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Foreign policy, General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with

other states. The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behaviour of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Leopold von Ranke emphasized the primacy of geography and external threats in shaping foreign policy, but later writers emphasized domestic factors. Diplomacy is the tool of foreign policy, and war, alliances, and international trade may all be manifestations of it. History of American Foreign Policy American Foreign Policy II: A Brief Survey of American Foreign Policy History Gordon Neal Diem American foreign policy during the years of the Confederation and the early years of the new federal republic faces a variety of challenges. Three challenges are the most serious. First, Great Britain continues to challenge the independence of the new republic and maintains constant pressure on the new government. Second, America faces a variety of challenges to its right to freedom of the seas and to commerce. Finally, the Native American "nations" provide a constant threat to American citizens and to westward expansion. In addition to the three challenges, America faces one great opportunity, the opportunity to expand national territory into Spanish and French lands of Florida and Louisiana. The British Challenge American independence is granted unwillingly by Great Britain, so it is understandable the British have no interest in either nurturing the new republic or being too far removed from the scene if the new republic is to fail. If the American experiment in liberal democracy is to fail, the British could possibly regain control of the territory, unless other European powers get there first. Most European continental nations are also reluctant to nurture the new republic. America's experiment in liberal democracy, if successful, might encourage other European colonies, and the European motherlands, to revolt against monarchy and initiate their own experiment in liberal republicanism. The French monarch helps in the American war of revolution, but that help is intended to harm the French enemy, Great Britain, more than encourage liberalism or republicanism. American victory in its war for independence seriously undermines the French monarch and fuels republicanism in France. It also encourages the Haitians to rebel against French colonial rule in Haiti, a French Caribbean possession. American failure to repay France for loans and expenses incurred when assisting the American revolution also encourages schism between France and the United States. Indeed, the expenses incurred by the French government in the

American Revolution create a financial crisis in France, help undermine the French monarchy, and require the French monarch to call a meeting of the French Assembly in order to raise taxes to relieve the crisis. Once the Assembly is called, the French liberal republican revolution is underway; the French monarch soon falls and French republicans, successful at home, begin to export their revolution to the other nations of Europe. Beginning in 1789, the European continent falls into nearly two decades of revolution, counter-revolution, Napoleonic Empire, collapse of the Napoleonic Empire, and restoration of the pre-revolutionary regimes under the Holy Alliance. European attention is directed inward and America becomes a secondary, but still important, consideration. This "neglect" allows the American republic to consolidate itself and strengthen itself. Britain continues to occupy frontier military installations even after the Revolutionary War ends. Britain has several reasons for failure to withdraw forces. First, Britain wants to maintain forward positions from which to reclaim the colonies and prevent rival European nations, especially France and Spain, from initiating their own colonizing efforts should the confederation between the newly independent United States collapse. Indeed, there is serious political and economic instability within the confederation and serious cultural disunity that fuels British speculation the United States will not survive. Once the Articles of Confederation is replaced by the Constitution, the United States becomes more politically stable, economically solvent, and culturally united and British hopes start to dim. Second, Britain maintains a military presence in the frontier in order to not desert their Native American allies. The Indians side with the British against the American revolutionaries and now need protection from American retribution and from the flood of frontiersmen and settlers moving west, into and throughf the Appalachian Mountains. Third, Britain wants to continue to exploit the fur trade in the northwestern frontier; exploitation of natural resources is key to the British mercantilist economic system. Fourth, Britain wants to provide a constant threat of intervention to insure that British loyalists remaining in the United States after the revolution are not persecuted by the victorious revolutionaries. Large numbers of British "Loyalists" or "Tories" flee to Canada or return to British soil during the American Revolution and immediately after the final British defeat, but many still remain in the newly free United States. Finally, Britain wants to hold some American frontier territory hostage to insure the Americans pay the war reparations promised in the treaty ending the American revolutionary war. During the 1780s, American diplomats gradually negotiate the withdrawal of British forces and make some agreements with England to pay the war reparations. At the same time, France increases pressures on the United States to repay French loans and expenses incurred in support of the war. Relations between the U.S. and both nations become increasingly strained. When the French Revolution begins in 1789, the United States seeks to remain neutral in both the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary efforts that swiftly embroil France and all the nations of Europe; Congress approves legislation declaring neutrality. As the French Revolution and the warfare on the European Continent that follows revolution spreads, both Britain and France declare blockades on each other, ban shipping to either nation by neutral nations, ban international commerce in goods and raw

materials from or to each other's national territory and overseas colonies by any nation, including neutral nations, and begin seizing ships from neutral nations violating the blockades and bans. American merchants have no intention of respecting either the blockades or the bans. U.S. flagged ships become fair game for seizure by both the British and the French. Several naval engagements between American and British or French war ships are fought in both European waters and in the Western hemisphere. The most provocative British action is an order permitting seizure of neutral ships either sending food and supplies to France or trading in goods produced in French colonies, particularly the West Indies. When Britain blockades French ships in the French harbors early in the French Revolution, American merchants move quickly to take over commerce in the West Indies. Now, these American merchant ships are subject to seizure. The British Navy seizes about 300 American ships and impresses thousands of captured American sailors into service on British ships. American attempts to negotiate with Britain infuriate France. France also begins seizing American ships. Attempts to negotiate with France are fruitless. The French begin to believe they can defeat the British and want to be in a position to continue their assault on the Americans after Britain is defeated. The United States Congress becomes outraged over French minister Talleyrand's attempt to extract a "gift" from the United States in exchange for more sincere negotiations on the shipping issues. "No! No! Not a sixpence!" is the American negotiator's reply. The reply from the U. S. Congress is even more forceful: "Millions for defense but not one cent for tribute!" Before Talleyrand's bribery attempt, the U.S. Congress is divided on how to deal with British and French affronts to American neutrality and seizure of American shipping. Some want negotiations while others want war. Talleyrand's actions consolidate congressional opinion in favor of war. The question is, war with France or war with England? When United States relations with England are at their worst, France makes overtures to the U.S. When relations with France are at their worst, England makes overtures to the U.S. American neutrality becomes increasingly difficult to maintain. Deteriorating relations with one or the other European nation usually leads to further congressional actions increasing America's preparedness for war. American shippers continue to ply commerce, incurring both great profit and great risk. Surprisingly, in the midst of these undulating relations, America purchases the Louisiana Territory from France. The French need funds for their war effort and the United States is able to exploit both a temporary French weakness and a temporary period of bi-lateral good will. When Great Britain attempts to blockade the American coastline, prohibit American shipping to the Indies or anywhere on the European continent, impress increasing numbers of captured American sailors into the British Navy, and incite the American Indians in the western frontier into hostile attacks on American settlers, Congress finally declares war on Britain. The War of 1812 sees the British and their Native American and Canadian allies victorious in most early military engagements and sees the British march across much of the American national territory effectively unopposed. The British even burn the American national capital. In the long run, however, Britain is unable to wage war on both the European and the North American continents at the same time. The European war against Napoleon consumes most of England's manpower and logistical

resources. The American campaign becomes a war of attrition which the British come to believe they can not win. The Treaty of Ghent is signed in December 24, 1814, but hostile actions continue until March 1815 because poor communications make it impossible to demobilize the armies in the field. The great American victory at the Battle of New Orleans is actually fought after the Treaty of Ghent is signed and is an unnecessary loss of British life; many of the soldiers who die at New Orleans are recent survivors of the carnage in Europe battling Napoleon. With the conclusion of the War of 1812, the United States enters a period of important foreign policy successes. First, America's standing and reputation in the world community increases considerably and threats to American national security and national integrity stop. Indeed, when the United States institutes the Monroe Doctrine after the War of 1812 to discourage the European Holy Alliance from initiating efforts to reestablish control of the newly independent former Spanish colonies in Central and Latin America, the Europeans are respectfully discouraged. Second, American rights to trade and commerce are recognized. Commerce is reestablished with both England and France. American shipping continues to dominate trade in the West Indies. Third, America sends a naval and marine force to North Africa to put a final end to the tribute extraction efforts of the Barbary pirates. Finally, the United States government extracts major concessions of territory from the Native American tribes, especially those that sided with the British in the War of 1812. The Sioux and the Ohio Indians cede vast areas from the Appalachians to the Great Lakes. The Chickasaw cede areas between the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers. The Creeks cede territory in the American South. The Seminoles, the lone resisting tribe among the frontier Indians, find themselves the subject of a Florida invasion. Having withstood an invasion by one of the most powerful nations of Europe, the United States earns a position of respect in both Europe and the Western Hemisphere. United States/Canada Relations During the first half of the Nineteenth Century, United States-Canadian relations are strained on several fronts. In 1837 and again in 1840, Canada and the U.S. nearly come to war over American citizens' aid to Canadian independence rebellions. In 1839, both the American Maine and the Canadian New Brunswick militias are mobilized when Canadians began logging operations in disputed Maine territory; a truce is declared before warfare begins. In the 1840s Canada makes claim to much of Americas Oregon Territory. The American presidential campaign of 1844 features not only a debate on Texas annexation, but a debate on a "54-40 or fight!" demand that America establish a claim to all territory to the 54-40 parallel and go to war with Canada, and possibly with Great Britain, to support that claim. The issue is resolved diplomatically by the more moderate winning politicians with the U.S. agreeing to an established boundary line at the 49th. parallel. Canada eventually becomes an independent nation within the British commonwealth of nations and becomes an ally and best friend of the United States. Civil War and Reconstruction

When internal domestic political and economic differences between the northern and southern states brings on an attempt to dissolve the union and to create two separate independent American states, both the federal and the confederate governments adopt a highly isolationist, even insular, view toward foreign policy. Both fear outsiders might exploit the internal division to foreign advantage. But, both also become so preoccupied with domestic war that foreign matters are largely neglected and ignored. The Confederate government attempts to secure some recognition of its independent status from major European powers and attempts to use the cotton trade as leverage. This effort is unsuccessful for several reasons. First, President Abraham Lincoln is successful in defining the war as a "civil war," of insurrection rather than a war between two independent nations. Second, the southern states' cotton crop becomes insignificant as the war progresses and the cultivation and harvesting of cotton declines. Most cotton produced is used by the Confederate States' war effort, leaving little for export. Third, the British and the French quickly find new replacement sources for cotton cultivation in their Asian and African colonies. Great Britain is the confederacy's best hope for diplomatic recognition but the British decide to remain neutral in the conflict. The Union government is afraid the Canadians and British will exploit the Civil War and make aggressive moves against America's northern borders; some Union troops are sparsely deployed along the northern border to discourage any threat. France uses American preoccupation with civil war as an opportunity to intervene in Mexico, under the excuse that Mexico owes France a huge, unpaid financial debt. France sends troops in 1863 and places a European aristocrat on a Mexican throne. After the end of the Civil War, the U.S. demands the French withdraw; they withdraw in 1867 and the monarch is executed by Mexican patriots days later. There is some degree of anarchy in Mexico during the French occupation. Some defeated Confederate States commanders seek to use that anarchy as an opportunity to retreat, regroup and return to the U.S. soil to attempt a second war for succession. Once in Mexico, the rebels largely begin new lives instead of returning to war. Following the Civil War, the reunited and renewed United States purchases Alaska from Russia in one of the few successful foreign policy initiatives of the immediate post-war era. The purchase is ridiculed in politics and the press. In spite of presidential encouragement, the Congress refuses to purchase the Virgin Islands (1867) or annex the Dominican Republic (1870) or, ironically, recognize a Cuban revolution in 1868. For the decade after the Civil War, America focuses its interests internally to reconstruction and re-admission of the Southern states, expansion into the vast territories of the American West, and domestic economic development. The United States builds a national infrastructure and establishes personal standards of living of envy to many foreign nations. When U. S. interests again turn to international interests, the United States is able to promote its interests from a position of economic superiority and assumed moral superiority. Manifest Destiny In post-Civil War America, foreign policy issues take a back seat to domestic economic and political issues. Infastructure destroyed by war is rebuilt. New industries, created out of the necessities of war, expand in a growing domestic economy. The political

union, shattered by war, is rebuilt. The west, already partlly opened before the war, sees a flood of immigrants, escaping both the destruction left by the American Civil War and the continuing economic and political hardships in Europe. The early American colonists and the leaders of United States during its formative years envision a United States which incorporates all the territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific. For the most part, they appear satisfied pursuing continental domination and they express little interest in imperialistic expansion beyond the North American continent. The European nations, on the other hand, actively pursue the construction of around-the-world empires. The Europeans carve up Asia into colonies, occupied territories, and zones of influence. The Europeans carve up Africa into colonies. The United States soon joins them in that pursuit. Foreign policy issues, neglected as America pursues its domestic development, return to the forefront in the1890s. The U.S. becomes more aggressive in asserting its international position, establishing a navy base in Hawaii, establishing a protectorate in Samoa, defending its fishing and sealing rights against the Canadians, meddling in the domestic politics of Chile, and arbitrating a boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. In a frenzy of manifest destiny, the U.S. even makes an early abortive move to annex Hawaii. Cuba becomes the preoccupying issue of late Nineteenth Century American foreign policy. Spanish human rights violations, publicized in the American press, anger humanitarians and enflame passions for war. President Grover Cleveland refrains from intervening in Cuba even though both the U.S. House and Senate pass resolutions favoring intervention in 1896. By 1898, however, humanitarian and imperialist cries for intervention intensify to the point that war is inevitable. A widely publicized Spanish insult of new President McKinley and the suspicious sinking of the American battleship Maine, leads to a one-sided war in which the U.S. takes possession of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, the latter accomplished in the face of resistance from native Filipino guerrilla fighters. The United States now has overseas territorial "possessions." American imperialism is fanned by the popular press, including Josiah Strong's book Our Country (1885) proclaiming Western superiority, and Capt. Alfred Mahan's book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890), which leads to the construction of the "Great White Fleet." Imperialism is also fanned through widely publicized speeches by notable congressional imperialists. They believe the U.S. should expand overseas to build American prestige, spread Christianity, spread the benefits of Western civilization, and protect American strategic interests. Flushed with victory over Spain, America flexes its muscle internationally, demanding a world "open door" trade policy granting equal trading opportunities for all countries, especially in Asia (1899), constructing the Panama Canal (1904), semi-assertively opposing Japanese expansionism in Asia (1905, 1915), and sending the "Great White Fleet" around the world to strengthen the American reputation, especially in Asia (1907). The U.S. reissues the Monroe Doctrine to warn European nations to stop meddling in Latin American nations in order to collect debts owed by those Latin nations (1904). The U.S. temporarily takes control of the Dominican Republic (1905) and Haiti (1915) to prevent European takeovers and to guarantee Dominican Republic and Haitian territorial integrity while these countries struggle out of debt. The U.S. actively governs its new possessions taken from Spain, intervenes in a Nicaraguan revolution to protect American

citizens and interests (1910), intervenes diplomatically in a Mexican revolution (1913) and intervenes militarily in a number of other revolutions in a number of other Latin nations, including the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Mexico. The U.S. purchases the Virgin Islands in order to keep Germany out of the Western Hemisphere and finally annexes Hawaii as a United States Territory following the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by American missionaries and businessmen and the temporary establishment of a Hawaiian Republic. Then, the United States finds itself drawn into World War I, largely against the will of the American public. World War I At the start of the war in Europe in 1914, the American government attempts to remain neutral in thought as well as action. America attempts to maintain its commercial and trading relationships inall countries of Europe. In political campaigns, presidential aspirants promote peaceful negotiations as a solution to the European conflict rather than calling outright for entry into the war. But the American people are gradually taking sides and the politicians are gradually loosing faith in non-military solutions. There is considerable sympathy for Germany, especially among the sizable German-American population. It is possible to see Germany as a victim of Russian and French aggression and Austrian stubbornness. But, American ties to Great Britain are hard to overcome. America and Britain share culture and language, share significant commercial interests, and share three centuries of a love-hate relationship. Americans are eventually swayed to support Britain and the allies by (1) British propaganda falsely claiming German human rights violations and war atrocities and claiming secret German motives for starting the war, (2) the German violation of American freedom of the seas through German submarine activities, (3) the Britishprovoked German sinking of a British passenger liner, now known to be carrying smuggled war munitions, and (4) the Pro-British biases and British ancestrial links of several important American leaders, including President Woodrow Wilson. The eventual declaration of war in April 1917 is not unanimous; the vote is 82-6 in the Senate and 37350 in the House. The U.S. helps define the previously undefined allied objectives in the war with President Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points". The Germans surrender in November 1918, based on those 14 points. Wilson takes a very personal role in both the declaration of war bringing the United States into the war and in the peace conference following the war. This helps politicize the war domestically. Wilson's Democratic Party suffers losses in the November 1918 congressional elections and Wilson fails to get congressional approval of the final peace treaty or congressional support for a proposed League of Nations to prevent future wars. Congress terminates war with Germany by resolution in October 1920. By its entry into World War I, the United States militarily intervenes in a major European war on the European continent for the first time in U. S. history. American military power proves decisive in altering the balance of power among European states. Americans return triumphantly to the homelands of their ancestors and, hopefully, help promote liberalism and democracy on the continent. But, the adventure is not satisfying;

the U. S. soon becomes distressed and disenchanted by the squabbling among the European nations concerning war reparations and the territorial claims of the victors. The United States soon washes it hands of Europe and of European entanglements and, following the advise of the nation's first president, George Washington, returns to isolation and non-involvement in European affairs. American negotiators dabble in the various peace and disarmament initiatives of the 1920s and 1930s but largely remain distant from the European scene. American leaders become increasingly focused on domestic economic and social problems caused, first, by the boom of the 1920s and, second, by the bust of the 1930s. American intellectuals are enamoured by Italian fascism and Soviet communism and only slightly alarmed by German fascism. Japanese aggression in Asia is outside the scope of most American leader's attention. Isolationism During the 1920s and 1930s, America again becomes insular and isolationist, although American diplomats are actively at work around the world. Americans believe existential logic and diplomacy will prevent future wars. They believe America can return its attentions to domestic affairs. U.S. diplomats are active in disarmament conferences (1921, 1922), war debt commissions (1922), war reparations commissions (1923), an international quarantine of Japan for its Asian aggression, and a Peace Pact "outlawing" war (1928). But, all this activity amounts to little more than dabbling and does not have any long term significance. Much of the effort is largely symbolic and of intellectual interest rather than of any practical interest. There is even a largely ignored move to adopt a new American "peace" flag as the American national flag to show America's commitment to peace. The failure of America to be more active in the post-World War I peace process and to provide a rational voice and outsider logic to the post-war European guilt assessment, damage assessment, and reparations collection process directly contributes to the European economic and currency crisis following the war. That crisis has world-wide implications and leads to a world-wide economic depression that eventually hits the United States in 1929-1933. Rather than seeking a world-wide solution to the economic crisis and seeking international cooperation, each nation tends to turn inward, developing domestic policies to deal with the effects of the crisis, encouraging national economic development, and isolating itself from other nations with tariffs and trade restrictions. This turn inward is the course taken by the United States. The three solutions to the economic crisis are communism (U.S.S.R.), fascism (Germany, Italy, Spain) and socialism (Britain, U.S.); many developing nations use more than one solution or combine and modify several solutions to create their own unique national solution. In Germany, the development of a rearmament industry is seen as a way to stimulate industrial and labor activity. The economic crisis causes many nations to assess their strengths and weaknesses. The British, French, German, and Soviet study of geopolitics, with its emphasis on selfsufficiency, "natural" national boundaries, and "living space," coupled with national selfishness and national self-interest, and with fascist and communist ideology, lays the foundation for a second world war. Germany becomes obsessed with assuring its geopolitical health; that obsession should have been seen as a signal of the war tocome,

but most American intellectuals and diplomats were either unfamiliar with geopolitical concepts or were unwilling to see the threat building before them. In 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt attempts to establish a "good neighbor policy" toward Latin American nations and agrees to cease intervention in Latin national domestic affairs. The Neutrality Acts (1935, 1936) seek to also withdraw the U.S. from intervention in European domestic and international affairs. Meanwhile, Italy invades Ethiopia (1935) and Albania (1939). Germany invades the French Rhineland (1936), Austria (1938), Czechoslovakia (1938, 1939) and Poland (1939). Russia invades Poland (1939) and Finland (1939). The Neutrality Act of 1939 allows American citizens and business to export arms and munitions on a cash and carry basis. The United States is neutral, but at the same time, involved. American neutrality is finally broken when the U.S. transfers 50 over-age destroyers to Britain in September 1940, three months after Paris falls to the Germans. The destroyers help Britain maintain control of its territorial waters and maintain its shipping in the face of German submarine attacks. In return for the destroyers, the U.S. receives rights to use various British-controlled ports. In his state-of-the-union address, January 1941, President Roosevelt recommends a lend-lease bill to support the allies; it takes two months of heated debate to get the bill through Congress. Americans are reluctant to get into another European war. The U.S. begins convoy escorts in the Atlantic in support of "freedom of the seas" and promises aid to Russia, invaded by Germany in June 1941. But , the United States remains reluctant to become a primary belligerent in a European war, in spite of pleas from Britain. On December 7, 1941, Japan attacks Pearl Harbor in an effort to deny the U.S. the ability to intervene in the Pacific to stop on-going Japanese imperialist expansion throughout Asia, should the U.S. eventually decide to do so. The U.S. retaliates by declaring war on Japan on December 8. Germany and Italy, both Japanese allies, declare war on the U.S. on December 11 and the U.S. reciprocates. America suddenly finds itself in the middle of a world-wide war in which the armies of fascism have the upper hand. American industrial, military and manpower resources lead the successful world-wide counter-attack on fascist aggression. Communism Following the defeat of Japan and Germany, the U.S. finds itself (1) rebuilding its allies devastated by war, (2) providing humanitarian relief to the conquered Japanese, Italians and Germans, and (3) opposing a new threat-- expansionist Soviet and Chinese communism. The Soviet Union seeks to construct a geopolitical empire with a buffer zone around itself and to export communist revolution around the world. President Truman eventually draws the line on communist expansion in Berlin, Greece, Turkey, Iran and Korea. The Western and non-communist world quickly allies itself to defend against communist advancement and to rebuild its economic and military strength. Communism lowers an "iron curtain" to isolate itself from the West and proceeds with its own economic and military development. The European nations,all former colonial powers, are too weakened from World War I, the world-wide depression, and World War II to continue their colonial empires. During the 1940s, 1950, 1960s, and 1970s, former colonies are either given independence by

their former masters or the colonies wrest their independence away from their former colonial masters through force. In time, many of these new nations turn to the U.S. for economic and military assistance, adding to America's burden, or turn to the communist bloc, compelling the U.S. to attempt to outbid the Soviets for the allegiance of these developing nations. The U.S. leads the defense against communist expansion, both diplomatically and militarily throughout the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s with international anticommunist alliances, military action, and support of anti-communist regimes in Greece, Korea, the Middle East, Central America, Vietnam and scores of other hot-and cold-war battle zones. American diplomats often have difficulty distinguishing between nationalist revolutions, ethnic self-determination movements, and communist aggression and often engage in short-term foreign policy initiatives that work to the long-term detriment of American interests. The policy of "containment" of communism, begun by President Harry Truman in the late 1940s and practiced by Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy, is modified by Presidents Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter to include some effort to understand and cooperate with the communists. Some trade and cultural exchange is encouraged. But, communisms aggressive nature remains unchanged. The Soviets, Chinese, and Cubans continue support for communist revolution throughout the developing world, most recently in Afghanistan and Nicaragua. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan decides to break the back of communist expansion by bankrupting the Soviet industrial system. Military and economic foreign aid is used to outbid the Soviets and Chinese for allies; world-wide free trade breaks Soviet monopoly trade relationships, the "star wars" strategic defense initiative overtaxes the Soviet technological capability, a massive arms race overwhelms the Soviet and Chinese industrial capacity, and the exportation of Western materialism into the Soviet and Chinese bloc nations through video, mass media, cinema, and popular culture overwhelms the consumer industries in the communist economies. Communism simply can not match capitalism in material, war, and technological production. Soviet communism collapses from popular withdrawal of support by the citizens of the Soviet Union, The Union disintegrates into its constituent republics, each adopting more western-style democratic and capitalist-- or semi-capitalist-- economic systems. Around the world, communism declines in popularity and, one by one, communist or communist-leaning regimes around the world fall before a world-wide pro-democracy movement. Only mainland China and Cuba remain as isolated bastions of communism. With the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the U.S. emerges as the singular most powerful nation on the planet. In the 1990s, the nation struggles to define its role in world affairs. The U.S. appears to be reluctant to become singularly dominant in world affairs but appears to prefer a role of "first among equals" in shaping the policies for the planet. The attempt to be seen as an equal rather than as the world's singular superpower is seen in America's approach to the Gulf War confrontation with Iraq, civil war in the former Yugoslavia, and domestic and international crisis throughout Africa. In all cases, the U.S. has the power to act unilaterally, but prefers, instead, to act in concert with other nations and through resolutions of the United Nations. The U.S. takes the lead in forming the international force to oppose Iraq's aggression, but allows the Europeans to take the

lead in forming the peace-keeping team to deal with the crisis in Bosnia. In Africa, the U.S. stands aside as Europeans and Africans, most notably the Nigerians, attempt to intervene to stop civil war, genocide, or international aggression in Angola, Liberia, Saharan Africa, and West Africa. America's largely unilateral efforts in Somalia fail and reinforce the desire to act in league with other nations rather than to act alone. As the Twentyfirst Century arrives, new foreign policy issues emerge, including significant environmental concerns, state-sponsored terrorism, group-sponsored terrorism, disintegration of large states into nationalist fragments, global economic interdependence, free trade, continued famine and poverty in the underdeveloped world, and the movement of large populations in and out of states around the globe. Social issues like slavery, sexism, drug abuse, unsafe factories, reproductive control, technological piracy, cloning, untested medical advances, agricultural chemicals, invasions by pest species, and species depletion pose specific challenges for foreign policy. Only one thing appears certain. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on American soil in September 2001, and in light of the massive intelligence failures surrounding that attack, it seems unlikely the United States will ever again feel safe in a return to its isolation and insularity. With the nation constantly exposed to attack from the outside world, the nation must forever remain an active player on the world scene. Dec 2, 1823: Monroe introduces bold new foreign policy On this day in 1823, President James Monroe delivers his annual message to Congress and calls for a bold new approach to American foreign policy that eventually became known as the "Monroe Doctrine." Monroe told Congress, and the world's empires, that "the American continents are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for further colonization by any European powers." This policy was invoked and adapted by subsequent presidents to advance American economic and political interests in the Western Hemisphere. Monroe's declaration, which was drafted by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams--who would succeed Monroe as president in 1824--was aimed at preventing attempts by other nations to colonize territory on the North and South American continents that had not yet been claimed by Europeans. Although the U.S. population was at the time concentrated east of the Mississippi River, expansion into the western half of the continent was foremost in the minds of many American politicians, including Monroe and his predecessor Thomas Jefferson. Monroe and Adams were also concerned that the British, French and Russians would attempt to annex regions once held by the Spanish (such as the Southwest, Central and South America and the Northern Pacific)--places over which the U.S. itself hoped to extend control. Monroe did not actively seek to add territory to the United States, but some of his successors, including James Polk and Theodore Roosevelt, used the Monroe Doctrine to

justify the annexation of new lands into the Union. Under its auspices, President James Polk took the land (via the Mexican-American War in 1846-48) that now makes up Texas. Later, Theodore Roosevelt tailored Monroe's philosophy to establish a strong American presence in Central America, the Philippines and the Caribbean

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELTS FOREIGN POLICIES When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President his attention was diverted from the international problems England and France had with Germany because domestic problems were more immediate and important to him. Former President Hoovers call for an International Economic Conference to be held in London in 1933 was wrecked by Franklin D. Roosevelts refusal to agree to peg the value of the U.S. dollar to any other currency because he felt it would hurt his efforts to raise American farm prices. I. The Good Neighbor Policy and Pan-Americanism Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated a new direction on foreign affairs by his Good Neighbor Policy. Actually, it was not a new direction since Hoover had started a policy of cooperation with the Latin American countries. So far as the Latin American countries were concerned, their governments were pleased by his abandonment of Theodore Roosevelts interventionism. Secretary Cordell Hull agreed to the idea of cooperation when he visited the Pan American Conference in Montevido in Uruguay in 1933. This policy of nonintervention was carried out by: (a) the American withdrawal of marines from Haiti, (b) a new treaty signed with Cuba whereby the Platt Amendment was nullified, (c) the U.S. giving up the right to police the Panama government in 1939, (d) the U.S. giving up control of finances of the Dominican Republic, and only making mild protests to the Mexican government when it took over oil and (e) farmlands owned by American citizens, thereby repudiating dollar diplomacy. The students should become aware that the Good Neighbor Policy was a continuous policy and not a campaign slogan. In 1936, when F.D. Roosevelt attended the Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, he showed that the United States was willing to stop dominating weaker nations by its adherence to the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation, and that the Latin American countries would be treated as equals. Sometimes students feel that treaties are just pieces of paper signed by dignitaries, and then forgotten. A way of showing the students that this is not so all the time is to point out that the above treaty brought about concrete results: A government cultural exchange program was instituted, supplemented by local and private agencies. (b) Hollywood film makers agreed to change the image of Latins in their films. (c) Time Magazine started publishing in Spanish and Portuguese. (a)

Following Hoovers example, F.D. Roosevelt supplanted economic nationalism with economic cooperation: (a) Reciprocity treaties were made with 15 different Latin American countries. U.S. government capital gradually replaced private investments through the Export(b) Import Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department. F.D. Roosevelt increased, nearly by double, the annual payments to Panama for canal (c) rights. After war broke out in Europe in 1939, the earlier Declaration of Lima was strengthened at a conference in Panama to secure the sovereignty, political independence of the American states and set up the machinery to make the declaration effective, with Latin American countries as coequal partners. This made the Monroe Doctrine more forceful by changing it from a unilateral U.S. doctrine to a multilateral Pan-American doctrine. II. The stalemate between an internationalist President and an isolationist Congress Franklin D. Roosevelts recognition of the U.S.S.R. was a new departure from previous administrations. The Roosevelt-Litvinov pact did not bring about a great increase in trade with the U.S.S.R. though Franklin D. Roosevelt had hoped to alleviate the Depression through increased foreign trade. This pact did not work out well for the U.S. because the Russians never offered a debt settlement satisfactory to American negotiators, nor did they buy much American goods. Nor did the Russians refrain from continuing their support of subversive agents in our country. The earlier Neutrality Acts dealt with war among nations and did not deal with civil wars. The new Neutrality Act of 1937 hurt the Loyalist government in Spain. According to Robert A. Divine, this Neutrality Act of 1937 made U.S. a silent accomplice of Hitler since Germany was not hampered in sending supplies to General Francos rebel forces, while the United States was hampered in sending supplies to the Loyalist government. To the Germans, this evidence of American isolation simply reinforced the Anglo-French appeasement policies. This Act also did not help the Chinese who were fighting against the Japanese invasion. However, Roosevelt tried to arouse the American public with his Quarantine speech in Chicago in 1937. He proposed to quarantine aggressors by joining other powers in such an effort. Isolationist feelings were still too strong among the American people and he was, therefore, unsuccessful. The German persecution of German-Jews during 1934-1936 brought loud protestations by different Jewish-American organizations, including a mock trial at Madison Square Garden in March, 1934. The German ambassador protested, but Secretary of State Cordell Hull could not stop the rally. There was no enthusiasm for the idea to bring German-Jews to America because the economics of the Depression governed official mentality in 1933. With high unemployment Roosevelts government upheld Hoovers executive order not to admit to the United States persons who were likely to become public charges. Franklin D. Roosevelts government refused to give even a token amount of contributions to the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and others) coming from Germany until other countries made contributions first. The scheme of Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German Reichsbank, to use one-quarter of the German-Jewish assets to finance purchases of German machinery after the Jews settled in

the U.S., fell through. According to Arnold Offner, conceivably Germanys Jews might have been spared future destruction had this plan been implemented. Later in 1938 the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, said that the question of GermanJews was an internal German problem and was not subject to discussion at the Evian Conference. The deliberate Japanese attack upon the American gunboat Panay in China left Americans unmoved. The majority of Americans thought that the United States should get out of China completely. The Japanese were willing to pay for the damages. In 1939, Roosevelt supplied Nationalist China with some supplies because Japan had not declared war on China even though it was fighting a war. This lack of declaration of war of the part of Japan provided a loophole in the Neutrality Act so Roosevelt was able to send aid to China. This technicality in the Neutrality Act made it possible for Japan to fulfill 90% of its needs for copper and metal scrap by buying it from the United States. The cashand-carry provision that Bernard Baruch had earlier proposed for the Neutrality Act of 1937 helped Japan but not China. Japan had a great merchant fleet and the necessary cash for American resources. III. Americas gradual involvement in the global conflict Finally, the realization came to Roosevelt that the expansionist policies of Japan in Asia and Hitlers Anschluss of Austria in March 1938 required stronger armed forces for the U.S. Congress passed a naval expansion bill for the building of a two-ocean Navy in May 1938. The effect of Germanys attack on Poland in 1939 brought about a declaration by President Roosevelt to be neutral in deed if not in thought. It became evident that the Neutrality Acts favored Germany since Germany had no need to buy armaments, while Britain and France had great needs. He urged Congress to repeal the arms embargo. His appeal was finally answered by Congress with the provision that England and France supply the ships and cash for armaments. Title to all exports were to be transferred before the goods left the U.S. With such provisions in the revision of the Neutrality Act, Americans felt there was no risk of getting involved in the European war. Franklin D. Roosevelt never hinted that his proposals for the revision of the Neutrality Act would link the United States with England and France against Germany. *Even while observing the provisions of the Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt began in 1939 to prepare for eventual participation in the war on the side of the western powers. *After the Neutrality Act of 1939 was signed by President Roosevelt, he proclaimed the North Atlantic a combat zone. In the first few months of war between the Allies (England and France) and Germany (September 1939), Franklin D. Roosevelt made every possible effort to insulate the United States from the European conflict. To the French Premier Reynauds request for American aid, Roosevelt could only answer that the U.S. could not give any aid. He stated that Congress could only declare war. Soon afterwards Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a five-fold increase of the Navy. In May 1940, Churchill asked for 40 or 50 overage destroyers. By September 1940 a destroyers-for-bases agreement was made; thereby the U.S. openly declared its support of England in the war against Germany. This act marked the end of American neutrality.

In June 1940 Japan entered the fourth year of war against China. Japan sealed Chiang Kai-sheks forces by having the British close the Burma Road, and forced the French (through the Vichy government) to ban military shipments via trains through Indo-China. Only the United States stood between Japan and its dominance of all Asia. President Roosevelt ordered the Pacific fleet to have maneuvers off Hawaii and ordered the fleet to remain indefinitely nearby. He also transferred the fleets base from California to Hawaii. The National Defense Act of 1940 gave the President the right to place embargoes on any materials deemed essential to national defense. When Morgenthay and Stimson persuaded Franklin D. Roosevelt to place oil and scrap iron on the list of materials essential for national security, Sumner Welles protested. The President then limited the embargo to aviation gasoline and only the highest grade of scrap iron. This made for a major departure in American foreign policy. The embargo of materials for Japan came too late since Japan decided to carry out its plan for the New Order in Asia, i.e., conquest of Southeast Asia. A Tripartite Pact was made between Germany, Italy and Japan. Germany wanted to prevent American entry into the war, while Japan wanted to frighten the U.S. with the prospect of a possible twoocean war. The 1940 election campaign in the U.S. was on. Roosevelt made a statement, Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign war. However, the following comment was not part of his speech: Of course, well fight if were attacked. If someone attacks us, then it isnt a foreign war. In December 1940 Roosevelt asserted that England was Americas first line of defense. Since Britain needed supplies to help protect American security, the simplest solution was to lease the materials. According to Robert A. Divine, the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in March 1941 was a major turning point in American foreign policy. The U.S. was firmly committed to the goal of defeating Germany. President Roosevelt gave permission to British and American military staff members to meet during January through March 1941 in order to coordinate military strategy in the event the U.S. entered war against Germany. They determined that Germany was to be first defeated, while the U.S. would stand on the defensive toward Japan in the Pacific. The Hemisphere Neutrality Belt (300 miles out into the Atlantic), which was established in October 1939, was extended by April 1941 to the 25 Meridian, approximately the halfpoint line in the Atlantic between Europe and America. Even though the agreement was secret, this line cut into Germanys announced submarine warfare zone (March 1941). The Danish government-in-exile placed Greenland under U.S. protection and authorized the construction of air and naval bases there. Roosevelts policy was that American warships were not to shoot at German submarines, and therefore no convoy duty for American warships would be allowed. To help China, Colonel Claire L. Chennaults Flying Tigers were organized with 50 American airplanes, and de-commissioned American aviators-officers were sent to China.

From December 1940 on, additional materials were placed weekly on the embargo list for Japan, and thereby an economic sanction policy was in force, except for oil. Denying oil to Japan would have brought about dire consequences. IV. The final plunge into the war. After Russia was attacked by Germany in June 1941, President Roosevelt stated, We are going to give all the aid we possibly can to Russia. He added that the U.S. would give forty million dollars worth of goods and the use of American ships. (The 40 million dollars were Russian assets that were frozen.) Roosevelt did not intend to invoke the Neutrality Act for the Russo-German war. He did not launch any immediate program to assist Russia in spite of his earlier remarks. On July 1, 1941, the U.S. and Iceland reached an agreement to allow 4,000 marines to be sent to Iceland to forestall a German invasion. By August 1941, the U.S. gave Russia its first formal commitment of assistance. Even though the U.S. was neutral, Roosevelt met Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland on a British warship. He resisted Churchills efforts to make him declare a warning to Japan that their continued aggression in Asia would bring war with the U.S.A. The Atlantic Charter was drawn up by Churchill and Roosevelt with the following statement of principles, among them: 1. a pledge against aggression. 2. a promise of self-determination in territorial changes. 3. respect for the right of self-government and freedom of speech. 4. a creation of an effective international organization. (Roosevelt rejected it.) On July 26, 1941, the United States declared a full-scale embargo ending all trade with Japan. Great Britain and her Dominions and the Dutch authorities did the same. It was disastrous for Japan. In September 1941 the Japanese asked for a summit meeting between the Prime Minister Price Konoye and Roosevelt. Konoye hoped to get American approval of Japanese dominance in the Far East. The United States insisted that Japan give up the New Order in Asia and to withdraw troops from China and Indochina. This insistence of America ended the last chance for diplomatic accommodation between Japan and the U.S. in 1941. Konoyes government fell from power on October 16, 1941. General Hideki Tojo formed a new cabinet. He pledged to fulfill Japans destiny in Asia. The Japanese attack upon the American gunboat Greer in China brought about Roosevelts reply that American warships would escort merchant marine ships and would get orders to shoot-on-sight. By November 7, 1941, Roosevelt got the Senate to vote for arming merchant ships. According to Robert Divine, Roosevelt surrendered the decision for war to Tojo and Hitler. On November 1, 1941, Tojo decided to have one more month of negotiations with the American government. If these failed, preparations for wars with America, England, and the Netherlands were to be completed by early December.

Roosevelts position was that Japan could continue its war with China, but could not move southward toward Thailand and the 100 Meridian, for such a move would result in a war with the United States. The American breaking of the Japanese secret code made Secretary of State Cordell Hull aware that if no agreement was reached by November 29, 1941, things are automatically going to happen. American response to Japan was a 10-point reply, giving the same demands which Japan could not accept. Tojo and his cabinet met with the Emperor on December 1, 1941. Japan decided on war. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Congress passed a Declaration of War on Japan. Later, on December 11, 1941, Germany declared war on the U.S.A. So did Italy. On the same day, Congress adopted a resolution recognizing a state of war with them. A teacher could bring to the attention of the students a controversy that arose during the early part of World War II. Was the concentration of our Navy (more than 70 ships) at Pearl Harbor a deliberate act to draw the Japanese to attack it? The Americans had broken the Japanese secret code and were aware that the Japanese were preparing to go to war against the U.S.A. With all the knowledge of the Japanese diplomatic moves, could there not have been a way found to keep the U.S. out of war? The Foreign Policies of Harry S. Truman Everyones Wild About Harry was the title of an article in Newsweek (March 24, 1975), which indicated a resurgence of interest in Harry S. Truman. Why this new interest? Could it be a post-Watergate reaction? Even the rock group called Chicago cane up with a hit tune, Harry Truman, Which had these lyrics:
America needs you, Harry Truman, Harry, could you please come home? Things are lookin bad. I know you would be mad To see what kind of men Prevail upon the land you love. (Laminations Music, Big Elk Music and CBS, Inc., 1975)

It appears that Trumans current appeal is more a matter of style than of substance. What sticks in the mind is Trumans bluntness and utter lack of pretension. Its been reported that All across America, in fact, people are hailing the 33rd president as one of the last American heroes. How this image squares with the historical record is the underlying question of this curriculum unit. This unit is for the high school U. S. History course. It could cover one or two weeks of classroom work, depending upon how much detail a teacher would like to stress. The unit will look into the problem of decision-making: how foreign policy is made and who makes the decisions. From Trumans point of view, it was never a question that the president was the decisionmaker. He kept a plaque on his desk which proclaimed The buck stops here. He would listen to the recommendations of his advisers and then make his decision. Truman had to face many crises and make quick decisions. This was especially true after he took over

the presidency upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt when urgent situations in the concluding months of World War II demanded immediate action. Truman epitomized the American democratic ideal: that anybody could become president of the United States. He was an average American without a college degree. However, many of his advisers were Ivy League graduates and professional diplomats. In the early days of Trumans presidency the war in Europe was coming to an end. From the beginning Truman acted differently. While Franklin D. Roosevelt was a patrician and took time to make decisions, Truman was plain and folksy and seemed to make quick decisions, which delighted the military and civilian high-ranking officials. This unit will examine some of the problems Truman faced and will look into the role the president and his advisers had in the decision-making process.

The Decision to Drop the Atom Bomb

Some students might wonder: Why did we build the atom bomb? Why did we use the bomb? Could it have been possible to win the war without using the atom bomb? How did this all come about? The main motive of American scientists to urge the development of nuclear power for use in the war was their conviction that the German scientists were working on an atomic bomb and that the Germans would have no scruples in using it. They were proven right when Hitler started using new secret weapons in June 1944: the V1 and the V2, pilotless jet-propelled rockets that bombarded England. Hitler warned the Allies of more secret weapons being developed. This was not the first time that he boasted about secret weapons. The Allies knew of the German attempts to build the atom bomb. A factory in Norway where the heavy water was produced for the manufacture of nuclear materials was bombed. Truman also had to take into consideration what the Joint Chiefs had told him about their plans to invade Japan and end the war. They informed him that a landing attack on Kyushu Island, one of the Home Islands of Japan, would probably cost about 31,000 American lives during the first 30 days of the invasion. General George C. Marshall reported that American air and sea power had reduced Japanese shipping south of Korea and would eventually stop it altogether. We were committed to a strategy of strangulation of their war economy by bombardment and a naval and air blockade. General Marshalls belief was that the Japanese might capitulate if the situation became hopeless with: 1. the destruction wrought by the bombardment and the blockade 2. an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands 3. the entry of Russia into war against Japan The Joint Chiefs planned an invasion of Kyushu Island for November 1, 1945. For the Interim Committee on the Use of the Bomb, composed of scientists, it was a foregone conclusion that the bomb would be used. The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson claimed that this committee recommended that the bomb be used as soon as possible on a Japanese military installation or war plant surrounded by houses most susceptible to damage, and that it should be used without a prior warning.

A wartime poll, by secret ballot, on July 12, 1945, of 150 scientists at the University of Chicagos Metallurgical Laboratory showed the following results: 15% favored full military use of the atomic bomb 46% favored limited use 26% wanted an experimental demonstration before military use 13% preferred to avoid any military use. Unfortunately, the results of the poll never reached the men in power because it was buried among other documents. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, recorded that the suggestion to warn the Japanese that the United States had an atom bomb was opposed by Stimson and the Joint Chiefs because they feared that the bomb might be unsuccessful. We only had two atom bombs. If one of the bombs were used as a demonstration on an uninhabited island for the benefit of a Japanese delegation and it turned out to be a dud, it would have been a psychological setback for the United States. The Japanese would have concluded that we had no new weapon. The Japanese militarists would have prevailed over the pacifist Japanese officials to continue fighting, thus prolonging the war and raising our number of casualties. Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy, believed that we should give a warning two or three days in advance of using the atom bomb. He felt that the Japanese should be contacted for unconditional surrender. The general impression is that Truman made the decision to drop the bomb. In reality his decision was not Whether to drop the bomb but rather when to drop it. Truman never lost any sleep over his decision. He believed that the bomb ended the war, and that an invasion of Japan would have resulted in a half-million soldiers on both sides killed and a million more maimed for life. Also, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State in 1945, advocated the use of the bomb for other reasons. He felt that the completion and the testing of it prior to the Potsdam Conference and the Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris would give him leverage in negotiations with the Russians. Byrnes believed that the Russians were going to declare war on Japan in early August of 1945, and he wanted to keep Russia out of Manchuria and Northern China. This would be averted by the dropping of the bomb on Japan, forcing an immediate surrender of Japan to the United States only. In any event, Russia entered the war against Japan and seized control of Manchuria, North Korea and parts of Northern China. Stimson also advised Truman in April of 1945 to use the bomb for its impact on relations with Russia. Byrnes attitude was antiRussian and it contributed toward a state of tension in our relations with Russia, which later developed into the Cold War. It is interesting to note that the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders showed that Japan would have surrendered in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, and certainly prior to December 31, 1945, even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if no invasion had been planned, or even if Russia had not entered the war.

Trumans Decision on Korea

When teaching about the U. S. Constitution the question comes up as to who has the power to declare war. Article 1, Section 8 states that Congress has the power to declare

war. This power has been given to Congress in order to make the presidential powers weaker. In order for a president to make the right decision it is absolutely essential for him to have adequate information and advice. It is the presidents responsibility alone to give directions. Once a president makes his decision in an emergency situation, he then goes to Congress asking for a declaration of war. When North Korea attacked South Korea on June 24, 1950, the State Department officials advised Secretary of State Dean Acheson to call for a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations. Acheson telephoned Truman telling him about the news and the suggestion and Truman agreed to it. Truman had to base his decision on recommendations of the State and Defense Departments. A meeting was called at the Blair House and Truman asked each person to state whether he agreed or disagreed with the following three recommendations: 1. to evacuate Americans from the Seoul area 2. to order General MacArthur to air-drop supplies to the South Korean forces. to order the 7th Pacific fleet to move north from the Philippines to the Formosa Straits 3. at once. All present at the meeting agreed to the recommendations. Truman wanted the news about the 7th fleets movement withheld from the public until the fleet was in position. Later, Truman gave all the credit for making the decision to stop the North Korean invasion to Dean Acheson.

Avoiding World War III in Korea

Students sometimes question: Why didnt the United States have a full-scale war with China, since we were fighting the Chinese in Korea. For what reason did Truman limit the war to the Korean peninsula? Why did Truman send the 7th Pacific fleet into the Formosa Straits when the war was being fought in Korea? Truman placed constraint on all his actions in Korea because he wanted to avoid war with Communist China. It was necessary to send the 7th Pacific fleet into the Formosa Strait to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from sending his troops to the Chinese mainland and to prevent the Communist Chinese from attacking Formosa. Truman also rejected Chiang Kai-sheks offer of 30,000 Nationalist soldiers for Korean duty. Why did Truman reject this offer of help? He was convinced that it would drag the United States into a major war on the Asiatic mainland, and would draw the Soviet Union into the war to help Communist China against the U.S. Truman agreed with General Omar Bradley that expanding the Korean War would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. Truman believed that the Soviet Union trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. Dean Acheson and everyone else around Truman were convinced that the North Korean decision to move troops across the 38th parallel into South Korea had come from the Kremlin, and that Stalin was testing American resolution and nerve. How did the military commanders in the field feel about this decision? General MacArthur had different ideas. He believed that all available military power of the Chinese nation, with logistic support from the Soviet Union, was committed to a maximum effort against our forces. He felt he was operating under restrictions of not

fully utilizing U. S. naval and air potential and not being allowed to cross the Yalu River into China. He also declared that it was a mistake to prevent Chiang Kai-sheks Nationalist troops from attacking the Chinese mainland. General MacArthur voiced these views publicly, a move that generated a lot of controversy. Truman felt that if the United States followed MacArthurs ideas, it would lead to a general war. A war with China would please the Soviet Union since it would entangle us in a vast conflict and would surely weaken out influence all over the world, especially in Europe. Therefore, Truman decided to fire General MacArthur. With this action, he reasserted the powers of a civilian president over the military. Truman was the Commander-in-Chief. Truman defended his firing of General MacArthur by saying that the cause of world peace was more important than any individual. He disregarded all the attacks made upon him for this decision because he felt that he was doing what was best for America.

Carter Foreign Affairs Before assuming the presidency, Jimmy Carter had been a one-term governor of a southern state with no national or international experience. He did, however, have his own foreign policy goals. Carter believed in the rule of law in international affairs and in the principle of self-determination for all people. Moreover, he wanted the United States to take the lead in promoting universal human rights. Carter believed that American power should be exercised sparingly and that the United States should avoid military interventions as much as possible. Finally, he hoped that American relations with the Soviet Union would continue to improve and that the two nations could come to economic and arms control agreements that would relax Cold War tensions. During his campaign, Carter's aides claimed he would govern in a different way, specifically, that he would not appoint Washington insiders to top foreign policy positions. Once elected, however, Carter recognized that he needed experts around him to conduct his foreign policy. He named Columbia University professor Zbigniew Brzezinski as his national security adviser and former Defense Department official and Johnson administration diplomatic troubleshooter Cyrus Vance as secretary of state. While Brzezinski and Vance both were experienced foreign policy hands, they had different strengths and worldviews. Brzezinski, a vigoursly anti-communist Polish migr who consistently advised a tough line towards the Soviet Union, served as the administration's foreign policy "idea man." Vance, on the other hand, had strong managerial skills and was known for his cautious and patient diplomacy. Brzezinksi and Vance clashed throughout the Carter presidency over the tactics, strategies, and goals of the administration's foreign policy.

Human Rights
Carter came to the White House determined to make human rights considerations integral to U.S. foreign policy. In part, this desire stemmed from practical politics: Carter's promises during the 1976 campaign that his administration would highlight human rights proved popular with the voting public. Just as important, Carter's emphasis on human

rights was consistent with his own beliefs on the necessity of living one's life in a moral way. What did Carter mean when he claimed that he would make human rights a key part of American foreign policy? Early in his presidency, Carter explained that U.S. support for human rights involved promoting "human freedom" worldwide and protecting "the individual from the arbitrary power of the state." These principles grew out of the United Nation's 1948 "Universal Declaration of Human Rights," which established the foundation of the modern human rights movement. Carter believed in holding accountable America's allies as well as its adversaries for their human rights failings, an approach that risked straining relations with friends and widening existing rifts with foes. These were risks Carter was willing to take. The Carter administration's human rights record was mixed. The President and his advisers denounced human rights violations by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. In addition, American allies like South Korea also came under tough criticism for repressing democratic dissent. Moreover, the United States took tangible actions including the suspension of military or economic aidto protest the human rights practices of the governments of Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Uganda. On the other hand, the Carter administration toned down its human-rights based criticisms of the Soviet Union after the Brezhnev government threatened to end arms control talks. Moreover, Carter refused to halt the sale of military supplies to Iran, whose government violently repressed its opponents, even though some of his advisers urged him to do so. The legacies of Carter's human rights gambits were just as mixed as their practice. Carter, more than any previous President, injected human rights considerations into American foreign policy, legitimizing these concerns in the process. But conservative Republicans like Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who would become U.S. representative to the United Nations in the Reagan administration, skillfully and successfully attacked Carter for supposedly undercutting American allies by criticizing their human rights' shortcomings. These attacks proved harmful to Carter during the 1980 election.

The Panama Canal

One of Carter's first challenges involved the U.S. role in Panama. A 1904 treaty negotiated by President Theodore Roosevelt permitted the U.S. to use and occupy the Panama Canal Zone, a strip of land adjacent to the Panama Canal, which opened in 1914. In 1936 President Franklin Roosevelt, as part of the "good neighbor policy" had dropped the U.S. claim to have the right to protect American lives and property in Panamanian cities. In 1964, after anti-American riots by Panamanian students, the U.S. and Panama agreed to negotiate on the future status of the zone. These negotiations were based on "eight principles" agreed to by Henry Kissinger in 1974, providing for Panamanian operation of the canal by 1999, and an end to U.S. occupation of the zone, thereby establishing Panamanian sovereignty. Carter did not prove an adept negotiator. His delegation did not include any U.S. senators, and he did not keep them well informed until August 1977 when an "Agreement in Principle" was signed with Panama. Conservatives organized grassroots opposition to the treaty, which Carter tried to counter by enlisting support from former presidents and giving a "fireside chat" to the American

people. In Senate hearings Secretary of State Vance claimed that the U.S. could unilaterally defend the canal, but Panama's chief treaty negotiator, Romulo Escobar, denied that the U.S. would have any right to intervene after the treaty was ratified. Senators Robert Byrd and Howard Baker then sponsored a bipartisan "leadership amendment" defining U.S. rights to defend the canal. Eventually the agreement passed the Senate, but only after amendments granting the U.S. the right to intervene had been introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini and accepted reluctantly by Panamanian president Omar Torrijos. It was a humiliating moment for Carter and Vance, even though they had won treaty approval. Thereafter Republicans would attack Carter for being "weak" and for "giving away" the Panama Canal, a theme that would play particularly well in the southern states in the midterm elections in 1978 and the presidential elections in 1980. Carter had demonstrated great courage in concluding the negotiations: public opinion polls showed three-quarters of the American people were opposed to it.

Camp David Accords

The greatest foreign policy success of the Carter presidency involved the Middle East. After the Yom Kippur War of 1973 between Israel and its Arab enemies, Egypt and Syria, the Israelis had gradually disengaged their forces and moved a distance back in the Sinai Peninsula. They were still occupying Egyptian territory, however, and there was no peace between these adversaries. In the fall of 1978, Carter invited Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egypt's President Anwar Sadat to sit down with Carter at Camp David, a rural presidential retreat outside Washington. Between September 5 and September 17, 1978, Carter shuttled between Israeli and Egyptian delegations, hammering out the terms of peace. Consequently, Begin and Sadat reached a historic agreement: Israel would withdraw from the entire Sinai Peninsula; the U.S. would establish monitoring posts to ensure that neither side attacked the other; Israel and Egypt would recognize each other's governments and sign a peace treaty; and Israel pledged to negotiate with the Palestinians for peace. Not since Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to end the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 had a president so effectively mediated a dispute between two other nations. Begin made several concessions to Carter, including agreeing to the principle of Egyptian sovereignty over the entire Sinai, and complete Israeli withdrawal from all military facilities and settlements. In return, Carter agreed to provide Israel with funds to rebuild Israeli military bases in the Negev Desert. Because Sadat and Carter had positions that were quite close, the two men became good friends as the conference progressed. Sadat also made some concessions to Carter, which alienated some of his own delegation. His prime minister resigned at the end, believing that Sadat had been outmaneuvered by the Americans and Israelis. The Camp David Accords, initialed on September 17, 1978 and formally signed in Washington on March 26, 1979, were the most significant foreign policy achievement of the Carter administration, and supporters hoped it would revive his struggling presidency. Although Begin and Sadat received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979 for this action, Carter received no significant political benefit from this achievement.

Relations with the Soviet Union

Carter hoped to continue the policy of dtente with the Soviet Union, but his appointment to the National Security Council (NSC) post of Brzezinski gave him an adviser who was profoundly suspicious of Soviet motives, and led Carter into several major confrontations with the Russians. Carter ordered a massive five-year defense buildup that the Soviets found provocative. In turn, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to quash a Muslim-based rebellion outraged the United States. The guerrilla war that ensued put a crimp in arms control talks between Moscow and Washington. The two sides had signed SALT II, a treaty limiting the deployment of nuclear missiles, and the treaty had been sent to the Senate. After the invasion it was clear that the Senate would take no action. Carter withdrew the treaty, but Moscow and Washington agreed to abide by its terms, even though neither side ratified it. In retaliation for the USSR invading Afghanistan, Carter cut off grain sales to the Soviet Union and ordered a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games by U.S. athletes. Because much of the public considered this to be more punitive towards American swimmers and runners than Soviet leaders, Carter's response only reinforced his weak image.

Recognition of China
Carter continued to expand American contacts with communist China, granting the communist regime formal diplomatic recognition on January 1, 1979. To do so required the severing of diplomatic ties and withdrawal of recognition of non-communist Taiwan (also known as the Republic of China). Moreover, Carter unilaterally revoked the 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, effective January 1, 1980. Carter's treaty abrogation was challenged in the federal courts by conservative Republicans. In the federal district court his opponent's won. However, in an appeals court the government's position that Carter had the power to abrogate the treaty without Senate consent prevailed. The Supreme Court then threw the entire case out without rendering any decision (on a technicality involving the standing to sue of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater), thus leaving the constitutional victory with the president by default. Carter's recognition of China significantly reduced tensions in East Asia. Hard-liners in China were replaced by communists who were more interested in economic growth than in military confrontations. Beneficial trade relations were established between China and the U.S., leading to huge imports of finished consumer goods from China, in return for U.S. lumber and foodstuffs. To substitute for diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act. It provided for the creation of an American Institute on Taiwan, which bought the old American embassy. Institute staffers consisted of newly retired American foreign service officers experienced in Far Eastern Affairs. Taiwan established a corresponding institute in Washington, D.C., staffed with its retired diplomats. Thus each side continued with quasi-diplomatic relations, even though the pretense was that they had cut off the relationship. The U.S. continued to supply arms to Taiwan to defend itself from the mainland, a step that kept some friction in U.S.-Chinese relations.

The Iran Hostage Crisis

Iran had become important to the 20th century chessboard for two reasons. Oil had been discovered there in 1909, and it was considered the geographic cork that kept Russia in the Asian bottle and out of the Middle East. The British, through Anglo-Dutch Shell Oil, had reaped Iranian oil for almost nothing through mid-century, but in 1951 a volatile new prime minister, Mohammad Mossadeq, threw them out. The American government became concerned that Iran was now ripe for a Soviet takeover. The Central Intelligence Agency staged a coup that toppled the prime minister and restored power to the Pahlavi ruling dynasty, whose monarch at the time had been reduced to a figurehead under Mossadeq. This leader, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlava, ("Shah" meaning "ruler") was allowed to govern once rights to 80 percent of the oil were ceded (transferred) to American and British interests. This made the Shah a Western puppet in the eyes of many Iranians. But the Shah, emboldened by American support over the years, became increasingly tyrannical towards his people. He outlawed rival political factions and deployed one of the world's most feared secret police agencies. This resulted in countless human rights violations. By the time of the Carter presidency, discontent with the Shah was widespread in Iran, and so was civil disorder. The Shah's most virulent opposition was led by a radical Islamic group that wanted to create a government adhering more strictly to their faith's teachings. Their supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, had been in exile in Paris for fifteen years. But by early 1979 the conservative Islamic movement had become so strong that the Shah was forced to flee Iran and turn over power to a new group of Western oriented technocrats. The Ayatollah returned to his homeland soon afterward and was instantly installed by a million Iranians marching on the capital as the nation's undisputed leader. The Shah was now in exile in Mexico, dying from cancer, and President Carter allowed him to come to the United States for refuge and medical treatment. This enraged Muslim fundamentalists in Iran. In November 1979, Islamic student militants loyal to the Ayatollah overran the American embassy in Teheran, Iran's capital. They seized sixty-six Americans and held them hostage, demanding the Shah's return to stand trial. In addition they demanded money and property that the Shah had stashed outside Iran, and an apology from America, who they considered "The Great Satan." Carter took immediate action. He froze billions of dollars of Iranian assets in the United States, then began secret negotiations, but nothing worked. The manner in which television network news reported on the crisis served to build up America's frustration. Mobs burned the American flag and shouted "Marg bar Amerika" ("Death to America") on nightly television news broadcasts in Iran. These film clips were rebroadcast in the United States, creating feelings of apprehension for the hostages and anger at Iran. By counting the number of days that the hostages had been held in capacity, nightly announcements such as "America Held Hostage, Day Eighty-nine" focused on the prolonged aspect of the situation. Americans grew impatient with the seemingly ineffective president who could not win the hostages' release. The Iranians heightened this political tension by making bright promises and then going back on them almost daily.

Finally, Carter approved a secret military mission to attempt to free the hostages. Unfortunately, three of the eight helicopters carrying the assault force developed mechanical problems. One crashed into a transport aircraft in a remote desert in Iran, killing eight soldiers. After the failure, Iran dispersed the hostages to hideouts throughout the country, making rescue impossible. The failure of the rescue mission doomed Carter politically. It seemed to reinforce the widespread notion that he could not get things done, and that America had lost its edge. His approval rating dropped badly and he was up for reelection within a year, when Republicans would make a major issue of his performance in the crisis. Near the end of his administration Carter concluded an agreement that led to the release of the hostages. His executive agreement with Iran specified that the U.S. would unblock all Iranian funds, and the U.S. and Iran would utilize a tribunal at the Hague, Netherlands, to settle their financial claims. The U.S. also promised not to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. In return, Iran agreed to release the hostages. The U.S. embassy subsequently became a training camp for the Revolutionary Guards, the most militant and most anti-American wing of the groups backing the Islamic regime.

Reagan Foreign Affairs In his last debate with President Jimmy Carter in 1980, Ronald Reagan asked the American public: "Is America as respected throughout the world as it was? Do you feel that . . . we're as strong as we were four years ago?" Throughout the campaign, Reagan made clear his belief that America's international prestige and power had declined precipitously over, not just the last four years, but the entire preceding decade. Reagan particularly wanted to redefine national policy toward the Soviet Union. Along with most other national leaders, he had supported the fundamental policy of containing the Soviet Union that President Harry Truman adopted in 1947 and was subsequently followed by all Presidents of both parties. But Reagan believed that the Soviets had taken advantage of dtente, as practiced by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. As an example, Reagan contended that the SALT II nuclear treaty, negotiated by Carter but never ratified by the Senate, imposed greater limits on the United States than on the Soviet Union. At the same time, Reagan was convinced that the Soviets were weaker economically than the intelligence community believed. As early as June 18, 1980, Reagan told reporters and editors at The Washington Post, that "it would be of great benefit to the United States if we started a buildup" because the Soviets would be unable to compete and would come to the bargaining table. In the decades before his presidency, Reagan had read and thought deeply about American foreign policy and brought with him to the White House a number of strong convictions. He regarded Communism as an immoral and destructive ideology and believed that the Soviet Union was bent on world domination. In a famous speech on March 8, 1983, the one in which he referred to the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," he also called the Soviets "the focus of evil in the modern world."

At the same time, Reagan was deeply worried about the accepted national policy that had prevailed since the Soviets acquired atomic weapons of "mutual assured destruction." This assumed that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States would ever attack each other out of mutual fear that both nations would be effectively destroyed in a nuclear exchange. This, said Reagan, was "a truly mad policy." He believed that it was immoral to destroy the civilian population of another country in a retaliatory attack. He also worried that the two sides might blunder into nuclear warin fact, that almost happened on September 26, 1983, when a defective Soviet satellite system mistakenly reported a supposed U.S. missile attack. Reagan's vision, not well understood when he took office and sometimes misrepresented even today, was of a world free of nuclear weapons and the terror they posed to all mankind.

Reagan's Foreign Policy Team

Reagan believed in cabinet government and assigned a higher role to his secretary of state than to his national security adviserthis made his choice for this position especially critical. His first secretary of state was Alexander Haig, a career military and government man, who had impressed Reagan in a private meeting and also came with the endorsement of former President Nixon. Haig, who called himself the "vicar" of U.S. foreign policy, lasted only eighteen months; he had continual run-ins with the White House staff, which did not consider him a team player, and with Nancy Reagan. Reagan said in his diary that Haig did not want "the President to be involved in setting foreign policyhe regarded it as his turf." Haig was replaced by George Shultz, a Stanford economist who had an even longer background in government. When Shultz took over in June 1982, he proclaimed that he was following Reagan's agenda, not the other way around. Shultz combined bureaucratic skills with diplomatic vision and over time became the most influential member of the cabinet. He gave priority, as did his boss, to U.S.Soviet relations. Two other key appointees in the Reagan administration were Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Director of Central Intelligence William Casey. Weinberger presided over massive increases in the Pentagon's budget that were crucial to Reagan's strategy of dealing with the Soviets. He also boosted the build-up beyond the level Reagan had promised by calculating the spending increases from President Carter's last budget, which itself included significant arms increases. Weinberger retired in late 1987 after questions arose about whether he had covered up the administration's arms sales to Iran. Ironically, he had been an outspoken internal opponent of the sales. Casey, chief of staff in Reagan's 1980 campaign, was a zealous anti-Communist with an intelligence background dating back to World War II. He died of a brain tumor shortly after leaving office in 1987, at which point he was under investigation for whatever role he may have had in the IranContra affair, a mystery to this day. The biggest revolving door in the Reagan foreign policy team was at the National Security Council, where six different men served as national security adviser, beginning with Richard Allen and ending with Colin Powell. This turnover in part attests to Reagan's belief that the NSC should be subordinate to the State Department. Nonetheless, national security advisers and their staff played important roles. In the first term, national security adviser Robert (Bud) McFarlane served as midwife of the innovative Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI), a missile-defense system. In Reagan's second term, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, an NSC staff member, helped lead the administration into the murky depths of the Iran-Contra scandal.

The Reagan Military Buildup

The Reagan defense buildup was predicated on an analysis that the Soviet Union had not abided by the limitations of the SALT II treaty intended to maintain nuclear parity between the superpowers. Instead, Reagan believed, the Soviets had continued its drive to nuclear dominance. Since the Soviets had a huge edge in conventional warfare because of the immense size of the Red Army, Reagan and his team were concerned that they would press their own advantage throughout the world and put pressure on Western Europe to disarm. Reagan believed the buildup would show America's traditional allies that he meant business and stiffen the spines of European anti-Communists, an objective in which he received stalwart support from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. So the buildup had three objectives: strengthening the military in case of war, persuading European allies that the United States would not abandon them, and encouraging the Soviets to come to the bargaining table. Reagan gave military spending priority over his promise of a balanced budget, telling his advisers, "Defense is not a budget issue. You spend what you need." And spend they did. While the Carter administration and the Democratic Congress greatly increased the defense budget in the late 1970s, Reagan on Weinberger's advice in March 1981 set the price tag at $220 billionthe largest peacetime military budget in history. Moreover, Reagan's budget planners called for 7-percent increases in defense spending between 1981 and 1985, totaling nearly $1 trillion. These funds were allocated for a wide array of new weapons systems, research and development, and improvements in combat readiness and troop mobility. This surge in military spending reaped a number of benefits. First, the military upgraded and modernized its forces and equipment. Second, the money invested in military-related research and development proved a spur to certain segments of the economy, especially the high-tech sector. Finally, the increases in defense spending, coupled with promises that the American military would again be unsurpassed, boosted the confidence of the public. These outlays, however, greatly contributed to the federal government's everlarger budget deficits and national debt. The growing defense budget, in concert with Reagan's tax cuts and his reluctance to cut costly domestic entitlement programs, ended any possibility of a balanced budget during the Reagan years.

Confronting the Soviets, 1981-1983

Reagan paired these increases in military spending with more aggressive anti-Soviet rhetoric. He backed away from the language of dtente that stressed superpower cooperation and made clear his distrust of the Soviet system and Marxist ideology. At his first press conference, Reagan stated that Soviet leaders reserved "unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat" in order to gain an advantage in U.S.-Soviet relations. Later that year, he promised that "the West won't contain Communism, it will transcend Communism." In a speech before the British Parliament in 1982, in a

paraphrase of a famous declaration of Karl Marx, Reagan said "the march of freedom and democracy ... will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history." During Reagan's first years in office, U.S.-Soviet relations were unstable. On the Soviet side, a succession of changes in the nation's geriatric leadershipthree different leaders during the first Reagan termproduced a foreign policy that oscillated between militancy and conciliation. Meanwhile, the Reagan administration was dogged by its own internal conflicts. One of these conflicts came to the fore soon after Reagan became President when he reversed Carter's decision to embargo American grain sales to the Soviet Union as punishment for the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Carter's grain embargo was favored by the Pentagon but strongly opposed by the Agriculture Department and many American farmers. Likewise, Reagan delayed repudiating SALT II after he learned that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that renouncing the treaty before the United States had completed its buildup would be advantageous to the Soviets. Responding to a clamor from Democrats at home and allies abroad, Reagan restarted arms talks with the Soviets in 1982, declaring that his goal was not to limit the arms race as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the 1970s had soughtbut to reduce the superpowers' stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Reagan dubbed this new round of negotiations START, for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. Despite these pragmatic moves, Soviet-American relations during the first three years of the Reagan administration were marked by tension and confrontation. The Soviets were rapidly deploying intermediate nuclear missiles, the SS-20, in Eastern Europe. In 1981, in the face of opposition from the Soviets and the anti-nuclear movement, Reagan agreed with European allies to deploy U.S. nuclear missiles in Germany, Britain, and Italy. Although U.S. and Soviet negotiators held arms control talks in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning in 1981, neither side made a realistic effort to resolve the nuclear deployments. By 1983, superpower relations reached a nadir. In March, Reagan memorably described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," andmore worrisome to the Sovietsunveiled his plan for a missile-defense system called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which critics derided as "Star Wars," after the name of the popular movie. The SDI project envisioned a shield in outer space to protect the United States from incoming missiles. While the scientific feasibility of a space shield was at best problematic, even a rudimentary missile defense plan would have forced the Soviets to compete in a range of technologies that was beyond its economic capability. Reagan offered to share the fruits of SDI research with the Soviets, an idea that frightened the U.S. intelligence community, but the Soviets did not take the offer seriously and asserted that Reagan really intended to develop "space weapons." In late 1983, a series of incidents brought American-Soviet relations near the breaking point. On September 1, a Korean Airlines passenger airplane (KAL 007) strayed off course and flew into Soviet territory. The Soviets shot down the jet, killing 269 people. Reagan denounced the act as a crime against humanity but sided with Secretary of State Shultz against Defense Secretary Weinberger in deciding to continue U.S.-Soviet negotiations. "The world will react to this," Reagan told his advisers. "It's important that we not do anything that jeopardizes the long-term relationship with the Soviet Union." With tensions high in November 1983, an American military exercise meant to simulate

procedures for a nuclear exchange, code-named "Able Archer," prompted the Soviets to put their military on high alert in expectation of a surprise nuclear attack. Although historians disagree on whether nuclear war was actually imminent, it was without doubt a dangerous time in which miscalculation might have led to accidental nuclear war. Meanwhile, in Europe, the West German Bundestag voted to accept deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise intermediate-range missiles to counter the deployment of the Soviet SS-20s. The Soviets promptly walked out of the arms talks in Geneva.

The Reagan Doctrine

Reagan believed that it was necessary for the United States to combat the spread of Soviet-backed Marxist and leftist regimes throughout the globe. He was particularly concerned about Afghanistan, where the brutal Soviet invasion and occupation killed an estimated one million people and made another five million refugees. Central America was also a focus: Reagan continued the Carter administration's support of El Salvador's efforts to wipe out Marxist rebels in a cruel civil war, and he viewed the Marxist government of Nicaragua as a menace to hemispheric stability. Reagan blamed much of the trouble on Cuba, which supported both Nicaraguan government and the Salvadoran rebels. Cuban leader Fidel Castro never missed a chance to tweak the United States; how much material aid he actually provided to his Marxist allies in the Hemisphere remains a matter of historical dispute. To Reagan, the soldiers and insurgents struggling against Communism on battlefields throughout the world were "freedom fighters," a description he particularly applied to the Contras opposing the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In his February 6, 1985, State of the Union message, Reagan called for support of anti-Communist forces "from Afghanistan to Nicaragua" and proclaimed that "support for freedom fighters is selfdefense." Seizing on this passage, conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer announced what came to be known as "the Reagan Doctrine." In Krauthammer's words, this was a policy of "democratic militance" that "proclaims overt and unabashed support for anti-Communist revolution." But Reagan pursued this doctrine selectively. Apart from Afghanistan, which was a bipartisan affair, Reagan tried to roll back Communism only in Nicaragua, and to a limited degree in Angola, where Cuban troops were trying to impose Marxist rule. Apart from these examples, Reagan usually followed State Department guidance in dealing with most world trouble spots and continued policies that were already in place. Within the United States, most of the controversy about the Reagan Doctrine centered on Nicaragua. Beginning in 1981, and at the behest of Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, Reagan authorized secret aid to the Contras, who grew from a force of a few hundred to an army of 9,000 three years later. Even so, as national security adviser Colin Powell observed, the Contras never amounted to more than a "highland fighting force" capable of putting pressure on the Sandinista government but not of overthrowing it. Reagan was mindful that the United States was resented in much of Latin America because of past military interventions. He often told advisers that the United States was seen as the "colossus of the North" in Mexico and Central America. For this reason, Reagan refused to send U.S. military forces to Panama to oust the corrupt dictator Manuel Noriega. (This would happen under Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush.)

The sole U.S. military intervention in the region during the Reagan presidency came in October 1983 in Grenada, where Maurice Bishop, the Marxist leader of this tiny Caribbean nation, was murdered by a renegade faction of his own party. Reagan wanted to intervene because hundreds of Americans, many of them medical students, lived on the island. He was also asked to intervene by the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, a group of six former British colonies that felt threatened by the events in Grenada. Reagan welcomed the opportunity to act because he saw Grenada, on which Cuban laborers were building a new airport with a 10,000-foot runway, as a Soviet and Cuban beachhead in the region. The U.S. military forces subdued the small detachment of Cuban forces on the island within a few days, took Bishop's killers into custody, and freed the American medical students with minimal casualties. Although the American people and Congress supported the Grenada invasion, Democrats led by House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, questioned the wisdom and morality of U.S. involvement in El Salvador, and, especially, Nicaragua. In 1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendment, prohibiting direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. The amendment, however, imposed no penalties for violation, which encouraged the administration to ignore it. Two years later, revelations that the CIA had aided in the mining of Nicaraguan ports and provided the Contras with an instructional manual that condoned terrorism and assassination caused an uproar on Capitol Hill. The Senate passed a resolution 84-12 condemning the mining. After much debate, Congress prohibited White House-supported funding for the Contras in the fall of 1984.

Involvement in Lebanon
In the summer of 1982, the Reagan administration was drawn into military involvement in Lebanon, a precarious democracy in the Middle East and a cauldron of conflict among competing military and confessional groups, as the various religious and ethnic factions are known. Reagan and his policymakers, including both his secretaries of state, believed that the United States had national security interests in the region to combat the Soviet influence. The United States also had an historic alliance with Israel, supported by every U.S. President since the Jewish state was created in 1948. Reagan himself had been committed to Israel from its inception, which did little to endear him to Arab nationsor to Israel's chief adversary, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). At the same time, Reagan's relations with Israeli leader Menachim Begin were less than harmonious and worsened considerably early in the President's first term when Reagan watched in horror on White House television as Israeli bombers leveled Beirut, the capital city of Lebanon, killing many civilians. Reagan became so angry that on August 12, 1982, he telephoned Begin and told him the bombing had gone too far. "You must stop it," Reagan said. Begin did, but the United States had moved a step closer toward involvement in Lebanon. Two months earlier, in June 1982, Israel had invaded neighboring Lebanon in the hope of depriving the PLO of a base of operations. The invasion, and particularly the bombing and shelling of Beirut, was globally condemned. Within the Reagan administration, the invasion touched off latent conflicts between the diplomats and the warriors. Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of State Shultz after him believed that the United States should

become involved in working out a peace process in Lebanon. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, influenced by the legacy of Vietnam, were reluctant to put U.S. troops in harm's way. Reagan followed a middle course and in August 1982 sent 800 U.S. Marines to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force that also included French and Italian contingents. Their mission was to maintain a cease fire during which PLO fighters in Lebanon would be allowed passage to neighboring Syria. Once the PLO had departed, Israel would withdraw from Lebanon. After the PLO fighters left, Weinberger withdrew the U.S. troops. But with the international force withdrawn, violence broke out again. Lebanese militia with ties to Israel massacred 700 refugees at two camps in mid-September 1982, including at least three dozen women and children. President Reagan, appalled by the massacre, ordered the U.S. forces back ashore. The Americans found themselves in the midst of a full-fledged civil war, one in which they unwittingly became targets as Israeli troops withdrew. In April 1983, Lebanese terrorists from a group called Hezbollahwhich received financial and logistical support from Iran and Syriadetonated a truck bomb in front of the American Embassy in Beirut; seventeen Americans died, including eight employees of the CIA. American forces continued to come under attack sporadically throughout the summer of 1983. In response to the deaths of six soldiers, Reagan ordered U.S. warships to shell the camps of anti-American militias. The most deadly attack against the United States occurred on October 23, 1983, when terrorists blew up the Marines' barracks at the Beirut airport, killing 241 U.S. servicemen, most of them Marines. More than 100 others were wounded in the attack, many of whom suffered permanent injuries. Reagan subsequently called it, "the saddest day of my presidencythe saddest day of my life." Suspecting that Hezbollah was responsible for the attack, Reagan ordered air strikes against Hezbollah's leadership. The destruction of the Marine barracks forced Reagan to reassess his Lebanon policy. The small remaining U.S. force had no hope of influencing events in Lebanon unless it was substantially reinforced. Against the opposition of the diplomats, Secretary Weinberger and the Joint Chief pushed for withdrawal of all U.S. military forces. So did White House Chief of Staff James Baker, who feared that Lebanon would become an issue in Reagan's 1984 reelection campaign. In February 1984, the surviving Marines were withdrawn to U.S. vessels waiting offshore. Reagan described the withdrawal as "redeployment," but he would not again send ground troops into Lebanon or any other place in the Middle East.

Middle Eastern Terrorism

Reagan's problems in the Middle East did not end with the withdrawal of U.S. troops, however. Beginning in late 1983, anti-American terrorist groups stepped up their attacks on the United States. In December of that year, a terrorist group bombed the U.S. embassy in Kuwait. One year later, hijackers commandeered a Kuwaiti airliner and killed two American passengers. In June 1985, Hezbollah terrorists hijacked another airliner, forced it to land in Beirut, and killed a U.S. Navy diver who was among the passengers. Shiite terrorists in 1984 and 1985 took hostage seven Americans living in Lebanon, hoping to force a shift in U.S. policy towards the Middle East, which the terrorists

considered anti-Arab and pro-Israel. Reagan desperately wanted to free the hostages, but he and his advisers were publicly adamant that they would not negotiate with terrorists. The longer the hostages remained captive, however, the more Reagan longed for their release. In 1985, terrorists with connections to Libya also began a series of audacious attacks against Americans. Relations between the two countries had deteriorated severely after Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi had threatened Americans in 1981, prompting a military encounter in which U.S. Navy jets downed two Libyan warplanes. The conflict flared anew in 1985 and 1986. The U.S. government suspected but at first could not prove that Libya was behind a series of terrorist attacks that included a cruise-ship hijacking, bombings of airports in Rome and Austria, and the bombing of a disco in West Germany. After U.S. and European intelligence agencies traced the latter attack to Libya, Reagan ordered Operation El Dorado Canyon, in which 200 U.S. aircraft dropped more than sixty tons of bombs on Libyan targets. Thirty-seven people died, but Qaddafi escaped. The air strike restrained Libya for a time but did not bring an end to the terror. Two days after the bombings, a pro-Libyan Palestinian group in Lebanon killed three hostages (one American and two Britons) in retaliation. In December 1988, terrorists with ties to Libya blew up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people.

The Iran-Contra Affair

"Iran-Contra," short-handed in history to a single scandal, actually involved two separate initiatives. The first was the clandestine sale of a small amount of U.S. military equipmentprimarily anti-tank missilesto Iran in contradiction of the Reagan administration's public policy of remaining neutral in the Iran-Iraq War. The Contra part of the affair was the attempt by a small group of National Security Council staff members and former military men to funnel proceeds from the sale of these weapons to the Contra rebels opposing the Nicaraguan government. Reagan said in his diary and later acknowledged to the American people that he authorized the Iran arms sales, but he insisted he had no knowledge of the diversion of funds to the Contras. The Iran arms sale, which had the support of the Israeli government, was first proposed to Reagan by his national security adviser Bud McFarlane. Reagan was told that U.S. representatives would be dealing with Iranian moderates rather than that nation's radical Islamic rulers. McFarlane presented the initiative to Reagan as an opportunity to make useful contacts with reformist forces in Iran and also counter Soviet influence in the region. The initiative was also backed by Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, who wanted to free William Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut who had been kidnapped on March 6, 1984, by terrorists with links to Iran. Casey feared that Buckley, who later died of medical neglect while in captivity, was being tortured to reveal the names of agents. Reagan was moved by this appeal, and he also wanted to free other Americans held captive by terrorists in Lebanon. Reagan had often said he would not negotiate with terrorists, but insisted after the arms sales became public that he had not done so because he was dealing with middlemen, not the kidnappers themselves.

Meanwhile, in the wake of the second Boland amendment which prohibited third-party and U.S.-government funding of the Contras, Reagan made it clear to his foreign policy team that he wanted to keep the Nicaraguan Contras together "body and soul" so they would continue to be a thorn in the side of the Sandinista government. McFarlane and NSC staff member Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North arranged for donations to the Contras from foreign governments (including Saudi Arabia and South Africa) and private citizens. Between 1984 and 1986, the Saudis alone contributed $32 million to the Contras in this way. Reagan formally (and secretly) approved the Iran initiative on December 7, 1985, over the objections of both Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. The initiative was in fact under way before Reagan acted; in August and September, Israel had sent more than 500 American antitank missiles to Iran, which produced the release of one American hostage. Throughout 1986, another 1,000 American missiles were sent to Iran via Israel; North and McFarlane, who had resigned as national security adviser in late 1985 and been replaced by his deputy, Admiral John Poindexter, accompanied one of the shipments and met with Iranian officials. As a result of the arms sales, a few more American hostages were released. But since the arms sales had in effect transformed the hostages into valuable currency, others were kidnapped to replace those who had been released. In April 1986, North went to Poindexter with a plan to divert the proceeds from the arms salesmore than $12 millionto the Nicaraguan Contras. Poindexter approved North's proposal. Poindexter said afterwardin sworn statements to Congress and in court during his criminal trialthat he never informed the President of the diversion. In November 1986, news of the arms shipments to Iran broke in a Lebanese magazine and quickly became a sensation in the United States. Poindexter and North destroyed a number of documents relating to the initiative, but others were unknowingly preserved on the main frame of an NSC computer and made available to the Tower Board, a commission Reagan appointed to investigate the affair. Reagan, on the basis of a briefing by Poindexter, made several inaccurate statements about the arms shipments in a November 13 speech to the nation. Polls showed this to be one of the few times that the public did not find Reagan credible. In late November, a Justice Department investigation of the arms deal uncovered North's diversion of proceeds to the Contras. Reagan asked for Poindexter's resignation and fired North, while also telling this decorated soldier that he was a "national hero." A federal court appointed Lawrence E. Walsh, a distinguished Wall Street attorney and former prosecutor, as independent counsel to investigate Iran-Contra. Congress appointed its own joint special committee to investigate and gave North and Poindexter immunity as witnesses despite Walsh's warning that this could have a "destructive impact" on criminal prosecutions. Walsh was prescient: Poindexter was convicted on five felony counts, but an appeals court set aside the convictions because it found that witnesses may have been tainted by their exposure to his immunized testimony before Congress. North was convicted of three felonies; these also were set aside. For the public, and subsequently for historians, the overriding question was the nature of President Reagan's role. Nancy Reagan believed strongly that Reagan needed to recover

his credibility to be effective during the remainder of his presidency, and she brought outsiders into the White House, including the Democratic kingmaker Robert Strauss, in an effort to convince her husband to apologize to the American people for authorizing the arms sales. Eventually, Reagan did. On March 4, 1987, in a speech to the nation, Reagan took "full responsibility for my own actions and for those of my administration." He went on to say, "A few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms for hostages. My heart and my best intentions still tell me that's true, but the facts and the evidence tell me it is not." Reagan insisted in this speech that he did not know that funds had been diverted to the Contras. Privately, he was incensed that retired Air Force General Richard Secord, one of the masterminds of the diversion scheme, had pocketed some of the money. As a political issue, Iran-Contra dogged Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush, as the investigation dragged on for more than six years. Conservatives assailed Walsh for taking so long but when he finally completed his report on August 5, 1993, during the Clinton presidency, he concluded that there was no credible evidence that Reagan knew of the diversion. Reagan was nevertheless tainted by the scandal. Even if one accepts the validity of Walsh's conclusionand it is the most authoritative word on the subjectthe various inquiries revealed lax management and enormous detachment on Reagan's part and appalling conduct by members of the National Security Council staff. But the public, judging from Reagan's rising poll ratings after his March 4, 1987, speech treated IranContra as a blunder and largely forgave him. This reflected their general trust of Reagan, and their acceptance of his motivations in wanting to free the Americans held hostage in Lebanon. Diplomatically, the Iran initiative embarrassed the United States. Since Secretary of State Shultz had urged allies not to supply the combatants in the Iran-Iraq War with arms, the U.S. shipments of missiles to Iran seemed an act of hypocrisy even though they had no impact on the war's outcome. On the other hand, the discredited Contras did achieve a measure of success, as Reagan hoped: they put pressure on the Nicaraguan government to hold free elections, in which the Sandinista President was defeated.

Reagan and Gorbachev

Time magazine put Reagan and Soviet leader Yuri Andropov on its year-end cover in 1983, designating them both as "men of the year." The two leaders were shown sternvisaged and back-to-back; the accompanying story raised the spectre of nuclear war. Meanwhile in Moscow, the chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces claimed that the United States "would still like to launch a decapitating first strike." But at this low point of relationships between the nuclear superpowers, diplomats on both sides were planting the seeds of a new relationship that would take root in the contentious ground of the Geneva summit in 1985 and blossom into the arms-control treaties that presaged the end of the Cold War. Many accounts of this turn in the U.S-Soviet relationship would assert that Reagan changed his approach to the Soviet Union during his second presidential term. Reagan did not see it that way. He believed his policies were of a piece and was convinced that the U.S. military buildup would inevitably lead to negotiations in which the Soviets would see that nuclear arms reductions were to the mutual benefit of both sides. Reagan

acknowledged to his diary that not everyone in his administration shared his optimism. "Some of the NSC staff are hard line and don't think any approach should be made to the Soviets," Reagan said in his diary entry for April 6, 1983. He concluded it by saying that he wanted to show the Soviets "there is a better world if they'll show by deed that they want to get along with the free world." In January 1984, with U.S.-Soviet relations apparently at a toxic stage, Secretary of State Shultz met with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to see if a path could be found to what Shultz called "realistic engagement" between Moscow and Washington. The main impediment to that reengagement was instability in the Soviet leadership. Andropov, a former head of the KGB, had become the Soviet leader after the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982. He was potentially a creative leader but suffered from kidney failure during most of his short reign in power. Andropov died on February 9, 1984, and was succeeded by Konstantin Chernenko, who was suffering from pulmonary emphysema and other ailments. Chernenko, who had been Brezhnev's intimate aide, was the last of the reactionary old-guard Soviet leaders. He rarely appeared in public or, as Reagan observed, said anything without a script, but did abandon the confrontational approach of his predecessors to the United States. Chernenko died on March 10, 1985, He was succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev, a vigorous 54-year-old Andropov protg with an innovative mind who recognized that the Soviet economy could not survive without serious reforms. He also hoped for better superpower relations. By 1986 and 1987, Gorbachev had determined that a more radical approach was needed in both domestic and foreign affairs. He believed that the restructuring of the Soviet economy ("perestroika") could only occur if accompanied by political liberalization ("glasnost"). Political and economic reforms, in turn, were possible only with better superpower relations. A less antagonistic Soviet-American relationship, Gorbachev believed, would permit a shift of money and resources away from the Soviet military toward the suffering economy. Reagan sensed that Gorbachev was a different sort of Soviet leader and was encouraged in this direction by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who had met with Gorbachev before his ascension to power. At a December 22, 1984, meeting at Camp David, Thatcher told Reagan that Gorbachev was "an unusual Russian" who was open to discussion. Reagan fired off a letter to Gorbachev when he assumed power, asking for a meeting. In November 1985, Reagan and Gorbachev met for the first time in Geneva; they held additional summits in each of the succeeding years of the Reagan presidency. The Geneva meeting, while short on specific agreements, laid the foundation for the other three summits. Reagan and Gorbachev argued freely but also developed the symbiotic relationship that served them in good stead. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) emerged at the Geneva summit as a key sticking point in the U.S.-Soviet relationship but also as leverage for a potential arms agreement. The other sticking point was Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; Gorbachev gave strong signals at this meeting that he wanted to find a way out. The next summit between Reagan and Gorbachev occurred in Reykjavik, Iceland, in October 1986. During the preceding year, Gorbachev had accelerated his political and economic reforms at home, but U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations remained stalled. Two days of high stakes talks, often unscripted, produced a remarkable opportunity as Reagan and Gorbachev galloped ahead of the talking points provided by their advisers and discussed the elimination of all

nuclear weapons. As Alexander Besstmertnykh, then the Soviet deputy foreign minister, said in an evaluation of this meeting years later: "Gorbachev believed in [doing away with nuclear weapons]. Reagan believed in that. The experts didn't believe but the leaders did." But the Reykjavik summit collapsed when Gorbachev insisted that any American work on SDI be confined to the laboratory. Reagan refused, telling Gorbachev that he "promised the American people" that he would not give up SDI. When Gorbachev persisted in his position, Reagan abruptly ended the meeting. Because the leaders reached no agreement, Reykjavik was in its immediate aftermath seen as a failure in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, it proved a breakthrough. Reagan's stand had made it clear to Gorbachev that the President would never yield on SDI, and Gorbachev had other, more pressing problems. The unpopular war in Afghanistan was a bleeding sore, and the Soviets privately told the United States that they intended to remove their troops from Afghanistan before the end of Reagan's term. Gorbachev declared that the "military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact ... is subordinated to the task of preventing war, nuclear and conventional." Meanwhile, encouraged by the discussions at Reykjavik, American and Soviet negotiators crafted a treaty that removed intermediate nuclear missiles from Europe, the first pact of the Cold War that actually reduced the number of nuclear weapons rather than merely stabilizing them at a higher level. Gorbachev and Reagan signed the INF Treaty in December 1987 while the Soviet leader made a triumphant visit to Washington, D.C. Reagan's desire to lessen the chances of nuclear war and the revolutionary changes in Soviet policy at home and abroadwhich by 1987 were beginning to spin out of Gorbachev's controlhad resulted in a landmark treaty that called for the destruction of more than 2,600 Soviet and American nuclear weapons. Superpower relations continued to improve during Reagan's final year in office. While progress toward a strategic nuclear weapons treaty was too slow to bear immediate fruit, it was clear by the end of the Reagan presidency that such a treaty was in the offing. (President George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991.) In December 1988, at the very end of Reagan's presidency, Gorbachev announced in an address to the United Nations in Washington that he would unilaterally reduce Soviet military forces in Eastern Europe by 500,000 soldiers and 10,000 tanks over the next two years. The capstone of the Reagan-Gorbachev relationship, however, occurred in June 1988 when Reagan visited the Soviet Union. The symbolism of the trip was powerful and undeniable. Reagan, the most outspoken anti-Communist elected to the American presidency, met Soviet citizens in Red Square and spoke to students at Gorbachev's alma mater. When a reporter reminded him of his 1983 description of the Soviet Union as an "evil empire," Reagan replied, "I was talking about another time, another era." By the time Reagan's presidency concluded, the Cold War was not formally over, but its end was in sight. Many people contributed to this achievement, including Secretary of State Shultz and Gorbachev's able foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, but Reagan and Gorbachev deserve the principal credit. In his book, Reagan and Gorbachev: How The Cold War Ended, career diplomat Jack F. Matlock, himself a key player in the U.SSoviet negotiations, wrote that Reagan and Gorbachev were willing to depart from the

position papers that had been written for them and make up their own minds on critical issues. "Both were willing to take political risks, and both were skilled in judging the degree of risk in their respective, very different societies," Matlock wrote. "They didn't always get things right, but on the most critical issues, they finally did."

Bush Foreign Affairs During his presidency, President Bush devoted much of his time to foreign affairs, an area over which Presidents generally have more latitude than they do with domestic affairs. In his first inaugural address, Bush spoke of unity between the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs, presenting a united front to the rest of the world and referring to a time when "our differences ended at the water's edge." He also put together a team of advisers, including National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, who generally worked well together. President Bush approached foreign affairs with his characteristic conservatism and pragmatism. He did not rush into new actions or policy changes but gave himself time to consider the administration's policies. When he acted, he did so with firm conviction and determination. His past experiences gave him significant experience in foreign affairs, and he relied on the many contacts within the international community he formed as ambassador to the United Nations, U.S. envoy to China, director of Central Intelligence, and Vice President. One example of Bush's conservative and pragmatic approach to foreign affairs occurred early in his administration. In June 1989, the Chinese military suppressed a prodemocracy movement demonstrating in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Using tanks and armored cars, the military crushed the demonstrations and fired into the crowd, killing hundreds of protestors. Although Bush abhorred the Chinese government's violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square, he did not want to jettison improved U.S.-Sino relations by overreacting to events. Many in Congress cried out for a harsh, punitive response to the Chinese government's killing of peaceful protestors, but the Bush administration imposed only limited sanctions. Later in his administration, Bush sent Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger, deputy secretary of state, to China to try to repair the damaged, but not destroyed, relationship. In the end, U.S.-Sino relations, while always somewhat fragile, have generally thrived, particularly in the economic realm, where both nations have benefitted from a robust trading partnership.

Throughout the Cold War, the United States had been involved in trying to stop the spread of Communism in Latin America and had established contacts throughout the area. One U.S. informant was Manuel Noriega, a Panamanian who began to work for the CIA as early as the late 1960s. Bush first encountered Noriega as director of the CIA when the agency relied on the Panamanian for intelligence. The Reagan administration initially saw Noriega as an ally because he opposed the Sandinista government in

Nicaragua. When Noriega began to aid the Sandinistas and became increasingly involved in the international drug trade, the U.S. government tried to cut its ties with him. But Noriega continued to increase his power within Panama; in 1983 he assumed control of the Panamanian military, becoming a military dictator who essentially ruled the country. After Noriega was indicted by a federal grand jury in 1988 on drug trafficking charges, his relationship with American military and intelligence agencies came increasingly under fire by congressional Democrats. Members of Congress demanded that the Reagan administration and later the Bush administration bring the Panamanian strongman to justice. Following the loss of Noriega's puppet candidate in the May 1989 Panamanian presidential election, Noriega nullified the results and his supporters attacked the opposition candidates. President Bush was appalled by Noriega's thwarting of democracy and began to focus on removing him from power. In October, information about an internal coup reached the U.S. military in Panama but the Bush administration chose not to get involved because the plan seemed sketchy and unorganized. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recounted that, "The whole affair sounded like amateur night." The coup failed, and Noriega's forces executed the coup leader. Reaction in the United States was harsh, and many critics took the President to task for missing an opportunity to remove Noriega. After the attempted coup, President Bush and his advisers realized that they had to do something definite about Noriega. He then ordered his foreign affairs team to put together a plan to remove the dictator from power. In December 1989, the Bush administration was notified that Noriega's military forces had killed a U.S. serviceman and attacked another serviceman and his wife. The administration now believed that it had the justification it needed to remove Noriega from power. On December 20, the U.S. military launched "Operation Just Cause" with about 10,000 forces landing in Panama and joining the 13,000 already there to quickly overtake the Panamanian military. Noriega went underground and eventually took refuge at the Vatican's embassy in Panama City. He surrendered to U.S. forces in early January and was taken to Miami, Florida, where he was eventually convicted on drug charges and sent to prison. "Operation Just Cause" was generally hailed as a success and bolstered Bush's reputation as a strong, decisive leader. It was the largest military troop deployment since the Vietnam War and resulted in few causalities and a U.S. victory. Although it violated international law and was denounced by the Organization of American States and the United Nations, polls indicated that a large majority of Panamanians supported the U.S. invasion. The operation also gave the administration the unintended benefit of improving its crisis management, which helped the Bush team months later when Iraq invaded Kuwait.

End of the Cold War and Changing U.S.-Soviet Relations

When Bush became President in 1989, the United States had already begun to see a thawing of relations with the Soviet Union. As vice president, he attended the December 1988 summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev. Bush spoke of softening relations in his inaugural address, claiming that "a new breeze is

blowing," and adding that "great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door to freedom." Bush's relationship with Gorbachev began with what the Soviets called the pauza (pause). With his instinctual caution, the President wanted time to study the situation before moving forward with his own policy. Although the Soviets were concerned that Bush's pauza indicated a new direction in U.S. foreign policy, it actually helped consolidate the improved U.S.-Soviet relations. When East Germany opened its borders and Germans tore down the Berlin Wall separating East and West Berlin in early November 1989, it marked a symbolic end to Communist rule in Eastern Europe. In the minds of many, the Cold War was over. Bush offered a muted response at a press conference on November 9: "I'm very pleased." When the press questioned his lack of enthusiasm over the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Bush responded by stating, "I am not an emotional kind of guy." In retrospect, many people recognized that by refusing to gloat or declare victory over the Soviet Union, Bush probably helped avoid a backlash by hardliners in Eastern Europe. He also did not want to endanger future negotiations with the Soviet Union. Still, Bush's restrained response to the collapse of Communism in Europe, while diplomatically deft, cost him dearly at home among his conservative supporters who argued that Ronald Reagan would have celebrated this historic development with some type of public address. In a December 1989 summit between Bush and Gorbachev in Malta, the two leaders discussed arms reductions and strengthening their relations. At a summit in Washington, D.C., in June 1990, the two men signed a broad arms reduction agreement in which the United States and Soviet Union consented to decreasing their nuclear arsenals. Bush and his secretary of state, James Baker, worked hard to establish a meaningful relationship with Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister. By most accounts, they were very successful in redefining relations with the Soviet Union in a post-Cold War environment. In July 1991, Bush met Gorbachev in Moscow and signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START. When Gorbachev's opponents attempted a coup to oust him from power the next month, the Bush administration waited anxiously for the outcome. The coup failed, and Gorbachev resumed his position but the Soviet Union was in evident decline. Throughout the fall, the Soviet Republics began to declare their independence from the Soviet Union, and in December, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus announced they were forming a new confederation of states. Gorbachev resigned as the President of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991. The efforts of Bush, Gorbachev, Baker, and Shevardnadze achieved results in improving U.S.-Soviet relations in ways that would have been unthinkable ten years earlier. Critics of the Bush administration faulted it for being aligned too closely with Gorbachev and too willing to compromise; many thought that Bush should have made more overtures to Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia who often wanted reforms to proceed more quickly than Gorbachev and eventually oversaw much of Russia's transition away from Communism. Nonetheless, Bush's relationship with Gorbachev helped facilitate improved U.S.-Soviet relations.

German Unification
Events in 1989 moved along at such a rapid pace that President Bush's natural inclination toward gradual change was severely challenged. After the Berlin Wall fell in November of that year, members of the Bush administration discussed German reunification as some future reality, perhaps even five years in the future. Very few people imagined that a unified Germany would exist in less than a year. Even more surprising was that a united Germany would become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). After the Berlin Wall came down, a remarkable number of challenges confronted the Bush administration. At first, there were three main proposals on how to proceed with German reunification. One was just to let the two Germanys determine the process, but because of agreements at the end of World War II, the four victorsthe United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and Francestill had input into Germany's situation. Another approach was to let the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its thirtyfive members hammer out the details. However, this plan was not widely supported because of the likelihood that the process would bog down due to input from so many countries. A third suggestion was to involve the two Germanys with the World War II victors in a framework that became known as "Two-plus-Four." In February 1990, the "Two-plus-Four" approach was formally approved. East and West Germany dealt with the internal details while the four victors of World War II worked with the two Germanys on external issues. The talks began in May and finally concluded in September 1990. The main sticking point to German reunification was whether the country would be part of NATO. The Soviets initially opposed having a united Germany as part of NATO, preferring it to be part of the Warsaw Pact or exist as a neutral, nonaligned country. In the end, the Bush administration helped broker a compromise: Germany would be part of NATO but no NATO troops would be stationed in East Germany. In addition, Soviet troops would have three to four years to withdraw from East Germany, and Germany agreed to provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union.

Persian Gulf War

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded its neighbor Kuwait. Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, had long held designs on Kuwait's land, wealth, and oil. Although intelligence agencies had watched Iraq's military buildup along its border with Kuwait, both the United States and Iraq's Arab neighbors did not believe that Hussein had plans to invade the small country to its south. But they misread Hussein's intentions. The invasion violated international law, and the Bush administration was alarmed at the prospect of Iraq controlling Kuwait's oil resources. Despite being somewhat caught off guard, the Bush administration went to work immediately trying to assemble a coalition to oppose Iraq. One fortunate turn of events for the administration was that, at the time of the invasion, President Bush was with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain at a conference, and Secretary of State Baker was in Siberia with Eduard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister. This allowed the United States to issue strong condemnations against Iraq with Britain, and most surprisingly, the Soviet Union. James Baker credited this moment, when the United States and Soviet Union issued a joint statement condemning Iraq's actions, as the end of

the Cold War because it marked the beginning of unprecedented cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the invasion began, Arab countries joined with the United States to form a coalition to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait or face the consequences. When Saudi Arabia became concerned about a possible invasion after Iraqi troops began to mass on the border, President Bush announced the deployment of U.S. troops to the desert kingdom. He also articulated the four principles that guided "Operation Desert Shield": the immediate and complete withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate Kuwaiti government; the stability and security of the Middle East; and the protection of Americans abroad. On the day of the invasion, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and demanded that Iraq withdraw "immediately and unconditionally". The United States also quickly moved to freeze Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets. Shortly thereafter, the UN imposed economic sanctions on Iraq designed to try to convince Iraq to withdraw. The Iraqi invasion allowed President Bush to emphasize one of his greatest strengthspersonal diplomacy. He had many international contacts, and he personally telephoned world leaders and U.S. allies to start building the coalition that would force Iraq to withdraw. However, the administration did not want Israel to join the coalition because it feared that Israel's involvement would alienate the Arab countries that had already agreed to join the alliance. Israel agreed to stay out of the coalition and not retaliate if attacked in order to allow the coalition's greater resources to deal with Hussein. After months of resolutions and diplomatic efforts, the situation still had not changed. Iraq seemed unwilling to withdraw from Kuwait, and the Bush administration was not convinced that the economic sanctions could convince Hussein otherwise. In November, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678, which authorized member states "to use all necessary means" to make Iraq withdraw from Kuwait if it had not done so by January 15. As the deadline loomed, the President often spoke of the situation in moral terms and cast Saddam Hussein as the embodiment of evil, highlighting the dictator's human rights violations. In December, President Bush put forth a proposal to ensure that the administration had exhausted all diplomatic efforts; he wanted war to be the last resort. Bush proposed sending Secretary of State Baker to meet with Hussein in Iraq to try to reach a solution. However, the President made it clear that there was no alternative to a complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Although Baker eventually met with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva, Switzerland, the negotiations went nowhere with Hussein rebuffing Bush's efforts. The administration also wanted to shore up support domestically for the impending military action so it turned to Congress for congressional authorization. Although some in the administration argued that it was unnecessary, others felt it was important to have Congress's support. On January 12, Congress narrowly voted to authorize the use of military force against Iraq. The vote was an important victory for President Bush. "Operation Desert Storm" began on January 17, 1991, when U.S.-led coalition forces began massive air strikes against Iraq. The coalition launched the ground war on

February 24 and quickly overwhelmed the Iraqi forces. Coalition troops reached Kuwait City by February 27, and a ceasefire was declared the next day. On March 3, General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander in chief of the U.S. forces, met with the Iraqi leadership to dictate the terms of the ceasefire. The war had ended in less than two months, and the Bush administration had successfully committed to the largest military action since the Vietnam War without getting bogged down or suffering high casualties. (One hundred and forty eight U.S. soldiers were killed in the Persian Gulf War.) On March 6, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and declared, "tonight Kuwait is free." The Persian Gulf War helped restore the morale of the U.S. military and dampened memories of the Vietnam War. It also showed the possibility of what Bush referred to as the "New World Order," breaking down Cold War alliances and using peaceful nations to stand united against rogue states. The President successfully held together the coalition and even succeeded in having many of the coalition countries provide manpower (including France, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt) and financial support (including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Germany). Critics argued, however, that the victory was hollow because Saddam Hussein remained in power. They faulted Bush for not pursuing Hussein and his army into Iraq and removing him from power. However, President Bush and his team had been clear from the beginning that their primary war aim was to make Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, and they achieved that goal. The removal of Hussein from power had never been one of the administration's war aims. Many in the administration argued that pursuing Hussein into Iraq and attempting to topple him from power would destabilize the region and lead to a lengthy military engagement.

The New World Order

On September 11, 1990, President Bush addressed a joint session of Congress regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and he discussed "an historic period of cooperation," which he called the New World Order. Bush claimed this new order would be: Freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony. Again, on January 16, 1991, in an address to the nation about the start of the Persian Gulf War, President Bush used the term in explaining the motivations and justifications for using force against Iraq: We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world ordera world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. When we are successfuland we will bewe have a real chance at this new world order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders. President Bush's New World Order involved collective security with multinational cooperation, and it broke down Cold War conceptions and created new allies. Many people debated whether the New World Order was a realistic foreign policy tenet or simply an idealistic approach to the future. Critics claimed that the Bush administration did not fully articulate the goals of the New World Order and how it hoped to accomplish

them. Some were unsure whether the term was meant as a new approach or simply a catchphrase. Realists complained that it was hard to justify U.S. involvement in situations without a clear national interest. But others felt that once the Cold War ended, the United States had to take on a large role as a world leader to guard against human rights abuses, defend democratic regimes, and lead humanitarian efforts. One example of the changing landscape of foreign policy was evident in the Middle East Peace process. In October 1991, the Bush administration, together with the Soviet Union and Spain, cosponsored a conference in Madrid, to try to reach consensus on moving the peace process forward. The United States had gained new legitimacy within the Middle East after the Persian Gulf War. Arab nations were more willing to work with the United States, and the thwarting of the Iraqi invasion had shown all participants the futility of force. After the Soviet Union joined with the United States in opposing Hussein, countries in the Middle East could no longer rely on the Soviet Union to counterbalance the United States. Once the Arab countries could not depend on the Soviet Union to support them to block Israeli-U.S. initiatives, they had little choice but to try to resolve the situation. Although the Madrid conference did not result in any lasting agreements, it was an important step toward future peace agreements. In Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the Bush administration encountered some of the first challenges to the New World Order. Near the end of his term, President Bush committed U.S. troops to Somalia to help ease a humanitarian crisis after the breakdown of civil society and the onset of mass famine and starvation. Although the operation was initially successful in helping to feed the Somali people, President Bill Clinton ordered the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Somalia after eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu, the country's capital, in October 1993. "Operation Restore Hope" left many people wondering whether the United States should intervene in other countries when U.S. interests were not clearly at stake. When Yugoslavia began to break apart, the Bush administration had hoped to persuade the various players to avoid violence and bloodshed and proceed with the breakup using a democratic process. The administration also hoped to see the European Community take the lead in resolving a conflict occurring in its own backyard, especially because some European countries seemed to chaff under U.S. leadership during the Persian Gulf War. And although the United States worked with the EC and the UN to take political, diplomatic, and economic steps to try to stop the conflict from escalating, they were unsuccessful. Many of President Bush's advisers felt that military action in the former Yugoslavia would more likely resemble the morass of Vietnam rather than the success of the Persian Gulf War. When President Bush left office, the former Yugoslavia republics were in the midst of wars that would continue for years to come. Few argued that President Bush was solely responsible for preventing the violence in the former Yugoslavia; it was a complicated situation with many ethnic groups, divided factions, and long histories. But some people believed that if the United States had launched a strong military action, it could have prevented some of the atrocities that occurred. Others, however, contended that the U.S. military would have gotten bogged down in the area. The situation showed some of the weaknesses in the New World Order. James Baker wrote in his memoir that after the Cold War ended, the international community needed to create new institutions and processes to fill the void in the post-

Cold War era; without them, no effective means existed to stop the onset of violence in the former Yugoslavia.