal v. 309.58 we considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the particular circumstances of each case. 58 407 Phil. the court must “allow the parties to be heard thereon. of their property for almost a decade. we ﬁnd no cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental ﬁxed by the CA. But contrary to Corinthian’s arguments. Moreover. Similarly. Costs against petitioner. the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Hao. mere judicial notice is inadequate. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. .CHAPTER 4 QUASI-DELICTS 95 judicial functions. This uniform factual ﬁnding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below. 323.” Hence. Before taking such judicial notice. including rightful possession.
2196. Art. or Exemplary or corrective. Temperate or moderate. 2197. Moral. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157. Art. Damages may be: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Actual or compensatory. 2198. 96 .96 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES “Damages are the sum of money which a person damaged is entitled to receive from the wrongdoer as compensation for the wrong. Nominal.” — Frank Gohan CHAPTER 1. Liquidated. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they are not in conﬂict with this Code. — GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code. 2195. Art. injury or illness is regulated by special laws. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death.
(7) Uncertain damages — Damages that are clearly not the result of a wrong.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 97 Damage deﬁned and explained Damage means loss or injury to persons or property. (10) Unliquidated damages. (5) Restitution damages — Damages awarded to a plaintiff when the defendant has been unjustly enriched at plaintiff’s expense. (2) Pecuniary damages — Damages that can be estimated and monetarily compensated.3 When penalty may substitute for damages and interests explained Article 1226 of the Civil Code provides that in an obligation with a penal clause. (3) Punitive damages — Damages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness. p. (9) Statutory damages — Damages provided by law. In other words. (12) Temporary damages — Damages awarded for an intermittent or occassional wrong. If the damage is the result of negligence. or ordered to be paid to. where the contract stipulates the rate of interest and the amount of the penalty to be paid in case of failure to pay the obligation within a 1 2 Black’s Law Dictionary. such as wrongful death and survival status. (13) Substantial damages — Damages that have been established by a verdict or award. 3 Ibid. (11) Treble damages — Damages three times the award. 393. Ibid. It is a considerable sum. if there is no stipulation to the contrary.1 Damages mean money claimed.. (8) Stipulated damages — liquidated damages. a person as compensation for loss or injury. the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance. . (6) Speculative damages — Damages that are so uncertain that they will not be awarded.2 Kinds of damages explained The kinds of damages are: (1) Nominal damages — a triﬂing sum awarded when a legal injury is suffered but when there is not substantial loss or injury to be compensated. pp. 356-357. 7th Edition. it is called an actionable damage. (4) Proximate damages — Damages immediately and naturally ﬂowing from the acts complained of.
dated September 2. 2003. in CA-G. then. Petitioner Edmerito Ang Gobonseng applied with Unicard for the issuance of a Unicard credit card in his name with co-petitioner Eduardo Ang Gobonseng as co-obligor. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “Article 1226 of the Civil Code provides that in obligations with a penal clause. the penalty shall be 12% per annum. Credit Card No. et al. 4 5 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. SP No. Unibancard Corporation (539 SCRA 561). Unibancard Corporation. A Unicard credit card5 with a monthly credit limit of P10. as follows: (1) When the penalty is stipulated or agreed upon in contract.98 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED given period. The case follows in toto: This is a petition for review on certiorari4 seeking the nulliﬁcation of the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) on February 27. and its Resolution.000 was issued to petitioners. 67510 entitled “Edmerito Ang Gobonseng. Based on existing jurisprudence. the interest shall be as stipulated in writing. v. interest on unpaid actual damages may be awarded.” The facts are as follows: Respondent Unibancard Corporation (Unicard) is engaged in the credit card business. the penalty shall substitute for the indemnity for damages. (3) But a penalty charge of 5% per month. both the penalty and the interest can be collected by the creditor. (2) When the penalty on interest actual damages is not stipulated. In this case.R. . 2003. The case Gobonseng v. Rules on penalty on unpaid interest on actual damages and when penalty on interest on actual damages iniquitous and unconcionable explained Penalty on unpaid actual damages is allowed. In addition to regular interest and attorney’s fees is iniquitous and unconscionable. 5-1010-02261-3.
. The motion was denied by the MeTC... A complaint for the collection of a sum of money was thus ﬁled by Unicard against petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City...638..... 43687.7 The proceedings before the MeTC continued notwithstanding the pendency of the petition before the CA. A petition for certiorari was then ﬁled with the CA6 but the same was likewise denied.. The same was denied..74 73..... pp.. 25-26.... ..17 P401. and to pay the cost. 8 Records...... the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE... 1997 representing the principal amount of the credit charges plus interest at the rate of 3% per month.........R...... Petitioners...................74.112.R.... 1995....CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 99 As of May 16. 1998...............74 as of October 10...638........... SP No.. A petition for certiorari was subsequently ﬁled with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City...88 Despite repeated demands......... Unicard was unable to recover the amounts stated......... instead of ﬁling an Answer. The RTC rendered a decision on January 22....... so respondent’s lawyer sent a demand letter to petitioners requiring the payment of the following amounts: Principal Interest Penalty TOTAL ...... SP No...447. judgment is rendered ordering defendants [petitioners].. 67510) was decided by the CA... as well as petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. jointly and severally..... and upon the court’s approval thereof.. 43687 remained pending at the time the main case (CA-G.... ﬁled a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in CA-G........R. to pay the plaintiff the amount of P179. SP No.. as and for attorney’s fees.......”8 CA-G.. and so was the motion for reconsideration........638.... ... Respondent moved to declare petitioners in default for non-ﬁling of an answer within the reglementary period. 7 6 .. petitioner Edmerito’s credit card purchases had accumulated to P179.198... the former was allowed to present evidence ex parte..... penalties at the rate of 5% per month to be reckoned from the ﬁling of the complaint until the amount is fully paid and 25% of the amount due...97 148..... SO ORDERED... ... Petitioner defaulted in his monthly payments.. P179..
the attorney’s fees of 25% of the amount due. Moreover. 67510. the penalty of 5% per month on top of the monthly interest of 3% is considerably high.R. the pertinent portions of which read: “It is herein emphasized that petitioners were declared in default for non-ﬁling of an answer.100 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied and they ﬁled a petition for certiorari with the CA.9 On February 27. Id. were established in an ex parte presentation of evidence of private respondents. the court has jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of the sum stipulated. thus. which if added.638. [upon] which its judgment was rooted. For the court to ignore an express contract for attorney’s fees. which appears to be so heavily weighted in favor of one of the parties so as to lead to an unconscionable result.74 or more than ten times his credit card limit of only P10. Volume 4. Sr. In the instant case.560. the CA10 rendered a decision. would result to almost 100% per annum. There is no way a prospective credit card holder can object to any onerous provision in the contract containing standard stipulations imposed upon those who seek to avail of credit services as they are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as the contract between them is one of adhesion (Polotan.74 are considered exorbitant. v. SP No. Tolentino. it is sufﬁcient that it is unreasonable or unconscionable (Civil Code. Although well-settled is the rule that a contract has the force of law between the parties. 296 SCRA 247). Finally. . 2003. gathered from the pleadings. by Arturo M. p. 1995 of P221. and each is bound to fulﬁll what has been expressly stipulated therein. petitioners did not deny the existence of the principal obligation but merely contested the sky-high interest rate and penalty charges including the charge of attorney’s fees. 269). While the parties may have agreed to the payment of attorney’s fees.14 which even exceed the principal debt of P179. Court of Appeals. 9 10 CA-G. is void. the lowering of penalty is justiﬁed by the contributory negligence of private respondent since it did not observe diligence in monitoring petitioners’ use of the credit card which had accumulated to P179. with the interest and penalties as of May 16.638. it is not always so.00 per month. the facts relied upon by the trial court. 1996. since any contract. Nevertheless.000.
322 SCRA 73.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 101 WHEREFORE. 299 SCRA 481. Court of Appeals. November 27.. The contract between the parties stipulated the following: “9.R. 13 G. May 28. These charges or balance thereof remaining unpaid after this 20-day period shall bear interest at the rate of 3% per month and a penalty equivalent to 5% of the amount due for every month or a fraction of a month’s delay… In case it is necessary to collect the account by or thru an attorney-at-law or collection agency. 7-10. 131622. 127135. the UNICARD holder 11 12 Id. 3) reduce the attorney’s fees to below 10%. January 18. 20-21.R. premises considered and ﬁnding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 57 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in the issuance of the assailed Orders dated December 5. at pp.. the baseless and exorbitant interest of 3% per month which is shocking to the conscience of man and the court is contrary to the 12% interest per annum set by the Supreme Court in Medel v. 1998. at pp. hence. 2000. Id. 2001. 2001. No. Court of Appeals13 and Eastern Assurance and Surety. and.14 Second. the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interest in case of noncompliance. All charges made through the use of [the] card shall be paid by the UNICARD holder and/or co-obligor within twenty (20) days from the date of the said statement of account without the necessity of demand. No. the attorney’s fees should be ﬁxed below 10%. the penalty of 5% per month violates Article 1226 of the Civil Code which states that in obligations with a penal clause. Corporation (EASCO) v. . 2) disregard the penalty of 5%. The issue is whether the CA erred in failing to: 1) apply the interest rate of 12% to the principal amount owed. the said Orders are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalties are reduced to 1% per month and attorney’s fees to 10%. 2000. 14 G. and Lastly.”11 Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied. the petition herein raising the following arguments:12 First. SO ORDERED. and August 10.
000. Corporation (EASCO) v. 234 SCRA 78. Corporation (EASCO) v.”15 The CA was correct in applying the 3% interest on the principal amount owed by petitioners to respondent Unicard. 18 Supra note 10.R. 97412. where the contract stipulates the rate of interest and the amount of penalty to be paid in case of failure to pay the obligation within a given period. the rate of interest.102 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED and co-obligor shall pay 25% of the amount due which shall in no case be less than P1. 17 Supra note 11. both the penalty and the interest can be collected by the creditor. as well as the penalty due thereon. v. Court of Appeals17 is misplaced. July 12.18 the 12% interest rate per annum was applied because this Court considered the stipulated rate of interest at 5. is imposed as follows: Records. in addition to costs and other litigation expenses. for the following reasons: One. 19 Eastern Shipping Lines. it is only when the parties to a contract have failed to ﬁx the rate of interest or when such amount is unwarranted that the Court will apply the 12% interest per annum on a loan or forbearance of money. In other words. thus: “With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages. G. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion. Court of Appeals. petitioners’ reliance on this Court’s ruling in Medel v. if there is no stipulation to the contrary. Supra note 10.00. the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance. 95. p. Two. the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety. In Medel v. as well as the accrual thereof.5% per month excessive and iniquitous. 24. Court of Appeals16 and Eastern Assurance and Surety. 16 15 . 1994. Article 1226 of the Civil Code provides that in obligations with a penal clause. Moreover. as collection or attorney’s fees. Inc. Court of Appeals19 reiterated the rules in ﬁxing the rate of interest. Court of Appeals. No.
With regard to the award of attorney’s fees. thus. the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. excessive. No. i. The court has to enforce the contractual stipulations in the manner that they have been agreed upon for as long as they are not unconscionable or contrary to morals and public policy. 2003 and September 2.e. Costs against petitioners. 2005. the petition is DENIED. a loan or forbearance of money. the reduction of the amount was appropriate. unless the stipulated amounts are exorbitant. The subsequent provisions thereafter are actually explanations or ampliﬁcations of the statutorily damages. When an obligation is breached. SO ORDERED. and it consists in the payment of a sum of money. 458 SCRA 164..20 obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. The principles of the general law on damages can be found in the speciﬁc provisions thereon of the Civil Code and both national and international applicable jurisprudence. however. 2003. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals on February 27. the same is recoverable because petitioners signiﬁed their adherence to such an arrangement when they availed of the Unicard credit card. are AFFIRMED.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 103 1. If the terms of the contract clearly express the intention of the contracting parties. WHEREFORE. as stated in Pryce Corporation v. 20 G. the literal meaning of the stipulations would be controlling. respectively. . Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation. the court will sustain the amounts agreed upon by the parties because. in the Philippines and the United States. Enumerated kinds of damages under the Civil Code The enumerated kinds of damages under the Civil Code are found in Article 2197 thereof.” Hence. May 6. The 25% attorney’s fees was.R. 157480.
Except as provided by law or by stipulation. being a form of indemniﬁcation. Actual compensation is synonymous with adequate compensation explained Adequate means sufﬁcient. R. It cannot be presumed. 7th Edition.22 There is indemniﬁcation when the compensation is made. (1106) Indemniﬁcation deﬁned and explained Indemniﬁcation is the action of compensating for loss or damage. . but also that of the proﬁts which the obligee failed to obtain. Macasaet v. A party is entitled only to such compensation for pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. 21 22 Black’s Law Dictionary.21 Actual damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty explained It is a settled rule that actual damages. 535 SCRA 503. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. therefore. must be proved within a reasonable degree of certainty. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.104 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED CHAPTER 2. 2199. Art. damage or liability. sufﬁcient if it is enough to restore a person before an injury inﬂicted upon him in good faith. — ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES “An amount awarded for a proven injury. 2200. Because to indemnify means to reimburse or make good a duty to pay another for any loss.” – Bryan Garmer Art. Transport Corporation. 772. malice being absent. p. Compensation is. Indemniﬁcation for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered.
R. E. 27 Records. 70585. 1-9. 26 Records. praying for judgment declaring R. 26-35. Veloso.” The case follows in toto. Transport Corporation against herein petitioner Alexander Macasaet before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. R. however. CV No. p. Hino EK100-305607. 334.000.00) and assume the existing mortgage obligation on the said buses in favor of Phil. Macasaet failed to pay the stipulated purchase price. Tolentino. . R. Hino EK100-305604. This petition seeks the reversal of the Decision23 of the Court of Appeals dated 5 October 2005 in CA-G.000... at pp. Vol. according to their nature. Despite repeated demands. On 11 October 1995. pp. Transport was a holder of Certiﬁcates of Public Convenience (CPC) to operate a public utility bus service within Metro Manila and the provinces whereas New Mindoro Transport Classic (NMTC). De los Santos and Vicente S. Transport and Macasaet entered into a “Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage” (deed of sale)26 over four (4) passenger buses27 whereby Macasaet undertook to pay the consideration of twelve million pesos (P12. at p. The complaint alleged that R. the court cannot rely on speculations. may be in keeping with good faith. 25 Id. On 3 January 1996. as well as its Resolution24 dated 28 March 2006 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly. and concurred in by Associate Justices Eliezer R. Moreover. Vol. 2. Transport as the lawful owner and possessor 23 Rollo. p. II. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: Absent proof of actual damages sustained. but must depend on the best obtainable evidence of the amount thereof. 24 Id. operates a transportation company in Oriental Mindoro. Hino EK100305632. a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages25 was ﬁled by herein respondent R. Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. conjectures or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages. “the parties are bound not only to the fulﬁllment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to the consequences which. 6. 1. Transport delivered to Macasaet two (2) passenger buses. the factual background. Transport Corporation In this case. Transport to ﬁle a complaint seeking the issuance of a writ of replevin.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 105 The case Macasaet v. Branch 147. This prompted R. First. R. and Hino EK100-305903. represented by petitioner. usage and law. Hino Sales Corporation.
Transport’s ﬁling of a bond in the amount of P12..29 This contract stipulated that R. He claimed ownership over the four passenger buses. 32 Records. 31 TSN. at p. 46.000. 20.31 On 8 January 1996. “Special Trip Contract” was entered into by the parties on 8 October 1995. the trial court issued a writ of seizure32 ordering the sheriff to take possession of the two buses in NMTC subject to R.34 For his counterclaim.000.00. p. 30 Records. including the two buses already delivered to him.28 Prior to the execution of the contract.000. 56-57. TSN. II.33 For his defense. as well as for payment of damages. I. 21. Vol.00 a day per bus or a total of P280. Vol. 359. . Transport’s motion.00 for the duration of one week. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows: 28 29 Id. p.00 representing the income generated by the two buses from 16 October 1995 to 2 January 1996.35 In its Decision36 dated 15 February 2001. pp. He further contended that he had already remitted P120. Transport would lease the four buses subject of the deed of sale to Macasaet for the sum of P10. 44. I. p. at p. II. he prayed for the return of the bus units seized and the immediate delivery of the other two units. p.30 Respondent’s ﬁnance ofﬁcer testiﬁed that the purpose of the contract was to support the delivery of the ﬁrst two buses pending formal execution of the deed of sale. Vol.00 per day on each of the buses.00 to respondent as partial payment of the mortgage obligation. 36 Records. The sheriff recovered the two buses and delivered them to R. 33 Id. Transport on 16 January 1996. on R.106 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED of the passenger buses and ordering Macasaet to remit the amount of P660.000.000. 11 September 1996. 35 Records.000. Petitioner admitted that he had been earning at least P7.000.00 and had agreed to assume the mortgage obligation in favor of Phil. p. Vol. p. 34 Rollo. Hino Sales Corporation. 61. the RTC upheld the right of respondent to possess the two buses but dismissed its claim for recovery of unpaid rentals for the use of the two buses. petitioner alleged that he had paid respondent the full consideration of P12. 9.000. 11 September 1996..000. 528. from 1522 October 1995.
respondent ﬁled a petition for review before the Court of Appeals asserting its right as an owner to the fruits of the two passenger buses. thus. Id.00 which had already been remitted to respondent. 528. at p.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 107 “WHEREFORE. 35. The trial court was likewise silent with respect to the status of the deed of sale. .000. p. at pp. deducting therefrom the amount of P120. in view of the foregoing.”38 The trial court did not bother to give a deﬁnitive ruling on the issues related to the counterclaim for speciﬁc performance of the deed of sale on the ground that the issuance of a writ of replevin effectively disposed of the cause of action in the principal complaint. 39 Id. Unlike the RTC. 526-527.e. the income derived from their use.. which is recovery of possession. i. SO ORDERED. dismissing the Complaint as regards the claim for recovery of the unpaid rentals of the two (2) passenger buses which were used by the defendant from October 16. 1996 for lack of evidence. 1995 until January 16. sustained the trial court’s ﬁnding that ownership over the passenger buses remained with respondent. the Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of sale was not perfected.39 Dissatisﬁed with the RTC’s refusal to award rentals. 37 38 Id.”37 The trial court observed that there was no basis for the payment of unpaid rentals because respondent failed to formally offer in evidence the records of operational expenses incurred by the buses delivered to petitioner and marked as Exhibits “W. over the fruits thereof. the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the defendant and against plaintiff.. It further ordered petitioner to remit the income from the passenger buses in the amount of P7. The Court of Appeals. in its Decision dated 5 October 2005.40 Macasaet ﬁled a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.000. respondent retained ownership over the buses.00 per day for the period between 16 October 1995 and 16 January 1996..” “W-1” to “W-3. 40 Rollo.
including the income thereof. Petitioner argues in the main that there was no legal and factual basis for the Court of Appeals to order the remittance of income. The said contract was the basis of the defendant- 41 42 Id. 47-54. Respondent. . at pp. on the other hand.000. 19-20. 43 Id. merely parrots the ruling of the Court of Appeals. petitioner asserts ownership over the subject buses by virtue of payment of the stipulated consideration for the sale. petitioner notes. Explained the appellate court: “True.. The appellate court declared that the non-perfection of the deed of sale precluded petitioner from possessing and enjoying the buses.43 Crucial to the resolution of the case is the continuing efﬁcacy of the deed of sale.42 Respondent..00. He harps on the fact that there was no lease agreement alleged in respondent’s complaint to support its claim for unpaid rentals. in its comment.. at p. as evidenced by the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. On the other hand. the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-appellee have no agreement as to the payment of rentals for the subject passenger buses. was not the lease. the instant petition raising this sole issue: Is Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which states that “the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered” applicable in the case at bar?41 However.108 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Hence. which in turn is the basis in determining the ownership of the buses. Id. with assumption of mortgage.000. 19. He reiterates the trial court’s ﬁnding that the exhibits tending to prove the rentals were not formally offered in evidence. but the sale of the subject buses to the defendant-appellee in the amount of P12. at pp. since what was actually agreed upon by the parties herein. Moreover. It was pursuant to this Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage that the subject two passenger buses were delivered by the plaintiff-appellant to the defendant-appellee in October. other interrelated issues have to be looked into to resolve the controversy. no other competent evidence was presented to substantiate its claim for unpaid rentals. [sic] 1995. claims that the contract was never consummated for lack of consideration and because of the subsequent disapproval of the security ﬁnance needed for petitioner to assume the mortgage obligation.
”44 The Court of Appeals erred in stating that the deed of sale was not perfected. Art. 47 CIVIL CODE. 395 Phil. the parties may reciprocally demand performance. 46 CIVIL CODE. No. However. Thus. usage and law. Court of Appeals. From that moment. is obligated to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. though. However. 166862.. 31-32. 463-464. the aforementioned contract of sale has never been perfected. which includes entitlement to the income thereof. . may be in keeping with good faith. according to their nature. in turn. and (3) cause of the obligation which is established. Philippine National Bank. 125-126. 1475. 340 SCRA 720 (2000) and Article 1315 of the New Civil Code. the court a quo found that no payment has been made by the defendant-appellee. 2006. The parties are bound not only to the fulﬁllment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to the consequences which. The essential requisites of a contract under Article 1318 of the New Civil Code are: (1) consent of the contracting parties.46 A perfected contract of sale imposes reciprocal obligations on the parties whereby the vendor obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing to the buyer who. other than real contracts are perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. for it was. December 20. citing Gomez v. the rescission or resolution of the deed of sale is in order. 1458. it could not have upheld the plaintiff-appellant’s possession over the subject buses. G.47 Failure of either party 44 45 Id. 115. sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Manila Metal Container Corporation v. Art. for otherwise. (2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 109 appellee’s possession and enjoyment of the subject property. contracts. subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts. Firstly. 511 SCRA 444. Once perfected. There was no consummation.R. at pp.45 Being a consensual contract. they bind other contracting parties and the obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Reynes. 48 . is particularly instructive in distinguishing the legal effects of “failure to pay consideration” and “lack of consideration:” “x x x Failure to pay the consideration is different from lack of consideration. 52 Records. In rescission under Art.110 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED to comply with his obligation entitles the other to rescission as the power to rescind is implied in reciprocal obligations. The latter argued before the lower court that payment was in fact made and counterclaimed for the immediate delivery of the two other passenger buses and payment of damages. 2002. 65. No. x x x”50 The Court of Appeals however failed to consider that in the instant case. See JURADO. and that paved the way for the issuance of a writ of replevin. Vol. fraud and others expressly speciﬁed by law. p. 51 Records. the only ground is failure of one of the parties with comply with what is incumbent upon him. while in rescission under Article 1380. II. COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS (1993).49 cited by the appellate court. the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack of consideration. Where the deed of sale states that the purchase price has been paid but in fact has never been paid.51 However. 1191. there was failure on the part of petitioner to pay the purchase price and to complete the assumption of mortgage. 469.48 Applying these legal precepts to the case at bar. 50 Id. we hold that respondent has the right to rescind or cancel the deed of sale in view of petitioner’s failure to pay the stipulated consideration. p.. there are several grounds such as lesion. as differentiated from rescission of rescissible contracts under Art. at p. While the Court of Appeals relied on the text of the deed of sale which adverts to payment of the purchase price. 49 G. 334. Respondent presented strong evidence that petitioner did not pay the purchase price.52 the non-payment of the purchase price was no longer an issue at the appellate level. July 26. 1191. Montecillo v. while the latter prevents the existence of a valid contract.R. I. Petitioner did not challenge the ﬁnding of the trial court before the Court of Appeals and this Court. Art. The former results in a right to demand the fulﬁllment or cancellation of the obligation under an existing contract. this claim remained a claim and was not substantiated. p. 498. 385 SCRA 244. He did not also CIVIL CODE. Vol. 1380. 138018.
par.54 this shortcoming was cured when the complaint itself made out a case for rescission or resolution for failure of petitioner to comply with his obligation to pay the full purchase price. 457 Phil.00). HINO SALES CORPORATION constituted over the above-described motor vehicles. (c) That pursuant to said Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. with the stipulation that the defendant as Vendee will assume the existing mortgage of the above-described motor vehicle with PHIL. will assume the balance of the remaining obligation due to PHIL. Philippine Currency. .000.53 While it is preferable that respondent instead should have ﬁled an action to resolve or cancel the deed as the right to do so must be invoked judicially. 1191. Oriental Mindoro. the plaintiff and the defendant entered into and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with plaintiff as Vendor and the defendant as Vendee covering four (4) units of passenger airconditioned buses. 36 (2003). The complaint relevantly alleged: “x x x x 3. 828. the plaintiff delivered to the defendant at Calapan. x x x 3. 3.000. 3. HINO SALES CORPORATION as agreed upon in the said Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Non-payment of the purchase price of property constitutes a very good reason to rescind a sale for it violates the very essence of the contract of sale. (d) That inspite of repeated demands made by the plaintiff to the defendant to pay the purchase price of the sale 53 54 Palma Gil v.000. Art. Philippine currency and assumption of mortgage by said defendant obligating himself to pay the remaining balance of the obligation due to the PHIL. (b) That the plaintiff and the defendant in said Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage x x x hereof agreed that the price of the sale of the above-described motor vehicles is in the sum of PESOS TWELVE MILLION (P12. CIVIL CODE. 3. 411 SCRA 18.000. the ﬁrst two (2) motor vehicles x x x withholding the other two (2) passenger buses pending the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of the purchase price of the sale of PESOS TWELVE MILLION (P12. (a) That on October 11. Court of Appeals. 804. 1995.00). HINO SALES CORPORATION and consequently.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 111 controvert the non-consummation of the assumption of mortgage at any level of the proceedings.
Philippine currency. .112 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED x x x the defendant. with the payment of damages in either case. if the latter should become impossible. He may also seek rescission. xxxx 4. even after he has chosen fulﬁllment. I. he wrongfully retained possession over the same. Article 1191 provides: “x x x x The injured party may choose between the fulﬁllment and the rescission of the obligation.55 x x x x” As previously noted. petitioner’s possession over the passenger buses became unlawful when upon demand for return. Thus. In ordering petitioner to remit to respondent the income derived from the passenger buses.000. the purchase price of the sale of the four (4) passenger buses. A necessary consequence of rescission is restitution with payment of damages. Vol. the appellate court ratiocinated thus: “Although the parties herein did not agree on the rentals for the use of the property.) That the plaintiff-applicant is the owner of the two (2) buses claimed as above-described and is entitled to the rightful possession thereof x x x 4.00).000. 2-6. c. petitioner did not pay the full purchase price as stipulated in the contract whereas respondent complied with its obligation when it delivered the two buses to petitioner. refused and failed and continue to refuse and fail to pay the plaintiff the purchase price of the said vehicles. b. the fact that the defendant-appellee 55 Records. pp. x x x x” Also.) That the above-described two (2) units of passenger buses are wrongfully detained by the defendant pretending that he is the owner under the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage which pretension is false because the defendant has not paid the plaintiff any single centavo out of the PESOS TWELVE MILLION (P12. corollary to the rescission of the contract of sale is the recovery of possession of the object thereof. in evident bad faith.
1997 to January 16. pp. It cannot be presumed. we could not grant the same. it is but fair that the defendantappellee be made to pay reasonable rentals for the use of the two passenger buses from the time that they were delivered. and has derived income therefrom. It would be unfair to excuse the defendantappellee from the payment of reasonable rentals because he enjoyed and made use of the subject passenger buses. was acknowledged by the court a quo and the defendant-appellee himself. with respect to the amount of damages.000. Settled is the rule that actual damages must be proved with reasonable degree of certainty.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 113 was able to use the two passenger buses for the months of October. Instead. It would be against the equitable proscription against unjust enrichment for the defendantappellee to keep the income from a property over which he has no legal right. A party is entitled only up to such compensation for the pecuniary loss that he has duly proven. Thus.00 which the defendant-appellee already remitted to the plaintiff-appellant. a modiﬁcation of the decision of the court a quo is in order. In view of the plaintiff-appellant’s failure to substantiate its claim for the unpaid rentals amounting to P660.00. we deem it just for the defendant-appellee to remit the plaintiff-appellant the income he derived from the subject passenger buses in the amount of P7. the court cannot rely on 56 Rollo. in the form of reasonable rentals for the use of the passenger buses. until they were seized from him. minus the amount of P120. [sic] 1995 to January.000.00 per day within the period that they were in the defendant-appellant’s possession. we differ from the award of the appellate court. . it concluded that he was liable to respondent for damages.”56 It can be inferred from this decision that the appellate court did not consider petitioner liable for the unpaid rentals when it noted that respondent had failed to support its claim over it. Niguno non deue enriquecerse tortizamente condaño de otro.000. It is a basic rule in law that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. 33-34. However. [sic] 1996. 1995. Under such circumstances. Absent proof of the amount of actual damages sustained. However. that is from October 16.
57.R.R. March 16. Vol. Padillo v.R. No. I. Inc. 58 Records. G.. 354 SCRA 521. of rentals per bus: x No. 2005.460. G. Court of Appeals.00 – Payment by Macasaet TOTAL 120.00 Since the amount awarded as damages in the form of reasonable rentals is more than the amount of rentals speciﬁed in the complaint. we turn to the provisions of the Special Trip Contract. 477 SCRA 256. 2001.58 The award cannot be sustained because no evidence was produced to support this averment made by petitioner.000. 371 SCRA 27.00 is deemed reasonable compensation for the use of the passenger buses. of rentals per day: x No. Therefore. 159467. .000. additional ﬁling fees corresponding to the difference between the amount prayed for in the complaint and the award based on the 57 Saguid v. No. 364 SCRA 385. December 9.000. 116847.00 per day for each bus. of days (16 Oct-2 Jan) P10. Inc. v. Petitioner did not present any record or journal that would have evidenced the earnings of the passenger buses for said period.460. Court of Appeals. No.57 The appellate court arrived at the amount of P7. of buses: Amt. and Manufacturers Building. In said contract. but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered by the injured party and on the best obtainable evidence of the actual amount thereof. conjectures. the amount of P1. marked and formally offered in evidence. or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages. September 4.114 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED speculations. This duly executed contract was presented.. The fact that Macasaet voluntarily signed the contract evinced his acquiescence to its terms.000.R. No. International Corporate Bank.00 P1. computed as follows: Amt.000.00 79 P1.00 2 P 20. 117907. Inc. G.580. 2001.00 per day as income for the use of the two passenger buses due to respondent on the basis of the allegations in the answer of petitioner. particularly the amount of rentals. 275 citing Sabio v. 2001. Security Finance. p.000. G.000. 132709.000. the rental is ﬁxed at P10. Since the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals was founded merely on speculations. November 29. Bare allegations would not sufﬁce.
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. without objection from the wife and children. or more than that claimed in the pleading. No. v. However. v. Madayag. 1150-1151. with a lien thereon corresponding to the additional ﬁling fees adverted to above. 2. Jonas Bustamante was charged with the crime of murder in an Information that reads: “That on or about the 17th day of October.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 115 evidence should be assessed as a lien on the judgment. Court of Appeals. FY Sons. — Where the court in its ﬁnal judgment awards a claim not alleged. 181 SCRA 687.R.00 with interest at 12% per annum from the ﬁnality of this decision. the wife of the victim left their conjugal abode x x x.R. September 29. G. The clerk of court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees. 1999. citing Benguet Electric Cooperative. Incorporated. the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent damages in the form of reasonable rentals in the amount of P1. January 30. G. Ng Soon v. In this case.460. For lost income due to death. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: Two years before the killing. there must be unbiased proof of the deceased average income. and Nestlé Phils. 634. 489 SCRA 624. Thus. to wit: “SEC. Fees in lien. province of Bohol. No. civil indemnity was awarded to his father. 85879. G. 1990. No.R. the petition is DENIED. May 5. Alday. On August 19. as mandated by Section 2. the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. SO ORDERED. 178 SCRA 221. 1998 in the municipality of Catigbi-an. 321 SCRA 524 (1999). citing Ayala Corporation v. The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati is directed to assess and collect the additional ﬁling fees. 59 . Proof required for lost income due to death explained Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and requires proof of the damages suffered.1989. 1137. Bustamante (533 SCRA 170) This is a very peculiar case. The case People v. 378 Phil. Philippines. or a relief different from. 150780. The wife and children refused to ﬁle charges against the killer. Inc.000. 2006. 88421.”59 WHEREFORE.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Gumersindo shouted. Sergio Tandog tendered a party in his house at Causwagan Norte. his brother Illuminado and a friend. “why did you shoot Mano Sering Bay?” Instead of answering. without affording the latter an opportunity to defend himself. but did not explode. Sergio. They were told by a barangay councilman not to touch it. Illuminado and Gumersindo saw accused Jonas Bustamante holding a gun two meters behind the place where Sergio was seated. After supper. the latter rolled over to the cement ﬂoor. Bohol. Charigen Tandog testiﬁed that her cousin Lolito Tandog picked up this sandal and threw it into the bushes by the road-side. In the search that ensued. However.61 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On the road where the accused passed. hitting him at the back portion of his head. with intent to kill. Illuminado tried to chase Jonas. and did then and there willfully. While seated partaking of their drinks. The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: “The State’s contention as unfurled from the evidence on record and as argued in their memorandum. and causing his instantaneous death. 27. and heard the gun clicked three times.A. but he was not able to catch up with him. Id.. at p. No. Catigbi-an.116 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. the accused entered a plea of not guilty. unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said victim with a short ﬁrearm. as amended by R. the abovenamed accused. . Illuminado and Gumersindo heard a gun burst and saw Sergio fell to the ground. may be summed up as follows: In the evening of October 17. it was policeman 60 61 Records. 1998. Accused then ran away. p. with treachery and abuse of or taking advantage of superior strength. 16. Jonas pointed his gun at Gumersindo. Gumersindo “Jimmy” Ape. to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in the amount to be proved during trial. Sergio’s yard was lighted with an extension light bulb at the eaves of the house. Illuminado saw a brown right-foot sandal. 7659. without justiﬁable cause.”60 During arraignment. attacked from behind the victim Sergio Tandog y Lasaca who was unarmed and unaware of the attack. digressed to the yard of Sergio’s house to drink Tanduay rhum.
They knew that Sergio Tandog and his wife Josefa Dinorog-Tandog had strained relations and have lived separately for more than two (2) years on account of frequent spats in the sharing of their common property and Sergio’s alleged womanizing. and Jaime Dinorog. Policeman Ibarra declared in Court that after arresting Jonas Bustamante. It was at this instance when Jovencio Tandog noticed that the accused was wearing a pair of sandals identical to the one found in the bushes by police ofﬁcer Ibarra. After the ﬁling of the instant case.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 117 Florencio Ibarra who found the said sandal in the bushes ﬁve (5) meters from the spot where it was ﬁrst discovered. They told the Court that they were hesitant to immediately reveal the culprit’s identity because they were afraid of being harmed by the persons who were behind the killing of Sergio Tandog. the father of the victim because the latter’s wife and children refused . the policemen observed that said eyewitnesses were in the state of shock and apparently afraid to divulge the identity of the assailant. Upon his refusal. in the early morning after Sergio Tandog was shot. the victim’s wife. Jonas Bustamante accompanied by Roselo Agon inquired from Jovencio Tandog the whereabouts of Sergio Tandog. there were sullied efforts to dissuade Gumersindo Ape and Illumnado Tandog from testifying as witnesses in this case. declared that immediately after the incident they talked to Gumersindo Ape and Illuminado Tandog. momentarily suspended their questioning to allow them to recover from their shock. however. The police. noticing the witnesses’ condition. who claimed that they were present when the shooting occurred. He was repeatedly asked to see Ex-Mayor Aurelio Dinorog otherwise a case will be ﬁled against him. brother of Josefa Dinorog-Tandog. Illuminado Tandog was impleaded as respondent in a complaint. Two days before the incident. he asked the latter about the sandal and Jonas admitted that the same belongs to him. It was only a month later. P/INSP Antonio Jongco and SPO1 Florencio Ibarra. Investigating police ofﬁcers. for Frustrated Murder initiated by Aurelio Dinorog. Their children who were not spared from the feud sided with their mother. Gumersindo reported to the police that he was pressured not to testify as witness in the killing of Sergio Tandog by Teresita Tandog. Jovencio replied that Sergio was in Cebu. The instant case was initiated by Epifanio Tandog. in November of 1998 when Gumersindo and Illuminado ﬁnally informed the police that it was Jonas Bustamante who shot Sergio Tandog.
That his late son earned from his cattle trading business P10. Immediately after the incident Jonas Bustamante left Bohol. He claims that he has no participation and has no motive . The prosecution also presented documents.00 per week. Sergio on the one hand. took the witnessstand to attest to his Postmortem ﬁndings. and his wife and children on the other. The fact of death of the victim Sergio Tandog is further conﬁrmed by his Certiﬁcate of Death on record.000. On the witness stand.000. Vito Inting. and 100 sacks of palay per harvest from his rice farm. Thus. wife of the victim and brother of then Ex-Mayor Aurelio Dinorog. Josefa’s brother. He paid his lawyer P20. that the victim Sergio Tandog succumbed to irreversible shock.118 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED to ﬁle a complaint against the herein accused. but Josefa Tandog. Epifanio likewise declared that Dr. Dr. due to a gunshot wound at the back portion of his head. Epifanio cannot understand why in the trial for the killing of his son. Complainant Epifanio Tandog also told the Court that because of Sergio’s sudden death he suffered sleepless nights and worries that cannot be paid even by P500.00 as acceptance fee. Inting was prevented from performing an autopsy on the victim’s body by Josefa.000. Accordingly. showing that accused Jonas Bustamante has a criminal record of conviction for Direct Assault. 1999 at Capalong.00 per appearance fees plus 25% of the damages that may be awarded. the defense’ contention may be capsulized as follows: Accused Jonas Bustamante denied the charge against him. the deceased was buried without any autopsy. P1000. Dr.00. xxxx Culled from the record. It was only after (5) months that accused was arrested by elements of the Catigbian police on May 17. It is admitted however that the deceased’s body was embalmed. Epifanio conﬁrmed the strained relations between his son. secondary to brain trauma and hemorrhage. and victim’s brother-in-law. his daughter-in-law Josefa and her brother chose to be on the side of the accused. Inting found it strange because this was the ﬁrst time that he was prevented to perform an autopsy in a medicolegal case. MHO of Catigbi-an. prevented him from conducting the autopsy. He wanted to perform an autopsy of the victim’s body to recover the slug and determine the caliber of the ﬁrearm. the deceased during his lifetime is even afraid of being injected. Davao del Norte. the victim’s wife and then Catigbian Ex-Mayor Aurelio Dinorog.
His employment is recorded in the company’s pay Roll and was required to submit Daily Time Record (DTR). Accused further claims that witnesses Gumersindo “Jimmy” Ape and Illuminado Tandog failed to identify the assailant of Sergio Tandog when they were investigated by the police after the incident. Accused denied being together with Roselo Agon near the deceased-victim’s residence at Causwagan. Catigbi-an. the latter did not return it to him anymore. Bohol on October 14. to secure his Birth Certiﬁcate. accused was at home with his family in Sitio Pandulian. and Second on October 4. Catigbi-an. 1998. School. Bohol. Although born in Causwagan. Illuminado then chased the accused but was not able to catch up with the latter. 1998 to ask for the whereabouts of Sergio. Catigbi-an. Inc.”62 The trial court found that prosecution witnesses Gumersindo Ape and Illuminado Tandog positively and clearly identiﬁed the accused as the victim’s assailant. Even before his marriage in 1992. The accused also tried to shoot Gumersindo but his ﬁrearm did not ﬁre. 62 Id. he has not visited Bohol until his arrest on May 17. Bohol. At the time Sergio was shot in the yard of his residence at Causwagan. Since his migration to Davao del Norte. and ﬁnished Fourth Grade at Causwagan Elem. He returned home to Capalong on October 9.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 119 to kill the deceased whom he doesn’t know. Capalong. Maria Suaybaguio. 1999. after 58 days when these witnesses named the accused to be Sergio Tandog’s assailang (sic). accused came back to Bohol only twice. After shooting the victim. Since then. Bohol to pay his respects to his dead grandmother. 1998 when he came to Causwagan. That he is not the owner of the right-foot sandal that was found by Police Ofﬁcer Ibarra. Catigbian. Davao del Norte. He does not know the deceased-victim and the prosecution’s eyewitnesses and therefore has no motive to kill the victim in this case. It was only later. at pp. . accused was already working with Stanphilco the banana plantation of Dole Phil. after giving his latest DTR to SPO1 Ibarra. First in 1989.. accused and his parents migrated to Capalong. Davao del Norte in 1983 when the accused was 12 years old. 231-234. However.
deﬁned and penalized under Article 248. Dosdos. with the accessory penalties of the law. Accused’s testimonies were fraught with inconsistencies that were rebutted by the prosecution. On the basis of the foregoing factual ﬁndings. Par. 63 Penned by Judge Baudilio K. the trial court found the denial and alibi of the accused to be self-serving and unsubstantiated.120 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Both prosecution witnesses remained ﬁrm in their testimonies despite rigorous cross-examination by the defense counsel and the stern warning that they will be prosecuted for perjury if found to be lying. that it is not true that he was employed by Stanphilco during the period 1990 to 2000. 7659. and embraced in the aforequoted Information. to indemnify Epifanio Tandog and his heirs. and that he was in Causwagan. that he returned to Bohol after migrating to Davao del Norte not only in 1989 and 1998 but also in 1990 and was even arrested for Illegal Possession of Firearms and convicted of Direct Assault. Thus. the Court hereby sentences the accused to an indivisible penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Catigbi-an. the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. the dispositive portion of which provides: “WHEREFORE. On the other hand. as amended by Republic Act No. Branch 2. the Court ﬁnds accused Jonas Bustamante. Moreover. 2001 a Decision63 ﬁnding the accused guilty as charged. Bohol in 1984. in the light of the foregoing. the trial court noted that the narration of the prosecution witnesses jibed with the physical evidence of the case. Bohol three days before the shooting incident asking for the whereabouts of the victim. There being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance adduced and proven at the trial. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. . Any seeming inconsistencies in their declarations referred only to minor and inconsequential matters. the prosecution successfully rebutted the claim of the accused that he left Bohol after ﬁnishing 4th grade by presenting a certiﬁcation that accused was among the 6th grade students who graduated from Causwagan Elementary School in Catigbi-an. rendered on August 29. The delay in reporting the identity of the accused to the police ofﬁcers was found reasonable and justiﬁed considering the threats of harm upon their persons and families.
that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor and inconsequential details which did not diminish their credibility. p. Barza and Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla. Instead. pp. and that the lapse of 58 days before the witnesses disclosed the identity of the accused to the authorities is reasonable. The Court of Appeals held that accused was correctly convicted of murder because the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. father of the deceased victim was the one who initiated the ﬁling of the instant case and claimed civil liabilities for the death of his son. worked for the latter’s acquittal without speciﬁcally claiming civil liability herein. reasoning thus: “The wife and children of the victim in this case did not commence any action against the person responsible for the death of their slain relative. 223-233. moral damages in the amount of P50. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo F. and attorney’s fees of P10.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 121 death indemnity in the sum of P50. SO ORDERED.000. Epifanio Tandog. the Court believes that the civil liability arising from the herein offense should be awarded to complainant Epifanio Tandog and his heirs. and Lolito Tandog. if not unworthy. Josefa Tandog. victim’s wife and son respectively. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. The accused who is a detention prisoner is credited in full of the period of his preventive imprisonment. Id. 240. Based on the foregoing peculiar circumstances.000. to merit award of civil liability in this case.00. They are therefore deemed to have waived and/or estopped. The appellate court ruled that the positive identiﬁcation of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime negated his denial and alibi. and not to the latter’s wife and children. 65 64 .”65 Accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered a Decision66 dated September 11. 66 CA Rollo.”64 The trial court awarded the civil indemnities to Epifanio Tandog.000. 2006 afﬁrming in toto the decision of the trial court. the father of the deceased. testiﬁed in favor of the accused. It noted that “the victim was having Records.00.00.
2006.. December 6. 100. There is no merit in the contention of the accused that he was not positively identiﬁed by the eyewitnesses because they failed to disclose his identity to the police authorities immediately after the shooting incident.e. Pang-oden v. No. . when and to whom was the identiﬁcation reported. 1014. As correctly found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. i. The fact remains that it was the accused whom the witnesses positively identiﬁed as the culprit. p. Granting there were inconsistencies.68 In this regard. at p. 235. p. p. 12. without warning. they refer only to minor details. G. hitting him in the back of his head which ultimately caused his untimely death. 138939. she pointed to and identiﬁed the appellants as her husband’s assailants.. he was shot by the accused-appellant from behind. there was justiﬁable reason for the witnesses’ delay in disclosing the identity of the assailant because of fear for their lives. 1009. The prosecution witnesses testiﬁed that they saw the actual killing but 67 68 Rollo.”69 The case of People v. In the instant case.”67 Hence. The accused assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. They were also sternly warned not to testify for the prosecution or else they would also be prosecuted. this appeal. Flores70 cited by the accused is not in point. 187. 70 377 Phil. 71 Id. Leonen. and this Court generally defers to the trial court’s assessment because it has the singular opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their manner of testifying.122 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED after-dinner drinks in his house with his brother and a friend when. the Court acquitted the appellants because of serious and inexplicable discrepancies in the declarations of the prosecution’s principal witness. 69 Records. she claimed that she did not witness the killing of her husband but during her testimony in court. there is no serious and inexplicable discrepancy in the declarations of Gumersindo and Illuminado. In that case. 320 SCRA 178 (1999). Sufﬁce it to state that matters of credibility of witnesses are best addressed to the sound judgment of the trial court.71 In her sworn statement. self-serving denial and alibi.R. direct and positive compared to the defense’s negative. the trial court held that “the identiﬁcation of the accused as the victim’s assailant by witnesses Gumersindo “Jimmy” Ape and Illuminado Tandog (was) clear. 510 SCRA 93.
upon further interrogation. they did not present any evidence to prove the accused’s innocence. the wife and children of the deceased refused to ﬁle charges against the accused. during trial. These inconsistencies were minor and immaterial and did not negate the fact that both eyewitnesses positively identiﬁed the accused as the culprit. For his part. When the suspect for the killing was identiﬁed. the wife of the victim left their conjugal abode in Catigbi-an. rather than to the latter’s wife and children. Two years before the killing. In fact. It was Epifanio who ﬁled the suit and hired the services of a lawyer. Bohol and stayed in Tagbilaran City because of frequent altercations concerning their properties and the fact that the victim allegedly had a mistress. in view of the peculiarities of the instant case. they admitted that they did not know whether or not the accused was the killer. When asked why they testiﬁed for the accused.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 123 did not immediately disclose the accused’s identity because they feared for their lives. Since they did not know for sure whether the accused was the perpetrator of the crime or not. . they claimed that they were seeking justice and truth. the failure of Gumersindo and Illuminado to immediately disclose the identity of the accused was justiﬁed. If at all. The wife and the children of the deceased did not give any assistance in the prosecution of the case. Gumersindo narrated that the purpose of the meeting was to prevent him from testifying in the case or else some harm will befall him.”72 We agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals in awarding the civil indemnities in favor of Epifanio Tandog. they were even presented as witnesses for the defense. In fact. 72 CA Rollo. In his testimony. pp. the inconsistencies refer only to matters such as when and to whom did the witnesses reveal the identity of the accused. Illuminado was made one of the respondents in a criminal complaint for frustrated murder initiated by the said Aurelio Dinorog after the ﬁling of the case for murder against accused-appellant. brother-in-law of the victim and ex-mayor of Catigbi-an. Moreover. 228-229. However. We ﬁnd this strange and contrary to human behavior. the father of the victim. Gumersindo Ape was summoned by Aurelio Dinorog. as in fact. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals: “[T]he fears on the part of the eyewitnesses were not unfounded considering that they were threatened by persons whom they perceived to be behind the killing of the victim.
the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. malice or fraud explained As provided in Article 2201 of the Civil Code.000. is AFFIRMED.00 as moral damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts. (1107a) Liability for damages in case of bad faith. Art. malice or wanton attitude. In case of fraud.000. Besides.000. it is different when the obligor is guilty of fraud. bad faith. Branch 2. P50. WHEREFORE. both in contracts and quasi-contracts.00 as attorney’s fees. Moreover. at the time the obligation was constituted. and which the parties have foreseen or could have foreseen. We have also reviewed the records and found no instance where the wife and son of the deceased claim that they suffered wounded feelings or mental anguish for his death. the wife and son of the deceased did not raise as an issue the award of civil indemnities in favor of Epifanio Tandog. while the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is limited “to those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation. the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED. 2201.124 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED then there is absolutely no reason for them to testify in his favor. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonable in the performance of the obligation. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 11. the defense failed to successfully rebut the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that some relatives of the victim’s wife dissuaded them from testifying for the prosecution. and P10. In the latter case.00 as civil indemnity. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.” . 2006 afﬁrming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. ﬁnding accused Jonas Bustamante guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Epifanio Tandog and his heirs the amounts of P50. bad faith. malice or wanton attitude.
2204. training and experience. Civil Code. given the person’s talent. It is the element considered when measuring damages under Article 2205(1). and (2) For injury to the plaintiff’s business standing or commercial credit. Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury. . Other instances when actual damages may be recovered under the Civil Code enumerated Actual damages may also recovered under Article 2205 of the Civil Code. the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 125 Art. Art. the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. the damages may be increased depending on the presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Liability for damages of the defendant in crimes or quasi-delicts explained In crimes and quasi-delicts. Whether it has been or could have been foreseen by the defendant is immaterial. (2) For injury to the plaintiff’s business standing or commercial credit. 2202. in crimes. In crimes and quasi-delicts. Art. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. Earning capacity deﬁned and explained Earning capacity refers to a person’s ability or power to earn money. In crimes. 2205. namely: (1) For loss of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent injury. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. 2203. skills. However. Art. the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.
had no earning capacity at the time of his death. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. 73 Now under Art.126 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Reputation deﬁned Reputation is the esteem which a person is held by others. unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos.73 the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession. 2206. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss. (3) The spouse. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291. . and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of. may demand support from the person causing the death. such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court. 209. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured. the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deﬁciency from the person causing the loss or injury. Art. for a period not exceeding ﬁve years. Evidence of reputation may be introduced as proof of character whenever character is admissible. as amended. the esteem which others have of him in his business activites is his business standing. If that person is engaged in business. 195. the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. Art. the exact duration to be ﬁxed by the court. legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. EO No. 2207.
that is. (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws. (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff. For example. by subrogation. 2208. (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. 1110. p. laborers and skilled workers.” Art.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 127 Subrogation deﬁned and explained Subrogation is the substitution of one party for another whose debt party pays entitling the paying party to rights. other than judicial costs. 7th Edition. entitled to any security held by the creditor and the beneﬁt of any judgment the creditor has against the debtor and may proceed against the debtor as the creditor would. remedies or securities that would otherwise belong to the debtor. the person is allowed to stand in the shoes of another assert that person’s rights against the defendant. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded. (6) In actions for legal support. (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid. cannot be recovered. (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime. 74 See Black’s Law Dictionary. In the absence of stipulation. (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff. a surety who has paid a debt is.74 “Subrogation simply means substitution of one person for another. (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers. (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded. just and demandable claim. .
although the obligation may be silent upon this point. Art. 2212. as in the following instances: (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract. quasi-contracts. Art. 2210. and the debtor incurs in delay. If there is penalty stipulation. In quasi-delicts. Art. be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. Rule in case of delay of money payment in subrogation explained Articles 2209 and 2010 are the rules to be followed in case of delay in payment of money and the debtor incurs in delay. 2214. Interest may. the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. (1108) Art. the legal interest. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. 2211.128 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. Art. the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. 2215. except when the demand can be established with reasonably certainty. In contracts. the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article. which is six per cent per annum. in a proper case. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages. the indemnity for damages. the court decision has to be followed for breach of contract. It there is no such stipulation. In all cases. (1109a) Art. interest as a part of the damages may. there being no stipulation to the contrary. 2213. and in the absence of stipulation. Art. In crimes and quasi-delicts. . and quasidelicts. 2209. shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon. in the discretion of the court. be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. it shall be prevail. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money.
Instances when equitable mitigation of damages is allowed by the courts explained In contracts. mitigation of damages is allowed by the courts in the instances enumerated in Article 2215 of the Civil Code.75 Without such proof. 2216. The assessment of such damages. nominal. that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel. Title XVIII.F. except liquidated ones.” — The author Art. (3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded. 551 SCRA 618. liquidated or exemplary damages. there must be competent proof of actual damages. actual damages cannot be granted because there is nothing to compensate for. temperate.76 the 75 76 B. and quasi-delicts. CHAPTER 3. 316 SCRA 509. is left to the discretion of the court. . (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. may be adjudicated. Delos Santos.’’ In Viron Transportation v. quasi-contracts. Metal Corporation v. the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff’s loss or injury. Lamotan. (5) That since the ﬁling of the action.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 129 (2) That the plaintiff has derived some beneﬁt as a result of the contract. Evidence of actual amount of loss required to justify award of actual damages explained It is fundamental that “to justify an award of actual damages. — OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES “The other kinds of damages referred to in Chapter 3. according to the circumstances of each case. of the Civil Code on Damages (Chapter V hereof) are damages other than actual damages.
2217. 77 Ibid. to wit: Art.77 There would be no basis. mental anguish. Article 2216 expressly provides that: “No proof of loss is necessary in order that moral. Although no proof of loss is required in the case of “other kinds of damages.” the law itself provides for standards to serve as basis for the award of damages explained SECTION 1. conjecture or guesswork in determining the award of damages. moral shock. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission. Assessment of liquidated damages is excepted. Civil Code and therefore quoted hereunder. It was also stressed that courts cannot simply rely on speculations. which has to be paid only in case of breach of the contract where the said liquidated damages has been agreed upon. No proof of actual or speciﬁc amounts required in “other kinds of damages” need be proven to justify any award therein explained Insofar as “other kinds of damages” other than actual or compensatory damages as indemniﬁcation for pecuniary loss are concerned. Therefore. social humiliation.” The assessment of such damages except liquidated damages is left to the discretion of the court. nominal. Moral damages include physical suffering.130 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Supreme Court particularly disallowed the actual damages suffered by private respondents therein were based considering that the estimate and a photo showing the damage to the truck and no competent proof on the speciﬁc amounts of actual suffered was presented. the same being agreed upon by the parties to a contract. fright. besmirched reputation. serious anxiety. wounded feelings. — Moral Damages The standards for the award of moral damages are set forth in Articles 2217. temperate. for an award of actual damages in that case. . Though incapable of pecuniary computation. liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated. and similar injury.
Libel. 3 of this article. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) (2) (3) acts. 2219. may also recover moral damages. 30. When moral damages may be recovered explained Moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s acts or omission. A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Malicious prosecution. Acts mentioned in Article 309. Art. Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. and 35. If no the proximate result of defendant’s act or omission. under the circumstances. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should ﬁnd that. Civil Code enumerates the damages or injury to one’s . such damages are justly due. abduction. 28. In the adjudication of moral damages. moral damages cannot be awarded. the sentimental value of property. Article 2217. in the order named. real or personal. 2220. 29. slander or any other form of defamation. 26. 9 of this article.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 131 Art. may be considered. The parents of the female seduced. Art. 34. (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Adultery or concubinage. 32. The spouse. descendants. Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. ascendants. and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. referred to in No. Seduction. Illegal search. raped. rape. or abused. or other lascivious (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21. abducted. 27. 2218.
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages. 2224. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. It is a cause that directly produces an event and without which the event would not have occured. . or in every case where any property right has been invaded. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions. be provided with certainty. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157. may be recovered when the court ﬁnds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not. as between the parties to the suit. Proximate cause deﬁned and explained The proximate cause of damage or injury to person or property is a cause that legally results in liability. 78 Black’s Law Dictionary.132 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED person warranting the award of moral damages. 2222. — Nominal Damages Art.78 SECTION 2. Nominal damages deﬁned and explained Nominal damages is a triﬂing sum awarded when an injury is suffered but there is no substantial loss or injury. 7th Edition. Art. p. SECTION 3. Temperate or moderate damages. or their respective heirs and assigns. Art. 2223. Sentimental value of property damaged or injured are also included under Article 2218. 2221. — Temperate or Moderate Damages Art. may be vindicated or recognized. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. 213. from the nature of the case. The purpose of nominal damages is to have a judicial declaration that plaintiff’s right has been violated.
2228. by way of example or correction for the public good. and not the stipulation. 2226. may be reduced if they are: iniquitous or unconscionable. Liquidated damages. 2227. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. Art. 2230. In criminal offenses. . exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. — Liquidated Damages Art. 2225. the law shall determine the measure of damages. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract. Liquidated damages deﬁned and explained Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by parties to a contract to be paid in case of breach thereof. shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. 2229. Such damages are separate and distinct from ﬁnes and shall be paid to the offended party. liquidated damages whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty. SECTION 4. Art. whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty. liquidated or compensatory damages. to be paid in case of breach thereof. Under Article 2227. Art. in addition to the moral. In quasi-delicts. SECTION 5. temperate. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. 2231. Temperate or moderate damages deﬁned and explained Temperate or moderate damages are those which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages if the court ﬁnds same pecuniary loss. — Exemplary or Corrective Damages Art. Art. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 133 Art. exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
The case Antonio v. Implications of malice explained Malice implies that the act complained of must be the result of an evil intent that excludes a mere voluntary act deliberated to inﬂict damage on either party to a case before him. the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. the acts of a judge in his ofﬁcial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. fraud. Art. November 22. G. reckless. 2235. In contracts and quasi-contracts. 149238. Art. No. nevertheless. Art. oppressive.134 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. 2234. temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. When an action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible explained An action for annulment of title or reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of the property subject of the acts. 2232. 538 SCRA 1. or malevolent manner. 2233. 2007 In this case. the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral. the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void. dishonesty or corruption. although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “we agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that here an award of moral . fraudulent. Santos. before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages.R. It is the established rule that in the absence of malice. even if such acts are erroneous.
Rizal. 1-6. 142-A (LRC No. Pasig.159-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot No. Cainta. . the property was previously owned by his father and that in 1984. it set aside its decision with respect to Lot No. The accepted rule is that the reason for the award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the trial court’s decision. His application was docketed as Land Registration Case No. Cainta-Taytay Cadastre. petitioner Sixto Antonio ﬁled before Branch 72. are as follows: On September 19. CAD 688-D was already titled in the name of respondents. the property is located in Barangay San Juan. Rizal. to avoid duplication of issuance of titles. CAD 688-D in an Order dated August 21. and Mario and Victoria Cruz. otherwise if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision. he ﬁled before Branch 71. Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents spouses Sofronio and Aurora Santos. when in fact. an application for the registration of two parcels of land. declared him the true and absolute owner in fee simple of the two parcels of land he applied for.. RTC. The antecedent facts.” Portions of the decision follow. He averred that. Although the RTC. 1261-A. He added. 79 Id. Cainta. Rizal. Rizal. CAD 688-D. 11703. Antipolo. He then ﬁled the complaint for Reconveyance. situated in Barangay San Juan. Antipolo. Rizal. Antonio said that after investigation. situated in Barangay San Juan. a complaint for Reconveyance. CAD 688-D. 1988. 1986. one of which was Lot No. culled from the records. 11703. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 142-A). at pp. RTC. averring that respondents committed fraud in their application for titling because they made it appear in their application for registration that the subject property was located in Pinagbuhatan. In his complaint.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 135 damages is not warranted since the records bereft of any proof that Antonio acted maliciously or in bad faith in ﬁling the action. Neither should attorney’s fees be awarded. Branch 71. 11703.79 Antonio alleged that he is the absolute owner of a 13. as evidenced by certiﬁcates of payment of realty taxes for the years 1918 and 1919. Rizal. he discovered that Lot No. Luis and Angelina Liberato. the same must be disallowed. 11703. Annulment of Title and Damages against respondents. Cainta.
by way of attorney’s fees. nor did he ever make any claim against the said property. Sps. the amount of P100.136 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED respondents also made it appear in their application for registration that the subject property is bound on the North East by the Pasig River when in fact it is bound on the North East by the Tapayan River. premises considered. District II. judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant complaint.00 each. the Pasig River does not traverse any portion of the jurisdiction of Cainta. null and void because it was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations and machinations. and costs of suit.”81 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated July 31. 108) in respondents’ names. Furthermore. Branch 72. 66-71. insofar as it included Lot No. at pp.000. had always been in peaceful possession of the property and at no time had Antonio possessed the property. Rizal. Aurora Santos. with modiﬁcation deleting [or] setting aside the award for moral damages and attorney’s fees. Luis Liberato and Angelina Santos. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states: “WHEREFORE. Id.. therefore. in a Decision dated October 7. The RTC of Antipolo. CAD 688-D. 2. Rizal. they. 108.. 1997 dismissed the complaint and ordered Antonio to pay respondents moral damages and attorney’s fees. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: “WHEREFORE.000. He argued that Original Certiﬁcate of Title No.00. 1989. To pay defendants the amount of P60. To pay defendants Sofronio Santos. by way of moral damages. In their Answer80 dated July 26. at p. 1977. . the 80 81 Id. They alleged that prior to the issuance of OCT No. 108 was duly issued to them by the Register of Deeds for Metro Manila. 11703. as registered owners. is. SO ORDERED. 635. and orders plaintiff as follows: 1. on May 20. 2001 afﬁrmed with modiﬁcation the abovementioned decision by deleting the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees. respondents averred that OCT No. 108 (OCT No.
V. SO ORDERED. IS SUFFICIENT BASIS OF PETITIONER’S CLAIM OF RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE.”82 Hence. . GAVINO SANTOS. raising the following issues: I.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 137 decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. WHICH THE LATTER ALLEGEDLY PURCHASED FROM LADISLAO RIVERA. II. p. BRANCH 71. 58707. 142-A. at pp. 15-16. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS’ MOTHER ACQUIRED SUBJECT PROPERTY FROM HER FATHER. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DISMISSING PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE. Id. the instant petition. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE FRAUDULENTLY REGISTERED AND TITLED SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THEIR NAMES. IV.83 82 83 Rollo. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AS ONE FOR TITLING OF A PARCEL OF LAND.. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY. LRC RECORD NO. 45. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DECISION IN LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO.
in not holding that respondents had fraudulently registered the property in their names.. After serious consideration. the said RTC issued a certiﬁcation for issuance of decree. after said decision has become ﬁnal and executory. Gavino Santos. 1986 adjudicating ownership of two lots. including Lot No. the issues raised are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in not holding that the decision in LRC No. rendered a Decision on January 7. but no certiﬁcate of title was issued to him 84 Id.138 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Simply put. They assert that their documentary and testimonial evidence which were unrebutted by petitioner show original ownership of the land by Ladislao Rivera from whom their grandfather bought the property. on the other hand. at pp. Respondents. 142-A was sufﬁcient basis of petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject property? (2) Did the Court of Appeals and RTC erroneously treat petitioner’s action for reconveyance as one for titling of a parcel of land? (3) Did respondents fraudulently title the subject property in their names? (4) Did the Court of Appeals err in ﬁnding that respondents’ mother acquired the subject property from her father. 142-A is sufﬁcient basis for his claim of ownership over the property. his right of ownership over the land has already been fully established.84 contend that they have proved they have a better title to the property. . 142-A. who allegedly bought the property from Ladislao Rivera. the RTC of Antipolo. He adds that on February 19. Gavino Santos. petitioner argues that in LRC No. They argue that petitioner’s attempt to register Lot No. CAD 688D in his name is tainted with fraud. in their Comments. 11703. we ﬁnd that petitioner’s arguments lack merit. and in holding that respondents’ mother had acquired the subject property from her father. On the ﬁrst issue. who purchased it from Ladislao Rivera? and (5) Did the Court of Appeals err in afﬁrming the decision of the RTC dismissing petitioner’s action for reconveyance? Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the decision in LRC No. and that petitioner had failed to adduce any evidence of fraud on their part. Hence. directing the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration. 11703. 124-148. in treating his action for reconveyance as one for titling. CAD 688-D. he argues. 1986. Branch 71. in his favor.
For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper. when two certiﬁcates of title are issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part.R. 316. . i. proven his title to the property. he adds. Court of Appeals. This. 123935. This Court has ruled that. the earlier in date must prevail.86 The RTC.” and that “it was indubitably shown that the defendants have occupied said property since time immemorial while plaintiff has never at anytime taken possession of said property.R. open.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 139 only because the property was already registered in the name of respondents. 2001. G. in its decision. No. was not treating petitioner’s action for reconveyance as one for titling of property. Moreover. Pasig City 85 Chan v.85 On the second issue. November 18. peaceful and continuous possession by the defendants over the subject property. 1998. 372 SCRA 312. hence inefﬁcacious and ineffective. in making the abovementioned ﬁndings. his title would be of a later date than the title of respondents. No. 298 SCRA 713. the person holding a prior certiﬁcate is entitled to the land as against a person who relies on a subsequent certiﬁcate. petitioner contends that it is very apparent that the RTC and Court of Appeals had the notion that his case a quo was not an action for reconveyance. 725. 118516. G. this Court has held that the party seeking reconveyance must prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud. by clear and convincing evidence. The RTC held that as shown by public records in the custody of the RTC.” We ﬁnd petitioner’s contentions unconvincing. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals. and in case of successive registrations where more than one certiﬁcate is issued over the same land. But we agree with respondents that petitioner cannot rely on the decision in LRC No. Court of Appeals (Special Seventh Division). public. whether or not respondents committed fraud in titling the subject property in their names. even if a title had been issued to petitioner based on said decision. 86 Barrera v. but rather an application for registration of land where the applicant and oppositor had to prove their respective registrable titles. the RTC. discussed the merits of petitioner’s ground for his action for reconveyance.e. December 14. could be gleaned from the RTC’s ﬁndings that “the claim of plaintiff on the basis of said documents cannot prevail over the adverse. But it was weighing whether petitioner has. 142-A.
358 SCRA 489. 498. 1990. The accepted rule is that the reason for the award of attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the trial court’s decision. 2006. if it is stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision.R. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certiﬁcate of title over the property.88 It appears that OCT No. 89 Francel Realty Corporation v. 1988. G. G. G. 108 was issued to respondents by the Register of Deeds for Metro Manila on May 20. 134. Fernandez. concerning the deletion of moral damages and attorney’s fees.140 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED and the Land Registration Authority. Based on the foregoing considerations. we ﬁnd them to be factual issues. June 6.89 Neither should attorney’s fees be awarded. 384.R. June 6. 1977 to the ﬁling of the complaint on September 19. however. we ﬁnd that the Court of Appeals did not err in afﬁrming the decision of the RTC dismissing petitioner’s action for reconveyance. G. more than four years had already elapsed. the same must be disallowed. otherwise. hence beyond our jurisdiction to resolve. From the time of registration of the land in the name of respondents on May 20. March 17. No. we agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that here an award of moral damages is not warranted since the record is bereft of any proof that Antonio acted maliciously or in bad faith in ﬁling the action. 88-89. 2001. it cannot be denied that petitioner’s action had already prescribed. No. Registration of real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons. 150187. we ﬁnd that the trial court’s decision Guanga v. 138971. 84751. the four-year period shall be counted therefrom. Philippine Economic Zone Authority v.R. In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 186 SCRA 375. No. 1996. 252 SCRA 127. Court of Appeals. thus. 485 SCRA 80. Hence. Thus.R. No. Court of Appeals. On the third and fourth issues. should be taken of the established doctrine that an action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the discovery of the fraud. 117051.90 In this case. petitioner’s claim that the property was fraudulently titled in the names of respondents is baseless. 90 Agustin v. 1977. petitioner’s contention that the RTC and the Court of Appeals treated his action for reconveyance as one for titling of property lacks any persuasive basis. Dela Cruz. 88 87 .87 Note. Finally. January 22. this Court’s power of review is limited to questions of law only.
m residential unit in respondent’s townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan. Laurel.” Portions of the decision follow. x x x Every person who. 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CAG. and for stability of the social order designed to indicate certain social norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience. “There is unjust enrichment when a person retains a beneﬁt at the less of another. 58246 is AFFIRMED. equity and good conscience. docketed as HLRB Case No. or any other means. No pronouncement as to costs. or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice. the spouses Hulst ﬁled before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with interest. Dutch nationals. through an act or performance by another. . CV No. The assailed Decision dated July 31. Batangas. The facts: Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida). guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that the law may approach its supreme ideal which is the way and dominance of justice. damages and attorney’s fees. acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground. Article 22 of the Civil Code embodies the maxim x x x no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury. the Supreme Court held inter alia that: “Petitioner received what he is entitled to receive under the circumstances. Hults v.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 141 failed to show the reason for the award of attorney’s fees.” Moreover. The above quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations. (respondent). the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. entered into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders. shall return the same to him.R. WHEREFORE. When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995. (532 SCRA 74) In this case. SO ORDERED. PR Builders. IV6-071196-0618. Inc. Inc. hence it was properly deleted by the appellate court. the provisions of which are formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings. for the purchase of a 210-sq.
00 as actual damages.000.94 On April 13. Perpetua Y. at p. the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside. 2) Pay complainant the sum of P297. On August 21. 3) Pay complainant the sum of P100.00 as attorney’s fees and for other litigation expenses.. the Ex Ofﬁcio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution.”92 Meanwhile. HLURB Arbiter Ma.. Builders. 95 Id. SO ORDERED.000. plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time complaint was ﬁled. . 66. Ozaeta (Sheriff) 91 92 Id. judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant. premises considered..93 From then on. 51. at p. the dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE. 4) Pay complainant the sum of P150.000. representing the purchase price paid by the complainants to P. 93 Id. 1997. 5) P50. at p. 1998.187. 48. at p.000..00.00 by way of moral damages. upon complaint of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. Id. However. spouses Hulst divorced. 1997. requiring the Sheriff to levy ﬁrst on respondent’s personal properties.142 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED On April 22. 46. 94 Id. Batangas directing the latter to execute its judgment. and 6) Cost of suit. 50.R. petitioner alone pursued the case. the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex Ofﬁcio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan.00 as exemplary damages. rescinding the Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to: 1) Reimburse complainant the sum of P3.500. at p. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered a Decision91 in favor of spouses Hulst.95 Sheriff Jaime B. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to petitioner..
Absent any restraining order from the HLURB. at p.33. 76. respondent ﬁled an Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value of the levied properties at P6. at p.313. at pp.00 per sq. 81. 97. 99 Id. 98 Id. 109. Inc. 2000 at 10:00 a. he received the Order 96 97 Id. Holly Properties Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount of P5. 121. 2000. 191-207. 89. respondent’s counsel objected to the conduct of the public auction on the ground that respondent’s Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution. the Sheriff levied on respondent’s 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certiﬁcates of Title (TCT)98 in Barangay Niyugan. 101. at pp. 102 Id.. 136. Id. which is over and above the judgment award.97 On March 23. The sum of P5. 210. 1999. of the scheduled auction date of April 28. 103 Id..00. 104 Id. 117. 100 Id. at p. 130. 2000.450.100 Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26. 1996. while the Sheriff was at the HLURB ofﬁce to remit the legal fees relative to the auction sale and to submit the Certiﬁcates of Sale104 for the signature of HLURB Director Belen G.000.. Laurel. upon petitioner’s motion.96 On January 26. the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied properties on April 28.m..CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 143 tried to implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisﬁed.616.653. 2000. 93. of the same day.103 At 4:15 p.. 78-129. at pp.. based on the Appraisal Report101 of Henry Hunter Bayne Co. 140 and 151. . 75..99 In a Notice of Sale dated March 27. at pp. the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution. at p. 125 and 129. 101 Id.102 At 10:15 a. 113. 85.m. Batangas. dated December 11.m. 105. Ceniza (HLURB Director).500....040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal fees. m is P83. 1999. at p.
864. issued the corresponding Certiﬁcate of Sale even prior to the payment of the legal fees (pars. 378). but the determination of the value of the properties 105 106 Supra note 14.616.000. instead of resolving ﬁrst the objection timely posed by Atty. However. 7 & 8.000. . Id. The difference between PhP83. the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order setting aside the sheriff’s levy on respondent’s real properties. Macaraeg.00 and Php6.000. 6. Atty.616. 2000.500. posthaste. what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as determined during the auction sale. Besides.00) as indicated in the Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report.105 Four months later.000. the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION represented by Ma.106 reasoning as follows: “While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied properties is PhP6.000. 7. or on August 28. 38.00-square meter levied properties is only around PhP6. Sheriff’s Return). While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale proceeding is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction and that.144 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED dated April 28. mere inadequacy of the price is not a sufﬁcient ground to annul the sale. 83 Phil.00. at p. the court is justiﬁed to intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks the conscience (Barrozo vs.000. we deﬁnitely cannot agree with the position of the Complainants and the Sheriff that the aggregate value of the 12..00 is PhP77. Chandra Cacho (par.616.000. 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the proceedings on the matter. Sheriff Ozaete totally disregarded the objection raised and.00 and it deﬁnitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had especially so when there was only one bidder. Sheriff’s Return) and the auction sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent’s counsel (par.00 per square meter (or an aggregate value of PhP83. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so egregious that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter ﬁrst before proceeding with the execution sale of the said properties. Mingoa. Sheriff’s Return) due to the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Levy which was ﬁled prior to the execution sale. especially when the auction sale proceedings was seasonably objected by Respondent’s counsel. Noel Mingoa.
Batangas. 378 (1949). and the tax declarations thereon. SO ORDERED. their size. and in the particular case of lands.”108 A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h). The CA held that petitioner’s insistence that Barrozo v. even during levy. 42-43.. that Buan v. and any levy in excess of the judgment award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals. taking into consideration not only the value of the properties as indicated in their respective tax declarations. the current value of like properties. Macaraeg110 does not apply since said case stated that “when there is a right to redeem inadequacy of price should not be material” holds no water as what is obtaining in this case is not “mere inadequacy. 235 SCRA 424). 111 G. namely: the cost of acquisition.R. the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex Ofﬁcio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan. The dispositive portion of the Order reads: “WHEREFORE. at p. 44. the Sheriff has to consider the fair market value of the properties levied upon to determine whether they are sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment. this time. 1994. On October 30. No. ..CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 145 levied upon by the Sheriff taking into consideration Section 9(b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x. 109 Supra note 1. Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules and Procedure. Court of Appeals111 properly applies since the questioned 107 108 Id. xxxx It is very clear from the foregoing that. its actual or potential uses. August 17. Id.” but an inadequacy that shocks the senses. but also all the other determinants at arriving at a fair market value. 2000. 2002. shape or location. 101614. 235 SCRA 424. petitioner ﬁled a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA on September 27. 110 83 Phil. at pp. is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead Respondent’s real properties that are reasonably sufﬁcient to enforce its ﬁnal and executory judgment. x x x x”107 (Emphasis supplied). the CA rendered herein assailed Decision109 dismissing the petition.
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals.00. forest or timber. (1987). 114 CONSTITUTION.000. G. corporations. and national parks. mineral lands. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be classiﬁed by law according to the uses to which they may be 112 . Without ﬁling a motion for reconsideration. 19.000. Section 3. 3. 432. Save in cases of hereditary succession. p. Article XII.113 Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in afﬁrming the Order of the HLURB setting aside the levy made by the sheriff. exploitation.” (Emphasis supplied). 2006. Lands of the public domain are classiﬁed into agricultural. a party may elevate a decision of the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. March 10. Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Sec. 7.146 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED levy covered 15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value of P83. No. 484 SCRA 424.00 which shockingly exceeded the judgment debt of only around P6. 113 Rollo.616. or associations qualiﬁed to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.” The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition. without the beneﬁt of a prior motion for reconsideration. 157877. The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities “qualiﬁed to acquire lands of the public domain. it behooves this Court to address a matter of public and national importance which completely escaped the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are disqualiﬁed under the Constitution from owning real property in their names.000. Mercado.112 petitioner took the present recourse on the sole ground that: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITER’S ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES. Sec.R. development and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens114 or corporations at least 60 percent Applying by analogy the ruling in Commissioner on Higher Education v.
. 1994. G. all forces of potential energy. December 20. Muller. or it may enter into co-production. 143958. are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and owning real property.117 It does not create. IV. parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law. Latin Words and Phrases for Lawyers (1980). the courts leave them as they are. coal.118 Generally. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than ﬁve hundred hectares. 71. or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens. August 29. Court of Appeals. forests or timber. 2006. or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase. Ong Ching Po v. 239 SCRA 341. 2. G. and other natural resources are owned by the State. for a period not exceeding twenty-ﬁve years. Civil Code of the Philippines (1991). Tongoy v. whether individuals or corporations. 69. p. G. 500 SCRA 65. 115. minerals. and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. all contracts whose cause. 116 Muller v. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. modify or extinguish a juridical relation. 2003. petroleum. at Section 2. at p. 119 (1983). Under Article 1409(1) and (7) of the Civil Code. 629. because they are deemed in pari delicto or “in equal fault. 118 Id.116 Since petitioner and his wife. or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. 123 SCRA 99.”119 In pari delicto is “a devoted.R. No. homestead. Catito. 346. Id. waters. and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and respondent is void. x x x x (Emphasis supplied). 115 Id. it produces no civil effect. 406 SCRA 55. July 11. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Sec. or grant. wildlife. have been disqualiﬁed from acquiring public lands. being Dutch nationals. 113472-73. No. development. joint venture. 113.R. No. 119 Sodhi. Court of Appeals. Frenzel v. With the exception of agricultural lands. x x x (Emphasis supplied). 117 Tolentino.R.. Tongoy v. ﬂora and fauna.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 147 of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. A void contract is equivalent to nothing. Court of Appeals. Vol. hence. The State may directly undertake such activities. 208 Phil. 632. object or purpose is contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and void from the beginning. 149615.115 Aliens. All lands of the public domain. and other mineral oils. renewable for not more than twenty-ﬁve years. The exploration. they have also been disqualiﬁed from acquiring private lands. p. all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease. . 95. ﬁsheries.
(1953). Civil Code).125 (e) the party for whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is Moreno. 1411. 1411-1412.123 (c) the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery (Art. Interest paid in excess of the interest allowed by the usury laws may be recovered by the debtor. 125 Art. neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract. Gaw Chee Hun. allow recovery of money or property delivered by the incapacitated person. p.148 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED universal doctrine which holds that no action arises. citing Rellosa v. Where one of the parties to an illegal contract is incapable of giving consent. if the interest of justice so demands. 121 Vitug. 1414. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense. and where the parties are in pari delicto. 1415.122 (b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. Civil Law Annotated. Vol. Civil Code). Civil Code). 831. 1414.”120 This rule. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract. In such case. 122 Art. and both shall be prosecuted. the following rule shall be observed: (1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties. the provisions of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.124 (d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands (Art. Moreover. but the innocent one may claim what he has given. and the act constitutes a criminal offense. no afﬁrmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other. or ask for the fulﬁllment of what has been promised him. both parties being in pari delicto. no suit can be maintained for its speciﬁc performance. (2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault. 1412. pp. allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property. from an illegal contract. or before any damage has been caused to a third person. is subject to exceptions121 that permit the return of that which may have been given under a void contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1415. however. 124 Art. The other who is not at fault. with interest thereon from the date of the payment. 159-160. Art. Civil Code). 451. or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking. may demand the return of what he has given without any obligation to comply with his promise. 123 Art. they shall have no action against each other. 1413. or damages for its violation. he cannot recover what he has given by reason of the contract. When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose. 93 Phil. III (2003). the contract may be repudiated by one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished. 1413. if the public interest will thus be subserved. the courts may. the courts may. 827. or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered. and shall not be bound to comply with his promise. This rule shall be applicable when only one of the parties is guilty. Philippine Law Dictionary (1988). or the money agreed to be paid. in equity or at law. 120 .
129 On the other hand. October 7. Court of Appeals. . Ray Burton Development Corporation. February 23. so that if the suspensive condition does not take place. or authorizes the setting of a minimum wage for laborers. When the law sets. Civil Code)127 and labor laws (Arts. No. Inc. 129 Ayala Life Assurance. But even upon the fulﬁllment of 126 Art. Court of Appeals. or authorizes the ﬁxing of the maximum number of hours of labor. A distinction between the two is material in the determination of when ownership is deemed to have been transferred to the buyer or vendee and. the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the happening of an event. 1048. November 14. When the price of any article or commodity is determined by statute. 113665. 1067. G. Lim v.R. 1416.R. the resolution of the question on whether the constitutional proscription has been breached.126 and (f) the party for whose beneﬁt the law has been intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1990. Inc. 468-469. the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. Civil Code). 330 Phil. 318. 477-478 (1996). the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efﬁcacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event. 1417. 1416. 197. and a contract is entered into whereby a laborer undertakes to work longer than the maximum thus ﬁxed.128 It is signiﬁcant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a Contract to Sell and not a contract of sale.R. Rose Packing Co.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 149 not illegal per se but merely prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 167 SCRA 309.R. Dijamco v. G. January 23. 262 SCRA 464. No.. he may. and the prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff. he may demand additional compensation for service rendered beyond the time limit. recover what he has paid or delivered. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited. L-33084. 163075. 130 Philippine National Bank v. if public policy is thereby enhanced. 570. 1418-1419. G. 440 SCRA 190. Civil Code). No. 85733. any person paying any amount in excess of the maximum price allowed may recover such excess. 1418. When the law ﬁxes. 2006. The vendor has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. 1417. which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. No. 1419. G. 127 Art. Court of Appeals.130 In other words. In a contract of sale. Art. 2004. and a contract is agreed upon by which a laborer accepts a lower wage. or by authority of law. 479 SCRA 462. he shall be entitled to recover the deﬁciency. v. 128 Art. v. Court of Appeals. 182 SCRA 564. 1988. ultimately. in a contract to sell.
2005. 165889. No. Court of Appeals. G. was not the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. Petitioner is therefore entitled to recover what he has paid. v. 468 SCRA 154. Thus. September 19. 1997 has long been ﬁnal and executory. G. the agreement produces no juridical tie between the parties involved. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale. G. petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon. Court of Appeals.500. National Labor Relations Commission. 1994. 393. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell. exception (c) ﬁnds application in this case.R. 449 SCRA 380.R. representing the purchase price paid to respondent. G. 97412.187. 159520.. 502 SCRA 383. 2005. 2006.R No. ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. 95. being nonexistent. No. Court of Appeals. August 25. But petitioner is entitled to the recovery only of the amount of P3. The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22. 161-162. 294. Ty. G. 470 SCRA 395. Under Article 1414.131 Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell. 2005. 133 Eastern Shipping Lines. 158971. Siy v. 404. which was granted by the HLURB. 404.R. 128967. such violation of the law did not materialize because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the ﬁnal deed transferring ownership. January 26. . 309. July 12. Inc.134 131 Sacobia Hills Development Corporation v. 28 (1996).00. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired ﬁnality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modiﬁed in any respect even if the modiﬁcation is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 134 Peña v. No damages may be recovered on the basis of a void contract. 132 Menchavez v.150 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED the suspensive condition. No. 599. 331 Phil. 234 SCRA 78. G.R. No. ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he ﬁled the suit for rescission. September 20. Sacdalan v.132 Further. May 20. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). one who repudiates the agreement and demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. 153201. 263 SCRA 15. Teves. Jr. No.133 moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 428 SCRA 586. 2004.R. although the basis of his claim for rescission. Coronel v.
Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under the circumstances. or any other means. and whenever circumstances transpire after the ﬁnality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground. G.137 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a beneﬁt at the loss of another. 137 Security Bank & Trust Company v. 136 Pilapil v. the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order. guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. 717. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).138 135 Peña v. . 47 Phil. Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim. states: “Art. Briones. 138 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution and Implied Contracts § 3. nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of another’s injury). 514 SCRA 197. Sacdalan v. 249 SCRA 206. Court of Appeals. 722-723 (1925). The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment.R. 209-210 (1995). 2007. 22.” The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations. Siy v.136 Ineluctably. Court of Appeals. National Labor Relations Commission. Concepcion. citing Gomez v. the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party. shall return the same to him.135 None of the exceptions is present in this case. No. 317. 319 Phil. February 5. supra note 45.CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES 151 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors. 150175. supra note 45. designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience. Every person who through an act of performance by another. as it was rendered by a tribunal with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. 162. supra note 45. the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the expense of respondent. or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice. Heirs of Maximino R. void judgments. at p. 312. equity and good conscience.
equity is exercised in this case “as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice where courts of law.613.500.00.125.”139 The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. June 9.500.187. 443 SCRA 44.00. 154895. G. November 18. Government Service Insurance System.313. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inﬂexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction. The Court shall now proceed to resolve the single issue raised in the present petition: whether the CA seriously erred in afﬁrming the HLURB Order setting aside the levy made by the Sheriff on the subject properties. that reliance on the appraisal report was misplaced since the appraisal was based on the value of land in neighboring developed subdivisions and on the assumption that the residential unit appraised had already been built.616. G. 1988.540.00 representing the net proceeds (bidded amount is P5. v.R. pp. 208-210.33) of the auction sale after deducting the legal fees in the amount of P137. No.152 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to beneﬁt from his act of entering into a contract to sell that violates the constitutional proscription. 589. 140 139 . Petitioner avers that the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no factual basis for pegging the fair market value of the levied properties at P6. 55. Agcaoili v. L-30056.653.33.00. Air Manila. the amount of the purchase price of the real property paid by petitioner to respondent under the Contract to Sell. 9. 2000. CA Rollo. G. Ticson.00 per sq. m or P83. This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule.000.040. 141 Sheriff’s Return dated May 3. Court of Industrial Relations.140 The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5. 83 SCRA 579. August 30. No. 1978. 2004.R. that the Sheriff need not determine the fair market value of the Tamio v. Rather. Inc. are incompetent to do so. 165 SCRA 1.450. No.141 Petitioner is only entitled to P3. Thus. L-39742. the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order petitioner to return the excess amount of P2. through the inﬂexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases.R.
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subject properties before levying on the same since what is material is the amount for which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction; that the pendency of any motion is not a valid ground for the Sheriff to suspend the execution proceedings and, by itself, does not have the effect of restraining the Sheriff from proceeding with the execution. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that while it is true that the HLURB Arbiter and Director did not categorically state the exact value of the levied properties, said properties cannot just amount to P6,000,000.00; that the HLURB Arbiter and Director correctly held that the value indicated in the tax declaration is not the sole determinant of the value of the property. The petition is impressed with merit. If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized ofﬁcer must execute the same pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz.:
“Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. — (a) Immediate payment on demand. — The ofﬁcer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. x x x (b) Satisfaction by levy. — If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certiﬁed bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the ofﬁcer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution, giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied upon, sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the ofﬁcer shall ﬁrst levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufﬁcient to answer for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufﬁcient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
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Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment (Emphasis supplied).”142
Thus, under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.143 Clearly, there are two stages in the execution of money judgments. First, the levy and then the execution sale. Levy has been deﬁned as the act or acts by which an ofﬁcer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment debtor’s property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of execution.144 The object of a levy is to take property into the custody
RULES OF COURT, Rule 57, Section 7: Sec. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof. — Real and personal property shall be attached by the sheriff executing the writ in the following manner: (a) Real property, or growing crops thereon, standing upon the record of the registry of deeds of the province in the name of the party against whom attachment is issued, or not appearing at all upon such records, or belonging to the party against whom attachment is issued and held by any other person, or standing on the records of the registry of deeds in the name of any other person, by ﬁling with the registry of deeds a copy of the order, together with a description of the property attached, and a notice that it is attached, or that such real property and any interest therein held by or standing in the name of such other person are attached, and by leaving a copy of such order, description, and notice with the occupant of the property, if any, or with such other person or his agent if found within the province. Where the property has been brought under the operation of either the Land Registration Act or the Property Registration Decree, the notice shall contain a reference to the number of the certiﬁcate of title, the volume and page in the registration book where the certiﬁcate is registered, and the registered owner or owners thereof. The registrar must index attachments ﬁled under this paragraph in the names both of the applicant, the adverse party, or the person by whom the property is held or in whose name it stands in the records. x x x. xxxx 143 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 297 (1980). 144 Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885, September 13, 2004, 438 SCRA 174, 191; Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 498, 523; 320 SCRA 731, 755 (1999); Fiestan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81552, May 28, 1990, 185 SCRA
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of the law, and thereby render it liable to the lien of the execution, and put it out of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any other use or purpose.145 On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial ofﬁcer under the authority of a writ of execution of the levied property of the debtor.146 In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and academic the motion to quash the levy. The HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned over to the judgment creditor. What was left to be done was only the issuance of the corresponding certiﬁcates of sale to the winning bidder. In fact, only the signature of the HLURB Director for that purpose was needed147 — a purely ministerial act. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an ofﬁcer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard for or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public ofﬁcer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of ofﬁcial discretion nor judgment.148 In the present case, all the requirements of auction sale under the Rules have been fully complied with to warrant the issuance of the corresponding certiﬁcates of sale.
751, 757; Del Rosario v. Hon. Yatco, 125 Phil. 396, 399; 18 SCRA 1263, 1266 (1966); Llenares v. Valdeavella, 46 Phil. 358, 360 (1924). 145 Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 55, at pp. 523524; Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. II, p. 700 (1968), citing 33 C.J.S. 234; Del Rosario v. Yatco, supra note 55. 146 Caja v. Nanquil, supra note 55. 147 CA Rollo, pp. 191-207. 148 Espiridion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146933, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 273, 277; Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, 442 Phil. 139, 189; 393 SCRA 639, 681 (2002).
. 45 Phil.000 only. 693 and Guerrero v. 445. that “only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience the courts will intervene. The HLURB and the CA misconstrued the Court’s pronouncements in Barrozo.156 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED And even if the Court should go into the merits of the assailed Order. at pp. and although defendant’ answer avers that the assessed value was P3. Supposing that this issue is open even after the oneyear period has expired and after the properties have passed into the hands of third persons who may have paid a price higher than the auction sale money. 380-381. Supra note 22. on Barrozo v. as well as the CA.960 it also avers that their real market value was P2. This declaration should be taken in the context of the other declarations of the Court in Barrozo. 57 Phil. x x x Another consideration is that the assessed value being P3. Gonzales.400 mortgage lien which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon examining the prices paid in the sales in National Bank v. Barrozo involved a judgment debtor who wanted to repurchase properties sold at execution beyond the one-year redemption period. to wit: “Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the auction sale was so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court. the ﬁrst thing to consider is that the stipulation contains no statement of the reasonable value of the properties. Anyway.”151 149 150 Supra note 21. Guerrero. Court of Appeals150 is misplaced.960 and the purchase price being in effect P1. Furthermore. the reliance of the HLURB Arbiter and Director. 151 Supra note 21.” is at best a mere obiter dictum. Macaraeg149 and Buan v. The statement of the Court in Barrozo. the petition is meritorious on the following grounds: Firstly. It is only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience that the courts will intervene. mere inadequacy of price — which was the complaint’ allegation — is not sufﬁcient ground to annul the sale. x x x x (Emphasis supplied).864 (P464 sale price plus P1. sales which were left undisturbed by this Court. where there is the right to redeem — as in this case — inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.
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In other words, gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks one’s conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction,152 upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the owner to effect redemption.153 When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because the judgment debtor may reacquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.154 Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. More importantly, the subject matter in Barrozo is the auction sale, not the levy made by the Sheriff. The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no speciﬁc portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.155
REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Section 28, provides: SEC. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and ﬁled. — The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certiﬁcate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount of the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. x x x x (Emphasis supplied). 153 Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 508, 522; 308 SCRA 229, 242 (1999); Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 914, 927; 268 SCRA 441, 453 (1997); The Abaca Corporation of the Philippines v. Garcia, 338 Phil. 988, 993; 272 SCRA 475, 480 (1997); Tiongco v. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 82782, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 176, 189-190. 154 Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138145, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 560, 579, citing Prudential Bank v. Martinez, G.R. No. 51768, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 612, 617; Development Bank of the Philippines v. Moll, 150 Phil. 101, 107; 43 SCRA 82, 87-88 (1972). 155 Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 776, 800; 348 SCRA 565, 587 (2000); Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 477, 484; 256 SCRA 466, 472 (1996); Policarpio v. Philippine Veterans Board and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131 (1959).
TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED
As regards Buan, it is cast under an entirely different factual milieu. It involved the levy on two parcels of land owned by the judgment debtor; and the sale at public auction of one was sufﬁcient to fully satisfy the judgment, such that the levy and attempted execution of the second parcel of land was declared void for being in excess of and beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the judgment creditor. In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, to “sell only a sufﬁcient portion” of the levied properties “as is sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees.” Each of the 15 levied properties was successively bidded upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt and the lawful fees were fully satisﬁed. Holly Properties Realty Corporation successively bidded upon and bought each of the levied properties for the total amount of P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and legal fees.156 Secondly, the Rules of Court do not require that the value of the property levied be exactly the same as the judgment debt; it can be less or more than the amount of debt. This is the contingency addressed by Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In the levy of property, the Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied property. Under Section 9, Rule 39, in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is required to do only two speciﬁc things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) ﬁle with the register of deeds a copy of the order of execution, together with the description of the levied property and notice of execution; and (b) leave with the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.157 Records do not show that respondent alleged non-compliance by the Sheriff of said requisites. Thirdly, in determining what amount of property is sufﬁcient out of which to secure satisfaction of the execution, the Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He may exercise a reasonable discretion, and must exercise the care which a reasonably prudent person would exercise under like conditions and circumstances, endeavoring on the one hand to obtain sufﬁcient property to satisfy the purposes of the writ, and on the other hand not to make an unreasonable
CA Rollo, p. 210. Cagayan de Oro Coliseum, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 55, at p. 524; p. 756; Philippine Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. v. Zabal, 128 Phil. 714, 718; 21 SCRA 682, 685 (1967). See also Martin, Civil Procedure, Vol. I, p. 806 (1989).
CHAPTER 5 DAMAGES
and unnecessary levy.158 Because it is impossible to know the precise quantity of land or other property necessary to satisfy an execution, the Sheriff should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the property levied upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy the execution does not render his actions improper.159 Section 9, Rule 39, provides adequate safeguards against excessive levying. The Sheriff is mandated to sell so much only of such real property as is sufﬁcient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. In the absence of a restraining order, no error, much less abuse of discretion, can be imputed to the Sheriff in proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy ﬁled by the respondents with the HLURB. It is elementary that sheriffs, as ofﬁcers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement and/or implementation of judgments, must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of justice and the like would be futile.160 It is not within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider, much less resolve, respondent’s objection to the continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone the conduct of the auction sale. Finally, one who attacks a levy on the ground of excessiveness carries the burden of sustaining that contention.161 In the determination of whether a levy of execution is excessive, it is proper to take into consideration encumbrances upon the property, as well as the fact that a forced sale usually results in a sacriﬁce; that is, the price demanded for the property upon a private sale is not the standard for determining the excessiveness of the levy.162 Here, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufﬁcient factual basis to determine the value of the levied property. Respondent only submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected value of the townhouse project
30 Am Jur 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 122. Id. 160 Security Bank Corporation v. Gonzalbo, A.M. No. P-06-2139, March 23, 2006, 485 SCRA 136, 145-146; Zarate v. Untalan, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1584, March 31, 2005, 454 SCRA 206, 216; Mendoza v. Tuquero, 412 Phil. 435, 442; 360 SCRA 21, 27 (2001). 161 30 Am Jur 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 122. 162 Id., at § 123, citing French v. Snyder, 30 Ill 339.
60981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. on the assumption that the residential units appraised had already been built. Perpetua Y.540. The Order dated August 28.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully paid. Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Thus. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the corresponding certiﬁcates of sale in favor of the winning bidder. The CA erred in afﬁrming said Order. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL and VOID. SO ORDERED. that is. WHEREFORE. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model units. The Appraiser in fact made this qualiﬁcation in its Appraisal Report: “[t]he property subject of this appraisal has not been constructed. The Decision dated October 30.125.125. the projected value did not become a reality. The Appraisal Report is not the best proof to accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is clearly self-serving. IV6-071196-0618 which set aside the sheriff’s levy on respondent’s real properties. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. — oOo — 163 CA Rollo. in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner.R. SP No.160 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED after it shall have been fully developed. 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Therefore. without interest. the instant petition is GRANTED. Aquino and Director Belen G. 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. . the Order dated August 28. was clearly issued with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the amount of P2. After the ﬁnality of herein judgment. 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza in HLRB Case No. p.540.00. the amount of P2.”163 Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through. the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value. 152.
2143. if the owner is in a position to do so. This juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances: (1) When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned. 1403. (n) SECTION 1. voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or beneﬁted at the expense of another. In the ﬁrst case. Certain lawful. (n) Art. (2) If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner. 1. — EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS CHAPTER 1 QUASI-CONTRACTS Art. (1888a) 161 . the provisions of Articles 1317. the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable. — Negotiorum Gestio Art. Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another. 2144.161 APPENDIX “A” Title XVII. No. and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts shall govern. or to require the person concerned to substitute him. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the purview of the preceding article. 2142. In the second case. without any power from the latter. is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents.
he shall be liable for the acts of the delegate. (1889a) Art. 2148.162 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. the ofﬁcious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events: (1) If he is manifestly unﬁt to carry on the management. Except when the management was assumed to save property or business from imminent danger. 2150. (4) If he assumed the management in bad faith. The courts may. The ofﬁcious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event: (1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon. unless the management was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger. (2) owner. If the ofﬁcious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties. 2149. The responsibility of two or more ofﬁcious managers shall be solidary. however. 2145. the owner of the property or . (2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the management. without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter toward the owner of the business. (1891a) Art. 2146. and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by the owner of the property or business under management. (1890a) Art. (1892a) Art. (n) Art. If he has preferred his own interest to that of the (3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner. 2147. even if the business may not have been successful. Although the ofﬁcious management may not have been expressly ratiﬁed. increase or moderate the indemnity according to the circumstances of each case. The ofﬁcious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a good father of a family. The ratiﬁcation of the management by the owner of the business produces the effects of an express agency.
APPENDIX “A’’ 163 business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for obligations incurred in his interest. (n) SECTION 2. 2153. (1893) Art. The ofﬁcious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has entered into with third persons. (3) By the death. (1895) . or (2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the business. even though he acted in the name of the owner. and it was unduly delivered through mistake. 2154. — Solutio Indebiti Art. 2152. provided: (1) The ofﬁcious manager has acted in good faith. (2) When the ofﬁcious manager withdraws from the management. ready to be returned to the owner. (n) Art. (n) Art. 2151. The management is extinguished: (1) When the owner repudiates it or puts an end thereto. and (2) The property or business is intact. The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when the management had for its purpose the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss. Even though the owner did not derive any beneﬁt and there has been no imminent and manifest danger to the property or business. and shall reimburse the ofﬁcious manager for the necessary and useful expenses and for the damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties. If something is received when there is no right to demand it. subject to the provisions of Article 2144. although no beneﬁt may have been derived. the obligation to return it arises. These provisions shall not apply: (1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratiﬁed the management. and there shall be no right of action between the owner and third persons. the owner is liable as under the ﬁrst paragraph of the preceding article. insanity or insolvency of the owner or the ofﬁcious manager. civil interdiction.
He shall furthermore be answerable for any loss or impairment of the thing from any cause. or gave up the pledges. 2158. (n) Art. 2157. he shall return the price or assign the action to collect the sum. Whoever in bad faith accepts an undue payment. 2155. The responsibility of two or more payees. the payee shall comply with the provisions of Article 1984. the provisions of Title V of Book II shall govern. 2156. (1898) Art. When the property delivered or money paid belongs to a third person. until it is recovered. Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difﬁcult question of law may come within the scope of the preceding article. (n) Art. 2160. 2159.164 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. (n) Art. (n) Art. he may recover if he proves that it was not due. He who in good faith accepts an undue payment of a thing certain and determinate shall only be responsible for the impairment or loss of the same or its accessories and accessions insofar as he has thereby been beneﬁted. is solidary. If he has alienated it. 2162. or shall be liable for fruits received or which should have been received if the thing produces fruits. If the payer was in doubt whether the debt was due. As regards the reimbursement for improvements and expenses incurred by him who unduly received the thing. (1896a) Art. believing in good faith that the payment was being made of a legitimate and subsisting claim. (1899) . He shall be exempt from the obligation to restore who. or cancelled the guaranties for his right. destroyed the document. 2161. shall pay legal interest if a sum of money is involved. He who paid unduly may proceed only against the true debtor or the guarantors with regard to whom the action is still effective. and for damages to the person who delivered the thing. or allowed the action to prescribe. (1897) Art. when there has been payment of what is not due.
. 2168. the latter is bound to pay the former just compensation. It is presumed that there was a mistake in the payment if something which had never been due or had already been paid was delivered.APPENDIX “A’’ 165 Art. 2165. but he from whom the return is claimed may prove that the delivery was made out of liberality or for any other just cause. 2164. even over his objection. should the latter claim reimbursement. upon the failure of any person to comply with health or safety regulations concerning property. with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. 2163. ﬂood. 2167. (1894a) Art. (1894a) Art. 2166. without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support. (1901) SECTION 3. undertakes to do the necessary work. any third person may furnish support to the needy individual. it is given by a stranger. or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the latter. said relatives shall reimburse the third person. property is saved from destruction by another person without the knowledge of the owner. and he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give consent to a contract. When through an accident or other cause a person is injured or becomes seriously ill. 2169. — Other Quasi-Contracts Art. Art. the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former. When during a ﬁre. unless the service has been rendered out of pure generosity. or other calamity. without the knowledge of those relatives who were obliged to give support to the deceased. When the government. unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being repaid. Art. he shall be liable to pay for the services of the physician or other person aiding him. he shall be liable to pay the expenses. Art. When funeral expenses are borne by a third person. When the person obliged to support an orphan. When. The provisions of this article apply when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him. storm.
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. is obliged to pay for the damage done. movables separately pertaining to two or more persons are commingled or confused. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. 2178. Art. Art. the rules on co-ownership shall be applicable. 2174. (n) Art. Art. pays the debt. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Such fault or negligence. 2176. ﬁre. is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Any person who is constrained to pay the taxes of another shall be entitled to reimbursement from the latter. the rights of the former are governed by Articles 1236 and 1237. (n) . The rights and obligations of the ﬁnder of lost personal property shall be governed by Articles 719 and 720. there being fault or negligence. without the knowledge of the debtor. Art. When by accident or other fortuitous event. 2175. 2171. 2170. The right of every possessor in good faith to reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses is governed by Article 546. Art. storm or other calamity. 2172.166 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. 2177. (1902a) Art. ﬂood. When a third person. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another. CHAPTER 2 QUASI-DELICTS Art. 2173. When in a small community a nationality of the inhabitants of age decide upon a measure for protection against lawlessness. any one who objects to the plan and refuses to contribute to the expenses but is beneﬁted by the project as executed shall be liable to pay his share of said expenses.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. but not when the damage has been caused by the ofﬁcial to whom the task done properly pertains. in case of his death or incapacity. teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices. the plaintiff may recover damages. but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions. The father and. are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. But if his negligence was only contributory. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.APPENDIX “A’’ 167 Art. 2180. (n) Art. Lastly. the mother. he cannot recover damages. so long as they remain in their custody. 2179. but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. (1903a) . even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care.
If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian. he was violating any trafﬁc regulation. (n) Art.168 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating trafﬁc regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle. 2182. 2187. 2183. although it may escape or be lost. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause. to answer for damages to third persons. 2181. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. In motor vehicle mishaps. (1905) Art. (1904) Art. although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. by the use of the due diligence. if the former. prevented the misfortune. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs. toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used. the owner is solidarily liable with his driver. 2184. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be ﬁxed by the competent public ofﬁcial. (n) Art. (n) Art. (n) Art. could have. (n) Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall ﬁle with the proper government ofﬁce a bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or ofﬁce. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. drinks. the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent. who was in the vehicle. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results . Unless there is proof to the contrary. 2188. 2185.
public buildings. 2193. (4) By emanations from tubes. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof. (1908) Art. 2191. the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article. 2189. 2192. (n) Art. and the inﬂammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place. (1909) Art. 2190. streets. or injuries suffered by. except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) . canals. (1907) Art. bridges. 2194. constructed without precautions suitable to the place. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse. and other public works under their control or supervision. such as ﬁrearms and poison. any person by reason of the defective condition of roads. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723. within the period therein ﬁxed. (1910) Art. which may be harmful to persons or property. sewers or deposits of infectious matter. (n) Art. (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes.APPENDIX “A’’ 169 from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances. if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. Provinces. if not caused by force majeure. (2) By excessive smoke.
2200. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death. one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Liquidated. 2197. Except as provided by law or by stipulation. Nominal. 2201. or Exemplary or corrective. CHAPTER 2 ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES Art. (1106) Art. 2195. Moral. 2199. Indemniﬁcation for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered. Damages may be: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Actual or compensatory. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not inconsistent with this Code. injury or illness is regulated by special laws. Art. 2198. Art. the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall . The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article 1157. Art. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they are not in conﬂict with this Code. but also that of the proﬁts which the obligee failed to obtain. — DAMAGES CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. Temperate or moderate. In contracts and quasi-contracts. Art.170 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Title XVIII. 2196.
Damages may be recovered: (1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury. Art. such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question. even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter. (2) For injury to the plaintiff’s business standing or commercial credit. unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant. In crimes. Art. bad faith. the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. had no earning capacity at the time of his death. (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291. Art. In case of fraud. the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos. Art. malice or wanton attitude. and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. 2203. 2206. the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 2202. In addition: (1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased. 2204. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. 2205. In crimes and quasi-delicts. the recipient who is not . (1107a) Art.APPENDIX “A’’ 171 be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation.
legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. (6) In actions for legal support. (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff. (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers. except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured. cannot be recovered. . 2208. the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. laborers and skilled workers. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. may demand support from the person causing the death. for a period not exceeding ﬁve years.172 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession. and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of. 2207. other than judicial costs. Art. (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff. (3) The spouse. Art. the exact duration to be ﬁxed by the court. the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deﬁciency from the person causing the loss or injury. (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss. (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid. In the absence of stipulation. just and demandable claim.
Art. (1109a) Art. 2215. 2210.APPENDIX “A’’ 173 (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime. 2209. in the discretion of the court. Art. the indemnity for damages. interest as a part of the damages may. and the debtor incurs in delay. the legal interest. except when the demand can be established with reasonably certainty. the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. 2213. be adjudicated in the discretion of the court. (1108) Art. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. and in the absence of stipulation. there being no stipulation to the contrary. (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded. Art. 2214. although the obligation may be silent upon this point. In all cases. (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In crimes and quasi-delicts. be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of contract. . In quasi-delicts. 2211. and quasidelicts. Art. Interest may. shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon. Art. 2212. the court may equitably mitigate the damages under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article. (2) That the plaintiff has derived some beneﬁt as a result of the contract. in a proper case. quasi-contracts. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money. In contracts. which is six per cent per annum. as in the following instances: (1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract. the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
2217. (4) (5) (6) (7) Adultery or concubinage. real or personal. Illegal search. liquidated or exemplary damages. Art. — Moral Damages Art. Seduction. or other lascivious . besmirched reputation. except liquidated ones. The assessment of such damages. moral shock. Art. and similar injury. moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act for omission. abduction. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral. mental anguish. fright. wounded feelings. CHAPTER 3 OTHER KINDS OF DAMAGES Art. slander or any other form of defamation. 2219. In the adjudication of moral damages. (4) That the loss would have resulted in any event. serious anxiety. rape. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) (2) (3) acts. 2218. according to the circumstances of each case. Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest. A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Libel. 2216. may be adjudicated. Though incapable of pecuniary computation. that the defendant acted upon the advice of counsel. may be considered.174 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED (3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded. the sentimental value of property. Moral damages include physical suffering. social humiliation. SECTION 1. is left to the discretion of the court. nominal. the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff’s loss or injury. temperate. Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries. (5) That since the ﬁling of the action.
abducted. 29. 2220. which has been violated or invaded by the defendant. Art. . 2224. 2222. 28. referred to in No. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. descendants. such damages are justly due. SECTION 2. 9 of this article. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should ﬁnd that. The parents of the female seduced. or abused. 32. Art. 3 of this article. The spouse. Acts mentioned in Article 309. in the order named. be provided with certainty. 30. SECTION 3. 2221. may be vindicated or recognized. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in Article 1157. as between the parties to the suit. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions. or their respective heirs and assigns. 26. under the circumstances. — Nominal Damages Art. ascendants. which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages. and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. from the nature of the case. and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. raped. may also recover moral damages. Temperate or moderate damages. and 35. or in every case where any property right has been invaded. 27. Art. (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21. — Temperate or Moderate Damages Art. may be recovered when the court ﬁnds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not. 2223. 34.APPENDIX “A’’ 175 (8) (9) Malicious prosecution.
Such damages are separate and distinct from ﬁnes and shall be paid to the offended party. exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 2226. 2229. temperate. Art. 2232. exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Art. Art. Art. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. 2228. liquidated or compensatory damages. 2234. 2233. the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton. 2231.176 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Art. 2227. In quasi-delicts. 2230. When the breach of the contract committed by the defendant is not the one contemplated by the parties in agreeing upon the liquidated damages. by way of example or correction for the public good. fraudulent. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved. whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty. 2225. SECTION 4. Art. or malevolent manner. Liquidated damages. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances. temperate or compensatory damages before . the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. and not the stipulation. the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral. in addition to the moral. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. SECTION 5. Art. the law shall determine the measure of damages. In contracts and quasi-contracts. Art. to be paid in case of breach thereof. In criminal offenses. shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. oppressive. reckless. — Liquidated Damages Art. — Exemplary or Corrective Damages Art. Liquidated damages are those agreed upon by the parties to a contract.
the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral.APPENDIX “A’’ 177 the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. before the court may consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages. although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered. 2235. nevertheless. — oOo — . Art. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon. temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages. A stipulation whereby exemplary damages are renounced in advance shall be null and void.
178 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED .
14 Doctrine of Respondeat Superior. storm or other calamity. 45 Constitutional Tort. 104 Award of Damages in Contracts general rule on the. 59 —B— Bond. 31 —D— Damage. on relatives obliged to give support to the deceased.179 GENERAL INDEX —A— Adequate. 40 Effect of payment of taxes for another. 125 Effect of a community measure for protection against lawlessness. ﬂood. 80 —C— Civil liabilities to an act or omission causing damage to another. 49 Effect of aiding an accidentally injured or seriously ill person unable to contract. 49 Effect of saving property from destruction without the knowledge of the property owner. 45 Effect of bearing funeral expenses by a third person. 96 kinds of. 103 Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. 72 Consequences of unjust refusal to support a minor or an orphan to the person obliged to support them. 78 —E— Earning Capacity. 97 kinds of damages under the civil code. 46 179 .
47-48 rights to reimbursement for necessary and useful expenses governed by Article 546. 124 Liability for damages of local government. 33 Indemniﬁcation. 73 —F— Fault. 74 . 38 possessor. 79 Liquidated Damages. 73 —G— Good Faith.180 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Effect of support given by a stranger upon the person obliged to give support. 37-38 accepter responsibilities of an. 29 Extraordinary Diligence. 125 Liability of motor vehicle owner in case of accidents. 82 —L— Liability for damages in case of bad faith. 48 —I— Imminent Danger. 35 Extra-contractual obligations. 104 —J— Joint Owner. 81 Liability for damages of the defendant in crimes or quasi-delicts. 133 —M— Malice implications of. 49 Moderate Damages (see: Temperate) Negligence. malice or fraud. 40 Extinguishment. 134 Malicious Prosecution. Civil Code of every.
4 responsibility for delegation of functions to another person by the. 33-34 effect by the owner of. 3 Negotiorum gestor. 98 . 35 Nominal Damages. Civil Code of. 33 personal liability of. 71 —R— Ratiﬁcation. 71 elements under Articles 2176-2194. 47 Proximate Cause. 3 duties of the. 71 requisites of. Reputation. 32 liability for fortuitous events of.GENERAL INDEX 181 —N— Negotiorum gestio. 34 —P— Personal Acts or Omission responsibility for. 44 Owner who has enjoyed the advantages of the management obligation of the. 132 —O— Obligation of person obliged to give support to the one who gives it without the former’s knowledge. 132 —Q— Quasi. 3 Negotiorum gestion. 77-78 Personal Property classiﬁcations. 73 Personal Acts or Omission and Respondeat Superior responsibility for. 126 Responsibilities of a building owner or proprietor. 29 Quasi-contract. 81 Rules on penalty on unpaid interest on actual damages. 29 Quasi-delict.
39 Tort. 30 . 127 —T— Temperate. 2 essential elements of.182 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED —S— Solidarity. 133 Things that may be proven by the person from whom the return is claimed. 31 Tortfeasor. 82 Solutio Indebiti. 2 Tortious. 1 kinds of. 2 —U— Unjust enrichment. 31 nature of obligations arising from. 36 Subrogation.
November 22. 378 Phil. No. 165 SCRA 1. Hernandez. Panay Electric Co. Inc. 160109. No. 9. 385 Phil. 393 SCRA 134 (2002). 893. 441 Phil. 2005. 123935. Inc. G. 60 Antonio v. G. v. 386. 54 Benguet Electric Cooperative. G. 694. 443 Phil. Inc. 1988. 1137.R. Philex Mining Corporation.. 115 183 . Inc.R. G. 84751. 89 Agcaoili v. 479 SCRA 462. June 9. 159124. 316. 1990.R. 2006. 980. v. Madriaga. Court of Appeals. 149 —B— Balanoba v. 986. 2005. No. Inc. No. G. Jr. 152 Agustin v. 9 Barrera v. Court of Industrial Relations. 2001. 87 Anselmo v. Commission on Elections. v. June 6. 139 Bayani v. G. December 14. 134-135 Ayala Corporation v. 372 SCRA 312. v. G.183 CASE INDEX —A— Abalos v. L-39742. 976. 538 SCRA 1.R. 330 SCRA 759. 956. No. 468-469. 1150-1151. 1978. 152 Alauya. 83 SCRA 579. Santos. Court of Appeals. 764-765 (2000). 589. 907. v. G. No. 181 SCRA 687. January 17. 334 (2000). 149238. No. Ray Burton Development Corporation. 321 SCRA 524 (1999). 384.R. 395 SCRA 742. 329 SCRA 314. 475 SCRA 688. 752-753 (2003). Court of Appeals.. November 22.R. No. Government Service Insurance System. 448 SCRA 681. 2007. No. 386 Phil. 163075. 533 SCRA 122. Madayag. 115 Ayala Life Assurance. 186 SCRA 375.R. August 30. Court of Appeals.R. 140 Air Manila. L-30056. January 23. G. Court of Appeals. 88 Almeida v. January 30. 1990.R. 88421. 9 Acebedo Optical Company.
1266 (1966). 1187. 35 Chan v. de Venecia. 139 Child Learning Center. 154 Capili v. A.R. 442 Phil. 407 SCRA 518 (2003). No. Radio Mindanao Network.R. Inc. 480 SCRA 314.M. 2005. 189. Yatco. 755 (1999). G. G. 22 Del Rosario v. No. 90. 157 . Inc. 378 Phil. 118516. 155 Department of Health v. Court of Appeals. 83 Coronel v.R. Tagorio. 498 SCRA 37. 148795.G. 28 (1996). G. 331 Phil. G. v.. November 2. 150920. 309.. et al. Nanquil. 2006. 575. 18 SCRA 1263. No. 191. 101. 521. 725. Court of Appeals. 425 Phil.R. 56 Corinthian Gardens Association. Inc. 523. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative. Cristobal. 10 Bulay-og. 10 —D— DBP Pool of Accredited Insurance Companies v. July 17. 1998. 125 Phil. 298 SCRA 713. 393 SCRA 639. Belfranlt Development. September 13. 301 SCRA 459 (1999). 506 SCRA 569. Bacalso. 155 College Assurance Plan v. 326. G. 374 SCRA 653 (2002). No. v. 150 Phil. Canchela & Associates. Court of Appeals. 43 SCRA 82. August 7. 399. 87-88 (1972). G. November 18.V. 475 SCRA 218.R.R. 2004. 139. v. November 16. No. G. 10 —C— Cagayan de Oro Coliseum. 320 SCRA 731. v. 495 SCRA 308. No. No. 294. 157906. 511. 14 Development Bank of the Philippines v. November 25. 140422. 455 Phil. Nos. Tanjunco. 438 SCRA 174. January 27. (538 SCRA 41). 396. Inc. 22 Cruz v. 150 Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v.. 263 SCRA 15. v. Inc. 2006. v. C. 285. Cardaña. 498. 242. 681 (2002). Espitero. P-04-1885. 61 O. Inc. 378 Phil.184 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. 151373-74.R. Court of Appeals (Special Seventh Division). 2006. 90 Codilla. Inc. 2005. 15 Cometa v. Sr. Court of Appeals. 147039. 476 SCRA 236. Hon. 558 SCRA 154. 154 Caja v. 91 Catalina v. 2006. Moll. 107.
Court of Appeals. 234 SCRA 78. No. 259. 424 (1969). 2004. 27 SCRA 418. 169026. 536 SCRA 36. 449 Phil. 155 Estacion v. 406 SCRA 55. 581 (2002). G.. 189. 117 Phil. 2003. February 27. 97412. 340 SCRA 720 (2000). 71 Gobonseng v. April 20. 150 Escano v. 277. No. 56 Fernando v. Legaro. 154 Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. July 11.R. No. 144724. No. 399. 140 Frenzel v. 143958. 1992. 718. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. 389. 95. 115. 88 First Women’s Credit Corporation v. 52 SCRA 421. 2001.R.R. Jr.R. Court of Appeals. Inc. June 15. 395 Phil. 722-723 (1925). 81552. G. Florido. 47 Phil. 757. 38 —G— Garcia v. 98 Gomez v. 92087. Court of Appeals. 146933. 83 Espiridion v. 137873. No. 252 SCRA 127. 1996. No. 437 Phil. 573 (1999).CASE INDEX 185 Dijamco v. 23 Domingo v. Court of Appeals. Ortigas. 147 Fule v.R. 440 SCRA 190. G. 1994. 117051. October 7. G. G. v. 134.R. Perez. July 12. 374.R. 151 Gomez v.R. May 28. 125-126. No. No. No. 357 SCRA 249. 36. 208 SCRA 714. Unibancard Corporation.R. Concepcion. 197. 149 DM Consunji v. 22 —F— Fabia v. 368 Phil. 69. January 22. 56 Francel Realty Corporation v. No. 231-232. 401 SCRA 197 (2003). 539 SCRA 561. 1990. 388 SCRA 574. 2006.R. Tempongko. Bernardo. 490 SCRA 273. Roces. G. 2006. 185 SCRA 751. G. 91 Fiestan v. Court of Appeals. 88 . Catito. G. 308 SCRA 559. May 8. 2006. Court of Appeals. 113665. 102. 717. June 8. G. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. 109 Government Service Insurance System v. 490 SCRA 774. G. 50. 483 SCRA 222. 10 —E— Eastern Shipping Lines.
160286. 344 SCRA 481. 2006. No. 409. 11 —L— Lafarge Cement Philippines. 325 SCRA 694. 1988. 109 Manufacturers Building. 54 Lim v. Bollos. G. 398 Phil. 24 Herrera v. G. No.186 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED Guanga v. July 30.. v. 360 (1924). 155 Lopez v. Court of Appeals. Royo. October 28. December 20. Inc. 149 Llenares v. 398 SCRA 550 (2003). 583. 1990. 608. 382 Phil. No. 116847. G. 94 Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation v.R. 105 Manila Electric Company v.R. 705. PR Builders.R. G. Transport Corporation. 54 Lao v. 485 SCRA 80. 435 SCRA 668. 358. February 17. Dela Cruz. 140 —H— Hernandez v. 138258. 114 Martires v. 451 SCRA 696. 413 Phil. 54 . No. R. 2002. 354 SCRA 521. 338. 46 Phil. 488 (2000). 84672. 511 SCRA 444. 166 SCRA 734. 53 —M— Macasaet v. 166862. Cokieng. Inc. January 18. 30 Phil. 443 SCRA 532. Court of Appeals. 463-464. 283. No. 200 SCRA 178. Court of Appeals. v. Intermediate Appellate Court. Valdeavella. 91 Manila Metal Container Corporation v. Dolor. 722. Continental Cement Corporation.R. 141 —I— Imperial Victor Shipping Agency v. 570. 85733. 446 Phil. 10 Lucas v. Inc. No. G. 150192. Court of Appeals. 739. National Labor Relations Commission.R. 31 Lagman v. 1991. 2005. Court of Appeals. No. 182 SCRA 564. 354. G.R.R. 2006. February 23. G. G. L-72281. 34 Hults v. 677-678.. 88-89. No. 2004. August 5. March 16. 374 SCRA 107. March 17. Philippine National Bank. 361 SCRA 35. 2001. 715 (2000). No. 150187. 49-50 (2001). Aldecoa & Co.R. 400. 532 SCRA 74.
1. 159 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.R. Incorporated. Inc. Court of Appeals. G. 110 Muller v. Jr. 634. 111 Pang-oden v.R. 2002. 115 People v. 463 Phil. 427 Phil. 533 SCRA 170. 2006. 115 Ng Soon v. Alday. 680. 425 SCRA 315 (2005). 943.CASE INDEX 187 Menchavez v. FY Sons. 442. 420 (2002). Teves. August 29. 153201. 500 SCRA 65. 150 People v. 130 (2003). 114 Palma Gil v. 934. 27 People v. G. November 29. 428 Phil. 178 SCRA 221. G. 115 —O— Ong Ching Po v. 149615. 153 (2002). No. 150 Mendoza v. Domingo. G. December 20. 150780. 672. No. G. 24 . 2005.R. Court of Appeals. 147 —N— Natalia Realty. September 29. 138018. 457 Phil. Latag. 100.R. v. 492. December 6. 430 SCRA 380. 411 SCRA 18. G. 449 SCRA 380. 1994. 2006. 19 Montecillo v.R.R. Reynes. 117907. 360 SCRA 21. 391 SCRA 370 (2002). 27 People v. 502. 59 Mindex v. 385 SCRA 244. No.R. 377 SCRA 412. G. No. No. January 26. 346. Bustamante. 2006. No. 510 SCRA 93. v. 404. July 26. Court of Appeals. Muller. 502 SCRA 383. 2001. G. 27 (2001). 371 SCRA 27. Leonen. 828. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). 239 SCRA 341. Court of Appeals (508 SCRA 215).1989. Malones. 159520. 804. 435. 489 SCRA 624. Espejon. 412 Phil. May 5.. 36 (2003).R. G. 138939. 538 SCRA 733. 9 Nestlé Phils. 122 Peña v. 440 Phil. Morillo. 418 SCRA 122. 49 Milwaukee Industries Corporation v. No. 147 —P— Padillo v. 379 SCRA 144. 393. 71. Court of Appeals. No. Pampanga III Electric Cooperative. 2006.. September 19. Tuquero. 113472-73. Inc. 24 People v. 85879.R No.
158 Pilapil v. December 16. November 2. 14 Republic v. 157 —Q— Quezon City Government v. G. Fernandez. 253. Sandiganbayan. 410. Tolentino-Genilo.R. 453 Phil. 324. Court of Appeals.R. 1059. 447 SCRA 442. 189 SCRA 612. 474 SCRA 191. 150304. Martinez. 88 Philippine Sinter Corporation v. Mangubat. No. July 12. December 21. 358 SCRA 489. 2005. 1990. Inc. 140 Philippine National Bank v. 128 Phil. 2005. G. 2004. 697. 498. 878 (2000). No.R. 2001. Brunty. 27 Perla Compania de Seguros v. 258 SCRA 712. 75 Philippine School of Business Administration-Quezon City v. 169891.. No.R. 161. 157 Philippine National Railways v. Sarangaya III. 749. 506 SCRA 685. 508. 2005. 1067. 1996. 714. G. 477-478 (1996). February 5. 150175. G. 718. John Bordman Ltd. Sumayang. No. 262 SCRA 464. 333.. June 15. 381 SCRA 582. June 6. 24 Pestaño v. 55 Prudential Bank v. G.R. September 14. G. 91 Philippine Economic Zone Authority v.R.. 108926. No. 159831.. Dacara. v. 617. August 7. Inc. 242 (1999). 406 SCRA 190 (2003). 125. 21. 330 Phil. v. Inc. of Iloilo. October 25. 138971. 21 SCRA 682. 431 Phil. No.R. 2006. 1048. Court of Appeals. 21 Policarpio v. No. 308 SCRA 229. 199. 163593. Inc.. G. 400 Phil. Philippine Veterans Board and Associated Insurance & Surety Co. Briones. Heirs of Maximino R.188 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED People v. 514 SCRA 197. 740. G. 21 —R— Republic v. 460 SCRA 243. 478 SCRA 387. 529 SCRA 377. G. 147746. 172068. No. 106 Phil. 2007. 590 (2002). 149 Philippine National Bank v. 448. 367 Phil. Zabal. 159277. 157 Preferred Homes Specialties.R. Inc.R. 2007. No. 522. No. 51768. 685 (1967). 151 Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. 2005. 10 .R. Court of Appeals. October 14. No. 473 SCRA 151. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co.R. 131 (1959). 88 Philippine Surety & Insurance Company. Court of Appeals. G. 346 SCRA 870. G.
148246. 485 SCRA 136. 318. v.R. September 4. 167 SCRA 309. v. 2005. 468 SCRA 154. 209-210 (1995). Alcantara. 23 Reyes v.R. 364 SCRA 385. 2007. No. August 25. 2004. Court of Appeals. 243 SCRA 143. G. Court of Appeals. L-33084. 145-146. No. 114 Security Bank & Trust Company v. 319 Phil. 443 SCRA 44. 396 Phil. 268 SCRA 441. Court of Appeals.R. G. Inc. Inc. 55. 249 SCRA 206. 148 (1995). Inc. 157 —T— Tamio v. 159 Sia v. 1988. 464 SCRA 409. 2001. No.M. 56 Sabio v.R. 88 Siy v. March 23.R. 87. 153535. 470 SCRA 395. 599. No. 511 SCRA 57. 150 Safeguard Security Agency. May 20. November 14. 437 SCRA 259. 272 SCRA 141. 490 SCRA 560. No. 401 Phil. July 28. May 5. 157 Sulit v. 98 SCRA 728. v. 158971. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation. 161-162. G. Ticson. G. 150 Solidbank Corporation v. 477 SCRA 256. Sisters of Mercy Hospital. 152. No. G.R. 927. 165889.CASE INDEX 189 Republic v. G. 149 —S— Saber v. June 15. February 16. 317.R. 800. Tangco. 429. 56 Suico Rattan & Buri Interiors.R. 23 Rose Packing Co. 152 Tawag v. No. December 9. Court of Appeals. 138145. No. 348 SCRA 565.R. 151 Security Bank Corporation v.. September 20. Inc. Inc. 335 Phil. 150 Sacobia Hills Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals. 275. 914. P-06-2139. November 18. International Corporate Bank. August 31. No.R. Ty. 96. 71 Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union v. 157 . Court of Appeals. 2005. 2004. 579. 132709. G. Court of Appeals. 341 SCRA 760. Security Finance. 132981. 771 (2000). 404. G. 94 Singapore Airlines Limited v. 159467. 428 SCRA 586. No. 2006. 73 Saguid v.R.. 587 (2000).. 2005. 516 SCRA 113. National Labor Relations Commission. 154895. 114 Sacdalan v. G. 312. G. No. 2005. Court of Appeals. 2004. A. 776. Tuvera. No. G. 1997. Court of Appeals. Gonzalbo. 128967. 453 (1997). 2006.
113. 475 SCRA 495. A. G. 2004. 2005. National Labor Relations Commission. G. 327 SCRA 391. De Ramos. No. 159636. 123 SCRA 99. 477. 157-158. 23 Villanueva v. 256 SCRA 466. 511. 212 SCRA 176. 157 Ventura v.M. 147 —U— Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH v. 326 Phil. 291 SCRA 66. 1971. 55 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals. 1992. April 30. 119 (1983). Untalan. G. 157 Tongoy v. 272 SCRA 475. November 25. 159 . October 6.R. 156339. 162187. 53 —X— Xentrex Automobile.190 TORTS AND DAMAGES SIMPLIFIED The Abaca Corporation of the Philippines v. Secretary of Justice. 1998. 484. Garcia. 208 Phil. No. Commissioner of Customs. 157 Tiongco v. 82782. 400 (2000). 440 SCRA 154.R. 13 —V— Valderrama v. No. G. 56 Victory Liner v.R. 53 —Z— Zarate v. March 31. June 18. 130.R. G. L-26760. November 18. 993. 444 SCRA 355. No. 2004. 370. Ruiz. MTJ-05-1584. 480 (1997). 988. Gammad. v. 454 SCRA 206. Bernabe. v. 38 SCRA 587. No. 189-190. 4 United States of America v. No. 384 Phil. 140. United Coconut Planters Bank.R. No. Inc. 338 Phil. G. Philippine Veterans Bank.R. 472 (1996). 2005. Court of Appeals. 136 SCRA 487. August 5. 121559. 95. 69 —Y— Yasoña. 216.
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Whenever there is non-performance of a legal duty. Siegfredo Porticacion and the assistance of Atty. or any other act punishable by law. it has to be righted just the same. cooperation of the UP Law library. The natural and logical consequence of a breach of legal duty is damages. at least a tort is committed. A tort presupposes a legal duty. Thus. Aurelio Sec Go is hereby acknowledged. Being a wrong. Hence.PREFACE A tort is not a criminal but a civil wrong. altough there is no contractual relations between the parties. As far as fairness under the rule of law can go. This book. which has to be performed in every civilized society. particularly. A realization of this fact brings us to the importance of torts as a subject. Mr. therefore. From there. February 11. the subject torts and damages has complications. The essence of fairness in every situation is the purpose for which every law was made anyway. 2010 REYNALDO B. the need to simplify the presentation. Jimmy Buhain and Mr. the damages sustained as a consequence of that breach can be quantiﬁed in terms of money. ARALAR iii . In the preparation hereof. the subject matter of this volume. As any law subject. is basically about righting a civil wrong. Quezon City.
................................ – QUASI-DELICTS ............................................... – DAMAGES ................................................... CASE INDEX .............................................. DAMAGES .................................................................................. iii 1 29 44 71 96 Chapter Three Chapter Four Chapter Five APPENDIX A TITLE XVII........................ EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS ......................CONTENTS Pages Preface ............ TITLE XVIII.................. GENERAL INDEX ............................................................... – EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS .................................... 161 170 179 183 — oOo — v ............. Chapter One Chapter Two – TORT ................. – OTHER QUASI-CONTRACTS ..................................................................................