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AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INTRUSIONS OF PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NATIONALS AND THEIR VESSELS IN THE SPRATLYS KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP

IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of Graduate School of the Lyceum of the Philippines University

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Foreign Service

By JOSE DELA ROSA BURGOS April 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 THE PROBLEM AND ITS BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . .1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Situationer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Conceptual Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Statement of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Objectives of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Scope and Delimitation of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Significance of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND STUDIES 22 Local Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23


The Nanshas (Spratlys) Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Basis of the Claims in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Why the Spratlys? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Territorial Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Strategic Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 Skirmishes and Near Conflict Incidents in the Paracels and Spratlys Island Group in the South China Sea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 Vietnam-China Military Engagement in the Paracels, Spratlys Island Group in 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Philippine-China Near Conflict Incident in Mischief Reef, Spratlys Group of Islands in the South China Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Steps Taken by the Philippine Government to Strengthen Its Position in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Code of Conduct and Multilateral Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Populating the Philippines Claimed Kalayaan Island Group in the Spratlys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 AFP Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 ASEAN Defense Spending 1989-1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 GMA Admits US was Training Filipino Soldiers to Defend the Spratlys vs. China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 RP and China Sign Bilateral Swap Agreement (BSA) and MOU on the Utilization of Preferential Buyers Credit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 DFA Circular 54-LLB-98-S on the Several Strong Protests of the Philippines Against Chinas Construction of Structures at Mischief Reef . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Historical Glimpse of the Origins of the Filipino People and Early Movements of Settlers to the Philippines from Mainland Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Early Trade Relations with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Early Trade with the Sultanate of Sulu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Voyage to the Philippines of the Ten Bornean Datus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Foreign Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Storm Over Spratlys: Arroyo prepares for diplomatic offensive against China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Bahrain vs. Qatar Territorial Dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Falkland Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

The Research Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The Respondents of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The Instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Procedure in Data Gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Statistical Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, INTERPRETATION OF DATA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Textual, Tabular or Graphic Presentation of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 A. Statistical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 1. Number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the South China Sea 1995 to 2009 . . . . . . . . 54 2. Number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality for the period 1995 to 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3. Total number of vessels caught or sighted in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 4. Total number of vessels apprehended or sighted in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality for the period 1995 to 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Analysis on the statistical data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Statistical Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59 59

1. Analysis of the total number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2. Analysis of the total number of vessels apprehended or sighted in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3. Analysis of the total number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality from 1995 to 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4. Analysis of the total number of vessels apprehended or sighted in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality of registered owners. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

B. Presentation of the Result of the Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 1. 2. 3. Result of the Survey with Students of the National Defense College of the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Result of the Survey with Students of the Command and General Staff College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Result of the survey with the Officers and Staff of the Western Command (WESCOM), AFP at Puerto Princesa City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

1. Analysis of the result of survey with the students of the National Defense College of the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 a. Civil Government Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 b. Business/Private Group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 c. Military Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 1. Analysis of the result of the survey with students from the Command and General Staff College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 2. Analysis of the result of survey with the Officers and Staff of the Western
Command (WESCOM), AFP, Puerto Princesa City. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

A. Statistical Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 B. Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATION . . . . . . . . . . 72 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 APPENDICES CURRICULUM VITAE

LIST OF APPENDICES
A. B. C. D. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992 Joint Statement, RP-PROC Consultations on the South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation, 9-10 August 1995 Joint Statement on the Fourth Annual Bilateral Consultations between the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi, 7 November 1995 Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the Peoples Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 1997 Declaration on the South China Sea, Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia, 04 November 2002 Sample Survey Questionnaire Map of the Spratlys Group of Islands List of Occupied and Unoccupied Features in the Spratlys Group of Islands Map of the Philippines Showing the Spratlys Kalayaan Group of Islands Map of the Philippines Indicating the Baselines in Accordance to Republic Act No. 9522 Otherwise Known as the Philippine Baselines Law Copy of Republic Act No. 9522 Map with Territorial Boundary Between Bahrain and Qatar World Map Indicating the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic

E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M.

LIST OF TABLES
1. ASEAN Defense Spending, 1989-1995 2. Bar Graph Showing Defense Expenditures of ASEAN Countries from 1989 to 1995 3. Table 1. Showing the Number of Illegal Entrants/Poachers Apprehended in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the South China Sea from 1995 to 2009 4. Table 2. Showing the Total Number of Illegal Entrants/Poachers in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea According to Nationality from 1995 to 2009 5. Table 3. Showing the Total Number of Vessels Caught or Sighted in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea from 1995 to 2009 6. Table 4. Showing the Total Number of Vessels Caught or sighted in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality from 1995 to 2009 7. Table 5. Data Showing the Result of Survey with Students from the National Defense College of the Philippines Comparing Responses from the Civil Government, Business/Private, and Military Groups of the Class 8. Table 6. Data Showing the Result of Survey with Students from the Command and General Staff College Indicating the Choices the Students Chose on the Ways, Steps, Approaches by Which the Philippines Could Deal with the Spralys Kalayaan Issue to Avoid Conflict with China

List of Figures

1. Figure 1. Bar Graph Showing the Number of Illegal Entrants/Poachers Apprehended in the Spratlys KIG for the Period 1995 to 2009 2. Figure 2. Pie Graph Showing the Total Number of Illegal Entrants/Poachers in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea According to Nationality from 1995 to 2009 3. Figure 3. Linear Graph Showing the Total Number of Vessels Apprehended or Sighted in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea from 1995 to 2009 4. Figure 4. Pie Graph Showing the Total Number of Vessels Caught or Sighted in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea According to Nationality from 1995 to 2009 5. Figure 5. Bar Graph Showing the Result of the Survey with Students of the Command and General Staff College Indicating the Choices of the Students on How to Deal Successfully with the Spratlys KIG Issue to Avoid Conflict with China 6. Figure 6. Bar Graph Showing the Result of the Survey with the Officers and Staff of the Western Command (WESCOM), AFP at Puerto Princesa City

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I wish to extend my sincerest appreciation and most profound gratitude to the following individuals who in one way or another have contributed immensely to the completion of this study: Ambassador NESTOR N. PADALHIN Adviser Ambassador BENJAMIN B. DOMINGO Professor Lt General HERNANIE B PEREZ AFP Commander, Western Command (WESCOM), AFP Puerto Princesa City Rear Admiral RAMON P ESPERA JR AFP Commandant, Command and General Staff College Camp Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City Commodore TEDDY O PAN AFP Deputy Commander, Western Command (WESCOM), AFP Puerto Princesa City Commodore CARLOS L AGUSTIN AFP (Ret) President, National Defense College of the Philippines Camp Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City Colonel ANTONIO F MATIAS PAF (GSC) Executive Vice President & Dean of Academic Affairs National Defense College of the Philippines Camp Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City Students of the National Defense College of the Philippines, School Year 2010 Students of the Command and General Staff College, School Year 2010 Officers and Staff, Personnel of the Western Command (WESCOM), AFP

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INTRUSIONS OF PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA NATIONALS AND THEIR VESSELS IN THE SPRATLYS KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CHAPTER 1 The Problem and Its Background Introduction

History could testify that one of the major causes of conflicts or bloody wars is the conflict emanating from the ownership of a territory or territories. Examples of these are the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Kashmir Issue, the Sabah Issue and our very own Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or the Spratlys Issue. Many years have passed and after much bloodshed, these problems on who are the legitimate owners of territories have up to this day remained unsolved.

The vastness of the South China Sea, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or Spratlys in particular, has brought difficulties to our law enforcement agencies such as the Philippine Navy to patrol the whole area. The situation has pervaded illegal intrusions and other illegal activities such as poaching, drug trafficking, smuggling, and endangering protected marine species in the KIG for several years now.

Diplomatic inroads of the Philippine Government to get the support of other Southeast Asian claimant countries to the KIG Issue, namely; Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam were not quite effective in stopping PROC intrusions in the KIG. During the 13 th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 02 November 2002, the claimant countries Brunei, Malaysia, China, Taiwan, and Vietnam issued a

declaration for the restraint of activities in the Spratlys. The declaration is a watered down version of the earlier code of conduct in the South China Sea planned to prevent hostilities in the Spratlys. The research problem is very important in dealing with the KIG or Spratlys Issue to find viable solutions to the territorial question of ownership of the said KIG in order to avert the possibility of a bloody conflict in the South China Sea other than its effects to the sovereignty and security of the Philippines. The South China Sea is a vital commercial sea lane which could seriously disrupt international commerce should a conflict happens in the area.

Situationer

The Peoples Republic of Chinas claim on the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group or the Nansha Island Group as the Chinese calls the group of islands is from a historical point of view. PROC claims that as early as the second century B.C., at the time of Emperor Wu Di of the Han Dynasty, Chinese people began sailing in the South China Sea. After long years of navigation, they discovered successively the Xisha (West Sandy Islands or the Paracels) and the Nansha Group of Islands (South Sandy Islands or Spratlys).

The importance of the island was discovered during World War II when Itu Aba (an island in the South China Sea near Taiwan) was used by the Japanese as staging point to bomb the Philippines and other nearby islands. The Chinese attention was caught when Tomas Cloma, a Filipino navigator discovered the Kalayaan Island Group in the Spratlys in 1952 and proclaimed its annexation to the Philippine territory. The move of claiming the Spratlys KIG as part of the Philippine territory reached its height during the regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he issued a decree stating that the KIG is part of the Philippines.

The closure of the American bases in Subic and Clark in 1992, emboldened China to impose its claim in the Spratlys KIG through illegal intrusions. It also started building structures in Mischief Reef which is close to the KIG in the mid 90s alarming Philippine authorities and causing an irritant in Philippine-China relations.

Rationale

The Philippines ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides that the Spratlys KIG is within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines and in accordance to the archipelagic concept of UNCLOS of which the Philippines is an archipelago of 7,107 islands. The main islands of the country are Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

As we go deeper into the study, the Philippines claim to the Spratlys KIG becomes clearer in international law perspective compared to Chinas claim based on history. Early inhabitants in Sulu and the historical voyage of the ten (10) Bornean Datus to the Philippines in the 13 th century could challenge Chinas implied claim that they were the only dominant seafarers at that time in the area. Thus, the Philippines claim to the Spratlys KIG is not only based on international law or UNCLOS but also on historical accounts.

Conceptual Framework

The concept of effective occupation and administration as the Philippines strong basis to support its claim in the Spratlys KIG inspires me to study deeper into the Spratlys Kalayaan

Territorial issue in order to find out what other concrete steps the Philippine Government could take to strengthen further its claim of the area versus that of the Peoples Republic of China which says that its claim is based on historical accounts. The concept of the archipelagic state further integrates sovereignty in a country composed of thousands of islands like the Philippines to include inland waters and territorial sea. Through the archipelagic state concept, baselines could be drawn from one point to another to include further islands separated by the sea.

Likewise, the concept of the exclusive economic zone extending up to 200 miles from the baseline very well includes the Spratlys KIG and in which the Philippines as a coastal state enjoys extensive rights in relation to natural resources and other jurisdictional rights and Third Parties enjoy the freedom of navigation, over flight by aircraft, and the laying of cables and pipelines.

The Philippines determination to assert its right of ownership in the Spratlys KIG eventually resulted in a status quo when it rallied the support of ASEAN to stop Chinese illegal incursions, naval presence, and the construction of structures in the disputed Spratlys area. China declared such structures at Mischief Reef in the Spratlys as fishermen shelter to avoid further protests from other ASEAN claimant countries. No less than 789 PROC Chinese nationals and 291 of their vessels were seized or captured by Philippines authorities for the period 1995 to 2009. Of these figures, 159, 167, 54, and 160 Chinese nationals were apprehended in the Spratlys KIG area in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002 respectively, the period which accounted for with the highest number of intrusions by Chinese nationals in the disputed area or an average of 11.25 intrusions per month during those four years: 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002. Similarly, 253 (an

average of 5.27 vessels per month) of their vessels were seized or apprehended out of the total 291 Chinese vessels apprehended from 1995 to 2009.

Actual consultations with select groups of individuals to find out or confirm the opinions or ideas of a particular sector of society with regards to the actions taken by the Philippine Government in dealing with the Spratlys KIG issue showed that the 111 respondents in the survey expressed their opinions and ideas as follows: (a) Students of the National Defense College of the Philippines Civil Government Group (9 students) The group approved the Philippine Governments taking a firm action against intrusions/poaching of Chinese nationals within the Spratlys KIG through apprehension, detention, court litigation, fines, and deportation of violators. Eleven (11) of the group or 38% of the 29 NDCP students indicated their approval. As a long-term solution to the territorial question, six (6) students or 21% opted to take the diplomatic approach and a better way to solve the problem in the long-term. Nine (9) of the group or 31% favored the strengthening of the local government in Pag-asa municipality and encourage population growth in the Spratlys KIG. As for the steps to resolve the territorial issue, seven (7) or 24% favored the setting up of a UN monitoring agency to ensure the peace and stability not only in the Spratlys KIG but the whole of the South China Sea.

Business/Private Group (12 students) Nine (9) or 31% of the students from the business/private group approved of the Philippine Governments taking a firm action against illegal entrants/poachers in the area. Violators

who were apprehended were detained, underwent court hearing, fined, and eventually deported. As a long-term approach in resolving the territorial issue, four (4) or 13.7% in the group prefer the diplomatic approach in resolving the issue. Eight (8) students or 27.6% favored strengthening the Pag-asa municipality in the Kalayaan. Four (4) or 13.7% prefer a United Nations monitoring agency established to keep the peace and stability not only in the Spratlys KIG but the whole of the South China Sea.

Military/Police Group (8 students) Four (4) or 13.7% in the military group favored the RP Governments taking a firm action against (illegal entrants/poachers) apprehended in the Spratlys KIG. Three (3) or 10.3% prefer naval and aerial patrols to deter intruders in the area. Five (5) or 17.2% prefer taking the diplomatic approach as a step in resolving the issue on a long-term basis. Five (5) or 17.2% favor the strengthening of the local government in Pag-asa. Three (3) or 10.3% prefer a co-sharing arrangement as another step in trying to resolve the territorial question in the area.

(b)

Students of the Command and General Staff College of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (47 students) Forty (45) or 95.7% favor the RP Governments taking a firm action against illegal entrants/poachers in the Spratlys KIG. Violators were apprehended, detained, underwent court litigation, fined, and deported to their home countries. The conduct of naval and aerial patrols got the approval of twenty-three (23) or 48.9% of the students. However, thirty-five (35) or 74.46% of the CGSC students prefer taking punitive measures against illegal

entrants/poachers in the area. Thirty-seven (37) or 78.7% of the students prefer the diplomatic approach as a better way of resolving the territorial question in the long-term. Forty-two (42) or 89.36% students approve of the policy to strengthen the local government in the municipality of Pag-asa in the Kalayaan. The establishment of a United Nations monitoring agency to keep the peace and stability in the area is the most preferred other step in trying to resolve the territorial question in the Spratlys KIG getting thirty-four (34) or 72.3% votes. A co-sharing agreement approach to develop the area got twenty-one (21) votes or 44.68%.

(c) Western Command (WESCOM), AFP, Puerto Princesa City (35 Officers and Staff) The survey conducted with WESCOM yielded the following data: - RP Governments taking a firm action on the issue of intrusions of PROC Chinese nationals and other nationalities caught in the area 31 or 88.57%; - use of naval and aerial patrols and the enforcement of laws against violators in Kalayaan 19 or 54.28% respectively; - diplomatic approach 18 or 51.43%; - military approach - 12 or 34.28%;

- economic and International Court of Justice 11 or 31.4%; - effective administration in Pag-asa municipality 31 or 88.57%; - co-sharing agreement 18 or 51.43%; and - establishment of a UN monitoring agency 17 or 48.57%. Thus, the data presentation showed the frequency (3 incursions per month from 1995 to 2009 or 11.25 per month at the height of PROC Chinese intrusions in 1998, 1998, 2001, and

2002) and the number of Chinese intrusions until their decrease when a diplomatic solution was reached between ASEAN and China to maintain status quo in the area. The survey manifested the ideas and opinions of a select group of individuals on how to deal with the issue on short and long-term approaches such as strengthening of the Philippines defense posture, political and economic stability, and an effective government in Pag-asa municipality.

Statement of the Problem

An average of three (3) illegal incursions per month of PROC nationals (789 total intrusions) and 1.73 vessels per month (291 total vessels) from 1995 to 2009 in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group is enough cause to alarm Philippine authorities to take measures to stop these infringements to the Philippines national sovereignty. PROC illegal entrants engage in illegal activities such as poaching, catching of endangered marine species such as the sea turtle or pawikan, dynamite fishing, human trafficking, smuggling or even perhaps drug trafficking. The illegal PROC incursions in the KIG may lead to a stand-off of relations between the two countries, worst it may lead to a bloody conflict between PROC and the Philippines. As such, the following problems need to find solutions or answers in the course of the study:

1. What is the profile of the respondents in terms of the following: Age Sex Occupation 2. What actions are taken by the Philippine Government on the illegal incursions of PROC Chinese nationals and vessels? 8

apprehensions detentions court litigations fines deportation 3. What is the move of the Philippine Government to stop PROC and other nationals illegal incursions in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the South Chna Sea? 3.1 naval and aerial patrols 3.2 court litigation and imprisonment 4. What action should be taken by the Philippine Government to solve the territorial dispute in the Spratlys KIG? 4.1 diplomatic approach 4.2 military approach 4.3 economic approach 4.4 Philippine-China Dialogue 4.5 International Court of Justice 5. What measures are suggested by the respondents to strengthen RPs claim in the

Spratlys KIG and ensure peace and stability not only in the Spratlys KIG but the entire South China Sea? 6. What are the suggestions of the respondents to resolve the territorial dispute?

Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to find possible measures in abating illegal incursions in the Spratlys KIG in order to avert a possible conflict or a stand-off of relations between the Philippines and China.

The study shows that stakeholders should study more seriously the Spratlys KIG territorial question with China by investing in the Philippines defense posture and ensuring political and economic stability of the country. For only when the Philippines is perceived by China as a strong country politically and economically could it pose a deterrence to avoid conflict with the awakened giant.

Assumptions

The study would like to make the following assumptions:

1.

A re-consideration by stakeholders to find more lasting solutions to the territorial question in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group will take place within five to ten years from now.

2.

The stalled AFP Modernization Program will be given top priority during the next Administration considering the poor state of equipment and assets of the AFP especially the Navy and Air Force due to years of neglect by previous administrations.

3.

China inspired by its burgeoning economy and urgent need of sources of energy such as oil and natural gas will push for joint-venture development of the resource-rich South China Sea.

4.

The Philippines will be one of the top beneficiaries of a lasting peace in the Spratlys KIG other than the area being a potential source of revenues for the country derived from its oil and natural gas deposits, minerals in its seabed and marine life.

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5.

A special body specifically created to look into the preservation of lasting peace and development not only in the Spratlys but possibly the whole of the South China Sea will take priority to be established in the near future. The said body will be under the auspices of the United Nations.

Statement of the Hypothesis

Within five to ten years, amidst the continuing slow US economic recovery, the stagnant Japanese economy, compared to the continuous economic prosperity of China causing the countrys hunger for more energy resources such as oil and natural gas, will encourage the latter to re-assert its influence in the Spratlys in the South China Sea. The Philippines with the joint effort of ASEAN to thwart Chinas expansionist moves in the South China Sea would not be enough prompting a need of the United Nations to intervene in the stand-off to pre-empt a conflict situation between China and ASEANs claimant countries. ASEANs claimant countries will endure for sometime the unchecked unilateral move of China to exploit the natural resources of the Spratlys and the other islands in the South China Sea.

Considering the South China Sea as a vital international sea lane for commerce and the supply route of oil for developed economies in the Far East such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the international community joins the fray against Chinas South China Sea domination, which might result to a heated conflict in the South China Sea interrupting international maritime commerce and navigation in this vital international trade route.

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The 111 respondents of the study have expressed their opinions and ideas as to the RP Governments actions in dealing with the intrusions of Chinese nationals in the Spratlys KIG as well as long-term approaches as better ways to deal with the said issue. Respondents from the National Defense College of the Philippines, Command and General Staff College of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Officers and Staff of the Western Command (WESCOM), AFP in Puerto Princesa City prefer the use of diplomacy rather than the military approach as a better step in dealing with the Spratlys KIG territorial dispute. Likewise, more of the respondents prefer on a worst scenario the resolution of the territorial issue through the International Court of Justice rather than using economic or indulging in a Philippine-China Dialogue.

Scope and Delimitation of the Study

Data in the study will cover the period from 1995 to 2009 or fourteen years. The disputed area referred to in the study is the group of islands discovered in 1952 by Tomas Cloma, a Filipino navigator who proclaimed the island cays, sand bars, and coral reefs in the Spratlys, which is now called the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or Freedom Islands. The KIG in the Spratlys is actually composed of twelve (12) main islands and three hundred ninety (390) islets, banks, reefs, shoals, and cays of which only thirty-six (36) permanently rise above the South China Sea and only seven (7) of these islands have an area of more than 0.5 square kilometer. The KIG is in the western section of the Spratlys with an estimated area of 64, 976 square miles. It is about 450 nautical miles from Manila and 235 nautical miles from Palawan. Philippine troops are currently stationed in only nine (9) areas of the Kalayaan, namely; the island of Pagasa (also known as Thitu), the reefs Rizal (Commodore) and Ayungin (LT 57), and the islets Parola (Northeast Cay), Lawak (Nanshan), Panata (Larkiam Cay), Kota (Laoitia), Likas (West 12

York), and Patag (Flat). The Philippines also lays claim to the Jackson Reef, about thirty-six (36) nautical miles northeast of Mischief Reef. The reef which the Philippines calls Panganiban Reef is one hundred fifty (150) nautical miles west of the island province of Palawan, also contested are the Scarborough Shoal claimed by the Philippines and China, and the Paracel Islands disputed by China and Vietnam. Scarborough Shoal lies about one hundred sixty-nine (169) nautical miles west of Pangasinan and La Union.

In the course of the study, it was necessary to look into the experiences of other countries in the resolution of their territorial conflicts with neighbor countries such as the Kingdom of Bahrain and Qatar and the United Kingdom and Argentina in the Falkland Crisis. These two territorial disputes are excellent examples since one portrays the resolution of a territorial dispute through diplomacy or through the mediation and arbitration of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Bahrain vs. Qatar from 1999 to 2001) and a bloody confrontation between the United Kingdom and Argentina to resolve their territorial dispute over the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic in 1982. Through portrayals of the two samples of resolving territorial disputes, the reader could reflect on how the Philippines should tackle its present territorial issue with China in the Spratlys Kalayaan. To respond to the readers quest for more resource knowledge on the workings of the ICJ especially its mandate in the resolution of international cases like territorial disputes, the study have exerted efforts in coming up with the readers expectation to get to know better about the ICJ.

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The study focuses on PROC incursions since it has the most number of illegal entries to the claimed area compared to Malaysia, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Taiwan, Singapore, and Indonesia. The incursions refer to the number of fishermen and their vessels.

At an average of three (3) incursions per month, Chinese fishermen enter the KIG illegally to engage in illegal fishing, catching of endangered marine species, dynamite fishing, and smuggling activities. These illegal incursions of PROC nationals if not minimized or stopped might lead to a diplomatic stand-off of relations between the Philippines and China or worst it might lead to a bloody conflict.

Significance of the Study

The top beneficiaries of the study are government policy makers and stakeholders of society, namely; H.E. The President, the Senate, Congress, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of National Defense, and the National Security Adviser. The Philippine Government will not hesitate at all cost from losing any of the claimed islands in the KIG. This has serious consequences to the government especially increasing the budget in modernizing the Philippine Navy and patrol aircrafts of the Philippine Air Force. China with its burgeoning economy and strong military could not be prevented from pursuing its expansionist plans in the South China Sea. Not unless the Philippines is quick enough to see the consequences, one day, it might be too late before it could react to Chinese occupation of the KIG. The Philippine Government should take seriously the Spratlys Issue and should prepare accordingly for any eventuality which may happen in the disputed area. The move of the Municipality of Pag-asa in the KIG under Mayor Rosendo Mantes to populate the area with the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units 14

(CAFGUs) troops was a positive thrust to strengthen our presence in the KIG. A resource-rich area, policy makers at this stage should have made the right steps to create a detente to the conflict to discourage third parties with vested interests from exploiting the issue to their advantage. The Philippines has much to lose if it takes the Spratlys Issue for granted.

The Code of Conduct in the South China Sea should be able to buy the Philippines time to prepare for the worst scenario to come with regards to the territorial question in the South China Sea. In short, diplomacy would not be enough to maintain a status quo in the area for an indefinite period of time not unless the Philippines is prepared economically and militarily to meet any eventuality should the atmosphere of moratorium changes for worse in the Spratlys KIG and the entire South China Sea.

Queries from the President and Commandant of the National Defense College of the Philippines and the Command and General Staff College of the Armed Forces of the Philippines respectively indicated that there were few researches made by students but not quite in-depth studies made about the Spratlys KIG Issue. The study will certainly contribute to the meager studies made by the academe on the Kalayaan territorial question. As the issue is coming up again due to recent expansionist moves of China in the area, that is, continuous erections of fortifications in the Spratlys and Paracels (claimed by China and Vietnam), the study is just timely to meet the necessary steps to be taken by the academe to make an in-depth study of the Spratlys Issue as one of the strong basis for the countrys policy makers in dealing wittingly with the issue. Students taking up political science especially those who have special interests in the Kalayaan territorial dispute could make use of the study as a reference material to enrich them

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academically and in preparation for any job responsibility whether they will be in government or business/private sector roles.

Peace and stability in the whole of the South China Sea not only in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group will benefit foremost the industry involved in oil and gas exploration including companies involved in seabed or undersea mining. Only a careful study of the actions to be taken by the Philippine Government in dealing the issue with China could lead to a peaceful coexistence in the Spratlys KIG. The study will certainly contribute though in a small way to encourage the business/private sector to help towards the realization of maximum benefits from the development of the area contributing to added economic opportunities to a fast developing nation like the Philippines. As the study has emphasized, efforts to establish an atmosphere of status quo and cooperation in the area would be worthless without utilizing to the fullest the resources and strategic trade route of the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea.

Last but not the least, is the encouragement of the study to scientists who wish to explore the rich marine and coral life of the Spratlys. This gives all the more that claimant countries should exert by all means to maintain peace and stability in the South China for the sake of scientific experiments in marine biology in the area for the benefit of humankind. Growing enthusiasm enticed by scientific marine discoveries in the area will inspire both local and foreign tourists to visit more frequently the Spratlys KIG.

Definition of Terms

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The following terms are helpful in understanding better our claim in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea:

Baseline is the line from which the outer limit of the territorial sea and other coastal state zones (the contiguous zone, the exclusive fishing zone, and the exclusive economic zone) is measured. In determining the extent of a states territorial sea and other maritime zones, it is obviously necessary first of all to establish from what points on the coast the outer limits of such zones are to be measured. This is the function of baselines.

Conventional law permits the use of baselines and sets forth two types of baselines (i.e., normal and straight baselines) together with applicable conditions for use. Each kind of baseline accomplishes the same result, namely; the division of the territorial sea from inland waters. The normal or traditional baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low water line that runs along the coast of a State. . . . In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity, the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.1

Article 76 of UNCLOS defines the . . . continental shelf of a State comprises the seabed and sub-soil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. 2

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The concept of the archipelagic waters is rather new in the international law of the sea created in UNCLOS III. The waters enclosed by straight archipelagic baselines are archipelagic waters which are neither internal waters nor territorial seas. An archipelagic state exercises sovereignty over its archipelagic waters. The sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and sub-soil and the resources contained therein. However, foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the archipelagic waters. Moreover, foreign ships and aircrafts enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes through, and air routes over archipelagic waters. Article 49 of UNCLOS says: The sovereignty of an archipelagic state extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with Article 47 described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 3

Contiguous zone is a zone of peace contiguous to and beyond the territorial sea in which states have limited powers for the enforcement of customs, fiscal, sanitary, and immigration laws (eight leagues or 24 miles from the shore). A contiguous zone was created at the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference held in Geneva. This zone falls within the high seas that are adjacent to the coastal State and the conventional law gives the coastal State limited regulatory powers within the zone. The definition of this zone is given in Article 24, Convention on the Territorial Seas and the Contiguous Zone. 1. In a zone of the high seas, contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to: (a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;

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(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or territorial
sea.4

Continental shelf is physically the sea bed adjacent to the coast which is composed of three separate sections: First, that section which slopes down gradually from the low-water mark to a depth, averaging from about 130 meters at which the angle of slope increases markedly: this is the continental shelf proper. Second, the section bordering the shelf and having the steeper slope, going down to around 1,200 to 3,000meters: this is known as the continental slope. Third, beyond the slope in many places there is a gentler falling away of the sea bed, these is composed mainly of sediment to around 3,500 to 5,500 meters. Together, these three sections form the continental margin, which constitutes about one-fifth of the sea floor.

Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9522 entitled an Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes provides that the baselines over which the Philippines likewise exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): (a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and (b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Article 121 Regime of Islands

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1.

An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above the water at high tide.

2.

Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with provisions of this Convention applicable to the land territory.

Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. 5

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a zone extending up to 200 miles from the baseline, within which the coastal state enjoys extensive rights in relation to natural resources and other jurisdictional rights and Third States enjoy the freedom of navigation, over flight by aircraft, and the laying of cables and pipelines. Most of the other developing coastal countries also support a wide exclusive economic zone of 200 miles. If they do not have the technological capacity to exploit its resources, they may employ contractors, enter into joint ventures with foreign States or entities, or make bilateral arrangement for exploitation of this zone. But they should have the exclusive right to regulate resource exploitation activities in the area. 6

Intrusion in law means, an illegal act of entering, seizing, or taking possession of anothers property.7 Territorial waters is defined in Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the territorial sea of a state up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention. 8

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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an international law formulated under the auspices of the United Nations to govern the rights of states with sea boundaries including archipelagic states. It spells out the limits wherein a state has jurisdiction over its sea waters as well as its inland waters as far as operation of vessels and the use of its marine resources vis--vis a neighboring country. As stated in the Preamble of the Convention, it says: Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sovereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communications, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment. 9

Endnotes:

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CHAPTER 2 Review of Related Literature and Studies

The Chapter depicts the researches and studies made in order to elucidate the basis of claims of the Philippines and the Peoples Republic of China in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island
Group in the South China Sea. It has two sources of references: local and foreign, and includes periodicals, magazines, and dispatches.

Local references touched on historical facts where PRCs basis of claims to the Spratlys KIG, mostly anchored on Philippine history, and also shows the movements of the early Filipinos in Southeast Asia, which refutes the Chinese claim that the Spratlys KIG was cris-crossed by early Chinese merchants and fisherman. Philippine laws as well as international law such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are mentioned in the chapter to support the Philippines claim to the Spratlys KIG. Local references also depicted the political, military, and economic events in the Philippines, which triggered overlapping claims by China and the Philippines in the area.

Foreign references were necessary to show examples of other countries experiences, particularly the Kingdom and Bahrain and Great Britain in settling their territorial disputes with Qatar and Argentina (in the Falkland Crisis) respectively. Foreign references highlighted the significant role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a form of settling territorial disputes peacefully and showed the importance of the United Nations role in the settlement and mediation of territorial conflicts when force or military power is involved.

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Careful and diligent efforts were made to choose the best possible references, limited they may seem, to enlighten the reader on the strengths and weaknesses of pursuing our claims for the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea.

Local Literature Hsiao-Shi-Ching, The Nanshas (Spratlys) Disputes. Manila: Color Lithographic Press, Inc., 1999

The book in all aspects portrays the historical and traditional claim of the Peoples Republic of China from the second century B.C. to the 20 th century and possible developments of the disputed claim in the new millennium. The Philippines claim of the KIG through discovery and occupation is disputed heavily by China even stating that the Philippines is among the late claimant countries. By looking at the series of events narrated in the book, the dispute in the Spratlys reached its peak when the Americans left the Philippines in 1992. Emboldened by the void left by the US, the PROC intensified its presence in the South China Sea which to an extent were checked by the Philippine authorities. The disputed claims in the South China Sea are exacerbated by the following strategic importance of the area: 1. They constitute the important sea lanes for commerce and the transport of critical materials in the South China Sea. 2. The seabed is believed to hold one of the largest oil deposits in the world. 3. They contain some of the richest living resources and substantial hydrocarbons and mineral deposits.

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Control of the archipelago means control of the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to the South Pacific and to the Pacific.

Esplanada, Jerry. Cafgus to Secure the RP- Claimed Spratlys Isles. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 05 October 2002, pp.A1 and A20.

The article features the effort of the Philippine Government particularly the Municipality of Pag-asa in the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) or Spratlys in straightening the Philippines claim to the KIG through stationing of Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units (Cafgus) in the island group.

Cafgus are a better alternative to populate the area because they are cheaper to maintain compared to regular troops. While in the islands, Cafgus can make an extra living by fishing. The move will see the countrys flag flutter in the 30-plus proud islets, reefs, shoals, and cays in the KIG ( Spratlys). Mayor Rosendo Mantes of the Municipality of Kalayaan led the 200 Cafgus to the island of Pag-asa ( the biggest of the islands) and other nearby islands in the KIG. Philippine troops are currently stationed in only nine areas in the Kalayaan: the island of Pag-asa ( also known as Thitu), the reefs Rizal (Commodore) and Ayungin (LT57) and the islets Parola (Northeast Cay), Lawak (Nanshan), Panata (Larkiam Cay), Kota ( Loaitia), Likas (WestYork), and Patag (Flat). The article has also indicated the strategic importance of the KIG in terms of an estimated 6 billion barrels of oil deposits (or its natural gas equivalent) under the Spratlys and a potential 225 billion barrels of oil under the South China Sea.

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The KIG is also a future tourist attraction for sea adventures, scuba diving, or bird watching especially in Lawak island.

Basis of the claims in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea

China bases its claims in the South China Sea (including the Kalayaans) on the grounds of discovery and occupation going back 2,000 years. The PROC demonstrates its claim by reference to maps drawn up during the Han Dynasty ( 206 B.C to 220 A.D) which purportedly show the Spratlys as part of its territory, and historical artifacts found in the islands indicating the preserve of Chinese fishermen.

The Philippines claim is much more recent. In 1956, Filipino navigator Tomas Cloma laid claims to the Kalayaans, declaring the islands res nullius (new territory), as Japan had been forced to renounce their ownership at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. In 1974, Cloma transferred sovereignty of the islands to the Philippine Government. 10

On June 11, 1978, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued two Presidential Decrees (PDs), PD No. 1596 claiming that the islands, cays, shoals and reefs in the Kalayaan Island Group are integral part of the Philippine territory. On September 14, 1979, Marcos announced that the Philippines had confined its claim to seven islands which were unoccupied, unowned and not possessed, they are therefore new territory, res nullius. 11 The Philippines claim to the South China Sea is also based on the provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the PROC had not affixed its

signature on the UNCLOS during its date of signing by Parties on December 10, 1982; it has not

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yet up to this date submitted its ratification or formal confirmation or accession to the UNCLOS. On the other hand, the Philippines affixed its signature on the UNCLOS on December 10, 1982 and it has also ratified or formally confirmed its accession to the UNCLOS, on May 4, 1984. The number of ratifications of, or accessions to the United Nations Convention in the Law of the Sea increased to 60 during 1993 (58 ratifications, 2 accessions) with the receipt of instruments of ratification from Barbados, Guyana, Honduras, Malta, Saint Kits and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zimbabwe. The convention, which was adopted by the Third United National Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982, was to enter into force 12 months after receipt of the sixtieth instrument ratification. On November 16, 1993, Guyana became the sixtieth country to ratify the Conventions entry into force on November 16, 1994.

Thus, the Philippines claim to the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea could be discerned in one of the provisions of the UNCLOS as follows, Article 60 Artificial islands, installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state should have the exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of: (a) artificial islands; (b) installation and structures for the purposes, provided for an Article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) installations and structures which may interfere in the exercise of the right of the coastal state in the zone. 2. The coastal State should have exclusive jurisdiction, such as artificial islands, installation
and structures.12

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Why the Spratlys?

A perplexing aspect of the Spratlys dispute is the lack, at this time, of clear motives for the rush to establish sovereignty over these forsaken little specks of reef.

One can speculate in the reasons for the activity, and, in the process, three interrelated motivation seem to emerge: (1) territorial integrity (2) resources (3) strategic considerations

Territorial Integrity With its history of colonial humiliation, this region is especially sensitive to territorial disputes. For this reason, the disputants especially China and Vietnam, are maybe pushing their historic claims to the South China Sea Islands. China with its ancient influence over the region, and equally ancient claims to the islands, is maybe motivated by the desire to secure finally its long claimed frontiers. Similarly, Vietnam, which has at least a consistent modern history of occupying and using the islands, may consider securing them as a matter of national pride.

Resources On the other hand, Chinese surveys made over the last four years have reportedly revealed a wealth of hydrocarbon deposits in the continental shelf around the Spratlys-25 billion cubic meters of

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gas and 105 billion barrels of oil. Without clear sovereignty by the issuing country, petroleum companies will be reluctant to take up licenses for exploration or development.

Strategic Consideration The South China Sea has long been a strategic focus of shipping lanes, including Japans vital oil supply line from the Middle East. Chinas Southern coastal development, which is based partly on the regions connection with overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, will also depend heavily on trade transiting the area.13

Skirmishes and Near Conflict Incidents in the Paracels and Spratlys Island Group in the South China Sea Vietnam-China Military Engagement in the Paracels, Spratlys Island Group in 1988

In early 1988, Chinese forces landed on Fiery Cross and Cuarteron Reefs and the island hopping race with Vietnam was on. In March, 1988, Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed near Chigua Reef, with the result that three Vietnamese ships were damaged or sunk. According to Vietnam, several Vietnamese sailors were killed and 74 were missing in action. By April, 1988, the Chinese were in control of six islands or reefs, and Vietnam had added fifteen more, for a total of 21. In November, 1988, Vietnam claimed that a Chinese destroyer had fired on one of its ships near Collins Reef, but the Chinese denied any such action.14

Again in early March, 1997, Vietnam and China came close to a physical confrontation when a Chinese oil rig, Kantan-D3 and two Chinese tug boats moved into waters near the northern coast of Vietnam.

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Philippine-China Near Conflict Incident in Mischief Reef, Spratlys Group of Islands in the South China Sea, 1995 The year 1995 marked a turning point in Sino-Philippine relations with the discovery of Chinese-built structures on Mischief Reef- a small, rocky outcrop lying 135 miles West of Palawan and well within the Philippine-claimed 200-mile Exclusive economic Zone (EEZ). In January 1995, the Captain of a Philippine fishing vessel reported that he and his crew had been detained for several days by Chinese troops on Mischief Reef. Reconnaissance aircraft later confirmed the existence of Chinese Structures on the reef-four platforms on stilts, with three to four octagonal bunkers on each platform, equipped with satellite communication equipment. Eight Chinese naval vessels were also seen near the Reef. Philippine President, Fidel Ramos condemned the construction of the structures as inconsistent with international law and the spirit and content of the 1992 Manila ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea to which both countries are parties. Although the Ramos administration made a token military gesture by reinforcing the garrison in the Kalayaans, diplomacy was the only realistic option available to the Philippines in defense of the crisis. Philippine and Chinese officials held two rounds of discussions over the dispute, and ASEAN as a group raised the issue with the PROC in Hangzhou in April 1995. The Philippine diplomatic strategy seemed to have paid off in August 1995 when the two countries agreed on a code of conduct. The code was aimed at preventing similar incidents occurring in the future, and increasing bilateral cooperation in the South China Sea.

The signing of the code of conduct did not, however, signal an end to the dispute. A minor skirmish took place between Chinese and Philippine warships in January 1996, and between March and May 1996, it was reported that the structures at Mischief Reef had been upgraded. In April 1997,

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tensions rose again when eight Chinese naval vessels were sighted near Mischief Reef and a new structure was seen on a reef six miles northeast of the Philippine- held Kota Island. At the same time, two vessels owned by the Chinese State Oceanic Administration were intercepted by the Philippine Navy near Scarborough Shoal, a small reef lying 130 miles west of Luzon ( Scarborough Shoal is not part of the Spratlys Group, but its ownership is disputed by both the PROC and the Philippines). The ships had been carrying Chinese and foreign amateur radio enthusiasts who had planned to make a broadcast from the reef. The captains of the Chinese vessels informed their Filipino counterparts that the PROC considered Scarborough Shoal its territory, a claim rejected by the Ramos administration. Not wishing to escalate tensions, the Chinese vessels withdrew. In mid-May 1997, a group of Philippine Congressmen sailed to Scarborough Shoal and planted the Philippines flag on the reef. 15 Two days after, Beijing protested the visit of the two Congressmen to the Scarborough Shoal and demanded the removal of the Philippine flag from the reef.

In October 1998, the issue of Mischief Reef came to prominence again when the Philippine government produced photographs of Chinese vessels unloading construction materials at the reef. Subsequent photographs revealed Chinese workers constructing a large building adjacent to the original structures. Manila condemned the move as a violation of the 1995 Code of Conduct, an assertion which the Chinese Foreign Ministry rejected. Newly elected Philippine President Joseph Estrada also met with U.S Vice- President Al Gore at the APEC Meeting. Estrada reportedly told Gore that he was pushing the Philippine Senate to ratify the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, and sought U.S. help to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines. On 29 November 1998, the Philippine Navy arrested twenty Chinese fishermen near Mischief Reef and charged them with illegal fishing. 16 Incidents like these happening in the Spratlys Island Group and Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea if

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not given lasting solution could cause a stand-off to Sino-Philippine relations worst a bloody conflict between the two countries in the area. Steps Taken by the Philippine Government to Strengthen Its Position in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea Diplomacy

Chinas occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995 was part of a dual strategy of negotiation and occupation, influenced by domestic political factors. The weakness of the Philippine Armed Forces provided the Peoples Republic of China with an opportunity to extend its claims in the South China Sea, avoiding the possibility of military confrontation. The Philippines has pursued diplomacy to resolve the depths, employing both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Whilst these negotiations have met with some success, the primary issues remain unresolved. In its dispute with the PROC, the Philippines received unprecedented support from ASEAN, which viewed Chinas actions as damaging to regional stability. 17 The PROC thought it right to listen to the voice of ASEAN as it moved not to be ganged up by this group of countries.

Code of Conduct and Multilateral Approaches

On August 9-10, 1997, the Philippines and China held vice- ministerial talks in Manila for consultations on their disputes in the South China Sea and other areas of cooperation. A Joint Statement was issued whereby both sides agreed to abide by the following principles for a Code of Conduct in the area:

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Territorial disputes between the two sides should not affect their normal relations. Disputes shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner. Efforts must be undertaken to build confidence and trust and both sides should refrain from using force or threat of force to resolve disputes. 18

Similarly during the 13th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 02 November 2002, the ASEAN heads of State/ Government reiterated the groups concern with regards to the Spratlys issue in a form of declaration to guide the actions of claimant States in the area to preserve peace and stability in the Spratlys and the entire region. Following US Representative Diana Rohrabachers visit (to the Mischief Reef in the Spratlys) on 10 December 1998 accompanied by Representative Roilo Golez, the US State Department appealed to China to avoid actions that could cause increased tensions in the Spratlys. In a statement issued for press guidance dated 11 February 1999, it reiterated its position on the legal merits of competing claims to sovereignty in the area, maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the US.

It was against this backdrop that the ASEAN Heads of State reportedly took turns during the 1998 Hanoi Meeting to express concern over these most recent developments. During the Hanoi Meeting, ASEAN governments agreed on the desirability of having a regional code of conduct to prevent the further escalation of conflict. 19

Populating the Philippines claimed Kalayaan Island Group in the Spratlys

To further assert the Philippine claim over the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), the Philippine Navy is seriously considering deploying at least 200 Citizens Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGUs) in the disputed areas. It is expected that the countrys tricolors will flutter high

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above the 30 plus proud islets, reefs, and shoals claimed by the Philippines in the KIG. Philippine troops are currently stationed in only nine areas in Kalayaan: the island of Pag-asa ( also known as Thitu, the reef Rizal (Commodore) and Ayungin (LT57), and the islets Parola (Northeast Cay), Lawak (Nanshan), Panata (Lankiam Cay), Kota (Loaita), Likas (West York) and Patag (Flat).

Kalayaan Mayor Rosendo Mantes, a former commanding officer of the Pag-asa Naval Station, has agreed to help the Navy hire CAFGUs for posting in the areas 20 The move is a way of strengthening Philippine presence in the areas and as a deterrent factor in discouraging other nationalities specially from PROC in doing illegal activities in the KIG.

AFP Modernization

A strategy being undertaken by the Philippine government to prepare for the worst scenario which might happen in the course of Philippine claims in the KIG is the Modernization Program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This move had gotten impetus during the administration of former President Fidel V. Ramos. Ramos paid more attention to the Philippine security than his predecessors. Ramos was well aware of the emasculated state of the Philippine military and, unlike many in Congress, he did not believe that the country would enjoy a totally benign strategic environment and the Americans had vacated their bases. Fears that the withdrawal of the Americans would leave the Philippines vulnerable to external threats were echoed by members of the Ramos Government, including Defense Secretary Renato S. de Villa, who openly admitted that, Until the armed forces have completed their modernization program, then we have very limited capability to depend ourselves in the air and at sea.21

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A comparison to defense spending among ASEAN countries is shown in the Table below.

ASEAN Defense Spending, 1989-1995 (In US$ billions) 1989 Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Thailand Philippines NA 1.593 1.384 1.49 1.8 1.28 1990 NA 1.61 1.7 1.7 2.06 0.928 1991 NA 1.5 1.72 2.13 2.40 0.986 1992 0.396 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.9 1.1 1993 0.212 2.03 2.64 2.44 3.12 0.749 1994 __ 1995__ 0.258 2.4 3.1 3.1 3.6 1.1 0.268 2.8 3.50 4.0 3.9 1.2

4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Source: Institute of International and strategic studies, The military balance (London: Oxford University Press, 1989-1995)

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GMA admits US was training Filipino soldiers to defend the Spratlys vs China; Philippine Daily Inquirer, Sunday, 04 April 2004, pp. A6

The PDI article on the Spratlys stated that this was the first time President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has admitted that US troops were training Filipino soldiers to defend the Spratlys vs China but was quick to state that the Filipino troops have been ordered to shift to training in fighting the Abu Sayyaf, a Muslim extremist group linked to Osama bin Ladens AlQaida. The President also said that the US anti-terrorism assistance to the Philippines has increased from US$1.9 million to US$400 million. The Philippines was expected to receive more US assistance since the latter has declared the Philippines as a non-NATO ally.

Public Information Services Unit, DFA (news briefs) Public Information Services No. 38-03 dated 01 September 2003: RP and China Sign BSA and MOU on the utilization of Preferential Buyers Credit

Despite the territorial question in the Spratlys KIG, the Philippines and China endeavored to strengthen bilateral relations by way of exchanges of visit of top government officials such as the Official Visit to the Philippines of Mr. Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress of China in August 2003. During the top level visit, two agreements were signed between the two countries, namely; The Bilateral Swap Agreement (BSA) and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the utilization of a US$400 million Preferential Buyers Credit.

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The BSA is an agreement made under the Chiangmai Initiative that would enable the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to swap Philippine pesos for Renminbi in the amount of US$1 billion in the event that an immediate need arises for balance of payments of short-term liquidity support.

The MOU on preferential buyers credit will provide US$400 million soft loan for the financing of the construction of Phase I Section of the North Luzon Railways Project that would provide commuter rail service for passengers and goods between Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan.

DFA Circular 54-LLB-98-S dated 11 November 1998

The circular was sent to all Philippine Embassies abroad on 11 November 1998 indicating the several strong protests made by the Philippine Government against Chinas construction of structures at Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. Mischief Reef is being claimed by the Philippines as part of its territory and the construction of said fishermen shelters in the said island was illegal. China made such construction of edifices on the island in October, 1998. The Philippine Ambassador in Beijing conveyed to the Chinese Government the strong protest of the Philippine Government on that same period. Likewise, the DFA summoned the Chinese Ambassador in Manila to convey a similar protest against Chinas construction of shelters at Mischief Reef. A bilateral meeting was held at the sidelines of the APEC Summit on 16-18 November 1998 between then President Joseph E. Estrada and Chinese President Jiang Zemin by which the Mischief Reef Issue was one of the matters discussed during the said bilateral meeting of the two leaders.

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Teodoro A. Agoncillo; History of the Filipino People; Garo Tech Books Inc., North Fairview, Quezon City, 2008 A historical glimpse of the origins of the Filipino people and movements of early settlers in the Philippines from mainland Asia through the now called South China Sea could clarify Chinese voyages as well as that of other early peoples from nearby Southeast Asia and the Far East plying through the South China Sea.

In February 1976, however, the theory of the land bridges to Asia was disputed by Dr. Fritjof Voss, a German scientist who studied the geology of the Philippines. According to Dr. Voss, the Philippines was never a part of mainland Asia but that it rose from the bottom of the sea and continues to rise as the thin Pacific crust moves below it. As proof that the Philippines was never a part of the Asian mainland, Dr. Voss points to the fact that when scientific studies were done in 1964-1967 on the thickness of the earths crust, it was found out that the 35kilometer thick crust underneath China does not extend to the Philippines. Hence, the latter could not have been a part of land bridges to the mainland of Asia.22

Early Trade Relations with China

Trade relations with China started in the 9 th century particularly during the Sung Dynasty (960-1127). Early trade continued during the Ming period (1368-1644). Trade was focused at the early period with the Sultanate of Sulu. During Ming Emperor Yung Lo (1402-1424), a large fleet consisting of more than 60 vessels under the command of Admiral Cheng Ho visited

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Lingayen in Pangasinan, Manila Bay, Mindoro, and Sulu. These visits took place in 1405-1406, 1408-1410, and 1417.

Early Trade with the Sultanate of Sulu

The Sultanate of Sulu consolidated its influence and turned into a trading center in the 12 th century. Nearby traders from Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Cambodia, as far as the Middle East, and Southern Annam cast their anchors at the trading port of Sulu.

The early traders implied a criss-crossing of trading ships in the area so-called the South China Sea especially in the 12th century onwards until the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521.

Voyage to the Philippines of the Ten (10) Bornean Datus

In the 13 th century, ten (10) Bornean Datus and their families, namely; Puti, Bangkaya, Dumalugdog, Sumakwel, Lubay, Paiburong, Dumangsil, Balensusa, Paduhinog, and Dumangsol sailed to the Philippines and landed in an island which is now Panay. Datus Puti, Balensusa, and Dumangsil further sailed north to Luzon disembarking in the region around Lake Bonbon (Taal). The families of Datus Dumangsil and Balensusa spread to Laguna and the Bicol Peninsula. Datu Puti seeing his companions fully settled and living peacefully, sailed back to Borneo.

Thus, the early history of the Filipino people and their interaction with other peoples and cultures made the South China Sea a common route not only for our early ancestors but early people for their voyages to trade and explore early settlements in the Philippines.

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Foreign Literature

Storm Over Spratlys: Arroyo prepares for diplomatic offensive against China, Gulf News, 09 November 2003, pp. 23

The Gulf Daily News article indicated updated news on the Spratlys Issue in the South China Sea particularly the renewed Chinese activities in the Mischief Reef, an area nearer to Palawan than the Spratlys KIG in southwestern Philippines. President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo directed the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate diplomatic action on the so-called Chinese creeping invasion of Philippine territory. The Armed Forces of the Philippines with its Chief of Staff General Narciso Abaya together with journalists flew over the area to confirm such presence of Chinese naval vessels in the Mischief Reef. The reported two PROC naval vessels arrived in the Mischief Reef in September 2003 and have not left since then according to then Western Command Chief, Rear Admiral Ruben Domingo. The President said that such reports which were confirmed to be true was a breach of the status quo agreement among the six claimant countries (Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam) which have signed to adhere to the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea.

Bahrain vs. Qatar Territorial Dispute

Bahrains Similar Experience in the Resolution of Its Territorial Dispute with Qatar Over the Hawar Islands from Where the Philippines Could Reflect On Last Day of Oral Pleading for Bahrain at the International Court of Justice and the Second and Final Round of Bahrains Oral

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Pleadings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Philippine Embassy, Manama Dispatches to the DFA, 01 July 2000 and 28 June 2000

The dispatches contained reports on the culminating events in Bahrains territorial dispute with Qatar over the Hawar Islands. Bahrain contended that its position with respect to Hawar is sufficient to prove Bahrains sovereign title over the islands. They are: Uti Possidetis Juris (the boundaries set an independence); Res Judicata (a settled state of affairs should not be (disturbed); and Original Title and effective and continuous manifestations of sovereign authority.

Bahrains experience in resolving its territorial dispute with neighbor Qatar through the ICJ demonstrated that territorial disputes though one of the most difficult problems to resolve between two countries could possibly be resolved through a proper venue, the ICJ. The Philippines could reflect on Bahrains experience in dealing with the latters territorial dispute with a neighboring state Qatar through legal means and not through a bloody conflict.

Jawad Salim Al-Arayed, A Line in the Sea, Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books, 2003

The Philippines could reflect on the resolution of the Bahrain-Qatar territorial dispute over the Hawar Islands through the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as decided with finality of the said Court on 16 March 2001.

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The Courts Decision

Before reviewing the Courts decision and reasoning in the case of Qatar vs. Bahrain, it is helpful to first understand the philosophy which underlies the International Court of Justice and its role in international law.

In documents prepared by the international court to describe its history and goals, the Court states its purpose clearly:
The ultimate aim of the Court, where there is a conflict, is to open the road to international harmony . . . The mere fact that the case has been submitted to the Court means that . . . good arguments exist on both sides. . . It is clearly impossible for the Court to please everybody, still less to favor any party. This is, indeed, inherent in the role of a Court (International Court of Justice 1996, 73-74).23 The fact that the Court is open to a state does not mean that the state is obliged to have its disputes with other states decided by the Court. The Courts jurisdiction to try contentious cases depends upon the consent of states since international justice, in contrast to national justice, is still optional. The following is a list of the 47 states which accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court; this list, which represents the situation on January 1, 1983, includes states whose declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice have not lapsed or been withdrawn and are therefore applicable to the present Court (Statute, Article 36, paragraph 5):

Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Kampuchen, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Haiti, 41

Honduras, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, Uruguay. In the event of a dispute as to whether the court has jurisdiction in a given case, the court decides the matter.24

. . . And so the International Court of Justice did in their decision in this case, rendered on 16 March 2001. It might be said that in terms of the Hawars and Zubarah ( a province within Qatars mainland) at least, the judgment gave twenty-first century political legitimacy to a kind of modus vivendi that had been arrived at between the two Parties and that had persisted for several generations.

After recounting the complex history of the dispute and the arguments presented by the Parties in their various written pleadings, the Judgments findings were: Qatar was awarded sovereignty over Zubarah, Janan Island, and the low-tide elevation of Fasht Al-Dibal; Bahrain was awarded sovereignty over the Hawar Islands and the island of Qitat Jaradah; A single maritime boundary between the two states was drawn (ICJ Judgment, 2001, 7172).25

For purposes of comparison and contrast, the final maritime line rendered in the Judgment, the maritime delimitations requested by Bahrain and Qatar at the Court, and the 1947 British 42

decision line (which had been the de facto border until the Judgment had been rendered) are all portrayed on Map No. 9, pp. 398. It can be seen by examining the map that Bahrain has gained considerable maritime boundary to the east of the 1947 British decision line, despite the loss of Fasht Al-Dibal and Janan.

Significance of the Judgment

Judgments of the International Court of Justice are considered final, without appeal, and binding for the two parties. However, as the court has no enforcement arm, it relies on the good faith of both parties for implementation of its decisions. By signing the Charter, a State Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with any decision of the International Court of Justice in a case to which it is a party (International Court of Justice, 1996, 73).26

Speaking to the nation on television after the Judgments reading, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, Bahrains Amir, said: We salute the ICJ over its wise verdict and declare our complete acceptance of its ruling. We have given orders to take the necessary measures to ensure its implementation, taking into consideration that the outcome of the verdict is a joint gain for both the brotherly states of Qatar and Bahrain. We have jointly won the battle for the future and the time has come to open a brighter, new chapter in our relations and to accomplish the dreams and aspirations of generations of Bahrainis and Qataris.27

For his part, Shaikh Hamad Al-Thani, the Amir of Qatar, also addressing his people on television, admitted that recognition of Bahrains sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, was not easy upon us. . . However, despite the pain we feel, we think that the Courts award has put an end to the

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dispute. . . It will enhance the security and stability of our Gulf states and contribute to strengthening the GCC. . . I extend to Bahrain a hand that has always been full of fraternity and cordiality so that we can close that page and open a new Chapter where the two brotherly people take part in planning and deepening our future relations.28

Both rulers have pointed to the settlement of this long-standing dispute as an example for other countries of the world to follow in resolving conflicts by calm and peaceful means.

With this long, complex dispute now settled, both parties can look forward to improved relations and a new era of ties which will bring mutual economic and social benefit. 29

The Future

Curiously, in the very midst of this dispute, relations between Bahrain and Qatar began taking a turn for the better. In December 1999, Qatari Amir Shaikh Hamad visited Bahrain to thresh out the disputed issues. This visit led to the establishment of a Joint Bahrain-Qatar High Committee, headed by the Crown Princes of the two countries. 30

Since then, the parties have established diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level, allowed citizens of mere personal identity cards to travel freely between the two countries, and Qatars airline now operates to and from Bahrain.

Beyond these many additional ideas have been put forth concerning issues of national concern. Chief among these has been discussion of the building of a causeway linking both countries.

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For its part, Bahrain has developed plans to exploit the mineral resources of Hawar, and also to develop the area as a site for tourism.31

Relations between the two countries have been further cemented since the visit of Shaikh

Hamad of Qatar to Bahrain in early 2001. He congratulated Bahrains ruler, Shaikh Hamad, for successfully completing the Referendum on the New National Action Center, and the overwhelming support demonstrated by the people of Bahrain for Shaikh Hamads efforts to modernize the country by means of political, economic, and social reforms.32

Falkland Crisis

The following story on the Falklands Crisis is another international territorial conflict by which the Philippines could reflect on depicting the worst scenario of resolving a territorial dispute through war or military force. The risk was great and was dubbed as a big gamble by British authorities at a cost of 257 British lives and millions of US Dollars worth of military assets destroyed compared with Argentinas more than 700 lives lost and likewise millions of US Dollars worth of military naval and air force equipment destroyed during the almost three months Falklands Crisis in the South Atlantic.

Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, London: Book Club Associates, 1983

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The Battle for the Falklands draws important events and experiences which depicted a sample action by which to deal with a territorial dispute through force or military action between two protagonists, the United Kingdom and Argentina.

By looking at the world map, the Falklands as the British call it is a group of islands near the southeastern part of Argentina. The Argentines call it The Islands Malvinas. The period of colonial conquests in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries have brought rivalries between Spain, Britain, and France. Voyagers led by these countries passed on sovereignty over the islands from France to Spain to Britain then to Spain and then to Britain. Distance, however, prevented, Britain from giving the islands effective administration and control of the Falkland Islands. In the midst of all these claims by the Western powers, Argentina consistently kept consistently its claims over the Falklands due to its proximity to Argentina and UNCLOSs provision of the exclusive economic zone. The incident was aggravated by the political situation in Argentina which was ruled by a military junta. The junta believed that Argentine invasion and occupation of the islands will not face military response from Britain. Argentina invaded and occupied the islands on 02 April 1982. Contrary to the Argentina military juntas belief, this triggered Britains sending of a task force to the Falklands on 05 April 1982. British forces landed on the island on 01 May 1982. After almost two months of battle, the Argentine forces recapitulated to British forces at Port Stanley on 24 June 1982, ending the Falklands Crisis. It should be noted that what moved Britain to go to war for the Falklands was to protect the interests of the 1,800 British and half-British citizens in the islands who refused to give up their British allegiance and citizenship to any foreign occupier including Argentina. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher by winning the support of the armed forces embarked on a

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very dangerous and expensive gamble of re-taking sovereignty in the Falklands through military means. Argentinas junta leader, General Leopoldo Galtiere could not seek for more opportune time to claim and occupy the islands though shrouded with miscalculations and lack of well seasoned and resources full armed forces.

Though victorious in its campaign in the Falklands, Britain surprisingly got all the flak from the United Nations . . . When the game had ended, Britains winnings were so vast that she appeared to abandon a long-term Falklands diplomacy policy altogether. Faced with yet another UN Resolution on 04 November 1982 requesting for a resumption of negotiations, Britain found ninety (90) nations voting against her, including the United States. She had won the war, but not yet the argument. The Falklands had merely become a costly fortress.33

The Argentine case rests on the argument that discovery alone has never been accepted by international lawyers as the foundation of sovereignty. Discovery is only a valid basis if allied to occupation and settled administration. The first colony on the islands was French, but this was ceded by de Bouganville to Spain virtually the only straightforward deal in the whole history of the Falklands. The British claim to first occupation must be confined to West Falkland, and did not involve any settled community. After a major dispute with Spain, this occupation was terminated: the famous plaque is legally immaterial. Spain then operated a peaceful colony on the islands for forty (40) years. When Spain left in 1811, the British did not claim the islands back and the government of what became Argentina declared sovereignty by inheritance from Spain in 1820. It appointed governors, installed them and at least attempted to enforce administration and justice. It was only a fortuitous act of American piracy which permitted the British seizure. 34

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The British case is three-fold. First, Britain asserted a claim in 1765 and never islands. This argument is not strong, and is known to have caused the Foreign Office some hesitancy when Argentina again revived her claim late last century. American neutrality on the issue of sovereignty is based on similar doubts expressed on a secret State Department memorandum of 1947.

Since before the Second World War, the British have moved to a second area of argument, the doctrine of prescription. This broadly states that the continuous possession over a period of time constitutes a right to ownership. The right is clearly reinforced if that possession is not contested by the world at large. Nor is it annulled by another claimant persisting in a competing demand. In international law, this is little more than an affirmation that might, sustained for long enough, is right. The best that can be said in its defense is that, if all nations re-opened 150 yearold claims whenever they felt strong enough, the world would be a bloodier place than it is.

The strongest British argument rests on a third principle, that of self-determination. The islands have a two-thirds indigenous population, who persistently want to stay British. Respects for the wishes of inhabitants on matters of sovereignty is enshrined in the United Nations Charter and has underlain decades of decolonization. The Argentines argue that any action can take anothers land, implant settlers and claim it. Yet, undoubtedly, the fact of the islanders presence and their freely expressed desire to remain British has dominated the last seventeen years of negotiation over their future.35

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Argentina can at least protest that she has never allowed her claim to lapse altogether. Buenos Aires objected when Britain formally declared a colonial administration in the Falklands in 1842. In the 1880s, when Argentina was being rounded off to the South with Chile, she again asked for the islands back. In 1908, Britain unilaterally declared sovereignty over uninhabited territory south of the Falklands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich, Orkney and Shetland Islands and Graham Land were all grouped under the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Argentina declared they were firmly hers, and thereby began a half century of genteel squabbling between Britain, Argentine and Chilean warships and scientists. They would sail south and put down plaques and build sheds to test each others resolve before retreating from the hostile weather.36

Theoretical Framework

The theory of pragmatism which does not only apply to the Chinese takes chances at every opportunity to be exploited for self-aggrandizement, expansion of wealth and solidification of regional power and influence. When there will be a chance for the Chinese to strike and occupy the Spratlys KIG, there is a high probability that the Chinese will do it. This situation should all the more move our leaders to strengthen the countrys defense posture and concentrate on economic and social development other than the historical claim over the whole of the South China Sea. Diplomacy they say has its limits in preserving peace and status quo between two countries. Diplomacy if not backed by a strong economy, a united people, and a strong armed forces becomes precarious in holding peace between two nations and peoples. Rather, diplomacy

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should be used to buy time for the government to build its defenses, strengthen its economy, and create a mindset for the people to be prepared in any eventuality should diplomacy break down to its limit and there would be an end to friendship resulting to confrontation or worst bloody conflict.

Perception on issues varies from one person to another. One of the purposes of the study is to see the consensus of a group of people like the respondents of the survey in as as far the right or better approaches to deal with the Spratlys KIG territorial question. It is quite fortunate that there is a consensus of people who participated in the survey to strengthen the Philippines claim in the area.

Endnotes:

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Barry Hart Dubner. The Laws of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and Archipelagic States. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. 9-12. 2 The Law of the Sea, (New York United Publications, 2001), pp. 49. 3 Ibid., pp. 37. 4 Barry Hart Dubner. The Laws of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and Archipelagic States. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp.13. 5 The Law of the Sea, (New York United Publications, 2001), pp. 63. 6 Ram Prakash Anand. Law of the Sea Caracas and Beyond. (New Delhi: Ekta Press, 1978), pp. 174. 7 Jess Stein, Leonore C. Hauck, and P. Y. Su. The Random House College Dictionary Revised Edition. (New York: Random House, Inc., 1983), p. 701. 8 The Law of the Sea, pp. 23. 9 The Law of the Sea, (New York United Publications, 2001), pp.21. 10 Ian James Storey. Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute, Contemporary Southeast Asia, A Journal of International and Strategic Studies (Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1999), pp. 96.
11 12

Benito Lim. Contending Claims Over the Spratlys: The Chinese Position, Panorama, (February 1999), pp. 89.

Martin A. Ocampo, China Legally a Squatter on Mischief Reef, Lawyers Review, ( March 31, 1995) pp. 14-

15. Bradford L. Thomas, The Spratlys Islands Imbroglio: A Tangled Web of Conflict, International Boundaries and Boundary Conflict Resolution ed. by Carl Grundy-Warr, (Washington, D.C, USA: Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, 1989). pp. 420-424. 14 Bradford L. Thomas, pp.413-430. 15 Storey, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., p.95. 18 Ibid., p.95. 19 Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, The Kalayaan Islands (Spratlys) in Philippine Foreign Policy, Panorama, (February,1999) pp.76-77. 20 Jerry Esplanada, Cafgus to Secure RP claimed Spratly isles, Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2002, pp. A1-A20. 21 Storey, op cit., pp. 104-105. 22 Teodoro A. Agoncillo; The History of the Filipino People; (North Fairview, Q.C. Garo Tech Books Inc., 2008), pp. 20. 23 Jawad Salim Al-Arayed, A Line in the Sea, (Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books, 2001), pp. 396. 24 Edmond Jan Osmanczyk. Encyclopaedia of the United Nations and International Relations. (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990, 2nd Edition), p. 447. 25 Jawad Salim Al-Arayed, A Line in the Sea, (Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books, 2001), pp. 396. 26 Ibid., pp. 404. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., pp. 405. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid.
33 34
13

Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Book Club Associates, 1983), pp. 327.

Ibid., pp. 6.
35 36

Ibid. p. 7. Ibid.

CHAPTER 3 Research Methodology The Chapter depicts the ways by which the survey/questionnaire was conducted to substantiate facts derived from the earlier research. Similarly, the Chapter shows the interpretation of data obtained through percentile, average and mean statistical methods. The
analysis and interpretation of data strengthened actions taken by the Philippine Government in dealing with the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group issue.

The Research Design

The research is in the form of an assessment study whereby data on the events surrounding the issues of the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the South China Sea shall have been considered carefully to answer questions such as the origin of the problem, skirmishes and near conflicts incidents in the area, decisions made by the top-ranking Philippine government officials to handle the issue, and the reasons why the Philippine government should be ready at all cost to defend Philippine sovereignty in the KIG.

To substantiate further the data obtained from books, periodicals, magazines and newspapers, it is necessary that a survey should be conducted with appropriate resource persons.

The Respondents of the Study

A group of students at the National Defense College of the Philippines taking their Masters in National Security Administration, coming from all walks of life, such as from the academe,

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government, and private sectors were some of the respondents of the study. Likewise, student officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines taking up their Command and General Staff Course at the Command and General Staff College at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City, participated in the survey. To give a more actual opinion on the study, military officers of the Western Command (WESCOM) based in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan have also been tapped to participate in the survey. WESCOM is the primary command of the armed forces task with patrolling and securing our interests in the western Philippines especially the contested Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group in the South China Sea. questionnaire activity. A total of 111 respondents participated in the survey

The Instrument

A set of questionnaires was prepared indicating the gender, age, civil status and occupation of the respondents. The questionnaire has the following topics: importance of the Philippines claim in the KIG, what are the possible ways to pursue said claim such as diplomacy, strong military alliance with the US, modernization of the armed forces, a regional code of conduct, and other preferences of the respondents as to the steps to be taken to strengthen the Philippines claim to the KIG.

The Procedure in Data Gathering

Coordination and arrangements were made with the President of NDCP and the Commandant of CGSC to allow the conduct of survey in the Colleges. Both Colleges are located in Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City. Likewise, coordination was made with the Commander and Deputy Commander of WESCOM to conduct the survey to determine the ideas, opinions, and preferences of

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men on the ground about how the Spratlys KIG issue could be best dealt with by the Philippine

Government vis--vis China, given the meager resources of the Government.

Statistical Treatment

The data gathered on the study are analyzed and interpreted by using the percentile, mean, average, and the application of the principles of estimation and forecasting to demonstrate through statistical data and survey the answers to the problems which are supposed to be answered through the study.

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CHAPTER 4
Presentation, Analysis, Synthesis, Interpretation of Data The Chapters presentation of data through tables and figures facilitated the analysis, synthesis, and interpretation with regards to the frequency of intrusions of Chinese nationals and their vessels in the Spratlys KIG. The years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002 showed the highest registered Chinese intrusions with 159, 167, 54, and 160 respectively. The total number of intrusions from 1995 to 2009 was 789. Similarly, in terms of the total number of Chinese vessels sighted or apprehended in the area, the years 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002 registered the highest numbers, which are 225, 15, 14, and 7 respectively. The total number of apprehended vessels for the period of 1995 to 2009 was 291.

Textual, Tabular and Graphic Presentation of Data

A. Statistical Data Table 1 Number of poachers/illegal entrants apprehended in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) in the South China Sea from 1995 to 2009
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 No. of Poachers/Illegal Entrants in the Spratlys KIG 88 47 159 167 54 160 46 47 8 -

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2008 2009

13 Grand Total 789

Source: National Committee of Illegal Entrants (NCIE), Office for Consular Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pasay City

180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Figure 1 Bar graph showing the number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG for the period 1995 to 2009.

Table 2 Number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea according to nationality from 1995 to 2009
Nationality Chinese (PROC) Taiwanese Hong Kong Total 472 3 105 Percentage 59.82% 0.38% 13.31%

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Malaysian Vietnamese Indonesian Unconfirmed Nationality

69 83 31 26 Grand Total 789

8.75% 10.52% 3.93% 3.30%

PROC Taiwanese Hong Kong Malaysian Vietnamese Indonesian Unconfirmed

Figure 2 Pie graph showing the total number of illegal entrants/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality for the period 1995 to 2009.

Table 3 Total number of vessels caught or sighted in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total Number of Vessels Apprehended 7 5 1 225 15 14 6 7 5 4 1 -

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2008 2009

1 Total 291

250 200 150 100 50 0 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Line 1

Figure 3 Linear graph showing the total number of vessels apprehended or sighted in the Spratlys KIG for the period 1995 to 2009

Table 4 Total number of vessels apprehended or sighted in the Spratlys KIG according to nationality for the period 1995 to 2009
Nationality PROC Chinese Taiwanese Hongkong Malaysian Vietnamese Indonesian Unconfirmed Nationality Total 167 2 46 16 34 4 22 Grand Total 291 Percentage 57.38% 0.69% 15.81% 5.50% 11.68% 1.37% 7.56%

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PROC Taiwanese Hong Kong Malaysian Vietnamese Indonesian Unconfirmed

Figure 4 Pie graph showing the percentages of vessels according to nationality caught or apprehended in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009

Analysis The data of poachers/illegal entrants in the Spratlys KIG show that in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002, the highest number of intruders/poachers of 159, 167, 54, and 160 respectively were recorded by the Provincial Committee of Illegal Entrants (PCIE) in Palawan. The total number of intruders/poachers for the period 1995 to 2009 was 789.

Similarly, in terms of the total number of vessels sighted or apprehended in the area, the years 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002 registered the highest total number of apprehended or sighted vessels such as 225, 15, 14, and 7 respectively. The total number of apprehended vessels for the period 1995 to 2009 was 291. 58

Looking at a per nationality basis, Peoples Republic of China (PROC) nationals topped the number of intruders/poachers apprehended in the Spratlys KIG with 472 (59.32%); followed by Hong Kong with 105 (13.31%); Vietnamese with 83 (10.52%); Malaysian with 69 (8.75%); Indonesian with 31 (3.93%); Unconfirmed Nationality with 26 (3.30%); and Taiwanese with 3 (0.38%).

The total number of vessels apprehended in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009 is 291 out of which is PROC, 167 (57.38%); Hong Kong, 46 (15.81%); Vietnamese, 34 (11.68%); Unconfirmed Nationality, 22 (7.56%); Malaysian, 16 (5.50%); Indonesian, 4 (1.37%); and Taiwanese, 2 (0.69%).

B.Presentation of the Results of Surveys 1.Result of the survey with students from the National Defense College of the Philippines 1 Civil Government Business/Private Military 1 1 9 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 0 0 5 7 6 0 1 3 2 0 1 7 7 4 1 1 3 2 3 0 3 1 5 1 3 1 1 1 1 9 8 5 1 2 2 1 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 4 5 2 3 1 5 3 1 0 1 6 1 3 1 1 7 7 4 2 18 0 1 0

Table 5 Result of the survey with students from the National Defense College of the Philippines

1. YES 2. NO 3. ABSTAIN 4. NAVAL AND AERIAL PATROLS 5. COURT LITIGATION, IMPRISONMENT AND FINES TO VIOLATORS CAUGHT OR APPREHENDED 6. DIPLOMATIC APPROACH 59

7. MILITARY APPROACH 8. ECONOMIC APPROACH 9. RP-CHINA DIALOGUE 10. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11. YES 12. NO 13. ABSTAIN 14. CO-SHARING AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 15. NEUTRAL GROUND (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH) 16. DEFEND SPRATLYS KIG EVEN WITH THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 17. U.N. MONITORING AGENCY 18. PASSIVE TREATMENT TO THE TERITORRIAL QUESTION Analysis of the result of survey with the 29 students of the National Defense College of the Philippines which was conducted on 05 to 11 March 2010.

The students in the College were divided into three groups, namely; civil government, business/private, and military. a. Civil Government Group The group approved of the Philippine Governments taking a firm action against illegal intrusions/poaching within the Spratlys KIG area through apprehensions, detention, court litigation, fines, and deportation of violators. Eleven (11) of the group indicated their approval.

As a long-term solution to the territorial question, six (6) students opted to take the diplomatic approach and better way to solve the problem in the long-term.

Nine (9) of the group favored strengthening the local government in Pag-asa municipality and encourage population growth in the Spratlys KIG.

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As for the other steps to resolve the territorial question, seven (7) favored the setting-up of a UN monitoring agency to ensure the peace and stability not only in the Spratlys KIG but the whole of the South China Sea. b. Business/Private Group Nine (9) students from the business/private/group approved of the Philippine Governments taking a firm action against illegal entrants/poachers in the area. Violators who were apprehended were detained, underwent court hearing, fined, and eventually deported. As a long-term approach in resolving the territorial question, four (4) in the business/private group prefer the diplomatic approach in resolving the issue.

Eight (8) favored the strengthening of the local government in Pag-asa and encouraging the population to grow in the Kalayaan Group of Islands.

Four (4) prefer having a United Nations monitoring agency established to keep the peace and stability not only in the Spratlys KIG but the whole of the South China Sea.

c. Military Group Four (4) in the military group favored RP Governments taking a firm action against violators (illegal entrants/poachers) apprehended in the Spratlys KIG. Three (3) prefer naval and aerial patrols to deter intruders in the area. Five (5) prefer taking the diplomatic approach as a step in resolving the issue on a long-term basis. Five (5) favor the strengthening of the local government and encouraging the people to settle in the Kalayaan. Three (3) prefer a cosharing arrangement as another step in trying to resolve the territorial question in the area.

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2.Result of the survey with students from the Command and General Staff College 1 4 5 2 3 3 0 4 2 3 5 3 5 6 3 7 7 1 5 8 1 5 9 1 6 1 0 1 1 1 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 1 1 5 5 1 6 7 1 7 3 4 18 4

Table 6 Result of the survey with 47 students of the Command and General Staff College 1. YES 2. NO 3. ABSTAIN 4. NAVAL AND AERIAL PATROLS 5. COURT LITIGATION, IMPRISONMENT AND FINES TO VIOLATORS CAUGHT OR APPREHENDED 6. DIPLOMATIC APPROACH 7. MILITARY APPROACH 8. ECONOMIC APPROACH 9. RP-CHINA DIALOGUE 10. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11. YES 12. NO 13. ABSTAIN 14. CO-SHARING AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 15. NEUTRAL GROUND (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH) 16. DEFEND SPRATLYS KIG EVEN WITH THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 17. U.N. MONITORING AGENCY 18. PASSIVE TREATMENT TO THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION

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1 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Figure 5 Bar graph showing the result of survey of the 47 students of the Command and General Staff College 1. YES 2. NO 3. ABSTAIN 4. NAVAL AND AERIAL PATROLS 5. COURT LITIGATION, IMPRISONMENT AND FINES TO VIOLATORS CAUGHT OR APPREHENDED 6. DIPLOMATIC APPROACH 7. MILITARY APPROACH 8. ECONOMIC APPROACH 9. RP-CHINA DIALOGUE 10. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11. YES 12. NO 13. ABSTAIN 14. CO-SHARING AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 15. NEUTRAL GROUND (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH) 16. DEFEND SPRATLYS KIG EVEN WITH THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 63

17. U.N. MONITORING AGENCY 18. PASSIVE TREATMENT TO THE TERITORRIAL QUESTION

Analysis of the result of the survey with 47 students of the Command and General Staff College which was made on 01 to 15 March 2010

Forty five (45) favors the Philippine Governments taking a firm action against illegal entrants/poachers in the Spratlys KIG. Violators were apprehended, d etained, underwent court
litigation, fined, and deported to their home countries. The conduct of naval and aerial patrols got the approval of twenty-three (23) students. However, thirty-five (35) students prefer taking punitive measures against illegal entrants/poachers caught in the area.

Thirty-seven (37) students prefer the diplomatic approach as a better way to resolve the territorial question in the long-term. Forty-two (42) students approve of the policy to strengthen the local government in the municipality of Pag-asa in the Kalayaan.

The establishment of a United Nations monitoring agency to keep the peace and stability in the area is the most preferred other step in trying to resolve the territorial question in the Spratlys KIG. A co-sharing agreement approach to develop the area got twenty-one (21) votes as another step to help resolve the issue.

3.Result of the survey with the Officers and Staff of the Western Command (WESCOM), AFP at Puerto Princesa City

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35 31 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 5 1 7 8 2 0 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 18 12 1111 10 6 5 29

18

17

Figure 6 Bar graph showing the survey with the officers and staff of the Western Command, (WESCOM), AFP, Puerto Princesa City. Bar Graph shows the choices of WESCOM personnel as to the approaches or steps of action to be taken by the RP Government in dealing with the territorial question in the Spratlys Kalayaan Group of Islands in the South China Sea 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. YES STRONG ACTION OF THE RP GOVERNMENT NO AGAINST PROC CHINESE ILLEGAL ABSTAIN INTRUSIONS IN KALAYAAN S. CHINA SEA NAVAL AND AERIAL PATROLS COURT LITIGATION, IMPRISONMENT AND FINES TO VIOLATORS CAUGHT OR APPREHENDED 6. DIPLOMATIC APPROACH 7. MILITARY APPROACH 8. ECONOMIC APPROACH 9. RP-CHINA DIALOGUE 10. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11. YES RPs EFFECTICE OCCUPATION 12. NO AND ADMINISTRATION IN KALAYAAN 13. ABSTAIN S. CHINA SEA (PAG-ASA MUNICIPALITY) 14. CO-SHARING AGREEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 15. NEUTRAL GROUND (SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH) 16. DEFEND SPRATLYS KIG EVEN WITH THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 17. U.N. MONITORING AGENCY 18. PASSIVE TREATMENT TO THE TERRITORIAL QUESTION

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Analysis of the result of survey with the Officers and Staff of the Western Command (WESCOM), AFP, Puerto Princesa City

The survey which represents the men on the ground who are assigned with WESCOM in Puerto Princesa City having the responsibility of preserving the national interest and security in the Philippines western frontier including Kalayaan has 31 or 88.57% in favor of the Philippines taking a firm action against illegal intrusions/poaching especially of PROC Chinese nationals and vessels in the Kalayaan. The use of naval and aerial patrols and the enforcement of laws against violators in Kalayaan got a tie at 19 or 54.28% of the group. 18 Officers or 51.43% are in favor of the diplomatic approach while the military approach got 12 or 34.28%, just one vote lead of the economic and International Court of Justice (ICJ) approach or 11 votes. 31 Officers or 88.57% favor the Philippines taking effective administration and occupation of Kalayaan welcoming settlers to the island group. As other steps for the development of the area, 18 Officers or 51.43% are in favor of a co-sharing agreement between the claimant countries and investors while 17 Officers or 48.57% favor the creation of a United Nations Monitoring Agency to ensure peace and stability in the Kalayaan and the entire South China Sea.

Syntheses

A. Statistical Data The statistical data show that in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 2002, wherein this period registered the highest total number of illegal entrants/poachers in the Kalayaan, PROC Chinese nationals were the top intruders/poachers in the area compared with other nationals from Hongkong, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and some with unconfirmed nationality. A total of 472 PROC Chinese

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nationals intruded and conducted illegal activities in the Kalayaan or 59.82% of the over-all total of 789 intruders/violators.

B. Surveys
Students of the National Defense College of the Philippines who are in civil government, business/private, and military service favor the Philippines taking a firm action against illegal

entrants/poachers in the Kalayaan. They also agreed that diplomatic approach is the preferred step by which to resolve the territorial question in the area. The establishment of a United Nations monitoring agency to monitor peace and stability in the Spratlys KIG and the entire South China Sea is preferred by the majority. The military group, however, did mention of naval and aerial patrols in the Kalayaan to deter would be illegal entrants/poachers from illegally entering Philippine territory. The military group also mentioned a co-sharing arrangement with other claimant countries and investor to develop the resource-rich area for mutual benefit. The three groups are one in favor of strengthening the local government in Pag-asa municipality and encouraging people to settle in the area.

The result of the survey with the 47 students of the Command and General Staff College yielded almost similar opinions and ideas as to how the Spratlys KIG territorial question could be dealt with such as abating illegal intrusions/poaching of PROC Chinese nationals in the Kalayaan. The groups opinions and ideas are as follows:

1.

The Philippines should take a firm action against illegal entrants/poachers in the Spraltys KIG by way of apprehension, court litigation, detention, fines, and deportation.

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2.

The CGSC students prefer the diplomatic approach as a better step to deal with the issue in the long-term.

3.

Strengthening the local government in Pag-asa municipality and encouraging people to settle in the area was preferred by the group.

4.

The CGSC students favored the establishment of a United Nations monitoring agency to monitor the peace and stability in the Kalayaan.

5.

Naval and aerial patrols are also encouraged as well as a co-sharing arrangement in developing the area is a preferred other step to deal with the Spratlys KIG territorial question.

Men on the ground from WESCOM of which 98% are from the military, like the other two groups from the NDCP and CGSC, prefer the use of diplomatic approach in the resolution of the territorial question in the Kalayaan. It is, however, inherent as soldiers to favor the strengthening of the Navy and Air Force or pushing through with the AFP Modernization to be able to act more decisively with speed in preserving peace and stability in the area. Most of the military Officers are in favor of effective administration and welcoming settlements in the Kalayaan Group of Islands. A co-sharing agreement for development and the creation of a United Nations monitoring agency is favored to preserve peace, development, and stability in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea.

Interpretation

By looking at the total number of illegal entrants/poachers on a per year basis, it could show what year wherein the number of illegal intrusions were high such in 1998, 1999, 2001, and 68

2002. With a total of 789 persons caught and apprehended from 1995 to 2009, or a span of 15 years, there were three (3) illegal incursions per month (on the average) within the period. In 1998, an average of 13.25 persons per month; in 1999, 13.92 persons per month; in 2001, 4.5 persons per month; and in 2002, 13.33 persons per month intruded/poached into the Kalayaan. PROC Chinese nationals composed almost 60% of the intruders in terms of nationality or for every 10 intruders/poachers, six (6) were PROC nationals. This was obtained through the percentile process of computation.

In terms of vessels, PROC owned vessels composed almost 60% of the vessels apprehended in the Kalayaan for the period. For every 10 vessels apprehended, six (6) were PROC registered or owned. The data was also obtained through the percentile process of computation.

Out of the total 29 students from the NDCP, 24 or 82.75% agreed with the Philippines taking a firm action in dealing with illegal entrants/poachers in the Kalayaan. 15 students or 51.72% chose the diplomatic approach as the long-term step to resolve the territorial question in the area. The policy of strengthening the local government in Pag-asa municipality including encouraging people to settle in the Kalayaan got 22 votes or 75.86% of the total number of NDCP students. 13 students or 44.82% favored a UN monitoring agency established to secure peace and stability in the Spratlys KIG if not the entire South China Sea. The percentile process was used based on the total number of students indicating their choices in the survey questionnaire. A minority of four (4) students who are from the military in this NDCP batch indicated the use of naval and aerial patrols in the disputed area to dissuade intruders and poachers.

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The all military 47 students of the CGSC expressed almost similar opinions and ideas with regards to the topic of the study and in the over-all effort of finding the better steps to resolve if not maintain peace and stability in the Kalayaan, Majority of the students expressed approval and support to the following: 1. The Philippines taking a firm action against intruders/poachers in the Spratlys KIG, 45 students or 95.74%. 2. Taking the diplomatic approach as the long-term step to resolve the territorial question, 37 students or 78.72%. 3. Strengthening the local government of Pag-asa municipality including encouraging people to settle in the Kalayaan, 42 students or 89.36% 4. The establishment of a United Nations monitoring agency to monitor the peace and stability in the area got the vote of 34 students or 72.34% choosing the option.

The comparative total of students choosing or expressing their opinions/ideas was taken and the percentile process was used in interpreting the results of the survey among the 47 CGSC students.

Through the use of the percentile process and comparative figure examination, the choices of WESCOM personnel were manifested, that is, the majority opted for a peaceful or diplomatic solution of the Spratlys KIG territorial dispute in the South China Sea. It should be discerned that the AFPs Modernization is a strong sentiment of the WESCOM group with the over-all wish or choice of the Philippines taking a strong, decisive, and careful approach towards the resolution of the Spratlys KIG Issue bearing in mind the application of the provisions of international law supported by local laws in advancing the Philippines claim and 70

interests in the Kalayaan. In the over-all, about 50% of the WESCOM Officers chose the application of international law supported by local laws and diplomacy towards a peaceful and progressive resolution of the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group Issue

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CHAPTER 5 Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation


Summary

The territorial question in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) is made more active through the frequent illegal intrusions of PROC nationals and vessels in the area especially the period 1995 to 2009. The highest total number of illegal intrusions/poaching in the area was in 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002. But why PROC Chinese nationals, despite other nationalities who were also found encroaching illegally into Philippine territory in the Kalayaan. China, the awakened giant, with its growing strong economy and armed forces is the most feared among the other claimants; Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. With its strong armed forces, nobody could prevent China if it decides so to occupy the Spratlys KIG anytime and it would take time for diplomatic negotiations to let the Chinese leave Kalayaan, worst, they would just ignore the Philippines clamor for them to leave the islands. Tension and near skirmish encounters between Philippine and Chinese forces reached its height in 1995 up to 1999. It started with the discovery in 1995 of Chinese structures built in Mischief Reef, a small, rocky outcrop lying 135 miles West of Palawan and well within the Philippine-claimed 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In January 1995, the Captain of a Philippine flag vessel complained that he and his crew were detained by Chinese forces at Mischief Reef, an action not welcomed by the Philippine Government. A strong protest was lodged by the Philippines against such Chinese action which was inconsistent with international law and the spirit and content of the 1992 Manila ASEAN Declaration in the South China Sea. Similarly, in April 1997, two vessels owned by the Chinese State Oceanic Administration were intercepted by the Philippine Navy near Scarborough Shoal,

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a small reef lying 130 miles west of Luzon (Scarborough Shoal is not part of the Spratlys Group, but its ownership is disputed by both the PROC and the Philippines). The ships had been carrying Chinese and foreign amateur radio enthusiasts who had planned to make a broadcast from the reef. The Captains of the Chinese vessels informed their Filipino counterparts that the PROC considered Scarborough Shoal its territory, a claim rejected by the Ramos administration. Not wishing to escalate tensions, the Chinese vessels withdrew. Following the incident, in midMay 1997, a group of Philippine Congressmen sailed through Scarborough Shoal and planted the Philippine flag on the reef. Two days later, the Chinese Government protested the action and demanded the removal of the Philippine flag from the reef. The issue on Mischief Reef came to prominence again with the discovery of Chinese vessels unloading construction materials at the reef and workers constructing a bigger structure to the earlier discovered edifices at the reef. The Philippines protested such Chinese action as a violation of the 1995 Code of Conduct. This incident gave the new Philippine President, Joseph E. Estrada the opportunity to meet with U.S. Vice President Al Gore, who was attending the APEC Meeting. President Estrada informed Gore that he was pushing for the Philippine Senates ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States and sought U.S. help in modernizing the armed forces. On 29 November 1998, the Philippine Navy arrested twenty Chinese fishermen near Mischief Reef and charged them with illegal fishing. Incidents like these if not resolved, could have brought SinoPhilippine relations at the brink of a bloody conflict.

On 11 February 1999, following the U.S. statement reiterating its position on the legal merits of competing claims to sovereignty in the area, maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the U.S., Chinese illegal incursions in the Kalayaan suddenly dropped to

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zero the following year in 2000. The U.S. maintaining such a position in abating possible conflict in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea strengthened the regional position of ASEAN in calling for a moratorium of illegal activities in the disputed area by all claimant countries. The last Code of Conduct in the South China was signed between the 10 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ASEAN and the Vice Foreign Minister of China on 04 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia during the 13th ASEAN Summit. From then on, the number of illegal intrusions and poaching incidents in the Spratlys KIG declined to its minimum level until 2009.

Lessons from the resolutions of territorial disputes of other countries such as Bahrain versus Qatar on the Hawar Islands and the Falkland Crisis in the South Atlantic between Great Britain and Argentina in early 2000 and early 1980s respectively, could give the Philippines and its leaders with insights as to how to deal with a territorial dispute either through diplomatic means, that is, through the decision of the International of Court of Justice (ICJ) or through military force as was in the case of the Falkland Crisis. Both steps of dealing with a territorial dispute have their costs in terms of lives, money, and time. Bahrain and Qatar before a resolution of the dispute incurred expenses and it took the two countries almost two years before a decision from the ICJ with finality was handed down on 16 March 2001. On the other hand, the Falkland Crisis took lesser time to end from 02 April 1982 (Argentine invasion and occupation of the Falkland Islands) to 24 June 1982 (the surrender of the Argentine forces at Port Stanley to the British forces). The Falkland conflict took 255 British lives and 777 wounded or maimed including several naval and air force assets lost and the over-all bill of 2 billion pounds to the British taxpayers. Argentina lost 652 lives, others missing during combat, and several naval and air force assets lost including a hefty expenditure to the Argentine government and its people.

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British military action to regain the Falklands from Argentina got the objection of 90 countries in the United Nations including the United States. The Falkland territorial dispute has ended but remained a costly fortress in the South Atlantic. It could not have a diplomatic negotiation ending with the strong opposition of the majority UN members.

It is hoped that the minimum level of illegal incursions and poaching in the Kalayaan will continue securing peace and stability in the area. The question is up to when this status quo will continue. Still another question is, will ASEAN remain as one in condemning these illegal activities in the disputed area or will it become weak to the burgeoning Chinese economy at the backdrop of U.S. and Japanese declining and stagnant economic growth.

Conclusions

Based on the survey, the following conclusions of the study have been derived: 1. The profile of the respondents in terms of the following: 1.1. Age the age bracket of the respondents is between 40 to 50 years old. 1.2. Sex the gender of the respondents is all male 1.3. Occupation the occupation profile of the respondents are; civil government officials, business/private sector, and military.

2. The actions taken by the Philippine Government on the illegal incursions of PROC nationals and their vessels are the following:

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2.1. Apprehensions out of the total of 789 intrusions, 472 or 59.82% were PROC Chinese illegal entrants in the Spratlys KIG from 1995 to 2009 and were apprehended mostly by the Philippine Navy including components of the Philippine National Police Maritime Command. Together with the 472 apprehended Chinese nationals, a total of 167 of their vessels were likewise impounded by the authorities during the period. 2.2. Detentions the 472 PROC illegal entrants who were apprehended were detained by the Philippine authorities. 2.3. Court Litigations the majority of the 472 were charged in Philippine courts for intrusion in violation of Philippine immigration laws, poaching endangered marine species such as the pawikan, smuggling of goods, dynamite fishing, and other violations of Philippine laws. 2.4. Fines part of the court decision is the imposition of fines to the PROC illegal entrants. For example, on Jan. 17, 1998, 22 PROC nationals were apprehended in Bataraza, Palawan for illegal entry and violation of Philippine laws, and were ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00. 2.5. Deportation After serving their court sentences and paying of corresponding fines, PROC Chinese illegal entrants were deported by Philippine authorities to their home country.

3. The steps of the Philippine Government to stop PROC and other nationals illegal incursions in the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea are the following:

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3.1. Naval and Aerial Patrols Forty-five (45) of the 111 respondents or 40.54% favor the Philippines move of conducting naval and aerial patrols in the Spratlys KIG to stop PROC and other nationals illegal incursions in the area. 3.2. Court Litigation and Imprisonment Nineteen (19) of the thirty-five (35) total respondents from WESCOM or 54.28% favor court litigation and imprisonment in dealing with PROC and other nationals intrusions in the Spratlys KIG.

4. Choices of the respondents on actions to be taken by the Philippine Government to solve the territorial dispute in the Spratlys KIG are the following: 4.1. Diplomatic Approach Seventy (70) of the total respondents or 63.06% favor the diplomatic approach to solve the territorial dispute in the Spratlys KIG 4.2. Military Approach Twenty-nine (29) of the total respondents or 26.12% favor the military approach solve the territorial dispute in the Spratlys KIG. Twelve (12) out of 35 respondents from WESCOM or 34.28% favor the use of military force should an escalation of conflict arise in the area. 4.3. Economic approach Thirty-one (31) out of the total respondents or 27.92% favor the economic approach as a means to solve the territorial dispute in the Spratlys KIG, especially with China. This means that an economically robust Philippines will serve as a deterrent for China in order to avoid an escalation of tension in the Spratlys KIG. 4.4. Philippine-China Dialogue Thirty-three (33) out of the total respondents or 29.72% favor the conduct of a Philippine-China Dialogue as a way to solve the territorial dispute in the Spratlys KIG. Through dialogue, differences arising in the overlapping

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claims of sovereignty in the disputed Spratlys KIG could best be ironed out or resolved amicably. 4.5. International Court of Justice (ICJ) Twenty-seven (27) out of the total respondents or 24.32% favor the resolution of the Spratlys KIG Issue in the ICJ.

5. The following are measures suggested by the respondents to strengthen RPs claim in the Spratlys KIG and ensure peace and stability not only in the Spratlys KIG but the entire South China Sea. 5.1. National Defense College of the Philippines Students a. The Philippine Government has no solution to the Spratlys KIG issue but to demilitarize the South China Sea with the help of ASEAN and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) plus the United Nations in multilateral ventures with China economically. b. Use the diplomatic approach to arrive at a joint development of the area (but no construction) with all claimants and everyone getting a just share in the economic benefits from the resources in the area. c. The Philippine Government must adopt multi-steps to assert control over the KIG. Continuous naval and aerial patrols act as deterrent to potential intruders. At the same time, strong political will is needed to engage PROC over sovereign rights of the Philippines on its own EEZ. Constantly engage with ASEAN and APEC forum focusing in the Spratlys KIG. d. In order for us to assert sovereignty in the KIG, we should modernize our Armed Forces. If we cannot do this, we should consider the KIG lost to PROC.

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e. The Government should prepare the AFP into a strong external defense force. 5.2. Command and General Staff College Students a. Although diplomacy is a better way of settling international disputes, the

Philippines should not disregard putting up a credible and capable Armed Forces. This will give us a relatively better bargaining power during negotiations in case of a conflict with other countries. b. Recommend that squatters in Metro Manila should be relocated in Pag-asa municipality to create a true community of Filipinos with livelihood intended for them. This will strengthen the local government in the area. c. .. let us develop the islands even if only for our troops. I have been there many times and while other countries developed their claimed islands as tourist spots and for inability of troops we have neglected ours, 5.3. Western Command Officers and Staff a. The Government should start developing the area to make the Philippines claim stronger. Now that we have established a municipality in Pag-asa, we should be very fast in developing the Kalayaan area. b. Use unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for intelligence reconnaissance and economic surveillance, surface radar to be installed at strategic areas such as in Pag-asa Island. Aerial radar (approach and control) to be installed at Mt. Salakot, upgrade of runway (Rancudo Airfield), Taramifao Airstrip/Bugsuk Runway, procurement of multirole fighter F-5E/F from the Korean Air Force or from the Royal Thai Airforce. c. Enforce R.A. 9522 or the Baselines Law

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d. If China and other claimants will concur on our Regime of Islands then we could have a strong ground to resolve the KIG problem. However, at present it is still contested and the area is still disputed. No amount of legalities can convict intrusions.

6. The following are the suggestions of the respondents to resolve the territorial dispute: 6.1. National Defense College of the Philippines Students a. Bilateral approach towards mutual understanding as first step. Then, regional approach, before the United Nations. b. . the KIG Issue should be resolved in a diplomatic way for a win-win situation for both countries. This will help boost economic growth too. 6.2. Command and General Staff College Students The Philippines, through its official representative, should bring the territorial dispute before the ICJ and request for a body which will determine ownership of the KIG. Once decided, Im sure it will resolve the issue. Of course, interventions of the ICJ is required to be recognized by all parties.

Further, it could not be denied that the instability caused by PROC Chinese illegal activities in the Kalayaan some ten to fifteen years ago was caused by the void left by the United States with the closing of the two big American military installations in Clark and Subic in 1992. The closure of the US military bases emboldened the awakened giant, China to try its luck in encroaching at disputed islands in the Spratlys KIG, Mischief Reef, and Scarborough Shoal. The U.S. support in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and issuing statements

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to China to refrain from actions which might increase tensions in the area strengthened ASEANs common effort to protest Chinas provocative activities in the Spratlys Kalayaan in the South China Sea. No less than five (5) Codes of Conduct in the South China were signed from 1992 to 2002 in an effort to resolve diplomatically the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea territorial dispute, as follows:

1. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992 2. Joint Statement, RP-PROC Consultations on the South China Sea and other Areas of Cooperation, Manila, 9-10 August 1995 3. Joint Statement on the Fourth Annual Bilateral Consultations between the Republic of the Philippines and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi, 7 November 1995 4. Joint Statement of the Meeting of Heads of State/Government of the Member States of ASEAN and the President of the Peoples Republic of China, Kuala Lumpur, 16 December 1997 5. Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia, 04 November 2002

The diplomatic approach employed by ASEAN with the strong support of the United States recapitulated Chinese provocative expansionist moves in the Spratlys Kalayaan in the South China Sea. The next move would be to cement further this status quo in the area by means of making use of the rich resources in oil, gas, and mineral deposits in the area for the benefit of all the claimant countries. The growing economies of China and ASEAN claimant countries Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam including Taiwan need enormous energy resources to

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power their economic growth amidst growing populations and market demands. This rush, however, to secure scarce and diminishing oil, gas and marine resources could cause a stand-off which could bring the territorial question to a higher level of mediation and arbitration through the International Court of Justice. Similarly, the need for a United Nations monitoring agency established to secure peace and stability in the Spratlys Kalayaan in the South China Sea will come to the fore.

A continuous vigilance, however, especially on the part of the Philippines is necessary to be able to react decisively against illegal intrusions of its interests and sovereignty in the Kalayaan. Effective occupation and administration of the Kalayaan must be continuously looked into; the AFPs modernization should push through side by side with the national leaderships determination to have economic prosperity for the people. Harmony, cooperation, and unity amongst ASEAN peoples and governments should always remain a top priority. Such are the top prices for peace and prevent bloodshed in a territorial conflict in the South China Sea.

Recommendations

As a result of the study in assessing the illegal intrusions of the Peoples Republic of China nationals and vessels in the Spratlys Kalayaan Island Group, the following are recommendations by which to deal with the issue:

1.

The Philippine Government should continue exercising its sovereignty in the Kalayaan by apprehending, charging in court, detaining, fining, and eventually deporting

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nationals who illegally intrude in the area to conduct illegal activities such as poaching endangered marine species, smuggling, drug trafficking and even human trafficking; 2. Diplomacy is the better option in dealing with the issue of territorial dispute over the Spratlys KIG in the South China Sea giving emphasis to ASEAN solidarity with the support of the United States in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; 3. The Philippine Government strengthen the local government in the Pag-asa municipality and encourage settlers in the group of islands in the Kalayaan to show effective administration not only occupation of the islands; 4. To support the diplomatic approach in dealing with the issue, the incoming administration should push for the modernization of the armed forces making possible the need for naval and aerial patrols in the Kalayaan to discourage intruders in the area; 5. For claimant countries, namely; Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam to mutually benefit from the rich resources in the disputed areas in the South China Sea, consultations should be made on how to go about arriving at a co-sharing agreement with the claimants and would be investors. The participation of the United Nations could not be avoided at this juncture to ensure peace and stability not only in the Kalayaan but the entire South China Sea.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Local Literature Books Anand, Anam Prakash. Law of the Sea Caracas and Beyond. New Delhi: Ekta Press, 1978. Agoncillo, Teodoro A. The History of the Filipino People. North Fairview, Q.C.: Garo Tech Books, Inc., 2008. Baviera, Aileen San Pablo. The Kalayaan Islands (Spratlys) in Philippine Foreign Panorama, February, 1999. Policy;

Dubner, Barry Hart. The Law of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and Archipelagic States. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. Esplanada, Jerry. Cafgus to Secure RP-claimed Spratlys Isles; The Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 5, 2002. Garett, Ian Townsend. Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea: Contemporary Southeast Asia, A Journal of International and Strategic Studies; Singapore vol. 20, No. 2, August, 1998. Lim, Benito. Contending Claims Over the Spratlys: The Chinese Position; Panorama; KonradAdenauer Stifling, Manila, February, 1999. Ocampo, Martin A. China Legally a Squatter on Mischief Reef; Lawyers Review; Makati City, March 31, 1995. Osmanczyk, Edmond Jan, Encyclopaedia of the United Nations and International Relations. New York: Taylor and Francis, 1990, 2nd Edition.

Parreas, Julius Caesar. Geopolitical Dimensions of the Spratlys Island Dispute; Foreign Relations Journal, Council for Foreign Relations Inc., Makati City, Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1993.

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Shiching, Hsiao. The Nanshas (Spratlys) Disputes. Quezon City: Color Lithographic Press Inc., 1999. Song, Yaun-huie, The U.S Policy on the Spratlys Islands and the South China Sea; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jakarta, Vol.XXV, No. 3, Third Quarter, 1997. Stein, Jess, Hauck, Leonore C., and Su, P. Y. The Random House College Dictionary (Revised Edition). New York: Random House, Inc., 1983. Storey, Ian James. Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute. Contemporary Southeast Asia, A Journal of International and Strategic Studies, (Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1999. The Law of the Sea. New York: United Nations Publication, 2001. Thomas, Bradford L. The Spratlys Islands Imbroglio: A Tangled Web of Conflict. International Boundaries and Boundary Conflict Resolution ed. Carl Grundy-Warr. Washington D.C.: Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State. Newspaper

GMA Admits US was training Filipino soldiers to defend the Spratlys vs. China; Philippine Daily Inquirer, Sunday, 04 April 2004, pp. A6

Dispatches

Several Strong protests made by the Philippine Government against Chinas construction of structures at Mischief Reef in the south China Sea; DFA Circular 54-LLB-98-S dated 11 November 1998

Foreign Literature Books 85

Al-Arayed, Jawad Salim. A Line in the Sea. Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books, 2003.

Hastings, Max and Jenkins, Simon. The Battle for the Falklands. London: Book Club Associates, 1983.

Newspaper

Storm Over Spratlys: Arroyo prepares for diplomatic offensive against China, Gulf Daily News, 09 November 2003, pp. 23

Dispatch

Last Day of Oral Pleadings for Bahrain at the International Court of Justice and the Second and Final Round of Bahrains Oral Pleadings at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Philippine Embassy, Manama Dispatches to the DFA, 01 July 2000 and 28 June 2000

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Name Date of Birth Place of Birth Parents Spouse Children Permanent Address Present Office

: JOSE DELA ROSA BURGOS. Career Minister : 09 March 1952 : Salunayan (Agri), Midsayap, Maguindanao : Inocencio (Francis) Brillantes Burgos, Sr. Salonica Edralin dela Rosa : DR. BLESILDA MANSILLA-BURGOS, O.D. : Karlo, Krista Marie, Keith Joseph and Kate Joy : Blk 32 Lot 2 Soldiers Hills Village, Muntinlupa City : Office of Intelligence and Security, OSEC, 11 th Floor, DFA Building, 2330 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City

EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT Elementary High School College (Philos) Post Graduate Studies, : Notre Dame of Midsayap : Notre Dame of Midsayap : Oblate Juniorate Seminary, Notre Dame University, Cotabato City, AB Philippine Military Academy, Fort del Pilar, Baguio City (BS) : International Relations & Development (Diploma), Institute of Social The Hague, Netherlands : M.A. in Foreign Service and Public Policy, Lyceum of the Philippines

HONORS/SCHOLARSHIPS/AWARDS Elementary Tilt High School College : Valedictorian, Medalist in Religion, Silver Medalist, and Voice of Democracy : Salutatorian, Medalist in English and History, Consistent Half Scholar : Consistent Scholar, Best Debater

GOVERNMENT EXAMINATIONS PASSED Philippine Military Academy Entrance Examinations Foreign Service Office Examinations

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Career Minister Examinations and Training

POSITIONS IN THE HOME OFFICE Special Assistant, Office of the Deputy Minister Assistant Director, Southeast Asia Division, ASPAC Executive Director, Technical Assistance Council of the Philippines Chief Coordinator, Trade Promotion Unit, ASPAC Principal Assistant, Office for ASEAN Affairs Principal Assistant, Office for the United Nations and Other International Organizations (UNIO) Acting Director, Division III, UNIO Acting Director, Ceremonials Division, Office of Protocol Acting Director, Division IV, Office for European Affairs (OEA) Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary Office of Intelligence and Security (OSEC-OIS) Director, Division IV, OEA Special Assistant/Director for Intelligence, Office of Intelligence and Security, OSEC

FOREIGN ASSIGNMENTS Singapore : Third Secretary & Vice Consul and Acting Admin Officer Second Secretary & Consul and Acting Admin Officer Philippine Embassy, Singapore : Consul, Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, CA, USA : Consul, Philippine Consulate General, San Diego, CA, USA : Second Secretary & Consul and Acting Admin Officer
First Secretary & Consul General, & Acting Admin Officer, Charge dAffaires, a.i.

Los Angeles, USA San Diego, USA Dhaka, Bangladesh

Manama, Bahrain

Career Minister & Consul General and Acting Admin Officer Philippine Embassy, Dhaka, Bangladesh : Minister & Consul General, Philippine Embassy, Manama, Kingdom of Bahrain

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