Side - 1

NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT
MAILING DATE: Mar 23, 2009

The trademark application identified below was abandoned in full because a response to the Office Action mailed on Aug 25, 2008 was not received within the 6-month response period. If the delay in filing a response was unintentional, you may file a petition to revive the application with a fee. If the abandonment of this application was due to USPTO error, you may file a request for reinstatement. Please note that a petition to revive or request for reinstatement must be received within two months from the mailing date of this notice. For additional information, go to http://www.uspto.gov/teas/petinfo.htm. If you are unable to get the information you need from the website, call the Trademark Assistance Center at 1-800-786-9199. SERIAL NUMBER: 77287043 MARK: SOCIALADS OWNER: Side - 2
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE COMMISSIONER FOR TRADEMARKS P.O. BOX 1451 ALEXANDRIA, VA 22313-1451

Facebook, Inc.

FIRST-CLASS MAIL U.S POSTAGE PAID

Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto , CA 94306

To: Subject: Sent: Sent As:

Facebook, Inc. (trademarks@cooley.com) TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77287043 - SOCIALADS - N/A 8/25/2008 8:12:44 PM ECOM117@USPTO.GOV

Attachments: Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20 Attachment - 21 Attachment - 22 Attachment - 23 Attachment - 24 Attachment - 25 Attachment - 26 Attachment - 27 Attachment - 28 Attachment - 29 Attachment - 30 Attachment - 31 Attachment - 32 Attachment - 33 Attachment - 34

Attachment - 35 Attachment - 36 Attachment - 37 Attachment - 38 Attachment - 39 Attachment - 40 Attachment - 41 Attachment - 42 Attachment - 43 Attachment - 44 Attachment - 45 Attachment - 46 Attachment - 47 Attachment - 48 Attachment - 49 Attachment - 50

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 77/287043

MARK: SOCIALADS CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto CA 94306

*77287043*
RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm
APPLICANT: Facebook, Inc.

CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: N/A CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: trademarks@cooley.com

OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 8/25/2008

This Office action is in response to applicant’s communications filed on 4/30/08, 6/30/08 and 7/14/08. Applicant’s revocation and appointment of attorney has been entered into the record and accepted. Applicant’s amendment of its filing basis from Section 1(a) (Use) to Section 1(b) (Intent to Use) has been entered into the record and accepted. Accordingly, the requirement for the applicant to submit a specimen of use is hereby withdrawn. Applicant’s arguments against the Section 2(e)(1) refusal have been entered into the record. Nevertheless, as detailed below, the Section 2(e)(1) refusal is hereby continued and maintained. The Applicant’s arguments against the potential refusal of registration under Section 2(d) based on the citation of prior pending application Serial Nos. 77028006 and 77163257 have been noted. Insofar as Application Serial No. 77163257 was abandoned on February 16, 2008, it is no longer a bar to the registration of applicant’s mark. However, the prior-pending Application Serial No. 77028006 has since registered. Therefore, as detailed below, registration is refused under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. Also, the applicant is required to provide additional information about its services. This is a non-final action. REFUSAL: LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION UNDER SECTION 2(d) Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 3485532. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); see TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. See the enclosed registration. Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that so resembles a registered mark that it is likely that a potential consumer would be confused or mistaken or deceived as to the source of the goods and/or services of the applicant and registrant. See 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). The court in In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) listed the principal factors to be considered when determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). See TMEP §1207.01. However, not all of the factors are necessarily relevant or of equal weight, and any one factor may be dominant in a given case, depending upon the evidence of record. In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 1315, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see In re E. I. du Pont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62, 177 USPQ at 567. In this case, the following factors are the most relevant: similarity of the marks, similarity of the services, and similarity of trade channels of the goods and/or services. See In re Opus One, Inc., 60 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 2001); In re Dakin’s Miniatures Inc., 59 USPQ2d 1593 (TTAB 1999); In re Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1209 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §§1207.01 et seq. Taking into account the relevant du Pont factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case

involves a two-part analysis. The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b). The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi). The applicant has applied to register the mark SOCIALADS. The registered mark is S.O.C.I.A.L. The dominant portion of the applicant’s mark, “SOCIAL”, is highly similar to the term that is comprised by the registrant’s mark. In this respect, the literal portions of the applicant’s mark and that of the registrant are highly similar in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression, and therefore, are likely to cause confusion as to the origin of the services. Consumers are generally more inclined to focus on the first word, prefix or syllable in any trademark or service mark. See Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F. 3d 1369, 1372, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1692 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Mattel Inc. v. Funline Merch. Co., 81 USPQ2d 1372, 1374-75 (TTAB 2006); Presto Prods., Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prods., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897 (TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is most likely to be impressed upon the mind of a purchaser and remembered” when making purchasing decisions). In this case the first word of the applicant’s mark is highly similar to the registered mark. The applicant’s services are identified as “advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet.” The services named in the registration comprise services that are identified as “advertising and publicity services, namely, promoting the goods, services, brand identity and brand awareness of third parties via the Internet through web casting; development of marketing strategies and concepts, namely, services enabling companies to promote free reign, user-generated content development and social interaction to build audience participation.” Both marks are used to identify potentially identical and closely related advertising services. The same consumers will be exposed to the services identified with both marks. The similarities among the marks and the services of the parties are so great as to create a likelihood of confusion. Applicant has argued that confusion is unlikely because the term “SOCIAL” is a common word entitled only to narrow protection, and that the consumers of the relevant services are sophisticated. The examining attorney disagrees. Despite the applicant’s assertion that the registrant’s acronym has another meaning, the examining attorney notes that consumers will still perceive the registrant’s mark as being equivalent to the term “SOCIAL”, which is the dominant first portion of the applicant’s mark. The fact that purchasers are sophisticated or knowledgeable in a particular field does not necessarily mean that they are sophisticated or knowledgeable in the field of trademarks or immune from source confusion. TMEP §1207.01(d)(vii); see In re Decombe, 9 USPQ2d 1812 (TTAB 1988); In re Pellerin Milnor Corp., 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board have recognized that marks deemed “weak” or merely descriptive are still entitled to protection against the

registration by a subsequent user of a similar mark for closely related goods and/or services. This protection extends to marks registered on the Supplemental Register. TMEP §1207.01(b)(ix); see, e.g., In re Clorox Co., 578 F.2d 305, 18 USPQ 337 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Hunke & Jochheim, 185 USPQ 188 (TTAB 1975). Accordingly, in view of the potentially identical and closely related nature of the services of the parties and the strong similarity of the marks and their commercial impressions, confusion as to the source of the services is likely under Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act. Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If the applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, the applicant must also respond to the following. CONTINUED REFUSAL UNDER SECTION 2(e)(1) OF THE TRADEMARK ACT The examining attorney refused registration on the Principal Register because the proposed mark merely describes the services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1); TMEP section 1209 et seq. Applicant has argued that the mark is suggestive rather than descriptive, and asserts that “a mental leap is required to connect Applicant’s Mark to its services.” IN particular, the applicant has asserted that “the composite mark SOCIALADS does not merely describe the services claimed in the Application” and that the mark “does not immediately convey the nature of the services rendered under the Mark.” The examining attorney disagrees. Applicant’s mark SOCIALADS is merely the combination of the two merely descriptive terms “SOCIAL” and “ADS”. The determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is considered in relation to the identified goods and/or services, not in the abstract. In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 814, 200 USPQ 215, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1978); TMEP §1209.01(b); see, e.g., In re Polo Int’l Inc., 51 USPQ2d 1061 (TTAB 1999) (finding DOC in DOC-CONTROL would be understood to refer to the “documents” managed by applicant’s software, not “doctor” as shown in dictionary definition); In re Digital Research Inc., 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (finding CONCURRENT PC-DOS merely descriptive of “computer programs recorded on disk” where relevant trade used the denomination “concurrent” as a descriptor of a particular type of operating system). “Whether consumers could guess what the product is from consideration of the mark alone is not the test.” In re Am. Greetings Corp., 226 USPQ 365, 366 (TTAB 1985). Relevant definitions of the term “SOCIAL” include: “relating to interaction of people: relating to the way in which people in groups behave and interact” and “of or relating to human society, the interaction of the individual and the group, or the welfare of human beings as members of society.” (See attached definitions.) Applicant has conceded that the term “ADS” is merely descriptive of an aspect of the claimed services. Indeed, the examining attorney notes that the term “ADS” is generic in relation to the applicant’s broadly identified advertising services that are identified as “advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet.” Upon encountering the mark used in connection with the identified services, consumers would immediately expect the applicant’s advertising services to pertain to the way in which people interact. Please see the attached evidence that indicates that the Applicant provides advertising services that allow companies to send advertisements to members of social networking sites based on social actions

that members of those sites perform. (See attachments.) Indeed the applicant markets its services as featuring a combination of social actions with advertisers’ messages, and as providing advertisements that are attached to social stories. (See attachments.) Two major reasons for not protecting descriptive marks are (1) to prevent the owner of a descriptive mark from inhibiting competition in the marketplace and (2) to avoid the possibility of costly infringement suits brought by the trademark or service mark owner. In re Abcor Dev. Corp., 588 F.2d 811, 813, 200 USPQ 215, 217 (C.C.P.A. 1978); TMEP §1209. Businesses and competitors should be free to use descriptive language when describing their own goods and/or services to the public in advertising and marketing materials. See In re Styleclick.com Inc., 58 USPQ2d 1523, 1527 (TTAB 2001). The applicant’s competitor’s should not be precluded from accurately using the descriptive wording “SOCIAL ADS” to identify advertising services that are directed to the members of social networking sites, that feature the images of and/or content about members of social networking sites, and/or that are triggered by the actions of members of social networking sites. In determining the descriptiveness of a term or mark comprising more than one element, it is permissible to consider the significance of each element separately in the course of evaluating the term or mark as a whole. See In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1174-75, 71 USPQ2d 1370, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding PATENTS.COM merely descriptive of computer software for managing and tracking the status of database records when noting that “the PTO may [separately] consider the meaning of ‘patents’ and the meaning of ‘.com’ with respect to the goods identified in the application.”); In re Save Venice N.Y., Inc., 259 F.3d 1346, 1352, 59 USPQ2d 1778, 1782 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding a mark primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive for a variety of goods when noting that “[i]t is not erroneous, however, for the examiner to consider the significance of each element within the composite mark in the course of evaluating the mark as a whole.”); In re Med. Plastics, Inc., 192 USPQ 239, 240 (TTAB 1976) (holding a mark generic when noting that “[t]he Examiner did discuss each word in the mark separately in order to show that the term in its entirety was the apt name of the applicant’s goods. This is not the same thing as dissecting a mark.”). A mark that combines descriptive words may be registrable if the composite creates a unitary mark with a separate, nondescriptive meaning. In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551, 157 USPQ 382, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding SUGAR & SPICE not merely descriptive of bakery products because of the mark’s immediate association with the nursery rhyme “sugar and spice and everything nice”). However, the mere combination of descriptive words does not automatically create a new nondescriptive word or phrase. See, e.g., In re Associated Theatre Clubs Co., 9 USPQ2d 1660, 1662 (TTAB 1988) (holding GROUP SALES BOX OFFICE merely descriptive for theater ticket sales services). The registrability of a mark created by combining only descriptive words depends on whether a new and different commercial impression is created, and/or the mark created imparts an incongruous meaning as used in connection with the goods and/or services. TMEP §1209.03(d); e.g., In re Copytele, Inc., 31 USPQ2d 1540, 1542 (TTAB 1994); In re Associated Theatre Clubs, 9 USPQ2d at 1662. Where, as in this case, the combination of the descriptive words creates no incongruity, and no imagination is required to understand the nature of the goods and/or services, the mark is merely descriptive. Accordingly, the refusal is continued and maintained.

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If the applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, the applicant must also respond to the following. INFORMATION ABOUT SERVICES REQUIRED To permit proper examination of the application, applicant must submit additional information about the services. See 37 C.F.R. §2.61(b); In re Planalytics, Inc., 70 USPQ2d 1453, 1457-58 (TTAB 2004); TMEP §814. The requested information should include fact sheets, brochures, and/or advertisements. If these materials are unavailable, applicant should submit similar documentation for services of the same type, explaining how its own services will differ. If the services feature new technology and no information regarding competing services is available, applicant must provide a detailed factual description of the services. The submitted factual information must make clear what the services are and how they are rendered, their salient features, and their prospective customers and channels of trade. Conclusory statements regarding the services will not satisfy this requirement for information. Applicant should also provide responses to the following inquires about the applicant’s advertising services that are, or will be, provided in connection with the proposed mark: Do, or will, the services feature advertisements that are sent to the members of social networking sites? Do, or will, the services feature advertisements that are triggered by actions performed by members of social networking sites? Do, or will, the services feature advertisements that contain social content about members of social networking sites? Do, or will, the services feature advertisements that contain the images and/or names of members of social networking sites? Failure to respond to a request for information is an additional ground for refusing registration. See In re DTI P’ship LLP, 67 USPQ2d 1699, 1701-02 (TTAB 2003). Merely stating that information about the services is available on applicant’s website is an inappropriate response to a request for additional information and is insufficient to make the relevant information of record. See In re Planalytics, 70 USPQ2d at 1457-58.

John Kelly /jmck/ Trademark Attorney Law Office 117 571.272.9412 Fax: 571.273-9117 (official responses only)

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail. For technical assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney. Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses. If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451. STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

To: Subject: Sent: Sent As: Attachments:

Facebook, Inc. (trademarks@cooley.com) TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77287043 - SOCIALADS - N/A 8/25/2008 8:12:49 PM ECOM117@USPTO.GOV

IMPORTANT NOTICE
USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 8/25/2008 FOR APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77287043
Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

VIEW OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link http://tmportal.uspto.gov/external/portal/tow?DDA=Y&serial_number=77287043&doc_type=OOA&mail_date (or copy and paste this URL into the address field of your browser), or visit http://tmportal.uspto.gov/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action. PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this notification. RESPONSE MAY BE REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) if a response is required; (2) how to respond; and (3) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 8/25/2008. Do NOT hit “Reply”to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses. Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System response form at
http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm.

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail TDR@uspto.gov. Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action.

WARNING
1. The USPTO will NOT send a separate e-mail with the Office action attached. 2. Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.

Trademark Snap Shot Amendment & Mail Processing Stylesheet
(Table presents the data on Amendment & Mail Processing Complete)

OVERVIEW
SERIAL NUMBER REG NUMBER REGISTER INTL REG # TM ATTORNEY 77287043 0000000 PRINCIPAL N/A KELLY, JOHN M FILING DATE REG DATE MARK TYPE INTL REG DATE L.O. ASSIGNED 09/24/2007 N/A SERVICE MARK N/A M80-NOT FOUND

PUB INFORMATION
RUN DATE PUB DATE STATUS STATUS DATE LITERAL MARK ELEMENT DATE ABANDONED SECTION 2F SECTION 8 SECTION 15 RENEWAL FILED DATE AMEND REG 07/17/2008 N/A 661-RESPONSE AFTER NON-FINAL-ACTION-ENTERED 07/01/2008 SOCIALADS N/A NO NO NO NO N/A DATE CANCELLED SECTION 2F IN PART SECTION 8 IN PART REPUB 12C RENEWAL DATE N/A NO NO N/A N/A

FILING BASIS
FILED BASIS 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E 66A NO BASIS YES NO NO NO NO NO 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E 66A NO BASIS CURRENT BASIS NO YES NO NO NO NO 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E AMENDED BASIS NO YES NO NO

MARK DATA
STANDARD CHARACTER MARK YES

LITERAL MARK ELEMENT MARK DRAWING CODE COLOR DRAWING FLAG

SOCIALADS 4-STANDARD CHARACTER MARK NO

CURRENT OWNER INFORMATION
PARTY TYPE NAME ADDRESS ENTITY CITIZENSHIP 10-ORIGINAL APPLICANT Facebook, Inc. 156 University Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 03-CORPORATION Delaware

GOODS AND SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL CLASS DESCRIPTION TEXT 035 Advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet

GOODS AND SERVICES CLASSIFICATION
INTERNATIONAL 035 CLASS FIRST USE DATE NONE FIRST USE NONE IN COMMERCE DATE CLASS STATUS 6-ACTIVE

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION/STATEMENTS
CHANGE IN REGISTRATION PSEUDO MARK NO SOCIAL ADS

PROSECUTION HISTORY
DATE 07/16/2008 07/16/2008 07/14/2008 07/01/2008 06/30/2008 07/01/2008 06/30/2008 ENT CD ACEC CRFA MAIL TEME CRFA ALIE TROA ENT TYPE I I I I I A I DESCRIPTION AMENDMENT FROM APPLICANT ENTERED CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED IN LAW OFFICE PAPER RECEIVED TEAS/EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE ENTERED CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED IN LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED TO LIE TEAS RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION RECEIVED ENT NUM 015 014 013 012 011 010 009

04/30/2008 04/30/2008 12/31/2007 12/31/2007 12/31/2007 12/05/2007 09/28/2007 09/27/2007

ARAA REAP GNRN GNRT CNRT DOCK MPMK NWAP

I I O F R D O I

ATTORNEY REVOKED AND/OR APPOINTED TEAS REVOKE/APPOINT ATTORNEY RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF NON-FINAL ACTION E-MAILED NON-FINAL ACTION E-MAILED NON-FINAL ACTION WRITTEN ASSIGNED TO EXAMINER NOTICE OF PSEUDO MARK MAILED NEW APPLICATION ENTERED IN TRAM

008 007 006 005 004 003 002 001

CURRENT CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION
ATTORNEY CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS Anne H. Peck Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto CA 94306 NONE

DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE

Trademark Snap Shot Amendment to Delete or Correct Basis
(Table presents the data on Amendment to Delete or Correct Basis)

OVERVIEW
SERIAL NUMBER REG NUMBER REGISTER INTL REG # TM ATTORNEY 77287043 0000000 PRINCIPAL N/A KELLY, JOHN M FILING DATE REG DATE MARK TYPE INTL REG DATE L.O. ASSIGNED 09/24/2007 N/A SERVICE MARK N/A M80-NOT FOUND

PUB INFORMATION
RUN DATE PUB DATE STATUS STATUS DATE LITERAL MARK ELEMENT DATE ABANDONED SECTION 2F SECTION 8 SECTION 15 RENEWAL FILED DATE AMEND REG 07/17/2008 N/A 661-RESPONSE AFTER NON-FINAL-ACTION-ENTERED 07/01/2008 SOCIALADS N/A NO NO NO NO N/A DATE CANCELLED SECTION 2F IN PART SECTION 8 IN PART REPUB 12C RENEWAL DATE N/A NO NO N/A N/A

FILING BASIS
FILED BASIS 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E 66A NO BASIS YES NO NO NO NO NO 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E 66A NO BASIS CURRENT BASIS NO YES NO NO NO NO 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E AMENDED BASIS NO YES NO NO

MARK DATA
STANDARD CHARACTER MARK LITERAL MARK ELEMENT YES SOCIALADS

MARK DRAWING CODE COLOR DRAWING FLAG

4-STANDARD CHARACTER MARK NO

CURRENT OWNER INFORMATION
PARTY TYPE NAME ADDRESS ENTITY CITIZENSHIP 10-ORIGINAL APPLICANT Facebook, Inc. 156 University Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 03-CORPORATION Delaware

GOODS AND SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL CLASS DESCRIPTION TEXT 035 Advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet

GOODS AND SERVICES CLASSIFICATION
INTERNATIONAL 035 CLASS FIRST USE DATE NONE FIRST USE NONE IN COMMERCE DATE CLASS STATUS 6-ACTIVE

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION/STATEMENTS
CHANGE IN REGISTRATION PSEUDO MARK NO SOCIAL ADS

PROSECUTION HISTORY
DATE 07/16/2008 07/16/2008 07/14/2008 07/01/2008 06/30/2008 07/01/2008 06/30/2008 04/30/2008 ENT CD ACEC CRFA MAIL TEME CRFA ALIE TROA ARAA ENT TYPE I I I I I A I I DESCRIPTION AMENDMENT FROM APPLICANT ENTERED CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED IN LAW OFFICE PAPER RECEIVED TEAS/EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE ENTERED CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED IN LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED TO LIE TEAS RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION RECEIVED ATTORNEY REVOKED AND/OR APPOINTED ENT NUM 015 014 013 012 011 010 009 008

04/30/2008 12/31/2007 12/31/2007 12/31/2007 12/05/2007 09/28/2007 09/27/2007

REAP GNRN GNRT CNRT DOCK MPMK NWAP

I O F R D O I

TEAS REVOKE/APPOINT ATTORNEY RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF NON-FINAL ACTION E-MAILED NON-FINAL ACTION E-MAILED NON-FINAL ACTION WRITTEN ASSIGNED TO EXAMINER NOTICE OF PSEUDO MARK MAILED NEW APPLICATION ENTERED IN TRAM

007 006 005 004 003 002 001

CURRENT CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION
ATTORNEY CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS Anne H. Peck Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto CA 94306 NONE

DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE

Trademark Snap Shot Amendment & Mail Processing Stylesheet
(Table presents the data on Amendment & Mail Processing Complete)

OVERVIEW
SERIAL NUMBER REG NUMBER REGISTER INTL REG # TM ATTORNEY 77287043 0000000 PRINCIPAL N/A KELLY, JOHN M FILING DATE REG DATE MARK TYPE INTL REG DATE L.O. ASSIGNED 09/24/2007 N/A SERVICE MARK N/A M80-NOT FOUND

PUB INFORMATION
RUN DATE PUB DATE STATUS STATUS DATE LITERAL MARK ELEMENT DATE ABANDONED SECTION 2F SECTION 8 SECTION 15 RENEWAL FILED DATE AMEND REG 07/02/2008 N/A 661-RESPONSE AFTER NON-FINAL-ACTION-ENTERED 07/01/2008 SOCIALADS N/A NO NO NO NO N/A DATE CANCELLED SECTION 2F IN PART SECTION 8 IN PART REPUB 12C RENEWAL DATE N/A NO NO N/A N/A

FILING BASIS
FILED BASIS 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E 66A NO BASIS YES NO NO NO NO NO 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E 66A NO BASIS CURRENT BASIS YES NO NO NO NO NO 1 (a) 1 (b) 44D 44E AMENDED BASIS NO NO NO NO

MARK DATA
STANDARD CHARACTER MARK YES

LITERAL MARK ELEMENT MARK DRAWING CODE COLOR DRAWING FLAG

SOCIALADS 4-STANDARD CHARACTER MARK NO

CURRENT OWNER INFORMATION
PARTY TYPE NAME ADDRESS ENTITY CITIZENSHIP 10-ORIGINAL APPLICANT Facebook, Inc. 156 University Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301 03-CORPORATION Delaware

GOODS AND SERVICES
INTERNATIONAL CLASS DESCRIPTION TEXT 035 Advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet

GOODS AND SERVICES CLASSIFICATION
INTERNATIONAL 035 CLASS FIRST USE DATE 09/20/2007 FIRST USE 09/20/2007 IN COMMERCE DATE CLASS STATUS 6-ACTIVE

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION/STATEMENTS
CHANGE IN REGISTRATION PSEUDO MARK NO SOCIAL ADS

PROSECUTION HISTORY
DATE 07/01/2008 06/30/2008 07/01/2008 06/30/2008 04/30/2008 04/30/2008 12/31/2007 ENT CD TEME CRFA ALIE TROA ARAA REAP GNRN ENT TYPE I I A I I I O DESCRIPTION TEAS/EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE ENTERED CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED IN LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED TO LIE TEAS RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION RECEIVED ATTORNEY REVOKED AND/OR APPOINTED TEAS REVOKE/APPOINT ATTORNEY RECEIVED NOTIFICATION OF NON-FINAL ACTION E-MAILED ENT NUM 012 011 010 009 008 007 006

12/31/2007 12/31/2007 12/05/2007 09/28/2007 09/27/2007

GNRT CNRT DOCK MPMK NWAP

F R D O I

NON-FINAL ACTION E-MAILED NON-FINAL ACTION WRITTEN ASSIGNED TO EXAMINER NOTICE OF PSEUDO MARK MAILED NEW APPLICATION ENTERED IN TRAM

005 004 003 002 001

CURRENT CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION
ATTORNEY CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS Anne H. Peck Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto CA 94306 NONE

DOMESTIC REPRESENTATIVE

PTO Form 1957 (Rev 9/2005) OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp. 04/2009)

Response to Office Action
The table below presents the data as entered.
Input Field SERIAL NUMBER LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED 77287043 LAW OFFICE 117 Entered

MARK SECTION (no change) ARGUMENT(S) RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION Applicant Facebook, Inc. (“Applicant”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby responds as follows to Office Action No. 1 issued in the instant application on December 31, 2007. In the Office Action, the Examining Attorney expressed concern that the SOCIALADS mark (the “Mark” or “Applicant’s Mark”) is merely descriptive under Section 2(e), and that there may be a likelihood of confusion with prior pending applications. As discussed below, the Examining Attorney should permit the Application to proceed to publication because: · The Mark is suggestive rather than descriptive as it does not merely describe the claimed services, and a mental leap is required to connect Applicant’s Mark to its services and · There is no likelihood of confusion with the mark S.O.C.I.A.L. (the “Cited Mark”) since Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark convey distinct overall commercial impressions, and because the shared component, “social,” is a common word entitled to narrow protection. I. The Mark SOCIALADS is Not Merely Descriptive The Examining Attorney refused registration, claiming that the mark SOCIALADS is merely descriptive under Section 2(e). In support of this refusal, the Examining Attorney noted that the definition of “social” is “relating to interaction of people” and that the definition of “ads” is advertisement. However, Applicant respectfully disagrees with the Examining Attorney’s assessment

of the relationship between the Mark and the services claimed. Although the separate terms “social” and “ads” may have descriptive aspects, the composite mark SOCIALADS does not merely describe the services claimed in the Application. Moreover, the Mark does not immediately convey the nature of the services rendered under the Mark. For these reasons, the Mark is suggestive, rather than descriptive, of the claimed services. A. Applicant’s Mark is Not Merely Descriptive of the Claimed Services

Under the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (“TMEP”), descriptiveness must be determined in relation to the goods or services claimed in the application. See TMEP §§ 1209.01(b), 1209.03(e). In the instant case, the services claimed in the Application are “advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet.” Applicant respectfully submits that the evidence provided by the Examining Attorney in the issued Office Action does not tend to show that the Mark is merely descriptive of the services noted above. Although concededly “ads” is merely descriptive of an aspect of the claimed services, the term “social” is not similarly descriptive of advertising and information distribution services or promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet. Indeed, Applicant notes that there are over 20 registered marks that contain the term “social” that also claim services related to advertising or promotions. See Declaration of Anne H. Peck in Support of Response to Office Action (“Peck Decl.”), Exhibit A. The existence of these third-party registrations indicates that the term “social” is not merely descriptive of advertising or promotions services and, more particularly, that the composite mark SOCIALADS is not merely descriptive of the services claimed. B. Applicant’s Mark is Suggestive Because a Mental Leap is Required to Determine Applicant’s Services From Applicant’s Mark Applicant’s Mark is suggestive, rather than merely descriptive, because the Mark does not merely describe Applicant’s services. A mark is considered suggestive if it “requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.” See Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfs., Inc., 160 U.S.P.Q. 777, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Conversely, for a mark to be

considered merely descriptive, the connection between the mark and the applicant’s goods or services must be instantaneous. See Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Investment Banking Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1991). The multi-step reasoning in the Office Action actually shows that imagination, thought and perception is necessary to determine the nature of the Applicant’s services from Applicant’s Mark. The Examining Attorney first defines “social” as “relating to interaction of people,” then notes that “the applicant provides advertising that is based on user actions on its online social network” and then concludes that the Mark is merely descriptive because it refers to advertisements that are triggered by and/or relate to the interactions of people. This line of reasoning, taking several steps to get from SOCIALADS to Applicant’s services, shows that a mental leap is required, making the SOCIALADS mark suggestive, not merely descriptive. Applicant notes, however, that its services differ from those described by the Examining Attorney. The services offered under the SOCIALADS mark are not advertisements that are “triggered by and/or relate to the interactions of people.” The services, which are sold to companies purchasing marketing services, not to the individual users enjoying Applicant’s networking site, allow companies to target their advertising to a certain user based on characteristics of the profile of that user’s Facebook “friend.” For example, if a Facebook user’s friend has news delivered to their news-feed about

baseball, the company may choose to target that user for advertisements about sports-related clothing. As this example illustrates, the services actually have very little to do with “the interactions of people,” and more to do with the characteristics of Facebook user profiles – an aspect of Facebook that is not “social,” except in the most abstract sense. Because these services are even one step further removed from the analysis described above, the mental leap required between Applicant’s Mark and its services is even greater Applicant’s Mark is comparable to the one at issue in Airco, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. 832 (T.T.A.B. 1977). In Airco, the Board found that the mark “AIRCARE” for Applicant’s program for maintaining anesthesia and inhalation therapy equipment and hospital piping systems was not merely descriptive. The Board explained that, “[t]he literal meaning of the mark, namely, ‘care of the air’ may, through an exercise of mental gymnastics and extrapolation

suggest or hint at the nature of Applicant’s services, but it does not, in any clear or precise way, serve merely to describe Applicant’s preventative maintenance services….” Id. at 835. Similarly, as explained above, one must exercise metal gymnastics to make the connection between the mark SOCIALADS to Applicant’s advertising and marketing services based on the characteristics of Facebook profiles. The literal meaning of the mark, namely, “advertisements relating to the interaction between people” does not actually describe Applicant’s services. Moreover, because one must exercise “mature thought or follow a multi-stage reasoning process to determine attributes of the product or service,” and because “the mental leap between the word and the product’s attributes is not almost instantaneous,” Applicant’s Mark is suggestive, not descriptive. See 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11.67 (4th ed. 2004); see also In re Tennis In the Round, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 496, 498 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (TENNIS IN THE ROUND for a round tennis stadium was suggestive); In re TBG, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 759, 760 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (SHOWROOM ONLINE was suggestive, not descriptive, of the applicant’s services of leasing databases and video disks related to viewing interior furnishings). In determining whether a mark is suggestive or merely descriptive, any doubt should be resolved in the applicant’s favor. In re Bed-Check Corporation, 226 U.S.P.Q. 946, 948 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (holding SENSORMAT not merely descriptive of a pressure-sensitive pad placed under hospital patients for monitoring their movement in bed); see also In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, and in light of the arguments above, the Applicant respectfully requests that the Examining Attorney resolve all doubt in Applicant’s favor and find that Applicant’s mark is suggestive, not merely descriptive. II. Consumer Confusion Is Not Likely

The Examining Attorney also expressed concern that there may be a likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the marks in Application Nos. 77/028,006 and 77/163,257. Application No. 77/163,257 was abandoned on February 16, 2008, and thus should not block publication of Applicant’s mark. The remaining application, for the Cited Mark S.O.C.I.A.L., owned by Dave Networks, Inc., claims numerous services in International Classes 35, 38 and 42, including advertising and publicity services in Class 35.

As discussed below, consumer confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark is not likely because the marks are not identical, they convey distinct overall commercial impressions, the common portion of the marks is weak and entitled to relatively narrow protection, and the respective parties’ sophisticated customers are likely to exercise care in their purchasing decisions. A. The Marks Are Not Identical, And Convey Distinct Overall Commercial Impressions The marks at issue are not identical. Applicant’s Mark consists of two components, SOCIAL and ADS. And, as argued by the owner of the Cited Mark in its October 30, 2007 Office Action Response, the Cited Mark “consists of the term ‘S.O.C.I.A.L.,’ an acronym which stands for Social O nline Community IPTV Application Library.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit B. This unique spelling of the Cited Mark, and the fact that the acronym has another meaning, contributes to the difference in appearance, sound and connotation between the two marks. Visually, the marks are distinct. Applicant’s Mark contains a portion of the mark completely lacking in the Cited Mark, namely, “ADS.” In contrast, the Cited Mark is spelled with periods between each letter, and is intended to be identified as an acronym. Thus, the marks differ in appearance. The marks differ in sound as well. As the owner of the Cited Mark observed, because the Cited Mark is an acronym, it “may be pronounced either by using the word ‘SOCIAL,’ or through use of its individual components, ‘S-O-C-I-A-L.’” See id. This difference in pronunciation further distinguishes the marks. Also, as the owner of the Cited Mark successfully argued in overcoming a 2(d) rejection based on other “social” marks, “[b]ecause it is an acronym, the [Cited Mark] has an inherent and independent meaning that distinguishes it from an otherwise identical mark utilizing the term ‘SOCIAL.’” See id.

The Applicant agrees with this argument, supported by Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 786, 789-790 (1st Cir. 1983), which found two otherwise identical “ASTRA” marks distinguishable where one was an acronym. This inherent and independent meaning of the Cited Mark makes it easily distinguishable from Applicant’s Mark. Although the preceding analysis has focused mainly on the shared term “social,” in evaluating

likelihood of confusion, the marks must be regarded as a whole. See In re National Data Corp., 224, U.S.P.Q. 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nations Foodservice, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re MCI Communications Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1535, 1538-39 (Comm'r Pats. 1991). Unlike the Cited Mark, Applicant’s Mark includes the term SOCIAL as well a second term -“ADS.” In this way, Applicant’s Mark is similar to that in In re The Hearst Corporation, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Hearst, the court found that the mark VARGAS was not confusingly similar to the mark VARGA GIRL, and that the TTAB inappropriately analyzed the VARGA GIRL mark by stressing the “varga” term and discounting the “girl” term. The marks at issue in the instant Office Action cannot be compared based solely on the SOCIAL component, while discounting the term “ADS” in Applicant’s Mark. When properly viewed in their entireties, and considering the difference in spelling, pronunciation and connotation, SOCIALADS and S.O.C.I.A.L. are sufficiently different as to eliminate any real likelihood of confusion.

B.

The Number Of Similar Marks Reduces Consumer Confusion

Another determining factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis is the existence of other registered marks that include a similar term and claim similar or related goods or services. See, e.g., In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods is a factor to be considered in evaluating likelihood of confusion); see also TMEP § 1207.01 (the Examining Attorney should also consider the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods and services). When such marks exist, the likelihood of confusion is reduced. As the owner of the Cited Mark noted, there are “a number of trademark applications or registrations containing the term ‘Social’ all of which are owned by different parties…theterm ‘social’ is a common and weak term, easily distinguishable by the consumer when presented in a distinct manner or with an additional term.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit B. Indeed, Applicant’s search of the USPTO records revealed at least 270 active registrations that contain the term “social.” See Peck Decl.,

Exhibit C. Where similarity is based on the shared use of common terms, the terms should be considered weak and registration should not be impeded. See Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. The Quaker Oats Co., 216 U.S.P.Q. 770, 775 (D. N.J. 1982) (CREAMY WHEAT mark not likely to be confused with registered CREAM OF WHEAT mark, both used with enriched farina, even though the marks were similar, if not identical, and the products targeted to the same customers through the same channels of trade); see also Gruner + Jahr USA Publishing, Div. Of Gruner and Jahr Printing & Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1583 (2d Cir. 1993) (no likelihood of confusion between registrant’s PARENTS mark and applicant’s PARENT’S DIGEST mark, both used with magazines targeted to parents, because the common terms are in the public domain which lessens the possibility of confusion.); Greentree Laboratories v. G.G. Bean, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (D. Me. 1989) (ODOR KLEEN not likely to be confused with ODOKLEEN both used for products used to eliminate odors and overlap in customers and channels of trade). Likewise here, the only common element of the two marks is weak and therefore not entitled to a wide scope of protection. C. Consumer Sophistication Weighs Against a Likelihood of Confusion

It is well settled that likelihood of confusion is reduced where purchasers and potential purchasers are sophisticated. See Electronic Design and Sales v. E.D.S., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1388, 13921393 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also TMEP § 1207.01(d)(vii) (care in purchasing tends to minimize the likelihood of confusion). The sophistication of the purchasers of services offered under the respective marks weighs against finding a likelihood of confusion. The Cited Mark owner noted that its services relate to computer, software and other information technologies, and that “[c]onsumers in this field are highly educated, and they exercise a significant degree of care in choosing products and services.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit B. Similarly, the purchasers of the services offered under Applicant’s Mark are business professionals making important decisions about how to spend their advertising dollars. Such professionals are generally well educated and exercise a high level of care in making important business decisions. Because they are sophisticated, Applicant’s customers are not likely to be confused into thinking Applicant’s services originate from

or are sponsored by the owner of the Cited Mark. Similarly, purchasers of services offered under the Cited Mark are not likely to be confused in purchasing decisions by the existence of Applicant’s Mark. This too weighs against a likelihood of consumer confusion. In light of the above, Applicant respectfully requests that the Examining Attorney withdraw the conclusion that there may be a likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark and allow this Application to proceed to publication. In the alternative, Applicant requests suspension of this Application pending disposition of the Application No. 77/028,006. Applicant specifically reserves the right to submit additional arguments and evidence in the future to illustrate that there is no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark. III. Amendment to Filing Basis

In response to the Examining Attorney’s request for a Specimen of Use, Applicant hereby amends the filing basis of this instant application from section 1(a) to section 1(b), per the Amendment to Filing Basis, filed separately. IV. Conclusion

Applicant respectfully submits that it has addressed each of the Examining Attorney’s concerns. Applicant has established that its Mark is suggestive, rather than merely descriptive, because the Mark does not merely describe the claimed services, and because a mental leap is required in understanding the relationship between Applicant’s Mark and its services. Also, Applicant has demonstrated that there is no likelihood of confusion between its mark and the Cited Mark. Consumer confusion is not likely because the marks differ in sight, sound, and connotation, and because the shared term “social” is so common and weak that the respective mark owners’ sophisticated customers are not likely to confuse the source of the respective services. Finally, Applicant is responding to the outstanding request for a Specimen of Use by amending the filing basis to 1(b). Applicant therefore requests that the Examining Attorney withdraw the refusal to register, and allow the application to proceed to publication. EVIDENCE SECTION
EVIDENCE FILE NAME(S)

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DESCRIPTION OF EVIDENCE FILE

Exemplars of third party registrations and third party office action response

SIGNATURE SECTION
RESPONSE SIGNATURE SIGNATORY'S NAME SIGNATORY'S POSITION DATE SIGNED AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

/anne h. peck/ Anne H. Peck Attorney of record 06/30/2008 YES

FILING INFORMATION SECTION
SUBMIT DATE

Mon Jun 30 19:45:23 EDT 2008 USPTO/ROA-209.10.219.19620080630194523450700-7728 7043-42053aa1e3034766985d

TEAS STAMP

3368552c930c698-N/A-N/A-2 0080630193502244271

PTO Form 1957 (Rev 9/2005) OMB No. 0651-0050 (Exp. 04/2009)

Response to Office Action To the Commissioner for Trademarks:
Application serial no. 77287043 has been amended as follows: ARGUMENT(S) In response to the substantive refusal(s), please note the following: RESPONSE TO OFFICE ACTION Applicant Facebook, Inc. (“Applicant”), by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby responds as follows to Office Action No. 1 issued in the instant application on December 31, 2007. In the Office Action, the Examining Attorney expressed concern that the SOCIALADS mark (the “Mark” or “Applicant’s Mark”) is merely descriptive under Section 2(e), and that there may be a likelihood of confusion with prior pending applications. As discussed below, the Examining Attorney should permit the Application to proceed to publication because: · The Mark is suggestive rather than descriptive as it does not merely describe the claimed services, and a mental leap is required to connect Applicant’s Mark to its services and · There is no likelihood of confusion with the mark S.O.C.I.A.L. (the “Cited Mark”) since Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark convey distinct overall commercial impressions, and because the shared component, “social,” is a common word entitled to narrow protection. I. The Mark SOCIALADS is Not Merely Descriptive The Examining Attorney refused registration, claiming that the mark SOCIALADS is merely descriptive under Section 2(e). In support of this refusal, the Examining Attorney noted that the definition of “social” is “relating to interaction of people” and that the definition of “ads” is advertisement. However, Applicant respectfully disagrees with the Examining Attorney’s assessment of the relationship

between the Mark and the services claimed. Although the separate terms “social” and “ads” may have descriptive aspects, the composite mark SOCIALADS does not merely describe the services claimed in the Application. Moreover, the Mark does not immediately convey the nature of the services rendered under the Mark. For these reasons, the Mark is suggestive, rather than descriptive, of the claimed services. A. Applicant’s Mark is Not Merely Descriptive of the Claimed Services

Under the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (“TMEP”), descriptiveness must be determined in relation to the goods or services claimed in the application. See TMEP §§ 1209.01(b), 1209.03(e). In the instantcase, the services claimed in the Application are “advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet.” Applicant respectfully submits that the evidence provided by the Examining Attorney in the issued Office Action does not tend to show that the Mark is merely descriptive of the services noted above. Although concededly “ads” is merely descriptive of an aspect of the claimed services, the term “social” is not similarly descriptive of advertising and information distribution services or promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet. Indeed, Applicant notes that there are over 20 registered marks that contain the term “social” that also claim services related to advertising or promotions. See Declaration of Anne H. Peck in Support of Response to Office Action (“Peck Decl.”), Exhibit A. The existence of these third-party registrations indicates that the term “social” is not merely descriptive of advertising or promotions services and, more particularly, that the composite mark SOCIALADS is not merely descriptive of the services claimed. B. Applicant’s Mark is Suggestive Because a Mental Leap is Required to Determine Applicant’s Services From Applicant’s Mark Applicant’s Mark is suggestive, rather than merely descriptive, because the Mark does not merely describe Applicant’s services. A mark is considered suggestive if it “requires imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of the goods.” See Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfs., Inc., 160 U.S.P.Q. 777, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Conversely, for a mark to be considered

merely descriptive, the connection between the mark and the applicant’s goods or services must be instantaneous. See Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Investment Banking Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1056 (11th Cir. 1991). The multi-step reasoning in the Office Action actually shows that imagination, thought and perception is necessary to determine the nature of the Applicant’s services from Applicant’s Mark. The Examining Attorney first defines “social” as “relating to interaction of people,” then notes that “the applicant provides advertising that is based on user actions on its online social network” and then concludes that the Mark is merely descriptive because it refers to advertisements that are triggered by and/or relate to the interactions of people. This line of reasoning, taking several steps to get from SOCIALADS to Applicant’s services, shows that a mental leap is required, making the SOCIALADS mark suggestive, not merely descriptive. Applicant notes, however, that its services differ from those described by the Examining Attorney. The services offered under the SOCIALADS mark are not advertisements that are “triggered by and/or relate to the interactions of people.” The services, which are sold to companies purchasing marketing services, not to the individual users enjoying Applicant’s networking site, allow companies to target their advertising to a certain user based on characteristics of the profile of that user’s Facebook “friend.” For example, if a Facebook user’s friend has news delivered to their news-feed about baseball, the company may choose to target that user for advertisements about sports-related clothing. As this example illustrates, the services actually have very little to do with “the interactions of people,” and more to do with the characteristics of Facebook user profiles – an aspect of Facebook that is not “social,” except in the most abstract sense. Because these services are even one step further removed from the analysis described above, the mental leap required between Applicant’s Mark and its services is even greater Applicant’s Mark is comparable to the one at issue in Airco, Inc. v. Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., 196 U.S.P.Q. 832 (T.T.A.B. 1977). In Airco, the Board found that the mark “AIR-CARE” for Applicant’s program for maintaining anesthesia and inhalation therapy equipment and hospital piping systems was not merely descriptive. The Board explained that, “[t]he literal meaning of the mark, namely, ‘care of the air’ may, through an exercise of mental gymnastics and extrapolation suggest or hint at the nature of Applicant’s services, but it does not, in any clear or precise way, serve merely to describe

Applicant’s preventative maintenance services….” Id. at 835. Similarly, as explained above, one must exercise metal gymnastics to make the connection between the mark SOCIALADS to Applicant’s advertising and marketing services based on the characteristics of Facebook profiles. The literal meaning of the mark, namely, “advertisements relating to the interaction between people” does not actually describe Applicant’s services. Moreover, because one must exercise “mature thought or follow a multistage reasoning process to determine attributes of the product or service,” and because “the mental leap between the word and the product’s attributes is not almost instantaneous,” Applicant’s Mark is suggestive, not descriptive. See 2 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11.67 (4th ed. 2004); see also In re Tennis In the Round, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 496, 498 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (TENNIS IN THE ROUND for a round tennis stadium was suggestive); In re TBG, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 759, 760 (T.T.A.B. 1986) (SHOWROOM ONLINE was suggestive, not descriptive, of the applicant’s services of leasing databases and video disks related to viewing interior furnishings). In determining whether a mark is suggestive or merely descriptive, any doubt should be resolved in the applicant’s favor. In re Bed-Check Corporation, 226 U.S.P.Q. 946, 948 (T.T.A.B. 1985) (holding SENSORMAT not merely descriptive of a pressure-sensitive pad placed under hospital patients for monitoring their movement in bed); see also In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1141, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, and in light of the arguments above, the Applicant respectfully requests that the Examining Attorney resolve all doubt in Applicant’s favor and find that Applicant’s mark is suggestive, not merely descriptive. II. Consumer Confusion Is Not Likely

The Examining Attorney also expressed concern that there may be a likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the marks in Application Nos. 77/028,006 and 77/163,257. Application No. 77/163,257 was abandoned on February 16, 2008, and thus should not block publication of Applicant’s mark. The remaining application, for the Cited Mark S.O.C.I.A.L., owned by Dave Networks, Inc., claims numerous services in International Classes 35, 38 and 42, including advertising and publicity services in Class 35. As discussed below, consumer confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark is not likely because the marks are not identical, they convey distinct overall commercial impressions, the

common portion of the marks is weak and entitled to relatively narrow protection, and the respective parties’ sophisticated customers are likely to exercise care in their purchasing decisions. A. The Marks Are Not Identical, And Convey Distinct Overall Commercial Impressions The marks at issue are not identical. Applicant’s Mark consists of two components, SOCIAL and ADS. And, as argued by the owner of the Cited Mark in its October 30, 2007 Office Action Response, the Cited Mark “consists of the term ‘S.O.C.I.A.L.,’ an acronym which stands for Social Online C

ommunity IPTV Application Library.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit B. This unique spelling of the Cited Mark, and the fact that the acronym has another meaning, contributes to the difference in appearance, sound and connotation between the two marks. Visually, the marks are distinct. Applicant’s Mark contains a portion of the mark completely lacking in the Cited Mark, namely, “ADS.” In contrast, the Cited Mark is spelled with periods between each letter, and is intended to be identified as an acronym. Thus, the marks differ in appearance. The marks differ in sound as well. As the owner of the Cited Mark observed, because the Cited Mark is an acronym, it “may be pronounced either by using the word ‘SOCIAL,’ or through use of its individual components, ‘S-O-C-I-A-L.’” the marks. Also, as the owner of the Cited Mark successfully argued in overcoming a 2(d) rejection based on other “social” marks, “[b]ecause it is an acronym, the [Cited Mark] has an inherent and independent meaning that distinguishes it from an otherwise identical mark utilizing the term ‘SOCIAL.’” See id. See id. This difference in pronunciation further distinguishes

The Applicant agrees with this argument, supported by Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 786, 789-790 (1st Cir. 1983), which found two otherwise identical “ASTRA” marks distinguishable where one was an acronym. This inherent and independent meaning of the Cited Mark makes it easily distinguishable from Applicant’s Mark. Although the preceding analysis has focused mainly on the shared term “social,” in evaluating likelihood of confusion, the marks must be regarded as a whole. See In re National Data Corp., 224, U.S.P.Q. 749 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Specialty Brands, Inc. v. Coffee Bean Distributors, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q. 1281

(Fed. Cir. 1984); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nations Foodservice, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 390 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Schwarzkopf v. John H. Breck, Inc., 144 U.S.P.Q. 433 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re MCI Communications Corp., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1535, 1538-39 (Comm'r Pats. 1991). Unlike the Cited Mark, Applicant’s Mark includes the term SOCIAL as well a second term -“ADS.” In this way, Applicant’s Mark is similar to that in In re The Hearst Corporation, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Hearst, the court found that the mark VARGAS was not confusingly similar to the mark VARGA GIRL, and that the TTAB inappropriately analyzed the VARGA GIRL mark by stressing the “varga” term and discounting the “girl” term. The marks at issue in the instant Office Action cannot be compared based solely on the SOCIAL component, while discounting the term “ADS” in Applicant’s Mark. When properly viewed in their entireties, and considering the difference in spelling, pronunciation and connotation, SOCIALADS and S.O.C.I.A.L. are sufficiently different as to eliminate any real likelihood of confusion.

B.

The Number Of Similar Marks Reduces Consumer Confusion

Another determining factor in a likelihood of confusion analysis is the existence of other registered marks that include a similar term and claim similar or related goods or services. See, e.g., In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 177 U.S.P.Q. 563 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods is a factor to be considered in evaluating likelihood of confusion); see also TMEP § 1207.01 (the Examining Attorney should also consider the number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods and services). When such marks exist, the likelihood of confusion is reduced. As the owner of the Cited Mark noted, there are “a number of trademark applications or registrations containing the term ‘Social’ all of which are owned by different parties…theterm ‘social’ is a common and weak term, easily distinguishable by the consumer when presented in a distinct manner or with an additional term.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit B. Indeed, Applicant’s search of the USPTO records revealed at least 270 active registrations that contain the term “social.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit C. Where similarity is based on the shared use of common terms, the terms should be considered weak and registration should not be impeded. See Nabisco Brands, Inc. v. The Quaker Oats Co., 216

U.S.P.Q. 770, 775 (D. N.J. 1982) (CREAMY WHEAT mark not likely to be confused with registered CREAM OF WHEAT mark, both used with enriched farina, even though the marks were similar, if not identical, and the products targeted to the same customers through the same channels of trade); see also Gruner + Jahr USA Publishing, Div. Of Gruner and Jahr Printing & Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1583 (2d Cir. 1993) (no likelihood of confusion between registrant’s PARENTS mark and applicant’s PARENT’S DIGEST mark, both used with magazines targeted to parents, because the common terms are in the public domain which lessens the possibility of confusion.); Greentree Laboratories v. G.G. Bean, Inc., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (D. Me. 1989) (ODOR KLEEN not likely to be confused with ODOKLEEN both used for products used to eliminate odors and overlap in customers and channels of trade). Likewise here, the only common element of the two marks is weak and therefore not entitled to a wide scope of protection. C. Consumer Sophistication Weighs Against a Likelihood of Confusion

It is well settled that likelihood of confusion is reduced where purchasers and potential purchasers are sophisticated. See Electronic Design and Sales v. E.D.S., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1388, 1392-1393 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also TMEP § 1207.01(d)(vii) (care in purchasing tends to minimize the likelihood of confusion). The sophistication of the purchasers of services offered under the respective marks weighs against finding a likelihood of confusion. The Cited Mark owner noted that its services relate to computer, software and other information technologies, and that “[c]onsumers in this field are highly educated, and they exercise a significant degree of care in choosing products and services.” See Peck Decl., Exhibit B. Similarly, the purchasers of the services offered under Applicant’s Mark are business professionals making important decisions about how to spend their advertising dollars. Such professionals are generally well educated and exercise a high level of care in making important business decisions. Because they are sophisticated, Applicant’s customers are not likely to be confused into thinking Applicant’s services originate from or are sponsored by the owner of the Cited Mark. Similarly, purchasers of services offered under the Cited Mark are not likely to be confused in purchasing decisions by the existence of Applicant’s Mark. This too weighs against a likelihood of consumer confusion.

In light of the above, Applicant respectfully requests that the Examining Attorney withdraw the conclusion that there may be a likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark and allow this Application to proceed to publication. In the alternative, Applicant requests suspension of this Application pending disposition of the Application No. 77/028,006. Applicant specifically reserves the right to submit additional arguments and evidence in the future to illustrate that there is no likelihood of confusion between Applicant’s Mark and the Cited Mark. III. Amendment to Filing Basis

In response to the Examining Attorney’s request for a Specimen of Use, Applicant hereby amends the filing basis of this instant application from section 1(a) to section 1(b), per the Amendment to Filing Basis, filed separately. IV. Conclusion

Applicant respectfully submits that it has addressed each of the Examining Attorney’s concerns. Applicant has established that its Mark is suggestive, rather than merely descriptive, because the Mark does not merely describe the claimed services, and because a mental leap is required in understanding the relationship between Applicant’s Mark and its services. Also, Applicant has demonstrated that there is no likelihood of confusion between its mark and the Cited Mark. Consumer confusion is not likely because the marks differ in sight, sound, and connotation, and because the shared term “social” is so common and weak that the respective mark owners’ sophisticated customers are not likely to confuse the source of the respective services. Finally, Applicant is responding to the outstanding request for a Specimen of Use by amending the filing basis to 1(b). Applicant therefore requests that the Examining Attorney withdraw the refusal to register, and allow the application to proceed to publication. EVIDENCE Evidence in the nature of Exemplars of third party registrations and third party office action response has been attached. Original PDF file: evi_20910219196-193502244_._SOCIALADS_Exhibit_A.pdf Converted PDF file(s) (70 pages) Evidence-1

Evidence-2 Evidence-3 Evidence-4 Evidence-5 Evidence-6 Evidence-7 Evidence-8 Evidence-9 Evidence-10 Evidence-11 Evidence-12 Evidence-13 Evidence-14 Evidence-15 Evidence-16 Evidence-17 Evidence-18 Evidence-19 Evidence-20 Evidence-21 Evidence-22 Evidence-23 Evidence-24 Evidence-25 Evidence-26 Evidence-27 Evidence-28 Evidence-29 Evidence-30 Evidence-31 Evidence-32 Evidence-33 Evidence-34 Evidence-35 Evidence-36 Evidence-37 Evidence-38 Evidence-39 Evidence-40 Evidence-41 Evidence-42 Evidence-43 Evidence-44 Evidence-45 Evidence-46 Evidence-47 Evidence-48

Evidence-49 Evidence-50 Evidence-51 Evidence-52 Evidence-53 Evidence-54 Evidence-55 Evidence-56 Evidence-57 Evidence-58 Evidence-59 Evidence-60 Evidence-61 Evidence-62 Evidence-63 Evidence-64 Evidence-65 Evidence-66 Evidence-67 Evidence-68 Evidence-69 Evidence-70 Original PDF file: evi_20910219196-193502244_._SOCIALADS_Exhibit_B.pdf Converted PDF file(s) (14 pages) Evidence-1 Evidence-2 Evidence-3 Evidence-4 Evidence-5 Evidence-6 Evidence-7 Evidence-8 Evidence-9 Evidence-10 Evidence-11 Evidence-12 Evidence-13 Evidence-14 Original PDF file: evi_20910219196-193502244_._SOCIALADS_Exhibit_C.pdf Converted PDF file(s) (10 pages) Evidence-1 Evidence-2 Evidence-3 Evidence-4 Evidence-5

Evidence-6 Evidence-7 Evidence-8 Evidence-9 Evidence-10 Original PDF file: evi_20910219196-193502244_._SOCIALADS_Declaration.pdf Converted PDF file(s) (2 pages) Evidence-1 Evidence-2 SIGNATURE(S) Response Signature Signature: /anne h. peck/ Date: 06/30/2008 Signatory's Name: Anne H. Peck Signatory's Position: Attorney of record The signatory has confirmed that he/she is an attorney who is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a U.S. state, which includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions; and he/she is currently the applicant's attorney or an associate thereof; and to the best of his/her knowledge, if prior to his/her appointment another U.S. attorney or a Canadian attorney/agent not currently associated with his/her company/firm previously represented the applicant in this matter: (1) the applicant has filed or is concurrently filing a signed revocation of or substitute power of attorney with the USPTO; (2) the USPTO has granted the request of the prior representative to withdraw; (3) the applicant has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her in this matter; or (4) the applicant's appointed U.S. attorney or Canadian attorney/agent has filed a power of attorney appointing him/her as an associate attorney in this matter. Serial Number: 77287043 Internet Transmission Date: Mon Jun 30 19:45:23 EDT 2008 TEAS Stamp: USPTO/ROA-209.10.219.196-200806301945234 50700-77287043-42053aa1e3034766985d33685 52c930c698-N/A-N/A-20080630193502244271

PTO Form 2196 (Rev 9/2005) OMB No. 0651-0056 (Exp 09/30/2011)

Revocation of Attorney/Domestic Representative and/or Appointment of Attorney/Domestic Representative
The table below presents the data as entered.
Input Field SERIAL NUMBER LAW OFFICE ASSIGNED MARK SECTION
MARK

Entered 77287043 LAW OFFICE 117

SOCIALADS

ATTORNEY SECTION HAROLD J. MILSTEIN HELLER EHRMAN LLP 41446-1000 275 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3506 650-324-0638 650-324-7000 sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com

ORIGINAL ADDRESS

CORRESPONDENCE SECTION HAROLD J. MILSTEIN HELLER EHRMAN LLP 41446-1000 275 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3506 650-324-0638 650-324-7000 sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com Janet L. Cullum, Peter J. Willsey, John W. Crittenden, Todd S. Bontemps, Gretchen Stroud, Susan BerneyKey, Emily Burns, Christine DuBois, Heather Dunn Navarro

ORIGINAL ADDRESS

NEW OTHER APPOINTED ATTORNEYS

NEW ATTORNEY ADDRESS By submission of this request, the undersigned REVOKES the power of attorney currently of record,

STATEMENT TEXT

as listed above, and hereby APPOINTS the following new attorney.
NAME FIRM NAME STREET CITY STATE COUNTRY POSTAL/ZIP CODE PHONE FAX EMAIL ATTORNEY AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA E-MAIL

Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto California United States 94306 (650) 843-5000 (650) 849-7400 trademarks@cooley.com YES

NEW CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS
NAME FIRM NAME STREET CITY STATE COUNTRY POSTAL/ZIP CODE PHONE FAX EMAIL AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA E-MAIL

Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto California United States 94306 (650) 843-5000 (650) 849-7400 trademarks@cooley.com YES

SIGNATURE SECTION
SIGNATURE SIGNATORY NAME SIGNATORY DATE

/Michael Richter/ Michael Richter 04/30/2008

SIGNATORY POSITION

Deputy General Counsel IP & Product

FILING INFORMATION SECTION
SUBMIT DATE

Wed Apr 30 17:27:18 EDT 2008 USPTO/RAA-209.10.219.19620080430172718773797-7857 4726-4005374826efdbf5513d ccdb620e1ed20-N/A-N/A-200 80430170355236604

TEAS STAMP

PTO Form 2196 (Rev 9/2005) OMB No. 0651-0056 (Exp 09/30/2011)

Revocation of Attorney/Domestic Representative and/or Appointment of Attorney/Domestic Representative
To the Commissioner for Trademarks: MARK: SOCIALADS SERIAL NUMBER: 77287043 The original attorney HAROLD J. MILSTEIN HELLER EHRMAN LLP 41446-1000 275 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3506 650-324-0638 650-324-7000 sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com Original Correspondence Address : HAROLD J. MILSTEIN HELLER EHRMAN LLP 275 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3506 650-324-0638 650-324-7000 sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com By submission of this request, the undersigned REVOKES the power of attorney currently of record, as

listed above, and hereby APPOINTS the following new attorney. In addition, any additional previouslyappointed attorneys that are currently listed in the application are replaced with the new "Other Appointed Attorneys" listed below. Newly Appointed Attorney: Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto, California 94306 United States (650) 843-5000 (650) 849-7400 Other Appointed Attorneys: Janet L. Cullum, Peter J. Willsey, John W. Crittenden, Todd S. Bontemps, Gretchen Stroud, Susan Berney-Key, Emily Burns, Christine DuBois, Heather Dunn Navarro The following is to be used as the correspondence address: Anne H. Peck COOLEY GODWARD KRONISH LLP 3000 El Camino Real, Five Palo Alto Sq. Palo Alto, California 94306 United States (650) 843-5000 (650) 849-7400 trademarks@cooley.com

Signature: /Michael Richter/ Date: 04/30/2008 Signatory's Name: Michael Richter Signatory's Position: Deputy General Counsel IP & Product Serial Number: 77287043 Internet Transmission Date: Wed Apr 30 17:27:18 EDT 2008 TEAS Stamp: USPTO/RAA-209.10.219.196-200804301727187 73797-78574726-4005374826efdbf5513dccdb6 20e1ed20-N/A-N/A-20080430170355236604

To: Subject: Sent: Sent As:

Facebook, Inc. (sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com) TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77287043 - SOCIALADS - 414461000 12/31/2007 8:12:30 PM ECOM117@USPTO.GOV

Attachments: Attachment - 1 Attachment - 2 Attachment - 3 Attachment - 4 Attachment - 5 Attachment - 6 Attachment - 7 Attachment - 8 Attachment - 9 Attachment - 10 Attachment - 11 Attachment - 12 Attachment - 13 Attachment - 14 Attachment - 15 Attachment - 16 Attachment - 17 Attachment - 18 Attachment - 19 Attachment - 20

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
SERIAL NO: 77/287043

MARK: SOCIALADS

*77287043*

CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS: HAROLD J. MILSTEIN HELLER EHRMAN LLP 275 MIDDLEFIELD ROAD MENLO PARK, CA 94025-3506

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm
GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm
APPLICANT: Facebook, Inc.

CORRESPONDENT’S REFERENCE/DOCKET NO: 41446-1000 CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS: sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com

OFFICE ACTION
TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE. ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 12/31/2007 The assigned examining attorney has reviewed the referenced application and determined the following. REFUSAL OF REGISTRATION: MARK IS MERELY DESCRIPTIVE OF THE SERVICES The examining attorney refuses registration on the Principal Register because the proposed mark merely describes the services. Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(e)(1); TMEP section 1209 et seq. A mark is merely descriptive under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. 1052(e)(1), if it describes an ingredient, quality, characteristic, function, feature, purpose or use of the relevant goods or service. In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 3 USPQ2d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 229 USPQ 818 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re MetPath Inc., 223 USPQ 88 (TTAB 1984); In re Bright?Crest, Ltd. , 204 USPQ 591 (TTAB 1979); TMEP section 1209.01(b). The applicant has applied to register the mark SOCIALADS for “advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet” in International Class 35. The definition of SOCIAL is: “relating to interaction of people.” (See attached definition.) The definition of “AD” is: “advertisement”. The mark immediately describes and names the characteristics and features of the services, namely, it refers to advertisements that are triggered by and/or relate to the interactions of people. The examining attorney also refers to the excerpted articles from the examining attorney's search in a computerized data base which show that the applicant provides advertising that is based on user actions on its online social network. Accordingly, the mark is refused registration on the Principal Register under Section 2(e)(1) of Trademark Act.

Although the examining attorney has refused registration, the applicant may respond to the refusal to register by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration. If the applicant chooses to respond to the refusal to register, the applicant must also respond to the following. Specimen Omitted The application is incomplete because it does not include the required specimen showing use of the applied-for mark in commerce for the goods and/or services identified in the application. An application based on Section 1(a) of the Trademark Act must include a specimen showing the appliedfor mark in use in commerce for each class of goods and/or services. Trademark Act Sections 1(a) and 45, 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56; TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). Therefore, applicant must submit the following: (1) A specimen (i.e., an example of how applicant actually uses its mark in commerce) for each class of goods and/or services based on use in commerce; and (2) The following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “The specimen was in use in commerce at least as early as the filing date of the application.” 37 C.F.R. §2.56(a); TMEP §904.05. If submitting a specimen requires an amendment to the dates of use, applicant must also verify the amended dates. 37 C.F.R. §2.71(c). Examples of specimens for goods are tags, labels, instruction manuals, containers, photographs that show the mark on the goods or packaging, or displays associated with the goods at their point of sale. TMEP §§904.03 et seq. Examples of specimens for services are signs, photographs, brochures, website printouts or advertisements that show the mark used in the sale or advertising of the services. TMEP §§1301.04 et seq. If applicant cannot satisfy the above requirements, applicant may amend the Section 1(a) filing basis (use in commerce) to Section 1(b) (intent to use basis), for which no specimen is required. However, should applicant amend the basis to Section 1(b), registration cannot be granted until applicant later amends the application back to use in commerce by filing an acceptable allegation of use with a proper specimen. 15 U.S.C. §1051(c); 37 C.F.R. §§2.76, 2.88; TMEP Chapter 1100. In order to amend to Section 1(b), applicant must submit the following statement, verified with an affidavit or signed declaration under 37 C.F.R. §2.20: “Applicant has had a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods or services listed in the application as of the filing date of the application.” 15 U.S.C. §1051(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(2) and 2.35(b)(1); TMEP §806.03(c). Pending a proper response, registration is refused because applicant has not provided evidence of use in commerce of the applied-for mark. 15 U.S.C. §§1051(a), 1127; 37 C.F.R. §§2.34(a)(1)(iv), 2.56; TMEP §§904, 904.07(a). Prior Pending Applications The examining attorney has searched the Office records and has found no similar registered mark which bars registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d). TMEP section

1105.01. Please note that the examining attorney has found potentially conflicting pending applications. The examining attorney encloses information regarding pending Application Serial Nos. 77028006 and 77163257. The filing dates of the referenced applications precede the applicant's filing date. There may be a likelihood of confusion between the marks under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d). If any of the referenced applications mature into a registration, the examining attorney may refuse registration in this case under Section 2(d). 37 C.F.R. Section 2.83; TMEP section 1208.01. The applicant may present arguments related to the potential conflict between the relevant applications or other arguments. The applicant's election to present or not to present arguments at this time will not affect the applicant's right to present arguments later.

John Kelly /jmck/ Trademark Attorney Law Office 117 571.272.9412 Fax: 571.273-9117 (official responses only)

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: If there are any questions about the Office action, please contact the assigned examining attorney. A response to this Office action should be filed using the form available at http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm. If notification of this Office action was received via email, no response using this form may be filed for 72 hours after receipt of the notification. Do not attempt to respond by e-mail as the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses. If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451. STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at http://tarr.uspto.gov. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

To: Subject: Sent: Sent As: Attachments:

Facebook, Inc. (sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com) TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77287043 - SOCIALADS - 414461000 12/31/2007 8:12:34 PM ECOM117@USPTO.GOV

IMPORTANT NOTICE
USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 12/31/2007 FOR APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77287043
Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

VIEW OFFICE ACTION: Click on this link http://tmportal.uspto.gov/external/portal/tow?DDA=Y&serial_number=77287043&doc_type=OOA&mail_date (or copy and paste this URL into the address field of your browser), or visit http://tmportal.uspto.gov/external/portal/tow and enter the application serial number to access the Office action. PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this notification. RESPONSE MAY BE REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) if a response is required; (2) how to respond; and (3) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 12/31/2007. Do NOT hit “Reply”to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses. Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System response form at
http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm.

HELP: For technical assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail TDR@uspto.gov. Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action.

WARNING
1. The USPTO will NOT send a separate e-mail with the Office action attached. 2. Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in

the ABANDONMENT of your application.

*** User:jkelly *** # Total Dead Marks 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 22 1064 1079 0 0 1131 181485 51 2 135 86 705 389 105 284 Marks 0 0 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A N/A 22 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0

Live Viewed Docs 1 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 0 0 105 284

Live Viewed Images 1 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 89 220

Status/ Search Duration 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:02 0:02 0:01 T/0:02 0:08 0:02 0:02 0:01 0:01 0:01

Search

77287043[SN] Facebook[on] *social*[bi,ti] *so{"csz"}{v:3}al*[bi,ti] *so{"csz"}h{v:3}al*[bi,ti] *{"csz"}o{"csz"}h{v:3}al*[bi,ti] *{"csz"}o{"csz"}{v:3}al*[bi,ti] *ad*[bi,ti] 7 and 8 4 and ad$[gs] 4 and ad$[gs] 4 and promot$[gs] 4 and 035[cc] (11 12 13) not dead[ld] 14 and 035[ic] 14 not 15

Session started 12/31/2007 5:26:12 PM Session finished 12/31/2007 5:46:06 PM Total search duration 0 minutes 28 seconds Session duration 19 minutes 54 seconds Defaut NEAR limit=1ADJ limit=1

Sent to TICRS as Serial Number: 77287043

From: Sent: To: Subject:

TMDesignCodeComments Friday, September 28, 2007 00:09 AM sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com Notice of Pseudo Mark for Serial Number: 77287043

ATTORNEY REFERENCE NUMBER:

41446-1000

The USPTO may assign pseudo marks, as appropriate, to new applications to assist in searching the USPTO database for conflicting marks. They have no legal significance and will not appear on the registration certificate.A PSEUDO MARK

may be assigned to marks that include words, numbers, compound words, symbols, or acronyms that can have alternative spellings or meanings. For example, if the mark comprises the words 'YOU ARE' surrounded by a design of a box, the pseudo mark field in the USPTO database would display the mark as 'YOU ARE SQUARE'. A mark filed as 'URGR8' would receive a pseudo mark of 'YOU ARE GREAT'. You are not required to respond to this notice. However, if you would like to suggest additions or changes to the pseudo mark assigned to your mark, please send an email to TMDesignCodeComments@USPTO.GOV or call 1-800-786-9199 to speak to a Customer Service representative. No fee is necessary. (Please include the serial number of your application on ALL correspondence with the USPTO.) The USPTO will review your request and update the record if appropriate. The USPTO will not send any further response to your e-mail. Check TESS in approximately two weeks to see if the requested changes have been entered. Requests deemed unnecessary or inappropriate will not be entered. Pseudo marks assigned to the referenced serial number are listed below. PSEUDO MARK:
SOCIAL ADS

PTO Form 1478 (Rev 9/2006) OMB No. 0651-0009 (Exp 12/31/2008)

Trademark/Service Mark Application, Principal Register
Serial Number: 77287043 Filing Date: 09/24/2007

The table below presents the data as entered.
Input Field SERIAL NUMBER MARK INFORMATION
*MARK STANDARD CHARACTERS USPTO-GENERATED IMAGE LITERAL ELEMENT MARK STATEMENT

Entered 77287043

SOCIALADS YES YES SOCIALADS The mark consists of standard characters, without claim to any particular font, style, size, or color. Principal

REGISTER

APPLICANT INFORMATION
*OWNER OF MARK *STREET *CITY *STATE (Required for U.S. applicants) *COUNTRY *ZIP/POSTAL CODE (Required for U.S. applicants only)

Facebook, Inc. 156 University Avenue Palo Alto California United States 94301

LEGAL ENTITY INFORMATION
TYPE STATE/COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION

corporation Delaware

GOODS AND/OR SERVICES AND BASIS INFORMATION

*INTERNATIONAL CLASS

035 Advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet. SECTION 1(a) At least as early as 09/20/2007 At least as early as 09/20/2007

*IDENTIFICATION

FILING BASIS FIRST USE ANYWHERE DATE FIRST USE IN COMMERCE DATE

ATTORNEY INFORMATION
NAME ATTORNEY DOCKET NUMBER FIRM NAME STREET CITY STATE COUNTRY ZIP/POSTAL CODE PHONE FAX EMAIL ADDRESS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA EMAIL OTHER APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Harold J. Milstein 41446-1000 Heller Ehrman LLP 275 Middlefield Road Menlo Park California United States 94025-3506 650-324-7000 650-324-0638 sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com Yes Lisa Greenwald-Swire, Thayer M. Preece, Chelseaa E. Larsen, Beth M. Goldman, John C. Wilson

CORRESPONDENCE INFORMATION
NAME FIRM NAME STREET CITY STATE

Harold J. Milstein Heller Ehrman LLP 275 Middlefield Road Menlo Park California

COUNTRY ZIP/POSTAL CODE PHONE FAX EMAIL ADDRESS AUTHORIZED TO COMMUNICATE VIA EMAIL

United States 94025-3506 650-324-7000 650-324-0638 sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com Yes

FEE INFORMATION
NUMBER OF CLASSES FEE PER CLASS *TOTAL FEE DUE *TOTAL FEE PAID

1 325 325 325

SIGNATURE INFORMATION
* SIGNATORY FILE SIGNATORY'S NAME SIGNATORY'S POSITION

\\TICRS2\EXPORT14\772\870\77287043\xml1\APP0003.JPG Michael Richter Associate General Counsel, IP

PTO Form 1478 (Rev 9/2006) OMB No. 0651-0009 (Exp 12/31/2008)

Trademark/Service Mark Application, Principal Register
Serial Number: 77287043 Filing Date: 09/24/2007

To the Commissioner for Trademarks:
MARK: SOCIALADS (Standard Characters, see mark) The literal element of the mark consists of SOCIALADS. The mark consists of standard characters, without claim to any particular font, style, size, or color. The applicant, Facebook, Inc., a corporation of Delaware, having an address of 156 University Avenue Palo Alto, California 94301

United States requests registration of the trademark/service mark identified above in the United States Patent and Trademark Office on the Principal Register established by the Act of July 5, 1946 (15 U.S.C. Section 1051 et seq.), as amended. International Class 035: Advertising and information distribution services, namely, providing advertising space via the global computer network; promoting the goods and services of others over the Internet. Use in Commerce: The applicant is using the mark in commerce, or the applicant's related company or licensee is using the mark in commerce, or the applicant's predecessor in interest used the mark in commerce, on or in connection with the identified goods and/or services. 15 U.S.C. Section 1051(a), as amended. In International Class 035, the mark was first used at least as early as 09/20/2007, and first used in commerce at least as early as 09/20/2007, and is now in use in such commerce. The applicant will submit one specimen(s) showing the mark as used in commerce on or in connection with any item in the class of listed goods and/or services, .

The applicant hereby appoints Harold J. Milstein and Lisa Greenwald-Swire, Thayer M. Preece, Chelseaa E. Larsen, Beth M. Goldman, John C. Wilson of Heller Ehrman LLP 275 Middlefield Road Menlo Park, California 94025-3506 United States to submit this application on behalf of the applicant. The attorney docket/reference number is 41446-1000. Correspondence Information: Harold J. Milstein 275 Middlefield Road Menlo Park, California 94025-3506 650-324-7000(phone) 650-324-0638(fax) sv-trademark@hellerehrman.com (authorized) A fee payment in the amount of $325 has been submitted with the application, representing payment for 1 class(es). Declaration

Signatory's Signature: signatory file Signatory's Name: Michael Richter Signatory's Position: Associate General Counsel, IP

RAM Sale Number: 10438

RAM Accounting Date: 09/24/2007 Serial Number: 77287043 Internet Transmission Date: Mon Sep 24 13:44:52 EDT 2007 TEAS Stamp: USPTO/BAS-66.28.245.154-2007092413445270 0428-77287043-40086ba3d6c9138689ecfab90f 911a6e5cd-ET-10438-20070924133619891345