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Asset Integrity Performance Management

Asset Integrity Performance Management (AIPM)- FAQ


1. Is there any difference between Asset Integrity (AI) and maintenance?

AI includes management of assets (asset definition: engineered piece of equipment) for the
entire life cycle (concept-material selection-design-operation-maintenance-de-
commissioning). Maintenance is just a part of AI, which is a much broader term. AI also
includes technical safety assurance by way of technical and quantified assessments such as
fire / explosion consequence modeling, dispersion assessment, etc.

2. What are the logical steps involved in achieving effective AIPM?

The logical steps involved in the AIPM process are given below:

a. Identify Major Accident Hazard (MAH) in a HAZID workshop;


b. Carry out a QRA (Quantified Risk Assessment) including Fire and Explosion
Assessment, as part of COMAH (Control of Major Accident Hazard) / Safety
Case report;
c. Identify Safety Critical Elements (SCE) or HSE CES (HSE Critical Equipment &
Systems) considering the critical plant systems and MAH events through a SCE-
ID (identification) Matrix;
d. Categorize the SCE/HSECES using Bow Tie and Swiss Cheese methods into
Control, Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Detection and Emergency Response;
e. Develop specific performance standards (performance criteria should be as far
as possible, quantitative and verifiable) for all SCEs/HSECESs;
f. Perform gap analysis to identify if the performance assurance tasks are aligned
with the plant CMMS (Computerized Maintenance Management System);
g. Tag all SCEs/HSECES and align them with the CMMS;
h. Re-align SCE/HSECES performance assurance tasks with CMMS;
i. Define WSE (Written Scheme of Examination) as part of Verification plan;
j. Define (measurement methods and periodicity, etc.) KPIs (leading and lagging)
(Key Performance Indicators) for all SCEs/HSECES;
k. Perform verification of SCE/HSECES/Barrier performance using UK HSE KP 3
Traffic light performance assessment system;
l. Define ‘Case to Operate’ procedure and develop SCE/HSECES Contingency
matrices (Operational decisions during SCE/HSECES failure or degraded
conditions); and
m. Review SCE/HSECES whenever major plant modifications are planned through
MOC (Management of Change) or Plant Change Control (PCP) procedure.

3. How do one decide for which SCE/HSECES you need to populate the Reliability and
Survivability tables in the SCE/HSECES performance standards?

The Reliability and Survivability performance standards will have to developed for all
mitigation/protection/emergency response HSECES/SCEs. In other words, the reliability
and survivability performance standards for all the SCEs/HSECES that are located on
the left side of the bow need not be done since the MAH (Major Accident Hazard)
depicted / occurs only at the centre of the MAH bow tie. So logically, the performance

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Asset Integrity Performance Management

standards for all SCE/HSECES located on the right side of the bow will require to be
develop in terms of reliability and survivability..

4. Development of performance standards for the SCEs/ HSECESs seems to be one of the
critical activities in the whole AIPM process. Can you please explain this in simple
terms?

Development of Performance Standards (PS) is a critical activity and the AIPM


effectiveness depends on performance standards. Although there are several PS
templates that are in use, it will essentially contain four tables –Functionality,
reliability/Availability, Survivability and Dependability. The Functionality table contains
the following details:

a. Functionality (for the sub-systems of SCE/HSECES);


b. Performance Criteria (should be quantifiable as far as possible, based on
applicable design standards, international best practices and guidelines based on
international standards such as API, NFPA, ASTM, IEC, etc.);
c. Performance Assurance task (details how the plant assures the performance
criteria by way of maintenance practices, control procedures and technical
assessments);
d. Performance Assurance References; and
e. Performance assurance Verification.

5. Bow Tie Assessment seems to be the logical starting point of AIPM process. Is it so?

Yes. Once the HAZID (Hazard Identification) workshop is carried out, the high and
medium risks (and based on SCE/HSECES definition of applicable standards/guidelines
such as UK HSE/ADNOC COP, etc.) are identified as MAH events. Once the barriers are
identified, then specific bow ties could be developed for each of the
SCEs/HSECES/barriers. Bow Tie method is universally used to demonstrate that MAH
events are controlled/mitigated using appropriate barriers/SCEs/HSECES.

6. Can there be a logical co-relation formed between Bow Tie Assessment and Swiss-
Cheese safety assessment techniques? Does this co-relation help in understanding AIPM?

Both Bow Tie and Swiss Cheese methods can be used to demonstrate that all MAHs are
controlled/mitigated using barriers/SCE/HSECES. Once the AI verification is carried out
using UK HSE traffic light system, ideally the bow ties should have all green (SCEs
performing as intended) barriers. Some major Oil & Gas operators consider ALARP (As
Low As Reasonably Practicable) condition for the asset if all SCEs/barriers are ‘Green’
and ‘Green Bow Tie’ is kept as the ultimate AIPM goal.

7. Since the SCEs/HSECES are basically hardware barriers, defining their performance
standards seem to be a complex process. Can you explain how this is done?

Yes, development of PS is a complex process and should include specific, quantifiable


criteria based on asset specific design specifications. Refer to FAQ 3 for further details.

8. Achieving AIPM does seem to require synergy between HSE, Maintenance, Technical
/Engineering services & Asset Integrity (AI) departments as an integral pre-requisite. In

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Asset Integrity Performance Management

most of the organizations, these departments operate in isolation. Is there a solution to


ensure effective AIPM?

Yes, in order to achieve effective AIPM, all these departments should work together since
all of them have a role to play in achieving AIPM. Corporate Asset Management team
should understand the requirement for this synergy and co-ordinate the AIPM activities
accordingly.

9. Logically the left side of the bow tie should be given importance/ weightage considering
their role in preventing MAHs. But practically more SCE/HSECES are available on the
right side (mitigation/emergency response) of the bow with a typical 40 (left side):60
(right side) configuration. Does this bow tie requires some re-align/balancing to achieve a
60 (left): 40 (right) configuration? If so how is this achieved?

However one tries to balance the bow tie, technically, this 40 (left): 60 (right)
configuration will ultimately prevail. While correcting gaps /verification corrections/
while defining risk-based inspections, the Control/Prevention SCEs/HSECES should be
given priority and more weightage.

10. Once the performance standards for all SCEs/HSECES are defined, the next logical step
is to monitor their performance by way of performance indicators. How is this critical
step achieved?

Please refer to FAQs 2 and 3.

11. The ‘Survivability’ table in the Performance Standard seems to be a bit confusing. Are all
emergency systems or SCEs designed to survive MAH events?

Not all SCEs are designed to survive MAH events. Please refer R 6 for details.

12. How do we co-relate functions of AI, HSE, Maintenance and Technical /Engineering
Services in achieving AIPM?

The performance assurance tasks for SCE/HSECES/barriers are achieved by all these
departments. A few performance assurance tasks and the roles of all these departments
are given below as examples.

HSE: Inspect emergency response facilities by way of safety audits/inspections.


Engineering/ Technical services: Perform necessary assessments (fire/explosion
modeling, toxic dispersion assessment, SIL (Safety Integrity Level) Assessment, RAM
(Reliability Availability and Maintainability) assessment, Emergency Systems
Survivability Assessment (ESSA), etc).
Maintenance: Test and inspect SCEs/HSECES based on maintenance schedules.
AI: Co-ordinate all SCE/HSECES performance activities, conduct performance
verification to ensure APIM.

13. How does Risk-Based Inspections play a role in the whole AIPM process?

Refer to FAQ 8.

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Asset Integrity Performance Management

14. Is there any form of assessment done by considering deterioration or failure of


HSECES/Barriers? How is this done?

Yes. Many Oil and Gas operating companies (Shell, UKOOA, Premier Oil, etc.) has
defined asset operations based on SCE/HSECES/barrier failure or degraded conditions.
Refer to point l of FAQ 2.

15. Logically, for an operating asset, the individual risk levels should be calculated based on
HSECES/barrier performance. How is this done?

The base case Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) levels are calculated in the QRA report
(part of COMAH report) by considering published barrier availability conditions based
on past failure data (ORDEA, E&P Forum, PARLOC, etc.). As part of the AI verification,
if the barrier performance is found to have failed or degraded, then the IRPA levels will
increase.

16. Ideally, who is suited as an ‘Asset Integrity Coordinator’ for an Oil & Gas asset?

An experienced senior manager who has worked in Operations, Safety, Technical


/Engineering services and Maintenance departments will be ideally suited to be the AI
co-coordinator.

17. Is there a comprehensive checklist that could be used by Asset Integrity managers to
ensure that nothing is left out to achieve effective AIPM?

Yes. OGP has developed a ‘Question Set’ (R 11) containing 34 questions that will help
AI managers to develop an effective AIPM.

References:

R1. UKOOA Asset Integrity Toolkit


R2. AIChE CCPS ‘Process Safety Leading & Lagging Metrics’
R3. UK HSE KP 3 ‘Asset Integrity Programme Report’
R4. UK HSE HSG 254 ‘Developing Process Safety Indicators- A Step by Step Guide for
Chemical & Major Hazard Industries’
R5. BP Texas ‘The report of ‘The BP U.S Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel
(http://sunnyday.mit.edu/Baker-panel-report.pdf)
R6. ‘Insights into ESSA’ article by Pillai Sreejith (www.scribd.com)
R7. ‘Offshore Safety Case Training’ power point presentation by Pillai Sreejith
(www.scribd.com)
R8. ‘Offshore Safety Performance Management’ article by Pillai Sreejith
(www.scribd.com)
R9. Shell SCE Management Manual
R10. OGP ‘Asset Integrity Question-Answer Set’ (http://www.ogp.org.uk/pubs/415-
1.pdf)
R11. OGP ‘Asset Integrity- The Key to managing major incident risks’

Compiled by:

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Asset Integrity Performance Management

Pillai Sreejith
E mail: pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com

Pillai Sreejith/ 2009