SmOI'Ot^Al^fte^

SAMPLE C&PY.

STUDIES IN HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY O F SCIENCE

Prparimcni of History A Philosophy of Science. University of hinr. Ctim/u i,tf;e CP2 3Rli, UK A t ^ c x i n i c l U l i t n r : A N I H i K W C U N N I N t n i A M , Wtthflme Ucfurer in the History of MediciniDrfnnnirni of HiMory nml PhUnsophy nfSiicnce. University of Comhiiifte, Cambridge. UK S e n i o r C i m ^ i i l l i n p I-H jiim : CF'.Rr) n U C U D A I I U Department of History <4 Philosophy of Science, IJnnrr.Miy nf Cmhrulf^,-. Inr Sih.ml l^mr. CanOnidRe CH2 Sftll. UK (.'nmhti,tf:r.
[diinr: N I C H O L A S J A I I D I N K ,

When is Historiography Whiggish?

ftrr

Sthtu.l

n <K .k R e v i e w i : , i i t o r : . ( ^ . N ^ Y

VVAHO.

Ernst

Mayr

Siiiilics in History
(pisicinnt(if: y.

<t

Philosophy

ofSiicnre

is e s s c n t i n i i c a r l i n g f o r s t u d e n t s a n d t e a c h e r s c o n c e r n e d w i t h

the h i s i o r i i n l . s t K i a l an-t i n i c l l c c l u . i l c o n t e x t s o f t h e s c i e n c e s a n d w i i h i h c i r m e t h o d o l o g y a n d

The jdmn.i! pnriicut.iflj rncniiragcs slintics w h i c h inlcgraic philosophical, historical a n d sociological t o i i s i d c r n i i n n s . l i s o i i c n i a i i o n is I n l c r i t . i i i o n a l . w i t h c o n i r i b u i i o n s f r o m a w i d e r a n g e o f c u l t u r a l

pcr^lKtlivcs.
T h e p a p e r s p u b l i s l i e d a i c o f t h e h i g h e s t s c h o l a r l y ( l u a l i t y . S i n c e t h e j o t i r n a l ' s i n c e p t i o n it h a s p r o v e d a n i n v a h i a l i l e s o u r c e I x i i h ( i n i c f l c c t i v e s c i c n i i s t j a n d fox w o r k e r s i n i h c h i s t o r y , p h i l o s o p h y a n d s o c i o l o g y of-

Increasingly oflcn in(recen?);ritiques of cooks and articles in the history of science an author is accused of liaving written whig history. Somelimcs specific items are mentioned thai are said to justify this label, but .sometimes it would seem simply to document that the critic does not like the writings of the author. N o two people seem to use the term in exactly the same sense, nor would any two historians entirely agree exactly what is whiggish. "One person's whig history is another's revisionism.'" A s the label whiggish was more and more frequently applied, some historians became so fearful of the whig epithet that they decided it was better not to make any interpretation or evaluation of the past than to be called a whig. T h i s meant, of course, as has been claimed, a return to "the Uaconian inductive method, which attempts to investigate phenomena with ar\t but empty m i n d . ' " With that method historiography would become a deadly, purely descriptive exercise of reporting facts. Furthermore, the use of the term whiggish has brought such an unpleasant tone into many book reviews that a critical analysis of its meaning and justification would seem appropriate. T h e expression "whig Interpretation of history" Nvas proposed by the historian n . Uutterrield to characterize the habit of somc-pnglish conslitutigiial historians of seeing their subject as a progressive/'broadening of human rights, in which good, " f o r w i m n o O t a n g ' ^ ^ w'iih the backward-looking conserv; v e L i ' M o r e broadjy, the term was applied by Hutterrieldjoj^ny interpretation of history thatf "sUidies the past with reference

iciciKe.
R c l c v a m p a p e r s a i c w e l c o m e for editorial c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

A Selection of Paiwrs r . D l J A R I ) C I . A S n he N c i h c i l a n d s ) , i c s l i n g the p h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s in the h i s t o r y o f m a l h c m a l i c s .

P a i l H: the \ i i n i l a r i l y I x M w c c n n w l h e m a i i c a l a n d .scicmific growtJ) o f k n o w l e d g e . P H I L IP M I R O W S K I ( U S A ) , M o w n o t to d o t h i n g s w i t h m e t a p h o r s : P a u l S a i n u e l s o n a n d t h e s c i e n c e o f

neoclassic:il economics. D A V I U n RF..SNIK ( U . S A ) . Adnpiati'inisl rxplanaiions. D O U C L A S N! J K S S K P I I ( U S A ) , P h i l o . s o p h i c a l t h e o r y ajid m a t h e m a t i c a l p r a c t i c e i n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h trtmiry. A N D R L V V I) V S I L . S O N (tl.SAJ. J l c i i z . B o h / n i a n n a n d W i i i g c n s l c i n Indoxrd/Ah'.li lulcd In: reconsidered.

Cmt ('nni Ati\C Hum ('it In I. Cutr Ct>ni ASCA. ASSIA, tiiosis Data. ( i^ni/Soc (< lirh Sii. Mt>lh li.So'nol Ahsir. Curr Cnnt Soc S<i Cil Uulx
(IKVlOl) |0<X) V n l i i m r : ) (1 i s o . r s )

Ciirr

Animal siiliu liptimi Tun

(PJ-H)!

P M D M

.15n.nn
665.00

v e a r rate ( l W O / 9 1 )

1SSN!(X).19 1 6 8 1

! ,\frrhrr f.K{ttH Mnfinillnn

PERGAIVION PRESS
Prrgamt^n

to the present." In that sense, it was applied by^him later to [ l i e l i i i d of history of science in wliich past science and scientists were judged in the light of modem ' Peter Howler, "The Wliig Inlerprctatioii of Geology," (1988), I0(), ' E. Harrison, "Wliigs, Trigs and Ilisloriaiis of Science,"

Puhti^h,ng Cor,.rr,lm

I V r g n i n o t i I'ro.i.s p i c . H c n i l i i i R i o n I l i J I U n l l . O x f o r d O X n O H W . U K rtTRaiMon P r c s a . I n c . , M n x w c l ! H o u s e , F n i r v i c w i * n r k , E l n s r o r d N Y 1 0 5 2 3 . U S A

iliohgy ami Pluiowp!.)\ Nature, .

.129 (I9:;7), 213-

Afl\<'r1i in |j r.Tir r n r d flvnilnl'k nt> rr/|iirt I'mV i"iicfl (ind currt -nt tibiKTiplion* irv -Ann BVI i nh\t In microform. Tht I'M p r i f d ' h o w n iiirlmlr- pmioii-f' aitti iii\tninrf. For Nuh3<rh]i(iiiii rntrn in tKc Anvrricn*. J n p i i n , U K Tid E i r e plcawi m n ( n r l your n c m f i ' l IVrj-niium i-fTirf. I'rirr* nnii p r o p o w f t puhtirotinn dntpit nrv mbjrri In ctiNngf w i t h n u t prior n o ' V e

1
^-Tf.

, ' 7 ^ Dullernekl, The Whig huerprclalwn of Ifi.siory 4

301

;
^/ :

,.

(tdiKlon,,'! 931). f

SBiPfOI^AFftE^

SAMPLE CdPY.

STUDIES IN HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY O F SCIENCE

Urparmrnt nf liislory A Philosophy of Science. University of Sthn,>l hmr. Comhfi,if^f CP2 JRH, UK A t s c ^ i n i c r .ditor: A N D I i K W ( : U N N I N ( ; i l A M , Wellcome Lecturer in the History of Medicint iirpoiimrni ofHiMory mul Philosophy of Science. University of Cambridge, Cambridgf. UK S e n i o r C o n ^ i i l l i n p l - d i i o i : ( i r ' . R I ) n O C I I D A i l L Department of History A Philosophy of Science, {Jm.rr.Miy of Cimhrulf^,-, I rvr Schnl Ijme. Camintdge Cli2 3RH. UK Cnrt/>nilf:r.
[idiinr: N I C H O L A S J A I I D I N K ,

When is Historiography Whiggish?

ftrr

n <K .k R e v i e w i : d i n r : . I L N N Y W A R D .

Ernst

Mayr

Siiiilirs

in History

Phitosophy

of Scicnre

is c s s c n t i n l l e a d i n g f o r students a n d t e a c h e r s c o n c e r n e d w i t h

Ihc h i s i o r i c n l . s o c i a l a n d i i i i c l l c c l u a l c o n i c x t s o f the s c i e n c e s a n d w i t h their m e t h o d o l o g y a n d fpisiciimhif: y. The joiirn.i! particutarlj r o c o i i r a g c s studies w h i c h integrate p h i l o s o p h i c a l , historical a n d s o c i o l o g i c a l

t o n s i d c r n i i n i i s . I t s o i i c n i a i i o n is i n t e r n a t i o n a l , w i t h c o n t r i b u t i o n s f r o m a w i d e r a n g e o f c u l t u r a l pct^lKCiivcs. The p a p e r ' s p u b l i s h e d a i c o f t h e h i g h e s t s c h o l a r l y q u a l i t y . S i n c e t h e j o t i r n a r s i n c e p t i o n it h a s p r o v e d a n

Increasingly often in(recen?);ritiques of oooks and articles in the history of science an author is accused of liaving written whig history. Somelimcs specific items are men'tioned that are said to justify this label, but .sometimes it would seem simply to document that the critic does not like the writings of the author. N o two people seem to use the term in exactly the same sense, nor would any two historians entirely agree exactly what is whiggish. "One person's whig history is another's revisionism.'" A s the label whiggish was more and more frequently applied, some historians became so fearful of the whig epithet that they decided it was better not to make any interpretation or evaluation of the past than to be called a whig. T h i s meant, of course, ns has been claimed, a

inv a h i a h l e s o u r c e M i h ( o r i c f l c c t i v e s c i c n i i s l j a n d fox w o r k e r s i n t h e h i s t o r y , p h i l o s o p h y a n d s o c i o l o g y ofscience. R c l c v a m p a p e r s a i c w e l c o m e for editorial c o n s i d e r a t i o n .

A Selection of Pa[wrt r . D U A R I ) 0 1 . A S {T h e N e t h e r l a n d s ) . T e s t i n g the p h i l o s o p h y o f m a t h e m a t i c s i n the h i s t o r y o f m a t h e m a t i c s . P a i l II; i h r s i m i l a r i t y I x M w r c n i n a l h c m a i i c a l a n d .scientific g r o w t J ) o f k n o w l e d g e . P H I L I P M I R O W S K I ( U S A ) , H o w n o t to d o t h i n g s w i t h m e t a p h o r s : P a u l S a r n u e l s o n a n d t h e s c i e n c e o f neoclassical economics. D A V I D n R F . S N I K (LISA). Adaplati'inisl explanaiions. D O l t O L A S M J K S S K P I I ( U S A ) , Philo.sophical theory ajid m a t h e m a t i c a l practice in the s e v e n t e e n t h trniury. A N D R K W D V M I . S O N (tl.SAJ. J l c n / . Bolt7niann and Wiiigcnstcin rrcons:dcrcd.

I n d o x r d / A h s d nctcd In:

( ,yni/Soc ((K>]()))
|0<H)

{'un ('oni Ait\C Hum ('it In I. Curr dmt ASCA, ASSIA, tiiosis Data. llrh Sri. Math H.Sonol Ahur. Cur, Com Soc Sci Cit huix

Curr

return to "the Uaconian inductive method, which attempts to investigate phenomena with ai\t but empty m i n d . " ' With that method historiography would become a deadly, purely descriptive exercise of reporting facts. Furthermore, the use of the term whiggish has bro\ight such an unpleasant tone into many book reviews that a critical analysis of its meaning and justification would seem appropriate. T h e expression "whig Interpretation of history" \vas proposed by the historian n . Uutterrield to characterize the habit of sonic-pnglish constitutignal, historians of seeing their subject as a progressivei'broadening of human rights, in which good, " f o r w a r x H o c j I r i n r ' T ^ ^^''''^ the backward-looking conservi v e L i ' M o r e broadJ.y, the term was applied by Butterrieldjo j^ny interpretation of history thatf "sUidies the past with reference

V n l i i i n c : ) M iso..^) DM DM .150.0(1 665.00

A n i m a l s i i l i s i r ipl i o n ( f J - H ) ) y e a r rate ( I W O / 9 1 } l S S N i ( X ) . 1 9 1681

! Mrrhrr f.K{trH Marrmllnn

I'tTR-TiMon

PERGAIVION PRESS
Prrgnmnn

to the present." In that sense, it was applied by him later to The t i i i d of history
CorpomKon

PuMinhing

of science in wiiich past science and scientists were judged in the light of modern ' Peter Howler, " I l i e Wliig Inlerprctatioii of Geology." (1988), 100.

I V r g n i n o t i Pn'.i.s p i c . M e n i l i i i R l o n IliJI U n l l . O x f o r d 0 X 3 O D W . U K P r r n a . I n c . ,M n x w o l ! H o u a e , F n i r v i c w I*nrk, K i n sfortl N Y 1 0 5 2 3 . U S A

ISiohgy ami Pliiiowpl.y.

Thf l i M p r i f " "hown inrlmlr pi'^l/iRf Brut iii\irHnrf. For Nuh9<rri]i(iiiii rntrn in tKc A n i r r i c n i , Jnpiin, U K i i i d Eire plcawi m n l n r l joiif nciirf-ol IVrpniium crTirf. I'lirr* nnit propnwrf puhtirotinn dntfn ^TV nilijrrl to ctiNngf w i t h n u t prior n o ' V t

' E . Harrison, "Wliigs, Trigs and Historians of Science," Naliirc, .129 ( IV:;7), 21314, ^ . ^ - t f . Dullernekl, 77ie Wliig liUerprcUilior. of liislory (Loiulon,,/!931).f ^/ p. :

301

304

Entst

Mayr

\Vh iggish

Historiography

305

Tlicy allcnipt (i) jiisliTy llicir love for detail by claiming that the conscientious recording of "family and social lives, travels, accomplishments, publications and awards . . . are the meat of historical explanation."'" As one critic of this descriptive type of history writing has complained (with respect to a recent history of geology), "not a hint of coilemporary relevance intrudes into the historical narrative as . . . the geology of the 1830s is put under a "historical microscope.' I f yon slay just at the level of crude phenomcnological description, yon have practically built in an anti-theoretical bent to your narrative." And one can describe the ideology of such historians of science by saying that it consists of "the dogma that one must eschew entirely anything with a hint of whiggish theorizing, or even any kind of seeing of the past through the eyes of the present. Thecc is an overriding insistence that one must stay as clo.se as possible to the documents."" It is curious that this approach should have been revived in the field of the history of science when in political historiography Ranke's recommendation of simply describing everything as it had been has long since been abandoned as the ideal of history writing.

Most scientists have had considerable interest in the history of science. This is noT^nrp^SingTTrecaiise "science without its history is likeli~man without a memory."" The interest of the scientist, however, is quite .ipccific and in many respects different fiom that of the historian trained in the humanities. The foremost interest of the modern scientist-historiographer is the development of ideas, from their <n igiiiTTiroTigirairnieir permutations up to the presehT"aay. The reason for ihis interest is that it is impossible to understand many of the current controvcisies aiid prevailing concepts without studying their history. The recent hisloiies by Stresemann, Lenoir, M . Greene, and R. Laudan are splciidiil c.xain|ilcs of this genre of historiography," W. and M . Kneale in their developnicnlal history oT logic slate "ourjfiTTmary purposc>has been to record the (Irsl appearances (if Ihiise ideas whicliscCTTTToTi^^ important ^TnTric ToguTof our own d a y . " " I n the preface of my Growth of njotogical Thoiighl I stated clearly: "This volume is not, and this must~T)ntressed, a history of bjology. . . ( Tjlie emphasis is on Ihe background and the developiiieiU jof the ideas dominating modern biology; in other words, it is a develgpmeTital, not a piireTy dcscripiivtY lustory! Such a treatment justifies, indeed necessitales, the iTegTect ollSerlain temporary developments in biology that left no i . ^ ^ 1 ^ , e subsequent history of ideas." Sloan, a professional historian, understood this fully. For a developmental historian, he says, "the history of science [mictions primarily as a tool for concept analysis and clarification. . . . The (^h^ is (not^ historicaJ _coiiil <U iiesa .(l)u^ He concludes that such
'"S. C. McCliiskcy, " I lislorians, Wliigs. and I'rogrcs.s," Nature. 3.10 (1987), 598. " M. Kusc. Docikiiolcs, Ilinhgy and IViiln.wpliy, 2 (1987), .377-81. " n.. Slrcscniann. Oriiitholof'y: From Aristotle In the Present (Cambridge, Ma.ss., 1975); r. t.ciuiir, 77ie Slrolegy of Life: 'teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenth Century Gennnn niology (Oordrcclil. I''82); U. Laudan, From Mineralogy to Geology: Ihe Foundations of a Science. I6S0-ISM) (Cliicago. 1987); N : . Greene, sec note 7 above. " W Kiicnic aiul M. Ncnlc, Ihe Development of Logic (Oxford, 1982).

an approach "is neither whig history in the sense intended by Butterfield . . . nor is |t_ n^legjtjmate^'' '* ~ . What a scientist is most interested in when doing historical studies is to \e or reconstruct the pathway of the currently prevailing ideas of science. This includes not only the origin of each new idea (background, causal contributions) but also a study of all subsequent modifications as well as the determination of who was responsible for them I f geology is sometimes described ^as "the study of the present in order to reconstruct the past," then developmental historiography of science can be described as "the study of those aspects of the past that help our understanding of the science of the present." Ideally, what a scientist would like to do for every concept in science is what Lovcjoy did for the concepts of plenitude and the Great Chain of Being. Mis' approach was guided by a strong emphasis on the vertical component of history." An emphasis on this component, however, does not mean that the hislorjarLs/ account has to become finalistic. Bi erfield quite rightly criticizes The tendency y a mong^oliticaThistorians of . le. nineteenth century to describe the "present as \ the inevitable outcome of a triumphant historical process" or "the tendency . . ) to emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story whicTTis the tJTtiTicaliofr iT not tlieglofifTcaiibh of the past! This approa'dr to historiography is, of course, an application of transformational evolutionism to history, combined with a strong belief in teleology. Scientific progress, by contrast, is obeying the principles of Darwinian variaiional evolution which has no teleological components. For a scientist who adheres to Darwinism there is nothing wrong or unscientific in following the evolution, and usually progress, of a scientific idea. Those who object to this procedure do so because they do not understand the interplay between variation and selection, which is as active in the history of ideas as it is in organic nature. This has nothing to do witii teleology or a naive belief j n an intrinsic drive toward jirogre!.s. Inevitably it incTucIes a treatment of false starts and of competing theories. Yet it does not necessitate exploring every long forgotten blind alley in the development of science. However, it must make use of our modern underslanding of particular scientific concepts or problems in order to be able to explain the reasons for Ihe dirficullies of former periods. Two major criticisms>liave been raised by the anli-whigs a |ainst devclopiiientaJJiisJorTography. One was stated by gutterfie]5^1rrthe words "TiTs partT and parcel of the whig interpretation of history that it studies Ihe past with reference to the present," as if there was anything wrong with this. By considering 3 ^ such an approach as objectionable, Butterfield demonstrated that he did not understand the objectives of developmental history. Developrrental history is impossible (and would be utterly vacuous) i f retrospection were not done. Obscure former controversies simply cannot be fully understood without the superior modern insights into the problems. As Hull has said rightly, if we are not prepared to interpret the past in terms of the present, why should we care about the past?"^ Admittedly, to write interpretive history is a far more demanding task than to write a purely descriptive one. It requires a careful study

^V.

R. Sloan, Essay review. Journal of the History of liiology. 18 (1985). 145-53. 'yA. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Canitjridge, Mass., 1936). " See note^atove.

308 by

Eriisl Mayr
Ihe opponenis o( dcvelopiiieiilal history, which has nearly destroyed the The two other manifestations of whiggishness Dynum ascribes to me are my

Whiggish

Historiography

309

nscfnlness of Ihc teirn. reputed failure to give sufTcient credit to the achievements of Erasmus D a r w i n and Richard Owen. Erasmus D a r w i n is a highly controversial figure whose stature is still uncertain, even after the recent work of A . J . C a i n and M . M c N e i l . Evaluations have ranged from the one extreme of considering him "just a medical crackpot, given to writing tediously long poems in ludicrously bad verse, noteworthy only because of his grandson's f a m e " " to ralifig him a major pioneer of evolulioiiism. I actually analyzed him rather carefully ( I own a copy of

Zoonoiniii)

but finally concluded that ".there is no justification for a detailed

prcscntalion of his thought [for rea.sons staled there] . . . [and because it] had remarkably little impact on subsequent developments."" T h e situation is different with Richard Owen who is indeed an important figure, more so than acknowledged in most historical accounts. 1 gave only a short abstract of his contributions because 1 was planning a full treatment of R i c h a r d Owen in the story of Ihe history of morphology in Vol. I I of my (never completed). Popper aptly described the pathway of scientific progress as conjectures and refutations. A t any particular period of time there are frequently a number of competing conjectures concerning some unsolved problem. Usually one of these conjectures leads to the next step in our understanding, while the others are refilled or al least only poorly supported. It is only common sense for a historian to devote most attention to that particular conjecture that turned out to have had the greatest "fitness," that is, which liad the greatest subsequent impact. Finally, developmental history must not only be comparative and selective, it must also be historical." Strictly horizontal historiography, which reports in loving detail the happenings of only a single moment of time, is singularly unrcvcaling. I l fails to conmnmicate the spirit of searching and experimenting ihat is such a characteristic clement of science. The accusation that developmental history ignores everything but the main line is ileinonstrably unfair. In all good d c e l o p m e n l a l histories known to me I find an adcipiate tienlmcnt of Ihe intellectual and cultural context. "Failed" scientists arc always treated appropriately, even though not in anywhere near the same detail as those of their contemporaries who contributed significantly to the subsc(|uent development of their field. What can we consider as the outcome o'' this analysis'' With Ruse 1 conclude Ihat it is by no means wrong to look a l the pasl on the basis of an understanding of the present." A s Hull has said so rightly " a knowledge of the present is absolutely crucial for the historian. . . . F r o m his position in the present the historian must use all evidence and tools available to him in reconstructing the past, even if this knowledge was unavailable to the people in the period under M. Ruse, " llooknotcs," Biology and Philosophy, 3 ( 1988), 404. " Sec iiolc 8 above, D R, Oldroyd. " lljstoric.sni and Ihe Rise of Historical Geology," History 17 (1979). 191-213. 227-57, " See note 1 1 above.

i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T o be sure, the historian must avoid the well known faults of bias, chauvinism, falsifications of priority, and finalistic interpretations, but Ihis is true for any kind of historiography, developmental or not. On the other hand, selectivity is a necessity in develqgmejital hjstorujgra^ Also, the historian rfiust be" permTltecrTo^TiTajc^e evaluations when writing intellectual history, as Lovejoy has demonstratedlo beautifully. A history that does not evaluate but merely records facts and presents documents is anti-inlellectual--it is prighistory, as Harrison has called i t . " Finally, I feel the pejorative label "wh^g-^ gishness" has been used increasingly^in sudi an irrespon^^^^ pletely unjustified manfief, tlTat one might w a n t j o jioj2ethalJt will disapp^^ altogether from the literature of scientific historiography. I f used at all, it should be applied only to genuine cases of whiggishness and not to developmental historiography." Museum of Comparative Zoology, Harvard University.

Growth of Biological Thought

" Tide

of Science,

" See note 5 above. See note 2 above. , "1 thank Robert K . Merton, I. Bernard Cohen, and Frank J, Sulloway for some very useful constructive comments on an earlier version.