Constitutional Law II

a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must answer. b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after the defendant was heard. If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by the accused regardless of the time that lapsed. c. Judgment according to law d. Tribunal with jurisdiction Administrative Due Process In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before administrative tribunals: a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evidence in support of his case. b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party. c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be supported by evidence. d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in the record and known to the parties affected. f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent consideration of evidence, and not rely on the recommendation of a subordinate. g. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can know the issues involved and the reasons for the decision. Substantive Due Process Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) Criminal Due Process In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People: F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin,

Bill of Rights I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights. The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do to the individual. A. Due Substantive process - Procedural and

Civil Procedural Due Process In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca: a. Court with jurisdiction subject matter. over the

b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant c. Judgement rendered according to law. d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)

Constitutional Law II
challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. (2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. (3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. (4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. VV. B. Due Process and Police Power Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL (Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works, Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied the petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion. HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have standing to challenge the validity of the LOI. (2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It has behind it the presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem. (3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does not render it invalid. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none." (4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.

Constitutional Law II
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983) Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops Rendering Massage Services Valid. from compensation, and due process. (3) upon observance of

F: The ordinance was enacted for a twofold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to collect a fee for operating massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships and (2) To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms. HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on general welfare clause. VV. Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. VV. C. Due Process and Eminent

Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take for public use without just compensation. Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. 1. Taking either for public use or public purpose. Public Use Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a large group of people short of the public in general (e.g. expropriating property for the relocation of squatters). Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts. HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The


The taking by the State of private property in an expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use, (2) with just

Constitutional Law II
contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain. VV. Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD 1224. HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being encroachments on judicial prerogatives. VV. 2. Just compensation must be judicially determined Just Compensation Just compensation is the fair and reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by the owner of the property due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property measured at the time of the taking, no matter how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in the 1920's, the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and Amigable cases, supra), and using the conversion rates at the time of taking (because according to those cases, Art. 1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual obligations). EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory. VV. Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987) F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage their properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation. The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the State and when the legislature or the President through

it appears that it was based on supervening events that occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social observed 3. While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people. on the other.Constitutional Law II his law-making powers exercises this power. it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws. Later on. the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision. No deposit before the taking is required. Because of the protests of residents of the latter. in 1983. Teehankee. however. leaving only as a judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence. HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to the NHA. When BP 340 was passed. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. or question the amount of payments fixed by the decree. There is not provision for any interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation. 182 SCRA 142 (1990) F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA and the construction of drainage facilities. Due process must be 100 SCRA 660 De Knecht v. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM Tuason v. PD 1669 and 1670 are declared unconstitutional. The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of . LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation. VV. No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later. The lower court denied tthe motion. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. The case was remanded to the lower court. the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon certiorari. The factor of functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets. on one hand. Appeal. the party adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties. CJ. VV. and progress and development. HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive judicial aprpoval. Bautista (1980) F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal Road Project. when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. among whom was petitioner. while the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. Republic v. originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay City. but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. De Knecht. it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out for the benefit of the people. the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan. the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary.

The price or value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. They shall be entitle to security of tenure. Gutierrez. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. NAPOCOR v. humane conditions of work. ownership. and living wage. the expropriated property. 2. 1. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers. Napocor's lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. local and overseas. Charo. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Art. the limitations imposed by the NPC against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use. Sec. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the acquisition of the right of way easements. the State shall regulate the acquisition. Charo. whenever it is possible to make the assessment. For these reasons." In this case. collective bargaining and negotiations. and possession of. 1. without loss of title or possession. through expropriation. The State shall afford full protection to labor. including the right to strike in accordance with law. the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of the title to. organized and unorganized. ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the land traversed by its transmissin lines. Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings. Sec. but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the owner of the condemned property. 3. the SC ruled that "Normally. the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. 193 SCRA 1 (1991) F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines. Moreover. the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should neither be more nor less. To this end. Art. Equal Protection Art. Sec. reduce social. nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity. XIII. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the subsequent legislative fiat. XIII. III. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. be subjected to an easement of right of way. Just equiivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of . and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. than the money equivalent of said property. and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. economic. RULING: In RP v. liberty or property without due process of law. No person shall be deprived of life. Sec. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines. D. XIII. Economic equality Art. and peaceful concerted activities.Constitutional Law II impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. PLDT. use. 1. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation. the expropriation. and disposition of property and its increments. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law. It is unquestionable that real property may.

Sec. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. 201 Phil. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. and deprived aliens of the right to earn a common livelihood. There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. Hernandez. For the protection of the law can be observed by the national interest. and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency. 5. In Villegas v. when the national interest dictates. The Congress shall. Sec. HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. Art. and shall not diminish. Cuevas. or modify substantive rights. Sec. the Integrated Bar. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978) F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a fee of P500. 10). 169 of the NIRC requiring manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful for infants. Ichong v. brought suit and obtained judgment from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. employed in Manila.. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. XII. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity of taxation. the SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail trade. Art. 1155 (1937) But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that they cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood. Sec. it failed to consider substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. an alien. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Sec. In imposing a flat rate of P500. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Sec. and procedure in all courts. the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. and to expansion and growth. XII. In the grant of rights. was struck down as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not require the same labeling in the case of filled milk (coco-fat added) . The Constitution itself acknowledges this in various places . 90 SCRA 379 (1979). certain areas of investments. 10. to name a few. reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens.Constitutional Law II recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments. 11. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. 86 SCRA 270 (1978). 2. Id. XII. xxx The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters. and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Villegas v. or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe. In Ichong v. Sec. 2). The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. 201 Phil.exploitation of marine wealth (Art. VIII. In Vera v. Art. Finally. the admission to the practice of law. increase. practice. especially when they are admitted to the country as immigrants. and exclusive economic zone. Hernandez. shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade. certain areas of investment (Art. VV. 1155 (1937). 2 par. the ordinance denies aliens due process and the equal protection of the laws. III. the SC invalidated a city ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an occupation. territorial sea. Respondent. privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. pleading.

VV. Comelec. At any rate. sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52. the question should be resolved. In Igot v. HELD: Sec. 95 SCRA 392 (1980). The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity. Social equality Art. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA 344. 1. They have no personal or substantial interest at stake and therefore no locus standi. . use. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired elective provincial. The retired employee in effect declares himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. His petition is a mere request for advisory opinion. It does not violate equal protection. This provision required that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever form. 95 SCRA 392 (1980). economic. 4 of which provides for the disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of subversion. IX. the disqualification of candidates convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as unconstitutional. 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk. voter and member of the bar. Sec. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980) F: Romeo Igot. To this end. Nevertheless. shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the provision. sec. III. from which the fatty part has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its immediate containers with the words: This milk is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age." Petitioner. Sec. VV. not invalid. Comelec. Governor of Nueva Vizcaya. In Dumlao v. Political equality Art. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments and therefore. 169 applied only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk. as taxpayer. city ot municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected. No petition seeking his disqualification has been filed against him. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979) F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk products. Sec. and Alfredo Salapantan Jr. ownership. 95 SCRA 392 (1980) F: Sec. 2. the SC upheld the validity of sec. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. . and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the equal political protection. 3. Bona fide candidates to public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination. for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government. 4 of Batas Blg. insurrection or rebellion or similar offenses. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. Dumlao v. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute does not involve disbursement of public funds. They brought an action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of the Tax Code. thus denying them the equal protection of the laws. Vera v.. Comelec. Sec. Igot c. sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of the law on the ground that it was contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantee of the Constitution. however. because of public interest. XIII. Art. 18. as taxpayer and voter. C. reduce social. 10. the law was already inoperative. VV.Constitutional Law II At that time of the decision thought. Sec. and disposition of property and its increments. the State shall regulate the acquisition.

Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. In the instant case. accused of violating the Anti-Usury Law. ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with. there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner. who was ill and confined at that time. By resolution. Tarlac. 65 Phil. swore that "he made his own personal investigation and ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a license.Constitutional Law II II. went to the office of the petitioner. or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board. Searches and Seizures Art. judge. proceeded w/ the execution thereof. The existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the peace before issuing the warrant complained of. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable. the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce. obtained from the justice of the peace of Tarlac. and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. and after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper. & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized. houses. & the restoration of certain documents alleged to have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. 689. Receipt books. if any. under oath or affirmation. III. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section. the prop. shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. & w/o the presence of the petitioner. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses. the judge must examine. 70 Phil. in his application. Almeda. de Garcia v. receipts. Requirements for Search Pasion vda. Sec. they could be held liable for perjury. as shown in the warrant itself. Separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. Almeda. 141 (1940) F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda. . Locsin. Even accepting the description of the prop. the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by the applicant." On the same date. Almeda. house or store of the petitioner for certain books. to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law. HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a SW to be valid. documents & other papers relating to her activities as userer. lists. commanding any officer of the law "to search the person. Warrants Yee Sue Kuy v. to be nullified in these proceedings. 2. 3. Salas. PNs and other articles were seized and retained in the possession of the Anti-Usury Board. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents demanded. Sec. accompanied by a captain of the PC. papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. a SW. Bu motion. Their affidavits were sufficient for. judge of CFI denied the petitioner's motion for the reason that though the SW was illegal. The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought. The right of the people to be secure in their persons. RULING: YES. (1938) F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents seized. thereunder. together w/ the SW. Charo. 1. the resp. a SW was issued to search the store and premises of the petitioner. except upon lawful order of the court. Arrests. Almeda. (3) in the determination of probable cause." The witness he presentted testified before the judge and swore that he knew that YEE was lending without a license because he personally investigated the victims who secured loans from the petitioner. The applicant. charging usurious rates. pet. shall be inviolable. (1) it must be issued upon probable cause. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE A. an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. chits. (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another.

ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with. publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as papers and other literature seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the crime of subversion. the offices of the Metropolitan Mail and the We Forum were search and printing machines. Bache & Co. HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. RAM. She could not have objected bec. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner. RULING: NO. IS THERE A WAIVER? waiver. and its pres. she was sick & was not present when the warrant was served upon Salas. mimeographing machines and tape recorders. paraphernalia. actual or constructive. In Stanford v. (Phil.. was taken by the Dep. VV. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. (2) that the person involved had knowledge. No express believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. they were turned over to the resp. Corro v. The judge did not have the opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to propound initial and follow-up questions which IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None. The delay in making the demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to result im implied. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.Constitutional Law II seized were not delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant. It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was made. To constitute a waiver of constitutional right. the US SC declared this type of warrant void. cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. waiver. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied. The judge did not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the NIRC. the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o basis. Another factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. Burgos v. VV. the application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. video machines and tapes. as required by law. the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures. The deposition was later read to the judge who asked the witness to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. typewriters. The failure on the part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of the consti. Instead. (3) that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Chief of Staff (1984) 133 SCRA 800 Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC. 37 SCRA 823 (1971) F: The Com. Ruiz. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or editor.) v. of the existence of such right. Clerk of Court. It is but a submission to the authority of the law. Certainly. right. Logronio. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to . the deposition of de Leon and his witness. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. State of Texas. motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing. The judge then signed the SW and accordingly issued the same. it must appear first that (1) the right exists. of Internal Revenue through Rev. there was no case pending against the petitioner. Petitioners brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the return of the things seized. Broad statement in the application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a hearing. newspaper dummies. Considering that at the time the warrant was issued. Examiner de Leon filed an application for a SW against Bache & Co. HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. being a personal one. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times.

Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his knowledge was based "on gathered infrmation from verified sources. RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states that it is in connection with "the violation of RA 6425. (3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was issued for one specific offense. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers. Dayrit. An exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single offense is when existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses." The same holds true for the affidavit of Angeles.or by letter or messenger. This is important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-importatnt question of w/n there was probable cause. marijuana dried stalks which are suject of the offense stated above. As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused. 180 SCRA 69 (1990) F: Judge Dayrit." executed by P/Lt. with reasonable effort. judge was invalid. the SC ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can. ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid. ammunitions and explosives in the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in possession of Dr. with its address and specifically mentioned the offices of the "Dept. While there was failure to state the particular provision of the law violated. (2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly describe the place to be searched. (1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness. What appears on the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no." This suffices to cure the defect. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer. Dimagmaliw. the SW specifically described the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The probable cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense. if any. the complainant and any witnesses he may produce. The fact that the word "etc. the warrant itself qualified the description of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms. in writing and under oath. explosives and ammunitions are punished in different sections of the PD. Prudente. issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of arms. However. on account of his training. Prudente v. Angeles. Prudente. The articles seized by virtue of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as evidence for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act. it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest. the same are deemed inadmissible against them. for notwithstanding that possession of firearms. there is no question at all that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as basis for determining probable cause is alleged. People. he shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. Charo. upon applicatin of P/Maj. and that any statement he might make could be used against him. etc. Moreover. Furthermore. they are treated as belonging to a single specie. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested. on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavit submitted. in the case at bar. the Court declared that: " At the time the person is arrested. The warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses. 3 fragmentation grenades were found in the bathroom of the office of Dr. was in the best position to conceive. 155 SCRA 486 (1987) F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp." was added to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not violate the rule on single offense. They also question the extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of a counsel. of Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of the President at the 2nd floor and the other rooms in that floor. before issuing the warrant.Constitutional Law II his judicial mind. ascertain and identify the place intended to be telephone if possible . Galit. Olaes v. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. In People V. . the judge did not examine Angeles in the form of searching questions and answers." Although the specific section of the law is not stated. In enforcing the warrant. by any person on his behalf. and the judge must. Here." it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable cause to believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his possession and control. or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means . the SW described the place as PUP. supported by a "Deposition of Witness. RULING: NO." This is deemed sufficient. a relative. Charo. or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.

the NIRC. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or arrest ) under Art. The Sec. The Court agrees that PASTF exercises. To that extent. The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. unconstitutional and of no force and effect. Achacoso. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this. whom the President of the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested. and the Revised Penal Code. of Labor . unconstitutional. sees nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon the body. it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. when he is neither. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. 38. warrants of arrest. This makes to our mind and to that extent. CA. Diokno. who may issue warrants of arrest and search. Unlike a magistrate. is to make him both judge and jury in his own right. 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central Bank Laws. it is only judges and no other. Although his office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused. He further ordered the seizure of the documents and paraphernalias. the authorities must go through the judicial process. Under Art. in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its enabling law. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens. there can be no valid search warrant. we declare Art. how could it be determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably . as the accused's adversary and his accuser. meaning to say. Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. 38 of the Labor Code? HELD: NO. a. par. 183 SCRA 145 F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022. The "responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills and competence but more significantly. not being a judge. and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse. now embodied in Art. The Court." he stands invariably. having verified that she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. Without probable cause. C of the Labor Code. the Tariff and Customs Code. 171 SCRA 348 (1989) F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. III. Petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. quasijudicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883. To permit him to issue warrrants and indeed. RULING: NO. PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002. Hence. 20 SCRA 385 (1967). and on that ground.Constitutional Law II The right to counsel may be waived but the wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. shall be inadmissible in evidence. following a final order of deportation. for the purpose of deportation. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court. ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973 Constitition. Charo." These requirements were even made stricter under the 1987 Constitution which provides that the rights of a person under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when made in writing and in the presence of counsel. Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This order was enforced on 26 January 1988. the neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. In Stonehill v. a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. POEA Administrator Achacoso ordered the closure of the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. prosecutorial powers. Salazar v. being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting illegal recruitment. or was meant to exercise. 38 of the Labor Code. in whole or in part. Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down. may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Existence of probable cause.

Lising. As determined by a judge Under the 1987 Constitution. asked the BIR agent and his witnesses if they affirmed what they what they testified to.Constitutional Law II guilty thereof? In truth. It is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. Otherwise. than if the goods were searched for the ideas they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). e. Likewise. (Phil) v. thus making the warrants general warrants. The instruction to seize "subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a material is subversive or not is not for the police officer to decide. leaflets. in Corro v. which violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. thus making the warrant a general warrant. he went back to his chambers and finding that the examination was finished. So said the Court in Bache and Co. leaflets. banners. handbills. the judge suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and take the testimony of the witnesses in his chambers. the warrant is void. Chief of Staff. The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based on the affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. Neither can it be based on a report. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts that they are testifying to." was again invalidated for the description was not at all particular or specific. In the latter case. Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void. printed matters. To establish the requirement of probable cause. customs agents are specifically authorized to search and seize vehicles even without a warrant. Lising. The testimony cannot be based on mere belief. The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else. The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled). the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine Times. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant (a) When search is made of moving vehicles The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the mean time. The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions. and thus threaten free expression. the testimony based on investigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to be not personal knowledge. one warrant. in Burgos v. 137 SCRA 541 (1985). Villamiel. only a judge can issue a warrant. reiterating the 1937 case of Rodriguez v. When it comes to printed matters. tape recorders. and thus the search warrant issued was not valid. subversive documents. and typewriters. After he was through with the hearing. etc. like the clerk of court. after which he issued the search warrant in question. papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines. In the Tariff and Customs Code. b. . articles. Thus. Ruiz. d. the rule is: One crime. 133 SCRA 800 (1984). no unfettered discretion must be granted to him. 2. 37 SCRA 823 (1971). the offensive and much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973 Constitution has been removed c. this was a fishing expedition. the offensive material need not be set out in full. when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing. In Burgos v. Chief of Staff. the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We Forum was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was inadmissible. the Light a Fire Movement. After personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witness. The search warrant must describe particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. In Corro v. a more detailed description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating the appreciation of ideas. and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular descriptions. In this case. the description which read "subversive documents.

a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. NPA and NDF. Gonzales. To be valid. . The arrest took place at 11:30 a. and if the documents in the apartment were 2 blocks away. and within the time of the arrest. the search must be "incidental" to the arrest. Earlier that day.g. Roque's apartment located 2 blocks away. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. was searched and some documents seized. At noon of the same day. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are and what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive. (c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party Roan v.g. as an incident of an arrest. probable cause that the criminal is inside the car). But the seizure of the articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. At 12:00 noon. On the basis of the documents seized.m.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. without a search warrant.. there is no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. the place of premises where the arrest was made can also be searched without a search warrant. that is. 139 SCRA 152 (1985). Sec. because it was an incident of a valid arrest. In Nolasco v.) A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves the commission of the offense. Rule 126. The SC at first held that the search was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing to describe with particularity the things to be seized. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group. (Rules of Court. Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant for rebellion against Milagros. The search warrant described the things to be seized as "Documents. the police can stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them. thus giving the officers discretion regarding what articles they should seize. If. Search incident to lawful arrest. There is absent a definite guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized. Nolasco v. the reconstituted SC granted the motion for reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search was likewise valid. Cruz Pano. judge on 5/10/84. Milagros Roque and Cynthia Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of control of the arrested person. one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid incidental search. the search would no longer be justified since there is no way for Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents. having been wanted as high officers of the CPP.Constitutional Law II Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e. not separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is looked into. 1984. It is a general rule that. But after the EDSA revolution. The petitioner's house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered.m. charges of subversion and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. (b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest. 145 SCRA 687 (1986) F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. xxx". There is no question that when a child has been reported kidnapped in a community. having been arrested already.-. her premises were searched and 428 documents. in the Nolasco case. apprehend a suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e. the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest. 12. The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by frisking him for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime. HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe with particularity the things to be seized. papers and other records of the CPP. of August 6. if the arrested officer has to first apply for a search warrant from a judge. Milagros asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained.

178 SCRA 362 (1989) F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng. Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal HELD: YES. in the full view of the witnesses. the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty against a possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting. together w/ the affidavit presented to him. judge did was question Capt. filed a motion to quash the search warrant by the resp. they are prohibited. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to. newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself. Malum Prohibitum. Pita v. policemen seized and confiscated from dealers. (Mata v. was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133 SCRA 800) . pornographic. Sec. "this procedural flaw notwithstanding. CA. or how far he was from the window. that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.Constitutional Law II RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. His application. therefore." shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits. the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith.It does not follow that bec. to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside." and only bec. In any case. We do not agree. but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply bec. But as we said and did in Burgos. or if the acts related were really done openly. we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the consitutional issues raised." RAM. personally known to him. an offense is malum prohibitum. Bayona. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. A SW is still necessary.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. they become unreasonable and subject to challenge.-. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record. he did not ask his own searching questions. except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp.-. judge. if he knew and understood the same. magazines. considering that these acts were against the law. who both claimed to be "intelligence informers. but this is not entirely true." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. Motion to Quash. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. or whether it was on the first floor or second floor. he seeks review with SC. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida. before coming to the SC. otherwise. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. Among the publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. 4 of the ROC. by their own personal info. distributors. to establish the applicant's claims.. standing alone. It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant . These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by CA. It is correct to say. By his own accounts. there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. however. It was. and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126. judge.Petitioner should have. all that resp. Depositions were taken of the complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita. the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the . invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. Instead. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others. or why his presence was not noticed at all. necessary for the witnesses themselves.

is actually committing." In such a situation. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. or when an offense has in fact. a political case. The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. a search warrant will issue. They must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action. If probable cause exist. Hence. Petitioner attempted to flee but was stopped by the 2. Petitioner was brought to the police station for further investigation. (d) Stop and Frisk Posadas v. valid or invalid. or was actually committing. The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge . He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. it was effected on the basis of a probable cause.38 Smith & Wesson revolver. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1 caliber . there is no question that. The US SC held in Terry v. a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a commission of an offense. Davao City. or is attempting to commit an offense. foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at military or police checkpoints.Constitutional Law II premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail.. futile and much too late. gun. a smoke grenade. R 113. & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. St. when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos. were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes. among others. unlike in the former. whether political or "obscene". a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar. R 136 of ROC. Ohio that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances & in an appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. Such an exercise may prove to be useless. they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. The judge must determine WON the same are indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's sound discretion. there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same. 38 cal. in the complete absence of a warrant. They did not know what its contents were. As bet. and trial on the merits. if in their opinion. indeed. by reason of a defective warrant. CA. While they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges. the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure. . There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid. They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person.. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto. the latter is more reasonable considering that. an obscenity rap is in order. the constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte v. just been committed. because speech is speech. the petition for review. However. w/o a SW. two Metro Manila Dailies. it is reasonable for an officer rather . they did not know that he had committed.. there are many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o necessarily being preceded by an arrest. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee w/ the buri bag. At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee. w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a . 5. ROC. both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force. de Villa.22 cal. gun. the offense. 12. 188 SCRA 288 (1990) F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar. the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. a decision was rendered finding petitioner guilty. & 2 live ammunition for a . HELD: From Sec. As the Sol-Gen said: "The assailed S & S may still be justified as akin to a 'stop and frisk' situation whose object is either to determine the identity of suspicious individuals or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officers seeks to obtain more info.

De lara F: After a surveillance conducted. holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition. the Receipt of Property Seized. proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintaing the status quo while obtaining more info. Ruling: YES . He also contends that he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation. Accused contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and void. a buybust operation was conducted by the police. Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not object to the search.) Bam. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing. The arrest that followed the hotpursuit was valid. Matillano. The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the house. 1994) F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December. RULING: YES. RAM. accused was apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. The accused admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. five bundles of C-4 dynamites. de Gracia. and for attempted homicide. During the investigation. and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. People v. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion. 233 SCRA 716 (July 6. but was acquitted of attempted homicide. The accused already pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the police when he sensed the presence of police operatives. 1989. They were then made to sign an inventory. A contemporaneous search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible in evidence. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire killing one member of the team. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion." PETITION DENIED. and the Booking and Information Sheet. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence reports about a coup. He tried to escape by running inside his house. he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case. RULING: NO. written in Tagalog. Accused was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant. The team. M-shells of different calibers. ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the accused in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. together with the accused. The policemen’s entry into the house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense in flagrante. The police pursued him and were able to subdue him. There was no need for a warrant. as a consequence of which. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. (e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked money. The waiver must be expressly made. Matillano. He even showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. The team arrested appellant. accused was arrested. When appellant was asked to give a written statement. of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. People v.Constitutional Law II than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur.

In addition. the military. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. De Villa. capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints. There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties. it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. Their alleged fear for their safety increased when Benjamin Parpon. 1866 defines and punishes. As part of its duty to maitain peace and order. 3. illegal. considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups. or other offenses. the military operatives. the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a rebellion. homicide. under the situation then prevailing. of the institution of said checkpoints. Prior to the raid. thereby compelling the former to break into the office. especially at night or at dawn. When the military operatives raided the place. Furthermore. HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment. had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by the Revised Penal Code. there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. 1866. In the first place. and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social. for that matter. w/o a SW and/ or court order. Presidential Decree No. indeed. unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder." Valmonte v. and also a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. such as illegal possession of firearms. Under the foregoing circumstances. was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air. for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense. bec. . the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and. in the course of their routine checks. 24 with variant elements. There was consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. maintaining peace and order. the building and houses therein were deserted. taking into account the facts obtaining in this case. the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas. arson. At the time the offense charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law. as a specific offense. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. Presidential Decree No. the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful search and seizure of other rights. appellant De Gracia could only be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the trial court. there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings. 170 SCRA 256 (1989) F: On 1/20/87. albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith. the Valenzuela residents are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM. that might conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed.Constitutional Law II It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. Consequently. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that. Petitioners aver that. economic and political dev't of the NCR. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. or threatened to be infringed.

and not one violator is properly charged. But. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts. the former should prevail. 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. the checkpoints during these abnormal times. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8. Police cannot respond to riots or violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers.Constitutional Law II Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. in the interest of public security. Wire Tapping Gaanan v. the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. cite Art. A show of force is sometimes necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. Resps. the remedy is not to stop all police actions. VII. have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is. 18. there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we can order prosecuted. Respondents stress 2 points. First. Sec. Accdg. bureaus and offices. inj. and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably committed and could be committed during future police actions. however. The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age. Guazon v. and other alleged acts w/c are shocking to the conscience. he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence. 17 of the Const.000 from him. We see nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges and a hard look by admin. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and whenever it becomes necessary.:"The Pres. reasonably conducted. This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification. xxx HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure. officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket prohibition are also warranted. at the cost of occasional inconveninece. the violation of residences even if these are humble shanties of squatters. to prohibit the military and police officers represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" in MM. are total lies. True. Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses. are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. to the petitioners. all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. second. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. discomfort and even irritation to the citizen. De Villa. 4. no permanent relief can be given at this time. 181 SCRA 623 (1990) F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt. the kicking in of doors. In the meantime. invasion or rebellion. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public. the problem is not initially for the SC. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices bec." They also cite sec. A blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are easily procured. This demand was heard by Atty. the herding of half-naked men to assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks. we have to temporarily restrain the alleged baning on walls. the resps. The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Where not one victim complains. when conducted w/in reasonable limits. bona fide residents of MM and Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights. the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. Gaanan through a telephone . including the essential and legitimate ones. shall have control of all the executive departments.:"The Pres. And." However. IAC. Those w/c are reasonable are not forbidden. Under the circumstances of this TP's suit.

blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel.-.) 6. People's Court (1948). (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense. 3. ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. action for damages. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. But if the thing is legal. xxx (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. The tel. The Court noted. as in the Stonehill case. in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. Atty. rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. Personal property to be seized. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage. the SC. case of Wolf V. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. especially in the Philippines where violations were committed by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning power to water down the gravity of the other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional rights. it would not be returned. sec. users. by their very nature. when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines.S. intercepting. This has not always been the case. In other words. Colorado. Consequently. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case. without prejudice to any criminal.g. 2. and (c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. What may be seized Rule 126. or other devices enumerated in Sec. or recording a tel. . the insufficiency of the other remedies (e. on WON an extension tel. complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the AntiWiretapping Act (RA 4200). This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because. It was in Stonehill v. dictagraph.Constitutional Law II extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent. through punishment. 5. Since Atty. the SC noting that the total suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the constitutional right which it seeks to preserve.S. (Rules of Court. The victim may or may not get back the thing seized. and only its suppression can be asked for. Ohio 1969. Sec. Furthermore. It the thing is contraband. they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping. civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was acquired. 2 and 3 (1) of Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". In Moncado v. even if no criminal prosecution has yet been filed. resistance). criminal punishment. conversation. Exclusionary Rule Art.A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: (a) Subject matter of the offense. persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate. The evidence is absolutely useless. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. following the U. Diokno. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. the evidence admitted. the mere act of listening . the party can ask for its return. One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken. case of Maop v. In such case. III. HELD: NO An extension tel. depending on whether it is contraband or not. following the U. supra.

but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. whatever their nature. As a consequence. Marti. and/ or residences. The averments thereof w/ respect to the offense committed were abstract. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. General search warrants are outlawed bec. (2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners. to search the perons named and/ or the premises of their offices. Diokno. 2 is no. the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended. 20 SCRA 383 (1967) F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense. and to seize several personal prop. papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners. as the "subject of the offense. prosecutors). Mr. thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights-. 2 of the Consti: (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth therein. several judges (resp. mandamus & injunction. w/n the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof are valid. None of these requirements has been complied w/. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art.that the things to be seized be particularly described-." or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws. said corporations have their respective personalities. w/n said documents. documents. directed to any peace officer. III. 8. a peculiar order emitted therefrom. When he opened appellant's box. they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims. NIRC & RPC. one can indirectly inquire into the validity of the suspension of the privilege. and things seized from the officers of the corporations. 193 SCRA 57 (1991) F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts. & (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations. By so doing. he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. His curiosity aroused. judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they were officers. prohibition. the court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even against the top ranking officials who ordered the seizure. Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC). No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. warehouses.Constitutional Law II Stonehill v. said petitioners filed w/ the SC this orig. In Aberca v. It was stated that the natural and juridical persons has committed a violation of CB laws. he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. opened the boxes for final inspection. Civil Action for Damages A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd parties. w/n petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants. NIRC and the RPC. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. RAM. it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause. for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts. or committed specific omissions. Search and Seizure by Private Persons People v. Ver. (2) No. violating a given provision of our criminal laws. Sec. (3) If the answer in no. HELD: (1) No. Opening one of the bundles. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by . action for certiorari. caprice or passion of peace officers. Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita Reyes. following standard operating procedure. The writ was partially lifted or dissolved. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations. to recover damages for the illegal searches and seizures made in a despotic manner. 7." Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void. separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. TCC. insofar as the papers.

however. The arguments of appellant stands to fall on its own weight. who made the search/ inspection. he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.Constitutional Law II the forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI. between a private individual and other individuals. personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers.) The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the govt w/o the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S). 6. rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy of communication and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence. When warrant of arrest may issue. where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof. (Rules of Court. allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights. before issuing the warrant. Its concern is not the relation between individuals. It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes. APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his consti.) Rule 126. Sec. This constitutional right refers to the immunity of one's person. Sec.) The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. xxx" (Sponsorship speech of Commissioner Bernas. 6 ( on warrants of arrest) with Rule 126.-If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Con Com. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST. the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Thus. or the lack of it. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. Having observed that w/c is open.-. In the absence of governmental interference. delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts. Thereafter. That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. 9. not law enforcers.: " xxx The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Reyes as a precautionary measure bef. Job Reyes. the protection against unreasonable S & S cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it w/in the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the govt. the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him. Sec.-. and w/o the intervention of police authorities. from interference by govt. acting in a private capacity and w/o the intervention and participation of state authorities. 4. would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. the liberties guaranteed by the Consti. the proprietor of the forwarding agency. Appellant. the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. In sum. that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. First. be invoked against the state? HELD: We hold in the negative. the right against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of private individuals. the judge may rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause Compare Rule 112.-Upon the filing of an information. is involved. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person. whether citizen or alien.The judge must. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. ISSUE: May an act of a private individual. as in the case at bar. in writing and . an information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425. 4 ( on search warrants. cannot be invoked against the State. is not search. it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. xxx (Villanueva v. Examination of complainant. Merely to observe and look at that w/c is plain sight is not search.) Rule 112. as distinguished from SEARCH warrants. Second. record. Sec.(a) By the Regional Trial Court. Querubin.

98 Phil. It is not obligatory. Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court. the Pres. Amarga v." has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Consti. alleging that Arangale harvested palay from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. upon the investigating judge to issue a WA. he must be satisfied that a probable cause exists. 739 (1956) F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua. instead. that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused commited the crime charged. The fiscal should. who were publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star. so he could determine for himself if. is left to his sound judgment or discretion. he can always ask the fiscal to submit the records of the preliminary investigation. legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had an imperative duty to perform it. 29 coup attempt. 167 SCRA 393 (1988) F: The Pres. To determine whether a WA should issue. there exists probable cause. have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable . Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue a WA. The fiscal deniend his motion after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners and filed the case in court w/c thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners. 5. The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely on the certification of the fiscal that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and has found probable cause on the part of the accused. The judge can issue the warrant on the basis of the information filed by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause. Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. 12. HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER. to issue warrants to "other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. hid under her bed. Makasiar. Abbas. It he is satisfied with the affidavits. a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. but merely discretionary. the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers. Beltran v. After the PI. 2) and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. of the Phils. noting that it has been practice long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis of the certificate. HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" (Art. Bam. Sec. Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in accordance with Sec. Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint. he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested. after conducting a PI. Abbas. Judge Samulde sent the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed. for the determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. while the firing was going on-. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a clear. Neverhteless. 1987 entitled "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you will recall. ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view of his finding. Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC. he need not summon the affiants. on the basis of the affidavits. if the judge is in doubt." Instead of submitting his counteraffidavit. during the Aug. based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct.Constitutional Law II under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the records their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.perhaps the first Commander-inChief of the AFP to have to do so. and there must be a need to place the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. 98 Phil. III. filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners. Of course. 739 (1956).

(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the gun and claims that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive documents were hidden.] It is true that 6 days later he executed a confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of counsel. is actually committing. without a warrant. Section. (Rules of Court. or is attempting to commit an offense. HELD: (1) Under R 113. 5. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof. What the Consti. in People v. 144 SCRA 1 (1986) F: On the basis of info.38 caliber revolver was found buried under his house. has in fact just been committed.-. Two arresting officers testified that the appellant had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. on charges of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion. the arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the crime has been committed. The appellant was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal. 5 talks of "citizen arrests". his admission is inadmissible under [Art. and the gun and documents were ordered confiscated. or is about to be committed. 1982. arrest a person: (a) When. Sec. is being committed. issue a warrant of arrest. 144 SCRA 1 (1986). (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal. the person to be arrested has committed. the appellant was arrested while plowing his farm in Tiguman. Sec. 7. Subversive documents were also seized from a place near his house. to reclusion perpetua. cases where an arrest can be made either by the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant. the appellant . III. This is not an accurate interpretation. but it was then already too late. in order to justify an arrest w/o a warrant. given by Cesar Masamlok. sec. he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and. The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his presence". the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail. However. Davao del Sur.) Rule 113. The offense must also be committed in his presence or w/in his view. Arrest without warrant. on the basis thereof. or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause. Burgos. he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. and it is uncorroborated and unreliable. when lawful. xxx 10. The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge". as maximum. as minimum. and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112. otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.Constitutional Law II cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. 12 (1). 5 (a). There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Sec. the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and the firearm and document are inadmissible in evidence. (4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. (2) Consequently.A peace officer or a private person may. since there was no personal knowledge of the offense itself. underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. a. Thus. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Sound policy dictates this procedure. Strict enforcement of rule People v. The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the former to be his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule. Following established doctrine and procedure. When arrest may be made without a warrant Rule 113. A . (b) When an offense. in his presence. or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. the arrest made by the constabulary without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive was held unconstitutional. and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. as the appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights at that time. on May 13. the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Burgos.

. People v. Metro Manila and requested that said person be apprehended. (a) and (b) of Rule 113. 187 SCRA 311 (1990) These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. Dural was referred to the Caloocan . I In Umil v. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station I.Constitutional Law II should be acquitted. An arrest w/o a warrant. The attendant circumstances taking place before their eyes led the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being committed. under Sec. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about the illegal trade of the accused. the person to be arrested has committed. Rodriguez. about a member of the NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. they asked the male person. a driver and 2 passengers. namely. The male person brought out from his pockets 2 small plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. Ramos. 232 SCRA 498 (April 25. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place was given to them. It was found that the wounded person. is actually committing. and that they are. 5. the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their pockets.. further detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court. as amended is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto. Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation. pars. Nothing illegal was found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle. 1989) F: Pat. Makati. is actually Rolando Dural. The tricycle driver brought out from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. ROC. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Ave. Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid? Ruling: YES. arrest a person: (a) When. A peace officer or a private person may. Ramos. viz. Arrest without warrant. 5. Exceptions to strict enforcement (1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion Umil v. The Court finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on HC. The arrest therefore was not valid as the requirements for a warrantless arrest were not complied with. Upon positive identification by an eyewitness. they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give something to the male person. They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on board. in his presence. a member of the NPA liquidation squad. responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. w/o warrant were clearly justified. stop in front of the house at 8199 Constancia St. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides: Sec. who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon.. 8199 Constancia St. The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge that he was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from the alleged sale transaction. the policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest. which the male person. when lawful. b. Michael Orbeta. the driver and the passengers of the tricycle did.. The 'suspicious stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be marijuana after tests were conducted on them. or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. Makati. who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling marijuana at No. so that their arrests. Pat. They also saw a male person come out of the said house and approach and talk to the driver of the tricycle. the Court. in the act of committing an offense. but the gun and the subversive documents must be confiscated.C. Q. Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta. RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls under the provisions of Rule 113. After a while they saw the male person go back to the house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a cigarette. Sec. The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC have been filed had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense. a team of policemen posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the house located at 8199 Constancia St. or is attempting to commit an offense. a marijuana cigarette'. Pajilan together with his companions approached the male person and the tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police officers. without a warrant. Dural was then transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM. when apprehended.

xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. who has been released on bail. antennae." They went to the address on 8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion. this Court. insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned. Thus. he refused to give a written statement.) Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. an info. Amelia admitted ownership of the documents seized. When confronted.Constitutional Law II City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. As to Dural. The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements. The arrest. of PD 1866 was filed bef. However. The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified." and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by their former comrades. After identifying themselves as military agents and after seeking permission to search the place. On 8/15/88. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. They found firearms. At the PC stockade. Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. the agents found them to be loaded guns. speaker and subversive documents. since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a crim. Subversion being a continuing offense. the petition for HC on his behalf is now moot and academic. of PD 1866 was filed. the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces. When questioned. regular power supply. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Roque and also to Buenaobra. At about 8 PM. of the CPP. the writ of HC is no longer available II The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. an outlawed subversive organization. is now moot and academic and is accordingly dismissed. etc. he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. III Anonuevo v. a petition for HC was filed bef. A was identified as "Ka Ted. A petition for HC was filed bef." The petition for HC. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. case. He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation." referring to RC and other members of the rebel group. Q. A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under surveillance. charging her w/ viol. a search of the house was conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. Buenaobra arrived at RC's house. need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause bef. for viol. ledgers. charging them w/ viol. R. is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict. than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. On 8/24/88. Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame. w/c was granted. subversive documents. they were brought to PC HQ for investigation. to quell the rebellion. When frisked. vouchers. no.C. In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos. When arrested. Constantino (RC) could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms. Another info. same day. journals. Obviously. ammunition. Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing the jumbled tel. Hence. the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. pursuant to a search warrant . the military agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place. a former NPA. w/o warrant is also justified. this Court on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. the Constantino house in Marikina Heights was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88. sister of Amelia Roque. Ramos. charging Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority. of Florida Roque. At the hearing. Accordingly. At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88. radio. aka. The military found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. Nor was he arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting incident. "Ka Nelia. therefore. among others. he readily submitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong. RTC-Pasig. In the course of the search were found several firearms. . although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Dept. Enrile. They were asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunitions but they could not produce any.

Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunitions for a . but he gave the lawmen his slip. no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that could cause the said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely. V The petitioners Ocaya. They were brought to the PC HQ for investigation. Nor did petitioners ask for prel. 7. Upon questioning.. ROC. believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson. a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2. having been first conducted. inv. At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88. When he asked for the warrant. did not belong to them. inv. while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Sec. Sec. There is also no merit in the contention that the info. issued a resolution denying the petition for HC. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers. 142. Laguna. Muntinglupa. of PISTON. could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition. when arrested. the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan." Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of R 113. during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. "Bukas tuloy and welga natin ." Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him. Sec.. The petitioners. where he was heard as saying. On the other hand. Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Art. agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP Command. On 5/17/88. inv. have not introduced any evidence to support their claim. the officers. there was no previous warrant. of PD 1866 was filed w/ RTC-Pasig. hanggang sa magkagulo na.. Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Rivera was released from custody. when O. an info. is w/o merit. As pointed out by the Sol-Gen. In view thereof. prel. and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. armed w/ a search warrant. Lim. MM. Aguirre.. 125. conducted a search of a house located at Marikina Green Heights. head of the CPPNPA.Constitutional Law II HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang. it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the . Station Commander. the men bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner type jeepney. ROC. 125 of the RPC. xxx On 2/1/89. w/o warrant. He demanded that his sister be allowed to accompany him. ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession. has been shown. IV Ocaya v. Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms. filed against them are null and void for want of prel. inv. Sec. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his companions in the killing of Bunye II. ROC. but the men did not accede to his request. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunitions in their person when apprehended. In the course of the search. In the afternoon of 11/22/88. he was awakened by his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed no less than by former comrades of the petitioners. When he went down to talk to them. 5 (b). RPC. he was immediately put under arrest. of Art. RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against him. charging him w/ viol. An info. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM of 11/23/88. the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition. is sanctioned by Rule 112.. after the informations had been filed against them in court. The filing of an info. however. charging her w/ viol. VII Nazareno v. filed w/ the competent court. picked up Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for questioning. but were planted by the military to justify their illegal arrest. he may not be released on HC. VI Espiritu v. Anonuevo. w/o a prel. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. was conducted bec. through trimedia was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on 11/23/88 xxx. Mla. pursuant to R112. No. Mesa. 7.45 cal. On 5/12/88. HELD: Vicky O.

(Sec. supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. Jr. or if such person is charged before any court. Padilla. w/in the contemplation of Sec. after he was positively implicated by his co-accused. The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime. v. had jurisdiction or not to issue the process. Ramos.) On the Ilagan Doctrine. His arrest was based on "probable cause. the writ of HC will not be allowed.. Dural. FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST. or bef. HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. not to limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the court w/c issued the process.. a continuing crime. as the court itself stated in Morales.) PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990 The decision (on July 9. 4. criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. MM. 202 SCRA 251 . in all petitions for HC. confined in the St. We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration. judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case."from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition. anywhere as agents or representative of an organized govt. 1990) did not rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant. Agnes Hospital. does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof." (Peo. 5. like rebellion is. R 113. the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense. or become less of a subversive. it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be detained participated therein. R 113. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause. he was committing an offense. v. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when. but rahter. the day before his arrest. an outlawed org. and for subversion w/c. and after investigation by the police.e. As the Court sees it. where membership is penalized. requires 2 conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1) the person to be arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense." and "only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution in fact has been satisfied. w/ a view to its abandonment. coupled w/ good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Rolando Dural. would have shot or would shoot other policemen." Sec. w/o warrant. R 102.. ROC. judgement or order of commitment. the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-. ROC. Dural was identified as one of several persons who. received by the arresting officers. Said confidential info.Constitutional Law II respondents by reason of an info. whom the detained person is charged. The answer and the better practice would be.His arrest w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that. Enrile. 5 (a). i. had shot 2 CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. bec. the indubitable existence of a crime. simply bec. in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers. re-examination or re-appraisal.-. ROC. at the time of arrest. of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. For the detention to be perfectly legal. Ancheta. Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA. given another opportunity." Umil v. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge. It is in this sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized govt is attained. under Garcia v. w/c means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Dural did not cease to be. It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant must be based upon probable cause. ROC. he was. R 113. 5 (b). and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order. is based on actual facts. to the effect that an NPA was being treated for a gunshot wound was based VIII In all the petitions here considered. filed against him w/ the RTC-Mkti. when arrested.

A few days after their arrests. Sanchez. they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first.-. The power to arrest w/o warrant is w/o limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our community. ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION. the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest. And at the time of the actual arrests. is still another thing. 5 (b). the search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantino safehouse. w/o warrant. Casiple & V. and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communist equipment. teh arrest falls under Sec. The reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was the info. at the time of their arrests. and/ or subversive documents. A few days after Dural's arrest. W. he had chosen to remain in detention. informations were filed in court against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial custody and disposition. therefore. NAZARENO'S ARREST. On 8/31/88. Anonuevo and Casiple). R 113 are met. not for subversive or any "continuing offense. arraignment asked the court a quo for reinvestigation. or on 1/31/88. has in this case. (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Dural. w/ info. As to A. Roque.. was inciting to sedition. as to their exact location and the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof. an info." (US v. 2 CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bo. Case against E.. explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons. at the time the words were uttered. D.-. since it was only on 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made promptly.. the court. 5. their arrests. "xxx The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime. or soon thereafter. R. while Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later. has been provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled. are also justified.Constitutional Law II on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in said hospital. w/c confirmed the belief of the military that the info. considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties." but for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in the perception of the arresting officers. Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural. Many persons differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the Consti. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a court of law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms. In the balancing of authority and freedom. and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/ NPA. second. And then shortyly after their arrests. tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction. Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. they were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA members. Buenaobra. the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque. w/o warrant.Although the killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88. Ocaya. for E. wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen.The peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith. found in the safehouse was a person named RC. ammunitions. . R113. given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other by Benito Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for their operations.) Supervening events made this case moot and academic. An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. On good faith. ROC.) ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant. even w/o a warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14 days to prevent possible flight. w/o obviously becomes difficult at times. Buenaobra's petition is moot bec. the peace officers did not appear. R113. who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP.. he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. but xxx upon the nature of the deed. (2) a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in said hospital for for a gunshot wound. had bef. caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright arrest w/o warrant under Sec. 5 (a). in their possession were unlicensed firearms. Anonuevo. He was placed under judicial custody. But. They were. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: (1) the day bef. Buenaobra. charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault against agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. third.

they violated his constitutional right to counsel. and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation. they are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. violence. III. the officers must undertake to afford proper safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the investigation to ensure that the statements made are truly the product of free choice. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section.Constitutional Law II These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant. 12. is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. threat. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the marked bills.e. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec.S. A Senator or Member of the House shall. when a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures. incommunicado. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. Source: Miranda v. but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. 11. R 113. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in his waist. (2) No torture. The ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were submitted for examination. Rights of custodial interrogation Persons under Art. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills. solitary. ROC. he must be provided with one. That is as it should be for as law enforcers. Sec. VI. be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. i. shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. are supported by probable cause. intimidation. 5. xxx B. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel. To note these admissions. the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling marijuana cigarettes. 384 U. 11. force. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. on the other hand. in all offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional). (1) Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress Art. one of the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the marked bills. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS. 436 (1966) According to Chief Justice Warren. After finding these positive for marijuana. Linsangan. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for HC. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical declarations than to the appellant’s denials. 17 hereof. (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs People v. and their families. to remain silent. a case was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Secret detention places. Linsangan denied the charge. Arizona. The two marked ten-peso bill were retrieved from him. Upon appeal. Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so. Sec. his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime.. . in compliance w/ Sec. where compulsion is forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated. 195 SCRA 784 F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust” operation.

The early rule placed the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary and. he does not have to defend himself alone. v. by force or violence or intimidation. a policeman. on the prosecution. b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police. sees X running with a stained knife away from an apparently dead man. b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he should lose his right to counsel. Since the introduction of the American accusatorial system of criminal procedure in the Phils. since the purpose of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can be used to prosecute the person. 3. for there can only be one purpose to the questioning. but without being directed at anyone's guilt in particular. But once A arrests X and starts interrogating him in the police precinct.when the investigation now focuses on the guilt of a person such that he is no longer allowed to leave the premise.) It was held that a confession not shown to have been voluntarily given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings. In the later case of Peo. (The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person arrested is a prominent Constitutional lawyer. Right to remain silent a) To make him aware of it. Although he may already know these rights. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent. No. the purpose is not so much to inform him. The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations. 4. when A. At this stage. 2) "Custodial investigation" . Under the new rule. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony. not even when such force and violence he is compelled to tell the truth. 10. 2 Law Rev. 619. then one will be provided for him by the state. code of 1916. de los Santos that "A confession. since the inherent pressures initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with the right to counsel. (Sec. ask him for an explanation as to what he saw without reading his Miranda rights. the Miranda rule is not yet applicable. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and violence. b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere c) To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to invoke his right.) The reading of these rights is required during "custodial investigation". Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel. a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or cannot afford one. In 1953. 61 Phil. LJ 409 I. but also that it is false or untrue. and that is to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him. For instance. 4. b) To make him aware that this is an adversary system. otherwise. 2. to be repudiated. Mendoza. The question is on whom the burden of proof is placed. Act No. It is at this stage that the Miranda ruling is necessary. people who could otherwise explain their innocence would be arrested. v. as to assure him that his interrogators are willing to respect his rights amidst the pressure of custodial investigation. A police investigation consists of 2 stages: 1) "General exploratory investigation" when the investigation consists merely of general questions to find out who might be the culprit. the Court stated "the .. Act No. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. even for the first time on appeal in the SC. therefore. admissible in evidence. the rule has been that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence against the accused. a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent. the accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood. anything he says can and will be used against him.Constitutional Law II Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be informed of the following rights: 1. w/c placed the burden of proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. it was sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie its admissibility. a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. and that the police are not acting in his interest. 2 (1988). then his rights must now be read. for the law rejects the confession when. he can rung after X and having grabbed him. Villanueva.

3. His motion was denied. As the Court indicated in Escobedo v. in the US.) THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases (Stonehill v. the suspect is taken into custody. the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system -. Miranda v.Constitutional Law II admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the supposed illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission contained therein. he was included in a police line-up of 5 detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion of the main suspect on the basis of w/c the accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the complainant. when the police officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation. As the police line-up in this case was not part of the custodial inquest. In Gamboa v. it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render inadmissible even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled to incriminate himself. it is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect. but in Miranda. w/c have been adopted by the Phil." xxx This is not bec. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police interrogators bef." (Rogers v. Urro. does not state at what stage of the interrogation process they must be made. The accused was then charged w/ robbery. the accused was arrested. By custodial interrogation. III. Cruz. SC: 1. a person in custody may be interrogated. 2 in Mla. THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION At what stage of the police interrogation must the warnings be given? The Consti. and the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. w/o a warrant. v. while the latter was interrogated. we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. People's Court.) THE MIRANDA RULE The prosecution may not use statements. MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. and/ or confessions or admissions from the accused.a system in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own mouth xxx. WAIVER OF RIGHTS. it is indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel. for vagrancy. xxx II. Hence. this petition for certiorari. Richmond. The next day. are null and void. The accused moved to dismiss the case against him on the ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during the line-up. xxx Indeed. 2. The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its admissibility (Moncado v. Frankfurter. should he choose to exercise it. xxx Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by law. Illinois. unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. whether exculpatory or inculpatory. the Court. IN TURN. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of the privilege but also of the consequences of foregoing it. the petitioner was not entitled to counsel xxx. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. . went back to the former rule that involuntary or coerced confessions. in Peo. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has a right to remain silent. to overcome the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. W/o expressly overruling its decision in de los Santos and Villanueva. He was taken to police precint no. stemming from custodial interrogation of the def. Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. and to assure the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and wilol be used against him. J. regardless of their truth. w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman methods to secure confessions. the court specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied. such confessions are unlikely to be true but bec.

xxx. free from the risk of confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance In New York v. 2. No distinction is made bet. Quarles. this social cost outweights the need for Miranda safeguards. they were informed that the deceased was with two companions. 17. sustaining stab wounds. When answers are not actually coerced. Jan. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.. it was held that although a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt. in fact. in a prosecution for selling heroin. as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense. No similar phraseology is used in the exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE." EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule excluding evidence illegally obtained is absolute. People v. never be used by the prosecution. to be valid. 1987. 1973. US. such confessions. The accused was apprehended. Does this mean there can be instances. 211 SCRA 262 F: Bolanos was convicted for Murder. the rule is that the voluntariness of a waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be determined on a case-to-case basis. With regard to confessions given after Feb." It held that the warnings were not themselves Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure the right against self-incrimination. 4. that the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in turn to fewer convictions. 17. but before March 20. the rule that the suspect must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel does not apply. it could . The victim.. The first can be made provided that the waiver is "voluntary. namely. the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. even though presented in evidence in a trial after the effectivity of the 1973 Consti. confession or admission. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. knowing and intelligent. where uncounselled statements may nevertheless be admissible in evidence.. the present Consti. the Consti. When the policemen inquired about the circumstances of the incident." it is obvious that there can be no valid waiver of the warnings. 1973. as a def. IX. when the present Consti. provided they are voluntary. Pagdalian was found dead. 1985. In such exigent circumstances. Petitioner. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. are admissible. on the previous night. spoke of confessions only. The Court noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule. 1987.. 1985 but before Feb. when the decision of Peo. For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory.Constitutional Law II It is important to distinguish bet. the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. the waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings. Although the previous Consti. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the warnings at the risk that probative evidence will be excluded. knowing and intelligent" but the second cannot. A waiver of rights will not be presumed. albeit. Galit was handed down. taking into account the circumstances under w/c the waiver was made. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence. police officers must not be made to choose bet. In the vehicle where the accused boarded. for a limited purpose? In Harris v. I have argued that it was not so limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements. 2. Bolanos. 1. it may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit. must be made w/ the assistance of counsel. using the traditional test of voluntariness. With respect to confessions obtained bef. took effect. on his way to the Police . requires that the waiver to be valid. 3. claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking powder. says. statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20. 2. As the warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so that any subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to public safety. v. must be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel.

the trial coust’s judgment was reversed. Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession of Bandula conformed with the constitutional requisites for its validity. Dionanao. "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. HELD: The trial court.. while already in police custody. The right against self. hence admissible in evidence. Zerna)". and Statements which are evidence as to someone's state of mind. Res gestae is based on the belief that because certain statements are made naturally. Evidence which can be admitted into evidence as Res gestae fall into three headings: Words or phrases which either form part of.Constitutional Law II Station. Not applicable to res gestae statements People v. to remain silent and to have a counsel of his choice. For his death and the loss of their things on the occasion thereof. dealt with in the section. it disregarded the defenses interposed by the accused and convicted Bandula. they leave little room for misunderstanding/misinterpretation upon hearing by someone else( i. Since the extra-judicial confession was the only basis for the conviction of the accused. it appearing from the confession that acussed were informed of their rights under the law regarding custodial investigation and were duly represented by Counsel (Atty. which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18. Article III of the 1935 Constitution. counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao. violated his Constitutional right to be informed. Zerna. Art III of the 1987 Constitution which protects the rights of the accused during custodial investigation. Suzette. Bolanos allegedly admitted that he killed Pagdalian because he was abusive. in admitting the extrajudicial confession of the accused in evidence. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations People v. 3.e. 232 SCRA 566 F: After he and his wife were individually hogtied and their house ransacked. and 2) the right of a person in custodial interrogation. On the basis of the extrajudicial confessions (EJC) allegedly made by Bandula and Dionanao during their custodial investigation which the court found to "have all the qualities and have complied with all the requirements of an admissible confession. The 3 other accused were acquitted for "insufficiency of evidence". Certainly. Sidigo. namely: 1) the right against self-incrimination i.. Garay was found dead with 3 gunshot wounds . and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution. Exclamations which are so spontaneous as to belie concoction. 12. Atty. Bam. and Ejan were charged in court for robbery with homicide. these are blatant violations of of Sec. 1973 2. Bandula." is . Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17. It has placed the rights in separate sections. they had no counsel present. 175 SCRA 216 (1989) It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights. Ayson. Bandula. by the witness who will later repeat the statement to the court) and thus the courts believe that such statements carry a high degree of credibility. spontaneously and without deliberation during the course of an event. the rights of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense.e. On top of this." Parenthetically. or explain a physical act. the right of a person not to be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence. 158 SCRA 111 (1988) Res gestae (a Latin phrase meaning "things done") is an exception to the rule against Hearsay evidence. HELD: NO From the records.e. or sets of rights. whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused and who is not an independent counsel. People v. and 2 weeks later with respect to Bandula. there are telltale signs that violence was used against the accused. If at all. it can be gleaned that when accused Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest. ISSUE: Whether or not the admission in the jeep was admissible in evidence. i. Dy. 1. the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay.incrimination. And counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these rights.

This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. Right Against Self-Incrimination The first right." It simply secures to a witness. is actually put to the witness. that against self-incrimination which." And. such opportunity afforded him." i. It follows that the right may be waived. It cannot be claimed at any other time. as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 2) no force.S. and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence. violence. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere.. a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission in court. and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel. or impliedly. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U. Rights in Custodial Interrogation Section 20. The rights of a person in custodial interrogation. or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. criminal. civil. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial. one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. After such warnings have been given.Constitutional Law II now embodied in Section 17. and 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. It must be claimed. i. a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement.incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights. Arizona. Supreme Court in Miranda v." or "incustody interrogation of accused persons. exist only in "custodial interrogations. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. is accorded to every person who gives evidence. intimidation. that he has the right to the presence of an attorney. resulting in self. group of rights. the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement." It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry. indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding. or administrative proceeding. mentioned in Section 20. which have been made more explicit. criminal. and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. the right can be claimed only when the specific question. whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena.e. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. as aforestated. threat. Article III of the 1987 Constitution. against self-incrimination. However. Miranda rights He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent. in any civil. to repeat." Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel. that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law. whether he be a party or not. and to be informed of such right. and to be . These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right. expressly. no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. or administrative. has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence. by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. The right against self-incrimination is not self-executing or automatically operational. to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed. to wit: 1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor. are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. as this Court has already stated. "suspects" under investigation by police authorities. incriminatory in character. for preliminary investigation).. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena." Rights of Defendant in Criminal Regards Giving of Testimony Case As In fine. but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way." The rights above specified. or better said.e.

c) to testify in his own behalf. VV. HELD: The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest. Hatton alleges that at the time that he was made to stand in the police line-up. not to be subjected to force. The prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police who identified a statement of the accused during a police interrogation and his alleged waiver of the right to remain silent and to counsel. AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN describing the latter as a "mestizo. When Roca was questioned on the incriminating answers in the statement. This cannot be considered as positive identification of the accused by the witness. Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play. knowing and intelligent F: Respondent Paquito Yupo was accused of murder in the CFI of Bulacan. a native of Samar. he was not assisted by counsel. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary. that he had a right to counsel and that anything he said could be used for or against him and after asking whether he was willing to answer questions and he answered "yes. 388 US 218 (1967) People v. Wade. Respondent Judge sustained the objection on the ground that the right to counsel cannot be waived." The statement was in Tagalog which the defendant. as the term should be properly understood. d) WHILE TESTIFYING. Custodial Phase of Investigation Police Lineups Gamboa v. hence. RULING: When the suspect was brought to the police station for indentification. the right to counsel does not yet apply. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights No valid waiver. threat. there is every reason to doubt the regularity of the identification of the suspect by the witness. the statement made only a perfunctory opening question. US v. to counsel. During the proceedings in the police station. 4. 210 SCRA 1 F: Algrame was stabbed at the back while walking with several companions including Ongue who vaguely recognized the assailant. intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will. 5. his identification therein by Ongue is inadmissble. Hatton. He was later charged with robbery and charged. In this case. prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand." Two days later. HELD: The right to counsel during custodial interrogation may be waived provided the waiver is made intelligently and voluntarily. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20. with full understanding of its consequences. he was not yet under custodial investigation. Hence. 1988 Police line-up not part of custodial inquest F: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy in Manila. People v. petitioner was not yet entitled. Ongue was invited by the police to identify the suspect in a police line. the defense objected. at such stage. violence. he was included in a police line-up and was identified as one of the suspects in a robbery case. The following day. He moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the conduct of the line-up. Hatton was pointed by Ongue as the assailant. were of no relevance to the inquiry. had not been shown to be fully acquainted with. However. technically. and 2) COURT a) to refuse to be a witness. after informing the suspect that he was under investigation.Constitutional Law II informed thereof. contending that Yupo's statement was given without the assistance of counsel. Ongue identified Hatton not because he was certain that Hatton was really the assailant but because he was the only mestizo in the station and because he was pointed by the police as the suspect. Thus. The date of execution of . was unconstitutional. It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation.up. Cruz June 27. subject to cross-examination by the prosecution. b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected. without the assistance of counsel. to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

Constitutional Law II
the statement before the municipal court was not indicated. The separate statement signed by the defendant stating he was made to read the opening statement containing the Miranda warnings and that they were explained to him all the more engenders doubt as to whether the defendant was properly informed of his right. People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) Public trial; waiver of right to counsel F: Jose Tampus and Rodolfo Avila were prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa, Rizal. On June 14, 1976, they attacked and killed Celso Saminado, another prisoner. Afterwards, they surrendered to the prison guard, saying "surrender po kami. Gumanti lang po kami." Two days later, they gave extrajudicial confessions admitting the killing. They were accused of murder and pleaded guilty. They took the witness stand and affirmed their confessions. Tampus was sentenced to death while Avila to reclusion temporal. Trial took place at the Penitentiary. On review, it was contended that Tampus was denied the right to a public trial and to counsel. HELD: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial there. Anyway, the right to public trial may be waived. In another case where Avila was also a defendant, the SC directed that, for security reasons, Avila's trial be held in the National Penitentiary. The accused was warned in Tagalog that he had a right to remain silent and to counsel but despite this, he was willing to answer questions of the police. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The truth is that shortly after the killing, Tampus and Avila admitted their guilt. That spontaneous statement, elicited without interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary confession of guilt. By means of that statement given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, the two waived their right to remain silent and to counsel. People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence F: Poyos was convicted of the murder of a 77-year-old woman and sentence to death. His conviction was based solely on his extrajudicial confession which he disowned in court. The confession was given to the police and subscribed before the clerk of court and contains a waiver. HELD: It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question whether there was a definite waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer was categorical enough, to be sure, but the question itself was not since it spoke of a waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was any waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could hire a lawyer but not that one could be provided for him for free. VV. Since Royo's conviction for murder was based on a written confession showing that he was apprised of his right not only by the police but also by the fiscal, but that he waived these rights, then the waiver found to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent and thus admissible. b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987) It is not enough that the confession is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The waiver must be made in the presence of counsel. Waiver of the right to counsel must be made with the assistance of counsel. This rule applied from March 20, 1985 to February 2, 1987. In People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 485 (1985), the SC, reiterating a dictum in Morales v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983), ruled that no custodial investigation should be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, and that although the right to counsel may be waived, the waiver should not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. In the Galit case, however, the adoption of the Morales obiter was also an obiter. The confession in this case was traditionally involuntary, and so the SC did not need the Morales obiter in order to disallow the confession. Under the facts of the case, the accused Galit was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of his confession, which was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered Galit's face with a rag and then pushed it into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that he signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985) F: Defendant was convicted of robbery with homicide by the Circuit Criminal Court. The

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principal prosecution witness testified that he heard the defendant and his wife, who was the mother of the witness' wife, quarrelling the morning after the crime. He said the defendant wanted to leave their house because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene." The prosecution also presented the extrajudicial confession of the defendant. HELD: The confession of the defendant is inadmissible because it was obtained through torture. The NBI investigators covered the defendant's face with a rag and then pushed in into a toilet bowl full of human waste. It was only after they had broken his will that the defendant signed the confession and posed for pictures for reenactment as directed by the investigators. The defendant is from Samar and there is no showing that he understood Tagalog. It was two weeks after he executed the salaysay that his relatives were permitted to visit him. His statement does not contain any waiver or right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. These constitute gross violations of his right. The SC cited the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile where it laid the procedure in custodial investigations: No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the precense of counsel engaged by the person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or of anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of this, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Whatever doubt as to the validity of the Galit rule, however, was laid to rest by the SC in People v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219 (1986). The Court held that in People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all the Justices except one who took no part, the Court was out to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Enrile, and embraced its ruling. In this case, the prosecution sought to prove its charge of subversion against Asis by means of her confession given in the hospital, in which she admitted through a leading question, that she was a member of the NPA and that she was wounded in the encounter. The SC upheld the trial court's decision excluding the confession on the ground that the waiver of the Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986) F: Jocelyn de Asis was accused of subversion. At the trial, the Fiscal offered as evidence an extrajudicial confession given by her in the hospital. In that confession, she admitted, through a leading question that she was a member of the NPA. The trial court excluded the confession on the ground that the waiver of Miranda rights was made without the assistance of counsel. The prosecution contends that the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile that the right to counsel may be waived only with the assistance of counsel, was only a dictum. HELD: In the case of People v. Galit, which was decided en banc and concurred in by all Justices except one who took no part, the SC put to rest all doubts regarding the ruling in Morales v. Ponce Enrile and Moncupa v. Enrile.

People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991) In People v. Nabaluna, 142 SCRA 446 (1986), Nabaluna et. al. were convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis, among others, of extrajudicial confessions taken in 1977. The confessions and the special counsel before whom the confessions were signed prove that the Miranda warnings were given, but these were not made in the presence of counsel. The SC, in allowing the confession, ruled that the GAlit ruling could not have a retroactive effect, especially since in this case the trial court decision was already rendered before the SC pronouncement.

People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987) F: Appellant was convicted of parricide on the basis of a confession and circumstantial evidence which the trial court found substantial to establish guilt. HELD: The waiver by the appellant of his right to counsel was made without the assistance of a counsel. The SC has held in Morales v. Ponce Enrile, People v. Galit and People v. Sison (1986) that this requirement is mandatory. Any statement obtained in violation of this procedure shall be inadmissible in evidence. VV. c. New rule on waiver (Feb. 2, 1987) Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be

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informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel. 6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution The burden to prove that there was a valid waiver of the Miranda warning devolves upon the one seeking to present the confession, that is, on the prosecution. This rule applies whether in the pre-Galit, Galit, or 1987 rule. In People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986), the SC noted that the stereotype "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a legal form. Investigators automatically type it together with "opo" as the answer, or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. Whenever a Constitutional protection is waived by one entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Thus, the prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession, and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) F: Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide for the killing and robbery of Ampara vda. de Bantigue on June 9, 1978. In another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the appellants, Raymundo Vergara and Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions were taken while the two were held incommunicado in the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of detention. HELD: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificial style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the waiver. Consequently, the prosecution must prove with strong, convincing evidence that indeed the accused willingly and voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that confession. That proof is missing in this case. 7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel, but not the right to be given "Miranda warnings" The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived. What cannot be waived are: 1. The right to be given the Miranda warnings. (For how can one waive what one does not know?) 2. The right to counsel when making the waiver of the right to remain silent or to counsel. 8. Exclusionary rule Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Note than under [Art. III, Sec. 3(2)] the exclusionary rule reads: (any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." There are two exceptions to the exclusionary rule. One, to impeach the credibility of the accused. Two, public safety. Impeach the credibility The unwarned or uncounselled confession is not totally without use. While it is

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not admissible to prove the guilt of the accused, it may be used against him to impeach his credibility by showing that he is lying in court, so ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) In this case, Harris was arrested for twice selling heroin to an undercover police agent. He confessed to the crime during the police interrogation, but the confession was uncounselled, and so it was held as inadmissible in evidence. But when Harris took the witness stand, he testified that what he sold was baking powder in order to defraud the police agent. The SC allowed the prosecution to introduce the uncounselled statment to show that he was lying. In justifying the admission of the testimony, Justice Burger said that it is one thing to say that the government cannot make an affirmative use of the evidence unlawfully obtained, and quite another to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which the evidence in the possession of the government was obtained to his own advantage, providing himself with a shield against perjury and the contradiction of his untruths. The reason, continued the Court is that the shield provided by the Miranda rights cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Public Safety Public Safety may justify the police in taking confessions without prior warning. Thus ruled the U.S. Supreme Court in New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). evidence in prosecution. C. Right to bail Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 1. When right may be invoked The right to bail is available from the very moment of arrest (which may be before or after the filing of formal charges in court) up to the time of conviction by final judgement (which means after appeal). No charge need be filed formally before one can file for bail, so long as one is under arrest. So ruled the SC in Heras Teehankee v. Rovica. 75 Phil.634 (1945). The case was unique in that after the war, the People's Court Act amended Art. 125 of the RPC to allow for a longer time to detain persons because of the impossibility of filing charges within the reglementary period due to the number of indictees. Bail and Habeas Corpus In the case of bail, there is an implicit recognition that the arrest and detention, are valid, or that even if they were initially illegal, such illegality was cured by the subsequent filing of a case in court. Thus, the prayer in bail is that one be released temporarily from such valid detention, and this can be made anytime after arrest. In habeas corpus, the assumption is precisely that the arrest and detention are illegal, so that the prayer is to be released permanently from such illegal detention. When the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to the victim is not available. Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect of the suspension has been considerably lessened to the need to file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise the detainee is to be released. The Constitution now provides, overruling Morales v. Enrile, that the suspension the subsequent criminal

New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). In the case, the Court excused the giving of the Miranda warning because the public safety required that the weapon had to be located before it could be used by the accused against those in the supermarket. The criticism hurled against this ruling is that while the police may be justified in forcing the assailant to say where the weapon is located, he is not justified to present this in

according to People v. (e) Age and health of the accused. and the automatic commutation of a death sentence to reclusion perpetua. III. or even detention that started as illegal but was cured by the filing of a case in court. The SC laid down the following guidelines in fixing the amount of bail in Villasenor v. (f) The weight of the evidence against the accused.The judge who issed the warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily. Amparo). 6. Standards for fixing bail Rule 114. For if it includeds even those crimes which before and now are really punishable by reclusion perpetua. later contained in sec. Penalty for the offense charged. otherwise. the order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by the conclusion on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 4. Probability of the accused appearing in trial.-. the remedy in this case is to increase the amount of the bail (Siquiam v. (b) Nature and circumstances of the offense. With the abolition of the death penalty (III. (c) Penalty of the offense charged. Nature of the offense. Health of the accused. It is a matter of discretion in case the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus. In such a case. and (b) the evidence of guilt is strong. Abano. Habeas Corpus refers to illegal detention. Thus. and (j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond. 6. the court's discretion to grant bail must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. it is contended that when the 1987 Constitution denies the right to bail in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. (d) Character and reputation of the accused. When bail is a matter of right. it becomes "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope. a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will" (Jackson). 10. Whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. Character and strength of the evidence. (g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial. 6 of Rule 114. it should not be rendered nugatory be requiring a sum that is excessive. guidelines. Even when the accused has previously jumped bail. bail. 9. Sec. (h) Forfeiture of other bonds. a bail of P1. Bail in courts-martial Commendador v. If the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases. Enage. it would go against the very spirit of the Constitution. 21 SCRA 312 (1967). 8.Constitutional Law II of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. said the SC in De la Camara v. Excessive bail shall not be required. Character and reputation of the accused 5. 20). Ability of the accused to give the 2. Where the right to bail exists. People v. still he cannot be denied bail. Forfeiture of other bonds. but not limited to the following guidelines: (a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail. (i) The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. while bail refers to legal detention. 7. De Villa. 3.195 million imposed against Mayor Camara for charges of 12 murders and 12 frustrated murder was found excessive. it is meant to apply only to those crimes which were once punishable by death. Amount of bail. 200 SCRA 80 (1991) 4. 26 SCRA 522 (1966). The only time bail may be denied is when (a) the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua. when it is a matter of discretion Bail is a matter of right in all cases not punishable by reclusion perpetua. In this case. 1. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. 6. San Diego. 2. 5. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national . Donato. 196 SCRA 130 (1991) 3. 41 SCRA 1 (1971). Right to bail and right to travel abroad Art. Sec.

was reversed by the SC on the ground that this change in the order of trial violated the constitutional presumption of innocence which places the burden proof on the prosecution. In Manotoc v. In all criminal prosecutions. to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In Alejandro v. implicit in the bail is the agreement between the State and the surety that the State will do nothing to make it difficult for the surety to arrest the defendant upon order of the court. Only De Guzman and Castro were . as may be provided by law. 96 SCRA 322 (1980). Sec. One. People v. over the objection of the prosecution. He appealed to the SC. namely to have the accused available whenever the court requires his presence. but is subject to lawful orders of the court. sec. The case leaves the question of allowing an accused under bail to go abroad for humanitarian reasons open-ended. 198 SCRA 130 (1991) D. However. Two. 6. The constitutional right to travel is not absolute. 1 upon the accused to make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. The firms were placed under a management committee by the SEC and petitioner was placed "on hold" by the Commission of Immigration. 1994. sec. VV. 16. 142 SCRA 149 (1986) F: Petitioner is a principal stockholder of two corporations. Dramayo. Manotoc v. and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. In Igot v. for violating the presumption against innocence. the SC noted that the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is a necessary corollary of the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. Castro and Catap were charged with murder for the killing of an unidentified person on Nov. the SC disallowed a person released on bail to travel abroad for a business trip. Comelec. Presumption of innocence In People v. Petitioner was charged with estafa. to have a speedy. then the State loses its right to order the forfeiture of the bond because it itself has breached its obligation to the surety. which hinted that the accused could be allowed to leave if he had "sufficient reason". thus affecting one of the conditions in the grant of bail. a judge who allowed the accused to present his evidence ahead of the prosecution. 231 SCRA 739 F: De Guzman. If the court thus allows his to leave. a law disqualifying candidates charged with national security offences was struck down as unconstitutional. de Guzman. 42 SCRA 69 (1971). 1. the accused may be placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court if he were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason. 3 (e) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which now reverses the order of trial when the defendant admits the act but invokes a justifying or exempting circumstance. Pepito. The Court gave 2 reasons why bail operates only within the country. Court of Appeals. after arraignment. He filed a petition for certiorari but his petition was also dismissed for lack of merit. to meet the witnesses face to face. but his request was denied by the courts. 14. 142 SCRA 149 (1986). trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. Donato. or public health. public safety. the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. impartial and public trial. CA. operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. What the Court found insufficient was the business trip. This ruling was modified by Rule 119.Constitutional Law II security. after the acused admitted the killing but invoked selfdefense. Rights during trial Art. III. He later asked for permission to leave the country for business reasons. and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This reason was not foreclosed by the Court. in one of which he was the president. HELD: The condition imposed by Rule 114. Waiver of the Right to Bail People v. 95 SCRA 392 (1980).

he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. it was not prudent. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. Rule 133 ROC namely: (1) there is more than one circumstance. she testified that they untied the man and brought him towards the direction of the Pasig river which was only 3 houses away. and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond resonable doubt. hence inadmissible as evidence. it could be treated as a verbal admission of the accused established through the testimonies of persons who heard it or who conducted the investigatiuon of the accused (Peo v Molas 218 SCRA 473)." Accused. Moreover in Peo v Alvarez. This was further strengthened by the extrajudicial confession (EJC) of accused Castro to Police Corporal Dominador Cunanan that it was Catap who killed the victim and that he and de Guzman acted only as look-outs. People v. the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. With regard to the EJC of Accused Castro to Police Cpl. Accused was convicted of a capital offense. 2. Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. Sec. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so . 85 Phil 752 (1952). that: If the defendant appears without attorney. Ocampo to do so. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. It is expressly provided in our rules of Court. 11. 6). Ruling: Under the circumstances. They were convicted by the court mainly on the basis of the testimony of Adelia Angeles. (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven. The proceedings in the trial court are irregular from the beginning. there is no evidence that Cunanan had any motive to falsely testify against accused. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty..) No matter how educated one may be. particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel. 4. She positively identified the 2 accused as the persons who were with Catap who maltreated an unidentified person whom they had tied to an ipil-ipil tree and upon seeing her. Cunanan. While it is true that accused's EJC was made without the advice and assistance of counsel. pleaded guilty and said that he was instructed by Mr. and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. particularly in the rules of procedure. Rule 112. One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law". without counsel. Issue: W/N the constitutional presumption of innocenec of the accused has been overcome. section 3 (now Rule 116. to say the least. the circumstantial evidence presented satisfied Sec. Holgado. Right to be heard personally or by counsel Adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty (Art. 85 Phil 752 (1952) F: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive. Sec. Holgado. III. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. the court ruled that an extrajudicial confession is admissible against a co-accused when it is used as a circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the participation of said co-accused in the crime committed.Constitutional Law II arrested and both pleaded not guilty. and. and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years. he may not know how to establsih his innocence for the simple reason that he does not know the rules of evidence said the SC in People v. unaided by counsel. for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense. HELD: YES Though there is no direct evidence to link the 3 accused to the killing of the unknown victim.

The provincial fiscal opposed the presentation of evidence by the defense. His Honor Judge S.000. counsel for the defense moved to dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case. the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense before entering judgment regardless of whether or not the defense had reserved its right to present evidence in the event its motion for dismissal be denied. (1949). Rule 118). and the sentence thus pronounced is void and may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. contending that the present procedural practice and laws precluded the defense in criminal cases from presenting any evidence after it had presented a motion for dismissal with or without reservation and after said motion had been denied. 279. section 1 (17). Homeres. it being provided in Article II. 2. the provisions of the Constitution hereinabove cited expressly and clearly guarantee to him that right. The reason is that it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him. Q: What happens if the accused files a demurrer to the evidence of the prosecution (on the ground that the prosecution failed to tender a case) and this motion is denied -.Constitutional Law II important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney.) Abriol v. 84 Phil 525. But if the motion for dismissal is denied. was accused of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. the court held the proofs sufficient to convict and denied said motion. Such constitutional right is inviolate. Homeres. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio if he so desires and he is poor grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119. (1949) F: Fidel Abriol. After hearing the arguments for and against the motion for dismissal. On the contrary. Sec. 2. without allowing the accused to present evidence in their defense.. Although the sentence against the petitioner is void for the reasons hereinabove . We have already shown that there is no law or precedent which could be invoked to place in doubt the right of the accused to be heard or to present evidence in his defense before being sentenced. Moscoso sustained the opposition of the provincial fiscal and. 15.could the defense still present its own evidence? In Abriol v. the court has no alternative but to decide the case upon the evidence presented by the prosecution alone. it has no power to sentence the accused without hearing him in his defense. The main question to decide is whether the writ of habeas corpus lies in a case like the present. and the court denies it to him. 1. contending that the right of the accused to present his evidence is a constitutional right which cannot be defeated by the dismissal of the motion of demurrer. the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of the evidence after the prosecution has rested terminates the case then and there. that court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. and citing as authority the case of United States vs. 28 Phil. No court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. of the Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. If the accused does not waive his right to be heard but on the contrary as in the instant case invokes that rough. Now that the Government cannot appeal in criminal cases if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy (sec. convicted all of them and sentenced the herein petitioner to suffer seven years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2. The refusal of Judge Moscoso to allow the accused-petitioner to present proofs in his defense after the denial of his motion for dismissal was a palpable error which resulted in denying to the said accused the due process of law guaranteed in the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution. Of course if the accused has no evidence to present or expressly waives the right to present it. 84 Phil 525. together with six other persons. Issue: Whether the accused should be allowed to present evidence after the denial of their motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the prosecution Ruling: The accused should be allowed to present evidence. the SC ruled in the affirmative. C. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney. There is no law nor "procedural practice" under which the accused may ever be denied the right to be heard before being sentenced. De la Cruz. whereupon counsel for the defense offered to present evidence for the accused.

49 SCRA 281 (1973) Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal F: After prosecution presented its witnesses.After the prosecution has rested its case. where the accused had signified his intent to withdraw his appeal. .Constitutional Law II stated. Demurrer to evidence. and it will be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the defendant. the court must assign a counsel de oficio. Sec. Today said right is enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for. or (2) on motion of the accused filed with proper leave of court. Right to free legal assistance Art. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M. Up to the point when the prosecution rested. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court. The right to be heard would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel.) 3. 201 SCRA 702 (1991) F: On 29 December 1989. the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity to be heard. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.-. If the court denies the motion for dismissal. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney. Justice Malcolm. Dris. but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor. Since there is a failure to prove the guilt of the accused.. the case must be dismissed. Rule 119. this is "perhaps the privilege most important to the person accused of crime. without counsel. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty. he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. the accusedappellant Ricardo Rio. in two (2) letters dated 14 December 1989. the defense moved for dismissal of the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Issue: Did such dismissal acquittal of the accused? operate as an People v. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. Rio. the court is required to inquire into the reason for the withdrawal. the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. for despite such withdrawal. the proceedings were valid and should be resumed from there." "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. III. he may be held under the custody of the law by being detained or admitted to bail until the case against him is finally and lawfully decided. The process against him in criminal case No. such that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes an intent to appeal. and. Paraphrasing Mr. in exactly the same way as a judgment of acquittal. particularly in the rules of procedure. Donesa. 15. as Judge Cooley says. such as the one at bar.." This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction of an accused by a trial court. addressed to Division Clerk of Court Fermin J. as in this case. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law. with Ruling: YES A dismissal ordered after the termination of the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution has the force and effect of an acquittal. The judge granted the motion. (Rules of Court. Even in a case. It continues. even during appeal. 1472 may stand should be resumed from the stage at which it was vitiated by the trial court's denial of his constitutional right to be heard. "Two (2) of the basic privileges of the accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to a preliminary examination. the duty to protect the rights of the accused subsists and perhaps. to have assistance of counsel for the defense' ". People v. President Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right . 11. Sec. manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney.

so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world." Justice should never be limited to those who have the means. appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the defense. does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. he would not have changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak well of the credibility of the defense. However. the accused-appellant. in the Municipality of Muntinlupa. This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent from the complainant. From the records of the case. The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is that Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. a brother of her very own mother. Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed to go scot-free. for it would be an incredulous situation indeed to believe that one.Constitutional Law II greater reason. "those who have less in life must have more in law. on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been more conscientious. is that a party may not shift his theory on appeal. allegedly. at the arraignment. which applies equally in criminal cases. to one of participation. would permit the occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle. It was stressed by counsel de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that. It is for everyone. this claim was. If the appointed counsel for the accused. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests of his client.appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a verified complaint filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio. by way of alibi. 1984. a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. only because the complainant's mother caught them. The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi. he also serves the ends of justice. had read the records and transcripts of the case thoroughly. It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial courts to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law (Section 13. Metro Manila. This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock the door to the bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there was consent. it is established that the accused. HELD: On appeal. Metro Manila on 31 March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon. that is. The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients' causes. as aforestated. On 26 June 1985. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office. by means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully. This claim was corroborated by the accused's brother. Its scales should always be balanced and should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over another. the Court deems it more likely that this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the case. duly subscribed before 3rd Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. which reads as follows: That on or about the 24th day of March. Philippines. Amado Rio. This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. This is so because the entrusted privilege to practice law . In this spirit. the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor General to file their respective briefs. the abovenamed accused. Although the Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate effort to get himself acquitted. according to defense counsel de oficio. The accused claimed that at the time of the alleged commission of the crime of rape he was in Romblon. unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against her will. as counsel de oficio. whether acting de parte or de oficio. Moreover." Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. with the alleged consent of the complainant. rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the voter's affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa. for "public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client's cause. Alejandro of the province of Rizal. xxx The trial court found the accusedappellant guilty of the crime of rape. The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from one of total denial of the incident in question. entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. fails to generate doubt as to the accused's guilt. the rule in civil procedure. assisted by Atty. The charge was filed. whether rich or poor. upon submission of which the case would be deemed submitted for decision. it was the fourth time accused had abused complainant. After all. he would have known that the sudden shift would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client).

this petition for certiorari. thus acquitting the accused. Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate preparation distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar. The court then allowed the prosecution to present evidence despite the fact that petitioner had not been arraigned. petitioner failed to appear. Again. thereby causing the threat of penal liability to remain hanging over the head of the accused for an extended period of time. 52 SCRA 143 (1970) The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. a case involving the prosecution for damage to property through reckless imprudence which had been pending for 6 years. As noted in Vera v. The court can order the public out of the trial room in the interest of morality and order. to have his guilt determined within the shortest possible time. who is sworn to uphold the law. Domingo. despite notice to his bondsman. Its objective is to free the innocent person from anxiety and expense of a court litigation. In Garcia v. Garcia v. 77 SCRA 422 (1977) No valid trial in absentia without arraignment F: Petitioner was accused of slight physical injuries in the City Court of Cebu. impartial and public trial (1) Speedy Trial The right to a speedy trial means one that is free from vexatious and oppressive delays. 52 SCRA 143 (1970). Borja v. to the bar and to the public. the court found petitioner guilty. Because petitioner was not arraigned. or certiorari. It is enough if it is conducted at a place where one's relatives and friends can be accommodated and the public may know what is going on. Right to speedy. The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to his client. the last step taken being the start of the cross-examination of the complaining witness. Sarmiento. The ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply with the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. an unreasonable delay on the part of the prosecution to present its case. he is expected to take such reasonable precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make him. and dismissal based on the denial of the right to speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. who did not appear thereafter. Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal proceeding. 5. one which thus far . Hence. The right is not absolute.Constitutional Law II carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court. After the offended party had testified and presented documentary evidence. Domingo. 36 SCRA 247 (1970). the SC dismissed the contention of one party that the trial was conducted inside the chamber of the judge on the ground that the objection came too late (the party only complained after the 14th hearing) and that the place was agreed upon by the parties for their mutual convenience (the judge's room was air conditioned). compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense the accused may interpose. the case was reset. violates the right of the accused to a speedy trial. procedural due process requires that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and what charge he must meet. a transgressor of its precepts. 4. prohibition or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. The remedy of the accused in this case is habeas corpus if he has been restrained of his liberty. After one postponement due to petitioner's failure to appear. While reasonable delay may be allowed as determined on a case to case basis. While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws. So said the SC in Acevedo v. Mendoza. The CFI affirmed the decision. (2) Public Trial A public trial does not require that the entire public can witness the trial. People. he was not informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The SC ordered the case dismissed with prejudice. HELD: Respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion and his decision is void. or otherwise.

is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public trial. 7." Then. and of the city court Judge. 273 U. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to arbitrariness. On fourteen separate occasions this was the case and there was no objection on their part. he would be interested in convicting those he tries so he would earn more. it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends.Constitutional Law II has remained unresolved. 8. In Tumey v. talks of 3 ways that the waiver may take place: (a) express waiver pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail bond. as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the production of evidence in his behalf) There are various means available to the parties to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery. 150 SCRA 144 (1987). Right to confront witness The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of the witness. perpetuation of testimonies. Another aspect of an impartial trial is an impartial tribunal bound by the Bill of Rights and the strict rules of evidence and procedure. it was held that a town mayor who was paid on the basis of the fine he imposes for every conviction for violation of the drinking laws. Moreover. Military Commission. Under such a situation. The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination. xxx (3) Impartial trial One aspect of an impartial trial is a neutral magistrate who exercises cold impartiality. could not be an impartial judge. however. as is quite usual. unless his presence is . Trial in Absentia Although the right to be present is not explicit in the provision. be waived by the accused. sec. without objection on the part of respondent policemen. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be present. Some are smaller than others. 6. The trial must be public. no problem arises. even during Martial Law. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the negative. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There was no evidence to substantiate the claim that any other person was excluded from the chambers. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in procedural due process. in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted. Where a trial takes place.S. Issue: Is the holding of trial in the chambers of the judge violative of the right to a public trial? Ruling: NO The defendants in this case agreed that the hearings be held in the chambers. In Olaguer v. no matter with what offense he may be charged. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. it is inferrable from the phrase "trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused" This right to be present may. 510 (1927). The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection. relatives and counsel present. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge. No relationship to the parties need be shown. Ohio. Rule 115." What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties. the SC held that a civilian cannot be tried by a military court (in connection with the Light a Fire Movement) so long as the civil courts are open and operating. too. 1(c). It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals. it was in the latter's airconditioned chambers that the trial was held. There is to be no ban on such attendance.

ruled the SC in Boria v. The requisites of a valid trial in absentia are: (i) the accused has been arraigned. 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution] which allows trial in absentia. Trial in absentia was introduced only in the 1973 Constitution to remedy a situation in which criminal prosecution could not move because the accused has either escaped or jumped bail. But he was gone. Mendoza. VV. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases F: Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned. 143 SCRA 163 (1986). learning of the trickery. If he does. which further ruled that trial in absentia applies even to capital cases. VV. This does not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence because it does not mean that the judgment of the trial court will result in conviction. the trial may be held " in absentia". Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping bail F: For repeated failure of the accused Dario Gamayon to appear. HELD: The subsequent trial in absentia deprived petitioner of his right to be heard by himself and counsel. and thereupon. The respondent Judge. The prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possible eventual conviction provided only that (a) he has been arraigned. 19 [now Art. the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. with no bail recommended. respondent Judge declared the bail bond forfeited and required the bondsmen to produce the accused within thirty days and to show cause why no judgment . The court will decide the case on the basis only of the prosecution's evidence. HELD: The doctrine laid down in People v. Nonetheless. Salas. Avanceña has been modified by Art. (b) implied waiver when the accused without any justifiable cause is absent at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice. and (c) implied waiver when the accused under custody who had been notified of the date of trial escapes. Conviction without arraignment violates due process and ousts the court of its jurisdiction. Arraignment is crucial because it informs the accued of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. and (iii) his failure to attend the trial is unjustified. 77 SCRA 422 (1977). The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. Trial commenced but while it was in progress. In People v. As a result of the reinvestigation. There can be no valid trial in absentia unless the accused has been arraigned. 77 SCRA 422 (1977). the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia. an amended information was filed. IV. Mendoza. The respondent Judge denied the motion and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. the prosecution can proceed with the presentation of the evidence. (b) he has been duly notified of the trial. he runds the risk of having his bail bond forfeited. Prieto. The defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. 84 SCRA 198 (1978). if the accused fails to attend trial (which presupposes arraignment). the court may consider the case submitted for decision. Waiver of the right to be present implies also waiver of the right to present evidence. (ii) he was duly notified of the hearing. Boria v. sec. supra.Constitutional Law II specifically ordered by the court for purposes of identification. People v. sec. without any justifiable cause. Hence. Just because th Constitution allows trial in absentia does not mean that the accused is now free to waive his right to be present during the trial. So ruled the SC in People v. In cases in which there have been a waiver of the right to be present. the prisoner took advantage of the first information filed and succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release. to which he pleaded not guilty. a case involving a charge for slight physical injuries where the accused failed to appear and so the trial court allowed the prosecution to present its evidence even if the accused has not yet been arraigned. Thus. whether expressed or implied. and (c) his failure to appear is unjustified. III. the SC ruled that trial in absentia does not justify the accused to jump bail. this petition. The indispensable requirement for trial in absentia is that it should come after arraignment.

VV. 9. Priviledge against self incrimination Art.Constitutional Law II should be rendered against them. infra." The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari. whether of innocence or of guilt Rule 116. After arraignment. 2. Military Commiission. If the accused is in the custody of the law. the following are the rules: 1. the conclusion is inescapable that issuing an order of forfeiture of the bail bond is premature. unless it is for a light offense. 14(2)] on trial in absentia. his presence during the trial is a duty only if the court orders his presence to enable the prosecution witnesses to identify him. on motion of defense counsel. (People v. 1973 but he escaped. presence in all stage is likewise a duty during (i) arraignment. b) Entering a plea. modifying People v. in which case accused may appear by counsel. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 32 O. IV. and (iii) promulgation of judgment. As we have consistently ruled. c. c) Promulgation of judgment. except that when the judgment is for a light offense.-xxx (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record. Salas. was charged with murder. 18. Salas. Sec. his presence is required in the following cases: a) Arraignment. the SC held that (a) the accused has the right to be present during trial. Generally. 6. During trial. Avancena. Avancena. reiterating Aquino v. a. this petition for certiorari. section 19 [now Art. respondent Judge reconsidered his order. He argued that "if trial could be conducted after the accused has been arraigned and identified. sec. infra. b. the accused has the right to be present at all stages the trial (from arraignment to rendition of judgment). HELD: Was the jurisdiction lost when the accused escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial? No. III. (b) if he is in the custody of the law.G. but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings. III. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case against his co-accused but it held in abeyance the proceedings against him in order to give him the chance to cross examine the witnesses against him and present evidence.. 143 SCRA 163 (1986). HELD: The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused. It does not give the accused the right to jump bail. Nazareno. This rule however has been modified. Although the accused is not in the custody of the law (and more so if he is in the custody of the law). . Hence. As things stand. Arraignment and plea. supra. he may be represented by his counsel or a personal emissary. HELD: The innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the conditions therein specified. together with five others. Promulgation of sentence. for identification People v. 160 SCRA 1 (1988) In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront witnesses F: Teodoro dela Vega Jr. regardless of the offense. 713. However. The court need not wait for the time until the accused finally decides to appear. (ii) entering a plea. jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. He was tried in absentia. To allow this delay is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. how made.) E. the case was set for hearing on Sept. Gimenez v. who invoked the last sentence of Art. 17. When presence of the accused is a DUTY In People v. 1.) 3. regardless of whether the plea is guilty or not guilty. Arraignment and plea. infra. Sec. or a representative (Rule 120. Sec. during which he pleaded not guilty. The lower court was correct in proceeding with the reception of evidence but it erred when is suspended the proceedings as to the respondent.

would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and compare his features with a photograph in proof. But the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself. in principle.Constitutional Law II Any confession or admission obtained in violation of section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same. is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips. Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined. Phil. 23. said: If. Mr. It refers therefore to the use of the mental process and the communicative faculties. without violating the rule that a person shall not be required to give testimony against himself. 119. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. there certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the purpose of using the same as proof. . Sec. had furnished evidence of the commission of a crime. or upon trial. is competent. Y.S. for when he is exhibited. but testimonial compulsion. an admission of his guilt. Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of a substance taken from his body (U. and the result can be used in evidence against him.) The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. there certainly could have been no question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of using the same as evidence against him.. when it may be material. even if the order goes too far. not an exclusion of his body as evidence. the accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act. In other words. If the act is physical or mechanical. 2263. and the mere fact that an object found on his person was examined: seems no more to infringe the rule invoked. [Art. than would the introduction in evidence of stolen property taken from the person of a thief. Moreover we are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a man to exhibit himself. Gardner. III. in his valuable work on evidence. 145 (1912)). v. the examination was made by competent medical authority and the result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. The substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection. (4 Wigmore. and not to a merely physical activity. Issue: Whether or not the information that the accused has gonorrhea may be used against him Ruling: YES. . The policeman who examined the defendant swore from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea. it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege. is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion. for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime. The accused was not compelled to make any admissions or answer any questions. whether voluntarily or by order. had the defendant been found with stolen property upon his person. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination obtained compulsorily. against his will. He was found guilty of the charge. (People vs. and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a clear reductio ad absurdum. 12 (3)] 1. in other words. to extort communications from him. by reason of blood stains or otherwise. . with all the tools and indicia of his crime. taken from the defendant.) . Wigmore. could not be used against him as evidence. Tan Teng. 144 N. in discussing the question before us. It was discovered that the rape victim was infected by venereal disease so that the finding of venereal disease in the accused was material to his conviction. So also if the clothing which he wore. The result of the examination showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. He appeals the decision on the ground that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the physicians about having taken a certain substance from the body of the accused while he was confined in jail and regarding the chemical analysis made of the substance to demonstrate the physical condition of the accused with reference to a venereal disease. F: This defendant was charged with the crime of rape. the evidence if material. sec. No one would think of even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the case indicated. it (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control] in whatever form exercised. then it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house. The objection. As was suggested by Judge Lobingier.

for this involves the use of the mental process. but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. Such an application of the prohibition under discussion certainly could not be permitted. Viewed against present standards. be decided as cases arise. Castillo. to submit her body to the examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Coats [1885]. because it does not call upon the accused as a witness it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial responsibility. The court ordered the defendant Emeteria Villaflor. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735. substance. Villaflor v. were marked as Exhibits 32. The accused can be ordered to expel the morphine from his mouth (U. or. no objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex can be seen. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the accused. 64 Phil. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. He contends that said six letters are the complainant's. Summers. (People v. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso must. for purposes of identification. can not violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill.] Bermudez v. The proviso is that torture of force shall be avoided. 34. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to show her body for physical investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. v. is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. Otadura. In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. it is possible that this method of determining pregnancy would violate due process as being too barbaric. (1917) Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. 62 (1920) F: The facts are not dispute.S. or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.S.Constitutional Law II The doctrine contended for by appellant would prohibit courts from looking at the fact of a defendant even. Mr. The taking of footprint sample to see if it matches the ones found in the scene of the crime is allowed (People v. 96 Phil 244 (1950)). Summers. that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Salas and People v. U. or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence. The accused refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735. Castillo. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. six letters which. Sara). taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. [Bermudez v. making the accused take dictation to get a specimen of her handwriting is not allowed. Issue: Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is pregnant. of course. for the purpose of disclosing his identity.. Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article. 35. v. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court. The corollary to the proposition is that. an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. 36 and 37. however. is not testimony but his body his body itself. (1917)). 485 (1937). 64 Phil. 62 (1920)). 415.) The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be photographed. 485 (1937) F: In connection with this administrative case. 41 Phil. Indeed. (Harris vs. . However. Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses. 41 Phil. said respondent filed. violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights Ruling: The constitutional guaranty. as in the Tan Teng case. 75 Ga.

it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury. as it is hereby held. thereby denying the respondent's petition. the marked money. the right is meant to avoid and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written by her. the alleged principal by inducement.incrimination. They contended that they had not been shown a search warrant. Essentially. The second paragraph of the Certification amounts to an implied admission that shabu. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. Also requiring the accused to reenact the crime is not allowed. then the evidence must be sought elsewhere. and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself. in a criminal or any other case. and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. or he should be asked. the house of the accused was searched. The constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Go. the trial court relied on a document entitiled “Certificate of Reconduct of Search”. 237 SCRA 73 F: After a buy-bust operation accused were arrested by the police. RULING: The extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible. Forced reenactments like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban against selfincrimination. to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person. and several prohibited drugs were seized. and the reenactment done by them of the circumstances surrounding the killing. It would violate her right against self. ISSUE: Whether or not such document is admissible in evidence. it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it. The reason for the privilege appears evident. Upon the presentation of a search warrant. The investigator. Olvis. In view of the foregoing consideration and holding. in a criminal or any other case. RULING: IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Cademas and Sorela were convicted in the lower court of murder for the death of Bagon. People v. upholding the complainant. signed by the accused. They were charged with and convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs law. that the complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her. then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally. If such is its purpose. He cannot therefore be said to have been acting on behalf of the accused when he lent his presence at the confession proceedings. Olvis. did not compel her to submit to the trial required. she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath. To this extent. The three accused were convicted on the basis of the extrajudicial confessions executed by them in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI to handle appellants' case. This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial compulsion but this has since been extended to any evidence communicative in nature acquired under circumstances of duress. People v. They were made in the presence of a counsel summoned by the NBI and not of appellants' own choice. Issue: Whether or not the complainant may be forced to make a copy of the letters in her own handwriting Ruling: No. the “Certification” is a declaration against the . But the accused were denied their right to counsel not once but twice when they were forced to re-enact the crime. one for all. and shabu papaphernalia had been found by the police authorities at the residence of the Go spouses and therefore. was acquitted. for this also involves the mental process." It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six documents above-stated. refused invoking her right not to incriminate herself. In concluding that a search warrant had been presented to the accused prior to the search. The complainant. 154 SCRA 525 F: Villarojo. subject to the control and custody of the accused (the spouses) and necessarily in their possession. the respondent's petition is denied.Constitutional Law II Respondent required complainant to copy the letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator.

The Court considers that there is nothing to prevent admission of the “Certification” to substantiate the fact that a search warrant issued by a judge had been brought to the attention of the spouses in the course of the raid or buy-bust operation carried out at their residence and that in the course thereof.Constitutional Law II interest and tacit admission of the crime charged. counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner. In Pascual v. the SC held that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect. it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed. 138 SCRA 274 (1985) A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self. the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding investigation by an adhoc body. "the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . petitioner-appellee. Board of Medical Examiners. 1965. relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. along with other rights granted an accused. made of record his objection. for some an even greater deprivation. Notwithstanding such. must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. Pamaran. 1965 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. Pamaran. for they may eventually lead to a criminal prosecution. 1965. even outside the court. Board of Medical Examiners. Respondentappellant. 28 SCRA 344 (1969) F: Arsenio Pascual.incrimination F: The respondents led by General Fabian Ver and Major General Prospero Olivas testified before the Agrava Board looking into the killing . consistently with the self-incrimination clause.. through counsel. respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot. 28 SCRA 344 (1969). In this case. petitioner-appellee. took note of such a plea.. no force or intimidation had been exercised upon the spouses. compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. filed on February 1. In Galman v. The constitutional guarantee. Galman v. Thereupon. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality. Jr. on February 12. A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2." In the light of the above. Why it should be thus is not difficult to discern." So also with the observation of the late Judge Frank who spoke of "a right to a private enclave where he may lead a private life. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice. now respondentappellant. it was held that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found guilty." HELD: Petitioner could suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness. who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. 2. finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself. such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. the Board of Examiners.appellee. could not be compelled to take the witness stand without his consent. unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. the accused were convicted of the crime charged against them. Pascual v. at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing.. To quote from Chief Justice Warren. That right is the hallmark of our democracy. In what proceedings available The privilege is available in any proceedings. More and more in line with the democratic creed. The second paragraph of the Certification is a self-incriminatory statment made at a time when the spouses were not assisted by counsel and under circumstances (in the course of or immediately after the search of the residence and seizure of quantities of shabu) which render intelligent waiver of their right against self-incrimination open to serious doubt." Thus according to Justice Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment. infra.

ruled that the right is amply protected by the use and fruit immunity." of a witness. When the State requires testimony to be made before a board or body.S. and gave power to the Board to punish refusal to testify.Constitutional Law II of former Senator Benigno Aquino. he can not be prosecuted anymore. Thus. Congress the cue to revise the Compulsory Testimony Act and provide for a "use and fruit immunity". say. public interest to get certain relevant information. The immunity in this case is from the testimony given. III. Yet they were not informed or at the very least warned of their right to remain silent and that any statement given by them may be used against them. The SC said it is not satisfied that when they testified they waived their constitutional right not be compelled to be a witness against themselves. The problem concerns the extent of immunity that the State must grant in order to protect the privilege against selfincrimination. the SC in Castigas v. 12." The subject matter dealt with and the questioning before the Agrava Board indubitably evinced purposes other than merely determining the surrounding facts and circumstances of the assassination. so as not to violate their right against self-incriminatrion.S. In 1964. but on the latter's objections. The SC also said it cannot be contended that the privilege against self. and Zicarelli v. 17 of the Const. Transactional Immunity In a transactional immunity.S. The private and public prosecutions filed petitions for certiorari. even if the guilt of the person testifying can be proven by independent means. The immunity is from the prosecution. "Use and Fruit "Transactional Immunity" Immunity" v. U. sec. Use and Fruit Immunity In a use and fruit immunity. The prosecution offered in evidence the testimony of Ver and Olivas before the Agrava Board. 175 SCRA 216 (1989). Thus. SC in Murphy v. supra. 3. The first portion of Sec. They were subsequently accused of murder in two cases for the killing of Sen. provides that "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. It is to be noted that the framers of the Constitution did not adopt the Miranda reference to "custodial investigation. 5 of PD 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. independent of the testimony and its fruits.incrimination applies only to criminal prosecutions. Ayson. if the state can procure evidence. Waterfront Commission of New York hinted that it was not really necessary to give transactional immunity in order to protect the right against self incrimination. Aquino and Rolando Galman. the state in effect exchanges immunity for the testimony . it has to grant immunity by means of law to the persons testifying. History in the United States In Councilman v. HELD: The persons summoned to testify before the Agrava Board were "under investigation for the commission of the offense" within the meaning of Art. a person is given immunity from prosecution of the crime in connection with which he gave his testimony. Through an immunity statute. Hitchcock (1892). This is the only way to reconcile two conflicting values. it can prosecute the person testifying nevertheless. the Sandiganbayan excluded the testimony. anything less violates the constitutional right. not merely from the use of the testimony. to legislation. "Transactional immunity" can be found in the following: Compare People v. much less their right to remain silent. III.S. sec. In the Philippines There is no fixed rule in the Philippines. providing for transactional immunity. U. a person is exempted from the use of his testimony as well as the leads (fruits) that the testimony opened up in a criminal prosecution arising from what he testified on. This gave the U. The respondents were called to determine their probable involvement in the crime. that can only be supplied by the testimony of certain persons and the highly primed constitutional right not to make a person a witness against himself. With the validity of this limited immunity was raised. They were charged as accessories in both. Thus. the SC ruled that the only way to respect the right against self-incrimination is to give transactional immunity. Congress in 1893 passed the Compulsory Testimony Act. the U. Art.

but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. 34 SCRA 663 (1968).confessed culprit". Galman v. Exclusionary rule Art. and it is as if no judgment has been rendered.1886. Ver and other high-ranking AFP officials were made to testify before the Agrava Board investigating the double murder of Sen. and not so much on uncounselled statement. Accused Chavez was made to testify as a witness for the prosecution without him being considered a state witness inspite of objections by his counsel. was exempted from being "used" in a criminal prosecution. . that is. Court of Appeals. Roger Chavez was found guilty. and one of the evidence presented was the testimony he made before the Board. Use and Fruit Immunity On the other hand. Despite this however. And so the matter was raised to the SC on certiorari. testimony forced out of a person cannot be used in evidence against that person. the Sandiganbayan sustained the objection. it gave them immunity and so now. all its proceedings are null and void.D. On the other hand. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. by the judge. 5 grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board. There is his prayer. which grants "use immunity" and the other. When the privilege is violated by the court itself. The Commission on Human Rights shall have the following powers and functions xxx (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority. too. In this case. then the testimony. Sec. on habeas corpus. every person summoned by the Board has to appear and testify on pain of being held in contempt. Aquino and Galman. 138 SCRA 274 (1985). HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one. A fortiori. "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. VV 4. 18. sec. PD 1886. by the police. and which was the subject-matter of Galman v. Court of Appeals. his testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As a matter of fact. a case was file against Ver in the Sandiganbayan. When objected to. The court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. XIII. 5. which created the Agrava Fact Finding Board. The SC held that the testimony could not be used in a subsequent proceeding." The trial court branded him "a self. But since the state needed the testimony. 1886. he be granted the alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief. say. The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced confession. the court is ousted of its jurisdiction. the State must honor its obligation and disallow the use of the testimony in the criminal prosecution. as already noted. Any testimony made. Under P. A classic case is Chavez v. III. is not admissible under the exclusionary rule. Sec. supra. Pamaran.D. and of mandamus to direct the said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely questions of law. Effect of denial of the privilege by court When the privilege against selfincrimination is violated outside of court. Pamaran. that. it hinted that were it not for the provision in the decree conmpelling attendance and testimony on pain of being held in contempt. 34 SCRA 663 (1968) F: The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled. should he fail in this. in turn. 12.Constitutional Law II Art. the accused could have invoked the right against selfincrimination. Chavez v. which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his conviction he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. "use and fruit immunity can be found in P. 138 SCRA 274 (1985).

which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will. the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. it is his right to forego testimony. Notes on the case: In this case. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. The constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and humanity. Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence." Petitioner. in spite of his objection that he had the right to remain silent and not to be a witness against himself. and he served his sentence. unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted. of facts usable against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. . he claimed the right upon being called to testify. genuine will. He was a cowed participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under contempt had he chosen to remain silent. we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself. of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest temptation to commit perjury. the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack. Because. in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. Years later. When the judge compelled the accused to take the witness stand. or impair his capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. And so he took the witness stand and was convicted by qualified theft. he did not offer himself as a witness. to remain silent. disable him from making a free and rational choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. this circumstance cannot be counted against him. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure. He appealed but the lawyer failed to file the appellant's brief and so the appeal was dismissed. The course which petitioner takes is correct. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right.Constitutional Law II Issue: Whether or not Chavez right against selfincrimination was violated Ruling: YES The right agianst self-incrimination is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court". The SC granted the petition and released him. Ultimately. and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. he was ousted of his jurisdiction and all subsequent proceedings became void. Nor could he escape testifying. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense. A court which denies the accused of his constitutional rights is ousted of its jurisdiction. His testimony is not of his own choice. as shown by this case. it is mandatory. midsentence. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him. Habeas Corpus.incrimination. The court made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial. Habeas corpus is proper to challenge a conviction where the consitutional rights of the accused were violated. The petition for habeas corpus is such that it inquires into all questions of illegal detention. and of humanity because it would be to extort a confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law abhors. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights are disregarded. occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. the accused Chavez was compelled by the judge with the threat of being held in contempt to take the witness stand. the judgment became final and executory. in reality. thus making the detention of Chavez illegal. unfettered exercise of his own free. and thus actionable by habeas corpus. So is moral coercion "tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant. xxx With all these. directly or indirectly. as accused. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void. and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. For. contending that his convictioin was void because it was rendered on the basis of evidence obtained in the violation of his right against self. the judgment of conviction and even the sentence were likewise void. If petitioner nevertheless answered the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under contempt. Therefore. on the contrary. remedy. Chavez went to the SC on habeas corpus. it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right. is an extraordinary post-conviction.

triable by military tribunals. Animas was charged had nothing to do with the performance of official duty. the accused shall be entitled to. 9. he cannot even be made to take the witness stand. A witness can be conmpelled to take the stand. Alejandro R. As explained by Justice Teehankee in his dissenting opinion in Aquino v." On February 16. the Judge Advocate General filed the corresponding charge sheet. 27. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by military courts Animas v. Olaguer v. the moment the accused agrees to take the stand. It is also clear from the records that the acts for which Sgt. There was no question about the case being prosecuted by civilian fiscals and tried by civil courts at the time." Since we are not an enemy occupied territory and even on the premise that martial continues in force. Thereafter.during the November 11 elections. xxx "The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by tenure and undiminshed salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition. he is deemed to have waived his right. and martial law is a thing of the past. prohibition and mandamus before the SC. the SC held that "Martial law creates and exception to the general rules of exclusive jurisdiction. We apply the rule in Rolando A. he can only object to the questions as they come. (G. the Minister of National Defense referred the case to the Military Tribunal's Branch of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) which in turn assigned the same to respondent Military Commission No. certiorari. No. The accused were arrested almost a year later. et al. for the only purpose of such is to incriminate him. It was only in 1974 that a "summary preliminary investigation" was conducted by a PC captain belonging to the Judge Advocate General Service. and must now thus submit himself to cross-examination. petitioner Sgt. 1984) where the lone military personnel was ordered tried together with 19 civilians accused before a civil court.Constitutional Law II The case also illustrates the difference between the ordinary witness and the accused. by a military tribunal. Military Commission supra: "Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the SC and insuch inferior courts as are established by law. Minister of National Defense. Of course. among others. Hon.R. Military Commission (1975). 1983 and March 13. 62798. HELD: In Aquino v. a trial. and renders offenses against the laws of war as well as those of a civil character. Rodolfo Animas is a military" Due process. 146 SCRA 406 (1986) F: This petition challenges the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to try twelve accused persons. December 22. " Illegal Possession of Firearms with Murder. questioning the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. The petitioners were recommended for prosecution before the Military Tribunal. 150 SCRA 144 Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the civil courts are open F: Petitioners were found guilty of subversion by the respondent military commission and sentenced to death. there is no more reason why a murder committed in 1971 should still be retained. Judicial power exists only in the courts which have the exlcusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen. . The petitioners were charged with murder in connection with the alleged killing of Yanson. 27 is without jurisdiction over the criminal case Ruling: The military court is without jurisdiction. however demands that in all criminal cases prosecutions. on September 21. They filed a petition for habeas corpus. invoking his right against selfincrimination. Issue: Whether or not Military Commission No. Substantially different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. But in the case of the accused. 1972 after martial law was proclaimed. the military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. only one of whom is in the military. 34. Apart from these differences. but he modified the crime charged from "Murder" to "Violation of Section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code" in Relation to Section 2692 of the same Code and Presidential Decree No. for the offense devoid of any national security or political complexion and committed long before the proclamation of martial law. at this time. Leopando. considering that one of them. Now that it is already late 1986. a political leader. but is a military officer. Military Commission No. 1971 long before the proclamation of martial law. hopefully never more to return. 1978. de Guzman v. The crime for which the petitioners were charged was committed on November 10. E.

this had neither been pleaded nor proved. and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. Bills of attainder-adjudication of guilt Bill of Attainder A "bill of attainder" is a law which substitutes the legislative determination of guilt for a judicial determination. as has already been done in the case of petitioners Imperial D. 157 are civilians. so as to entitle them to immediate release from detention. dismissed the contention. however. over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning. that no breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners" cases. despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger. however.Constitutional Law II the suggestion of the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it. G. The SC. willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself. Olaguer cannot and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of these charges. A bill of attainder is of two kinds: (i) bill of attainder proper (legislative imposition of the death penalty) and (ii) bill of pains and penalties (imposition of a lesser penalty). 48 SCRA 382 (1972). It seems evident. is continued until their cases are transferred to the ordinary courts having jurisdiction. 160 SCRA 702 (1988) F: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this Court on October 1. Usman and Samu Gumal. Ponce-Enrile. however. selects its members and the counsel on both sides. with. the Anti-Subversion Law (RA 1700) which declared the Communist Party of the Philippines a clear and present danger to Philippine security. and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned The fact cannot be ignored. and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is a pervasive one in military laws. The State should be given a reasonable period of time to accomplish this transfer. and the necessary informations have been filed against them therein. at . Issue: Whether or not military courts have jurisdiction over civilians Ruling: No As held in Olaguer: A military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction." of the Party and of any other similar "subversive" organization. and thus prohibited membership in such organization. Ferrer. for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. or establish that the same are baseless. and there are accusations against herein petitioners for those offenses. Through a statute. becomes or remains a member. the legislature finds individuals or groups guilty. Ferrer. and punishes any person who "knowingly. ISSUE: W/N this law is a bill of attainder. In People v. People v. Of the 217 prisoners. 1986 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. holding that although the law mentions the CPP in particular. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. Legislative Cruz v. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial. was contended to be a bill of attainder. its purpose is not to define a crime but only to lay a basis or to justify the legislative determination that membership in such organization is a crime because of the clear and present danger to national security. even during the period of martial law. VV. 48 SCRA 382 (1972) F: Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act. without the benefit of being proven so in court. which time the petitioners may apply for bail for their temporary release. The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates questions to arise as to the availability of certain defenses to the petitioners upon their prosecution before the civil courts. which outlaws the Communist Party and other "subversive associations". that crimes appear to have been committed. Justice will be better served if the detention of such of the petitioners as are not hereby ordered released or excepted. if any of these offenses had any political color. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as much interest as the State has to prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds.

Martinez. without more would suffice to secure their punishement. a valid exercise of the State of its power to determine what acts constitute a crime. Debts and civil obligations Art. the SC again upheld Batas Blg. VIII. Mere beliefs and aspirations Art. in Lozano v. The term "CPP" is used solely for definition purposes. or administrative bodies. What the law prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of a contractual obligation. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. When one is convicted of estafa and sent to prison. Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. which is a tax imposed on certain persons regardless of their property or business.payment of debt but for the deceit or abuse of confidence employed by the convict. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE A. Sec. were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder. 20. III. It is true that under this law deceit is not necessary. What it does is simply to declare the Party to an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition against membersip in the outlawed organization. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial. as the law alone. The constitutional ban against bill of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rulemaking and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 146 SCRA 323 (1986) F: BP 22 punishes any person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value. it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court. the Constitution in several other places provides periods for deciding a case: The Supreme Court has to decide cases within 24 months from the date of submission . the Constitution mandates that the judicial. What the Consitution further prohibits is imprisonment for non-payment of poll tax. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) as not unconsitutional for being violative of the rule against nonimprisonment for debt. of the case for decision which is the date of filing of the last pleading [Art. Sec. Martinez. 15 (1). willfully and by overt acts. Right to a speedy disposition of cases Art. Sec. III. however. 2) it impairs freedom of contract. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation. Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 18. In fact the Act applies not only to the CPP but to "any other organizatuiion having the same purposes and their successors". 16. 2.] III. III. The prohibition does not apply to non-payment of property taxes and taxes on privilege. It is. Lozano v.judicial or administrative body or tribunal must decide the case consistent with the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case.Constitutional Law II HELD: NO A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. quasi. it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Phils (CPP) of the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. the imprisonment is not for the non. which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds xxx" Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of BP 22 on the following grounds: 1) It offends the constitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt. To carry out this mandate. quasijudicial. knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment. What acts cannot be criminalized 1. Thus. 146 SCRA 123 (1986). and that they joined with the specific intent to further its basic objectives. After the case has been submitted for decision. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly. Indeed. so that technically the trial stage is terminated. Sec. 3) it contravenes the The right to a speedy disposition of cases complements the right to a speedy trial. H. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established.

Its unfairness consists in the fact that the person could not have known the act was criminal. the Congress hereafter provides for it. the Congress hereafter provides for it. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Recent statistics show that one third of the entire money supply of the country consists of currency in circulation. when committed. 8(a) thereof. it is allowed to retroact. III. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but as an offense against public order. Sec. III. 74 (1902)] This constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. 2. the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. 4. claiming to be a duly recognized non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the land. 2. In re Kay Villegas Kami. 19. and thus could not have avoided the crime. III. It is not the non. Excessive fines Art. Sec. Inc. 35 SCRA 428 F: This petition for declaratory was filed by Kay Villegas Kami Inc. 8. Sec. HELD: The gravamen of the offense punished in BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The amount concerned justifies the legitimate concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that its provisions shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Any death .. Sec. 5. 3. ISSUE: W/N it is an ex post facto law. 3. degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. and punishes such an act. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law which was innocent when done. 18 penalizes a violation of any provisin of RA 6132 including Sec. These demand deposits in the banks constitute the funds against which commercial papers are drawn. Ex Post Facto Law An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an act which. Aggravates a crime . (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. While it is true that Sec. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed. III. 3. and praying for the detremination of the validity of Sec. or a proclamation of amnesty. nor cruel. [Quoting Mekin v. in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled. Wolfe.payment of an obligation which the law punishes. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. was not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. What punishments cannot be imposed 1. When a law is more favorable to the accused. except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been convicted. B. Involuntary servitude Art. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only. and 6. Petitioner claims that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law. and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan prohibited amendment of the bill on 3rd reading.. 19. 2 Phil. Acts which when done were innocent Art. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any form shall exist. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. however. HELD: NO An ex post facto law is one which: 1. such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal. RA 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's right s and duties thereunder. Alters the legal rules of evidence. nor cruel. 22. when committed. 4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers. It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. degrading punishments and inhuman Art. Cruel.Constitutional Law II equal protection clause. or makes it greater than it was.

Whether the cruelty of a punishment depends on its form or whether it depends on its severity has been ambivalently answered by the SC: In People v. the accused continues to enjoy the presumption of innocence. Borja 91 SCRA 340 (1979). solitary. People v. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. that constituted "cruel and unusual" penalty under the 1935 Constitution. 248 of the RPC except insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty adn reduces it to reclusion perpetua. degrading or inhuman" punishment. Unfortunately. The range of medium and minimum penalties remain the same. threat. Borja was sentenced and he served at the national penitentiary for 20 years before the case came to the SC. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution and until such burden is sufficiently discharged . III. An accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. charging Remelito Lubreo along with crime of Homicide in connection with the killing of Mamerto Sanico. Secret detention places. The SC spoke in a different way in People v. They were found guilty of murder. it was against "cruel or unusual " penalty. etc.) and not its severity. this was a form of penalty that was neither cruel nor unusual. his defense of alibi would not prosper. psychological or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee. violence. Three appealed to the SC which found them equally liable for the killing.Constitutional Law II penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. the lower court convicted Lucrecio on the basis of its conclusion that he was positively identified by witnesses Nenita Monter and Epifanio Pangatungan as one of the assailants. so that what today is considered as acceptable may in the next generation be deemed as cruel penalty. shall be dealt with by law. Lubreo. Although the sentence was initially valid. 19 which provides that "Neither shall the death penalty be imposed. In the instant case. and not to fix the concept of what is cruel to the standards of the present civilization. the prohibition was against "cruel and unusual" penalty. in 1987. unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Sec. the testimonies of the abovementioned witnesses did not categorically stated or proved that Lucrecio took part in hacking the victim. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. or those of antiquity. People v. . due process prohibits barbaric and disproportionate penalties. And yet. 92 Phil. Judge Gorgolon of said court conducted both the preliminary investigation and preliminary examination.] In 1935. The employment of physical. Thereafter. Trial Court find them guilty of the crime charged. 200 SCRA 11 (1991) F: A complaint for homicide was filed with MTC of Del Carmen. sec. the prohibition is against "cruel. The purpose in changing the phraseology is to allow for experimentation. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Id. After all. force. III. Munoz. The penalty for murder under the RPC is reclusion temporal to death. in 1973. VV. Thus a disproportionate penalty (10 years imprisonment for theft) is not cruel or unusual because it is only a matter of severity of an acceptable form of punishment (imprisonment). incommunicado. III. section 19 does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Art. The Court said that Borja had been living in the shadow of death. dela Cruz. or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions. The fiscal conducted his own PI and on the basis thereof. ISSUE: W/N the constituional presumption of innocence in favor of Lucrecio has been overturned by the prosecution HELD: NO. intimidation. Congress provides for it. xxx (2) No torture. Sec. [Art. Assuming that judgment has been rendered and the accused has been convicted the Constitution now further prescribes certain standards as to the punishment that can be meted out. he filed an information for murder not only against remelito but also against Lucresio Lubreo." HELD: Art. The question concerns the penalty to be imposed in view of Art. he forwarded the records of the case to the Office of Provincial Fiscal. This notion is supposed to expand and grow. it had become cruel by the lapse of time. 900 (1953) the SC ruled that it was the form of punishment as fixed in antiquity (pillory desembowelment.. 19 (2). and that therefore. 170 SCRA 107 (1989) F: The accused are four of the 11 bodyguards of a mayor who killed three persons on suspicion that they were cattle rustlers. 12. Surigao del Norte.

he never elaborated as to what "abetted in hacking " means. Sec 7. incommunicado and other forms of detention and the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities Art.Constitutional Law II Though Monter categorically stated in her direct examination that she saw the accused Lucresio hacking the victim. or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. There is evidently insufficient evidence to show the actual participation of Lucresio in teh crime. in Melo v. or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. psychological. Subsequent following: prosecution is barred for the (1) Same offense (2) Attempt of the same offense (3) Frustration of the same offense (4) Offense necessarily included in the 1st offense (All the elements of the 2nd constitute some of the elements of the 1st offense) (5) Offense that necessarily includes the 1st offense (All the elements of the 1st constitute some of the elements of the 2nd offense) Exceptions to no. solitary. (3) The plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and the offended party. there is no double jeopardy if he is charged of . she however candidly informed the court Lucresio was just standing by and she could not remmenber as to who actually hacked the victim.appellant. because after the filing of the information. threat. or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. of the accused. or dismissal of the case without the express consent. From her version. in the "reenactmment". People. Identity of offenses and identity of act When an act gives rise to two or more offense which are punished by the same authority. 23 SCRA 249 (1968): (1) Court of competent jurisdiction. 4. This overrules People v. conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. or the case dismissed without his consent. Thus. the SC allowed the amnedment of the information from its original cahrge of frustrated homicide. It is worse in the case of Pangatungan. (2) The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information. Sec. of one of these offense (Crime A). solitary. (Rule 117. xxx (2) The employment of physical. (3) Arraignment and plea by the Accused. acquitted. 5: (1) The graver offense developed die to "supervening facts" arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charged. he cannot be held for the acts of his co. Secret detention places. and an individual is convicted. violence. Id. that it was the fault of the prosecution if they had an incompetent medical examination. Obsania. Secret detention places. Indefinite Imprisonments People v. acquittal. 766 (1950). supra. 12. force. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance. Sec. incommunicado. 19. He could not even specify the part of the body of Mamerto which was hit by Lucrecio. 173 SCRA 90 (1989). Elements of double jeopardy. the participation of Lucrecio is at one enveloped inserious doubt. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. People v. Dacuycuy. There being no evidence of conspiracy. The protection against double jeopardy Art. C. intimidation. 5. xxx (2) No torture. Yorac. (2) A Complaint or Information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. where the SC disallowed the amendment of the information from slight physical injuries to frustrated murder after the prosecution subjected the victim to another medical examination and found a wound. Sec. (4) Conviction. 21. III. the victim died. III. While he stated that "Lucrecio abetted in hacking as if they will come one after the other in hacking his mind (sic) and the neck". 85 Phils..

He admitted installing the electric wiring devices found by the police in order to decrease the readings of electric current. flowed from the same act. Identity of Act: People v. there is no identity of offenses. People v. The court also dismissed this case on the ground of double jeopardy. The case was however dismissed on the ground that the offense had prescribed. this is called double jeopardy by "identity of act. Once the court deprives either party. the SC declared the criminal prosecution of the 26 accused in the AquinoGalman double murder case a "mistrial" after the SC commission found that the Sandiganbayan justices and the Tanodbayan prosecutors had been summoned by the President and instructed on how to conduct the trial. Sandiganbayan. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) F: Manuel Opulencia was charged wiht violation of Ordinance No. So the fiscal filed a case for theft of electricity under the RPC. Loss of Jurisdiction: No double jeopardy If the court has no jurisdiction. held that the move by the trial court of summarily dismissing a criminal case for theft on the ground that it merely involved a question of ownership deprived the prosecution of due process by denying it the chance to introduce its evidence. From the same act (cohabiting with the married woman). even if he is charged of another offense which is punished by the other auhtority (Crime B by ordinance). Branch VI. the City Fiscal filed another case for theft against him. the SC. or the case dismissed without his consent. but the case was dismissed because the crime has prescribed." Sum: If only a law in involved. this is called double jeopardy by "identity of offenses". VV. the two offenses coming from the same authority. HELD: The contention has no merit. Thus. and so the second case could no longer be filed. And in this case. The prosecution appealed contending the offense was different. the act was punished by a law and an ordinance. Relova was prosecuted under an ordinance of Batangas City for the use of wiring to tap electricity without permission from the local authorities. of any of these offenses punished by one authority (Crime A by law). sec. For although the offenses were different. acquitted. The SC ruled there was double jeopardy already. there is double jeopardy. In Galman v. 21 states the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution. Fourteen days later. Thus. one punished by a law and the other punished by an ordinance. the accused may again be charged. because both offenses. both flowed from the same act. Identity of Offenses: If a married man maintains as concubine a married woman not his wife. But is a law and an ordinance are involved. although both may be based from the same facts. there is double jeopardy when there is an identity of act. there is double jeopardy only when there is an identity of offenses. But when an act which give rise to two or more offenses is punished by two different authorities (a law and an ordinance). then it is ousted from its jurisdiction. two offenses arise. In People v. The first sentence of Art. 1 series of 1974 of Batangas City prohibiting the installation of electric wiring devices without authority from the city government. City Court of Manila. The second sentence provides an exception: that the protection against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under the national statute such as the RPC provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Relova. which in this case is the State. 1. 48 SCRA 292 (1987).Constitutional Law II another offfense (Crime B) flowing from the same act. 154 SCRA 175 (1987) . Bocar. And yet he can be prosecuted for both because. 144 SCRA 43 (1986). of a fighting chance. and double jeopardy would not apply. Thus. 138 SCRA 166 (1985). or was ousted of its jurisdiction beccause it violated the right to due process of the parties. the man is guilty of both concubinage and adultery. the accused were ordered retried. Two situations contemplated People v. the decision is null and void. This ousted the court of its juridsiction. Double jeopardy arises only when he is again charged of that same offense (Crime A). III. then if an individual is convicted. Due process is a right not only of the accused but also of the State.

Rules of Court provisions Rule 117. was not arraigned as he is still at large. An amended information . or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof. do not make only one offense. Pangilinan. The motion picture may be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board. he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense. 201(3) of the RPC is malum in se. 7. Upon arraignment.-When an accused has been convicted or acquitted. On the other hand. scenes. in two separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila. In any of the foregoing cases. At 10:15 am of the same day. All these requisites do not exist in this case. the offense punished in Art 201(3) of the RPC is the public showing os indecent or immoral plays. several serious wounds on different parts of the body. at 8 am. also pending aginst him another criminal case. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. the offense defined in Sec. in relation to Sec. Motion denied. On Dec. The other accused. Suzette. for having allegedly inflicted upon Obillo. The nature of both offenses also differs. 7 of the RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included inthe offense defined in Art 201 (3) of the RPC punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motin pictures. contrary to private repondent's allegation. the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission consituting the former charge. or shows. The elements of the 2 offenses are different. (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated. 29. requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days. or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense in the former complaint of information. Later. The crime punished in RA 3060 is malum prohibitum in wh criminal intent need not ber proved because it is presumed. Former conviction of acquittal. 85 P 776 (1950) F: Conrado Melo was charged in the CFI. Melo v. or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. 201(3) of the RPC. Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. accused pleaded not guilty to the offense chargde. In other words. 11 RA 3060 and Art. where the accused satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement. Obillo died from his wounds. Sec. he again moved to quash the information in one of the Criminal case on the ground of duble jeopardy. acts. accused Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. as there was according to him. and (3) the second jeopardy must be for teh same offense. the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. 1949. The gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion pictures which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. was accused of violating Sec. with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill. and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. HELD: NO It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy. or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. Court granted the motion. Rizal with frustrated homicide . its public showing constitutes a crimnal offense. while the offense punished in Art. where the informatin allegedly contain the same allegations as the information in the first criminal case.7. 2. The 2 informations with which the accused was charged . People. double jeopardy.Constitutional Law II F: Agapito Gonzales. not just motion pictures. (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information. which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. 3 requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second. together with Roberto Pangilinan. However. or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of compentent jurisdiction.

Accused pleaded guilty on April 16. Accordingly. in a criminal case on the ground of double jeopardy. HELD: YES Well settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days for arresto menor. the rule of identity does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of teh first prosecution . However as held in the MELO case. Respondent court held that the accused having been previously tried and convicted of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the victim would place the accused in double jeopardy. 121 SCRA 637 (1983) F: This is a petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila Branch XI. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. When the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was. to be convicted for an offense that was then inesistent. the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. the accused was already in doubly jeopardy. HELD: NO Double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused. and had served sentence therefor. to be convicted for an offense that was inexistent. Thus. dismissing the information for homicide thru reckless imprudence filed against Gapay. the provincial fiscal filed an information charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock for upon further diagnosis. the offended party being Lam Hock who. City Court of Manila. People v. ISSUE: W/N a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries. 1968. during the first prosecution. according to the medical cerificate issued by Dr. if the second offense was then inexistent. Yorac. 42 SCRA 230 (1971) F: Accused Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod. for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused. ISSUE: W/N the defendant.Constitutional Law II was filed charging accused with consummated homicide. The victim Diolito de la Cruz died on the day the information was filed . when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution. there is the indispensable requirement of the existence of a new fact which supervenes for which the defendant is responsible changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. People v. . for otherwise. In order not to violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy. Branch XI. however. 1972 . The phrase "the same offense" has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information. who had already been convicted of slight physical injuries for injuries inflicted on Lam Hock . for the purpose of detremining the existence of double jeopardy. for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution. the healing period for the injuries caused to accused was found to be longer. no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution. an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in another offense. On April 18. Rogelio Zulueta. This rule of identity however does not apply. was confined since April 8 1968 up to the present time for head injury in Occidental Negros Provincial Hspital. may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person HELD: NO. but also that the two offenses are identical. Accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy. Suzette. therefore. 1972. the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. filed on October 24. Motion denied. and the accused was arraigned 2 days after or on October 20. ISSUE: W/N there is double jeopardy. Suzette. when both offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution. A motion to quash was filed by the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute a second jeopardy. where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the accused dies.

When defense of double jeopardy not available. the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other. although. RULING: YES. Galman v. who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double jeopardy. Yap v. Sandiganbayan.-. The SC dismissed. the legal shield of double jepardy.When the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion of the accused personally.Constitutional Law II In this case. Barlongay: When defense of double jeopardy available. and accordingly. Meanwhile. under certain conditions. The wound causing the delay in the healing of the injuries caused to the victim was already in existence at the time of the first examination of the doctor. Hence this appeal by the fiscal. through their acquittal. From the viewpoint of Criminal Law. Obsania had carnal knowledge of one Erlinda Dollente against the latter's will. Respondents submitted that in view of the SB decision. which represents the sovereign people in crimnal cases is denied due process. Charo. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the SC ruling. DJ cannot be invoked where the prosecution. (3) accused is discharged to be a state witness. In legal contemplation. RULING: The report of the Commission revealed that Pres. unless he pleaded double jeopardy. A dictated. it is no judgment. Marcos used the overwhelming resources of the Government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in this case. In any case. the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged. once placed in jeopardy for one. if the injuries mentioned in the second information were not established by the evidence. (2) dismissal bec.(1) Dismissal based on isufficiency of evidence. . Meanwhile. as distinguished from Constitutional or Political Law . The unwholly scenario for the acquittal of the accused after the rigged trial would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfying the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giviing them. of denial of accused's right to speedy trial. Obsania." and that the amended information did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. Said delay was caused by the very superficial and inconclusive examination then made resulting to a later finding of fracture. 23 SCRA 249 F: The information filed by the fiscal alleged that through violence and intimidation. People v. petitioner could be convicted in the first case of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in the first case. Later he was charged again in another criminal case in the same court with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The accused after pleading not guilty moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the first information was fatally defective for failing to allege "lewd desiigns. ISSUE: W/N there was double jeopardy. the lower court erred in dismissing the case by failing to distinguish between the concept of jurisdiction and insufficiency in substance of an indictment. RULING: The failure of the prosecution to allege "lewd designs" in the first information does not affect the sufficiency in substance of the information. the fiscal amended the complaint to allege therein that the offense was committed with lewd designs. April 30. coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as in this case is a void judgment. However. Suzette. The SC created the Vasquez Commisssion to look into petitioners' allegations. such dismissal is regarded as w/ express consent of the accused. there is no supervening fact which occurred to justify the non-existence of double jeopardy. It neither binds nor bars anyone.the offenses with which petitioner was charged constitute. Yap moved to quash the latter information. The criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents completely disqualified them and voided ab initio the SB verdict. The motion of the defense was sustained by the judge. or through counsel. petitioner was acquitted in the first case. for unchaste motives are deemed inherent in the very act of rape itself. 1959 F: Yap was charged with reckless driving in violation of a city ordinance. strictly different offenses. the case has become moot and academic. Later. Thus.-. double jeopardy does not attach where a criminal trial was a sham. 144 SCRA 43 F: The petitioners filed an action to nullify the proceedings on the trial of the AquinoGalman duble murder case alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. one offense may include the other. Lutero.

upon motion of the accused. When all else is lost. such dismissal is to be ragarded as with the express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped from claiming such defense on appeal by the Government or in another indictment for the same offense. the President may. The writ of habeas corpus as a postconviction remedy In Chavez v. this is so only for 3 days. when the case is dismissed. in Moncupa v. it is the last recourse to get someone out of his illegal detention. or convicted. though temporarily released. the following requisites must have been obtained to invoke the constitutional protection against it: (1) a valid complaint or information. supra. An extensive discussion was made under the Commander-in. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ. 39 P 778 (1919) Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is merely restrained. Enrile. Under the Conmstitution. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. supra. The case of herein accused falls under the general rule. The exception to this is where the dismissal is sought by the accused on the ground that they were denied their right to a speedy trial and that the government failed to prosecute.Chief clause of the President.) directed A "writ of heabeas corpus" is a writ to the person detaining another. 15. other than on the merits. 1. otherwise he shall be released. any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within 3 days. or any other restraint to liberty. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus Art. D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion. could not change his residence. and had to report to the military. and (4) the defendant was acquitted. could not be interviewed by media.. (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge. This rest of the section will be confined to habeas corpus as a remedy in all other offenses. (2) a court of competent jurisdiction. in which case double jeopardy will set in. In case of invasion or rebellion. 18.Constitutional Law II As to the question of double jeopardy. VII. when the public safety requires it. The "privilege of the writ" is the right to have the immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. Sec. In general as already noted above. Lukban. or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. and not the writ itself. 2. the SC granted habeas corpus to petitioner who. After 3 days. III. The writ will always issue as a matter of course. Thus. commanding him to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place. Court of Appeals. 141 SCRA 233 (1986). (Art. The SC ruled that as a general rule. But when the privilege of the writ is suspended. What is suspended is the privilege of the writ. suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. for a period not exceeding 60 days. The only remaining and decisive issue in this case seems to be as to whether or not the case was dismissed without the prior consent of the accused. habeas corpus was the remedy of one whose confinement was the result of a void judgnment of conviction arrived at after the judge violated . The suspension of the privilege of the writ applied only to crimes related to invasion or rebellion. and the court cannot inquire any further to find out if the detention is legal. and to show cause why he should continue to be detained. all the detaining office needs to do when he receives the writ of habeas corpus is to show to the court that the detainee is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension. could not travel outside Metro Manila. Functions of the writ Villavicencio v. the Court can now require the detaining officer to produce the body of the detainees and show cause why he should not be released.. when the public safety requires it. the privilege of the writ is an extraordinary remedy to question the illegality of the arrest or detention. Sec.

Lansang v. III. Sec. means of public opinion. and rehabilitation of. Chief of Staff.that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market. and their families. United States. 133 SCRA 800 (1984). rape. As a result. Sec. 12. The other accused. and their families.. rape. Sec. etc.Constitutional Law II due process by compelling him to take the stand and testify against himself. III. 4. for these common crimes are absorbed by rebellion. they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-. Director of Prison. Garcia. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Art. with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. 3.. did not appeal their conviction and so were sentenced accordingly. (Justice Holmes. alert and even militant press is essential for the . This state of being is patenly anathematic to a democratic framework where a free. of expression. For self government United States v. 616. Court of Appeals. The SC ruled that those who conrtinued to languish in jail could avail of habeas corpus to question the legality of their continued detention pursuant to the ruling in People v. VII. 2. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices.S. 37 SCRA 420 (1971). III. Suspension of the privilege Art. 24 SCRA 633 (1986). For the discovery of political truth When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices. or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievance. Sec. Bustos. III. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights Art. Free access to the courts Art. 250 U. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioner's freedom to express themselves in print. supra HELD: As a consequence of the search and seizure. (1919) The theory behind freedom of expression is the principle that ours is a democratic society. those who did not remained in jail. while those who appealed were now free. Id. which is possible only when everyone can speak their minds out and compete in the free market place of ideas. 42 SCRA 488 (1971) E. or other common crimes. resulting in a new ruling in People v. IV. Compensation to. some persons who were charged with the complex crime of rebellion with homicide. the premises of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" were padlocked and sealed. 3. Hernandez to the effect that there can be no complex crim of rebellion with homicide. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees Free Market Place of Ideas 1. and the truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. or of the press. 18. In Gumabon v. victims of tortures Art. Sec. however. Hernandez. Affirmative rights 1. 2. Sec. 37 P 731 (1918) Burgos v. Chavez v. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. 12. xxx A. and so the only way to rule ultimately is by. appealed their conviction. 18. supra. Abrams v. 11.

51 (1964) The interest of society and good government demands a full discussion of public affairs. so long as related to the conduct of his office) and good motive. Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished. the Philippine Supreme Court. 380 US 51 (1964) 3. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is a fit subject for proper comment.Constitutional Law II political enlightenment citizenry. 249 US 47 (1919). in the exercise of its discretion. [Schenck v. this test was supposed to apply when there is a statute. have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech. Sullivan. And just as factual error afforded no warrant for repressing speech that would otherwise be free.] While. the court cannot intrude. the prosecution cannot even prove malice-in-fact. United States (1971). When the legislature has decided that one who advocates a certain conduct is guilty of a crime. Publication of Pentagon Papers). robust and wide-open. The speech itself may not be dangerous. giving the government a heavy burden to show justification for the imposition of such restraint. when the defense proves that the communication is privileged. and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Public policy. Prior Restraints Thus any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality. If the communication is absolutely privileged (as in parliamentary freedom of Test of validity of content-based New York Times v. 268 US 652 (1925). If the communication is only qualifiedly privileged (Art. [Justice Malcom. For individual protection B. Supreme Court and. such a presumption of malice does not arise because of the greater public interest involved. uncer the Revised Penal Code. the burden is shifted on the prosecution to prove malice-in-fact.S. The most significant expression is the law on libel. 731 (1918). legal moral or social duty). (New York Times v. It is a question of proximity and degree. Bustos. and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. C. (New York v. 142. which the defense can overcome by proving the truth of the defamatory statement (which in the case of public officials may or may not constitute a crime. in and itself. In such cases. the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely. and growth of the speech). The falsity of some of the factual statements and alleged defamations do not qualify the role. Pentagon and Bantam Books v. Inciting to sedition. As it evolved. 354 enumerates the 2 instances: fair and true reporting of an official proceeding. United States v. We consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to debate on public issues being uninhibited. welfare of society. The U. is not open to consideration. 380 U. As .] The emphasis of the test is the nature of the circumstances under which it is uttered. to bring the substantive evils. New York. also in New York Times v. [Gitlow v. by haphazard imitation. COMELEC. and that it may well include vehement. Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body has determined generally. the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prohibit. 181 SCRA 529 (1990) Subsequent Punishment And even subsequent punishment is tempered by the greater interest of promoting free public opinion. Content-Based Restrictions 1.] Example: Art. restrictions Sanidad v. Sullivan.S. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. United States. the same is true of injury to official reputation. caustic. in contrast to the clear and present danger rule which applies when the speech is not prohibited by statute. any defamatory statement is presumed to be malicious (malice-in-law).

quoting Judge Learned Hand. and perhaps (3) the specific intent with which the speech is launched. Soliven v. Speaker may. They brought an action for prohibition to stop the NIB from questioning them and from filing libel suits on matters that had been the subject of inquiry by the NIB. United States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). [Brandenburg v. it is a question of balancing the freedom of expression of the producer and the right to privacy of Enrile. an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. In addition. while ordinarily. associations and even private lives. United States. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice" Read Revised Penal Code. 2. beliefs. quoted in Dennis v. 444 (1969). and is likely to incite or produce such action. Capulong and Enrile. Comelec) In Aver v. such an invitation can easily assume a different appearance as when it comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers and the designate interrogation site is a military camp. it is not idle to note that. 167 SCRA 393 (1988) F: The President of the Philippines filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners. Although one cannot be prevented from saying something before he actually says it. Makasiar. Be that as it may. Ohio. who . discounted by its improbability. HELD: The petition has become moot and academic. Involves an appoint of the competing interest. for instance." Or saying "Fire" in a crowded movie house. Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation. Beltran v. 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] The test applied when two legitimate values not involving national secuirty crimes compete. Douds. On different dates in July 1980. Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of the evil. Cruz Pano. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316 (1984) F: Petitioners are journalists and columnists. 134 SCRA 438 (1985). one of them was charged with libel by a General who sought to recover P10 million in damages. 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v.Constitutional Law II Holmes said: "Many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight. (Gonzales v. Freedom of expression and national security Babst v. Libel is the most common form of subsequent punishment.] The test emphasizes the very words uttered: (a) What words did he utter? (b) What is the likely result of such utterance? It criticizes the clear and present danger test for being top dependent on the circumstances. they were summoned by military authorities for interrogation regarding their work.] This test was meant to supplant the clear and present danger. (not in VV's revised outline) Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger test is oversimplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity. under certain circumstances. (Freund. however. when tested show no incitement but you know the speaker is inciting to sedition. (2) the availability of more moderate controls than those the State has imposed. 341 US 494 (1951). but this latter test consider the weighing of values.S. Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v. They both emphasize the circumstances of the speech. feelings. except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action. sentiments. b. Makasiar. 395 U. Applications contexts of tests in various a. COMELEC. cited in Salonga v. justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. Articles 353354 and 361-362 Freedom of expression and libel Freedom of speech versus right to reputation. [Dennis v. one can be held liable for what one has said if it causes damage to the rights of others.

an ordinary citizen without known ties to newspaper. The SC. HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and substantive law. directly to the addressee without any funfare nor publicity. 23. claiming of murders there.Constitutional Law II were the publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star. The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Sola. sugar planters of Bacolod. moved to dismiss the complaint. Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion was denied. this petition for certiorari. in order to be deemed libelous. could have by himself caused the publication. made in good faith and without comments or remarks. 12. It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. Court of Appeals. VV. quoting Quisumbing v. the mayor. it cannot be libelous. however. 172 SCRA 225 (1989) Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed outright unless made in bad faith F: Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling Action Center denouncing abuses allegedly committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's clients. 34 SCRA 116 (1970) The pictures of a former mayor was inadvertently published and mistaken for another man who was a sanitary inspector and fooled the authorities about the Babuyan Islands. v. It was sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to his clients. but with reduced damages. 1987 totle "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration": "If you recall. so they could go and he could be rescued. this appeal to the SC. An article must be sufficiently. The trial court denied the motion and petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the IAC which was dismissed. Manuel v. since the error in in this case could have been checked consideringing that this was a weekly magazine and not a daily. An erratum was published by the This Week magazine. HELD: Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class. complained that the article portrayed them as exploiters of sugar workers. so that he can bring the action separately if need be. Thus. the Bulletin Today published a news item based on petitioner's letter to ASAC. Lopez v. it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or allembracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class. Petitioner found prosecutors unsympathetic so he filed a civil action for damages against the agents. found for plaintiff. Later." Beltran did not submit a counter affidavit and instead. the charge is defective. or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him. At any rate. of the privileged character of the publication. The disputed portion which refers to plaintiff Sola never singled out Sola. Notes: Since the Newsweek artciles "Island of fear in the Visayas" did not specify any individual. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose proper disciplinary sanctions. Hence." The plaintiffs. HELD: xxx (3) As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel bec. This became the basis of an action for libel brought against petitioner and his clients. VV. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace and bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. during the August 29 coup attempt. As for the news report. based on the following statement in Beltran's column of Oct. Thus. . As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on the press freedom. the President hid under her bed while the firing was going on perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief to do so. the letter was sent privately. Lopez. the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties. Cruz-Pano. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986) F: Petitioner was sued for libel in connection with the publication in the Feb. As an index of good faith. specific or at least sweeping as to apply to all members of a group. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the article was not libelous since it did not single any particular individual. The fiscal denied his motion. the news item is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding. it is difficult to believe that the petitioner. Newsweek Inc. the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point. VV. But the agents were exonerated so petitioner filed criminal charges of robbery. 1981 issue of Newsweek of the article "An Island of Fear. He could also invke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. the report referring as it does to an official act is within the realm of privileged and is protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press. The letter constitutes privileged communication.

the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of private concern." a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. w/o it. however. and other profit motives. Gonzales. Freedom of expression. 1988 F: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing the movie "The Four Day Revolution. Bustos is a landmark decision antedating by forty years a similar decision of the US Supreme Court to the effect that a libel prosecution must survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. persons portraying some of MOISES PADILLA's kin.000.. while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present the true-tolife story of Moises Padilla. 92 SCRA 476 (1979) F: Lagunzad filmed the Moises Padilla story based on a book written by Rodriguez. Justice Malcolm in US v. However." He filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his communication was privileged. Mercado v. It is not. Bustos was careful to point out that qualified privilege and this is one instance may be "lost by proof of malice. to a point of suppression. Fernando. he was sued. petitioner admitted that in the picture produced. Capulong April 29. Thus. Subsequently. 96 Phil 510 (1955) Newspapers should be given leeway and tolerance to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. de Gonzales." What casts doubt on the good faith of petitioner is his conduct. they should not be held to account. . v. press reporters and editors usually have to race to their deadlines. [In the agreement signed by him. Petitioner appealed to the SC contending that he was forced to enter into the agreement only to avoid financial loss caused by delay in the showing of the movie and the relatives of Padilla did not have a property right in the life of M." in consideration of P20. he had "exploited the life story of Moises Padilla for pecuniary gain. HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures . xxx Nelly Amane who was a half-sister of Padilla objected to the movie on the ground that it contained a portrayal of Padilla's private and family life. Maria Soto vda. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to fictional or novelized representation of a person.Constitutional Law II Quisumbing v. w/c was affirmed by the CA. But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. and (had) encroached upon the privacy of Moises Padilla's immediate family. Petitioner paid P5. mandamus and prohibition in the SC. for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words. In the preparation of stories. c. use and develope the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the pictures. HELD: Petitioner's averment is not well taken. Virginia Mercado of the Public Service Commission "as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt practices xxx. including scenes about his mother. together w/ her sister and mother."] Ayer Productions Pty. Petitioners contended that the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. this petition for certiorari. w/o limitations. and consistently with good faith and reasonable care. and a certain "Auring" as Padilla's girl friend. but his motion was denied. The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as the bona fides of petitioner. indeed. the validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particular bec.000 but as he failed to pay the balance agreed upon. Nelly Amante. in the PICTURE's case. it would be a drab story of torture and brutality. In the particular circumstances presented and considering the obligations assumed by petitioner under the agreement. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy Lagunzad v. Being a public figure does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to privacy. He filed another motion which was also denied. occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties. vis-à-vis private respondent. This. no matter how a public figure he or she may be. The prosecution should be given a chance to prove malice. Padilla since Padilla was a public figure. and (had) in fact included. agreed to allow petitioner to "exploit. Judgement was rendered against him by the trial court. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) F: Petitioner was accused of libel on the basis of a telegram which he sent to the Secretary of Public Works requesting investigation of Mrs. HELD: US v.. this action for certiorari. Ltd. petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film bec. In the case at bar.

(2) the state's interest in preventing breaches of the peace was not implicated on the record in this case. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. 60 Phil 265 (1939) A person can be held liable for making comments on a pending case (sub judice) which have the tendency to impair or obstruct the orderly administration of justistice. Sandiganbayan. Johnson was convicted of desecration of a venerated object in violation of a Texas statute which (1) prohibited the desecration of. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. Freedom of expression and administration of justice (contempt of court) In re Ramon Tulfo. It held that although such a letter should have been sent to the SC and not the PAC.Constitutional Law II and to exhibit them. In Ayer. since (a) no disturbance of the peace actually occurred or threatened to occur because of the flag burning. and (2) was not adequately supported by the state's purported interest in preserving a symbol of unity. Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. who had previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer. d. among other things. Johnson's conviction was inconsistent with the First Amendment under the particular circumstances because (1) Johnson's conduct was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to implicate the First Amendment. Symbolic burning case Expression-The to Flag- Flag burning when done dissent is protected speech." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. Because of the preferred character of speech and of expression. Enrile. 90-4-1545-0. although Moises Padilla was also a public figure. April 17. But if the case is not pending. given that this flag burning was the culmination of a political demonstration and that the state conceded that the protester's conduct was expressive. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint. Alarcon. But in Lagunzad. ISSUE: Whether the flag desecration statute is unconstitutional HELD: YES. a state or national flag. the orderly administration of justice. although several witnesses were seriously offended by the flag burning. after all. which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials. was lifted by the SC. a public figure. Fernandez. 1990 Zaldivar v. Decision Affirmed. because the statute (1) was too broad for First Amendment purposes as it related to breaches of the peace. thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. 170 SCRA 1 (1989) Cabansag v. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed. such comment is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression. holding that the desecration statute as applied violated the defendant's right to freedom of speech under the Federal Constitution's First Amendment. e. He is. and (2) defined desecration as the physical mistreatment of such objects in a way which the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover the act. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or altered. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger. the movie dealth with both the public and private lives of Moises Padilla. 102 Phil 152 (1957) A contempt imposed by the court on the party who sent a letter to the Presidential Action Committee complaining about the delay in the disposition of the agrarian case. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth. A state court of appeals affirmed. People v. AM NO. express F: Respondent Johnson participated in a political demonstration where he burned an American flag while protesters chanted. it was nevertheless a valid exercise of speech which did not significantly destroy. (b) it cannot be presumed that an audience which takes serious offense at a particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the peace. and (c) the flag burning does not fall within the small class of "fighting words" . a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury.

2d 419. but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave. But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything. The petitioner brought an action. HELD: Motion pictures are important both as a method for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. v. it has a greater impact on the audience and produces instant reaction for the ideas it presents. taken as a whole. applying contemporary community standards. The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public morals or other public interest. and (3) the state's asserted interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity does not justify the conviction. public health or any other legitimate public interest. California. sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable law. Gonzales v. Katigbak. 37 L. the owners enjoy the rights to due process according to the standards set in Ang Tibay v. However there is not enough votes to consider the abuse of discretion grave as it explained that there were reasons for its action because of the scenes showing women erotically dancing naked and kissing caressing each other like lesbians. political or scientific value. so that censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. but only against impairments that would cause serious offenses to others and is aimed at protecting onlookers from being offended by the ideas expressed by the prohibited activity. f. lacks serious literary. and (b) although the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag. (Miller v. the test being whether. California). The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression. and thus subject to the most exacting scrutiny. Dans. For freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exception. and it is such that one is likely to listen to what is being said. public morals. and Notes: The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and to label "For Adults". Thus on this score. artistic. (2) Whether the work depicts or describes. it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of obscenity. given that the flag desecration statute is aimed not at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances. in a patently offensive way. appeals to the prurient interest. the Board can only classify.) g. (Miller v. since (a) the attempted restriction on expression is content-based. rather the presumption is against its validity. unlike newspapers which are read by people separated by walls. 137 SCRA 647. CIR. using contemporary community standards. taken as a whole. The power to impose prior restraint is not to be presumed. the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity. the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest. If closed down. claiming violation of their freedom of expression. would find that the work. Tests of obscenity: (1) Whether the average person. censorship in the movies is tolerated because by the nature of the medium.Constitutional Law II that are likely to provoke the average person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace. . 137 SCRA 356 (1985) F: Petitioner was the producer of the movie Kapit sa Patalim which the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Televisions allowed on condition that certain deletions were made and that it was shown on adults only. On the issue of obscenity. Ed. The Board committed an abuse of discretion in subjecting petitioner to difficulty and travail before the movie was classified as "For adults only" without deletion. The power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. Radio Broadcast In Eastern Broadcasting Corp. Censorship is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety. VV. Movies Censorship While prior restraint is the general rule. But radio deserves greater regulation than newspapers because it could invade the privacy of everyone for no fee. (3) Whether the work. it may not foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it and by criminally punishing a person for burning the flag as a means of political protest. the SC held that radio broadcast also enjoys the protection of the freedom of expression. In all other cases.

adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC. the law limits the right of free speech and of access to mass media of the candidates themselves.Constitutional Law II Eastern Broadcasting Corp. subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development. official acts. 207 SCRA 712 (1992)] 1. 391 US 367 (1968). III. assails Comelec Resolution No. 71 SCRA 14 (1976) Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is guaranteed. bears a clear and reasonable connection with the objective set out in the Constitution. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process because no hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. 3) The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it. BOI. Content-Neutral Restrictions O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government. and if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 177 SCRA 374 (1989) D. Garcia v. and the right to reply. shall be afforded the citizen. 2) All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. CIR should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed. for the guidance of the inferior courts and administrative bodies. Baldoza v. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. However. The limitation however. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Necessarily. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6646 constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression. 137 SCRA 647 (1985) F: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent government officials to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used to incite the people to sedition. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized." Of course. 207 SCRA 1 (1992) F: Petitioners herein were representatives of mass media which were prevented from selling and donating space or air time for political advertisements under RA 6646. time. COMELEC. 207 SCRA 712 (1992) F: Petitoner. before the Court could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that the National Telecommunications Commission had expressed its willingness to grant the requisite license. Sec. Adiong. 2347 insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and . h. and to documents and papers pertaining to. (DYRE) V. O'brien. But it is subject to reasonable conditions by the custodian of the records." as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities. or decisions. transactions. However. COMELEC. Freedom of Information Art. Regulation of political campaign National Press Club v. 7. and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. Access to official records. HELD: The case has been moot and academic. [US v. and space. Dans. a 1992 senatorial candidate. Dimaano. in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates. RULING: NO. the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and print media. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation f media of communication and information. For it is precisely in the unlimited purchase of print space and radio and television time that the resources of the financially affluent candidates are likely to make a crucial difference. Adiong v. The fundamental purposes of such power are to ensure "equal opportunity. the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v.

If they anticipate trouble. (3) size (4)manner of the use of the street. RULING: NO. and limits their location or publication to authorized posting areas. But no permit from the mayor is required in case the rally is going to be held in (i) freedom parks. There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case. If a rally does not have a permit. He should hold a hearing during which the applicant can be heard. and (c) to cooperate with local authorities in maintaining peace and order. The applicant can then go to any court other than the Supreme Court for the review of the decision of denial of the mayor. Significantly. the police must be limited to maintaining peace and order and so must stay away by 100 meters from the rallyists. they must give a second warning. The regulation strikes at the freedoom of an individual to express his preference and. 2. (b) to police their own rank.. place and street. not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided. If violence persists. The Mayor has 2 working days to act on the application. the police can disperse the crowd. only then can they fight back. etc. The restriction is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property. Under the clear and present danger rule. and he has proof of this. or in any case if the applicant is satisfied with the decision. the judgment becomes final and executory immediately. . (5) sound system to be used (6)purpose. he should not deny the application right away. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehichle. Acknowledgemet is given of its receipt. public or private. The courts have 24 hours to act on the petition. which in this case is a privately owned vehicle. then it is enough for filing purposes if a copy is posted in the premises. Penalty is imposed only on the leaders and organizers. but they cannot use violence. If the Mayor refuses to accept the application. If after hearing he is still not satisfied that no danger exists. the expression becomes a statement by the owner. by displaying it on his car. When trouble actually erupts. They must be in full uniform. order. and no appeal can be taken by the local authorities anymore. Morever. (ii) inside a private property (provide with consent of the owner). But if he thinks that the rally creates a "clear and present danger" to public peace. Freedom of Assembly Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. If he does not act. 580) A permit to hold a rally must be filed with the Office of the Mayor at least. then he can deny the application. (2) date and time. ISSUE: Whether constitutional. the freedom of expression curtailed by the prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. In consequence of this prohibition. but they are allowed protective devices. Among the duties of the rallyists are: (a) to inform the members of their duty under the law. But if the decision is not satisfactory to the applicant. the police must call the attention of the leader of the rallyists. The posting of decals amd stickers in mobile places does not endanger any substantial government or public interest. the police must not disperse the crowd right away but first give a warning. and (iii) campuses of state universities (which are left to university authorities) The application must be in writing and must include: (1) names of the organizers and leaders. During the rally. must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. with their names visibly written. They can carry no firearm except a nighstick. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. It must also have a statement of the duties of the rallyists. If the judgment is a reversal of the denial. health. then he has 48 hours from receipt to appeal to the SC. primarily his own and not of anybody else.Constitutional Law II stickers on mobile places. it is deemed granted. another cardinal right guaranteed under the Constitution is violated which is that no person shall be deprived of his property without due proocess of law. to convince others to agree with him. If still violence continues. or not the resolution is The written application is filed with the Office of the Mayor. five working days before the day of the rally.

acting in behalf of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP). in Navarro v. place. 31 SCRA 730 (1970) F: The petitioner. applied for a permit from the Mayor of Manila to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda. which means and includes the power to control. the SC. Hague v. they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and. Primicias vs Fugoso. (a) it is concered only with the time. and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. The Mayor denied the application on the ground that passions still run high due to the recent election. as the statute is construed by the state courts. . to a consideration of the time. campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties. 31 SCRA 730 (1970). Petitioner contended that the right of the people to peaceful assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances may be exercised without the prior necessity of securing a permit from the government and that such right cannot be fully enjoyed without the corresponding right to use public places for that purpose. " a statute requiring persons using public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press. communicating thought betwee citizens. and manner of the parades socially to secure public order. on a finding that everytime there was an announced rally. where. time out of time have been used for purposes of assembly. in the issuance of licenses. CIO) Although under a "permit system". the licensing authorities are strictly limited. Navarro v. loss of a few lives. RULING: NO. It found the policy of the mayor to allow rallies only during weekends to be reasonable." The Court quoted with approval the decision in the American case Cox v. to compel Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila to issue a permit for the holding of a peaceful public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the purpose of petitioning the government for redress of grievances. an association of students. subject only to reasonable regulation." (Justice Roberts. and to restrain but cannot be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit. the principle has always been that one has the right to a permit. place. Respondent Mayor denied the application to hold the rally on the date and time specified by petitioners in view of the events that transpired during the last demonstration held by them which ended in the destruction of public and private property. offices and many stores. ISSUE: W/n the Mayor can refuse to grant the permit. govern. with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing. one must first obtain prior permit from the proper authorities. Villegas. 71 F: This is an action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Primicias. The police power granted to the Mayor under the Ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board pursuant to its authority under the Revised Administrative Code which pertains to the use of streets and public places. can be construed only to mean the power to regulate. Villegas. 80 Phil. denying the Nacionalista Party a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda on the ground that passions raised by the recent national election were still high and a rally to protest election anomalies could only exacerbate the matter. place and manner of assembly ad (b) it does not vest on the licensing authority unfettered discretion in choosing the groups which could use the public place and discriminate others. As held by the SC in Primicias vs Fugoso. convenience and welfare. upheld the mayor's refusal to grant permit to a group during weekdays. stores closed and business was gravely affected because of violent incidents. and a rally to protest election anomalies might threaten breaches of the peace and disruption of public order.. Thus. 71. and discussing public questions. before one can use a public place. The Mayor suggested that the MDP utilize the Sunken Gardens near Intramuros for its rally and that the rally be held during weekends and earlier during the day so that it may end before dark. State of New Hampshire. was overturned by the court. The validity of the permit system has been upheld by the Court.. provided. the City Ordinance of Manila giving authority to the Mayor to issue permits for parades should be construed to be limited to the time. workers and peasants. and manner of the parade or procession. Petitioner challenged the action of the Mayor on the ground that the same constitutes a violation of their right to freedom of assembly. injuries to a score of other persons and the closing down of schools. 80 Phil.Constitutional Law II Notes: The freedom to use public places to peaceably assemble is best expressed thus: "Wherever the title or steets and parks may rest." But under the same ordinance.

L. He filed this petition because as of Oct. The respondent Mayor has not denied nor absolutely refused the permit sought by petitioner. which. 26. Then it gave guidelines for the issuance of permits (now in BP 9801 (i) any group which applies must do so within a sufficient time so the authority can have time to act: (ii) if a disagreement arises over a denial of a permit. and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such assemblies. 1983 starting 2 p. HELD: Free speech. petitioner has manifested. the majority upheld the mayor's denial of permit to members of the Jehovah's Witnesses sect for the use of a klosk within the town plaza in order to avoid any untoward incident with members of the Roman Catholic Church. it has no means of preventing. Ela." There can be no legal objection. whose tenets are opposed to those of the petitioners. if granted. Reyes v. There is to be no previous retraint whether in the form of libel suits. Bagatsing. 99 Phil. He has expressed willingness to grant the permit for the peaceful assembly during certain days and time. Experience in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations have shown that they pose a clear and imminent danger of public disorders. Bagatsing. and whose church is very near the klosk. Neither can there be objection to the use of the streets up to gates of the US Embassy. Charo. the SC found no basis for the denial of permit to the Anti-Bases Coalition to hold a march from Luneta to the street fronting the . Embassy. there was yet no action on his request to hold a rally. the SC upheld the power of the city authorities to close JP Laurel Street fronting Malacanang from all rallies as a form of "area restriction". may give rise to disturbance of the religious ceremonies being performed by the Catholic Church which was said to be within hearing distance from the kiosk and which might lead to any untoward incident with members of the rival denomination. The respondent mayor possesses reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the assembly in order to secure convenient use thereof by others and provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risks of disorder and maintain public safety and order. place and manner and the authorities are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse a permit. or contempt proceedings unless there is a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. like free press.L. from Luneta to the gates of the US Embassy. ISSUE: W/N the denial is valid. 346 (1956) F: The Mayor denied a permit to the members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to use the kiosk in the town plaza for the purpose of holding a public lecture on the ground that the permit. It affirmed the general rule that the use of streets is free to all. 99 Phil. In J.S.B. on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition.B. prosecution for damages. Petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on the part of respondent Mayor to grant their application for a permit unconditionally. sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on Oct. Reyes v. the applicant can question the denial in the lower court. Barangan. given the report of the NPD that adequate security measures were provided by the police. may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. in order to protect the President Ignacio v. 346 (1956). J. The Court did not rule on the validity of the ordinance of Manila prohibiting any rally within 200 meters from any foreign embassy as a means of complying with the Geneva Convention that requires the host country to protect the premises and personnel of the embassy. It found the fear entertained by city authorities that the rallyists might be agirated by provocateurs to be unfounded. The licensing of authorities are strictly limited to the consideration of the time. U. and at a place when they would not disrupt the normal activities of the community. Ela. 20. 125 SCRA 553 (1983). breaches of the peace.m. and (iii) appeal can be made to the SC on an expedited procedure. In Ignacio v.Constitutional Law II ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor`s denial to issue a permit amounted to a violation of petitioner`s right to freedom of assembly. 135 SCRA 514 (1985). A statute requiring persons to secure a special license to use public streets for a procession is not unconstitutional. In German v. which can try questions of fact and law. 125 SCRA 553 (1983) F: Retired Justice JBL Reyes. criminal acts. absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to the holding of a peaceful rally at Luneta. HELD: NO.

However. the SC upheld the right to expression of students who held a rally in a private university. 129 SCRA 359 (1984) F: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. Suspending them for one year is out of proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of views was expected. On appeal. 2. HELD: As held in Malabanan v. In case a rally is held in a private place. Sanchez (1987) 154 SCRA 541 . Jude's. The rallyists in this case purported to merely worship at St. They expressed in a vehement language their opposition to the merger and as a result. their fists clenched and chants of anti-government investives support the government's claim that the petitioners purpose was not really to worship at the chapel but to hold an anti-government demonstration close to the residence of the President. the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the exuberance of the youth should be taken into consideration. They brought an action for mandamus. were let loose. the exuberance of youth. it is allowed in the case of assembly. HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC allowed the students to enroll. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to protest the merger of two units of the university. the propensity of speakers to exaggerate. censorship is presumptively unconstitutional. based on the incident in the early 70s when the gates of the palace were almost stormed. They take into account the excitement of the occasion. met on JP Laurel Street in Manila for the ostensible purpose of hearing mass at the St. Ramento. The remedy in this case is prosecution or subsequent punishment. the measure is constitutionally acceptable. at times even vitriolic. 1982. Nestle Phils. classes and office work was disturbed. 28. Malabanan v. their suspension was condoned. There is very little possibility or justification for the regulation of news. In publication. the consent of the owner of the place must be acquired.Constitutional Law II and his family. Respect for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of suspension. extremely critical. v. Notes: Note that while the permit system is not allowed in the case of publication. with clenched fists. even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to accord full credence to their fiery exhortations. They filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. But there is a need to pass squarely on the constitutional question. They were stopped from proceeding to the chapel by the Presidential Security Command. Ramento. xxx" The refusal of the university to enroll the students is a highly disproportionate penalty. Arreza v. The need to secure the safety of heads of states cannot be overemphasized. But since they held it beyond the time granted in a place other than the one allowed by the administration. marched on the street and shouted anti-government invectives. Jude Chapel which adjoins the Malacañang grounds. with an enthusiastic audience goading them on. GAUP. 13 SCRA 94 (1985). they were found guilt of holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation. But in assembly regulation is allowed because it is needed by the very nature of the expression. The petitioners were not restrained in their freedom of religion but only in the manner by which they had attempted to translate the same into action. They wore yellow T-shirts and. 13 SCRA 94 (1985) F: Petitioners were officers and members of the Student Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation. the students continued their meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a different place from that indicated in the permit. At any rate. In Malabanan v. Inc. German v. 129 SCRA 359 (1984) and Arreza v. The excitement of the occasion. no permit from the mayor is required. 1984 the petitioners who were businessmen. students and employees. The restricted use of JP Laurel Street is justified. when people use streets. They would be ineffective if during the rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. utterances. Ramento: "If in the course of such demonstration. GAUP. They were refused enrollment for having led a rally on Sept. The threat to their lives is constant and felt throughout the world. They were suspended for one academic year. that is quite understandable. So as long as only the incidents of speech are regulated. HELD: The yellow T-shirts worn by some of the marchers. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) F: On Oct. On the scheduled date. they may deprive other groups which want to use the streets too.

HELD: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes. SSS failed to act on the union's demands. including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and govt. alleging that the officers and members of the latter staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS building preventing non-striking employees from reporting to work and SSS members from transacting business w/ SSS. are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof. to form unions. The latter held that since the employees of SSS are govt employees. Relations bet. When required to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. however. the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. like workers in the private sector. EEs to Self-Organization which took effect after the initial dispute arose. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA. III. through appropriate petitions or pleadings in keeping with the respect due the courts as impartial administrators of justice. against petitioners SSSEA. in order to pressure the Govt. their lawyer apologized and assured that the above incident would not be repeated. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. workers in the private sector and govt employees w/ regard to the right to strike? Since the terms and conditions of govt. where properly given delegated power. or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. to accede to their demands. Minister of Labor and Employment (124 SCRA 1) is relevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing bet. The statement of the court in Alliance of Govt Workers v. walkouts and other temporary work stoppages. 8. HELD: The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending before it. Moreover. Discussed elsewhere is the argument why public employees cannot engage in collective bargaining and strike. 4. w/c motion was denied. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. govt.political right. owned and controlled corporations with original charters. The SSSEA went on strike bec. the labor unions involved intensified the pickets they had been conducting in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Court and set up picket quarters. Grievances must be ventilated in the proper channels. the right to association in general is a civil.e. they are not allowed to strike. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Govt. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation. The restraining order w/c was previously issued was converted into an injunction after finding the strike illegal. rules. including those employed in the public and private sectors. "parties have a constitutional right to have the causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal. In govt employment. The Public Sector Labor-Management Council ordered the strikers to return to work but the strikers refused to do so. not through CBA's . The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. As now provided under Sec. associations. 175 SCRA 686 (1989) F: SSS filed w/ the RTC-QC a complaint for damages w/ a prayer for a writ of prel inj. The right of the people. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector Art. i. at times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises. it is the legislature and. The inclusion of the right to unionize in this article is ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic and labor right. and regulations.Constitutional Law II F: While these cases were pending in the SC. uninfluenced by publication or public clamor xxx" The acts of respondents are not only an affront to the dignity of this Court but equally a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large. Sec. the terms and conditions of employment in the Govt. workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. 3. SSS Employees Assn vs CA. the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. employment are fixed by law.

Failing on such conditions. UP invokes its exercise of academic freedom. Charo. In considering the problems of academic freedom. program because they felt that "her frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class. what may be taught. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. Academic Freedom Garcia v. sought to restrain the University from phasing out the UPCBHS. and (d) allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. 9. This status of the individual teacher is as important as the status of the institution to which he belongs and through which he disseminates learning. The collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it. the UP BOR approved the establishment of the UPCB Highshool to serve. (c) appointment and tenure of office of academic staff. that the reasons given therefor were invalid for nowhere did it appear that her conduct constituted a violation of the school's regulations and grave misconduct. UP was created under its charter to provide advanced tertiary education. What a student possesses is a privilege rather than a right. An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education. both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. the Dept of Professional Education in Baguio was never organized. The personal aspect of the freedom consists of the right of each university teacher to seek and express the truth as he personally sees it. facilities. There is no duty on the part of the School to admit her to study since the School clearly has the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space. CA. Ayson. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It is the business of a university to proviide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation. Garcia assailled her expulsion for being unreasonable. It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom.A. UP intervened. For the above reason. The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of the right to academic freedom. Private respondent invokes the right to quality education and to free secondary education. RULING: NO. The rights invoked by private respondent may be asserted only as against the Government through the DECS. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities. and who may be admitted to study." However. Faculty of Admission. 1993 F: Former PANAMIN Minister Manuel Elizalde and the Tasaday representative filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against UP Professors Jerome Bailen and Zeus Salazar who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and made a proposition in various conferences attended by them that Elizalde merely fabricated the discovery of the Tasadays. the BOR decided to phase out UPCBHS for failing to attain the conditions for its creation. It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a university prevail . how it shall be taught. 176 SCRA 647 (1989) F: In 1972." that it would be "to the best interest (of the petitioner) to work with a faculty that is more compatible with her orientation. among others. mandamus is not available for the petitioner.Constitutional Law II E. (b) curricula for courses of study. "as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers provided that UPCBHS must be self-supporting. ISSUE: Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the UP? RULING: NO. professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the students. Garcia. ISSUE: Whether or not the FAC can be compelled by mandamus to readmit petitioner. 68 SCRA 277 (1975) F: The FAC of the Loyola School of Theology refused to readmit petitioner. UP can order its abolition on academic grounds. as a corporate body. So. and the freedom of the individual university teacher. The UPCBHS Foundation Inc. Feb. the internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (a) admission and examination of students. UP v. There are standards to meet and policies to pursue. in its determine for itself who may teach. On other hand. UP v. one must distinguish between autonomy of the university. aaserting its duty to protect the respondents as faculty members for . experiment and creation.

XIV. [Art. by using its public school system to encourage the recitation of the Regent's prayer has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. 370 U. Still. [Art. creation and management of educational institutions must be in the hands of Filipinos or 60% Filipinoowned corporations. violative of the Non. the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. RULING: With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring the Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community. in resolving the complaint for damages. 4. the SC disallowed the conducting of an interdenominational prayer before the start of classes in public schools as.Constitutional Law II acts and utterances made in the exercise of academic freedom. The prayer was composed by govt officials as part of a . V. 97 (1968). the SC held that the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution cannot be prohibited from public shools by parents whose religions finds the theory offensive. denominationally neutral prayer.. FREEDOM OF RELIGION Art. concurring). The complaint was filed mainly to vindicate plaintiff's dignity and honor. 393 U. 4(2). Arkansas. religious instruction in public elementary and secondary schools during class hours. Code. 421 (1967) F: The respondent Board of Education upon the recommendation of the State Board of Regents. Its observance on the part of the students was voluntary. directed the School's District principal to cause the recitation in public schools of a brief. 421 (1967).] The clause prohibits the State from establishing a religion. Non-Establishment Clause The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with. even if nothing is done against the individual. provided the administration is in the hands of Filipinos. because the use of classrooms and electricity are costs in the State). Vitale. RULING: The Court ruled that the State of New York. Lynch v. The lower court denied UP's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. endorsement or disapproval of religion [Vicoriano v. by one approved by the authorities of the religion of the child or ward is allowed. To be sure. for there may be atheists who are not so favored. the questions to be asked are: a. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. Religious instruction in public schools Provided it is upon the written petition of the parents and it is at no cost to the State (although this is not entirely possible. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship. Sec. 59 SCRA 54 (1974).] 3. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion. Donnelly. the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. Indeed. Is its effect to promote or to avoid an excessive entaglement between the State and religious matters in religion? The Non-Establishment clause is violated when the State gives any manifest support to any one religion. 1. or is it secular? b. sectarian schools and those run by religious groups and missions board are exempted from these requirements. Greater Pittsburg ACLU. Vitale. or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.] 2. 3(3). 370 U. Operation of sectarian schools While the ownership. Engel v. 5.] Religion can even be integrated in the school curriculum. J. Does it or does it not inhibit or advance religion? c. III. without discrimination or preference.S. 492 US 574 (1989). In assessing the validity of the law. Hence this petition. it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and function is the determination of legal issues. Is the purpose of the law religious. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools In Engel v. who could be sectarian.S. A. Sec. it is beyond the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise.S. Allegheny County v. It is likewise violated if the State favors all religions. [Civ. Anti-evolution laws In Epperson v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. Sec. 359 (1). 465 US 668 (1984) (O'Connor.Establishment clause. XIV. shall forever be allowed.

Schemp.S.Establishment clause. represented by the Bishop of Nueva Segovia. teaching and observance. These exercises were prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students who are required by law to attend school and held in school buildings under the supervision and participation of teachers employed in those schools. The test in determining whether a legislative enactment violates the Establishment clause which withdraws all legislative power respecting religious belief or the expression thereof. 374 U. charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. . it likewise disallowed the reading of a passage from the bible without comment in public schools as contrary to the Non. Schemp. is the PURPOSE and the PRIMARY EFFECT of the enactment. mosques. The clauses of the 1st Amendment which prohibit laws respecting an establishment of religion and abridging the free exercise thereof. non-profit cemeteries. then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the First Amendment. Board imposed a tax on the whole land. unlike the free exercise clause. the establishment clause was violated. On the north side is an old cemetery and the base of what was once a tower. of verses from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's prayer by the students in unison. the convent and an adjacent lot used as vegetable garden. educational Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. is the owner and occupant of a parcel of land in San Nicolas. xxx (3) Charitable institutions. The constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion means at least that it is not part of the business of the government to compose official prayers for any group to recite as part of a religious program carried on by the govt. Tax exemption Art. The stablishment clause. The ruling in Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. although overlapping in certain instances. The establishment clause prohibits a state from placing official support behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies and the free exercise clause guarantees the right of every person to freely choose his own course with reference to religious training. does not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion. 203 (1963).S. In the center is the remainder of the churchyard and the church. 352 (1927) is modified to the extent now that the property must be "actually. If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion. Abington School District v. and all lands. ISSUE: Whether or not the taxation is legal. VI. 28. none of those factors being consistent with the contention that the Bible is used either as an instrument for non-religious moral inspiration or as a reference for the teaching of secular subjects. at the opening of each school day. In Abington School District v. 203 (1963) The issue was whether the establishment clause was violated by a Pennsylvania Statute or a rule of the Board of Commissioners of Baltimore adopted pursuant to statutory authority requiring the reading without comment. This is particularly so where the State's recognition of the pervading religious character of the exercise is evident from the rule's specific permission of the alternative use of the Catholic Douay version of the Bible as well as from a recent amendment permitting non-attendance at the exercises. and exclusively used for religious. 352 (1927) F: The plaintiff. the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church. forbids two diff kinds of governmental encroachment upon religious freedom. Sec. To withstand the strictures of the establishment clause. If not for purposes. 51 Phil. Ilocos Norte. directly and exclusively" used for religious purposes to be exempt. 374 U. The place of the Bible as an instrument of religion cannot be gainsaid.Constitutional Law II governmental program to further religious beliefs. free from any compulsion from the State. buildings and improvements. 51 Phil. Provincial Board. actually. RULING: YES. 5. parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto. whether or not those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals. there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. The students and parents may refuse to participate in the school exercises. churches. Provincial Board. On the south siide is a part of the church yard. The Prov. directly. religious purposes. and upon an awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religion and religious persecutions go hand in hand. It rests on the belief that a union of govt and religion tends to destroy govt and to degrade religion.

Flag Salute Ebranilag v. Except in large cities where the density of the population and the development of commerce require the use of large tracts of land for buildings. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu. The purpose in issuing the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this country. B." What was emphasized was not the event but Manila. the resulting propaganda received by the Roman Catholic Church was merely incidental and was not the aim and purpose of the government. penal institution. So long as the use of public property is only incidentalally and temporarilly for religious purposes and so long as the use is such as to be reasonably compatible with the use to which other members of the community are similarly entitled. in the case of a convent. which comes under the tax exemption. except in those cases provided in the Constitution: priests assigned in the AFP. government orphanage. The same constitutes an incidental use in religious functions. Therefore. In Ignacio v.Constitutional Law II RULING: NO. Mons. What it gave the Director of Posts was the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government. accdg to the evidence. neither is it used for commercial purposes and. they are no different from ordinary pedestrians or promenaders who use the street: that they are performing religious acts is only incidental. while it is no longer used as such. Ruiz. and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Crusade. its use is limited to the necessities of the priest. The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance to give publicity to the country and its people. Ind. ISSUE: W/N petitioner's contention is tenable. RULING: NO. Aglipay v. the SC held that the stamp printed by the government showing the map of the Philippines with a rosary to commemorate the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress to be held in Manila did not violate the NonEstablishment clause because its main purpose. As to the lot which was formerly the cemetery. It also comes within the exemption. Aglipay. 29 (2)] But in Aglipay v. The Director issued the stamps under the provisions of Act 4052 which appropriates public funds for the cost of the plates and printing of the stamps. Ruiz. Public aid to religion The payment or use of public money or property for any religious institution or clergy is not allowed. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of the stamps was done in violation of the . benefit or support of any sect or religion. The stamp contained a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila. Head of the Phil. the dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion pointed out that the mayor disapproved the application for a permit not so much because he was afraid that breach of peace would ensue but because he wrongly though the kiosk should be used for public purposes only and not for religious purposes. Church. and whatever benefit it gave the Catholic Church was only incidental. was to call the world's attention to Manila as the site of an international congress. It therefore must include not only the land actually occupied by the church but also the adjacent ground destined for the ordinary incidental uses of man. VI. 201 (1937) F: The petitioner. The exemption in the payment of the land tax mandated in the Constitution in favor of the religious entities refers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to take care of himself in order to discharge his duties. a vegetable garden belongs to a house and. Ela. When the Jehovah's Witness members use the public squares. supra. or leprosarium. [Art. It was obvious that while the stamps may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character. sought to restrain respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. 6. 64 Phil. Constitutional provision that no public money or property shall be appropriated for the use. The tests then are (1) Is the use of the public facility compatible with general use? (2) Is the resulting benefit to the religious group only incidental. Sec. then the non-establishment clause is not violated. is now being used as a lodging house by the people who participate in religious festivities. 64 Phil. 219 SCRA 256 (1993) Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the flag. Free Exercise Clause 1. Act 4052 contemplated no religious purpose in view. 201 (1937).

Order No. health or any other legitimate public interest. F: The State Board required public school pupils to salute the flag of the United States while reciting a pledge of allegiance under penalty of expulsion entailing liability of both pupil and parents to be proceeded against for unlawful absence. of other persons. is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights w/c guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines American Bible Society v. and recite the patriotice pledge. through the iron hand of the law. It requires an affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag. moral. saluting the Phil. xxx The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent. RULING: NO. the flag salute is a form of utterance. during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school. from the schools is not justified. It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by the Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. 2. Absent such a threat to public safety. 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. the school authorities have the power to discipline them. to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Phil. we are required to say that a Bill of Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his mind left it open to public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in his mind. However. both religious and patriotic. To sustain the compulsory flag salute. sing the national anthem. Board of Barnette. Compare West V. ISSUE: W/N the compulsory flag salute is valid. they do not engage in external acts or behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in exercising their love of country through the observance of the flag ceremony. Plaintiff protested against this requirement as constituting a restraint upon the exercise of religion. HELD: NO. if they should commit breaches of peace by action that offend the sensibilities. They quietly stand at attention during the ceremony to show their respect for the right of those who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings. on account of their religious beliefs.Constitutional Law II F: All the ptetitioners in these cases were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag. Appellees. It claimed that it is not engaged in business which necessitates . The City Treasurer of Manila informed the plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise without securing the necessary license and paying the requisite fee in violation of the City ordinance. 101 P 386 (1957) F: Plaintiff is engaged in the distribution and sale of bibles and religious articles. City of Manila. will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities. 319 US 624 (1943) Education v. 8 dated July 21. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. since the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 and by Dept. xxx xxx Forcing a small religious group. flag and reciting the patriotic pledge. In connection with pledges. members of the Jehovah's Witnesses. expulsion is unwarranted. National Anthem. The State asserts the power to condition access to public education. The Court applies the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. that the state has a right and duty to prevent. consider the flag as a graven image which they are forbidden to salute under their religious beliefs. xxx Although petitioners do not participate in the compulsory flag ceremony. the expulsion of the pets. ISSUE: W/N school children who are members of a religious sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both private and public). of a serious evil to public safety. Here the power of compulsion is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression. As there is no disruption. to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs. for refusing.

The freedom to travel is one of the most cherished. The union appealed. in view of the likelihood that this Court may be faced again with the same situation. III. In the first case. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Albuquerque." The CFI dismissed the petition on the ground that the ineligibility has been impliedly repealed by section 23 of the 1971 Election Code. III of the 1935 Constitution. Justice Teehankee held that section 2175 had been repealed by the Election Code. The mark up can only be treated as contributions by the faithfuls to the religious cause. it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship. Madella. The power to tax the exercise of the privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. It does not impair the obligation of contracts for not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix the obligation of the parties but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into such contracts. as may be provided by law. Salonga v. 4. ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance as applied to petitioner is unconstutional for being in restraint of petitioner's right to free exercise of religion. Seven justices held that section 2175 is no longer operative. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980) Right to travel This is not the first time petitioner Jovito Salonga came to the SC by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. The CFI ruled in his favor exempting from the closed-shop contracts members of religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any labor organization. As the union demanded his dismissal from employment pursuant to a closed shop agreement. 3. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978) F: In 1971. It has been held that in order to withstand objections based on this ground. Victoriano brought this action for injunction. Justice Fernando held that section 2175 imposed a religious test on the exercise of the right to run for public office contrary to Art. it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. HELD: The statute does not violate the rights of association. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. he resigned from the respondent labor union on the ground that the Iglesia ni Kristo of which he is a member prohibits union membership. the statute musr have a secular purpose and that purpose must not directly advance or diminish the interest of any religion. public safety. Salonga v. Fr. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Art.Constitutional Law II the securing of a license as it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles. HELD: The voting of the SC was inconclusive. Disqualification from local government office Pamil v. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security. Congress acted merely to relieve persons of the burden imposed by union security agreements. for in so doing. or public health. as well as its right to disseminate religious beliefs. A petition was filed against him on the basis of section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that "in nocase shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics. 6. Five justices held that section 2175 is constitutional. but this cannot mean that plaintiff was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. xxx . In the motion to dismiss filed by the Solicitor General. soldiers in active service. Elizalde Rope Workers Union. Neither does the law constitute an establishment of religion. 59 SCRA 54 (1974) F: Benjamin Victoriano is an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory. Those who can tax the exercise of religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. The present petition is likewise moot and academic. Exemtion from union shop Victoriano v. Nonetheless. The Ordinance CANNOT be applied to plaintiff society. VI. or contractors for public works. Bohol. it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. persons receiving salaries from provincial funds. It is true that the price asked for the religious articles was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same. In 1962. Sec. the case became moot and academic. HELD: YES.

is part of the law of the land. independent from although related to the right to travel. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. the right involved is the right to return to one's country. a totally distinct right under international law. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. against being arbitrarily deprived thereof. such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or not. and under our Constitution. it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the Intl. i. However. Essentially. Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. but it is the Court's well considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally accepted principle of international law. Respondents argue the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In that context. which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel.e. The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the provisions of the Constitution respecting one's liberty of abode and right to travel. Manglapus. RULING: The right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel.Constitutional Law II Marcos v. . 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989) F: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr.

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